2011-1 Tam Metin - Atılım Üniversitesi | Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi

Transkript

atılım
sosyal bilimler dergisi
social sciences journal
Cilt / Volume: 1 • Sayı / No: 1 • Mayıs / May 2011
ISSN 2146-6181
İçindekiler
Editörden
ÖZGÜN MAKALE
M
Pre-face to Derrida: Tryst with the Copula................................................. 7-26
Prakash Kona
erhaba,
ATILIM SOSYAL BİLİMLER DERGİSİ, elinizdeki bu sayı ile yayın hayatına başlıyor.
Atılım, Türkiye’de sosyal bilimler alanında yapılan nitelikli çalışmaları teşvik etmeyi,
sosyal bilimlerin farklı alanları arasında kısıtlı olduğunu düşündüğümüz iletişim ve
etkileşim imkânlarını geliştirmeyi ve araştırmacıların kuramsal ve uygulamaya dönük
özgün çalışmalarını sizlere ulaştırmayı hedefliyor. Disiplinlerarası kopukluğun sosyal
bilimlerin en büyük sorunlarından olduğu tespitiyle yola çıkıyoruz. Dergimizde sayfa
bulan özgün yazılarla bu kopukluğu gidermeye katkıda bulunmak, öncelikli hedeflerimiz
arasındadır.
İmgeler ve Ötekileştirme: Cadılar, Yerliler, Avrupalılar.......................... 27-38
Z. Nilüfer Nahya
From the Theory of Consent to the Theatre of Conflict: Theoretical
Perspectives on the Changing Character of the Modern State................ 39-68
Idowu William
Representing Class Dynamics in Baz Luhrmann’s Australia.................. 69-78
Ayşegül Kesirli
“Us” and “Them” Dichotomy Within: Iraqi Identity Building
During the Saddam Era............................................................................... 79-96
Duygu Dersan Orhan
Drug Trafficking and Human Security in Guinea-Bissau...................... 97-116
David Alexander Robinson
Dergimizin sayfaları ülkemiz ve yurtdışından akademisyenlere açıktır. Titizlikle işleyen
hakem değerlendirme süreciyle dergiye gönderilen bütün yazılara etkin geri bildirimler
sağlamak ve bu yolla bilimsel üretimde kaliteyi yükseltmek amacındayız.
Atılım’ın sayfaları, henüz Türkçeye kazandırılmamış kendi alanlarında temel bazı eserleri,
Türk araştırmacı ve öğrencilerle buluşturmaya hizmet edecek çeviri çalışmalarına da
açıktır. Sayısız temel eserin dilimize hala kazandırılmamış olduğu düşünüldüğünde, bu
yönde gerçekleşecek olan katkıların önemi daha iyi anlaşılacaktır. Öte yandan dergimiz,
her sayısında kitap inceleme yazılarına yer verecektir. Akademik dünyada oldukça önemli
olan kitap incelemeleri Türkiye’de fazlaca gelişmemiştir. Dergimiz, akademik kitapların
tartışılacağı ve eleştirileceği inceleme çalışmalarına özellikle önem vererek bu eksikliği
giderme yönünde katkıda bulunmayı amaçlamaktadır.
Hakemli bir dergi olan Atılım Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi yılda iki kez yayınlanacaktır. Zaman
zaman özel sayılarla ve belirli dosya konularıyla da karşınızda olmayı hedeflemekteyiz.
Derginin bu ilk sayısında yedi adet özgün makale, iki çeviri metin ve üç kitap incelemesi
yer almaktadır. İyi okumalar dileriz.
En Exploratory Investigation of Rural Clusters in Turkey.................. 117-134
Elif Kalaycı
ÇEVİRİ MAKALE
Ernesto Laclau, Popülizm: Bir Ad Ne İçerir? ...................................... 135-146
Çeviren, Hayriye Özen
Peter Dahlgren, İnternet ve Yurttaşlık Kültürünün
Demokratikleştirilmesi............................................................................. 147-154
Çeviren, Oya Sırma Tekvar
KİTAP İNCELEMESİ
Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces
in the Making of History............................................................................. 157-162
İnceleyen, Mehmet Gürsan Şenalp
Zbigniew Brzezinsky, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy
and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking
of the World Order...................................................................................... 163-170
İnceleyen, M. Kemal Utku
ÖZGÜN
MAKALE
Pre-face to Derrida: Tryst with the Copula
Prakash Kona
İmgeler ve Ötekileştirme: Cadılar, Yerliler, Avrupalılar
Z. Nilüfer Nahya
From the Theory of Consent to the Theatre of Conflict:
Theoretical Perspectives on the Changing Character of the
Modern State
Idowu William
Representing Class Dynamics in Baz Luhrmann’s Australia
Ayşegül Kesirli
“Us” and “Them” Dichotomy Within: Iraqi Identity Building
During the Saddam Era
Duygu Dersan Orhan
Drug Trafficking and Human Security in Guinea-Bissau
En Exploratory Investigation of Rural Clusters in Turkey
Elif Kalaycı
P
Atılım Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi 1(1), 7-26
7-25
re-face to Derrida:
Tryst with the Copula
Prakash Kona
Department of English Literature, The English and Foreign
Languages University (EFLU).
Abstract
In this essay I wish to “introduce” Derrida by giving a preface to his philosophy. But
Derrida’s entire contention rests on the premise that philosophy can only be prefaced
since it lacks an original face or meaning. Since his own work is a preface to philosophy,
the preface that I intend to give is twice-removed from the original preface that Derrida
offers readers. Briefly this is Derrida’s tryst with the copula: the copula or the connector,
something that is not taken seriously but is in fact the basis of construction of meaning.
What is the copula? Historically, it is a philosophical expression of various marginal groups
that were not taken into consideration. In the context of Spivak’s preface to Derrida’s Of
Grammatology, my preface is one level further removed from reality. What is philosophy
“ultimately” except a tryst with the preface (that connects the reader with the author) or
the copula! Can we take hard-line positions both at the methodological level and in how
we interpret data – this is the Derridean paradox, that we can’t take such positions without
being aware that they’re positions. The copula in its shifting state as floating signifier plays
the role of a Zen master constantly teasing meaning trapped in cages of words that we
attribute to situations. The discourses of humanities and social sciences are replete with
examples of over-meanings by which I mean that research scholars tend to take positions
that are absolute and use those positions to interpret reality. Things mean more than what
they actually could be because we impose our positions on them without claiming that
they’re positions. To be aware of the class, race, gender and other biases inherent in our
positions liberates the text from the clutches of totality and opens to meaning the doors of
infinity.
Key Words
Deconstruction, philosophy, difference, copula, otherness.
2011, CİLT 1 SAYI 1
8
Pre-face to a Preface
(or) What Comes
Before the Face
This part of the article plays on the metaphor of the “face” as both appearance and
something we need as a basis to find a deeper truth; therefore, the “face” is real to the
extent that it is there while simultaneously acting as a means to discover something more
than what meets the eye. In any research study are we looking for what is obvious or if we
are looking for something deeper, do those depths exist outside our preconceptions of the
truth! In unequal situations the truths are bound to be unequal because what is true for
those in positions of power is not true for the marginalized and the excluded.
They have asked me for a preface.
Short, they said, only a few words,
but ones that will open vistas.
Impreface – (Octavio Paz 1991, 530)
India a nation! What an apotheosis! Last comer to the drab nineteenth-century
sisterhood! Waddling in at this hour of the world to take her seat! She, whose only
peer was the Holy Roman Empire, she shall rank with Guatemala and Belgium
perhaps! Fielding mocked again. And Aziz in an awful rage danced his way and
that, not knowing what to do, and cried: “Down with the English anyhow. That’s
certain. Clear out, you fellows, double quick, I say... we shall drive every blasted
Englishman into the sea, and then”--he rode against him furiously--“and then,” he
concluded, half kissing him, “you and I shall be friends.”
“Why can’t we be friends now?” said the other, holding him affectionately. It’s
what I want. It’s what you want.”
But the horses didn’t want it--they swerved apart; the earth didn’t want it, sending
up rocks through which riders must pass single file; the temples, the tank, the jail,
the palace, the birds, the carrion, the Guest House, that came into view as they
issued from the gap and saw Mau beneath: they didn’t want it, they said in their
hundred voices, “No, not yet,” and the sky said, “No, not there.”
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
9
Paris is civilized conduct in Peking... and that European nations had no moral obligations
in dealing with Asian peoples... was part of the accepted creed of Europe’s relations with
Asia” (Panikkar 1959, 35). European morality does not apply in dealing with third world
peoples. It does not apply in how the United States in its foreign policy deals with the
Middle East and it does not apply in how western politicians, scholars and journalists
imagine the “communities” of non-western others. The problem is at two levels: in how
western methodologies form the basis of our understanding of the text and how colonial
discourses continue to shape our perceptions of the world. Therefore, it is important for the
purpose of the novel that Aziz cannot accept Fielding’s friendship, since it’s a friendship
rooted in a situation of inequality. The passage is an event that belongs to the future in an
entirely different political situation.
In the above context, what makes the “friendship” (assuming that such a symbiotic
relationship exists between an author and a translator) between a first world male writer
(the author) and a third world woman writer (as the translator) a possibility in 1976, the
year of publication of the English version of Derrida’s Of Grammatology? Is the space of
the preface, a space in which a third world writer engenders a fiction of a fiction (if writing
is fiction, an imitation, while fiction itself is not an imitation but a construction of reality, a
philosophy of writing as a philosophy of the fictionality of philosophy—the ungrounding
of the essence)? To what extent is the preface “real?” Is all reality a preface to an essence
that does not exist and philosophy a celebration of the preface or the Impreface as the title
of Octavio Paz’s poem goes? In Forster’s terms, a preface would be a “passage” that could
not have been imagined as a genuine bond of friendship in the year 1924. In 1976, a French
philosopher, a Sephardic Jew born in Algiers, is prefaced by an Indian woman (Gayatri
Spivak)—the preface as a timely, postcolonial gesture! As Spivak pre-faces herself at the
end of her Translator’s Preface to Of Grammatology:
The first part of this book, ‘Writing before the Letter,’ sketches in broad outlines
Now I insert my text within his and move you on, situating here a theoretical matrix.
It indicates certain significant historical moments, and proposes My name: certain
critical concepts. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. These critical concepts are put to
the test the places of this work: Iowa city, (New Delhi-Dacca-Calcutta), Boston,
Nice, Providence, Iowa City, in the second part, ‘Nature, Culture, Writing.’ Its
time: July, 1970-October, 1975. This part may be called illustrative. (Derrida 1976,
lxxxvii)
WEYBRIDGE, 1924
E. M. Forster, A Passage to India (Forster 1984, 317)
In 1924, Forster felt that the friendship between Fielding an Englishman, and Aziz a
citizen of the empire was not feasible. The passage to India exists in not being there, since
it’s a one-way passage that Vasco Da Gama discovered to the East, a passage leading
to eventual exploitation of the colonies. The place Weybridge and the year, 1924, are
offered as personal testimony to the author’s presence in opening the book to history. As
the historian Panikkar points out in Asia and Western Dominance, the basis of European
ethics was an exclusion of the colonial other based on “the principle that the doctrines of
international law did not apply outside Europe, that what would be barbarism in London or
 atılım
Jacques Derrida—who is J.D.??? James Dean--Rebel without a cause! (J)ames Bal(D)
win- black American author of Go Tell It On The mountain—inscribing the voice of the
teller on the rocks! (J)ohnson (D)r. Age of D.J.—Doctor Johnson! (J)a(d)e—stone. In the
arrangement of the letters of the name, new names are possible which de-identify (where
one loses track of the preceding order of letters) the older ones. Thus, a trace1 is left.
1
The trace is the leftover, the taken-for-granted or the crumbs seen around the text. Essentially,
they mean “nothing.” But other-wise, they’re the basis of the construction of meaning.
 P. Kona
10
Spivak / India / woman / third world / colored / translator / East / preface is a trace to
Derrida / Jew / white male / author / West / philosopher / Face etc. There is a geographical
space that separates Iowa City from the city of New Delhi and within / out of this space is
a historical passage that Forster dramatizes in his novel. Fielding can be attracted to Aziz
though Aziz could reciprocate Fielding’s intensity with suspicion. Historians are all too
eager to congratulate themselves for arriving at factual descriptions of life-worlds. The
literary artist in the Nietzschean spirit of looking at margins rather than the mainstream
works with a problematized reality. This is why Forster gives the novel an ending whose
beginnings are in the future – a genuinely postcolonial society. History is a passage into
the future. The passage that is history is a derangement of names/spaces, where authors
and translators exchange roles and genders to confound their own positions as readers.
The point of the derangement is that all positions are rooted in a definite time-frame; to be
aware of the time-frame makes one aware of the possibility of social and political change.
The making of history cannot be the goal of the historian; the goal of the historian is to
bring to light the passages through which one moves caught between ideas and identities.
Translation, in the above terms of derangement, is power without the “authority” of the
author, the hermeneutical power that views prejudice in terms of point of view as one of the
significant bases of writing. To write is to bring the personal at table of the political; what is
written is a source of discovering a point of view or a prejudice that the author is carefully
attempting to conceal. All writing becomes an acknowledgement of one’s prejudices. If
the Derridean position is that the friendship between an author and a translator (as the
other) is one of alterity and differance, then translation acquires the dubious “identity” of
“philosophy” and the “preface” becomes a self-ef-facing metaphor of writing. A preface
to a translation is itself a gesture of reading, enabling the reader to translate authority
in her own terms. In metaphorical terms, the year 1976 can be read as a paradigm-shift
and a history of Western philosophy cannot henceforth be written as “history” except
through an attempt to isolate essence (a metaphysical assumption); all philosophers are
translators pointing to the essence (that is in not-being there), while essentializing what
is a viewpoint. The passage, the hymen or the copula is a central metaphor where the
“West” as identity makes space for the political differance of nations; an identity that in
the event of deconstructing itself brings out an other concealed at the being of the self. The
act of instituting deconstruction as a philosophy of writing is an event whereby the text is
deinstitutionalized from its traditional character of being the original “face” of meaning to
a series of prefaces.
To the question whether there is a final reality, the deconstructionist would have an evasive
(rather than a positivistic) “no!” But, to the question whether there is a social and political
reality, the deconstructionist would reply in the affirmative. What if Nietzsche was the
name of the son of a farmer belonging to the so-called lower castes in colonial India?
Would the name “Nietzsche” still have the historical significance that we associate with
They’re metaphysical in their inessentiality; they’re also what makes metaphysics a field of
knowledge founded on the otherness of the other.
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
11
the philosopher? Historicity (Nietzsche) and possibility (What if... Nietzsche) are never
oppositional terms where one is the truth and the other is an idea toyed upon by poets and
fiction-writers. Historicity is a possibility generated within a social and political arena.
Does that mean that all proper names are possibilities with never a “real” or an “essential”
one? In his dedication of the lecture Scepters of Marx to Chris Hani the assassinated black
South African Marxist leader, Derrida defies the idea of deconstruction as the unending
plurality of names.
One name for another, a part for the whole: the historic violence of Apartheid can
always be treated as a metonymy. In its past as well as in its present. By diverse
paths (condensation, displacement, expression, or representation), one can always
decipher through its singularity so many other kinds of violence going on in the
world. At once part, cause, effect, example, what is happening there translates what
takes place here, always here, wherever one is and wherever one looks, closest
to home. Infinite responsibility, therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good
conscience.
But one should never speak of the assassination of a man as a figure, not even an
exemplary figure in the logic of an emblem, a rhetoric of the flag or of martyrdom.
A man’s life, as unique as his death, will always be more than a paradigm and
something other than a symbol. And this is precisely what a proper name should
always name.
And yet. And yet, keeping this in mind and having recourse to a common noun, I
recall that it is a communist as such, a communist as communist, whom a Polish
emigrant and his accomplices, all the assassins of Chris Hani, put to death a few
days ago, April 10th. The assassins themselves proclaimed that they were out to get
a communist. They were trying to interrupt negotiations and sabotage an ongoing
democratization. This popular hero of the resistance against Apartheid became
dangerous and suddenly intolerable, it seems, at the moment in which, having
decided to devote himself once again to a minority Communist Party riddled with
contradictions, he gave up important responsibilities in the ANC and perhaps any
official political or even governmental role he might one day have held in a country
free of Apartheid.
Allow me to salute the memory of Chris Hani and to dedicate this lecture to him.
(Derrida 1994, xv-xvi).
Chris Hani cannot be confused with the names of Alexander, Caesar, Genghis Khan or
Ed Fabus. It has an entirely different kind of historicity associated with it rooted in a
history that is both “necessary” and one that transcends the field of signs. When a person
gives himself up for a certain cause, which in this case is to resist Apartheid, his name is
automatically bound with the kind of person that he was and probably is in the popular
imagination. As Derrida notes in the dedication: “a man’s life, as unique as his death, will
always be more than a paradigm and something other than a symbol.” The Derridean point
 P. Kona
History as the Fall of
the Sign
12
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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is that there is an existential reality in the way one lives one’s life, the kinds of choices one
is willing to make and the goals and visions that one voluntarily embraces.
pretending to arrive at a synthesis in a dialectical manner, then the origin of phenomena in
speech is a fiction of the origin of the word “origin,” the foundation of patriarchy4.
This part of the article deals with the idea of history as a sign within a field of signs. Just as
there are no essential truths, the histories constructed on those truths are equally fictitious.
The apotheosis of the face is best observed in Edmund Husserl’s 1910 lecture presented
before the Vienna Cultural Society entitled “Philosophy and the Crisis of European
Humanity.” The central theme of Husserl’s essay is the importance of the European “body”
that is in a state of crisis. This body is not just a physical body like any other but something
that has evolved and is unique to European culture and history; this unique European body,
which is more than a body is a cultural icon that needs to be preserved against possible
annihilation. One way of overcoming the crisis is by acknowledging the uniqueness of the
body both on a scientific as well as a humanistic level.
Husserl in his Ideas I offers a “paradox... that the element which makes up the life of
phenomenology as of all eidetical science is ‘fiction’ that fiction is the source whence the
knowledge of ‘eternal truths’ draws its sustenance” (Husserl 1972, 184). In saying that
fiction is a source of eternal truths, the ideas to which objects look forth2, Husserl opens
himself to a Derridean reading. The “paradox” instead of seeking resolution undermines
the basis of its linearity, which is to tell the truth in a direct fashion. We have the paradox
of discovering “the knowledge of ‘eternal truths’” in the appearance of “truths” that one
finds in fiction. This would be a position where ideas are the basis of fiction or that ideas
could be nothing else but fiction.
There is something unique here that is recognized in us (Europeans) by all human
groups, too, something that quite apart from all considerations of utility, becomes a
motive for them to Europeanize themselves even in their unbroken will to spiritual
self-preservation; whereas we, if we understand ourselves properly, would never
Indianize ourselves, for example. I mean that we feel (and in spite of all obscurity
this feeling is properly legitimate) that an entelechy is inborn in our European
civilization which holds sway throughout all the changing shapes of Europe and
accords to them the sense of a development toward an ideal shape of life and
being as an eternal pole... The spiritual telos of European humanity, in which the
particular telos of particular nations and of individual men is contained, lies in
the infinite, is an infinite idea toward which, in concealment, the whole spiritual
becoming aims, so to speak. (Husserl 1970, 275)
History is the fall of the sign from being the transcendental--the word--to the literal,
i.e., words, the prefacial character (the makeup, face-lift or the visuality of writing), an
aesthetics of the face, the faciality of the word “eternal” that is the death of metaphysics3,
a sign of the birth of deconstruction. Hence the slogan, Derrida is Spivak. Derrida is not
Derrida. The translator is the author and the author is not the translator. Truth is not the
truth, just as the face is a preface.
The copula is not an ahistorical being outside the history of beings or the signs/science
of writing but a cultural discourse interpreted differently in various times and spaces.
There was never a universal copula, only a differant one; as Derrida asserts in Speech and
Phenomena the “movement of differance is not something that happens to a transcendental
subject; it produces a subject” (Derrida 1973, 82). If the knowledge of ideas is a knowledge
of differance, where the subject far from being the sole producer of language is subjected
to the copula or the sign, the letter ‘a’ of differ(a)nce that makes a difference both in terms
of temporality as well as context “is no longer simply a concept, but the possibility of
conceptuality” (Derrida 1973, 141).
The problematic of the copula, problematic - owing to its existence in a state of dispersal,
puts the signs post-structuralism or post-modernism or post-colonialism – a series of
“posts” mailed without a ‘proper’ destination in view - under the strain of merging into a
single label with overlapping differances while consistently mocking a notion of essence.
The positionality of the copula suffered historical subjection and “If the word ‘history’ did
not carry with it the theme of a final repression of differance, we could say that differences
alone could be ‘historical’ through and through and from the start” (Derrida 1973, 141). If
a history of differance is simultaneously a differance of history that negates itself without
2
A pun on the word ideas since fiction is also a play with ideas while ideas are the Platonic
“original” beings from which objects draw their appearance.
3
The “death of metaphysics” is an alternate reading based on the deconstruction of “everyday”
language pretending to be objective and realistic.
 atılım
The European would never Indianize himself. However, the Indian could Europeanize
himself and that would be “legitimate” because the “spiritual telos of European humanity,
in which the particular telos of particular nations and of individual men is contained, lies
in the infinite.” What about the spiritual telos of the Indian – is it of any consequence at
all! The idea of Europe as the center of civilization is a one-sided one because it justifies
every imaginable western atrocity in the colonies until the twentieth century. Alternative
to what Husserl proposes in the discovery of the so-called spirit of Europe that could
solve the crisis of European humanity and probably the rest of the world, how would one
phrase a question such as “the future or telos of deconstruction” or “After deconstruction,
what?” Such a question would signature (in a dangerous manner) its own death. The same
phrase can be re-posed as “after what, deconstruction?” or “Deconstruction, what after?”
Or “what deconstruction after” or “what the copula” and if not “what,” then what? This
would mean less a parody of Husserl’s seriousness and more a Nietzschean undermining
of the so-called Europeanization of the world, a grand project of self-determinism or
4
Patriarchy is the other word for origin. It is the basis of history and epistemology. A fiction of
the “origin of the word origin” is also a fiction of the “origin of the word patriarchy” or even
a fiction of patriarchy itself. A fiction is both a form of construction and what Barthes refers
to as “mythologies” that constitute modern reality.
 P. Kona
14
autoeroticism that fears/avoids the encounter of the self with the other and perpetuates a
body of words as a substitute to the reality of the encounter5.
If the European body/spirit is a metaphysics of rights and wrongs6 (with ultimately a right
purpose in mind) other than a game of prefaces, then the voice acquires predominance
over writing as it can identify itself as itself7 (beyond which all signs are only de/signs
meant to disrupt the self from the supreme point of its knowledge). Who is a European or
what is a body or humanity or telos, words that Husserl barely defines, in the anticipation
that the voice of the speaker has communicated to the Vienna audience all that could
possibly be implied in the spirit of the lecture existing beyond the domain of signs8. The
copula as an aspect of the voice that the audience can grasp without needing to be shown
the signs is a masturbatory climax9, where the other presumably identifies itself with the
desire of the self in a wholehearted manner indispensable in order for one to be thoroughly
Europeanized.
The statement that the death of metaphysics is the birth of deconstruction is a passage of
the self into an awareness of selfhood since metaphysics is identified in its reality as a
monster that the warriors of deconstruction (if deconstruction is visualized as a strategy
meant to upset traditional structures) have brought to an end; and now we arrive at the
beginning of post-history (thanks to deconstruction) with an entirely novel telos in view.
What makes the defining of metaphysics an act of metaphysics is that we can talk about
one abstraction only by using another set of abstractions. An abstraction by its very nature
is incapable of a concrete manifestation. As Derrida says: “There is no such thing as a
‘metaphysical name.’ The ‘metaphysical’ is a certain determination or direction taken by
a sequence or ‘chain.’ It cannot as such be opposed by a concept but rather by a process
of textual labor and a different sort of articulation” (Derrida 1981, 6). The rigidness of
metaphysics can be confronted through “a process of textual labor and a different sort
of articulation.” A close reading of the text that can identify the spaces between words as
the source of meaning would enable “a different sort of articulation,” where marginal and
What is “Western Metaphysics” but “knowledge” itself, since in Derridean terms “to know”
would be to see in terms of “speech” as the center and “writing” as the external or the
outside.
What Derrida calls “oppositions” where good is opposed to evil, man to woman etc.
This is the narcissistic dimension of knowledge that celebrates its own coming of age
without any concern for the other who makes the knowledge possible. For instance, the fact
that colonialism made possible the Industrial Revolution in Europe, a fact that historical texts
of the period rarely have taken seriously.
5
6
7
8
9
Husserl sees no need to define terms because his “voice” (literally the sincerity in the
tone of his voice as well as the voice as a pre-existing domain of knowledge) has already
communicated a certain kind of mood to the audience.
The metaphor of masturbation refers to a narcissistic point where the self sees the other as
none but itself. The project of Europeanization is akin to the masturbatory climax.
 atılım
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
15
excluded voices are able to express their difference10. In equating philosophy with writing
Derrida turns philosophers into writers employing all the strategies that writing demands
in order to express a point of view. In presupposing that they were something other than
writers using signs, philosophy and philosophers fell into the trap of having to listen to
their own voice in the hope of finding an ulterior self.
The alternation of the identities of translator and author is an event that takes place between
the preface of a translation and a text of deconstruction that declares bankruptcy before
it is raided for money11. The money that is here referred to is both meaning as well as
presence meant to fulfill the reader’s expectations of finding an unalterable expression of
the author’s intention. Bankruptcy is the state-of-economy of a text that must be ruptured
in order to be understood12. The violence of the sign is a way of encountering metaphysics,
the virgin male who must be seduced13 in order to disrupt the stagnation of the body
politic. Discourse is the economy within which language functions and as Derrida puts it
in “Violence and Metaphysics,” “Discourse, therefore, if it is originally violent, can only
do itself violence, can only negate itself in order to affirm itself, make war upon the war
which institutes it without ever being able to reappropriate this negativity, to the extent
that it is discourse” (Derrida 2002, 130)
Whether the violence of metaphysics can be countered using the metaphysics of violence
(just as the Greek word “pharmakon” means both poison as well as remedy depending on
which sense of the term you intend to emphasize) is a question that could be restated as
whether the philosopher can counter the writer because the former looks for an essence in
language and the latter shows that no essential meaning is possible in the use of words. The
philosophy of writing/medicine is the basis to deconstructing the writing of philosophy/
poison. Writers and philosophers are not so much contraries since writing is a metaphor
An extraordinary way of rephrasing the statement into a question would be: can deconstruction
exist in the absence of metaphysics? Is there a positive deconstruction that can be used for
reconstructing an alternate order of things other than a negative destruction that critiques
the present state of affairs? A “serious-minded” deconstructionist would deconstruct the
question itself as a binary opposition and essential as well as metaphysical. In my opinion,
there is a deconstruction that is simultaneously self-destruction and other-construction. In
the rejection of one’s authority as male, heterosexual, etc. one begins to see the possibility of
the other. One sees the otherness of oneself and the limitation of the goal of oneness.
10
The idea of the text as economy is an interesting metaphor since every time one seriously
wishes to find “knowledge” or the “voice” or “money” or “meaning” the text seems vacuous
or bankrupt.
11
Meaning is not something that already exists within the text. The text is “ruptured” before
it is understood. Meaning is forced out of the text. Here, “violence” is a metaphor of “theft”
where the reader steals from the author a meaning that does not belong to either of them.
12
The text (the woman) seduces the reader in order to disclose an alternate economy, a differant
reading or an other reading. The text as Derrida points out in the above quote “can only
negate itself in order to affirm itself.” The discourse of the self is also the discourse of the
other. Plato can be “read” or “misread” to make possible a different kind of meaning.
13
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that philosophy cannot evade in the name of being a discipline (writing is the name of the
other, the “inter” that falls between disciplines (inter[-]disciplinary)—interred: philosophy
as the burial-ground of meaning; writing as the un-disciplining or ungrounding of the
inter / copula / thing / phallus—or the destruction of the tomb); philosophy as a metaphor
of forgetfulness; it is sleep, dream, death or reality. “Exhibiting, denuding, undressing,
unveiling: the familiar acrobatics of the metaphor of the truth. And one just as well could
say the metaphor of metaphor, the truth of truth, the truth of metaphor” (Derrida 1987,
415). If metaphor is the cure that kills, violence is a metaphor that exhibits, denudes,
undresses and unveils the truth of violence.
In saying that reality can be known through differance, Derrida places a “mental” block on
philosophy (literally a block on the Cartesian notion of the Mind as a source of knowledge)
that ignored the copula-tionary aspect of knowledge which makes all constructions of
meaning fragile, ambivalent and disputable in the face of the whimsicality of words.
Language is a copulation of body and soul, word and sense, voice and silence, nature and
culture, appearance and reality etc. The passage or the copula between the one and the
other is neither a given (the relation of the preface to the face, the author to the translator
or the philosopher to the writer) nor a sign unique to language (an essence beneath the
arbitrary). The author differs/defers from the translator. One is the differer (the standard
bearer of meaning who claims his uniqueness), while the other is the deferred (she escapes
being fixed in the present and either recedes into the past or remains in the future.
Another metaphor of the copula is the accent, i.e., the differance underlying speech; it is
both writing as deception that masks the innocence of origin as well as the Nietzschean
laughter (Christ - the essence - never laughs while Zarathustra - the difference - laughs) that
defies the very origin. The sign becomes a metaphor of the sign and the sign “metaphor” is
in turn a sign metaphorizing the other. Derrida (de-read-ah!) is a change of accent (accent
defies gender); the name of the man is an accent on the sign that threatens the security of
possession which is the basis of identity. The generation of signs occurs in the field of the
t/race where copulas or passages are spilt all over the text. In the dispersal of laughter the
text is liberated from metaphysical constraints while language becomes funny and accent
is the source of differential amusement. If the copula is the essence of deconstruction, it
is an essence that cannot sustain its own metaphysicality and in the process paves the way
for the discourse of laughter.
Another name (definition) of differance is the movement/moment of the copula. The only
way of recognizing the moment is not through its fixity but in its state-of-movement. The
essence must learn to coexist with differance just as simultaneity and dispersal exist in the
moment/movement. “On the one hand, this negation, as reaffirmation, can seem to double
bolt the logocentric impasse of European domesticity (and India in this regard is not the
absolute other of Europe). But on the other hand, it is also what, working on the open
edge of this interiority or intimacy, lets [laisse] passage, lets the other be” (Derrida 1995,
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78). There is a name but there is a passage that undermines the essence of the name14; the
name is both the affirmation of the essence and also the letting be of the other being. The
word “play” is both the name of the essence as well as play that cannot be essential in any
possible sense. Colonialism is the name of the passage between England and India, but the
appendage “post” of post-colonialism (the hyphen is the passage) is the play—it is the story
of his-story or fiction that is a stranger to truth; it is woman as style.
The Copula i.e.
Woman i.e. Style
Derrida turns marginalization and exclusion from a source of disprivilege to one of
empowerment. Thus he uses Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil as a basis to creatively
misread Nietzsche’s misogyny and thus arrive at a notion of woman as style in a subversive
manner.
It is impossible to dissociate the questions of art, style and truth from the question of
the woman. (Derrida 1978, 71)
In order to understand Derrida’s tryst with the copula it is important to understand Derrida’s
tryst with woman. Woman as metaphor is central to the philosophy of deconstruction. Is
it possible that without “woman,” deconstruction would be a homoerotic philosophy in
quest of sameness of essence finding resolution in essentiality or the father in fatherhood?
Derridean metaphysics is the metaphysics of the playful woman, the woman that dances
on the borderline of discourse, the woman that is style similar to the style that is woman;
the woman who prefers writing to speech, who prefers metaphor to “fact” and the fringe to
the center15. The politics of undermining the center is connected to reading from the fringe;
power has to be acquired in order to be dismantled and this is possible when women recognize
themselves as a group. What literally follows is: women never had / do not / cannot have a
voice in the current order of things. If voice is the language of desire and resistance to what
comes in the way of desire, the liberationary potential of voice must be acknowledged since
voice is a discourse of resistance and speech is of fundamental importance to any individual
or group that seeks liberation. The politics of liberation is at the heart of the Derridean jest
that Nietzsche’s style is a woman or that Nietzsche’s “woman” is style.
The copula is the being that stands between the legs of the father. Another definition of
metaphysics: the thing “between the legs of a word, between a word and itself to the point
For instance, take the word “history.” It denotes an essence that there is a past that is common
to entire humanity and this past can be referred to as history. There is also a history that is
in fact history; it must be read and understood in order to arrive at an alternate order where
one can co-exist with the other. We have a history that is colonialism but we also have postcolonialism that attempts to look at colonialism from a marginal point of view.
14
To the question of whether the Derridean notion of the playful woman is another male
construction, one response would be that deconstruction like any other discourse functions
within a historical context. It is possible to view the “playful woman” as a male construction
at the risk of losing the “point of viewness” of deconstruction. To the latter, certainly there is a
construction involved in the idea of the playful woman; but it is only when the construction is
understood as a “construction” rather than essential that it becomes the space of deconstruction.
15
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of making entire civilizations see-saw” (Derrida 1987, 78). As Derrida points out in his
essay “The Madness of Economic Reason,” “For in the end, it must always be the Thing,
the same thing that gives itself, even if it does so by dividing itself or by partitioning itself
into partial objects” (Derrida 1992, 53). The question is not whether the thing is the point
from where the mother/sister/wife (woman) cums like a baby toward Nietzsche, the father.
The freedom of style that is woman is the death of Nietzsche, the stylist and disseminator.
In an economic-political sense “Nietzsche,” the name is significant; an entire discourse of
marketing his books and philosophy that is a monetary transaction takes place within the
sign-field “Nietzsche.” Does this imply that it is the male author (Nietzsche) who has to
make space for the woman; that woman must discover her own voice in the pleasure of the
male author; that she must write in signs that signify a terror of the master woman-hater.
Style becomes a basis of subversion (sub-version or an alternate reading), where women
instead of being or Da-Sein deliberately choose elusiveness as a way of writing. If autoeroticism is the error of the essentialists, one must discover the other, not as oneself, but
as the other, i.e., woman.
The Magic of the
Copula
that is the essence of the copula? It is a magical situation and not about believing or
disbelieving in the imagination of the author; however, if credibility is not the issue, what
is it that makes the magical situation so convincing, owing to the fact that we must accept
Gregor Samsa in his new incarnation as the insect? The magic is what the real is because
we attribute a greater credibility to the fact that language is the source of possibilities. As
Derrida expresses it: “But the counterfeiter can lie, he’s lying, I am almost sure of it, from
experience. There is doubtless no real secret at the bottom of this sentence, no determined
proper name” (Derrida 1991, 51). Gregor Samsa, like the author Franz Kafka—two
counterfeiters lying about a transformation of a human being into an insect! The other
characters in the story—Samsa’s parents, Grete—the sister, the charwoman and the chief
clerk—are willing to accept Gregor’s new image as the insect. In fact they have taken it so
seriously in a life and death manner (Gregor Samsa eventually is killed by an apple from
his father’s blow) that it borders on the tragicomic.
There is a “lie” that gives the magical quality to the copula. It is a lie that functions
systematically. As Derrida replied to Kristeva in the interview “Semiology and
Grammatology,” “Now, ‘everyday language’ is not innocent or neutral. It is the language
of Western metaphysics, and it carries with it not only a considerable number of
presuppositions of all types, but also presuppositions inseparable from metaphysics, which
although little attended to, are knotted into a system” (Derrida 1981, 19). Kafka is playing
on this apparent “innocence” of the system (language) guiding Western metaphysics.
In taking language to its logical extremes—the metamorphosis—Western metaphysics
betrays its true face which is a quest for power more than anything else. The metaphysical
must make way to the magical16 and the transcendental to the differential.
The Derridean tryst with the copula does not end with opening the center to the margins.
It is also about the magical dimension of words, the dreaminess of language and the
metamorphosis that metaphysics undergoes in the hands of deconstruction.
The magic of the copula is the magic of words that is both woman and style. The copula is
an emotion. As Sartre puts it in his The Emotions: Outline of a Theory: “It is necessary to
speak of a world of emotion as one speaks of a world of dreams or of worlds of madness,
that is, a world of individual syntheses maintaining connections among themselves
and possessing qualities. But every quality is conferred upon an object by a passage to
infinity” [my emphasis] (Sartre 1948, 80). The copula is a dream and unlike reality it has
no pretensions of being captured in deed. The copula is the passage; it is the passage to
India (or infinity—since the other is always infinite); “Thus, man is always a wizard to
man, and the social world is at first magical” (Sartre 1948, 84). The copula or the dream is
first and foremost social, potentially opening out to the magical. The magician is an artist
of language or a language-user trying to understand things as events in a person’s life. She
is the writer of the preface unlike the speaker voicing an essence. The copula espouses a
philosophy of wonder and “Consciousness, plunged into this magical world, draws the
body along with it, insofar as the body is belief. It believes in it. The behavior which gives
emotion its meaning is no longer ours; it is the expression of the face, the movements of
the body of the other person which come to form a synthetic whole with the disturbance of
our organism” (Sartre 1948, 86).
The first line of Kafka’s short story “The Metamorphosis” clearly illustrates the magical
and incantatory side to deconstruction. “As GREGOR SAMSA awoke one morning from
uneasy dreams he found himself transformed in his bed into a gigantic insect” (Kafka
1949, 67). The copula is inserted at a position where the mood of casualness—uneasy
dreams, (not a very unusual occurrence) changes into the grotesque—a gigantic insect.
To identify a determiner in the sentence is to determine the identity of the copula. Is it
Gregor Samsa or the morning or the dreams or the bed or the insect or the transformation
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From the Vocal
(Mouth) to the Visual
(Hand)
Deconstruction’s project of subverting the metaphysical is about bringing to light what
has traditionally been disprivileged. In this case I’ve used the “mouth” as a metaphor of
the privileged voice of authority as opposed to writing connected to the serving “hand”
or the watchful “eye.”
The notion of the transcendental is related to the dental area—the mouth17. The “originality”
of the mouth in comparison with the secondariness of the hand; “writing” is a writing of
a farewell to the end of the “ending” of Man, a dirge or a requiem, restoring the Babelian
confusion of sounds in the form of a Nietzschean celebration—“writing” / writing, end/
“ending,” “”/— (the hyphen—a sign of the void of the in-betweenness). The question
of the “future” of deconstruction is a question of the future of “Western” philosophy.
Henceforth, a “history” of “philosophy” cannot be written except in quotes. The hand and
The magical far from being the illusory is the associative quality of words which gives the
magical feeling i.e. the movement from one sign to another and so on, an interminable text
whose meaning cannot be compartmentalized.
16
The plausibility of such a claim rests on the metaphorical nature of the voice. The mouth
is the source of the voice. If Derrida refers to the voice as a celebration of origin, then the
mouth is the origin of an origin. The argument is meant to play on the prefacial character of
the voice in terms of the mouth. Every origin in turn has an origin to its credit or debit.
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the eye trespass the zone of the mouth; the apparent enters the forbidden territory of the
real and writing encounters the voice18. If all ideas are signs functioning within a system,
what is possible is a literature of philosophy; a fiction of philosophy; a “passage” from A
Passage to India; a philosopher-fictionist or a philosopher-writer; can a philosopher-writer
be the philosopher-king?
The copula is the passage from the mouth to the hand. It is the preface to the eye in
which one sees one’s face as the other. “The metaphysics of the face therefore encloses
the thought of Being, presupposing the difference between Being and the existent at the
same time as it stifles it” (Derrida 2002, 144). The face is not so much an expression of the
senses as much as the repression of differance; it is transcendental because it encompasses
the mouth—the teeth, tongue and the lips required for speech—it writes with the hand in
precisely what it excludes, i.e., the hand itself.
The hand is an important metaphor to the copula because unlike the mind, the hand is
without a destiny. The spirit is a mental thing—it has everything to do with Beingness
that surpasses beings that Heidegger discovers in transcendence. “For, in transcendence,
the essence of the finitude of Dasein discloses itself as freedom of reasons” (Heidegger
1969, 131). The hand does not transcend reason and is adjunct to the mind that can voice
reasons with the aid of the mouth. The hand expresses itself in traces it leaves behind. As
Derrida points out in Of Spirit, “the difference or duality inscribed by the trait or even by
the impress is not considered by Heidegger as a division. It is the relation of spirit itself to
itself as gathering together. The trait gathers” (Derrida 1989, 106). It is divisiveness that
characterizes the hands rather than a gathering of the spirit. It is the being of the hand in
its state of differance at once mute and simultaneously the condition of all writing (hence
the silence of writing); and not the hand as a pure receptacle of spirit (in effect the spirit is
the condition of the being of the hand). If the hand, far from being the voice of the spirit is
the possibility of the spirit, or the trace that expresses the spirit, then the history of copula
is the writing of the hand (in more vocal terms, good versus bad hand-writing) and not the
voice of the spirit that is the traditional bastion of Western metaphysics.
In-citing Derrida:
Deconstruction as
Metaphysics
Is deconstruction “metaphysics” of another kind with its avowed project of dismantling
systems of authority and privilege! Are all identities ultimately essential since we cannot
imagine something being identified without offering the parameters of identification! Is
deconstruction ready to assume responsibility for its own death since there is no other way
for it to exist as a discourse that challenges mainstream assumptions about reality!
The ideal definition of metaphysics is contradiction, a contradiction that does not admit
that contradictoriness is a way of looking at things. Can the margins be deconstructed
or is marginality the point of situatedness that endows deconstruction with some kind
of an identity? Metaphysics is an aspect of language because it cannot be otherwise. It
18
Writing, that is secondary to the voice, is further secondary to the hand and the eye that are
helping aids to the writer. There is a metaphorical interaction going on between the voice/
mouth and writing/ hand/eye.
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exists in the spaces of words since entities can after all be multiplied without necessity.
Deconstruction is an attempt to move to a point where language is not metaphysics, an
“original” point in space, where things undermine their identities in order to claim their
differences. If identity is not opposed to difference, but rather its outcome, how else
could difference be identified except as an opposition in how it differs from having an
identity? To deconstruct deconstruction (maybe it goes against decorum to quote a man
against himself) is to assume that language becomes what it is not--metaphysics; that
there is a language that can avoid metaphysics or at least perpetually cognizes its own
metaphysicality.
Such a cognition based on rhetoric visualizes a viewpoint of labor that is primarily an
operation in language working itself into the reality of beings. At the heart of deconstruction,
there is a utopian hope of such a reading interspersed with pleasure (la jouissance), not
as a consequence or telos, but as an experience of brilliance each time the reader, in the
way she sees the text, undercuts the nowness, the “living presence” of words. “To grasp
the operation of creative imagination at the greatest possible proximity to it, one must
turn oneself toward the invisible interior of poetic freedom. One must be separated from
oneself in order to be reunited with the blind origin of the work in its darkness” (Derrida
2002, 8). It is with this “poetic freedom” that one writes her work, reverting to the aboriginal as the origin, with darkness (of the other) as background (instead of light).
In the rejection of history as a point of origin, deconstruction breaks through the
complicity between history and knowledge or epistemology as the history of knowledge.
If deconstruction refuses the status of epistemology or being a phase in the history of
language theory, then it seems to throw down the gauntlet to metaphysics trapped in the
cage of essence into devouring the presumption that deconstruction claims for itself:
that it is a statement revealing contradiction as the true face of Western metaphysics; did
metaphysics ever have a “true” face to its credit? There is an essential cage and there is
this strange, exotic creature that has obsessed Western philosophy--this being in the cage
is metaphysics. The otherness of metaphysics is the reality of deconstruction. The precise
point of deconstruction (if there must be one at all) is in the reader knowing that she can
never escape metaphysics (the presence of the father), except literally in signs, and rejoice
in the freedom of her knowledge. She must not mourn the imprisonment of the soul in
the body, but rather celebrate the bodiness of the soul, the thingness of things and the
wordiness of words.
If there is no truth opposed to falsehood all we can have is the truth of the falsehood of
truth or the falsehood of the truth that there could ever be a single truth: has deconstruction
brought language to a standstill where one could only be a “liar” celebrating the “truth” of
the lie? What if the jouissance of the word cannot be sustained except as metaphysics? Does
that imply that deconstruction once again makes way for history as the “truth?” Neither
can deconstruction evade history nor can history encompass deconstruction without itself
being deconstructed in its claim to reveal the past as a way into the future. Deconstruction is
less the epistemology of death and more the death of epistemology (viewing epistemology
as a systematic foundation of essence). If deconstruction is a discourse of death different
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from philosophies of life based on the constructionist metaphysics of the unity of being,
the pleasure is not a masochistic yearning but an intense desire of being in a state of nonbeingness where one is in the present without being so19. The knowledge of being is not
the knowledge of the living present except as a metaphor of death because the present has
either become a sign of the past or a precursor to the future.
In the context of the death of the “present” (i.e., also the undermining of the name of the
author who inscribes his signature in an “eternal” present or the deconstruction of the
opposition of the temporal and the eternal) the reader interprets the text, while the text
interprets another text (an interpretation that functions in the absence of the author as a
source of meaning). The reader (in the act of opening the book) is exposed to the danger
lurking within the text, what can never be known from the outside, but can be preconceived
as reality or the truth. In fact, Western metaphysics is founded on the bifurcation of
reality from the truth--one as what is (the present; illumination) and another as what is
apprehended to be (history; the eternal; meaning). In a state of beyond, the “what is”
and the “to be” fall into a communion of reality and the truth, where one becomes the
other and the other the one, the Aufhebung, which “is a relationship between two terms
where the second at once annuls the first and lifts it up into a higher sphere of existence;
it is a hierarchical concept generally translated “sublation” and now sometimes translated
“sublimation” (Derrida 1976, xi). While the Heideggerian position is to view reality as
being-t/here (Da-sein), the deconstructionist position is to see being as truth that differs
from other truths, the truth of “reality” being one of them; and the possible “truth” being
differance itself.
If differance is not the master-word of deconstruction, then, what is? In an ironic and
Beckettian stance, deconstruction must assume the responsibility of its own death.
Whether the death is a theatrical move or a political ploy, either way it is an activity
or movement that actively engrosses the reader desperate to look beyond the stage and
so on ad infinitum. As Derrida points out in “The Theater of Cruelty,” “Theatrical art
should be the primordial and privileged site of this destruction of imitation: more than any
other art, it has been marked by the labor of total representation in which the affirmation
of life lets itself be doubled and emptied by negation” (Derrida 2002, 234). The moral
implication of an affirmation that both doubles and negates is that the other need not
be cognized in the presence of the self and ultimately not even as the so-called other;
possibly as differance, but differance is a mode of cognition rather than a name for the
other; whether of naming the other or “namelessness” as marginal situatedness of the other
is a transcendental question that can find an answer in metaphysics; without seeking an
answer one can only differ—it is not a game of avoidance with the other circumventing
19
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23
the predator-self, but a game that involves wit and humor. It is a game in which third world
people and writers lay claim to their otherness, i.e., writing; a translation of authority in
other terms, a passage that strikes at the impasse of speech and presence, the copula that
liberates without pretending to terminate the dialogue between one and an/other.
India a Nation!
While deconstruction must voice the aspirations of the excluded or the others it is also a
discourse of perpetual resistance to the monopoly of one set of meanings over others. The
copula escapes being pinned down firmly into one system of thought. It continues to play
the role of a passage, a sign, a vision of difference that challenges the status quo built on
the authority of discourses that claim to “know” owing to their power to repress every
other meaning.
The passage of the copula is a metamorphosis of nations. It is Forster’s dramatic vision
of a postcolonial world at the end of the novel A Passage to India. The title is a passage
from a passage that is also the burden of history upon fiction. Another version of Western
metaphysics would be the metaphysics of nationalism characteristic of colonial structures
operating in third world nations. In The Other Heading, Derrida challenges Europe’s
identity--its heading toward an end in view, the end of the passage or the copula. “The
idea of an advanced point of exemplarity is the idea of the European idea, its eidos, at
once as arche—the idea of beginning but also of commanding (the cap as the head, the
place of capitalizing memory and of decision, once again, the captain)—and as telos, the
idea of the end, of a limit that accomplishes, or that puts an end to the whole point of the
achievement, right there at the point of completion” (Derrida 1992, 24-5). The end in view
is also the Christian after-life, the theology of the transcendent, the invisible secret that is
God himself. “That is the history of God and of the name of God as the history of secrecy,
a history that is at the same time secret and without any secrets. Such a history is also an
economy” (Derrida 1995, 109). The end, i.e., God, a secret and an economy, is a social
and political order functioning under the banner of nationalism to the effect of determining
meaning that is in view. If at all there is such an end, all that remains of it is but ashes or
cinders. “There the cinder is: that which preserves in order no longer to preserve, dooming
the remnant to dissolution. And it is no longer the one who has disappeared who leaves
cinders ‘there’; it is only her still unreadable name” (Derrida 1991, 35).
St Augustine’s definition of time in Book xi of the Confessions simultaneously accepts and
undercuts the nowness of the present: “If, then, time present--if it be time--only comes into
existence because it passes into time past, how do we say that even this is, whose cause of
being is that it shall not be--namely, so that we cannot truly say that time is, unless because
it tends not to be?”
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References and Selected Bibliography
Öz
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Derrida, Jacques. 1991. Cinders. trans. Ned Lukacher. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
_____ 1981. Dissemination. trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____ 1995. The Gift of Death. Trans. David Wills. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
_____ 1992. Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money. trans. Peggy Kamuf. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
_____ 1982. Margins of Philosophy. trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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_____ 1995. On the Name. trans. Thomas Dutoit. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
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_____ 1994. Specters of Marx. trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York: Routledge.
_____ 1973. Speech and Phenomena. trans. David B. Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University
Press.
_____ 1978. Spurs, Nietzsche’s Styles. trans. Barbara Harlow. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
_____ 2002. [1967] Writing and Difference. trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Forster, E. M. 1984. A Passage to India. San Diego: Harcourt.
Heidegger, Martin. 1969. The Essence of Reasons. trans. T. Malick. Evanston: Northwestern
University Press.
Husserl, Edmund. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. trans.
David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
_____ 1972. Ideas I. trans. Boyce Gibson. London: Collier-Macmillan.
Kafka, Franz. 1949. The Penal Colony - Stories and Short Pieces. trans. Willa and Edwin Muir. New
York: Schocken Books.
Panikkar, K. M. 1959. Asia and Western Dominance. London: Allen & Unwin.
Paz, Octavio. 1991. The Collected Poems 1957-1987. trans. Eliot Weinberger. New Directions: New
York.
Sartre, Jean Paul. 1948. The Emotions - Outline of a Theory. trans. Bernard Frechtman. New York:
Philosophical Library.
Derrida için Önsöz: Koşaç ile Buluşma
Bu makalede Derrida’nın felsefesine bir önsöz oluşturarak, Derrida’nın felsefesini
“tanıtmayı” amaçlıyorum. Ancak Derrida’nın tartışmasının tümü, özgün bir çehre ve
anlamdan yoksun olan felsefenin sadece önsözünün yazılabileceği fikrine dayanır.
Derrida’nın çalışmalarının tümü de sadece felsefeye bir önsöz oluşturmaktan ibarettir;
benim ortaya koyduğum önsöz ise Derrida’nın okuyucularına sunduğu önsözden iki derece
uzaktır. Kısaca bu, Derrida’nın fazla ciddiye alınmayan ancak anlamın oluşmasında temel
bir rolü olan koşaç ile buluşmasıdır. Koşaç nedir? Tarihsel olarak ciddiye alınmayan belli
başlı marjinal grupların felsefi ifadesidir. Spivak’ın, Derrida’nın Of Grammatology’sine
yazmış olduğu önsöz nezdinde benim önsözüm gerçekten bir derece daha uzaktır. En
nihayetinde, felsefe (yazar ve okuyucu arasında bir bağ kuran) önsöz ya da koşaç ile bir
buluşmadan başka nedir ki? Hem metodolojik açıdan hem de verileri yorumlarken ödün
vermeyen bir tutum içerisinde olmamız mümkün müdür? Bu, Derrida’nın paradoksudur:
bunların birer tutum olduğunun bilincine varmadan herhangi bir tutum içerisine giremeyiz.
Sürekli değişken yapısıyla ve bir işaretleyen (signifier) olarak koşaç, bir Zen ustası gibi,
durumlara yüklediğimiz, kelime kafeslerinde hapsolmuş anlamları sürekli olarak didikler
durur. Beşeri ve Sosyal Bilimler söylemlerinde üst-anlamlarla doludur; demek istediğim
araştırmacı bilim insanları kesin tutumlar içerisine girerler ve gerçekleri bu tutumların
ışığında yorumlarlar. Tutumlarımızın temelinde varolan sınıf, ırk, cinsiyet ve diğer
önyargıların bilincinde olmak, metni bütünselliğin pençesinden kurtararak anlam için
sonsuzluğun kapılarını açacaktır.
Anahtar kelimeler
Yapıbozumculuk, felsefe, farklılık, koşaç, ötekilik.
About the Author
Prakash Kona is a writer, teacher and researcher working as an Associate Professor at
the Department of English Literature, The English and Foreign Languages University
(EFLU), Hyderabad, India. He is the author of Nunc Stans [Creative Non-fiction: 2009,
Crossing Chaos enigmatic ink, Ontario, Canada], Pearls of an Unstrung Necklace [Fiction:
2005, Fugue State Press, New York] and Streets that Smell of Dying Roses [Experimental
Fiction: 2003, Fugue State Press, New York].
Yazar Hakkında
Prakash Kona İngiliz Edebiyatı Bölümü, İngilizce ve Yabancı Diller Üniversitesi,
Hyderabad, Hindistan’da Doçent olarak görev yapmakta olan bir yazar, öğretmen ve
araştırmacıdır. Eserleri arasında Nunc Stans (2009), Pearls of an Unstrung Necklace
(2005) ve Streets that Smell of Dying Roses (2003) yer almaktadır.
 atılım
 P. Kona
İ
mgeler ve Ötekileştirme:
Cadılar, Yerliler, Avrupalılar
Z. Nilüfer Nahya
Dr., Etnoloji (Bağımsız Araştırmacı)
Öz
İmge, ötekileştirmeleri ve benzeştirmeleri kapsayan bir düşünce dünyasıdır. Kopya,
benzerlik, betimleme, portre çizme ve hayal etme anlamlarına sahip olan imge, görsel
ve düşünsel ögelerden beslenir. İmgeler, aynı zamanda damgalamaya varabilecek denli
toplumsal ve kültüreldir de. Bu nedenle imge konusu, iç/öz ve dış tanımlama gibi kimlik
bileşenleri kapsamında, daha da detaylandırılırsa ötekileştirme, ayrıştırma, farklılaştırma
gibi eylemler çerçevesinde incelenebilir. Bu çalışma, konuyu, Avrupa’nın kötülük ve
kötülere ilişkin düşünceleri bağlamında somutlaştırdıkları cadılar ve cadılık imgeleri ile
Yeni Dünya’nın yerli halklarının görünüş, inanç ve yaşam biçimleri arasında çatışan ve
aynı zamanda çakışan noktalar üzerinden ele almaktadır. Avrupalıların zihinlerindeki
imgelerle, karşılaştıkları yerliler arasında imgesel bir analoji ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu
bağlamda bu çalışma Yeni Dünya’nın [yeniden] keşfi ile birçok farklı yerli halkla karşılaşan
Avrupalıların hafızlarındaki imgeler üzerinden, farklı olan(lar)ın ötekileştirilmesini
imgeler dünyası üzerinden “okumaktadır”.
Anahtar Kelimeler
İmge, öteki, ötekileştirme, Avrupalılar.
28
Giriş
İmgeler, ötekileştirmeleri ve benzeştirmeleri kapsayan bir düşünce dünyasıdır. Kopya,
benzerlik, betimleme, portre çizme ve hayal etme anlamlarına sahip olan imge (Lat.
imago) görsel ve düşünsel ögelerden beslenir.1 Resimlerden haritalara, rüyalardan
manzaralara, anılardan stereotiplere kadar oldukça geniş bir yelpazeye sahip olan
imgeyi, hayatın birçok safhasıyla ilgili, kimi zaman diyakronik kimi zaman da senkronik
özelliklere sahip, değişken ve “geniş bir aile” (Mitchell 1986, 9) olarak düşünmek gerekir.
İmgeler, damgalamaya (stigmatizasyon) varabilecek denli toplumsal ve kültüreldir de.2
Bu nedenle imge konusunu kimlik bileşenleri kapsamında iç/öz ve dış tanımlama, daha
da detaylandırılırsa ötekileştirme, ayrıştırma, farklılaştırma gibi eylemler çerçevesinde ele
almak sıra dışı bir birleşim olmayacaktır.
Bu bağlamda bu çalışma Yeni Dünya’nın [yeniden] keşfi ile birçok farklı yerli
halkla karşılaşan Avrupalıların hafızlarındaki imgelere bakarak, farklı olan(lar)ın
ötekileştirilmesini imgeler dünyası üzerinden okumaktadır.3 Avrupa’nın kötülük ve
kötülere ilişkin düşünceleri bağlamında somutlaştırdıkları cadılar ve cadılık imgeleri ile
Yeni Dünya’nın yerli halklarının görünüş, inanç ve yaşam biçimleri arasında çatışan ve
aynı zamanda çakışan noktalar bulunmaktadır. Avrupalıların zihinlerindeki imgelerle,
karşılaştıkları yerliler arasında imgesel bir analoji ortaya çıkmaktadır. Böyle bir perspektif,
yerlilerin, farklılaştırılmasının ve bir Öteki olarak kabulünün yolunun açılmasına da
katkı sağlamaktadır. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı Avrupa’nın cadı imgeleriyle yerliler
arasındaki bu bağlantıları ifade etmek ve bu yönde karşılaştırmalar yapmaktır. Ancak bu
çerçevede esasen tarihsel bir betimleme yapmaktan ziyade, toplumsal ilişkiler ve kültürel
farklılıklar göz önüne alınmakta ve değerlendirmelerde sosyal antropolojinin perspektifi
kullanılmaktadır.
Antropoloji alanındaki çalışmalar, doğrudan imgeye ilişkin olmasa da, sanıldığından daha
fazla olan imgebilim kapsamındaki çalışmalar, sanattan, popüler kültüre ve milliyetçiliğe
kadar geniş bir yelpazeye sahiptir.4 Bu çalışmalarda ağırlık, gezi yazıları (örn. Kutlu 2005),
sanat (örn. And 1999), edebiyat (özellikle karşılaştırmalı edebiyat) (bk. Gültekin 2006),
tarih (örn. Kumrular, der. 2005) ve psikoloji (örn. Steele vd. 2002) alanlarındadır.5 İmge
çalışmalarındaki temel hedef, imgenin, toplumsal belleğin bir dışa vurum şekli olduğu
1
İmge’nin anlamı ve içeriği için bk. Atakay (2004, 72) ve yanı sıra Latince-İngilizce Sözlük,
İmago, http://arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Lexis/Latin/, erişim tarihi, Nisan 2007; English Word
Information, İmag-, imagi, http://www.wordinfo.info/words/index/info/view_unit/2882/
erişim tarihi, Nisan 2007.
2
Sosyal damgalama için bk. Goffman (1963) ve Dovidio vd. (2000).
3
Bu yazı, temelini oluşturan metin, bir grup üniversite öğrencisinin AB imgesinden yola
çıkarak, imgenin [yeniden] üretilişini anlamaya çalışan doktora tezimin kavramsal
çerçevesidir (Nahya 2010).
4
İmgebilimin birçok tanımı ve açıklaması olmasına rağmen, imgeleme ve ötekileştirmeye
ilişkin bu çalışmada Ammossy ve Pierrot’nun açıklaması tercih edilmiştir. Buna göre
imgebilim, “bir toplumun kendini görme ve başkasını hayal ederek görme değişkenliğini
inceler” (akt. Ulağlı 2006, 27)
5
Disiplinlerarası imge çalışmaları için ayrıca bk. Ulağlı (2006).
 atılım
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
29
düşüncesinden hareketle, imgenin, toplumsal ve kültürel olayların, sanata, edebiyata ve
düşünce sistemlerine yansımasını araştırmaktır (bk. Ulağlı 2006).
O halde imge, bir halkın veya bir grubun başka bir ya da daha fazla halk veya grup
hakkındaki, soyut ve somut, tüm fikir, hayal ve yargılarını içeren, gücünü toplumsal
bellekten alan ve sosyo-kültürel yansımaları bulunan, bir düşünme biçimi olarak
tanımlanabilir. İmge çalışmalarını içeren imgebilim, “Öteki”ye karşı duyulan merakın
giderilmesi işlevinde kendini göstermektedir. Yanı sıra ulusal önyargı ve stereotiplerin
kökenini, sürecini ve işlevini tanımlamak; bunları açığa çıkarmak; analiz etmek ve
insanların, bunun farkında olmasını sağlamak da imgebilimin amaçları arasında sayılır
(Beller 2007, 11). Dolayısıyla imge çalışmaları geçmişe ya da günümüze dair herhangi bir
döneme ya da duruma yönelebilmektedir.
İmgenin (ve imgelemenin) güncelliği kadar da tarihsel bir süreç olduğu ayrıntısı, hem
imgedeki tarihsel geçmişi hem de tarihteki imgeleri düşündürmektedir. Böylece bazı
imgeler, tarihsel bir geçmişe sahip olabildiği gibi tarih içindeki imgeleri bulmak da
mümkündür. Bu yönden tarih, farklı imgelere ve birçok da Öteki’ye sahiptir.
“Öte(de)ki”
Son yılların gözde adlandırması, sosyal antropoloji çalışmalarının temel sorunsalı ve
bazen çıkmazı, toplumsal ve siyasal ilişkilerin kimi zaman belirleyicisi olan “Öteki”
kavramının, kimi ifade ettiği kadar kimleri nasıl ifade ettiği de önemlidir. Türkçede
kullandığımız “Öteki”, “öte” kelimesinden türemiştir ve “iki şeyden, konuşulmakta veya
göz önünde tutulmakta olandan geride kalanı” olarak tanımlanmaktadır (TS 1969, 586).
Birçok anlama sahip olan “öte” ise “(1) konuşanın, temel olarak aldığı bir şeyden daha
uzak olan yer veya şey; (2) bir şeyin, arkadan gelen kısmı; (3) öbür yan; (4) sıfat olarak
ise konuşana göre uzakta kalan”dır (TS 1969, 586). Buna göre Türkçede, antropolojik
manada “’biz’den olmayan insanlar” (Aydın 2003, 661) olarak isimlendirilen “Öteki”,
sıfat ya da zamir halleriyle de bu düşüncenin kültürel yönünü işaret etmektedir. Uzaklık,
gerilik, arkadalık, bu kelimenin en önemli bileşenleridir ve beraberinde anlamsal olarak
bir mesafeyi ifade etmektedir.
Birçok Avrupa dilinin kökenini oluşturan Latincede ise “Öteki” için alius (alia ve aliud)
kelimesi kullanılmaktadır. Kelimenin en dikkat çekici yönü, İngilizcedeki alien (“yabancı”)
kelimesinin kökeni olmasıdır. Bir diğer Latince “Öteki” kelimesi ise ceterus’tur ve “kalan
(öteki)” anlamına gelmektedir. Romalı olmayanları belirten bir başka “Öteki” kelimesi
de, bugün dahi bu ötekilik mirasını sürdüren barbaria’dır. Yunancadaki allos (άλλος)
kelimesi ise Latincedeki alius kelimesiyle aynı anlamdadır. Allos ve alius kelimelerinin
ortak özelliği zıtlarının idem (Lat.) ve idios (Yun. ίδιος) yani “aynı” kelimesi olmasıdır.
Dolayısıyla Avrupa’yı derinden etkileyen bu kültürler açısından “Öteki”, aynı zamanda
keskin bir farklılığı ifade etmektedir. Türkçedeki “Öteki” kelimesi ise Latince ceterus’a
(İng. the rest) yani “geri kalan”a daha yakındır.
Özetle “Öteki”, bir ya da daha fazla kişi, kültür ya da toplum tarafından, geçmiş
veya güncel ilişkiler referans alınarak, dikey (sınıfsal) ya da yatay (etnik vb.) olarak
farklılaştırılmış ve ayrıştırılmış olan, kişi, grup, sınıf, halk vb. şeklinde tanımlanabilir.
Az önce de görüldüğü gibi “Öteki” kavramının farklı dillerdeki etimolojisi, içerik olarak
dahi, toplumsal farklılıkları yansıtabilmektedir. “Öteki” kavramının derinliklerine inmek
 Z. N. Nahya
30
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
kâşifler, maceraperestler ve misyonerler; zenginliklerin kaynağı olan topraklara geçtiler;
Orta ve Uzak Doğu’yu ve Kuzey Afrika’yı daha yakından tanıdılar (Rietbergen 1998,
228). 15. yüzyıl, Avrupa imparatorluklarının yeni toprakları ve Yeni Dünya’yı keşfettiği
ve yerleşmeye başladığı yüzyıl olarak tarihe geçti.
elbette mümkündür; ancak etimolojik irdelemede de görüldüğü gibi, “Ötekinin/Ötekilerin”
belirlenmesindeki esas unsur, durumun eylemsel yani toplumsal boyutundadır; bu da
ötekileştirmedir. Konuyu toplumsal boyuta çeken ve imge ile buluşturan nokta da budur.
Ötekileştirmeyi
Düşünmek
Wilkinson ve Kitzinger (1996, 27-28), eğer bir konu olarak ötekileştirme sürecini
kavramazsak, onu “kendi araştırma ve yazılarımızda eleştirmeksizin yeniden üreteceğimiz
riski” bulunacağını hatırlatmaktadır. Buna karşılık –Ötekilik yerine– ötekileştirmeye
odaklanıldığında, ötekileştirmenin nasıl yapıldığının ya da yapılamadığının, nasıl
kuvvetlendirildiğinin ve zayıflatıldığının yollarını keşfederek, “onun bunaltıcı söylemini”
engelleme imkânı elde edilmektedir.
“Ben” (“biz”) ve “Öteki” kutupları bağlamında konumlandırılan “Öteki”, en temel
noktada bir farklılaştırma eyleminin sonucudur. Ötekileştirme, bir süreç ve durum
olarak, farklılaştırma ve ayrıştırma düşüncesinde bir imge yaratmaktadır. Bu imge,
yargıları içeren, kimi zaman aşırı bir olumsuzlukla önyargılar, stereotipler ve kimi zaman
damgalama şeklinde karşımıza çıkabilen, olumlu olarak da benzeştiren (fakat aynı veya
tek yapamayabilen) bir düşünme ve algı biçimidir. Çünkü önyargı bir düşünüş şeklidir.
Buna karşılık imge, bu önyargının oluşturduğu algısal ve sunumsal bir tepkidir. Önyargı
sadece düşünsel ve pasif bir eylem iken, dışa vurulması ve bunun üzerinden bir kimlik inşa
edilmesi ise imgedir (Ulağlı 2006, 104).
Bir başka ifadeyle bir ya da birkaç kişiyi, grubu, etniyi ya da ulusu dışarıda bırakmak,
bir mesafeyi korumak için uzaklaştırmak ve farklılaştırmak amacıyla, birçok halk,
grup veya toplum, kendilerinden olmayanlar şeklinde tanımladıkları hakkında, çeşitli
klişeler ve yargılar üretmektedir. Bu yargıların üretiminde “Ben” (ya da “Biz”) ögesinin
içeriği önemli yer tutar. Çünkü “Öteki” olana yaklaşım ve bunun biçimi “Ben” ögesinin
kendisinden kaynaklanır. Yani ötekileştirme, “Ben”in düşündüğü biçimde gerçekleşir
ve “Ben”, kendi imgeler dünyasıyla karşısındakini ötekileştirir. Örneğin Antik Yunan
uygarlığında, tüm insanlık iki seçkinci ve karşıt kategoriye ayrılmıştır. “Yunanlılar” ve
“barbarlar” karşıtlığı şeklinde oluşturulan tutum, çelişkili değilse de geniş kapsamlı ve
karşılıklı olarak seçkinciydi (Cartledge 1993, 11) ve genel yapı açısından da, bu farklar,
doğal kabul ediliyordu (Schnapper 2005 [1998], 36). Bu “doğallık” elbette Yunanlıların
hafızasındaydı.
Tarihin en büyük ve en güçlü imparatorluklarından birini kurmuş olan Romalılar
için durum, Yunanlılarınkinden ancak biraz farklıdır. “Yabancı” ve “Roma vatandaşı
olmayan” anlamına gelen Latince Peregrinus/Peregrina, sadece özgür yabancılar için
kullanılmaktaydı. 4. yüzyıl sonrasında ise Roma’dan uzaklaştırılan insanları tanımlamak
için tercih edildi (Noy 2000, 1). İlerleyen yüzyıllarda Hristiyanlığın Roma tarafından
kabulü dahi, “barbar” nitelendirmesini ortadan kaldırmadı; aksine Hristiyanlık, Romalılık
kapsamında, İmparatorluk tarafından benimsense de, “medeni” ve “barbar” arasındaki
fark sürdü (Jones 1971, 380).
Zaman zaman Kuzey Afrika kıyılarına ve Ön Asya’ya kadar ilerlemiş olan Yunan ve
Roma kültürünün yayıldığı ve etkilediği Avrupa’nın, kendisi dışındaki dünyaya açılımı
Doğu’nun keşfi ile hızla devam etmiştir. 14. ve 15. yüzyıllarda Akdeniz’i aşan tüccarlar,
 atılım
31
Avrupalılar, bu [yeniden] keşfettikleri Yeni Dünya içlerine ilerledikçe altın, yeşim gibi
kıymetli taşlar ile patates, tütün ve kahve çekirdeği gibi sıra dışı besin maddelerinin yanı
sıra, kendilerinden farklı görünüşlere, yaşam şekillerine ve inançlara sahip insanlarla
tanışmışlardır. Avrupalıların, bu Yeni Dünya halklarına davranışlarıysa günümüzde dahi
konuşulan ve tartışılan bir konu olmuştur. Yaşananlara, imgeler penceresinden bakıldığında
bu tartışmanın başka bir boyutu ortaya çıkmaktadır.
Cadılar, Yerliler,
Avrupalılar
Avrupa tarihinde hayli uzun bir dönemi kapsayan, kötü ruhlar ve şeytan saldırısı iddiası,
Avrupa’nın tarihi kadar hafızasına da yerleşmiş bir olaylar silsilesini doğurmuştur.
Yaygın adıyla, “Cadı Avı” dönemi olarak bilinen Orta Çağın bu evresinde, dönemin
Hristiyan teologları, şeytanı ve kötü ruhları6, görünüşlerinden davranışlarına kadar
tanımlama çabasına girmişlerdir. Veba gibi büyük salgın felaketleri ve büyük kayıplar
verilen savaşlardan kaynaklanan olumsuz yaşam koşullarına bir sorumlu arama eğilimi
bu teologları, kötülüğü hatta bizzat Şeytan’ı ve onun hizmetkârı olarak kabul edilen
“cadıları” düşünmeye sevk etmiştir7. Bu da binlerce insanın cadılık suçlamasıyla mahkum
edildiği Cadı Avı dönemini başlatmıştır (11-18.yy). Cadı folkloruna bakıldığında, onların
köylerden ve şehirlerden uzakta düşünülmedikleri, gündelik hayatta bir köylü, çiftçi
ve bazen asil bir insan olabildikleri görülmektedir. Cadılar, kendilerine herhangi bir
saldırı yapıldığında karşılık verebilen ya da kıskandıkları veya zarar vermek istedikleri
kişilere büyüler yapabilen insanlar olarak düşünülmüştür.8 Fiziksel olarak da oldukça zor
eylemleri yapabilmektedirler: uçabilirler, hayvanlara dönüşürler, çocukları kaçırır, öldürür
ve yerler (bk. Henningsen 1997, 843). Yedi yüzyıl süresince Avrupa’da cadılar, kötülükle
ve şeytanla doğrudan bağlantılandırılmış ve yerel halktan din adamı sınıfına kadar geniş
çaplı bir korku ve öfkenin merkezinde olmuştur.
Cadı avının en yoğun yaşandığı dönem, Avrupalıların, Amerika, Afrika, Asya ve
Avustralya’daki yerlilerle karşılaştıkları ve bu topraklarda koloniler kurmaya başladıkları
Bu kelime Türkçeye “cinli” olarak çevriliyorsa da İslam’daki cin anlayışı ile Hristiyanlıktaki
“demon” yani kötü ruhlar arasında varlıksal bir tanımlama farkı bulunmaktadır. Bu sebeple
“demon” için “kötü ruh” karşılığını kullanmanın düşünsel farkı daha sağlıklı vurgulamak
açısından daha doğru olacağını düşünüyorum.
14.yüzyıl sonu ve 15.yüzyıl başı Avrupa için felaketler dönemidir. Açlık Avrupa’nın
her yerinde yaşanmaktadır. Asya’da sıkça görülen vebayı Moğolların Cenevizlilere
bulaştırmasıyla (ki bu bir savaş taktiği olarak uygulanmıştır) Avrupa, “Kara Ölüm” ile
karşılaştı ve nüfusunun büyük bir bölümünü kaybetti. 1340’da 79 milyona yaklaşan nüfus,
1347 sonrasındaki veba salgını ve açlığın ardından 1400 yılında 55 milyona düşmüş; ancak
1500’te 75 milyona ulaşmıştır (Fontana 2003, 69). Dolayısıyla bu felaketler Avrupa’nın
birçok yerinde gerçek bir travma yaratmıştır. Toplum dindarlaşmış, yer yer ayaklanmalar
görülmüş ve şiddet olayları artmıştır. Yaşanan olaylar için bk. Davies 2006 [1996], 436-440.
Bu suçlamalar için örnek bir çalışma olarak bk. Gibson (2000).
6
7
8
 Z. N. Nahya
32
dönemle kesişmektedir9 (15.yy-16.yy). Süreç içinde cadılık kapsamında gelişen
cadı imgeleri, Avrupa’nın [yeniden] keşfettiği Yeni Dünya’nın yerli halklarının bazı
özellikleriyle örtüşmektedir.10 Örneğin cadılara ilişkin inançların başında, onların, büyü
yardımıyla kurt, kedi, fare gibi hayvanlara dönüşerek insanlara zarar verebildiği fikri
gelir (Akın 2001, 249). Öte yandan hayvanlar ve insanlar arasındaki ilişki, Avrupalılar
tarafından, belirli bir mesafenin korunduğu bir dünya düzeni olarak algılanmaktaydı. Öyle
ki Protestan ve Katolik reformları öncesinde değiştirilene kadar, karnaval eğlencelerinde
gerçekleştirilen canlandırmalarda, hayvanlarla insanlar yer değiştiriyor; atlar nalbant
olup efendilerini nallıyor; öküz kasap olup insanı kesiyor; balıklar balıkçıları ve
tavşanlar avcıları kızartıp yiyordu (bk. Burke [1978] 1996). Böyle bir imgelemeye sahip
Avrupalılar, ulaştıkları yeni kıtaların yerlileri arasındaki Şamanist inançlarla karşı karşıya
gelmişlerdir. Farklı türlerine rastlansa da birçok Şamanist pratikte, Şaman, esrime töreni
sırasında gizli bir dil, -çoğu zaman hayvan dili- kullanırlar; bununla beraber hayvan
dillerini anlar ve sağaltma veya kurban sunmak için yaptıkları ruhsal yolculuklarında
hayvan ruhlarından yardım görürler11 (Emiroğlu ve Kutlu 2003, 759). Ruhsal yolculuklar,
cadılara özgü görülen en önemli özelliklerdendir. 16. ve 17. Yüzyılda bugünkü Kuzey
İtalya ve çevresinde etkili olmuş ya da olduğu düşünülen bir grup olan Benandanti de
trans ya da uyku halindeyken gezebiliyorlardı. Fakat onlara atfedilen özellikleri, cadıları
yakalayabilmeleri, cezalandırabilmeleri ya da kovabilmeleriydi. Doğumları sırasında zorla
dünyaya geldiklerine inanılan bu kişiler, folklorik olarak cadılara karşı olarak düşünülmüşse
de, rüyalarda gezebilmeleri, cadıları ayırt edebilmeleri ve koruyucu pratikler uygulamaları
nedeniyle Kilise tarafından yine bir tür cadı olarak nitelendirilmişlerdir.12
Bu imgesel örtüştürme ve kesişmeler, ormanlık alanlar açısından da sürdürülebilir.
Düzlükler kadar ormanlık arazilerde de yaşayabilen Yeni Dünya insanlarının; ormanların,
perilerin yaşadığı, cadıların buluştuğu tekinsiz alanlar olduğunu düşünen Avrupalıların
aklındaki “tekin olmayan bölge ve insan” imgesiyle eşleşmeleri olasıdır.13 Ayrıca Şeytan’ı,
çoğunlukla siyah ya da koyu renkli, zaman zaman da morumsu ya da sarımsı olarak tasvir
eden ve de edebi analojilerinde onu ölümle, sapkınlarla, ayrılıkçılarla ve büyücülerle
bütünleştiren (Russell 2001, 279) Avrupa imgesi, beyaz olmayan, siyah ya da sarı tenli
ve büyü ile ilgilenen insanlarla karşılaşmıştır.14 Bununla beraber Avrupa düşüncesinde ve
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
33
sanatında, “kötülerin efendisi Şeytan”, siyah ve iri olduğu kadar çıplak olarak gösterilmiş,
çıplaklık günah ve ahlaksızlık olarak kabul edilmiş, Hristiyanlık öncesi inançlar ve
bunlara mensup kişilerle özdeşleştirilmiş, kirlenmenin bir simgesi olmuş ve suçluları
cezalandırmak için kullanılmıştır (Link 2003 [1995], 80 ve Duerr 1999 [1988]).
Bu olumsuz yargılara sahip Avrupalı kâşiflerin, çıplak ya da yarı çıplak yerlileri
benzeştirebilecekleri akli unsurlar, haliyle kendi kültürlerinden bağımsız olmayacaktır. Şu
halde Avrupalıların tanıştığı yerliler, yarı çıplak gezen, politeist, totemci, ak ve kara büyü
ile ilgilenen kişilerdir ve kendilerinden farklı bir cinsellik anlayışına sahiptirler. Cinsellik,
dönemin Avrupa’sı için önemli bir fenomendir. Cadılar, düzenledikleri ayinlerin sonunda
ensest yasağını delen toplu seks törenleri düzenlemekle suçlanmışlardır. Bu önyargıyla
Avrupalıların karşılaştığı Yeni Dünya’da ise yerliler, farklı cinsellik,15 aile ve akrabalık
ilişkilerine sahiptirler.16
Son analoji ise yerlilerin yüzlerine, özel gün ya da dönemlerde çeşitli renklerde boyalar
sürmeleri ve buna benzer geleneklere sahip olmaları üzerinden kurulabilir. Demonoloji
literatürüne göre, Avrupa’nın cadıları, kaçırdıkları bebekleri öldürerek, uçabilmek
amacıyla vücutlarına sürmek için kremler hazırlıyorlardı (Akın 2001, 257). Bu halde
yüzlerini boyayan yerlilerin, Avrupalıların aklındaki olumsuz imgeyle örtüşmüş olması
yine güçlü bir olasılıktır.
Ancak elbette ki Yeni Dünya yerlileri, Avrupa’nın kötülük ile analojik bir bağ kurma
ihtimaline sahip ilk “Ötekileri” değildir. Keşifler çağı öncesinde de, diğer birçok kültürde
olduğu gibi, Avrupa’nın birçok bölgesinde de “kadim Ötekiler” bulunuyordu. Bunların
başında uzunca bir süre Yahudiler gelmiştir. Kimi zaman cüzzam hastalarıyla beraber
kimi zaman da kendi başlarına hastalık, kıtlık ve kuraklık yaymakla suçlanmışlar ve
özellikle bu bağlamda Kutsal Hafta içinde saldırılara uğramışlardır (bk. Ginzburg 2004
[1989], 63-86). Cadıların ayin günlerine Yahudilerin kutsal günü “Şabat” ve toplantı
yerlerine “sinagog” denilmiş; cadılar da Yahudilerle aynı suçlamaya (kan iftirası) maruz
bırakılmışlardır: Hristiyan çocuklarını kaçırıp yemek.17 Yahudileri, yaklaşık altı yüzyıl
boyunca, Avrupa’nın korkulu rüyası olan Türkler takip etmiştir. Reform dönemi sırasında
Protestanlar için Papa ve Katolikler için Luther (ve diğer Protestan öncüler) kendilerince
kötülüğün temsilcisi, hatta Şeytan ilan edilmişlerdir (bk. Russell 2001 [1986]).
Cadı Avı döneminin kronolojisi ve bölgesel detayları için bk. Levack (2006 [1987], 204288).
10
Buna benzer bir konuda Özbudun (2002), farklı açılardan “Öteki”ni tanımaya çalışan
Avrupalıların “sahip olduğu kadim kültürel dağarcığı kullanış tarzı”na odaklanmıştır.
15
Özel olarak Kuzey ve Güney Amerika Şamanizmi için örnek olarak bk. Hultkrantz (1989) ve
Levy (1994).
16
9
11
Bu topluluklarda cinsellik anlayışına dair örnek bir çalışma olarak bk. Malinowski (1989
[1927])
Amerikan yerlilerinde aile ve akrabalık ilişkileri üzerine özet bir çalışma olarak bk. Miller
(2004 [2002])
12
Kuzey İtalya kadar çeşitli Slav halklarında da görülen Benandanti konusuna dair en kapsamlı
araştırmayı, Engizisyon belgelerine dayanarak hazırladığı kitabında Carlo Ginzburg
sunmaktadır: bk. Ginzburg [1983] 1992.
13
Avrupalılarda ormana dair inançlar için bir örnek olarak bk. Porteous (2002 [1928]).
14
Bu başlıklara ilişkin bilgi alınabilecek örnek bir çalışma olarak bk. Clastres (1992 [1980])
Yine enteresan bir tarihlendirmeyle, Fontana (2003, 67-68), 11. yüzyıla kadar Avrupa’da
bir Yahudi karşıtlığının bulunmadığını; onların bu yüzyıldaki zenginliklerinin, hükümdara
yakınlıkları ve bu sebeple de vergi artışlarından sorumlu tutulmalarının anti-semitizme zemin
hazırlamış olabileceğini aktarır. Bu düşmanca yaklaşımın yaygın kan iftirası suçlamalarına
nasıl vardığını da kısaca özetler.
 atılım
 Z. N. Nahya
17
34
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
da yaşamdaki yerini almıştır. Böylece “Öteki” halklar, coğrafyalar ve yaşamlar, Avrupa
yaşamına ötekilikleri akılda kalarak yavaş yavaş yerleşmişlerdir.23
Cadı avı, Avrupa’da özellikle 17. yüzyılla beraber azalmaya başlamıştır. Bu yüzyıl aynı
zamanda Yeni Dünya’nın kontrolünün Avrupa imparatorluklarına geçtiği, yerlilerin
sindirildiği ve “farklı insanların” varlıklarının benimsendikleri de bir dönemdir. Cadılar
ve yerliler arasındaki tüm bu benzerliklere rağmen cadı avı, Yeni Dünya yerlileri üzerinde
Avrupa’daki kadar etkili olmamış; yerliler de cadılar olarak nitelendirilmemiştir. Ancak
yerlilere yönelik, “vahşi” ve “ilkel” gibi adlandırma ve tanımlamalara bakıldığında,
oldukça olumsuz imgelere maruz kaldıkları da açıktır. Peki sonuç ne olmuştur?
Yerlilerin ikinci hatta üçüncü sınıf varlıklar olarak nitelendirildiklerini, köleleştirildiklerini,
kendi topraklarından sürüldüklerini, topraklarını savunurken öldürüldüklerini biliyoruz.
Cadılar gibi kötülüğün baş sorumlusu ilan edilmeseler de iyi olarak kabul edilmedikleri,
ötekileştirildikleri ve dışlanarak ciddi bir ayrıma tabi tutuldukları da bir gerçektir.18 Onlar,
Avrupalıların hafızalarındaki imgelerle örtüşseler de cadı değillerdir; ancak bu kez Öteki
olarak damgalanırlar; “vahşi” ve “ilkel” olarak adlandırılırlar. Yeni Dünya, Avrupalılar
için artık bir yaşam alanı olarak kabul edildiği ve egemen olunabilecek yeni bir coğrafya
olduğu için, yok edilmek yerine özümsenmiştir. Salgınlar, kıtlıklar ve yokluk, giderek yerini
zenginliklere, besin çeşitliliğine ve yavaş yavaş bolluğa bıraktığı için mücadele edilmesi
gereken kötüler dönüşmüş, geriye sadece köleler, “barbarlar” ve “vahşiler” kalmıştır.
18. yüzyıl sonuna gelindiğinde Avrupa, artık bu yeni coğrafyaları kendi sosyal hayatına
katmıştır. Artık birçok freskte ve resimde, “kıtaların kraliçesi” ve “egemeni” olarak tasvir
edilmekte, yanı sıra diğer kıtalara ve halklara da yer verilmektedir.19 Yeni Dünya’nın Avrupa
dünyasına yansıması, resimle sınırlı kalmamış, müzik20, hayvanlar21 ve hatta mobilyalar22
18
Yerlilerle cadılar arasındaki en önemli inançsal fark, cadı olarak suçlanan kişilerin
Hristiyanlığı bilmesine rağmen kendilerini kötülüğe teslim etmiş olmaları; buna karşılık
yerlilerin kurtuluşa ihtiyacı olduğunun düşünülmesidir. Ancak yerlilere ilişkin bu perspektif
bile onları katliamlardan kurtarmamıştır. Amerikan yerlileri ve Hristiyanlıkla ilgili olarak bk.
Rolling (2004 [2002], 121-138).
19
Bu bağlamda Giovanni Battista Tiepolo’nun Würzburg, Almanya’da yaptığı ünlü duvar
freski, Gezegen ve Kıtaların Alegorisi’ne de bakılabilir. 1751-1753 yılları arasında yapılan
resim, dünya üzerinde yükselen güneş olarak Apollon ve gezegenleri sembolize eden,
çevresindeki tanrıçaları merkezinde gösteren ve dört tarafına da bilenen dört kıtayı -Avrupa,
Asya, Afrika ve Amerika- yerleştirmiş olan bir başyapıttır. Yüksek Rönesans resmi ve
Tiepolo’nun sanat kariyeri açısından döneminin en önemli eserlerindendir. Bununla beraber
“Kraliçe Avrupa”, Heinrich Bunting’in 1581 yılında yayınlanan Forma Virginis kitabında
bulunan Europa Prima Pars Terrae haritasında İspanyol Kraliçesi şeklinde tasvir edilmiş
Avrupa’dır (Wintle 1996).
20
Örneğin Vivaldi’nin yeni keşfedilen Motezuma operasında, İspanya’nın Meksika’yı işgali
sırasında direnişiyle ün salan, Aztek İmparatorluğunun kralı II. Motecuhzoma (Montezuma
veya Motezuma) (bk. Tsouras 2005) anlatılmaktadır.
21
Jan van Kesel’in resimlerinde baskın olan egzotik hayvan figürleri bu bağlamda güzel
bir görsel örnektir. Afrika Kıtası (1672) adlı resmi, siyah insanlarla beraber birçok Afrika
hayvanını göstermektedir.
22
Mobilyaların kullanımı için bk. Reitbergen (1998, 253).
 atılım
35
Sonuçta, keşifleri ve ordu gücüyle yeni topraklara, bilgilere, insan gücüne, madenlere ve
besinlere egemen olan Avrupa’nın kendisi dışındakilere bakışı da bu bağlamda yeni bir hal
almıştır. Avrupalı olmayan halkların “daha düşük bir yaratılışta olduğu” düşüncesinden
hareketle, farklılıkları bir açıdan ırksallık ve “vahşilik”; diğer açıdan da “ilkellik”
üzerinden değerlendirmişlerdir. Bu tespiti yapan Fontana’ya göre de (2003[1994], 106)
ilkinden jenosit ve köle ticareti, ikincisinden de emperyalizm doğmuştur.
Sonuç
Keşifler ve yeni halklarla tanışma sürecine, imge penceresinden bakma çabasındaki bu
çalışma, imgenin varlığını dikkate alarak imgesel nitelendirmeleri cadılar ve yerliler
üzerinden kısaca karşılaştırmayı amaçlamıştır. Tarihteki bu iki parça bir araya getirilerek,
imgelerin yargılarla ilişkisi, keşifler, işgaller, tanışmalar ve karşılaşmalar gibi temasların,
hafızalardaki imgelere ve yeni imge yaratımlarına etkisi üzerinde durulmuştur.
Böylece, Yunanlıların, kendilerinden olmayanları “barbar” sınıflandırmasıyla
ayrıştırılmasının, “barbar” kabul edilen halklarla sıkı temasın kurulduğu Helenizm’le
dahi yok olmadığı ve Roma İmparatorluğunda vatandaşlık çerçevesinde devam ettiği
görülmektedir. Ancak Öteki’ne karşı imgelerdeki en büyük şokun Yeni Dünya’nın keşfiyle
yaşandığı söylenebilir. Avrupalıların cadı ve kötülük imgelerine denk düşen benzerlikleriyle
yeni kıtaların insanları, anlaşılmak istenmekle birlikte ötekileştirilmiştir de.
Bu örneklerle Öteki kelimesinin anlamı, benzerliklerin imge içindeki gücü açısından ortaya
çıkmıştır. Yanı sıra karşılaşmanın sonrasında oluşan zihinsel çatışmalar ve farklılaşmalar,
imgenin içeriğini de açıklamıştır. Karşılaştıkları yeni halklar ve onların kültürel yapıları,
Avrupalıların hafızalarındaki olumsuz imgelerle temas etmiştir. Bir yandan zamanla artan
temaslarla ve iletişimle gerçekleşen değişim, bir yandan da üzerlerinde kurulan hakimiyet,
hem ötekileştirmenin içeriğini değiştirmiş hem de büyük olmasa da bir benzeşmeye veya
etkileşime yol açmıştır.
İmgenin, ötekileştirme, ayrıştırma, farklılaştırma, tanımlama, tasvir etme, hayal etme
gibi kimlik bileşenleri çerçevesinde düşünülmesi, tarihte olduğu gibi bugün de canlıdır.
Tekeli’nin “dışlayıcı ol[un]mayan bir öteki anlayışı” vurgusundaki gibi (2007, 143),
Ötekilerin durumu, günümüzde sıkça tartışılan, etnik çatışmalar, göçmen ve mültecilerin
sorunları, ırkçılık, asimilasyon, yabancı düşmanlığı vb. konular etrafında yürütülen
tartışmalarından bağımsız değildir. Bu konular içinde duran imgeler de, ötekileştirmeleri
ve benzeştirmeleri içeren, değişken, kimi zaman tarihsel kimi zamansa sadece güncel,
toplumun her alanından beslenen ve her alanında karşımıza çıkan, çok yönlü ve çoğu
kez yeniden-üretilen düşünceler, duygular ve izlenimlerdir. Bu nedenle milliyetçilik, ulus
devlet, ayrımcılık, asimilasyon hatta çokkültürcülük gibi birçok konu bağlamında ele
alınabilir ve imgeler üzerinden yorumlar yapılabilir. Çünkü bu çalışmada da görüleceği
gibi, Ötekilerin oluşumunda imgelerin ve imgelerin değişiminin önemli ve güçlü bir yeri
vardır. Aynı şekilde imgelerin oluşumu, örtüştüğü ve benzeştiği noktalar da dış tanımlama
ve kültürler arası ilişkiler bağlamında belirleyicidir.
Bu çerçevede sosyal antropoloji alanındaki çalışmaları değerlendiren McGrane’e (1989)
bakılabilir.
23
 Z. N. Nahya
36
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Gültekin, Ali. 2006. Türkiye’de karşılaştırmalı edebiyat ve imgebilim araştırmaları. Uluslararası
İmgebilim Sempozyumu içinde der. Serhat Ulağlı, 47-55. Muğla: Muğla Üniversitesi Yayınları.
Henningsen, Gustav. 1997. “Witchcraft” Folklore-An Encyclopedia of Beliefs, Customs, Tales, Music
and Art içinde Green, der. A. Thomas. Cilt II, 842-847. California: ABC-CLIO.
Hultkrantz, Ǻke. 1989. Health, religion, and medicine in Native American traditions Healing and
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Jones, W. R. 1971. The image of the barbarian in medieval Europe. Comparative Studies in Society
and History. 13(4), 376-407.
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Kumrular, Özlem der. 2005. Dünyada Türk İmgesi. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi.
Kutlu, Mehmet Necati. 2005. Francisco de Miranda’nın Seyahatnamesi’nde Türkiye ve Türkler.
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38
Abstract
Images and Othering: Witches, Natives, Europeans
Image is a world that includes both otherness and sameness. Image gets its context from the
visions and the ideas by means of copy, likeness, representation, picturing and dreaming.
At the same time images are so social and cultural that they can also cause stigmatization.
Images can be considered in the context of identity components like identification,
self-identification and of othering, segregation and differentiation. This study aims to
compare the European ideas about witchcraft and the appearances, beliefs and lives of
the New World’s native people in the context of imagination. This comparison reveals an
imaginative analogy between the mental images of Europeans and the cultures of native
people of the New World. Thus, this study “reads” the differentiation of the Others through
the mental images of Europeans who met with many different native tribes by the [re]
discovery of the New World.
Key Words:
Image, the other, otherness, Europeans.
About the Author
Z. Nilüfer Nahya is an independent researcher of ethnology and social anthropology. She
received her doctorate in 2010 from the Ethnology Program of the Department of Folklore
in Ankara University. Her areas of interest include images and othering in different cultures
within the context of identity, religious conversion, and religious minorities in Turkey.
Yazar Hakkında
Z. Nilüfer Nahya etnoloji ve sosyal antropoloji alanında çalışan bağımsız bir
araştırmacıdır. Ankara Üniversitesi, Halkbilimi Bölümü Etnoloji Doktora Programını
2010 yılında tamamlamıştır. Araştırma alanları, kimlik bağlamında farklı kültürlerde imge
ve ötekileştirme, yanı sıra din değiştirme ve Türkiye’deki dini azınlıklardır.
F
rom the Theory of Consent to the
Theatre of Conflict: Theoretical
Perspectives on the Changing
Character of the Modern State
Idowu William
Department of Philosophy, Obafemi Awolowo University.
Abstract
The concept of the state is a central and cardinal subject matter in political and philosophical
thoughts. However, there are different and conflicting perceptions concerning both the
historical and contemporary realities around the state. This paper addresses one important
aspect of the contemporary perceptions concerning the state. The paper argues that even
though the modern state, theoretically, grew out of the idea of a contract or theory of
consent, as expounded by classical philosophers and theorists, its present and contemporary
status seems to be enraptured in a lingering sense of conflicts and contradictions. The
paper discovers that the idea of citizenship, the multicultural and plural elements in most
societies, the high rate of global migration, the politics and philosophy of multinational
expansions, the transition of the nation-state into a market state with an undue endorsement
of capitalism and the reverberations of globalisation are all corroborative of the conflictridden and contradictory nature of the modern state especially in Third World countries.
The paper concludes that the conflictual and contradictory trappings around the modern
state cannot be explained outside the historical conditions that have influenced its
emergence including the factors highlighted above.
Keywords
State, contract, consent, conflict, human nature
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Introduction
That there are different theories and conceptions of the state is not just a mere fruitless
and worthless academic exercise; the different theories and conceptions actually picture
the fact that the state and its understanding cannot be described using just one linguistic,
ideological and phenomenological apparatus alone. In a way, those different theories lend
credence to the terse but profound statement that diversity is an inescapable fact of the
universe. In fact, the different theories only legitimate the view that the state has become
an important aspect of human existence. As argued by Andrew Heywood (2004, 75), “so
powerful and extensive is the modern state that its nature has become the centrepiece of
political argument and ideological debate.” In my view, part of the reasons why the state
has become the centrepiece of philosophical debates could be attributed to what Ralph
Miliband said almost forty years ago, a pronouncement that is still valid despite decades
after its initial utterance. According to Miliband (1973, 1):
need to know what the state is. What is somewhat certain is that Easton’s very careful
observation about state theory and theorisation carries a sense of validity in terms of the
perceived presence of theory conflicts and conflict of theories.
More than ever before men now live in the shadow of the state. What they want
to achieve, individually or in groups, now mainly depends on the state’s sanction
and support. But since that sanction and support are not bestowed indiscriminately,
they must, ever more directly, seek to influence and shape the state’s power and
purpose, to try to appropriate it altogether. It is for the state’s attention, or its control,
that men compete; and it is against the state that beat the waves of social conflict.
It is to an ever greater degree the state which men encounter as they confront other
men...it is possible not to be interested in what the state does; but it is not possible
to be unaffected by it.
In interpretive terms, all these show that the state and the perceptions, judgements and
beliefs we have ended up forming about the state are not static. And, even if our perceptions
and judgements about the state are not static, it appears clear to me that, perhaps, a
particular form or appearance/quality about the state may have influenced the contents
of our perceptions about the state. Even though it is often contended that the nature and
character of the polis, as conceived, in Aristotelian terms, do not exactly picture the nature
of the modern state, it is still nevertheless a truism that the picture of idealism cast around
the divergent theories of the state in general beggars the belief that the state is a dynamic
construct. This dynamism is concocted within the understanding of the different realities
encoded in each epoch or which the age in question seems to embody.
Considered in the light of this prophetic pronouncement, it is no wonder that J. W. Garner
(1932) contended that political science begins and ends with the state. What is worrisome,
however, is the fact that even though scholars are agreed on the significance of the state,
yet, what its actual nature and specific character is has not only been different but equally
controversial. A quite perceptive capture of this controversy can be seen in David Easton’s
philosophical evaluation of the different views on the state. According to David Easton
(1953),
One person sees the state as the embodiment of the moral spirit, its concrete
expression; another, as the instrument of exploitation used by one class against
others. One author defines it as simply an aspect of society, distinguishable from it
only analytically; another, as simply a synonym for government; and still another,
as a separate and unique association among a large number of other associations
such as the church, trade unions, and similar voluntary groups.
For Easton, just one entity attracts conflicting perceptions which means, according to
Easton, either that the entity in question cannot be quantified, epistemologically, or is,
altogether, a myth. Yet, the whole of politics, as a science, is said to revolve around the
state. So, when philosophers and political theorists pay attention to the epistemology of the
state, it appears very clear that they seem to be in pursuit of something even if one cannot
exactly say that something is actually pursuing those whose interests are actuated by the
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It is this conflicting tendency in the characterisation and conception of the state that,
perhaps, prompted Sushila Ramaswamy (2006, 87) to contend that the modern state is
highly differentiated, specialised and complex upholding the difference between the
private and public space. The complexity alluded to is not just contingent on the different
possibilities ingrained in the functions it performs contemporarily but in the fact that its
ancient as well as its contemporary theoretical historicity are both subjects of lingering
controversies. But a very reasonable question to pose is: if philosophers are divided in
their theorisation about the state, which is actually the subject of conflict: our judgements,
perceptions and beliefs about the state or the state itself?
Granted all these postulates, this paper argues that the dynamic and changing status of
the modern state, viewed from the perspectives of the etymology, history and dialectical
features of the state, is negative rather than positive. The paper contends that, theoretically,
the picture of consent and the contractual perspectives that classical theorists alluded to
in explaining the emergence of the state is fast losing its normative appeal thus giving
way to the idea that the modern state is a theatre or stage of conflict and one of lingering
irreconcilable contradictions between and among competing and often antagonistic groups.
My idea of conflict is not completely new but it builds on the idea advanced by many
conflict theorists over the years that conflict is not necessarily physical nor violent but
can transcend the mutually comforting and commonsensical ways in which it has been
opinionated in the literature.1 Nevertheless, I seem to share the views of Johan Galtung
(1998) on what constitute the necessary condition for the formation and existence of
a conflict situation. It does not however follow that Galtung’s conception of conflict
1
For examples of definitions of conflict, see Edward Murray (1963), Nicholson (1971),
Coser (1956). Murray tags a conflict situation as a motivation towards two or more mutually
exclusive activities; Nicholson says conflict occur where there is interaction between at
least two individuals or groups whose ultimate objectives differ while Coser describes it as
struggles over values and the intention to eliminate rivals over such values.
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42
is unassailable, invincible and the most acceptable form of conception available. As a
matter of fact, one could easily contend that the epistemological basis of Galtung’s idea
of conflict is an escapist one. But the beauty of the conception and which makes it readily
adaptable is that, for Galtung (1998, 70), “deep inside every conflict lies a contradiction,
something standing in the way of something.” The definition does not, however, conclude
that a contradiction is necessarily evil or destructive but my own estimation is that, if this
conception is applied, strictly, in the interpretation of the normative status and the general
characteristic of the modern state, a contradiction may be considered negative. This means
that following the historical trajectory of the state, the existence of a contradiction in its
conceptual understanding represents a negative outlook.
But, while it is true that the contractual models in classical philosophy were only models
suggesting solutions to possible conflicts, already existing or that might arise among
individuals or groups, and that, these classical theories did not imply a conflict free-zone,
the idea of the formation of a state was underscored in those theories but, essentially, that
the state that was conjured in these theories, not the great state empires in existence then,
either in the West or Eastern part of the world, were construed in a sense as emanating
principally because individuals and groups who found themselves in the state of nature2
had to enter into a contract3 between themselves, that is, between subjects and subjects, not
subjects and sovereign, which means that, according to Alan Ebenstein (2002, 165), the
state is a very crucial institution in ensuring that the subjects, who are party to the contract,
2
3
The nature of the ‘state of nature’ in classical philosophical treatise, even though hypothetical
and lacking factual reality, was not even conceived in the same ways by those who argued
out and defended its significance for an emerging state theory. For example, while Hobbes
contended that the state of nature was chaotic, with human life nasty, poor, brutish, short and
solitary, Locke, the defender and astute articulator of what is called liberal individualism,
never saw it as chaotic but as a golden era. The same, perhaps, could be said of Jean Jacques
Rousseau, the French philosopher, who contended that man was born free but is in chains
everywhere. So, the state of nature should not be held as representing, for all times and
seasons, the same in terms of quality, limits and consequences. Gauba (2003) argued that
Hobbes construction of the state of nature was borne out of his experience of the English
Civil War of 1642 and sought to justify the doctrine of state absolutism as an essential
condition for social solidarity. It follows that Hobbes was picturing a particular type of
state theory through his postulation of the doctrine of absolutism while Locke’s construct
was informed by the Glorious Revolution of 1688. In both a contract and/or consent theory
was emphasized even though what the contract or consent created for both were different.
Important in both of course was the picture or theory of state those scholars had in mind. The
idea of the state as subject to consent or contract was hinted at.
Steve Buckler (2010) gives a modern interpretation of the contents and details of the contract
from the perspective of liberalism as consisting of the following: mutual terms of agreement
establishing a state that would enforce common rules to ensure peaceful coexistence meaning
prevent, control, and manage real and imagined conflicts aside from protecting liberties and
rights. Normatively, the state has a moral assignment towards citizens and very central to this
normative assignment is perceptions about conflict.
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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maintain a conflict-free atmosphere to the satisfaction of the subjects. This normative
image and picture of the state, viewed within the context of the modern state, is changing.
It is of course true that many factors could account for the observed changes such as
changes in the existing political order, the global emergence of new values, ideals and/or
changes in the nature and scope of human epistemology etc. It is the nature of the changes,
with respect to the modern state, in the light of the controversial concept of citizenship that
attracts my attention.
Divergent Opinions
on the State: The
Significance of
Controversies
Taylor (1983) contended aptly that there never was an age as theory-drenched as the modern
age. From the domain of empirical science to the realm of pure and abstract philosophy,
it appears evidential that theories seem to be the harbinger of truth concerning modern
realities. In most cases, it seems reality also conjures in itself elements of mysticism such
that it takes only a theory toothily packaged to demonstrate and express the true essence
of what reality itself is. Significantly, ideas about what exactly is meant by the state in
modern terminology is perspicuously affected and infected by this theory-drenched culture
in which we live.
But, then, according to Berki (1989, 12), everybody agrees that the state is a rather baffling
phenomenon. While it is true that the state may, indeed, be a baffling phenomenon, it is
quite an exaggeration on the part of Berki to assume that everyone agrees. The baffling
nature of the state and the terms of its expression may not be open to everyone. Besides, it is
not out of place to come across those who actually see nothing baffling about the state and
its complex institutional networks. Nevertheless, the baffling nature of the state pictured in
Berki’s opinion could actually have been influenced by the well-known remarks of Michel
Foucault who contended that the state is ensconced in mythicised abstraction. In the words
of Foucault (1991, 103), “but the state, no more probably than at any other time in its
history, does not have this unity, this individuality, this rigorous functionality, nor to speak
frankly, this importance: may be after all the state is no more than a composite reality and
a mythicised abstraction, whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think.”
If we are to assign any sense of meaning to Foucault’s conclusion on the state, I am inclined
to believe that Foucault was being too overzealous concerning his remarks about the state
especially in his preference for the term ‘government’ above the idea of the state. To
designate the state as having a history yet denouncing its importance as ensconced in myth
and abstraction is to provide an inconsistent analysis of the state. As Timothy Mitchell
(2006, 179) contended, Foucault’s analysis could not account for how the appearance of
the state arose in the first place and what accounts for the reality of the composition that
Foucault talked about in relation to the state. Indeed, one can claim that Foucault did
attribute a history to the state, talked about that history and yet in his critique did not
denounce, in particular, that history.
The meaning is that the state carries the aura of a non-existent entity. To ground the state
in a non-abstract manner may exactly be what compelled G. D. H. Cole (1926) to suggest
that rather than talk about the state, it is better to replace the state-concept with that of
government-concept. In this case, it is believed by Cole that the actualities of the state
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44
and what is meant when the term is raised for intellectual discussion would be obvious
and thus not be riddled with uncertainties. The state is the governmental machine so
concluded Cole (1926, 86). The philosopher, Harold Laski, also, in a sense, seem to have
shared Cole’s sympathy. For Laski (1919, 30), “state action is, in actual fact, action by the
government.”
The views of Cole and Laski are, however, denounced by Andrew Heywood who
sees no anomaly in maintaining an apt and appropriate distinction between state and
government despite the fact that the relationship between both terms remains shrouded
in complexity. For Heywood, there is no reason why scholars cannot maintain a sense of
distinction between state and government inasmuch as it is true that both terms are not
and never synonymous. The absence of synonymity, for Heywood (2004, 77), is clear:
state is an inclusive association while government is exclusive; the state is continuing
while government is temporary; the state is inconceivable without a government while
government is conceivable in the absence of a state.
Furthermore, Heywood contends that the state represents and reflects the permanent
interests of society while government stands for the ideological preferences of the political
figures in control of the state powers as at that moment. In short, Heywood (2004, 78)
concludes that “the distinction between state and government is not, however, simply an
academic refinement; it goes to the very heart of constitutional rule. Government power
can only be held in check when government of the day is prevented from encroaching
upon the absolute and unlimited authority of the state. This is particularly important given
the conflicting interests which the state and the government represent.”
The controversies surrounding the state are breathtaking and within the context of such a
theoretical confusion one should not expect to have a sense of finesse when it comes to the
definition of the state. Who can vouchsafe a definition of a matter so momentous and an
issue that is of lingering interests yet encoded in what one may proudly call the ambiguity
of intellectual undecidability.4 No wonder, then, that Dyson (1980) constate that the state is
a contested concept and, therefore, involves problems of meaning and application. Where
there is the absence of enough empirical evidence to reiterate any particular definition,
what most scholars often resort to is the attempt to isolate theories that could help in
actualising the grounds for a solid discussion of the state.
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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the state. Like Christopher Pierson (2004, 1) would readily claim the modern interest in
the subject matter of the state seems to coincide with a period when the intellectual and
academic faith in the idea of the state is declining, forcing us, as it were, to conclude that
our age is that of the twilight of the state.5 Very significant, however, is the fact that this
trajectory of the state shows that the science of the state is a very comprehensive one.
Even though this science is a laudable one, it, however, remains ensconced in the human
science.6
There are several possible meanings to this observation: one, that the changing nature
of the character of the state is an attribute of humans in their diversity; in other words,
that pluralism, difference and heterogeneity are crucial aspects of our modern world and
of the nature of humans; that no theory can be said to be comprehensive and detailed if
it fails to accommodate this essential realities of our present world; two, that we cannot
construct the theory of the state outside a consideration of the theory on, about, concerning
and revolving around human nature.7 G. Duncan (1983) once said that “at the centre of
political theory lies the effort to establish a relationship between human nature, however
that is conceived, and the state”. The third possibility, and very important, is the fact that
the comprehensive nature of the theories of the state reveals the absence of satisfaction
with the nature of preceding thoughts. This explains the view that state theories are the
outcome of philosophical speculations an indication that the modern world is still in dire
need of the philosophical temperament. The fourth possibility, of course, consist in the view
that we now live in the age of ideological professions, profligacy and possibilities which
means that our understanding of the state often has an ideological flavour undergirding its
expression and conclusions. Basically, it is these diverse ideologies that inform the need
for theorisation and theory constructions. So, then, those who canvass the view that the age
of ideology has come to an end will not only be disappointed by considering the enormous
weight the state seems to shoulder but by considering the fact whether just one theory is
enough to explain the complexity that surrounds the idea of the state even in the twenty
first century.
5
The decline, in my view, is not out of disregard for the importance of the state but because
the state itself, if it really exists, has disregarded its importance. In other words, the
understanding that the state is controversial and yet proving indispensable, as argued by
Ralph Miliband (1973), is one of the reasons in my view why the decline is so pertinent and
evident.
6
Andrew Heywood (2004) has observed pertinently that a major and lasting attribute of all
theories within the sphere of the human science, that is, human social nature, is that they are
all concocted from a normative perspective so long as those theories are not testable.
7
According to some scholars, Stevenson (1974), for instance, the question ‘what is man?’
lies essentially at the root of all philosophical theories. In this sense, one may claim that the
philosophical theories of the state, in their deepest controversies, are clear attempts to show
that there are no agreed theories on what human nature is.
To this end, the development of the theories of the state is, in terms of anticipation, a very
significant one. This development not only projects a sense of dynamism around the idea
of the state but also pictures, in the relevant sense, the changing status of the notion of
4
This undecidability, in my view, is essentially theoretical, philosophical and encoded in
abstraction without, most of the time, tangible, untestable reflections in reality judging,
solely, from the nature and limits of definitions of the state in the literature: feminists, for
instance, accoding to Randall (2010) see the state as the site and instrument of patriarchy.
Michael Bakunin (1973), speaking from the mindset of anarchism, defines the state as the
most flagrant, the most cynical and the most complete negation of humanity.
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 I. William
46
The very fact that there are conflicting ideologies in our days is enough evidence of
the continuing possibility of conflicting theories of the state. For example, liberalism,
Marxism, Socialism, Fascism, Anarchism, theories about Nationalism and Feminism are
examples of ideologies today with important implications on what the state is and what it
should look like.8 The historical development of these ideologies and their philosophical
inputs into how the world should be creates enough intellectual impetus to consider the
changing status and character of the modern state. The question is what is the nature of
the changing status of the modern state and to what can we attribute the change? Apart
from the evidence associated with the movement from one state theory to another theory,
historically, my emphasis is on the changing status of the modern state vis-à-vis the
controversial concept of citizenship.
The State and
Citizenship
A characterisation of the changing nature of the modern state is obviously incomplete
without a consideration of the corresponding influence the state bears on citizenship.
While the previous section hinted at the view that the state, historically and conceptually,
has been construed using the language of change, the idea of citizenship with which
this nexus and the changing character of the state is demonstrated needs to be familiarly
and fashionably conceptualised. Such conceptualisation in itself further proves that the
emerging picture of citizenship, in the modern world, corroborates the thesis that the
state’s original mooring as an hypothetical entity concocted, using the idea of consent or a
moral image and posture, may no longer be attributed to it. Indeed, it is a proposition too
plain to contest that the modern state itself has been at the threshold and background of
conflicts in modern societies.
Curiously, in every modern state, there is always a one-to-one correlation between the state
and citizenship. Citizenship makes sense within the confines of the state. In other words,
the hallmark of modern states is citizenship. Drawing fresh insights from phenomenology,
modern replication of state-citizen relationship is reminiscent of Brentano’s acclaimed
one-to-one identity between the subject and the object i.e. the cogito always produces
a cogitatum. Thus, one can say that the state is the cogito whereas the citizen is the
consciousness that the state carry or embody i.e. the cogitatum. This is what is generally
called the statist tradition in the conceptualisation of citizenship. According to this
tradition (Janoski 1998, 12), it is meaningless conceiving the idea of citizenship without a
corresponding construction of the state. Citizenship exists only within the purview of the
state. But then what is the meaning of citizenship?
8
Even though most feminist has reiterated the need to debunk the significance of the state
to political analysis, yet, today, feminists have not only sought to expand the scope of what
the political is but equally gone ahead to construct feminist idea of the state with the use of
several catchy phrases such as the ‘the gendered state’ or ‘gendering the state’, or Connell’s
(1990) concept of ‘gender regime’ or Chappell’s (2006) notion of the ‘new institutionalism’
which is also seen as enveloping the idea of a gendered logic of appropriateness within
institutions.
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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Perspicaciously, aaccording to Ralf Dahrendorf (1974, 673), “there is no more dynamic
social figure in modern history than the Citizen.” In his opinion, Bryan Turner (1990, 194)
contended that “the problem of citizenship has re-emerged as an issue which is central, not
only to practical political questions concerning access to health care systems, education
institutions, and the welfare state, but also to traditional theoretical debates in sociology
over the conditions of social integrations and social solidarity.” Modern commentators on
the idea of citizenship often are found expressing a normative defense for the state based
on the sanctity of its vitality (citizenship) to the existence of democratic culture.
It is only now, perhaps, due to a whole lot of factors that the idea of citizenship seems to
be enjoying an intestinal prominence within the context of critical concepts and debates
in socio-political philosophy and political theory. Concepts dreaded within socio-political
philosophy are now seen to have an internal connection and significance in relation to
citizenship. Social justice, for instance, or justice for short, is meaningless except when it is
brought home to bear in relation to human society. And where their conceptual significance
is reiterated in intellectual discourses, it would appear as if their prominence is actually
subsumed under the rubrics and elemental rudiments of citizenship. The same can be said
of equality, liberty, civil society, civil disobedience and even democratic discussions. The
important fact is that all these revered concepts in political theory are intertwined, one way
or the other, with the idea of citizenship. In other words, it follows that modern intellectual
exchanges are empty and represents mere façade when the idea of citizenship is omitted.
It is thus indubitable that we live in the age of citizenship.
A little before this time, citizenship discourses and ideas around it seem to carry a
pestilential air among political thinkers. As a matter of fact, Van Gusteren (1978, 9), opined
strongly that “citizenship has gone out of fashion among political thinkers.” However,
since the 1990’s, possibly due to the increasing wave of democratization all over the
world, especially in Africa, and the reverberating influences and impacts of globalization,
citizenship, according to Derek Heater (1990, 293), has become the ‘buzz word’ among
political thinkers. This same view was shared by Vogel and Moran (1991, x).
The importance of citizenship seems to straddle between the fact that it is on one hand
ensconced and entrenched in a sweeping sense of normativity and, on the other hand,
it is seen as the basis and source of the legitimacy of certain political actions in a given
political society. Nevertheless, it is still a truism that we live in the age of ‘the citizen.’ The
popularity of the citizen discourse has been attributed to the resurgence in minority rights
and some other conditions of modern societies. This is the view of Will Kymlicka and
Wayne Norman (2000, 5-6). In the words of these authors,
There are a number of reasons for this growing interest in citizenship throughout
the 1990s. One reason is related to the rise of minority rights. Debates over
multiculturalism have often been fractious, and have put a considerable strain
on the norms of civility and good citizenship…but there are several other recent
political events and trends throughout the world that point to the importance of
citizenship practices. These include increased voter apathy and long-term welfare
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48
dependency in the United States, the erosion of the welfare state, and the failure of
environmental policies that rely on voluntary citizen co-operation.
While it is true that philosophical ideas are generated conceptually or in terms of abstraction,
it will still not be true to contend that those ideas belong to the realm of abstraction alone.
Philosophical thinking is undoubtedly influenced by and the tenor of their conceptual
tenacity is also critically derived and derivable from experience and practical affairs of
human societies. This is because philosophers are, themselves, ensconced and situated in
specific societies. Citizenship is thus and has always been of philosophical interests. Greek
philosophy is replete with fantastic instances of philosophical thoughts on citizenship.
Aristotle reflected on citizenship just as much as Plato did. Going by Greek philosophical
discussion on citizenship, it behooves one to constate that the concept is suggestive of a
democratic ideal.
Even though T. H. Marshal (1950, 28-29) is often credited with the provision of a seminal
approach to the idea of citizenship, it is exactly clear that his analysis does not describe nor
conceptualize citizenship as a democratic ideal. The greatest offer of Marshall’s thesis is
the internal connection that citizenship shares with rights, on one hand, and the systematic
institutionalization of a scheme of welfare through those rights, on the other. Apart from
this, Marshall, again, did not prove that citizenship was going to generate any form of
conflict in states that subscribe to the idea of citizenship as an institution of the state. Yet,
citizenship today is not only a prominent feature of state construction; it is equally a source
of perennial trouble and crisis for modern states especially those that are multicultural and
those in which vestiges of external control of internal policies are still discernible. As a
matter of fact, the “Gentleman Theory of Citizenship” that Marshall passionately worked
for and defended would, definitely, be against the claims and requirements that modern
citizenship is making on modern states.
The only conceptual platitude for conflicts that Marshall’s analysis created room for was
the view that citizenship and capitalism are bound to be in perpetual war with each other.
Besides, Marshall did not invent the study of citizenship in relation to or in the light of
the state. While it is true that Marshall was actually concerned with welfarism and social
classes, the critical role of the state was not adequately spelt out in Marshall’s analysis. It
was a theory steeped in much passion for the actualization of rights. No wonder Kathryn
Dean (2003, ix) contended that modern citizenship has overwhelmingly been a matter of
rights; rights to life, liberty and happiness; right to privacy and property. Following the
Marshallian tradition in England, that is, the right centric tradition, a British Government
White paper (1991) defined citizenship as people’s rights to be informed and choose for
themselves. No doubt, the influence of Marshall is notable here but Marshall’s conception
of rights as the core and essence of citizenship neglected a seasoned analysis of the
implications of those rights for state condition especially those in Third World countries
or aspiring democracies.
According to Peter Ekeh (1975), the political problems of the age as well as the historical
context of politics determine to a large extent the aspects and issues of citizenship that are
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sorted out for emphasis in a given society. Ekeh’s comments on the sociological conditions
of citizenship are insightful and illuminating. States’, for instance, that are still struggling
with the effects of colonialism are likely to have problems with the full demands and
requirements of the institution of citizenship. Again, if we take Ekeh seriously, we are
bound to agree that even states that have problems of legitimacy are also, historically
and contemporaneously, going to have problems in the institutionalization of citizenship.
Postcolonial states, for example, are drawn in a lingering struggle between the internal
conditions of their respective societies and the character of stability which are manifesting
in such societies. Questions concerning political legitimacy, allocation of resources, the
nature of political accountability, transparency and probity all seems to be tied around the
bounds and boundary of citizenship. As a matter of fact, in every modern state, citizenship
seems to be the bedrock on which political programs and policies are based.
In most advanced countries, it is correct to say that many of the hurdles that confront
citizenship seem to have been transcended, at least, to a minimum. It is in this sense
that Peter Ekeh’s pointed remark above seem to derive and attract their inherent truth.9
Perspicaciously, though citizenship and its historical contour and anatomy seems to be
different in both western and non-western societies, it appears that they have become
subject matters of conflicts although we may have to agree that what constitute the contents
of conflicts would definitely be different from each other. The nature of conflicts that
underlie both western and non-western conception and attitude to citizenship in modern
states can be compared to the differences development scholars and economists point out
between the concept of “economic development” and the concept of “economic growth”.10
To speak in logical terms, talk of a state implies the existence of citizenship. In other
words, states constitute the necessary condition for the existence of citizenship rights. It is
therefore an aberration to define citizenship in terms of the phenomenon of ethnicity. This
makes the state, for instance, an unquestionably influential spatial and historical category
in the analysis of the political and democratic process in the world especially in Third
World States. Even in distant Europe, the era of the state and its relative significance
in the understanding of the political process is not yet over. Even the idea of European
9
In a country like Nigeria, aspects of the political problems and the historical contexts, such
as the long era of militarization, the northern principle of primacy, the ethnic configuration
of political parties, the religious diversities imbued into the history of Nigeria, and the
general passivism and lack of correct political education, among others, seem to provide the
historical contour that has shaped the nature, texture and conditions of citizenship generally.
Those conditions of citizenship place the state in situations of instability.
A general synthesis of the difference between the concepts of “development” and “growth”
and with serious implications on the different attitude to citizenship concern in both western
and non-western societies is that development is the concern of non-western countries while
growth is the concern of western countries. The former is fundamental while the latter is
incremental. Citizenship conflict in non-western countries is directed at and influenced
by concerns with development while citizenship concerns in the west is directed at and
influenced by concerns with growth.
10
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50
citizenship, some have argued, is meaningless unless and until a European state is formed.
The same goes for the idea of global citizenship. Such constructs and their conceptual
designations remain slippery concepts without the establishment of a global state. We
have to agree with Crawford Young (1993, 29) that the state is not an inert abstraction; it is
above all a historical actor, a collective agent of macro political process.
Given the analysis above, many reasons account for the claim that, viewed from the
perspective of citizenship, the nature of the state is changing from what we historically
know it to be, that is, as an entity that is neutral, created on account of agreement between
consenting individuals to one that is non-neutral, partisan and a complex domain and
theatre of conflicts. Many of the classical philosophers11 had viewed the emergence of the
state to consist in the evolution of a contract and consent between citizens themselves, on
one hand and, on the other hand, the sovereign who is configured to represent the state.
While this contention is actually not wrong, a great metamorphosis, via the problem of
citizenship, nevertheless, is a daily confront on the nature of the state.
In the first instance, the assertion above makes sense if we understand that not only is it
that the state has an historical context but, also, that the type of historicity built around
the state also matters. The modern state is a product of many factors but a major and very
important qualifying characteristic of the modern state, especially in the Third World,
is that it is a nations-state, not a nation-state. This is very important in underscoring the
view that the characteristic of the modern state is one riddled with conflict rather than a
product of consent or contract. At best, one can contend that the inability of the modern
state to mitigate and manage the contents of the assumed contract with and/or consent of
the citizen, if there were any at all ab initio, has turned the nature of the modern state to a
conflict-ridden one.
The meaning of the term “nations-state” is very significant. Kwame Gyekye (1997) and
Idowu (2008, 240-250) have provided very illuminating accounts of the apt distinction
between nations-states and nation-state and how that distinction translates into an effective
understanding of the dilemmatic situation that the modern state seem to be experiencing.
But then, the account of Luc van de Goor et al. (1996) on the connection between conflict
and development equally provides a detailed attempt at understanding the crisis of the
state.
In their analysis, conflicts can be seen in four main types: political, cultural, economic
and military. These all are striking characteristics of the twentieth century which means
that the twentieth century is the bloodiest period in all of human history (1996, xv-xviii).
This is, in a sense, true: two World Wars were fought and staged during the last century.
However, what is worrisome about this pattern of conflict, according to their analysis, is
that: one, the conflicts in question are prevalently situated within the context of the Third
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World and the region of developing countries.12 But the important assertion, according to
their study, which is the second pattern of the nature of conflict, is that these conflicts are
internally generated than externally induced; they are local creations rather than being
global in context and consequences.
The meaning is that those conflicts are, integrally and fundamentally, crisis of the state in
question.13 Concerning this latter proposition and position, many factors are responsible:
one, the absence of democratisation;14 two, the problems associated with development
or the willingness to initiate or allow the full process of development;15 three, internal
rumblings that have the appearance of secession, self-determination and, more recently,
fundamentalism;16 four, citizenship discontent with the agenda of such states especially
According to Kalevi Holsti (1991, 274-278), between 1945 and 1989, about 58 wars and
major armed conflicts occurred but only two occurred outside the context of the Third World
countries. And, what is more, in his estimation they are in one way or the other connected
with liberation from colonial rule, state creation and regime legitimacy. The estimation of
wars and the factors could be described as conservative given that there are many other
events of a conflict situation that occurred in other insignificant areas of the world which
are not accounted for in Kalevi’s numeric tabulation. The conservatism is, again, obvious
given the view that many of the wars that occurred are not tied essentially to the factors
adumbrated by Kalevi. Nevertheless, the import of the study is educative and raises our
epistemological insight on the nature of the modern state.
12
Many Scholars are agreed on this proposition and position. According to Kalevi (1992, 38),
this lends credence to the view that conflicts in Third World countries are nothing but the
“ubiquitous corollary of the birth, formation, and fracturing of ‘Third World’ States”.
13
According to Larry Diamond (1990, 48-49), while it is true that the 1990s can be declared as
the decade of the return to full democratization all over the world, this impulse and excitement
is short-lived by the fact that democracy is very difficult to maintain. This difficulty, called
one of the paradoxes of democracy, explains the challenge of full democratization within
the context of the modern state. According to Diamond, one paradox which has crippled the
modern democratic (constitutional) state is what he calls the paradox between consent on
one hand and effectiveness of states on the other. According to Diamond, “democracy will
not be valued by the people unless it deals effectively with social and economic problems
and achieves a modicum of order and justice.”
14
H. W. Houweling (1996, 143) provided a very relevant conceptualization of the development
necessary to mitigate the occurrence of crisis and conflict within the state from the perspective
of citizenship. Such a developmental agenda is one where the state is non-confiscatory,
impersonal and bureaucratic and where rights of citizenship are freely exercised. This is
proper development. Unfortunately, this idea of development is lacking inasmuch as
citizenship is still denigrated by the state.
15
The popular philosophical coinage underscoring this position is what Philosophers such as
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau in their very different ways and
manner tagged the Social Contract Theory.
Examples from Algeria, Sri Lanka, India and Malaysia establish the fundamental challenges
posed by Islamic and religious fundamentalism to the state in these countries. Yet, it is not
this rising political phenomenon alone that that threatens the state. Equally troubling is the
ethnic and racial imbalance which unequivocally defines present modern societies.
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 I. William
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11
52
where such states are regarded or seen as examples of failed states17 or, in the language of
Robert Jackson (1990), quasi-states.
One possible interpretation of this scenario is that the nature of the modern state as a
nations-state is laden with serious implications and the meaning it conjures is that the
state is changing from an entity concocted through contract or consent to that of conflict.
As a nations-state, the modern state is bound to have within its settings crisis that is
foundationally and fundamentally disintegrating. It all arises from the actual meaning of
the term nations-state. This cannot be done outside the frame of the understanding and
meaning of nation-state. A nation-state, according to Tilly (1990, 3) is one whose peoples
share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity. In such an arrangement, Ayoob
(1996, 70) contends that nationalism is a necessary condition or element. In other words,
shared nationalistic feelings are the basis for the formation of a nation-state. It means in
the absence of such a condition, the idea of a nation-state relapses into a mirage, or less
euphemistically, mere wishful thinking.
Nevertheless, it depends on how nationalism is construed. In the words of E. U. EssienUdom (1962, 6), nationalism, as a concept, may be thought of as the belief of a group that
it possesses, or ought to possess a country; that it shares, or ought to share, a common
heritage of language, culture, and religion; and that its heritage, way of life, and ethnic
identity are distinct from those of other group. Ali Mazrui (2004) constate that nationalism
is not subject nor limited to a single definition inasmuch as it attracts its very meaning
based on who is doing the definition or the interpretation. According to Mazrui (2004, 472),
“nationalism is both an ideology with specific constituent ideas and a set of sentiments,
loyalties, and emotional predispositions”. In the words of Heywood (2007, 143), it is
“the belief that the nation is the central principle of political organization” meaning that,
one, humankind is naturally divided into distinct nations and that, the nation is the most
appropriate and perhaps only legitimate unit of political life.
The idea is that nationalism is not objective attitudinal predispositions since it is tied
more to sentiments, loyalties and emotions which can shift and are, by nature, essentially
fleeting. The so-called objective basis of nationalistic feelings is a group feeling which
can be subjected to changing conditions. This, however, does not detract from the fact that
what sustains the idea of a nation-state is the strong belief in the sameness of identity. Yet,
modern anthropological studies have revealed the fact that identity is not static, and that,
identity of a person can be multiple or defined using multiple indices.18 The implication is
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that the possibility of identity being shared is not exactly remote. While this is not exactly
a minus for nationalism and the idea of nation-state, which is the opposite of the nature
of the state in Third World countries, Ernest Gellner (1983, 1) opined that the nationalism
which works for a nation-state is one where the political and the national unit of that
society is congruent with each other.
But this is not the nature of the modern state. If this were, then, the aura of modernity around
the state in developing and under developing regions of the world would appear rather
calm and categorically co-habiting. The irony is that modern states are now becoming
or were initially nations-state with few exceptions in some parts of the western world.
The meaning is that the modern states of Europe, according to Luc van de Goor et al.
(1996, 6-7) which were states before they became nations, are now becoming enmeshed in
struggles that are nationalistic in nature and that are essentially prompted and promoted by
secessionist desires, self-determination struggles and dissatisfaction with the centralizing
authority.
Upon critical acceptance this statement would mean that, in European experiences, what
emerged eventually were not nations that became states other wise that would make them
nations-states as we have in most Third World countries. What emerged were nation-states
because the states in question had existed before the idea of nationhood evolved and which
gained ground overtime. In other words, Western model of state making was remarkably
different from those that emerged, after colonialism, in the Third World countries. However,
even though colonialism contributed to the emergence of nations-states in Third World
countries, the multicultural element, due to globalization, migration and other globally
construed phenomena of incorporation are turning states even in Europe to nations-state.19
Interestingly, the tendency in modern societies, in Europe and Third World countries,
towards what Will Kymlicka (1995, 10) calls cultural imperialism, where a very large
cultural group dominates and preside over affairs of other groups, such as minority
groups, is crippling the nature of the modern state and it is equally having corrosive
effects on the idea of citizenship. The possibility, actual and factual, of such domination
by the predominant cultural group is what is referred to as cultural imperialism. This
brand of imperialism suggests the absence of the recognition of difference, the refusal to
accommodate the cultural identities of minority groups, and the distribution of resources in
It is estimated that by 2050 the Latino or Hispanic community in the United States of
America will form a quarter of the population of that country more than any other cultural
and linguistic group. See Heywood (2007, 312, 330) According to Grillo (1989), the illusion
that countries such as Britain, United States of America and France are “melting pot” is
losing its long time appeal. All these only show that the liberal state can no longer serve as
the representative of general interests considering the rise in the multiethnic phenomenon
even in the western world. Alemika (2003, 11) attributes this to the fact that the liberal state
only enforces individual rights and interests rather than collective, group rights and interest
thereby endangering the possibility and promotion of equality between and among these
diverse groups.
19
17
Failed states have been defined poetically by Ayoob (1996, 81) to mean the combination of
a juridically sovereign but empirically non-functioning central authority in a state. A failed
state necessarily breeds the high incidence of ethnic nationalism which is of course rooted in
the absence of true citizenship. A situation where ethnic nationalism is the order of the day
shows that conflict is not just the resort but the rule of the game. It is in this sense that Jack
Snyder (1993, 12) classifies ethnic nationalism as a default option.
18
Kwame Appiah (2004), for instance, wrote that limiting the configuration of identity of an
individual to one set of factors such as race, gender, religion, and culture is to create ways in
and through which the identity of such individuals is eventually restricted.
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Deprivation and the
Modern State
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defiance of the cultural equation and logic of the respective polytechnic and multicultural
blend of that society by the dominant cultures (always in control of political and economic
powers of that state). The push and pull of this cultural imbalance is what escalates into
political misunderstanding and struggle for ascendancy between the rivals. This struggle
sometimes is an attempt to defend citizenship sentiments which the cultural groups believe
they all share. At other times, the struggle consists in the bid to maintain and enforce the
sense of cultural distinction, especially on the part of the minority groups, which they
regard as non-negotiable.
the way the economy operates, with the way resources are allocated, distributed and
how collective benefits are shared. All these, it is argued, stems from the fact that the
state system, especially the liberal type in most western systems, endorses some forms
of deprivation or the other. In such a system of deprivation, what holds is the fact that the
state system encourages deprivation. To be deprived is to be denied the opportunities to
enjoy the standard of living that is befitting that of citizens. John Scott (1994) corroborates
this view when he posited that the poor are those who are deprived of the resources that
would allow them to participate to the full as a citizen of their society.
The second argument which shows that the modern state, as an institution, is conflictual
rather than contractual draws enormous weight from the way the state’s economic system
is being operated. This removes the understanding of the state away from a contractual one
to that of conflict, and, from a sociological concept to one that is economically determined
and enmeshed in severe economic trappings. The economic image that the modern state
bears betrays essentially its several attempts at retaining its humble beginning as a sociopolitical entity. The economic image of the modern state is illustrated by its partnership
with the capitalist system. The relationship between the state and citizenship has been
severally viewed and contested through its very deep alliance with capitalism.
These definitions are meaningful for analysis in the light of the concept of citizenship.
Since the state system is structured after this pattern, what results is the outbreak of
conflicts between aggrieved citizens against the state system. As a matter of fact, such wars
and conflicts, according to Dietrich Jung et al. (1996, 56) have to be seen as conditions of
the emergence and advancement of capitalism. Furthermore, it is clear that such state with
such capitalistic bent are generally unable to manage and mitigate the social conflicts that
arises as a result of the infusion of the principles of and the transition to capitalism. Such
an economic legacy is one of the reasons why state legitimacy is normally questioned.
Historically, Marshall’s work on citizenship and social class represents a vivid and
illustrative analysis of the unequal yoke between citizenship and capitalism. According to
Marshall, citizenship and capitalism are bound to be in perpetual enmity with each other.
This is because, according to Marshall (1949, 29), citizenship promotes and emphasises
equality and rejects exclusion; capitalism, on the other hand, endorses a system of
inequality and defends exclusion. It is therefore obvious that both institutions and systems
are conceptually, contextually and in terms of values, ideals and beliefs at odds with
each other. Yet, it appears that capitalism is the major supplier of the blocks on which the
economic ambience/foundation of the modern state is built.20 Possibly, it could be that
this is the reason why John Hoffman (2004, 17) reiterated that the state cannot uphold
principles of universalism and emancipation in relation to citizenship. This is based on
the view that the state is too monopolistic not only in the use of violence to promote the
“common good”, a task that Hoffman sees the state as incapable of achieving, but also in
the fact that it is an exclusionary institution; it includes some and excludes others within
the same setting without appealing to any modicum of rationality.
The word “monopoly” as used by Hoffman is economically significant: one of the ways
the modern state exercises monopoly over its citizens and excludes them has to do with
20
See Klaus Jurgen Gantzel and Jens Siegelberg (1998). Based on insights from these two
scholars, the aftermath of the Second World War became associated with the imposition
of capitalism in the world generally. Another critical dimension to this observation is that
while democracy was being enthroned everywhere in the globe, especially in the 1990s,
socialism was being dethroned especially in the Soviet Union and other Eastern bloc. The
twist of fate is that democracy and capitalism, in these times, became integrally connected
such that the democratic state today is almost synonymous with the imposition and onslaught
of capitalism.
 atılım
But the implication of this analysis for the nature of the state as a theatre of conflict rather
than consent is carried to interesting heights in the thoughts of T. M. Marshall. According
to Marshall, where deprivation is encouraged by the state system or the economic system
it adopts, it affects the public status of the citizen. In a capitalist system, for instance,
according to Marshall, the system is run in such a way that it not only promotes class
inequalities but gross manifestation of relative deprivation. With relative deprivation, it
follows that those who are referred to as citizens are constrained by the economic system
that is in vogue.
At another level, citizens are constrained by what Samuel Britten (1977) calls the
economic consequences of democracy where politicians not only outbid themselves by
promises they make during campaigns for vote but are restricted in the choice of what
they do to citizens either by concentrating on only those who vote for them or, on account
of corruption. This confirms what Larry Diamond (1990, 48-60) had already described
as the three paradoxes of democracy. One of the paradoxes is that democracy in itself,
surprisingly, and quite contrary to normal expectations, generate a sense of conflict where
it is the case that dividends of democracy are not delivered and where citizens perceive
that rulers are either not faithful in their promises or promote a sectarian agenda with
regards to the distribution of goods and services.
In most cases, evidentially, one of the economic consequences of democracy is the
promotion of class politics and, by implication, class conflict or, to dissuade our minds
away from thinking Marxistentially, conflicts between, among and by elites in society.21
A number of scholars (Burnham 1941; Wright-Mills 1956; Bottomore 1993; Tom Young
2003) have given enough intellectual attention on the cogitative and cerebral significance of
the elite factor and the concept of elitism in appraising the nature of the state and the potential
impact that concept bears in the understanding of conflict with regard to the state. From
21
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56
What is unfortunate always is that the state often becomes partisan in the sense that it
becomes absorbed in elite’s interests and preferences and thus loses its neutrality. This is
often exemplified in states in the Third World especially Asia and Africa where empirically
instantiated is the fact that most leaders in these regions of the world have spent longer
years in power than what obtains in western liberal democratic countries.22 Such selfdesignated, personal rule is, most of the time, antagonistic to the principles of effective,
transparent and credible change of leadership based on consent.
Essentially, such a phenomenon, rampant all over the world and throughout history,
represents a denigration and clever truncation of the process that allows for the cultivation
of true citizenship ideals and standards. It might have had its possibility engineered by the
constitutive and totalistic nature of the state itself or a telling and compelling indicator of
the kind of society in question, yet, it is undeniable that states where personal rule have
been established, where, like Louis XIV, the leaders declared themselves as the state, have
been thrown into moments, whether prolonged or short, of instability, strife, conflicts and
chaos. In a sense, the decorum and values of governance are contradicted by such selfinduced professions and utterances.23 As Tom Young (2003, 2) constate in relation to the
nature of African politics, “over time African societies, or elements of them, have resisted
these tendencies causing both politics and states to fail.”
As a matter of fact, where personal rule is established, it, in a way, constitutes a sense of
disrespect and rejection of the values and potentials that are ingrained in the ethos and
culture of that particular society. The breach of trust has often escalated into the outbreak
these scholarly analyses, no doubt, elitism is a fundamental characterization of capitalism
and represents the extensive possibilities that are associated with capitalism especially in its
influence on the running contradictions that capitalism often displays.
22
When Louis XIV declared, famously and triumphantly, “L’etat c’est moi” in France that he
was the state, it was thought to be an aberration. Today, as we look at Asia, Latin American
countries and, in Africa, with countries like Uganda, Egypt, Libya, Kenya, Cameroun,
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi in the days of Kamuzu Banda, Tanzania, and Zaire under
Mobutu, we have no choice but in saying that what Louis XIV declared in those days of
imperial rule in France and some parts of Europe have received a revival in the world. The
interesting fact is that these leaders represents certain elitists interests in society and have
only succeeded in using state power to advance those elite’s interests. Just recently, the
opposition leader in Uganda, Dr. Kizza Besigye, was arrested on 21st April, 2011 over protest
on the high cost of food and fuel prices. The interesting aspect is that both have been allies
all along. Museveni’s control over power is highly suspect considering the way and manner
in which opposition leaders have been handled and treated. This is what Robert Jackson and
Carl Rosberg (2003) tagged as “personal rule”
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of conflicts as it is clearly instantiated in what is now popularly known as the global Arab
uprising in countries such as Yemen, Syria, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain etc. These conflicts have
both political and economic implications on the character of the modern state especially
where such states, though professes allegiance to socialism, but in practice, is essentially
capitalistic in character.
It is in this sense that Marshal quite anticipated that essentially a capitalist system will
always be in perpetual war with the ideals of citizenship. Where a state adopts the
capitalistic principles and ideals, it is incumbent that such a state system is operated, no
doubt, on the principle of political and economic inequality while citizenship itself is a
programme of general equality. In this sense, capitalism entails a struggle and conflict with
the ideals of citizenship. In other words, conflict characterises relationship in a capitalist
order. This is because inequality is in conflict with equality. Attempts to realise the gains
of citizenship which is an agenda of equality are often precipitants to conflict in such a
state system.24
It appears that it is this essential struggle and antagonism that was anticipated earlier
in Marx’s political philosophy when he wrote that capitalism engenders inequality and
alienation of citizens. In proper terms, the implication of Marx’s thought for citizenship is
what was demonstrated and fleshed out in Marshal’s extensive treatment on relationship
between citizenship and social classes. Marx and Marshall seem to have been agreed on
this point: capitalism generates in a society a system of inequity and inequality. The result,
for both scholars, is what is essentially captured as the perpetuity of conflicts. In this kind
of socio-political ecology, the state is not an innocent institution but a very important
aspect of this conflictual conundrum.
Kathryn Dean (2003) has attempted a thought-provoking analysis of the connection
between citizenship and capitalism. Both cannot be coterminous a fact which suggest that
the modern state, since it carries the aura of capitalism, has become an entity riddled
with conflict rather than an institution based on the model of fair play, mutual consent,
agreement, consensus and contract. Three reasons account for this conclusion or claim. One,
citizenship is essentially a public-spirited idea; it is about the idea of participation which
is meaningful only within the context of the public. Capitalism, on the other hand, thrives
on the idea of the private. It is about the private realm where every part and involvement
is sacred. How then can capitalism promote the essence and stay of citizenship when both
are essentially concerned with different texture of political obligations?
Kamuzu Banda of Malawi was once noted as saying that “I don’t care what the world calls
me, a dictator or what, my job is to develop this country.” Impliedly, Banda’s belief is that
of a notorious dictator who saw nothing essentially good or worthwhile in other citizens’
access to the development of Malawi. The question is after many years of personal rule, how
developed is Malawi?
The outbreak of conflicts in the Niger Delta of Nigeria has been argued to consist in the
different and contradictory ways in which the public status of citizenship is defined in the
Nigerian nations-state. Many scholars have written on the citizenship-conflict dimension of
the problem in the Niger Delta in Nigeria and some other regions, such as Angola, Sudan,
Democratic Republic of Congo, where oil resource has been responsible for the escalation of
crisis and conflicts. See, for examples, Ike Okonta (2008), Idowu William (2002).
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24
58
Again, the central focus of capitalism is the market. What thickens the blood of capitalism
revolves around how the market and its forces are made to run and operate. Without any
iota of sacredness attached to the market, capitalism cannot exist talk less of having any
sense of meaning. However, a very close look at citizenship shows that it is not at all about
the market. Citizenship does not, in any way, derive its sacredness from an attachment
to the market. Without due consideration to the market, it does not follow that that the
essence of citizenship has been compromised for its essence does not lie there. How then
can citizenship and capitalism be coterminous? Market forces in a capitalist system are,
most of the time, not sympathetic to the core ideals and principles that citizenship, as an
institution, stands for.
Thirdly, capital is the main driving force of capitalism while it is not for citizenship
for although there is due consideration to capital which is what we may call economic
empowerment but it does not follow that citizenship arise essentially from an obsessive
tendency to acquire capital or be judged worthy of existence by it. Capital, while not
insignificant, is not the very basis of citizenship. State endorsement of capitalism is one
of the ways in which the modern state has dragged itself into conflict with the idea of
citizenship, the aura of democracy around it notwithstanding. As a matter of fact, the
appeal and allusion to democracy is a pretentious attempt on the part of the modern state to
create an unbroken, unhindered atmosphere and freedom for capitalism to thrive without
the restriction of popular culture.
One of these ways is elitism that was hinted at earlier on. It is no wonder that elitist
theorists criticised liberal democratic theorists for the pretentious silence over the fact
that, in most western democracies, especially in the United States of America, it is actually
the phenomenon that C. Wright Mills (1956) calls “the military-industrial complex” that
influences state policies contrary to the push and pull of the citizenry or the electorate.
Judged from this perspective, it is no wonder that modern anarchists perceive the modern
state as nothing more than an instrument of organised violence. Murray Bookchin (1982,
197) was even willing, along this line of thought, to see the state as representing a mindset
whose global agenda is the realisation and institutionalisation of coercion. This is one of
the reasons, perhaps, why he described the state as “an instilled mentality for ordering
reality.”
Concerning the connection between the state, citizenship, capitalism and conflict, scholars
are not agreed: van de Goor et al. (1996, 19) constate that the connection stems from the
inability to take redistributive measures for citizens in situations where there is shortfalls
in export revenues, Houweling (1996, 162) is of the view that the accounting factor is
the absence of administrative means to regulate behaviour especially where pre-state
institutions seek to offer survival strategies. On my part, the role that exploitation and
corruption plays by the political class in the capitalists’ accumulation process cannot be
overemphasised. This is where Robert Ted Gurr’s (1970) theory of relative deprivation as
precipitants to conflict in the modern state becomes relevant. The discrepancy between
citizens’ expectation and what they actually get creates the predisposition to conflict a
situation where, in obvious terms, the state is always complicit.
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
Migration, National
Citizenship, and the
Modern State
59
The impact of global migration on the nature of citizenship and the modern state appears
phenomenal. The impact is complex and it does not appear clear to me that this section
can attend to all the issues that are connected with the subject matter. Nevertheless, even
if the treatment is likely to be perfunctory, the importance of the concepts to the changing
character of the state is what necessitates the attention given to it here. To do justice to
the issues will require a whole and complete paper outside the purview of the present
endeavour.
The contention here is that the contour of global migration has had and continues to
have a critical and perhaps a negative impact on the idea of national citizenship and the
character of the modern state turning it, as it were, to a theatre of conflict and irreconcilable
interests. A critical look at the effect of globalisation on citizenship shows, very glaringly,
that the state is more of a theatre of conflict than one of consent. Migration pattern all
over the world, for example, shows a dramatic change in the pattern of citizenship and
consequently a change in the character of the modern state. But then, the question is: what
exactly is the pattern of change that migration exposes the concept of citizenship to and
what is the relevance of the state in this whole episode? This is a crucial question inasmuch
as it helps us transcend the myopism that often characterises the treatment of the notion of
citizenship in the light of migration.
The effect of migration on national citizenship, and, consequently, on the modern state
cannot be effectively underscored if we neglect the connection it has with multiculturalism.
Clearly, there has been a one-to-one effect between multiculturalism and migration. The
increase in global migration since 1945 has paved way for the high incidence of cultural
and ethnic diversity. It is historically true that after the Second World War, many European
societies had to open their borders for neighbouring countries and most especially to
former colonies in a bid to restore and rebuild the ruined economies. This is the economic
dimension. Besides this, the incidence of conflicts all over the world especially in the
Eastern bloc, for example, the collapse of the former USSR, Yugoslavia, political instability
in some Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and in Africa based on
nationalistic struggles, ethnic relation breakdown and the clamour for ideological reforms
have also increased the rate of migration all over the world. The number of refugees all
over the world, on account of these wars and conflicts, are reasons why migration patterns
have increased tremendously.
In fact, given this scenario, most scholars see explosion in migration pattern as creating
the possibility of a “hyper-mobile planet” indicating that mobility is the greatest quality of
the twentieth and twenty first centuries. From this sketch, it is no surprise that migration
has influenced the pattern and existence of multiculturalism one way or the other. This
tendency alone makes the modern state, that is, the host state, more volatile than ever
before. This often leads to what one may call the overloading of the host state. Apart
from making multiculturalism an official policy, the demands and rights based on the
multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-religious trends found in such entity become not
just crucial issues but controversial especially when it threatens what the nation-state is
actually known for. For example, jobs that are needed to sustain the economy such as odd
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60
manufacturing works but which are important are performed by these migrants but are
rejected by citizens.
The contribution of migrants, though important, in this respect, to the host nations become
a subject matter of debates and controversies which are fatal and have far reaching
consequences on the state. One of such consequence is the requirement on the part of the
state to ensure that cultural diversity is harmonised to create lasting civic and political
cohesion. But then, on account of the imbalance between demands of international politics
and global economic domination coupled with, in the face and phases of multiculturalism,
what Samuel Huntington (1996) tagged as the clash of civilisation, both migration and
multiculturalism leaves the state a huge responsibility of containing the resulting clashes
and conflicts.
In a sense, therefore, global migration has a connection with citizenship concerns.
Migration pattern all over the world is, in one sense or the other, a reflection of citizenship
problems and travails that migrants are experiencing or had experienced while in their
home country.25 It is in this sense that we must understand what Stephen Castles means
when he said that migration pattern challenges nation-state conception of citizenship.
For Castles (1996, 51-76), migration possesses what he calls widening tendencies in the
conceptualisation and re-conceptualisation of national citizenship. The state does not help
in such matters since it is itself enmeshed in some form of conflict or the other based on
citizenship dissension and disagreement. Such conflicting tendencies affect states response
and treatment of migrants and non-citizens. Canefe (1998) describes such tendencies as
having the possibility of creating an extensive definition of citizenship in consonance with
the principles of global democracy.
For these scholars, migration creates conflicting tendencies in understanding of what
national citizenship implies. Again, since an extensive programme of inclusion is made
possible by the state in consonance with principles of democracy for migrants, denial
and exclusion of certain rights of citizens on traditional or cultural grounds are resisted
and thus leaves the state in a state of conflict with original citizens. This does not,
however, remove the fact that the state, given the demands of a global order and internal
awakenings, is enmeshed in a conglomeration of complex institutions engaged with each
other in one form of conflict or the other to the detriments of migrants and minorities. This
contradiction in the state’ institutional network often creates feelings of alienation and
exclusion as the case may be.
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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And what is more, globalisation and the politics of multinational expansion also reiterate
the view that the state is a theatre of conflict rather than consent or contract.26 Even
though there are disagreements about the meaning of globalisation in the literature,
scholars tend to see it, in the first place, as a complex and dramatic phenomenon based
on its trend and impact. Those who, however, see globalisation as a new orientation and
tendency in world politics do not seem to have a correct perspective to globalisation and
the Enlightenment, in my estimation. This is because globalisation, in my thinking, is
a continuous movement with the period of European Enlightenment basically because,
apart from the major shift that the Enlightenment represented and projected, the aims and
objectives of both globalisation and the Enlightenment appear arguably coincidental and,
properly speaking, strikingly similar. Both are attempts to unite the world, perceive a sense
of interconnectivity among nations all over the world. This is what the world seems to be
singing now about globalisation.
It is in this sense that Scholte (2000) defined globalisation as the growth of superterritorial
relations between people. One important effect of globalisation is that it reduces the
weight of importance that is attached to the nation-state and, as a result, the conception of
citizenship arising from it. Again, globalisation has a potentially weakening influence on
the state itself and states’ sovereignty in general. National policies which are sometimes
defended on traditional and cultural values, and, that are of symbolic importance to such
nation-states, are corrosively eroded by the onslaught of the globalising forces.
In a very poetic form, Phillip Bobbitt (2002) opined that globalisation has removed the
nation-state with all the trappings of cultural and nationalistic sovereignty that it naturally
has and has reduced it altogether to or replaced it with a market state. It means that in the
language of globalisation, the state, traditionally known as the custodian of the national and
symbolic pride that a society is known for ceases to possess these qualities and becomes
nothing other than a market where mere exchange and commerce transpires. The state
becomes an economic entity without any sense of moral, cultural and aesthetic values. It
means the state can no longer be viewed in a normative sense. And as a market state, it
shows that principles of economic profit become its running and reigning principles.
For example, the number of Nigerian citizens who apply year in and year out for the American
Visa Lottery is simply alarming. The exact figure may not be available on immediate demand.
However, of the countries in the world where applications were received, the number of
applicants from Nigeria is about four times the number of those from other countries. One
explanation for this has to do with the fact that citizenship has not been institutionalized in
the Nigerian context. In other words, absent in the Nigerian socio-political ecology is the
programmatic impact of what Christopher Pierson (2004), Francis G. Castles (1996) and
others call the ‘existence of the welfare state”.
The case of the Niger Delta in Nigeria can still be used to corroborate this point. The politics
of multinational expansion is simply exploitative. Shell and the Nigerian State hardly
operate by rules on account of the disrespect for citizenship rights, a factor that explains
the incidence of conflict in the Niger Delta. Angola is also a case in point. The increase in
the production of oil in that Sub-Saharan country has reawakened the interests of countries
such as China and the US in the importing of oil from that conflict-ridden country. US and
China share approximately 75 percent of Angolan oil exports. The unmitigated interests and
the returns from such have been used in sponsoring the almost-three decades of civil war in
that country. It is contended that oil has mortgaged the promotion of citizenship interests on
account of the rise and safeguard of elitists’ interests. See J. D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner
(2001) and M. L. Ross (2001).
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26
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If we follow Bobbitt’s analysis properly, what it means is that globalisation endorses one
of the incredible instances of the mere commoditisation of the state where what matters
is economics and profit making. This approach to the idea of the state has created the
picture of amoralism around the state which means that the state can no longer act as the
true custodian of neutrality and fair play, a tendency that is not consistent with state theory
especially when we fall back on the social contract or consent theory. The possibility is
that the political economy of conflict becomes one of the diversionary tactics, ideology
and strategy of the state.
In some other instances, the replacement and transition initiated by globalisation have
created situations of military weakness, political instability, and economic insecurity
especially in states where the conception of leadership have proven to be dynamic and
resistant to the reductive and weakening tendencies inherent in globalisation. Inevitably,
states subjected to this ‘isolationism’, courtesy of globalisation, have always had problems
coping with the demands that are both internally generated and externally induced. The
slogan that no national economy is an island has created rooms for uprising in states
that desire to be unique especially in situations where demands and obligations towards
citizens are not met due to the isolation package. Capacities to function and meet demands
are often very low and such moments generate tension in the institutional framework of
such states.
Dependency, realisably, is a very harsh conflictual context that most Third World countries
especially postcolonial African countries have found themselves. The unbridled ambition
to control state resources and the interests that multinational corporations have developed
towards such resources like petroleum resources, oil and other natural resource are catalysts
to the conflictual nature of modern states. States are engulfed in conflict all over the world
such that we may not be committing an intellectual misnomer in saying that a global feat
in the age of globalisation is multiplicities of conflicts. W. O. Alli’s timely analysis and
appraisal of globalisation and conflicts in Africa tends to give a warm support for the thesis
propounded so far. In a fairly long passage, Alli (2006, 329-330) enthused that,
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
63
Incidentally, no theory that is known to me seems to have a justifiable Pilatic philosophy
exonerating the modern state from the theatrical instances of conflict in the twentieth and
present centuries. And if it is reasoned that the science of conflictology attributed to the
modern state is nothing but an exercise in personification, the supposed “misnomer” would
not be mine alone considering that particular schools of idealism, with a modern example
in Murray Bookchin (1982), see both history and the state as a rational order exhibiting a
mind of its own.
Conclusion
In concluding, it is important to contend that a lot seems to be impacting on postcolonial
states especially in Africa and Latin American countries. This is not exactly informed
by the crisis of conception on the meaning of postcolonialism but in the fact that the
conditions of the postcolonial are underrated and, possibly, operates based on some
freezing assumptions. Postcolonialism, as an ideology, indeed sought to challenge and
displace the cultural superiority projected by imperial and colonial rule and in the process
instil a sense of recognition and worth to non-western ideas, values and practices. But, at
best, it remained simply ideological without any true reflection on the modern and anticolonial condition of such postcolonial states.
It is in this sense that we have to agree that what postcolonialism did not actually
foresightedly challenge and seek to dislodge was the context and circumstanciality of
artificiality built around postcolonial states in general even though an emphasis on Africa
is not out of place. It is this aura of artificiality around the state that often turns the state to
a theatre of conflicts with the conflicts in turn, in the words of Samuel Egwu (2006, 407),
retaining the verbiage of weakness and incoherence as veritable aspects and features of the
state unable to manage the challenges of development and poverty. Inevitably, postcolonial
state embodies certain contradictions by attempting to reflect the elements of the modern
state when both are built and brought about by different historical conditions generating
unique and peculiar conflict patterns.
The end of the Cold War paved the way for the dramatic changes in the world.
A world hitherto driven by the divisions of ideology was to be integrated by
markets and technology. Structural adjustment and the logic of the market, debt
crisis and marginalisation have all been intensified by this globalisation process
and are also indicator of the process. They have all “down-sized the role of
the state in economic management” thus undermining the capacity of the state
for social provisioning. Yet, for African people, the role of the state is defined
in developmental terms. Consequently, the interplay of economic crisis, social
upheaval and political instability exposed the inadequacies of the African state and
exacerbated the economic condition of the people who fall further into deprivations
and desperation. In this situation, social and political misunderstanding quickly
degenerate into conflicts.
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Öz
Modern Devletin Değişen Karakteri Üzerine Kuramsal Görüşler
Devlet kavramı, siyasi ve felsefi düşüncede merkezi ve önemli bir konudur. Ancak, devlet
etrafında hem tarihsel hem de güncel gerçeklerle ilgili farklı ve çelişkili algılar vardır.
Bu makale, devlet ile ilgili çağdaş algıların önemli birini ele almaktadır. Makale, modern
devletin her ne kadar, teorik olarak, klasik filozof ve kuramcılar tarafından açıklandığı
gibi, bir sözleşme ya da rıza teorisinden ortaya çıkmış olsa da bugünkü çağdaş durumunun,
durağan bir çatışma ve çelişki hissinden etkilenmiş göründüğünü savunmaktadır. Makale,
vatandaşlık fikri, çoğu toplumlardaki çok kültürlü ve çoklu unsurlar, küresel göç oranının
yüksek olması, çok uluslu açılımların siyaset ve felsefesi, ulus-devletin kapitalizmin
aşırı desteği ile pazar-devlet haline geçişi ve küreselleşmenin yansımaları, özellikle
Üçüncü Dünya ülkelerinde, modern devletin çatışmalı ve çelişkili doğası ile birbirlerini
desteklemektedirler. Makale, modern devletin etrafındaki çatışmalı ve çelişkili göstergeler
yukarıda vurgulanan faktörler de dahil olmak üzere ortaya çıkmasını etkilemiş olan tarihsel
koşullar dışında izah edilemez sonucuna varmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Devlet, sözleşme, rıza, çatışma, insan doğası.
About the Author
Idowu William obtained his doctoral degrees from Obafemi Awolowo University, IleIfe and University of Ibadan, Ibadan. Presently, Dr. Idowu William teaches philosophy
at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Osun State, Nigeria with special interests
in Philosophy of law, Continental Philosophy and Socio-Political Philosophy. Idowu
William’s research products have gained seasoned expressions in several transnational
epistemic fora such as Politikon, Journal of Juridical Science, Law and Global
Development, Cambrian Law Review, JPSL, NJAS, Doxa, Quest, Enter-Text, and Africa
Development. He is presently working on the Enlightenment’s conception of human nature
especially in relation to Africa.
Yazar Hakkında
Idowu William doktora derecelerini Obafemi Awolowo Üniversitesi ve Ibadan
Üniversitesi’nden almıştır. Dr. Idowu William Obafemi Awolowo Üniversitesi’nde
özellikle Felsefe Hukuku, Kıta Avrupası Felsefesi ve Sosyo-Politik Felsefeye odaklanan
felsefe dersleri vermektedir. Idowu William’ın yayınları Politikon, Journal of Juridical
Science, Law and Global Development, Cambrian Law Review, JPSL, NJAS, Doxa, Quest,
Enter-Text ve Africa Development gibi uluslararası dergilerde yayımlanmıştır. William
Idowu halen Aydınlanmanın insan doğası kavramı üzerinde, özellikle Afrika’ya ilişkin
olarak, çalışmaktadır.
 I. William
R
epresenting Class Dynamics in Baz
Luhrmann’s Australia
Ayşegül Kesirli
Department of Visual Communication Design, Doğuş University.
Abstract
This article explores the class dynamics in Baz Luhrmann’s Australia and discusses
how both the narrative and the characters in the film are surrounded by constant change,
movement and transitivity. It analyzes the multi-layered narrative of the film in order to
determine the class dynamics between the characters and to discover their shifting positions.
Throughout the analyses, the article refers to how social inequalities, colonial exploitation
and cultural imperialism are represented in the narrative of Australia and questions how
Baz Luhrmann’s cinematic approach and the features of Hollywood historical epic as a
genre are related to the representation of those issues in the film.
Keywords
Class, colonialism, historical epic.
70
Australia (Baz Luhrmann 2008) conveys the story of an English aristocrat, Lady Sarah
Ashley (Nicole Kidman), who inherits a cattle station in Australia in 1939 and struggles
against the monopoly of the cattle baron, King Carney (Bryan Brown), by resisting his
domination and pressure. Parallel to this struggle, the story revolves around Lady Sarah
Ashley’s protection of an Aboriginal child, Nullah (Brandon Walters), from the colonialist
powers and her love affair with a lower class man named Drover (Hugh Jackman), who
helps her to manage the station. Just like Karl Marx’s words in the beginning of Communist
Manifesto that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles,”
(Marx and Engels 1969 [1848], 99) the narrative of Australia is based on class struggles.
As a historical epic that takes place at the beginning of World War II, the film brings an
aristocrat lady, an Aboriginal child and a drover together to stand against a tyrant baron.
This article explores the class dynamics in Baz Luhrmann’s Australia and discusses
how both the narrative and the characters in the film are surrounded by constant change,
movement and transitivity. By using the methodology of political economy, film and genre
theory, it analyzes the multi-layered narrative of the film in order to determine the class
dynamics between the characters and to discover their shifting positions. Throughout the
analyses, it refers to how social inequality, capitalist establishment, colonial exploitation
and cultural imperialism are represented in the narrative of Australia. Regarding Baz
Luhrmann’s cinematic approach and the features of the Hollywood historical epic as a
genre, Australia’s production process and its relation with Hollywood historical epic,
which provides the film with the necessary atmosphere to spread its initial message,
are discussed in the article. It is claimed that Australia, which seems to be resisting and
criticizing capitalist powers in the first place, actually ends up affirming the establishments
of capitalist system by disguising, transforming and reshaping the earlier forms of
capitalism.
Australia is set in a “territory” called Darwin, Australia which, as described in the
prologue of the film is “a land of crocodiles, cattle barons and warrior chiefs” and also
“a place where the Aboriginal children of mixed-race where taken by force from their
families and trained for the service in white society”. With the help of the iconography
of western genre, Darwin is presented as a pre-industrialist land. During the sequence
where Sarah arrives in the harbor of Darwin and Drover first appears, the costumes of the
characters, the horses that are seen all around, the desert-like environment and the lousy
bar with the swing door refer to the Western genre, which usually takes place in the Wild
West of the 19th century. When Magarri (David Ngoombujarra) warns Drover about the
plane’s arrival, the plane interrupts the frame as something bizarre and out of this world
because although the prologue prepares the spectators for a romantic, adventurous and preindustrial fairytale, the spectators acknowledge that at the time of the narrative, the rest of
the world is living in a post-industrialist era in which big metropolises and huge capitalist
industries have already been established and where free competition reigns. Therefore,
with the interruption of the plane, the hybrid and layered character of the film is revealed
right from the beginning.
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
71
In the opening scene of Australia, when Nullah’s voiceover notifies the spectator that
the story of the film is not beginning in Australia, but a place called England, the hybrid
character and the layered narration of the film become much more stratified. The use
of telegram, airplanes, automobiles, firearms, along with the horses and spears at the
beginning of the narrative all support the layered character of the film and invite change
and movement. In this way, the narrative proves that it contains the aristocratic background
of England, the colonialist era and the post-industrial society altogether and declares that
this combination carries the spectator to a constant struggle, transformation and change.
Sarah Ashley is one of the most significant characters to support this changing, multilayered and transformative narrative of the film. She comes to Australia to catch her
husband, Lord Ashley, in action with “native” women and convince him to sell their
property in Australia and go back to England. However, when she arrives in Darwin she
finds out that her husband is murdered and their cattle station is without a boss. Just after
she buries her husband and gets ready to go back to her country she realizes that the
manager of the cattle station, Neil Fletcher (David Wenham), has been making the station
look infertile and stealing money from her in order to lower the value of the property and
provide King Carney with the opportunity to buy the station at high profit. Following this,
Sarah Ashley fires Neil Fletcher and everybody who works in the station starts to call her
“Mrs. Boss”.
Although Sarah Ashley is an English aristocrat she embraces bourgeois values when she
comes to Australia. As the accountant Kipling Flynn (Jack Thompson) suggests she plans
to continue what her husband has planned to do in the cattle station; drive the cattle to
Darwin, sell them to the army, break Carney’s monopoly, use the profits to put the cattle
station Faraway Downs back on its feet, go back to London and continue her life. However,
in order to execute this plan, Sarah Ashley has to learn how to be a “true” capitalist first.
After Ashley fires Neil Fletcher, Drover comes into the scene because the cattle station
needs a proper manager. Sarah begs Drover to take charge and help her. But Drover is a
character who just works for himself. He refuses to be an employer since his life motto
is “no man hires me, no man fires me.” He accepts Sarah’s proposal only because she
offers to give him her Capricornia, which is a very special, pure English-blooded horse
in exchange of his labor. It can be said that Drover tries to withdraw himself from the
capitalist society by being devoted to rural life, horses and soil. He does not belong to the
post-industrial society and consequently he prefers to work with barter instead of money.
Drover owns nothing for himself. The spectator never sees a house or any personal ties that
bind him to a property except horses and soil. Drover just drives other people’s properties
and he has nothing for his own in the end. He sells his labor to the landowners in Darwin
to make a living, but he always refuses to admit that he is a laborer, which indicates that in
this sense, he has no class consciousness at all.
The main characters live their lives as if they are under the command of a feudal landlord.
King Carney has no competitor in meat business and owns most of the property in Darwin.
For the properties that he does not own he sets up traps and conquers them. When the
 A. Kesirli
72
camera focuses on an auction for charity at the missionary ball where the man who gives
the highest price deserves the first dance with Sarah Ashley, King Carney gives the highest
price and the host says “Let the King take his prize.” Beginning with this sequence, King
Carney is represented in the film as a character who can invade anything. This is why when
he dances with Sarah he also starts to bargain with her in order to buy the cattle station. As
a true capitalist Sarah says that she has workers in the station for whom she is responsible.
However, as a feudal landlord prototype, Carney says that he can also buy the workers
with the station and put this provision into the contract. This shows that ‘King’ Carney,
who can buy everything with his money and power appears to be the only authority in
Darwin until Sarah Ashley’s arrival.
“Exploitation” as a Marxist term opens a major discussion about the representation of
class dynamics, power figures and division of labor in Australia. The term first comes into
question when Drover explains Sarah his determination to breed a bush brumby (a feral
horse) with an English filly (a pureblooded, female horse). Sarah misunderstands Drover’s
words and thinks that he is coming on to her. She says that Drover “wants to have it on her,
just like he exploits the poor, native girls.” After this conversation, the word ‘exploitation’
is used once again when Sarah explains to Drover why she dismisses Neil Fletcher. Within
a moment of anger, Drover suggests that Sarah might have fired Fletcher because he tried
to exploit her. When Sarah says that Fletcher has been stealing from the station in favor of
King Carney, exploiting as a term finds the right meaning for itself in a Marxist analysis.
Although Drover makes a joke about “exploiting”, Fletcher has been really exploiting the
profit of the station as well as the labor of the workers in it.
“Exploitation” turns into the main subject of the discussion when Drover explains to Sarah
how white stockmen take Aboriginal women on the drove by shaving their heads and
making them look like boys in order to use them as ‘company’ at nights. While Drover is
explaining the situation he refers to Sarah’s word choice in the earlier scenes and uses the
term ‘exploitation’ on purpose to clarify the act of white men. In this way, although Drover
uses the term as an expression of sexual exploitation it is clear that white men also use the
labor of Aboriginal women on the drove for nothing and exploit them both sexually and
materially.
As a result of these discussions, it can be said that Sarah’s position in the dynamics between
the exploited characters and the exploiters becomes complicated. At the beginning of the
film Sarah, whose profit is exploited by Neil Fletcher and King Carney, is positioned on
the side of the exploited characters, but she is not necessarily very different from the white
exploiters in the diegetic world because she is the one who brings the free competition of
capitalism to Darwin. Her relation with Nullah and her association with “mother” England
make her position complicated as well. It can be said that Sarah is the only character
who is exposed to most of the changes and transformations throughout the whole film.
Therefore, her changing position and role in the course of actions place her in different
positions in different levels of the narrative. Sarah is a significant figure through whom the
establishment of capitalism in the diegesis can be analyzed.
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
73
The sequence where Drover teaches Sarah how to drive the cattle is a good example for
starting to explain Sarah’s changing position. During the sequence she acts like an amateur
land owner who learns how to manage her capital and private property. She shouts at
the cattle, rides her horse onto them and tries to rule them. In this way, she learns how
to survive in capitalism on her own. Sarah’s struggle with the cattle also signifies her
survival in the rural establishment of Darwin. She studies the land and tries to be a part
of the natural Australia as a cultural subject. Even though the film gives numberless clues
to identify Sarah with nature and the soil the dichotomy between nature and culture is
complicated in Sarah’s case. On the one hand, her infertility prevents her from identifying
with nature’s fertility although the film leads the spectator to think in that way. On the
other hand, her inability to reproduce fits in her English descent figuratively and reveals
many aspects of her symbolic position in the history of colonialism.
As an island, United Kingdom cannot expand/reproduce its land organically. There is no
way for United Kingdom to create a territorial integrity (i.e. an umbilical bound) with
another land. An island can only adopt/colonize other countries in order to spread out its
hegemony, which makes it physically infertile and Australia as another island is a perfect
candidate for this adoption. Similarly, Sarah’s physical inability to reproduce corresponds
with this condition and brings her colonialist character into the surface.
There is no simple explanation to describe the history of English colonialism in Australia
from which Baz Luhrmann’s Australia takes its inspiration. It can be said that England
started to colonize Australia in the last quarter of 18th century when the country was ruled
by King George III. The first fleet under the command of Captain Arthur Philips, who had
been employed by the Royal Navy, arrived in Australia in 1786. Australia was an open
prison in the first days of colonization. The English prisons were too crowded for the
convicts at that time and the government thought that it was a good idea to use the convicts
for the preparation of the settlement in the Australian colony (Clarke 2002, 23).
It is not clear how and when Australia became a completely independent country, separate
from England. It seems to be a very long process, which lasts until the 1980’s but it can
be said that the first separation occurred during the World War II when Winston Churchill,
who was the leader of the United Kingdom during World War II, “regarded the war in the
Pacific as a side issue and took the view that the most important task was to defeat Hitler.
[…] Naturally, this view did not recommend itself to the Australian government, and in
December 1941 the prime minister made a historic declaration in which he refused to
accept that the struggle in the Pacific was a secondary importance or that Australia was
dispensable.” (Clarke 2002, 136)
Winston Churchill’s declaration was made after the Japanese attack to the harbor of Darwin
which is represented in the second half of Australia. It is significant that the film contains
a part of Australian history which is a breakthrough for the rising independent spirit in
Australia. However, it should be remembered that the film ends at the point where Darwin
is completely ruined by the attack, so it does not indicate how and when the independent
 A. Kesirli
74
spirit rises and strengthens in Australia. Therefore, the characters in the diegetic world
only obey and respect England as a “mother” country.
The issue that grows around the notion of motherhood is important in the narrative of
Australia because there are only two more characters in the film who are specified as
mothers like England. The first character is Nullah’s Aboriginal birth-mother, Daisy
(Ursula Yovich), who works and hides with Nullah from legal authorities in Faraway
Downs. Although Daisy is an important figure in the narrative she is drowned in the water
tank in the cattle station during the first act of the film while she tries to hide from the
police officers with Nullah. After Daisy’s death Nullah becomes an orphan and Sarah takes
him under her protection.
When Nullah loses her mother Sarah starts to take care of him and happens to be the ‘new’
mother figure in the narrative. After a while their relationship gets closer and Sarah takes
Nullah under her wings as if he is her own child. She dresses Nullah like a European
boy, she teaches him how to play tennis and they all celebrate Christmas together. Along
with Sarah’s attempts to transform Nullah into a European subject ‘with good intentions’
Nullah’s grandfather King George invites him to go to a ritualistic journey called
‘walkabout’ during which male Australian Aborigines trace the paths of their ancestors and
live in the wilderness for a period of time. Although Drover constantly warns Sarah about
the fact that Nullah is an Aboriginal child and has to go to walkabout with his grandfather
Sarah insistently ignores him by saying that Nullah is only a little boy and cannot survive
in a long journey like walkabout.
Sarah always speaks for Nullah without asking his own ideas. She always thinks of
him as a little boy who cannot have his own wishes and decisions. She also does not
allow his grandfather to speak for him and acts like he does not exist at all. She refuses
Nullah’s own traditions and cultural background and becomes one of the missionaries
herself although she constantly criticizes them. That is why Sarah’s branding of cattle,
Drover’s domesticating Capricornia and Nullah’s rejecting his grandfather’s offer to go to
walkabout were indicated in parallel editing to emphasize that all of those scenes have a
mutual meaning. Sarah tries to domesticate Australian traditions and nature. She attempts
to possess them by putting her own brand/flag on. In this way, Sarah develops into a
character who comes to Australia as a cultural subject and grows into a strong mother
figure that captures and transforms both the nature and the culture of the land inorganically.
On the other hand, Sarah’s attempt to be a family with Nullah and Drover also support
her bourgeois position. By keeping Nullah away from his own traditions and culture for
the sake of being a “family”, she does not only turn into a cultural imperialist but also
becomes committed to bourgeois family values. Sarah considers both Nullah and Drover
as her possessions and properties. She also thinks that if she can break Nullah and Drover’s
connections with their cultural backgrounds she can possess a part of Australia as well.
It is very strange that Australia makes Sarah’s attempts look like a revolutionary act. It
can be said that this assumption has to do with the director’s personal history and the
film’s genre. Baz Luhrmann is an Australian director who works on co-productions with
 atılım
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
75
Hollywood film industry. In Altyazı Monthly Cinema Magazine, Nadir Öperli says that Baz
Luhrmann emphasizes one specific motto throughout his career which is “Just because it
is, doesn’t mean it should be.” (Öperli 2009, 50)
As a Luhrmann character, Sarah literally embraces this motto in one of the most important
scenes of the film where she urges Drover to come to the missionary ball with her but
Drover turns her invitation down by saying that he is as good as black to the people who
would be at the ball. He also says “I mix with dingoes, not duchesses” but Sarah replies to
him by saying “Just because it is doesn’t mean it should be.” What is understood from this
conversation is that Sarah always craves for change and transformation which can come
only if people from different classes contact, clash, and get into a struggle with each other
just like in a missionary ball where people from Australian high society come together
with a person from lower class like Drover.
The same idea repeats itself throughout the whole film. The struggle of Sarah, Drover,
Nullah, Magarri and Bandy (Lillian Crombie) all together during their trip from Faraway
Downs to Darwin is a proof of how clash of different classes can lead the narrative to
movement and change. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the class struggle and
the changing social conditions that are indicated in the diegesis of Australia lead into the
victory of proletariat as predicted by Marx. Instead they are used to form another social
system.
Öperli says that at the entrance of the website of Baz Luhrmann’s production company,
an assertive logo and slogan which says that “A life lived in fear is a life half lived” greet
the visitors. According to Öperli, this logo and slogan reflect the spirit of Baz Luhrmann’s
cinema, which focuses on the characters who do not give up on their dreams despite the
obstacles and emphasizes the director’s constant interest in searching for new narrative
techniques. He points out that Luhrmann always tries different narrative techniques
in cinema and re-interpret old genres. (Öperli 2009, 50) The essential features of Baz
Luhrmann’s cinematic approach come into surface in Australia as well.
Australia is a film which imitates the iconography and narrative techniques of Hollywood
historical epics defined by Vivian Sobchack as a mixture of “sartorial extravagance” with
“extravagance of action and place.” Sobchack says “there are all those chariot races, all
those stampedes and crowd scenes, all those charges and campaigns on land and battles at
sea, all those horses and slaves and Christians and wagon trains. There is also the vastness
of deserts, plains, and oceans, and the monumentality of Rome, the Pyramids, Khartoum,
and Babylon.” (Sobchack 1990, 25) All the scenes in the great mountains and deserts
where the crowded cattle and horse herds are seen as well as the excessive sequences that
indicate the Japanese attack to the harbor of Darwin prove the extravagance of Australia
which is produced by 20th Century Fox. Along with this, the film’s use of maps, voiceovers,
historical costumes and items as well as Hollywood stars makes Australia a Hollywood
historical epic.
On the other hand, Vivian Sobchack says “the Hollywood historical epic is not so much
the narrative accounting of specific historical events as it is the narrative construction of
 A. Kesirli
76
general historical eventfulness.” (Sobchack 1990, 28) Australia is a film which makes
no attempt to be historically accurate either. As a historical epic it is praised “not for its
historical accuracy or specificity but rather for its extravagant generality and excess – of
sets, costumes, starts and spectacle, of the money and labor that went into the making of
such entertainment” (Sobchack 1990, 28).
Sobchack also emphasizes that “in its particular representation of the “production” of
History, Hollywood historical epic depended upon a celebration of rationalism, humanism,
the unity of historical agents, the progress, continuity, and coherence of centralized
“production” process availing itself of labor’s surplus value to produce excessive
temporality as a fixed commodity, a stable and coherent narrative: History” (Sobchack
1990, 41). In this context, she explains how the Hollywood historical epics are proudly
promoted according to their extravagant use of labor, big budget/capital and box office/
surplus value. In reference to Vivian Sobchack’s theories on Hollywood historical epics, it
can be said that these films including Australia are proud to be a part of the capitalist system
because they are benefiting from it although sometimes their narratives and narration
spread anti-capitalist messages which means that even the Marxist way of thinking can
turn into a commodity in the Hollywood historical epics to get benefit and profit. This is
why although Sarah is a character who brings the free competition of capitalist system
to Darwin and exploits other characters in many different ways, the narrative shows her
every act as if they were revolutionary footsteps. Although Sarah defeats the monopoly
of the tyrant baron, King Carney, she creates new ways of exploitation, alienation and
suppression at the same time. Simultaneously, the means of production of Hollywood
historical epic allows, supports and leads her to her goals.
The change and movement that come to Darwin with Sarah’s arrival enables the
disappearance of King Carney’s feudal monopoly and ends the war between Sarah and
King Carney in Australia. However, this disappearance also causes new wars and new
struggles. For that reason, it is really significant that Australia ends with a sub-story that
focuses on the Japanese attack to Darwin during the World War II and people’s escape
from Darwin after the attack. In this way, the film reflects the idea that the war is never
ending. Although the film concludes, the spectator knows that World War II continued to
give a new shape to the material conditions of people and the world has kept changing as
long as the class conflict has existed and that capitalism has survived.
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
77
References
Clarke, Frank G. 2002. History of Australia. US: Greenwood Publishing Group.
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1969. [1848] Communist Manifesto. Selected Works Volume One.
98-137. Moscow, USSR: Progress Publishers.
Öperli, Nadir. 2009. Baz Luhrmann: Görkem peşinde bir misyoner. Altyazı Aylık Sinema Dergisi.
80, 50-55.
Sobchack, Vivian. 1990. “Surge and splendor”: A phenomenology of the Hollywood historical epic.
Representations. 29, 24-49.
Öz
Baz Luhrmann yönetmenliğindeki Avustralya’da Sınıf Dinamiklerinin
Temsil Edilmesi
Bu makalede Baz Luhrmann’ın Avustralya filmindeki sınıf dinamikleri araştırılmakta
ve filmin anlatısı ve karakterlerini çevreleyen daimi değişim, hareket ve geçişkenlik
tartışılmaktadır. Makalede, karakterler arasındaki sınıf dinamiklerini belirlemek ve
karakterlerin değişen sınıfsal pozisyonlarını saptamak amacıyla filmin çok katmanlı
anlatısı incelenmektedir. Bu inceleme boyunca, makalede sosyal adaletsizliğin, kolonyel
sömürünün ve kültürel emperyalizmin Avustralya’nın anlatısı içinde nasıl temsil edildiğine
değinilirken Baz Luhrmann’ın sinema anlayışının ve Hollywood tarihi epiğinin türsel
özelliklerinin film içerisinde tüm bu konularla nasıl bağdaştığı sorgulanmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Sınıf, sömürgecilik, tarihi epik.
About the Author
Ayşegül Kesirli was born in Izmir in 1983. She studied advertising and film at Istanbul
Bilgi University. She completed her MA degree at Istanbul Bilgi University, Department
of Cultural Studies. Currently, she is pursuing a PhD at Bahçeşehir University, Cinema and
Media Research. She is working as a research assistant at Doğuş University, Department
of Visual Communication Design.
Yazar Hakkında
Ayşegül Kesirli 1983 yılında İzmir’de doğdu. İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Reklamcılık
(ana dal) ve Sinema-Televizyon (yan dal) Bölümleri’nden mezun olduktan sonra aynı
üniversitenin Kültürel İncelemeler Bölümü’nde yüksek lisans eğitimini tamamladı. Halen
Bahçeşehir Üniversitesi Sinema ve Medya Araştırmaları Bölümü’nde doktorasına devam
ediyor. Doğuş Üniversitesi Görsel İletişim Tasarımı Bölümü’nde araştırma görevlisi
olarak çalışıyor.
 atılım
 A. Kesirli
U
s” and “Them” Dichotomy Within:
Iraqi Identity Building During the
Saddam Era
Duygu Dersan Orhan
Department of International Relations, Atılım University.
Abstract
Saddam Hussein’s attempts at nation-building promoted a dichotomy of “us” and “them”
not only on the outside, but also within Iraq’s borders. Within this context, the paper
reveals how the Ba’ath regime gradually transformed itself into an oligarchy during
Saddam Hussein’s rule and transformed the Sunnis from a minority to a majority while
alienating other ethnic and religious elements in Iraq. The paper also explores how the
system collapsed with the Iraqi War in 2003 as well as the contribution of Saddam’s failure
in developing an Iraqi national identity to that process. Throughout the paper it is argued
that the alienation of certain ethnic and religious groups contributed to the downfall of
the Saddam regime by forcing the alienated groups into collaboration with the US. Today,
little remains of the Iraqi nationality and the Iraqi identity. The Iraqi national identity,
which various Iraqi regimes tried to develop, dissolved as soon as the state apparatus
disappeared.
Key Words
Iraq, nation-building, identity, Saddam Hussein
80
Introduction
After the US invasion, the Iraqi nationality and the Iraqi identity all but disappeared. The
sectarianism along ethno-religious lines escalated into a civil war, and some suggested
that the country be divided into three parts as a solution: a Kurdish state in the north, a
Sunni Arab state in the middle and a Shi’i Arab state in the south. Today, it remains unclear
whether Iraq will remain as a unified state, or whether it will break up into three separate
identities. The Iraqi national identity that various Iraqi regimes tried to develop, dissolved
as soon as the state apparatus disappeared. It is generally argued that the alienation of
certain ethnic and religious groups by the Saddam regime’s policies of assimilation and
repression contributed to the collapse of the regime by facilitating cooperation between the
alienated groups in Iraq and the United States.
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
have also tried to construct a common identity, a sense of Iraqi nationhood. As part of the
nation-building process, state education emphasized nationalism and secularism; an army
was built and introduced as the essential national institution. Authoritarian, repressive and
centralizing regimes that have ruled Iraq since the demise of the monarchy in July 1958
relied on mobilization efforts and made appeals to identity. However, the most frequent
definitions and redefinitions of Iraqi identity have occurred in the era of Saddam Hussein.
Ryan (1995, 2) asserts that “[i]n the third world, states that inherited artificial borders that
did not reflect pre-existing cultural divisions have frequently experienced serious ethnic
violence as they struggled to adjust to a post-colonial generation”. In the Iraqi context,
there is not a clear convergence between state frontiers and cultural boundaries. This
situation challenges Gellner’s definition of nationalism, which is “primarily a principle
that holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (Gellner 1983, 1).
Ethnic and sectarian composition of the country, which is heterogeneous and fragmented,
has become an obstacle to the formation of a common identity since the inception of the
Iraqi state and has led to conflict. However, ethnic and cultural diversity by itself does
not necessarily lead to conflict between ethnic groups as Stavenhagen suggests (1996, 9);
when a state is essentially controlled by a majority or dominant ethnie, which is able to
exercise hegemony over the rest of the nation, ethnic conflict will occur. Inter-ethnic or
sectarian competition or rivalry is hardly a cause of conflict itself. Rather, poor leadership,
motivated by particular interests and with a record of discrimination, violation of human
rights and economic and social neglect, is the main cause of internal conflicts (Wolff 2006,
63).
This paper examines the identity formation process in Iraq during the Saddam by looking
at i) the strategies of the Saddam regime in formulating a common national identity; ii) the
policies of the regime towards different ethnic and sectarian groups, mainly Sunni Arabs,
Shi’i Arabs and the Kurds; iii) and the existence of competing national, sub-national
and transnational identities in Iraq during that period. The main argument of the paper
is that the Saddam regime’s assimilative and repressive nationalist ideology has proven
to be divisive, promoting an “us” and “them” dichotomy within Iraq as well as outside.
It is argued that sub-national ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and transnational identities took
precedence over the Iraqi national identity.
Iraq’s fragile national identity can be traced back to the origins of the Iraqi state. Iraq
was created in 1921 according to British interests in the Middle East. The Iraqi state was
put together from three provinces of the collapsed Ottoman Empire: Baghdad, Basra
and Mosul. The creation of Iraq and demarcation of its borders was an artificial process.
The boundaries of modern Iraq were drawn according to narrow European political
and economic interests rather than demographic realities. The south of the country was
overwhelmingly Arab Shi’i, the central part Arab Sunni, and the north contained substantial
non-Arab populations, primarily Kurdish and Turcoman. There are two basic cleavages
within the Iraqi population: religious and ethnic. The religious division lies between the
Shi’i Muslim majority, approximately 60 per cent of the population, and the Sunni Muslim
minority, constituting less than 30 per cent of the population, who nevertheless dominated
the government until the collapse of the regime in 2003. Although the Sunnis and the
Shiites largely adhere to the same belief system, they have fought with each other in Iraq
for over 1400 years (Sciolino 1991, 39). In addition to this diversity, there are smaller
groups of Christians and Jews who are mainly city dwellers. The exception is the Christian
Assyrians who live in villages north of Mosul (Dawisha 2002, 119). There is also an ethnic
division that separates Arabs and non-Arabs.
King Faisal (1921-1933) under the British mandate became successful in maintaining a
politics of moderating conflicting elements and introducing a measure of social integration.
According to Sluglett and Sluglett (2003, 112), although Faisal was brought to power by
the British, he did not totally submit to British demands. He tried to keep a balance between
the expectations of the British and the Iraqi national aspirations. It seems that Faisal was
more successful in nation-building than his successors. Succeeding Iraqi governments
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The Rule of Dominant
Minority
Saddam’s
Consolidation of Power
On 17 July 1968, the Ba’thists made their successful coup and toppled the Arif regime.
In the second Iraqi Ba’thist government, General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became the
president and commander-in-chief, he remained secretary-general of the Party and
chairman of its Revolutionary Command Council. Saddam became the deputy chairman
of the Revolutionary Command Council, the second most important post in the ruling
hierarchy, and he became responsible for all internal security matters. At the beginning of
his career, Saddam started to remove dissident elements and anyone who might threaten
Ba’thist power or his own position, as Simons (1996, 280) argues. In that era, non-Ba’thists
were expelled from state institutions and Saddam gradually increased his power. He had
dominated the army, placed his own security men into all the state organs, removed all the
civilian rivals, and increasingly came to dominate the Iraqi president. Although al-Bakr
was the official president, by 1973, he was completely isolated, and became a symbolic
president at the end (Simons 1996, 280-293).
On 17 July 1979, Saddam Hussein declared himself as the president of Iraq. According
to Karsh and Rautsi (1991, 24), Saddam began creating for himself a cult of personality
which had never been seen before in Iraq or the Arab world (Rezun 1992, 124). As
Saddam’s cult of personality grew after his seizure of presidency in 1979, the party’s role
correspondingly diminished. Thus, it could be said that, after 1979, Iraqi politics became
linked to the person of Saddam Hussein. Saddam believes that he always speaks for the
Iraqi people so their wishes are his. He was equated himself with the state similar to
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King Louis XIV who said that “L’état c’est moi” (I am the state) (Simons 1996, 287).
As a part of launching a strong personality cult strategy, Saddam’s pictures appeared
everywhere like on postage stamps, wrist watches, T-shirts, street hoardings, in schools,
offices, and throughout government buildings. The airport at Baghdad became the Saddam
International Airport and Saddam’s Birthday became a National Day.
Ideology of Nationbuilding in Ba’thi
Iraq: Between
Arabism and Iraqi
Nationalism
Failure of nation-building attempts in Iraq could be explained by two factors as Bengio
suggests. One is the systemic factors related with the very makeup of the Iraqi state
itself. It could be said that Iraq lacks the cornerstones for the formation of a nation, such
as common territory, religion, language and race. However, this systemic factor could
not explain the failure of nation-building process in Iraq by its own. It is known that
some countries with more heterogeneous and fragmented populations than Iraq like Iran
were successful in nation building. The problem with the Iraqi case could be explained
by another factor which is the occasional, related to the Ba’thi ideology and its policies
(Bengio 1999, 150). Although, the Sunni-led Ba’thi regime in power was more dedicated
than any of its predecessors to the ideal of Iraqi nation building and state building, its
policies produced opposite results. It is even argued that the failure of the nation-building
process in Iraq is related with the propagation of nationalism as a state ideology by the
Ba’thi regime (Bengio 1998, 103).
In addition to the heterogeneous and fragmented structure of Iraq which seems as an
obstacle to the state and nation building, Arab Sunni minority rule in the country made
the nation-building process difficult. The tension between the politically dominated Sunni
minority and the other Iraqi communities continued during the Ba’th regime. Chalabi
(2007) explains the transition in the Iraqi Ba’th party which was formed in Iraq in the early
1950s by Shi’i and Sunni Arabs. He states that within the four years of the November 1963
coup by nationalist army officers Shi’is removed from the leadership. In the 1968 coup,
which brought the Ba’th Party to power for the second time, Sunni policy makers were
the overwhelming majority. After Saddam succeeded in eliminating all of his opponents
within the “Iraqi Command”, the party turned into a sectarian organization. On the other
hand, Musallam (1996, 22-73) explains the sectarianism in Ba’th party through making a
comparison with the Communist party of the Soviet Union where the ethnic Russians were
overwhelmingly composed the majority. He states that “in Iraq Sunni Muslims accounted
for 84.9 per cent of the top command of the party, while Shi’i members represented only
5.7 per cent”.
During Saddam Hussein’s term as the leader of the vigorously Arabist Ba’th Party, whose
slogan was “one Arab nation with an external mission,” Arabism was systematically
propagated by the Ba’th party. Given the existence of the non-Arab populations in Iraq,
Arabist Ba’th ideology was in contradiction with the ethnic and religious composition of
Iraq. Ba’thists continuously invoked Arabism by ignoring the existence of the non-Arab
Kurdish community which constituted some 20 percent of the Iraqi population (Dawisha
2003). Ba’th party’s commitment to the uncompromising Arab nationalist ideology and
to achieving pan-Arab unity not just alienated the non-Arab population-mainly Kurdsbut also Arab Shi’is. The country’s Shi’i majority never overcame its suspicion of Arab
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nationalism as being a Sunni project as Dawisha (2003) argues. Shi’i suspicions related
with the Sunni project were related primarily to politics, with the Sunni dominance over
Iraq’s political system. It is even said by Bengio (1998, 103) that all-Arab nationalism
adopted by the regime was the most extreme case of sectarianism. Pan-Arabism in Ba’th
regime’s ideology was seen by the other ethnic and sectarian groups as a tool in order
to consolidate the Sunni Arab rule. According to some authors like al-Khalil (1990,
215), much of the violence during the Ba’thi regime is attributable to the incompatibility
between the political goal of Arabism and the confessional distribution of the Iraqi society.
As a result of the Kurdish rebellion which led to the 1970 settlement and the bloody fight
between Jordan and Palestinian guerillas which was in contradiction with the pan-Arabist
policy that Iraq followed, Saddam revaluated Iraq’s single-minded pan-Arab orientation
(Dawisha 2002, 128) According to Dawisha (2003), the enthusiasm for Arab nationalism
decreased due to the recognition of the country’s own needs. It does not mean that the Ba’th
regime no longer cared about Arab nationalism, rather primacy was started to given to the
internal problems of the country like achieving political harmony, building infrastructure,
reviving economy and solving the problem of ethnic and sectarian divisions (Dawisha
2002, 129). This tendency was also related to the regional developments, particularly
with the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 and Nasser’s diminishing prestige. Musallam
explains this situation with the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt which
marked the beginning of a new era in contemporary Arab politics. He states that while
the first generation Arab leaders who founded Arab nationalism were idealistic, second
generation of Arab leaders such as Hafez al-Assad in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq
followed realistic policies due to the failure of pan-Arabist ambition (Musallam 1996,
33-34).
As a result of these developments, Iraq was quickly loosing its image as a base for
Arab nationalist revolution by the mid 1970s. To prove this tendency, in instructing an
educational committee, Saddam Hussein said:
When we talk of the [Arab] nation, we should not forget to talk about the Iraqi
people… When we talk about the Arab homeland, we should not neglect to educate
the Iraqi to take pride in the piece of land in which he lives… [Iraqis] consist of
Arabs and non Arabs, [so] when we talk about the great [Arab] homeland, we must
not push the non-Arabs to look for a country outside Iraq (Baram 1983, 196).
Therefore, Ba’th elites have been confronted by a problem of identity between two
ideologies: Iraqi nationalism versus Arab nationalism, or wataniyya versus qawmiyya
Arabiyya. Qawmiyya Arabiyya derived from the word qawm (meaning “tribe, ethnic
nationality”) while wataniyya derived from the word watan (meaning “homeland,
native country”). The word qawmiyya has been used to refer to pan-Arab nationalism,
while wataniyya has been used to refer to patriotism at a more local level and based on
territory (in our case; Iraqi nationalism). This is not unique to the Iraqi case; there are
different identities and nationalisms in the Arab Middle East due to the make-up of the
region. The concept of the state is a European one and come to the Middle East as an
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‘imported commodity’ partly under colonial pressure and under the influence of imitation
(Ayubi 1995, 21). The states of the Arab Middle East established after the World War I
lacking prior territorial statehood attached to the Islamic and Arab identities rather than
the territorial nation state. Hinnebusch (2003) states that there is an incongruity between
the state (sovereignty) and the nation (identity) in the Middle Eastern context. This is
why, some of the countries of the region are irredentist and identification with sub-state
or supra-state levels are stronger than territorial identification. While, nationalism means
loyalty to the “state”, ethnicity, primordialism, tribalism, sub-nationalism means loyalty
to the “nation”. In the Middle East, there is a strong tendency to organize political life
according to cultural boundaries rather than the territorial boundaries (Ryan 1995, 9).
There is also an argument that political configuration in the Middle East is a consequence
of Islamic culture, rather than a Third World phenomenon. According to that perspective,
the reasons for the lack of identification with the territorial nation-state in the Middle East
is related with the Islam itself. In the Arab world, due to the concept of umma (universal
Islamic community) in Islam, Arabs are not sympathetic to territory based on politics and
in Islam there is no territorial conception of the state. However, religious factors are not
sufficient to explain the weakness of national territorial state in the Arab world by its
own. Ayubi (1995, 136) asserts that, the transition to a nation-state corresponds with the
emergence of an industrial revolution and the organization of a working class movement
in Europe, which has not taken place in the Middle East.
On the other hand, qawmiyya Arabiyya rests on the Pan-Arabist ideology developed in
the twentieth-century in conjunction with the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire and the
entrance of the colonial powers in the region. Its roots back to the idea of Sati’ Al-Husri
(1882-1968) who was the most influential theoretician of Arab nationalism. Al-Husri was
inspired by German nationalism and German philosophers Herder and Fichte. As opposed
to the French idea of the nation which is equated with the state, al-Husri borrowed German
nationalism in which there is a distinction between the state and the nation. Depending on
cultural nationalism which has linguistic and historical dimensions, al Husri rejected the
view that “state creates the nation”. Pan-Arabism was emerged as a political movement to
throw out the rule of the Ottoman Empire during the World War I. Arabism was perceived
basically in contrast to ‘Turkism’ in the Ottoman state. Pan-Arabism perceived as a
challenge to the Turkification policies of the Ottoman Empire. After the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, pan-Arabism became a challenge for the domination of the colonial
rulers in the Middle East and then the externally imposed “the state of Israel”. The
independence movements motivated by Arabism paved the way for the formation of the
Arab Ba’th Socialist Party. Arabism both had a political and cultural character. Culturally,
it was based on the idea of a common culture, language and shared history and politically, it
was a common struggle against colonialism and for liberation and progress. Pan-Arabism
reached its peak in the 1950s and 1960s due to the rise of independent movements and the
rise of Nasser in Egypt as the pan-Arab leader. Pan-Arabism was perceived as a solution
to “one nation-many states” dilemma. Given the popular credibility of Arabism, rulers in
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the Arab states identified themselves with Arabism in order to overcome their legitimacy
crisis (Hinnebusch 2003).
While Wataniyya is expressed as to rely on the Iraqi state and make emphasis on the “unity
within”, qawmiyya Arabiyya means Arab nationalism, its focus is on “unity without”
(Bengio 1987, 512) Qawmiyya and wataniyya both coexisted and competed with each
other in the Iraqi context. Ever since its formation, the question of whether Iraq is a nationstate or an Arab state has been contested (Tripp 2002, 168). This situation is valid for all
the Arab states in general in these years but it is clearly valid for Iraq, and most especially
for Ba’thi Iraq. This is related with the ideological commitment of the Ba’th party to allArab nationalism on the one hand and the existence of non-Arab populations on the other
hand.
After Iraqi nationalism gained primacy to Arab nationalism, the Ba’th regime started
to promote a new version of Iraqi nationalism through selecting elements from ancient
Mesopotamian history and imagery and incorporating them into the new Iraqi national
identity. Throughout the 1970s, the regime adopted a political and cultural program
designed to create a link between modern Iraq and ancient civilizations (Dawisha
2002, 128). As a part of this strategy, Saddam resurrected the important archeological
sites of ancient Iraq including the reconstruction of Babylon (Sciliono 2001, 50). Plays
revealing the achievements of Sumeria, Akkadia, Babylonia and Assyria were performed,
archeological work was done to resurrect and/or reconstruct such identities as Hatra,
Assur, Nineveh and Babylon, new museums of Iraqi history were built and artists and
intellectuals were encouraged to incorporate Iraq’s pre-Arab heritage in their work. This
strategy shows that instead of portraying a politician model inspired by the modern ideas
of liberalism or democracy, Saddam inclined to seek political models in the Mesopotamian
past when absolutist regimes were imposed on entire populations. The aim was to maintain
a homogenized Iraq. In an interview to Time magazine, he stated that “Any leader would
prefer his people to think from one point of view, to be of one religion, one sect, in one
city” (Sciolino 1991, 92). In order to achieve this goal, he used the Party, army, history
and repression.
Saddam regime tried to make an emphasis on Iraqi) nationalism due to failure of panArabist policies both in the Arab world and in Iraq. In the Arab world, after the humiliating
defeat of 1967 war which had motivated by pan-Arab ambitions, pan-Arabist retreat began.
After the demise of pan-Arabism, the vacuum was filled by Islam or loyalty to the state
(territorial nationalism). In addition to the demise of pan-Arabism regionally, the Kurdish
opposition movement played a role in Saddam’s strategy to develop Iraqi nationalism.
However, as it stated before, the distinction between Arabism and Iraqi nationalism is
not clear in the Iraqi context. The Iraqi Baathist regime did not abandon its commitment
to Arabism. The Baathist regime in Iraq invoked different “nationalisms” on different
occasions. As it will be analyzed in the previous pages, although the regime initiated a
series of nation-building instruments depended on territorial nationalism throughout the
1970s, pan-Arabism continued to be an important tool for the Saddam regime. It was
a key element in self-legitimation. Saddam tried to the fill the vacuum of Egypt which
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
done by the Government of Iraq. Torture was institutionalized and systematically applied
during the Saddam era (Makiya 1998, 66).
had perceived as the leader of the pan-Arab world after Egypt signed a peace treaty with
Israel in 1979 and lost its prestige in the Arab world. As an example for the coexistence
of Iraqi nationalism and Arabism together, the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) would be given.
Although the war against Iraq was inspired by Iraqi nationalism depending on a territorial
claim (to take Shatt al-Arab), Saddam both made appeal to pan-Arab solidarity in order
to provide economic and political support and to a nationalist mythology concerning the
rightful frontiers of the territorial state of Iraq (Tripp 2002, 180).
Another method in the nation-building process was the building of a strong army. This was
the continuation of the monarchical era, when the country was kept together by force of
arms. Makiya asserts that “Iraqi army acted as an agent for internal repression” (Makiya
1998, 21). Army was perceived as a melting pot which would help in overcoming the
religious and ethnic divisions. The strong army in Saddam’s era, which was the strongest
in the country’s history, was established with the aim of compensating the weak social,
political, and national bonds between the different segments of the society and providing
glue for keeping them all together (Bengio 1999, 151). In a similar way, the wars that
Iraq initiated, first against Iran and then Kuwait was seen as a way to stimulate nationalist
feelings. This strategy seemed to work especially during the Iran-Iraq war given the
identification of Shi’is in Iraq with Iraq rather than Iran in spite of Iranian calls. Iraq
emerged as a major militarized state during the Iran war. Before the Gulf War, Iraq was
listed as one of the top military states in the world by some experts (Musallam 1996, 84).
It is puzzling that although both the Arabism and the nationalism are secular ideologies,
in Iraq there was the dominance of the Sunnis in each cases. The essence of pan-Arabism
was secular and the Arab nationalists from Husri to Michel Aflaq who is the founder and
the philosopher of the Ba’th Party rejected Islam’s political and constitutional implications
and insisted that it was not religious but linguistic and historical ties that would unite the
Arab nation. However, Ba’thist pan-Arabism was a Sunni phenomenon in Iraq. On the
other hand, religion and nationalism are seen as two competing concepts. Kedourie gives a
clear definition of nationalism as a secular doctrine of self determination (Kedourie 1993).
In the Iraqi case, the dominance of the Sunni Arabs was not just purely motivated by
religious considerations. Saddam and the Baathist regime had a secular character. Saddam
had hardly ever been used Islamic symbols. The rule of Saddam based on tribalism, even
a small group of people from Saddam’s hometown Tikrit rather than religion. Saddam was
not able to trust anyone and he just positioned closest relatives and tribal members whom
he would not regard as a direct threat to important posts (Rezun 1992, 17). An important
reason for the exclusion of the Shi’is Arabs is related with the Saddam regime’s notion that
Shiites are foreigners, who have a Persian origin.
Instruments of Nation
Building
Standardized education is an important element in nation- building processes. Gellner
suggests that a modern industrial state can only function with a mobile, literate, culturally
standardized population and this requires standardized education which forms a solid
basis for a nation (Gellner 1983, 19-38). The Ba’th regime perceived schools as primary
instruments in establishing patriotic sentiments. Saddam had always believed that the
education of the young is vital in the process of nation-building (Karsh and Rautsi 1991,
176). The most important duty of teachers was seen to create nationalist sentiments. A
national education committee was established where ways and means of strengthening
patriotic feelings among the young were discussed. Youth centers all over the Iraq opened
in order to develop feelings of patriotism.
The Ba’th regime used some instruments in imposing Iraqi nationalism on the population.
Main method in accelerating nation-building process was the Ba’thisation. For instance,
the right to the title of patriot was taken away from the people who opposed the Ba’th and
all organizations and parties were closed. Loyalty to Iraq was measured to the party. Every
citizen was thought to be a servant of the Ba’th party as Saddam commented in February
1979 during a visit to Basra; “all citizens are Ba’this irrespective of their ethnic origins”
(Simons 2006, 285). Abu Japer (1966, 87) asserts that although the actual members were
less than 1 percent of the population, 10 percent of the population was on the member list
of the Ba’th Party.
The use of force and violent measures were other methods used by the regime. Saddam
recognized the necessity of autocratic measures as a part of nation-building process
(Musallam 1996, 72). The Iraqi state rests on some elements such as indoctrination, Party
membership, nepotism, terror, rewards for service to the state during Saddam’s leadership
as Simons (1996, 289) states. The organs of state security which are Mukhabarat (Party
Intelligence), The Amn al-Amm (State Internal Security), the Amn al-Khass (Presidential
Affairs Department) and The Amn al-Hizb (Party Security) were responsible for protecting
the Party. In these security organizations, totalitarian conditions were sustained where
there is little regard for human rights. Such bodies as Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch have frequently provided evidence of torture and other forms of repression
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Ba’thi efforts at nation building which were exclusive, contradictory, extremist and violent
created a “republic of fear” in al-Khalil’s terms where fear became an integral part of
daily life (Al-Khalil 1990). The Ba’thi “divide and rule policy” which excluded the Shi’is,
Kurds and other ethnic and religious from the mainstream of national identity prevented
the creation of a united Iraqi nation and forced the regime to re-invoke certain identities
like Arabism, Islamism and tribalism that will be examined in the following sections.
The Kurdish Question
under the Ba’th
Regime
The Kurds, today, exist in the parts of Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey and Lebanon and the former
Soviet Union. They are pastoral, nomadic people who have never been an internationally
recognized nation. The Kurdish people are probably the largest ethnic group that has never
achieved statehood. Iraqi rulers perceive Kurds’ very existence as a challenge to both Iraqi
and Arab nationalism, and every single regime in Iraqi politics has had to deal with them
in one way or another. After examining the policies of the different Iraqi regimes, it is seen
that the policies have ranged from assimilation to recognition of their national rights. The
Ba’th over the years of its existence applied policies towards the Kurds lying between
these poles. In order to understand this complicated relationship, it is necessary to examine
the relations between the Kurds and the Ba’th regime briefly.
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When the Ba’th party seized power in 1968, the political question of the Kurds gained
importance. The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)’s political influence as a pressure group
had been growing steadily then. Since the KDP was a non-Arab political party opposing
to the Ba’th party’s tenets of Arab nationalism and Arab unity, a clash was inevitable
(Musallam 1996, 69). As it was stated before, the policy of Arab-nationalism followed by
the Ba’th regime was in contradiction with the general structure of Iraq where non-Arab
population-mainly the Kurds-lived.
The idea of autonomy for the Kurds of Iraq is as old as the Iraqi state itself, however
Iraqi governments including the Ba’th regime opposed this idea when it came to power.
However, in 1970, Ba’th regime decided to sign an agreement with the Kurds which
recognized the Kurdish right to autonomous rule. Bengio explains the reasons for the
attitude change in Ba’th towards the Kurds by domestic factors such as the power struggle
between the civilian and military wing of the regime, increasing pressures from the Kurds
and the desire of the Ba’th regime to settle the Kurdish problem through giving autonomy
(Bengio 1998, 111). Although the Kurdish autonomy seems in contradiction with the Ba’th
Party’s policies, it was thought by the Ba’th officials that recognizing a Kurdish identity
would not harm the uniform Iraqi identity; on the contrary, it would reinforce it. In the
same manner, Kurdish autonomy that was proclaimed on 11 March 1970 contained two
important clauses relating to Kurdish uniqueness on the one hand and the Kurds’ place in
the Iraqi state on the other.
Since the Ba’th had reached an agreement with the Kurds because of its weakness, it
changed its attitude towards the Kurds immediately with the change in the balance of power
in favor of itself in the years following the autonomy agreement. Iraq’s nationalization of
oil industry and the dramatic increase in the oil prices enhanced the regime’s stability.
As Bengio argues that with the change in the balance of power and in the absence of any
urgent need to appease the Kurds, relations began to deteriorate between the Kurds and the
Iraqi government (Bengio 1998, 112-113). A Kurdish resistance movement began to gather
strength. In order to weaken the resistance movement, some measures were followed.
In that period, large numbers of families were removed from their homes by force to
change the ethnic balance of particular areas, especially around Kirkuk, which the Kurdish
leadership had insisted should form part of the Kurdish area and which the government
wanted to retain for itself. Again, in September 1971, some 40,000 Faili (Shi’i) Kurds
were expelled to Iran from the border area near Khaniqin on the grounds that they were
not really Iraqis (CARDRI 1989, 196).
The tension between the regime and the Kurds continued until 1974. A dialogue existed
between the regime and the Kurds in that period although the prospects of a settlement
did not seem close due to the disagreement over the Iraqi unity (Sluglett and Sluglett
2003, 159). While the Kurds stressed on their uniqueness, Ba’th regime made emphasis
on the unity of Iraq. In other words, two nationalisms; territorial nationalism of the Ba’th
government and the ethno-nationalism of the Kurds were in conflict with each other. The
Kurds urged the Ba’th to give the autonomous region a well-defined territorial character,
but the Ba’th consistently ignored this question. Finally, the autonomy agreement broke
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down because of Ba’th’s rejection of the Kurdish attempts in including Kirkuk in their
region and the objection in principle to the Kurdish feeling of separateness (Bengio 1998,
118).
The Algiers Treaty that was signed between Iran and Iraq in 1975 to end the frontier
disputes gave an important opportunity to Ba’th to defeat the Kurdish resistance movement.
According to the agreement between Iran and Iraq, Iran closed the Iran-Iraq frontier in
the north. This prevented the aid that was reaching the Kurds from Iran, and preventing
the Kurds themselves from regrouping and rearming in and from Iran (CARDRI 1989,
197). To sum up, the Algiers Treaty damaged the Kurdish movement seriously and as
Sluglett and Sluglett (2003, 187) argue that the cultural identity and even the physical
existence of the Iraqi Kurds came under threat with this development. Algiers Treaty also
weakened the Kurdish movement. After the defeat of March 1975, the Kurdish movement
split into principal rival factions, the KDP led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan (PUK), founded in Damascus in June 1975 by Jalal Talabani, the Barzanis’
long-standing political rival (CARDRI 1989, 198).
After the border with Iran remained closed with the Algiers Treaty, the Iraqi regime got
the upper hand in its fight against the Kurds. However, after the Iranian Revolution, the
Algiers Treaty suddenly collapsed and the Kurdish problem reappeared for the Ba’th that
it had managed to contain since 1975. In addition, some Iraqi Kurds set up new bases in
Iran using the chaotic atmosphere to their advantage. Iranian support strengthened the
Kurdish movement and led to the formation of a more powerful Iraq Kurdistan Front
(IKF) jointly led by Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani. Although the Kurdish movement
had its internal problems stemming from the disagreements over the leadership, it posed
a serious threat to the Ba’th regime (Musallam 1996, 70). The war with Iran (1980-1988)
was largely confined to the central and southern parts of Iraq. This put the North and its
Kurdish population at ease and some of the border areas in the north came under de facto
Iranian occupation by July 1983 (Sluglett and Sluglett 2003, 269).
Iranian occupation of the north and the collaboration of the Kurds with Iran added a
new dimension to the war. The Ba’th also started a war campaign against the Kurds and
after taking the south under control, Saddam had turned its attention to northern Iraq
and under a decree dated 29 March 1987, he appointed his cousin Ali Hasan al-Majid.
This appointment marked the beginning of a campaign of genocide against the Kurdish
population. This led to a more systemic campaign against the Kurds known as al-Anfal
(as the Kurdish genocide was called) which began about a year later (Sluglett and Sluglett
2003, 268). In the spring of 1988, Iran launched an offensive in Northern Iraq with the
assistance of PUK and the KDP, capturing the city of Halabja. The next day the Iraqi air
force responded it through bombing Halabja with poison gas, causing some 5000 deaths
and the flight of over a hundred thousand civilians to Iran and Turkey. However, the Iraqi
government claimed that it was not responsible for the bombing in Halabja because the
poisonous gas used there was cyanide which Iran only had at that time (Ali 1993, 153).
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Gulf War of 1991 is another important event for the Kurds which brought the Kurdish
autonomy for the second time. Thus, the Gulf crisis, which seemed to be an external affair,
had very serious causes for the future of Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi state itself (Bengio 1999,
153). The creation of ‘safe haven’ over most of the Kurdish area in 1991 led to the gradual
withdrawal of the Iraqi civil and military authorities from the area, and to the creation of a
de facto autonomous region, which followed a line from the Turkish border to the Iranian
border. The second experiment in Kurdish autonomy came some twenty years after the
first one and quite interestingly at a time when they were at one of the weakest points
in their history. Different from the first autonomy experience, this time autonomy was
imposed on Baghdad by international powers (Bengio 1999, 153). Although the Kurdish
de facto region remained autonomous during the Saddam era, hot confrontations took
place between the Kurds and the regime and also among the different Kurdish factions,
mainly between PUK and the KDP until the Iraqi invasion in 2003.
The Shi’i Opposition
under The Ba’th
Regime
In July 1958, the Shi’is in Iran founded their first political organization named Jama’at al‘ulama’ fi’l-Najaf al-Ashraf (the association of Najaf ‘ulama’) whose members formed the
nucleus of what became al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya (the Islamic call, or Mission) in 1968. Since
the Association was a secret society, there is not any accurate information about its origins
and membership, but it is known that Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr played an important role
in its activities.(Sluglett and Sluglett 2003, 195). In the early 1970s, al-Da’wa and other
Shi’i movements worried the Ba’th and a separate branch of security services was created
to deal specifically with the potential Shi’i opposition groups. Although Muhammad Baqir
al-Sadr was the symbol of Shi’i opposition, he avoided any open confrontation with the
regime at this stage.
An uneasy modus vivendi continued between the Shi’i and the regime until the Iranian
Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Iranian Revolution encouraged al-Da’wa and its leaders
to raise their voices and to make open declarations supporting the Iranian Revolution.
Saddam responded this situation by putting Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr under house arrest
in Najaf and the Shi’i riots were put down with great brutality. After Saddam took over
presidency from Bakr and consolidated his position, he completed the fearful purge of the
party and in April 1980, al-Sadr and his sister were hanged. At that time, between 15,000
and 20,000 Shi’is were expelled from Iraq, and hundreds more were arrested, tortured
and executed (Simons 1996, 309). In March 1980, the Iraqi regime executed ninety-seven
civilians and military men, half of them were members of Da’wa, a banned organization.
The regime’s ruthless policies against the Shi’i were efficient and it prevented the Shi’i
oppositions.
Because of the Sunni-Shi’i cleavage, religion has not served to promote a common national
identity and feelings in Iraq, in fact it has played the opposite role (Bengio 1999, 150). The
principal tension between the Sunni and Shi’is in Iraq is related with the minority Sunni
regime’s rule over a predominantly Shi’i population. The problem between the Sunni and
the Shi’i population did not arouse from the religion or sectarian affiliation per se. Sunni
rulers of Iraq did not seem to promote Sunni sectarianism, or they were not regarded as
representing Sunni Islam. On this issue, Sluglett and Sluglett suggest that the fundamental
division between the Shi’is and the Sunnis is not religious, it is socio-economic, between
the economically prosperous Sunnis and the poor Shi’is, or in another words between
“haves” and “have-nots” (Sluglett and Sluglett 2003, 190).
The Ba’th regime successfully repressed the Shi’i opposition movement that was started at
the end of the 1970s until the 1991 Gulf War. After the war ended, a Shi’i uprising (Shi’i
intifada) started in the south of Iraq, it began in Nasiriyeh, and spread rapidly to the other
Shi’i majority towns and cities. Shi’i intifada of 1991 was the second serious attempt by the
Shi’is aimed at changing the political structure in their favor after the “Great Revolution”
of 1920 (Bengio 1999, 159). The Shi’i intifada of 1991 reflected that there was a lack of
unity in goals and the methods on the Shi’i side in comparison with the Kurdish movement.
While the Shi’i intifada was directed against the regime, that of the Kurds was against the
state. Although the Kurds proclaimed themselves as Kurds and demanded Kurdish rights,
the Shi’is could not play the same game. Although, the Kurds gained autonomy after the
Gulf War, the Ba’th took a terrible revenge after the Shi’i intifada in the south. As a result
of Iraqi air and ground attacks on the South and the virtual genocide being waged against
the Marsh Arabs, the Western allies imposed a no-fly zone south of 32° N at the end of
August 1992 (Sluglett and Sluglett 2003, 300).
The majority of the Shi’i population lived in the rural south and most of them were rural
dwellers which constituted the majority of the rural poor. In addition, they also constituted
the majority of the urban poor in Baghdad and other cities after the Second World War.
The traditional urban Shi’is were engaged primarily in trade and handicrafts in bazaars
rather than government employment. Shi’is tended to distrust the central government and
distanced themselves from it historically. In contrast to the Kurds, the Shi’is have been
quite passive politically until the 2003 Iraqi invasion of Iraq. Until that time, they did not
have any representative political organization, or even a newspaper that openly expresses
their views. Clandestine organizations did exist and they had their own publications abroad.
Ba’thism, although not directly identified with Sunni Islam, did not create enthusiasm
among the Shi’i Arabs. Al Khalil states that to an Iraqi Shi’i, pan-Arabism and Sunnism
go hand in hand, just as for the Arabic speaking Christian, pan-Arabism and Islam and
inseparable (Al Khalil 1990, 214). When the control of the Ba’th passed into the hands of
the Takritis after 1968, there were no Shi’is at all in the higher echelons of the party. On
the other hand, the Ba’th considered the Shi’i question so sensitive and even avoided the
very word “Shi’i”. Unlike the Kurdish problem, that was publicly referred, the Shi’i was
almost a taboo. If the word, “Shi’i” was used at all, it was with reference to the Shi’is of
Lebanon or Iran (Bengio 1998, 99).
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91
Utilizing From
Different Identities as
a Function of Regime
Survival
Although, the Ba’th regime instituted policies and enacted laws designed to construct an
Iraqi national identity, it produced opposite results because of the exclusionary and violent
structure of the nation-building process. Since Iraqi national identity did not serve as glue
in the hard times of the country like during the Iran-Iraq war, Gulf War and in its aftermath,
identities other than the Iraqi national one used. The regime utilized from the Arab identity
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Arab Identity
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
during the Iran-Iraq war, Islamic identity during the Gulf War and the tribal identity in the
aftermath of the Gulf War.
in Islam’s holy land and called the Arabs and Muslims to liberate Islamic lands from the
foreign occupation (Dawisha 1999, 560).
Although the regime had decided to invoke an Iraqi nationalist identity rather than Arabism
because of domestic and regional considerations in the 1970s, it turned to Arabism once
more during the Iran-Iraq war. This was related with the Shi’i population in Iraq. As
mentioned earlier, the war with Iran across the border and the Iranian ayatollah’s sectarian
calls increased Iraqi Shi’is awareness of their sectarian identity. Saddam raised Iraq’s Arab
identity as a response to the sectarian appeal of Iranian ayatollahs, which he thought that it
would draw a clear ethnic distinction between the “Arab” Iraqis and the “Persian” Iranians
(Dawisha 2002, 130). This statement of Saddam reflects his strategy in re-emphasizing
Iraq’s Arab identity:
It was the first time that the “secular” Ba’th regime invoked Islamic identity since coming
to power in 1968. These Islamic symbols had hardly ever been used by Saddam or any other
members of the Ba’th party. This new Islamic orientation of the regime created enthusiasm
among the radical Islamist groups who must have been surprised by the conversion of the
secularist Iraqi President. Saddam now became a true mujahid (struggler), Americans in
Saudi Arabia and the Saudis that allow the US to enter the holy lands portrayed as the
“infidels”. He used images of a new “crusade” against Islam and effectively utilized from
this strategy in strengthening his support base. Some radical ‘ulama’ even declared him as
the Khalifa of Muslims (Dawisha 1999, 560). However, after the military defeat of Iraq at
the end of February 1991, Islamist identity used by Saddam during the war immediately
abandoned and that not a single mention of Islam or Islamic values was made. When
appeals were made, they emphasized Iraqi unity and Arabism.
The ruling clique in Iran persists in using the face of religion to foment sedition and division
among the ranks of the Arab nation despite the difficult circumstances through which the
Arab nation is passing. The invocation of religion is only a mask to cover Persian racism
and a buried resentment of the Arabs. The clique in Iran is trying to institute fanaticism,
resentment and division among the peoples of the area (Dawisha 1999, 556).
In order to survive from the Iranian attack, Saddam attempted to unite the various religious
and sectarian communities under the ethnic umbrella of Arabism. Such identification had
the risk to alienate the Kurds, but it was thought as a loss worth of taking by the regime
as Dawisha asserts (Daawisha 1999). Saddam’s counterattack contained examples from
Arabist symbolism. For example, the war with Iran came to be known as Qadissiyat
Saddam, the Qadisiyya1 of Saddam as a result of government propaganda (Dawisha 1999,
558). Another example of the use of historical imagery was to remind the Iraqi Shi’is of
the Arab ethnicity of the founders of their sect in emphasizing the ethnic divide between
the Arab Shi’is of Iraq and Persian Shi’is of Iran. The government put an official banner at
the entrance of Imam Ali mosque in Najaf which declared: “we take pride at the presence
here of our great father Ali, because he is a leader of Islam, because he is the son-in-law of
the prophet, and he is an Arab” (Dawisha 1981, 142).In addition, Imam Ali’s birthday was
made a national holiday (Simons 1996, 560).
Tribal Identity
During the invasion of Kuwait, Saddam again came up with the re-definition of Iraqi
identity in order to legitimize his attack. Initially, he continued to utilize from Arabism in
order to take the support of Arab peoples against the United States. But, the entrance of
American troops to Saudi Arabia led him to invoke Islamic symbolism in order to attain
greater support. Saddam began to repeat consistently the presence of non-Muslim troops
1
In the battle of al-Qadissiyya, the Arabs of the Peninsula defeated Sassanid Persia in AD 637,
proceeded to capture Ctesiphon, the Sassanid capital and expelled the Persians from Iraq.
 atılım
Another identity that Saddam tried to invoke in the aftermath of Gulf War (especially
during the period of 1991-1996) was the tribal identity. In reality, the Ba’th party rejected
“tribalism” as soon as it came to power in 1968. In the party’s Communiqué No.1., it
is declared that “we are against religious sectarianism, racism and tribalism” (Baram
1997, 1). Tribalism was regarded as a sign of backwardness and an obstacle to the social
transformation and modernity. As a result of this belief, anti-tribal policies were adopted
in the 1970s. The 1976 government regulation banned the use of names showing tribal
or regional connections. Although the party declared that it is against tribalism, the Ba’th
Party itself was “a tribe”. Kinship was used as a principle guiding the selection of leaders,
Takrit, the town of Saddam’s birth, provided a disproportionate number of country’s ruling
elite.
In the 1970s and 1980s, tribalism was an important element in Saddam’s own political
identity, but politically it was declared as an obstacle to the regime. After the Iraqi defeat
by the US armies in 1991, especially with the Shi’i rebellion in the South of Iraq, Saddam
decided to benefit from tribes and tribal values. Regime’s most important means of
controlling the Shi’i uprising of 1991 was through alliances with tribal chiefs. A number
of southern Shi’i tribes receiving benefits from the Baghdad regime either sided with or
remained neutral during the intifada. Anti-regime disturbances in the south were put down
by the regime with the help of tribes. However, in the mean time, strengthening certain
tribal leaders as a means of controlling Shi’i south created problems for the regime. By the
early 1997, as result of clash between tribal and state interests, the government had to call
on tribes to give national interest first priority (Bengio 1999, 163).
This emphasis on Iraq’s Arab identity did not mean that other identities were not invoked
however neither was emphasized as much as Iraq’s Arab identity. This strategy seemed to
work with the co-operation of the Iraqi Shi’is with the government and their identification
of themselves as Arabs rather than in terms of sectarian affiliation.
Islamic Identity
93
Conclusion
The Iraqi nation-building process during the Saddam regime is a good example to show
how national identities are constructed and re-constructed. Although, some kind of
 D. D. Orhan
94
primordialism2 exists in Iraqi nationalism, which has its roots in the Mesopotamian past,
Iraqi elites especially during the Saddam era re-defined the Iraqi identity several times
that would be most beneficial to their interests and most suitable to existing socio-political
imperatives. In that sense, ethno-symbolism introduced by Anthony D. Smith, which is
the middle way between primordialist and constructivist approaches to nationalism, best
suits to the case of Iraq as Dawisha (2002, 135) suggests. Secondly, the propagation of
nationalism as a state ideology by the state could produce opposite results as it is seen in
the Iraqi case. The nationalist ideology used by the Ba’th regime proven to be divisive in
Iraq and has promoted “us” and “them” dichotomy rather than national cohesion on the
inside. This is related with totalitarianism in Ba’th regime which recognized the necessity
of autocratic measures as a part of nation-building process.
The final revelation from Iraqi nationalism is that the nation-building is a difficult process
in heterogeneous and fragmented societies. However, the problem with the Iraqi identity
formation process is not just related to the heterogeneity of the population. It is known that
not many nation states have completely homogenous populations, but they managed to be
a nation as opposed to the Iraqi case. The difference is the legitimacy of their authority,
based as it must be on popular sovereignty. The state of Iraq at its birth was devoid of this
popular sovereignty and Saddam’s power was rested on coercion and force rather than
the political legitimacy. Lack of popular sovereignty and the coercive methods used by
the regime prevented the formation of a common identity and this led the Ba’th elites to
utilize from different identities for regime survival. This system has somehow worked
until the US invasion of Iraq. The American occupation itself effectively revived the
largely dormant form of sectarianism. Now, it seems hard to keep Iraq united given the
internal conflicts between different ethnic and religious groups and the rhetoric used by
them emphasizing separation or autonomy.
2
The argument that nations are primordial, they exist in the first order of time and lie at the
root of subsequent processes and the developments.
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California Press.
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International Power Politics. London, New York: British Academy Press.
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Simons, Geoff. 1996. Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam. London: MacMillan Press.
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Sluglett Marion Farouk and Peter Sluglett. 2003. Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship.
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Wolff, Stefan. 2006. Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Öz
İçeride “Biz” ve “Siz” Karşıtlığı: Saddam Dönemi’nde Irak Kimlik
İnşası Süreci
Bu makale, dışarıda olduğu kadar içeride de “biz” ve “siz” karşıtlığına neden olan
Saddam’ın ulus inşası çabalarını incelemektedir Bu çerçevede, Baas Rejimi’nin
kendisini zamanla nasıl Saddam Huseyin’in oligarşisine dönüştürdüğünü ve diğer etnik
ve dini kimlikleri dışlamak suretiyle Sünnilerin nasıl bir azınlıktan çoğunluk haline
getirildiğini göstermektedir. Bu sistemin 2003 Irak savaşı ile birlikte nasıl tamamen
çöktüğü ve Saddam’ın Irak ulusal kimliği yaratma konusundaki başarısızlığınının buna
katkısı incelenmektedir. Belirli etnik ve dini grupların dışlanmasının, bu grupları ABD
ile işbirliğine yönelttiği ve bu durumun Saddam rejiminin çöküşüne zemin hazırladığı
ifade edilmektedir. Bugün Irak milletinden çok fazla birşey kalmamıştır ve Irak kimliği
hiç olmadığı kadar uzak gözükmektedir. Bu çeşitli Irak rejimlerinin geliştirmeye çalıştığı
Irak ulusal kimliğinin, devlet mekanizmanın çökmesi ile birlikte tamamen çözüldüğünü
göstermektedir.
Anahtar kelimeler
Irak, ulus-inşası, kimlik, Saddam Hüseyin.
About the Author
Duygu Dersan Orhan is a research assistant at the Department of International Relations,
Atılım University since 2007. She is also a PhD candidate at the Department of International
Relations, Middle East Technical University. Her areas of interest include international
politics of the Middle East, international relations theory and theories of nationalism.
Yazar Hakkında
Duygu Dersan Orhan Atılım Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü’nde, 2007 yılından
bu yana Araştırma Görevlisi olarak görev yapmaktadır. Aynı zamanda Ortadoğu Teknik
Üniversitesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü’nde doktora çalışmalarını sürdürmektedir. İlgi
alanlarının arasında Ortadoğu’nun uluslararası politikası, uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi ve
milliyetçilik teorileri konuları vardır.
 atılım
D
rug Trafficking and Human
Security in Guinea-Bissau
School of Communication and Arts, Edith Cowan University.
Abstract
There has recently been rising concern amongst Western nations over drug trafficking
through West Africa, with Guinea-Bissau identified as a major regional conduit for cocaine.
Increasingly Guinea-Bissau’s internal political and military turmoil has also been linked to
the influence of drug money. This paper will examine this drug trafficking in the context
of Guinea-Bissau’s history and address what impacts it is having on “human security” in
the nation, examining the categories of political, economic, health and personal security.
The argument will be made that considering the already low levels of human security in
Guinea-Bissau, the impact of drug trafficking may not actually be that significant, and that
rather than focusing on drugs as Guinea-Bissau’s primary problem, trafficking should be
considered as only a symptom of deeper underdevelopment due to European colonization,
and the effects of global economic structures and policies.
Keywords
Drug trafficking, Guinea-Bissau, human security.
98
Introduction
Since 2005, concern has risen amongst Western nations over the formation of drug
trafficking routes through West Africa. The small nation of Guinea-Bissau has been
identified as a major transit-route for South American cocaine through the region to
Europe, and its domestic turmoil has increasingly been linked to the influence of drug
money. This paper will examine drug trafficking through Guinea-Bissau in the context of
the nation’s history, and address the question of what impacts drug trafficking is having
on “human security” in Guinea-Bissau. The categories of “political security”, “economic
security”, “health security” and “personal security” will be used to analyse the true effects
of the industry, and the argument will be made that considering the already low levels of
human security in Guinea-Bissau, the impact of drug trafficking may not actually be that
significant. Rather than focusing on drug trafficking as Guinea-Bissau’s primary problem,
trafficking should be recognised as a symptom of the true causes of human insecurity
in the nation: underdevelopment due to European colonisation, and the effects of global
economic structures and policies. This paper will first outline Guinea-Bissau’s history,
then examine the rise of drug trafficking in West Africa, before presenting an analysis of
drug trafficking’s impacts.
Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau is a nation of approximately 1.6 million inhabitants, which is consistently
ranked amongst the ten least-developed countries in the United Nations Development
Program’s (UNDP) Human Development Index. Wedged between Senegal in the north
and Guinea-Conakry to the south, Guinea-Bissau consists of 36,125km2 of mainly
swampy marshland, and its population are primarily peasant farmers. The daily ocean
tide bathes the mangrove-strewn land up to 100km inland (Galli 1990). The populace
consists of around thirty small ethnic groups, with the majority Balanta the largest at 30%
of the population, and the Fulani people numbering another 20% (Temudo 2008, 245).
Claimed in the imperial era as Portuguese Guinea, Portugal mainly retained a trading
rather than colonial relationship with the territory until the 1930s, described by some as,
‘an exercise in economic exploitation at minimal financial and human cost’ (ICG 2008, 2).
Few plantations were established, and the Portuguese merchant class were restricted from
substantial capital accumulation by Portuguese imperial policies and international trade
competition. A wealthier creole class developed in Guinea-Bissau’s small urban centres,
with political leadership restricted to this elite and systematically denied to the majority of
the population (Galli 1989, 373-374). Portuguese mercantile policies and failure to build
infrastructure in the colony not only precluded European investment, but also deliberately
disrupted economic development by Bissauan entrepreneurs – including ‘measures
designed to maintain and protect ‘traditional’ forms of settlement and production’ (Galli
1995, 52-53).
In the late 1950s Portugal’s brutal repression of Guinean protests against economic
hardship, and particularly the massacre of 50 striking dockworkers in 1959, motivated the
commencement of an armed independence struggle (ICG 2008, 4). Led by Amilcar Cabral –
‘perhaps the foremost political thinker to emerge out of the many independence movements
of post-World War II Africa’ (Forrest 1987, 95) – the African Party for the Independence of
Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) forged a supra-ethnic struggle that mobilised the support
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
99
of the majority of Guinea’s peasantry, and created liberated zones with their own village
committees, schools, people’s stores and health clinics (Chabal 1983, 191-192). By the
early 1970s the PAIGC controlled more than 70% of Guinea-Bissau’s territory and 50%
of the population, operating as a one-party state and providing a higher level of social and
economic administration than experienced under the colonial regime (ICG 2008, 6). Thus,
at independence in 1974 the PAIGC was an effective organisation with a large network of
party activists spread throughout the nation, a confident leadership and coherent ideology,
widespread support from the population, and an international diplomatic stature that far
exceeded Guinea-Bissau’s importance as a country (Chabal 1983, 191-193).
However, the newly-independent state faced a swathe of challenges, as a predominantly
agricultural economy still locked in a monopsonic relationship with Portuguese
companies, with virtually no industry or infrastructure, and high unemployment in the
cities (Carolissen-Essack 1980, 2175). The year before independence the PAIGC was also
robbed of the talented and charismatic Amilcar Cabral through assassination, with his
brother Luís Cabral taking over the reins of leadership (Chabal 1983, 190). The postcolonial government of the PAIGC thus set out upon the problematic path of trying to
sustain the popular support of the peasantry while challenging their local traditional
authorities; fostering democratic representation within the structures of a one-party state;
and embarking upon the road of transformation to socialism while focusing on agricultural
development and remaining linked to capitalist economies and the world market (Chabal
1983, 193-197). Now based in the capital, Bissau, the PAIGC found itself dependent on
colonial structures of government and a hostile bureaucracy, with its own membership
increasingly riven with personal, ethnic and political divisions (Forrest 1987, 96-99).
By 1980 economic crisis, the ossification of a bureaucratic elite, the increasingly dominant
role of the armed forces, and constitutional changes that seemed to favour the more
creolised population of Cape Verde – the nearby island with which Guinea-Bissau was
moving towards unification – provided the setting for the Prime Minister João Bernardo
‘Nino’ Vieira to lead a coup d’état on 14 November 1980, harnessing ethnic Balanta
support within the military (Chabal 1983, 202; Forrest 1987, 101-103; Munslow 1981,
111-112). Vieira quickly established a Revolutionary Council rule under his authority,
and set about purging Cape Verdeans from the political and military hierarchy. However,
over the following decade Vieira (himself of the minority Papel ethnic group) also used
repression against successive coup attempts to break the Balanta dominance of the
military and reward loyal individuals. Vieira maintained his popularity in the military,
and the military’s dominant political position, by allowing them priority access to national
resources and ruthlessly eliminating his enemies. (ICG 2008, 9-11; Forrest 1987, 101-103).
He also began to oversee Guinea-Bissau’s economic liberalisation through IMF structural
adjustment, however the primary results of economic reform were the acquisition of
large shares of the economy by public officials and their friends, a drastic decline in the
purchasing power of urban workers, and little change in the living standards of agricultural
producers (Galli 1990).
 D. A. Robinson
100
Pressure from international donor nations eventually forced Vieira’s regime to move
towards multi-party democracy, legalising opposition parties in 1991 for elections in
1994 (ICG 2008, 9-11). While the PAIGC and President Vieira won the 1994 elections
by a narrow margin, Kumba Yala of the Party for Social Renovation (PRS) emerged as
a presidential challenger, mobilizing Balanta support by highlighting Vieira’s history
of ethnic repression (ICG 2008, 11). Following the 1994 elections, divergent views on
liberalization polarized the PAIGC and opposition grew to Nino Vieira within his own party
and the military. By the late 1990s Vieira had also deepened relations with neighbouring
Senegal and France, which drew Guinea-Bissau into conflict as the President supported
the Senegalese government’s war against separatists in the southern Senegalese region of
Casamance (Temudo 2008, 249). Utilizing some of the estimated 650,000 light weapons in
Guinea-Bissau (Francis 2009), the national military leadership had been smuggling arms
to the Casamance rebels, but President Vieira intervened in 1998 by dismissing GuineaBissau’s Military Chief of Staff, Ansumane Mané - who subsequently attempted a coup
against Vieira which failed. War veterans who supported Mané soon demanded that Vieira
step down, and launched a military uprising on 7 June 1998 (Temudo 2008, 250).
Within two days Mané announced that he was now running Guinea-Bissau via a military
junta, and demanded that Vieira resign and hold new elections within 60 days. However, the
conflict became internationalised as soldiers from Senegal and Guinea-Conakry, invaded
to support Vieira’s forces. This conflict continued for 11 months, drawing diplomatic
interventions and military pressure from the Community of Portuguese Speaking
Countries (CPLP) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and
displacing almost 300,000 refugees (Rudebeck 1998). It has been suggested that many
young Guineans actually joined the side of the military junta in reaction to looting and
atrocities committed by the foreign troop contingents (Temudo 2008, 251). Faced with an
unending rebellion by the majority of the nation’s armed forces, Vieira eventually fled to
Portugal in May 1999 (Macqueen 2003, 5). An election was held in November 1999, and
PRS candidate Kumba Yala was elected president. Former military Chief Mané attempted
another coup in November 2000 against the new President Yala, but Yala prevailed and
Mané was killed (Macqueen 2003, 20).
While many Guineans were hopeful that President Yala would bring a new dawn of
rebuilding and political reform, they were quickly disappointed as he acted to solidify
the power of his Balanta supporters within the military and the state. Meanwhile, the
government drifted dangerously without effective policies, with Yala himself becoming
increasingly incoherent and unpredictable – on various occasions announcing the national
capital was to change cities, and threatening to invade nearby Gambia. The IMF suspended
budgetary assistance to Guinea-Bissau, thus public servants ceased to be paid, and the
nation entered new political crisis. In the meanwhile Yala’s regime survived several
attempted coups, until he was eventually overthrown on 14 September 2003 by Military
Chief of Staff General Verisimo Correia Seabra. Henrique Rosa was then elected as an
interim president in March 2004 (ICG 2008, 14-15).
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In October 2004 General Seabra was killed by mutinous soldiers demanding unpaid
salaries, though some suggested that the mutiny was ethnically motivated. General Tagme
Na Wai, a Balanta, was appointed in his place and set about reintegrating 65 senior military
officers who were purged from the ranks following the civil war and military uprisings.
This appeared to be an effort to provide more ethnic and political balance in the armed
forces leadership, so General Na Wai came to be seen as a consensus-building figure (BBC
6 October 2004; BBC 7 October 2004; Cordeiro 2004; Inter Press Service 5 November
2004; De Queiroz 2004). Meanwhile, military reform became an ever-more pressing issue,
with government plans to reduce the standing army from 4,500 men to less than 3,000.
Of course the prospect of demobilisation was not welcomed by many in armed forces,
and would persist as a motivator of unrest (UNIRIN 18 April 2005). With new elections
in June 2005 both Nino Vieira and Kuamba Yala returned to the political scene to contest
the Presidency, despite being specifically forbidden by government decree. Though the
elections were declared free and fair by international agencies, an agreement with General
Na Wai had helped Vieira to again win the presidency –and now entrenched the military
as the power behind the throne (ICG 2008, 16-17; UNIRIN 31 March 2005; UNIRIN 12
April 2005).
Under Vieira’s new presidency Guinea-Bissau’s economy stagnated, and military reforms
continued to be delayed. Meanwhile, Vieira twice dissolved parliament to fend off political
challenges, before surviving an assassination attempt in November 2008 – for which
Vieira blamed the Head of the Navy, José Americo Bubo Na Tchuto (ICG 25 June 2009,
3). Increasingly rival factions began to allege the others’ involvement in drug trafficking.
Then in March 2009, following months of debate and violence connected to the control of
the Presidential Guard, Military Chief of Staff General Na Wai and President Vieira were
violently killed within hours of each other – Vieira’s death seemingly a revenge attack for
the General’s death. Many speculated that the killings were related to disagreements over
the drug trade. It was also suggested that the fugitive Head of the Navy José Na Tchuto may
have ordered General Na Wai’s death. A number of politicians allied with the late President
Vieira were then also assassinated over the next few months. While the violence and chaos
of Guinea Bissau’s politics certainly pre-dated any major influence from drug trafficking,
this new source of wealth and conflict was starting to make its political mark (ICG 25 June
2009, 1). A subsequent military coup against Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior in April
2010 then brought Na Tchuto back to Guinea-Bissau in alliance with his co-conspirator
General Antonio Indjai – who the new president, Malam Bacai Sanha, then appointed
as Military Chief of Staff (BBC 1 April 2010; Gorjão 2010). This led the United States
to make statements of concern regarding constitutional violations in Guinea-Bissau, and
label senior Guinean officials such as Na Tchuto and Air Force Chief of Staff Ibraima Papa
Camara as ‘drug kingpins’ (AFP 25 June 2010). The European Union also subsequently
suspended their assistance with military reform for the indefinite future (BBC 4 August
2010), and UN chief Ban Ki-moon called for sanctions on key figures in Guinea-Bissau’s
drugs trade (BBC 3 October 2008).
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Drug Trafficking
By some estimates the trafficking of illicit drugs in recent years has constituted more
than 3% of world trade (Klein 2008, 119), with an estimated ‘gross criminal product’
of US$1 trillion annually (Jojarth 2009, 7). Some crime organisations have resources
exceeding those of small nations, and they increasingly take advantage of unprecedented
communication and transportation networks available in the modern world to create a
global system parallel to the legal international economy. ‘[D]rug traffickers … have
refined networking to a high science, entering into complex and improbable strategic
alliances that span cultures and continents’ (Van Schendel and Abraham 2005, 3). The legal
architecture of international drug control, constructed over the past 50 years, commenced
with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which combined the various
existing international agreements. This was supplemented in 1971 with the Convention
on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. As of 2007 182 nations were parties to all three of
these conventions (Klein 2008, 123).
The 1988 Convention, which sought to increase nations’ powers to interdict drug trafficking,
specifically noted, ‘the links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal
activities which undermine legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security, and
sovereignty of states’ (Jojarth 2009, 100). Indeed, as Moises Naim asserts, trafficking
networks, ‘diversify into other businesses and invest in politics… assum[ing] a powerful
– and in some countries unrivalled – influence on matters of state’ (2005, 8). Increasingly
the line between profit-driven organised crime groups and ideologically-motivated rebels
and terrorists has blurred over recent decades, merging the spheres of crime and warfare
(Jojarth 2009, 2). This is well-illustrated in nations like Colombia, where significant
violence has arisen from struggles between the government, drug cartels – with their
associated right-wing paramilitary forces, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – and
the nominally left-wing insurgents, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(FARC) (Jojarth 2009, 95).
However, despite these agreements and US$150 billion spent in the United States’ fourdecade-long ‘War on Drugs’, global narcotics production has risen relentlessly since the
early 1970s (McCoy 2003, 26). The increasingly high purity levels of drugs in Europe and
North America, in the context of continually falling prices, is a clear indicator that drugsupply control efforts have failed (Klein 2008, 135). Klein argues that,
In no other area of social policy are the positions of policy-makers so out of step with a
significant section of the population. Nor has there been such a steady, if not exponential
increase, in any form of behaviour that policy-makers have tried systematically, and often
brutally, to eliminate, as there has been in drug-taking (2008, 56).
Meanwhile, global prohibition necessitates that drug traffickers evade law enforcement
and corrupt police, courts and governments; and successful interdiction merely encourages
constantly-shifting smuggling routes that increase trafficking and consumption (McCoy
2003, 25). This is sometimes known as the ‘balloon effect’ of drug enforcement, in which
applying pressure to any particular drug supply route will only divert the contents elsewhere.
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International efforts against drug trafficking have forced criminals to develop new supply
routes through an increasing number of countries, and in each of these trafficking leaves a
footprint of drug use and production in local markets (Klein 2008, 135). In some places the
narcotics trade then becomes, ‘an indispensable source of income and employment which
would be lost if effective anti-narcotics policies were implemented’ (Jojarth 2009, 103).
These scenarios are of increasing relevance for the West African state of Guinea-Bissau.
In the case of West Africa, geographical position makes it predominantly suited for
cocaine trafficking. West Africa is not a convenient route between heroin producer-nations
(predominantly Afghanistan) and key international markets, so heroin seizures in West
African countries are generally very small (UNODC 2008, 29). On the other hand, nearly
all of the world’s coca leaf is produced in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia (UNODC 2008, 7)
because, as Christine Jojarth explains, ‘Coca bushes require a tropical climate and develop
sufficient concentration of the psychoactive substance cocaine alkaloid only if grown in
high altitudes – conditions that are only found in the Andes’ (2009, 116). Meanwhile, over
the past two decades US cocaine consumption has declined (due to both consumer taste
and law enforcement) while Western European consumption has grown, thus diverting
a significant amount of product to that market (UNODC 2008, 8). While Colombia is
the world’s most prolific cocaine-producing nation (Vargas 2005, 193), Venezuela has
increasingly taken over as the key shipping point due to crackdowns in Colombia, so
a pattern has emerged of large maritime and air shipments of cocaine departing from
Venezuela for Europe, via West Africa (UNODC 2008, 9). This has led some analysts to
argue that West African transhipment routes and ethnic networks probably now pose some
of the greatest drug trafficking challenges to the world (Chalk 2000, 22).
Drugs in Guinea
Bissau
The first reports of Guinea-Bissau being a transit point for cocaine-trafficking networks
emerged in April 2005, when several foreigners including two Latin Americans were
arrested on an island in the Bijagos archipelago along Guinea-Bissau’s coastline. Since
then there have been a number of large cocaine seizures, though nowhere near the total
amount thought to be transiting the nation (Mazzitelli 2007, 1087). These seizures have
also themselves been undermined on occasion, with 674kg of cocaine, worth around
US$20 million, vanishing from police custody in September 2006 (ICG 2008, 22). Also,
following a seizure of 635kg of cocaine in April 2007, two soldiers travelling with the
shipment were released without charge as an army spokesman claimed they were simply
hitch-hikers who were, ‘in the wrong place at the wrong time’ (Kohnert 2010, 10). The
UN subsequently issued a press release accusing Guinean military officers of involvement
in drug trafficking (Mazzitelli 2007, 1087). While drug seizure statistics throughout
Africa seem to confirm 2005 as the year Africa experienced a large drug trafficking surge,
reaching a peak of roughly 50 tons of cocaine being shipped through West Africa each
year, with a wholesale value in Europe of around US$2 billion (though this amount may
have since declined) (UNODC 2008, 1-2).
In this context some analysts have begun to call Guinea-Bissau a “narco-state”, and Western
authorities are afraid that after spending billions on counter-drug policies in other parts of
the world the West African drug route might undermine years of work. Significant sections
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insecurity’, as primarily being felt by, ‘victims of war and internal conflict; those who
live close to the subsistence level and thus are structurally positioned at the edge of socioeconomic disaster; and victims of natural disasters’ (Suhrke 1999, 272).
of the government, military, judiciary and police seem to already be corrupted by drug
networks (Bernard 2008). Soldiers have been observed on several occasions unloading
drugs from planes on disused landing strips inside the country, and the navy is believed
to be complicit in trafficking activities (ICG 2008, 22). In addition, those who are trying
to combat drug trafficking are hamstrung by a complete lack of resources, with many
articles noting the almost-comical stories of the coast guard’s single functioning boat,
police having to hail taxis to chase traffickers, and Guinea-Bissau’s lack of proper prisons
in which to hold offenders (ICG 2008, 22; Mazzitelli 2007, 1087). In terms of monetary
worth, for this vastly underdeveloped state the value of cocaine transiting its shores every
year is estimated to be more than double its GDP, and just six grams of cocaine has a value
equal to an average Guinean’s annual salary – emphasising the disparity in power between
the drug cartels and the Guinean state, and the high incentives for involvement in the
industry (Thaler 2009, 6).
A key criticism of the paradigm has been that it is far too broad in scope to be of analytical
value or specific policymaking use (Paris 2001, 88). Some analysts have also asked whose
interests the paradigm serves. From a Neorealist perspective it has been argued that the
support for the ‘human security’ concept by middle power states like Norway and Canada
has served as a mask for power-orientated goals within the global system (Suhrke 1999,
265). And more radical analysts connected to Critical Security Studies remain, ‘suspicious
of human security as a hegemonic discourse co-opted by the state’ (Newman 2010, 77).
Advocates have in turn noted the political utility for Neorealists in denigrating alternative
approaches to security studies (McDonald 2002, 277), and advanced that sometimes
‘human security should operate less as a policy agenda within existing political structures
and discourses than as a radical critique of those practices’ (Bellamy and McDonald
2002, 376). The value of the concept of human security is both its redirection of theorists’
attention to individuals as the primary focus of security studies, rather than states and
their institutions, and its categorisation of threats to individuals for the purposes of
measurement. This study will also embrace the use of human security as part of a radical
systemic critique, and is highly sympathetic to the notion that,
Logistically, most of the cocaine arrives in West Africa from South America, with GuineaBissau as a key entry point. This tends to involve using large commercial fishing or freight
ships, which are met at sea by African vessels, often with a Latin American ‘controller’.
The African boats may then continue northward, or dock in West Africa to disperse
the drugs through the region prior to transfer northward. Latin American groups retain
ownership of the bulk of the shipments until they reach Europe, but some West Africans
are paid for their services in drugs, which are then exported to Europe by local criminal
syndicates – usually using drug mules on commercial air flights (UNODC 2008, 10-12).
Human Security
A discourse of human security that does not delegitimize states when they act as agents of
human insecurity, does not devalue sovereignty when it protects the perpetrators of human
wrongs, or does not challenge the moral value of an international economic system and
structure of states that creates and perpetuates most of the globe’s insecurity has, at best
limited utility. At worst, it … sustain[s] the very practices and structures that cause human
insecurity… (Bellamy and McDonald 2002, 375-376)
The question of how drug trafficking affects human security in Guinea-Bissau cannot be
pursued without a foundational notion of ‘human security’. This term has been highly
scrutinised (and often criticised) in recent years, and remains contested terrain. The term
spread following its use in the 1994 UN Development Programme report, and at the time
Norwegian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy explained that,
human security means safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats.
It is a condition or state of being characterized by freedom from pervasive threats to
people’s rights, their safety or even their lives. … It is an alternative way of seeing
the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively
on the security of territory or governments (Suhrke 1999, 269).
Some advocates of the concept have thus expounded seven key elements of human
security: political security (proper functioning of state institutions and protection of civil
liberties); personal security (personal exposure to abuse through violence or mistreatment);
economic security (personal income and national productivity); food security (access to
and production of basic nutrition); health security (exposure to disease or other ailments
not arising from violence, and access to medicine); community security (the continued
physical, geographical, social and cultural cohesion of a community); and environmental
security (pollution, biodiversity, and ecofacts e.g. mines-sites and rising sea-levels) (Paris
2001, 90). Other presentations of the concept have asserted that the extreme vulnerability
of certain populations is the key focus, and thus highlighted the condition of ‘human
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The key focus here will thus the real impact of drug trafficking on elements of political,
economic, health, and personal security in Guinea-Bissau, and what broader conclusions
may be drawn from this.
Drug Trafficking and
Human Security in
Guinea-Bissau
What then can we identify as the impact of drug trafficking on ‘human security’ in GuineaBissau? Let us begin with political security – the proper functioning of state institutions
and protection of civil liberties.
Political Security – Most analyses make clear that the entry of drug money into an
economy can play a key role in undermining vulnerable regimes by encouraging official
corruption amongst political and military leaders, and the judiciary. As well as corrupting
individuals this can damage the overall structure of government by encouraging corrupted
branches to violate separation of powers through interference in other spheres, e.g. military
interference in government, or political interference in the judicial process (ICG 2008, 1;
Chalk 2000, 24-27). Antonio Mazzitelli points out that in the West African context,
a patrimonial conception of the state within which national natural and financial
resources belong to the individual(s) in power, also contribute to the creation of
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an environment where a disregard for existing laws and the use of institutional
prerogatives for private goals is considered not only justified, but an indicator of
power (2007, 1073).
Drug activities can also disrupt the state through violent confrontation, an example being
the activities of the Colombian Medellín cartel, which during the 1980s killed many
public figures in Colombia, including elected politicians, a High Court Judge, presidential
candidates, and journalists, as well as over 3,000 military and police personnel (Jojarth
2009, 94). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime thus warns that West African
states, ‘risk becoming shell-states: sovereign in name, but hollowed out from the inside
by criminals in collusion with corrupt officials in the government and the security
services’ (UNODC 2008, 2). Preventing the proper functioning of the state detracts from
the expression of individual political desires through the medium of the democratic
government, thus impacting the population’s political security.
Guinea-Bissau is nominally a semi-presidential multi-party democracy, with an independent
judiciary, and a military subservient to civilian rulers. Two major parties have exchanged
power within the parliament, in coalition with several smaller parties, and three sets of
presidential/parliamentary elections have been held since 1994. However, this system is
far from functional, with more coups and coup-attempts than elections during the period,
the assassinations of various political figures, including the president, and a military that is
highly active within the political sphere. Indeed, it has been said that, ‘nothing in Guinean
politics can be achieved against the will of the military’ (Vaz and Rotzoll 2005, 545).
Specifically, over the past two years the assassinations of President Vieira and General
Tagme Na Wai have been linked to drug trafficking, and the powerful explosives used to
kill Na Wai are suggested to have been imported by traffickers (Monteiro and Morgado
2009, 4), and a key suspect – former Head of the Navy José Na Tchuto, who fled to the
Gambia – has been named internationally as a wanted drug trafficker (Gorjão 2010, 4-5).
Na Tchuto then helped instigated the ‘semi-coup’ in Bissau on 1 April 2010, in which the
Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior was detained before temporarily fleeing the country,
and which resulted in Na Tchuto-ally General Antonio Indjai being appointed Military
Chief of Staff, and Na Tchuto resuming a position as a key figure in the Guinean navy
(Kohnert 2010, 11).
However, while the surge in drug trafficking can be specifically dated to 2005, the events
of the subsequent years are not an unusual break in the flow of Guinean politics since
independence. From the coup and coup-attempts of the 1980s and 1990s, to the civil war
in 1998, the coup against Kuamba Yala in 2003 and all of the violence and unconstitutional
dealings in between, the operation of politics in Guinea-Bissau in the drug trafficking era
maintains continuity with the previous decades. And even when the Guinean electoral
system has functioned at its best, voting has often been along ethnic lines, with regional
leaders deciding who an entire locality will vote for, and with candidates distributing,
‘tools, motorcycles and cellular phones in an attempt to influence people’s voting decisions’
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(Vaz and Rotzoll 2005, 538, 542). Meanwhile the local media has been unable to facilitate
informed political discourse due to lack of training and resources (ICG 29 January 2009, 4).
Generally then, “the inherent problems of the country are not explained by this trafficking,
but seem rather entrenched in the ambiguous social, ethnic, political and military relations
developed since [ independence]” (Monteiro and Morgado 2009, 4). As the International
Crisis Group notes, Guinea-Bissau’s ‘political and administrative structures are insufficient
to guarantee control of its territory, assure minimum public services or counterbalance
the army’s political dominance’ (ICG 2008, 1). Rather than being a cause of poor statefunction and instability, drug trafficking is a symptom. The causes of Guinea-Bissau’s
political insecurity are the deep underdevelopment and,
fragile formal state structures inherited from colonial times, … an ‘uncaptured’
peasantry on the one side and the emergence of a stratum of poverty ridden urban
poor on the other, created … by ill-conceived neo-liberal structural adjustment
programs of the Bretton Woods Institutions (Kohnert 2010, 4-5).
This has been compounded in recent years by the failure of international donors to, ‘fully
engage in reforming the state, allowing it to continue weak and un-capacitated’ (Monteiro
and Morgado 2009, 2). As the state is the major source of wealth in Guinea-Bissau, the
political and military conflict the nation has experienced has been a competition over its
resources using all available means, in an environment of general scarcity, which lacks any
tradition of popular empowerment. In this context, drug traffic is merely a new resource to
compete over, primarily through the vehicle of the state. In the absence of drug traffic the
competition would continue regardless.
This is not to dismiss drug trafficking as having no impact on the stability of GuineaBissau’s government. With the army so deeply embedded in politics, international donors
have seen military reform as the key to resolving the nation’s intractable political quagmire
– aiming to streamline the force, weed out corruption, and transform it into a guarantor of
democracy (Gorjão 2010, 1). The army remains bloated with veterans of the independence
war, hundreds of whom have passed retirement age, and around two thirds of the army
are of officer rank. However, the involvement with drug trafficking provides a source of
income that decreases their dependency on foreign donors (thus undermining international
efforts to advance reform within the Bissauan military), as well as creating circumstances
for increased factionalisation and conflict within the armed forces. As streamlining of the
military would deprive factions of members, influence and resources, it is generally resisted
(Fletcher 2008). Thus, the head of the UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau,
Shola Omoregie, asserts that, ‘Drug trafficking … will undermine everything we do to
build peace here if it is not tackled’ (UNIRIN 28 August 2008). Acknowledging this, others
also apportion some blame for the ineffective reform process to the international donors,
who have, ‘been present in the country for ten years now, and [whose] involvement has
been disjointed and unclear’ (Monteiro and Morgado 2009, 6). So drug trafficking helps
perpetuate political insecurity in Guinea-Bissau, but is not one of its fundamental causes,
and a high level of political insecurity could be predicted to continue in its absence.
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Economic Security – Guinea-Bissau’s economic position has changed very little in the
last 30 years. Pervasive poverty remains entrenched, and the nation remains on the lowest
rungs of the UNDP Human Development Index: with life expectancy at around 47 yearsof-age; child mortality at more than 10%; and illiteracy at 60% of the population. There
are only 4,400km of roads, and of that only 40km are paved; thus most become unusable
during the rainy season (ICG 2008, 1). Guinea-Bissau’s economy is almost completely
agricultural and cashew production provides around 90% of export income. However,
agricultural revenues are insufficient for the country to sustain itself, so it also relies greatly
on foreign aid (Thaler 2009, 6). Generally, in the countryside, ‘“people live independently
of the central state”, as they did at independence, and … community structures, [supported
by NGOs] … provide basic services such as education and health care’ (ICG 2008, 1).
Despite the population’s dependence, by the mid-2000s international aid donors began
shifting funds away from Guinea-Bissau – classified as a ‘Difficult Partnership Country’
(DPC) – and towards nations considered ‘aid darlings’, who receive greater resources
thanks to their positive political returns (Thaler 2009, 9).
Meanwhile, this situation is not helped by expenditure on the armed forces estimated at
30% of the national budget. This again confirms demobilisation of around 50% of military
personnel as a key aim for donors, though the compensation packages considered have
failed to placate soldiers with few alternative sources of income. Before his death, General
Na Wai, emphasised that soldiers would only accept reform that allowed them to ‘preserve
their dignity’, however one international donor made clear that, ‘dignity has a monetary
value that the international community is not prepared to pay’ (ICG 2008, 20-21). Progress
is thus deadlocked by the quandary that international donors will not offer enough material
incentive for the military to voluntarily relinquish political control, and that any attempt to
inflict penalties on the military elite will only increase the importance to those individuals
of maintaining political influence. Meanwhile, drug trafficking provides a new source of
income that is not contingent on satisfying donors.
The economic security of most individuals is generally linked to the overall health and
diversity of the national economy. Apart from impeding reform of the armed forces, why
might drugs be bad for Guinea-Bissau’s economy? Theoretically a number of problems
have been suggested. Firstly, there is the issue of distortion of the economy: diverting
resources from constructive activities; creating dependence on the drug industry; and
‘Dutch Disease’ – making other economic activities unprofitable (Klein 2008, 169). In
West Africa, where few industries other than resource-extraction have the economic
weight of cocaine trafficking, participation in the trade may be a rational choice for many.
The industry thus draws in human and financial capital as a high-profit/low-risk alternative
to promoting real economic development (UNODC 2008, 49). The illegal income is rarely
transformed into the productive capital investments necessary for long-term economic
expansion (Singer 2008, 475). Economies re-structured around smuggling are then left
vulnerable to collapse once international law enforcement efforts successfully block drug
traffic (UNODC 2008, 47).
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Secondly, there are direct costs and losses associated with being a transit point for
drugs. There is the channelling of state funds into additional law enforcement to deal
with trafficking crime and the violence that surrounds it, as well as resources diverted
to treating drug addicts (Chalk 2000, 24-27). By degrading the national quality of life,
skilled workers are encouraged to move overseas, while crime discourages businesses
from investing in the nation. The shadow economy of criminal proceeds can erode the tax
base, thus further impoverishing the state, while bribe-seeking officials can fuel inequality.
And the luxury lifestyle associated with illicit money fosters the consumption of imported
goods over locally-produced items (Mazzitelli 2007, 1086). Thirdly, there are the direct
effects on workers’ productivity. There are significant occupational risks faced by workers
involved in producing or transporting drugs, which can frequently result in permanent
injuries and thus reduced productivity for those involved; while those who consume drugs
are themselves likely to have reduced productivity due to drug intoxication or related longterm health effects (Singer 2008, 472).
However, in the context of Guinea-Bissau, many of these problems seem virtually irrelevant
at present. Guinea-Bissau’s economy is already highly ‘distorted’. The nation has virtually
no manufacturing or industrialised sector, and over the five years prior to the surge in drug
trafficking activity its economy was experiencing additional contraction (UNIRIN 7 June
2006). Tens of thousands of Guineans are also periodically at risk of starvation due to
widespread over-dependence on cashew nut exports, an industry that is highly vulnerable
to international markets (UNIRIN 5 May 2006). Drug trafficking itself does not require a
large workforce, and is therefore unlikely to take many workers away from growing food
for either local consumption or export. If drugs were to be produced locally then land may
be diverted to drug production, however this is unlikely to be cocaine, as the growing zones
for coca are geographically limited. The drug most suitable for production in GuineaBissau is cannabis, which is already the most used drug in West Africa, with regional
production estimated at about 3,500 tons. But the cannabis market has not emerged as a
major problem, as competitive markets keep profits low, and the ability of individuals to
cultivate the drug themselves prevents crime monopolies from developing (UNODC 2008,
31). If opium were to be grown in place of cashew nuts, peasants may in fact find it to be an
excellent high-value alternative crop, with a stable international market – as have farmers
in Afghanistan (Singer 2008, 472). Meanwhile, the Bissauan state is already completely
dependent on foreign donors to pay the public service, and health costs are largely borne
by the international community (UNIRIN 21 June 2006).
On the other hand, it can also be argued that not all the economic results of drug trafficking
are negative. The UNODC itself acknowledges that, ‘[i]n countries such as Guinea Bissau,
where the largest commercial activity is the export of cashew nuts to India, drug trafficking
and services to the drug traffickers may generate more money and jobs than anything in
the legal economy’ (UNODC 2008, 41). Enriched members of drug networks increase
their consumption of everything from beer to washing powder, helping to stimulate local
markets; while there is also the potential for a beneficial economic multiplier effect as local
businessmen expand production to meet drug industry demands for farm equipment, tools,
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vehicles, simple chemicals, and various machines. Banks, legal experts and accounting
firms may earn work servicing the drug industry; while traffickers’ demand for luxury
housing boosts local construction and related industries supplying building materials.
Wealthy drug barons also require security, drivers, and domestic staff. Additionally, drug
traffickers may keep investments within the country because of advantages they acquire
through influence over the state, so drug money may be converted into investment in
legitimate industry through money-laundering. Finally, in some countries drug barons
have sometimes engaged in social investment to increase their own popularity. Social
investment may include basic infrastructure, support for cultural associations, or loans
to local entrepreneurs (Griffith 1993/1994, 27-28; Klein 2008, 170; Geopolitical Drug
Watch 1996, 2). There is already a detectable in-flow of money into Guinea-Bissau that
the UNODC believes may be drug-related, with foreign reserves increasing from US$33
million in 2003 to US$113 million in 2007, and a substantial increase in foreign direct
investment (US$42 million in 2006) after years of virtually none (UNODC 2008, 42-44).
2000, 25). If drug processing takes place in the region there are also associated health
effects of pollution and working with chemicals (Griffith 1993/1994, 29). Meanwhile,
Guinea-Bissau remains ill-equipped to use any available medical resources due to, ‘poorly
presented proposals, demotivated civil servants, lack of technicians, institutional and
authority vacuums, and wrecked infrastructure’ (UNIRIN 14 July 2006).
Contextually, it must be also noted that in addition to the mere supply of hard drugs, the
conditions in which people are driven to take drugs in part arise from urban environments
beset by poverty, lack of housing, inadequate water and sanitation, ill-health and street
violence. ‘Without sufficient employment opportunities, many young people grow
discouraged and feel worthless’ (Singer 2008, 468). Often these conditions are fostered by
the global economic policies of developed nations. It can also be reasonably argued that
legal drugs like tobacco and alcohol, ‘have at least as great if not a considerably greater
impact on development internationally than do illegal drugs’ (Singer 2008, 469, 476).
Personal Security – In terms of personal security, individual crime is not prevalent in GuineaBissau though political violence has erupted periodically in the region, particularly around
the capital Bissau. Cocaine trafficking is unlikely to have any positive results for personal
security, but may contribute negatively through an increase in crime rates associated
with consumption, violence between drug trafficking factions, or violence between drug
traffickers and state authorities (Chalk 2000, 24). Drug traffickers can commit violent
crimes categorised as ‘enforcement’ or ‘business’ – with enforcement violence directed at
coercing compliance with contracts and avoidance of arrest; and business violence aiming
to acquire wealth through extortion or robbery. Globally, thousands of businessmen,
journalists, government officials and clergymen have been killed in drug-violence, along
with many ordinary citizens. Meanwhile, corruption of the judiciary allows perpetrators to
go unpunished (Griffith 1993/1994, 22-24), though Guinea-Bissau has actually also lacked
facilities to hold convicted offenders, due to the destruction of their prison in political
violence (UNODC 2008, 36). The history of war surrounding resources in West African
nations, such as diamonds in Sierra Leone and Liberia, also demonstrates the potential
for conflict to emerge around drug trafficking – the monetary value of which is actually
higher than blood minerals. The security situation facing Mexico today is thus often raised
as a warning of the future for nations like Guinea-Bissau (UNODC 2008, 22). However,
military uprisings against the government have already played a large role in GuineaBissau’s post-independence history, and elements of the military are said to control current
drug trafficking, thus future violence will probably resemble what the nation has already
experienced (UNODC 2008, 35).
Again, the argument here is not that drug trafficking is the preferred avenue for the
development of Guinea-Bissau’s economy, but that from the perspective of an already
deeply underdeveloped state, marginalised within the global economic system, and
predominantly dependent on a single export crop vulnerable to market-fluctuations, it is
not necessarily a given that drug trafficking will only have negative economic effects in
the short-to-medium term. The majority of the nation’s negative circumstances already
existed in the absence of drug trafficking. It is thus disingenuous for international
agencies to devote disproportionate blame to the burgeoning drug trafficking industry,
when Guinea-Bissau’s underdevelopment actually arises from European imperialism that
stifled domestic development in the colonial era, neo-liberal structural adjustment that
undermined state-driven development after independence, and increasing abandonment of
the country by aid donors in the years prior to the drug surge. Ironically, the emergence of
drug trafficking may work to reinvigorate foreign assistance to Guinea-Bissau due to its
new relevance to the Western world.
Health Security – For individuals the health impacts of the consumption of hard drugs are
primarily negative, and while West Africa is not the end-market of most of the trafficked
drugs, consumption is rising in the region. Cocaine and crack cocaine are becoming available
in many major towns, and heroin use is also increasing (Mazzitelli 2007, 1077). In GuineaBissau reports are that use of crack cocaine, with the local name ‘Pedra’, is growing.
The drug is highly addictive, and is strongly associated with personal aggression, crime,
and social breakdown (UNIRIN 3 March 2008). Whether the finances are provided by
Guinea-Bissau’s government or international donors, costs connected with drug addiction
and associated violence detract from the resources available for other conditions (Griffith
1993/1994, 26). These include high-levels of infection with HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis and
malaria (UNIRIN 14 July 2006). Drug use can be a particularly major contributor to
the spread of AIDS due to sharing of syringes and other drug paraphernalia, and related
poor sexual health practices, with the disease then often attacking sufferers during their
most economically-productive years, further burdening society (Singer 2008, 473; Chalk
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111
Conclusion
In examining the impact of drug trafficking on human security in Guinea-Bissau, within the
categories of political, economic, health, and personal security, I have tried to demonstrate
three key points. Firstly, that Guinea-Bissau already had a high level of insecurity in all
these categories prior to the onset of drug trafficking. Secondly, in the context of this
existing insecurity drug trafficking’s impact may actually be relatively limited. In the areas
of health and personal security, the impacts will be predominantly negative, but small in
scope in comparison to the general context of insecurity. In terms of political insecurity,
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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drug trafficking may become a major motivator and facilitator of this insecurity, but in
its absence the struggle over other sources of wealth may continue regardless. And in
the category of economic security, Guinea-Bissau is so marginalised within the global
economy that an argument can actually be made for a beneficial impact arising from drug
trafficking. Thirdly, while this does not thus lead to an advocacy for drug trafficking, it
does point to the conclusion that any new focus on drug trafficking as Guinea-Bissau’s
most serious problem is mistaken – concentrating on a symptom of underdevelopment
and insecurity rather than a cause – and instead reflects the self-interested viewpoint of the
major drug-consuming nations.
Europe’s drug addiction’ (Almeida 2007). Ironically, perhaps it will be Guinea-Bissau’s
threat of undermining Western drug prohibition that will finally bring the international
attention and resources necessary to begin improving the nation’s lot. However, to truly
resolve the problems of Guinea-Bissau, and many similar nations, the roots of crisis in
the normal functioning of the global political economy must be recognised and measures
taken to ameliorate their consequences.
Prior to the emergence of drug trafficking through West Africa, a key aim of the international
community in Guinea-Bissau was army reform, and breaking their power over the political
system. This was/is seen as a prerequisite for creating a stable national political system
and economy, and thus future economic growth. These fundamental reforms can only
be achieved with sufficient financial aid from donors, which has not been forthcoming.
However, implicit in this formulation is that having ‘normal’ political institutions and
interaction with the global political economy will bring about development – rather than
an understanding that it has actually been this interaction, under European imperialism and
post-independence economic liberalisation, that led to and perpetuated Guinea-Bissau’s
underdevelopment and political insecurity. While aid money may certainly help GuineaBissau, the tendency of donors to offer inadequate funds, and to withdraw these whenever
there is instability, is the equivalent of a doctor offering an insufficient dose of medicine
and withdrawing it whenever the symptoms reappear (ICG 2008, 21-23; Bernard 2008).
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developed world, and in this case particularly Western Europe, that maintains and spreads
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Öz
Gine Bissau Cumhuriyeti’nde Uyuşturucu Madde Kaçakçılığı ve İnsan
Güvenliği
Son zamanlarda Batılı ülkelerde Batı Afrika genelinin ve özellikle Gine Bissau
Cumhuriyeti’nin kokain kaçakçılığının kilit noktasını oluşturmasından kaynaklanan ve
giderek artan bir endişe söz konusudur. Gine Bissau Cumhuriyeti’nin iç siyasetinde ve
askeri kurumlarında yaşanan çalkantılar da uyuşturucu ticaretine bağlanmaktadır. Bu
makale, uyuşturucu madde kaçakçılığını Gine Bissau Cumhuriyeti’nin tarihi çerçevesinde
ele alacak ve bu ülkedeki “insan güvenliği” konusuna olan etkilerini politika, ekonomi,
sağlık ve insan güvenliği açısından inceleyecektir. Makalenin argümanı, Gine Bissau’da
halihazırda var olan düşük insan güvenliği göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, uyuşturucu
madde kaçakçılığının etkilerinin o kadar da anlamlı olmadığı ve uyuşturucu ticaretini
Gine Bissau’nın temel sorunu olarak ele almaktan ziyade, kaçakçılık olgusunun, ülkenin
Avrupa sömürgeciliği ve küresel ekonomik yapılar ve politikalar sonucu geri kalmışlığının
sadece bir göstergesi olarak ele almanın gerekli olduğu yönündedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler
A
n Exploratory Investigation of
Rural Clusters in Turkey
Elif Kalaycı
Department of Management, Atılım University.
Uyuşturucu madde kaçakçılığı, Gine Bissau, İnsan Güvenliği
About the Author
David Alexander Robinson is a Lecturer of History at Edith Cowan University in Western
Australia. His research specialty is modern African history, and his teaching includes
courses on twentieth century history, human rights, drug history, and genocide. He is
currently writing a history of modern Mozambique.
Yazar Hakkında
David Alexander Robinson, Batı Avustralya’da bulunan Edith Cowan Üniversitesi’nde
öğretim üyesidir. Uzmanlık konusu modern Afrika tarihidir ve verdiği dersler arasında
Yirminci Yüzyıl tarihi, insan hakları, uyuşturucu tarihi ve soykırım yer almaktadır. Dr.
Robinson halen Modern Mozambik konulu bir kitap yazmaktadır.
Abstract
Clusters have been examined from many perspectives, but until recently very little
attention was paid to clusters in rural regions. The recent literature acknowledges the need
for studying clusters as a means of development in rural economies. Given the need to
study rural and agricultural clusters in developing nations, this paper aims to detect some
potential clusters in rural Turkey. In this exploratory work, we look for signs of clustering
or networking in various rural areas of Turkey. The findings suggest that there is indeed
evidence of rural cluster formation within Turkey: Bartın is a potential cluster, while
Gödence and Bademli both appear to be growing clusters. Gedelek, with the oldest history
and the most established institutions among the cases examined, seems to be a mature
cluster, while the Assembly of Eastern Anatolian Agricultural Producers in Erzurum
(DATÜB) in Erzurum could at best be called a network.
Key Words
Rural clusters, entrepreneurs, potential clusters, Turkey.
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Introduction
Clusters have been receiving an increasing amount of interest in the economic development
literature ever since the introduction of the concept by Michael Porter in 1990. According
to Porter, clusters are defined as “geographic concentrations of inter-connected companies
and institutions in a particular field” (Porter 1998, 78). Thus clusters can include competing
and cooperating enterprises in closely related industries as well as other actors such as
providers of complementary products or specialized skills and technologies. Universities,
public or private research institutions, standard-setting institutions, local trade associations,
financial organizations, training and information-providing bodies are other examples of
various types of agencies that cater to the needs of a cluster’s constituents. A distinguishing
feature of all these bodies is their tendency to co-locate within a specific region (Porter et
al. 2004, 23).
The essence of clusters stems intrinsically from their competitiveness-enhancing nature.
Competitiveness is enhanced in three ways: through productivity increases, through the
emergence of innovation and through the commercialization of innovation starts (Porter
et al. 2004, 45). Clusters improve productivity because they provide access to specialized
machinery, technology, skilled labor and specialized infrastructure. Vocational training
is readily available so that it is not costly to improve the skills of the specialized labor
pool. Knowledge spills over easily from one firm to the other within the cluster. As a
result, know-how is “in the air”. Such an environment reduces transaction costs and helps
improve the productivity of firms. With the availability of specialized factors of production
in the cluster, enterprises targeting selected customer needs begin researching for new
products and trying out new processes to cut back production costs. Such initiatives create
an innovative environment in the cluster. As new products are developed, start-ups or
spin-offs are created. Clusters welcome such newcomers because their customers keep
pressing for increasingly customized and specialized products and services. The presence
of venture capitalists and other financial institutions that cater to the needs of the cluster
pave the way for the formation of new enterprises; thus it is easier for new firms to flourish
in a cluster than elsewhere. Also in case of a failed start-up, it is easier for entrepreneurs
to find employment because there are many firms in the same field that can employ them
(Ketels 2003).
Although clusters have been examined from many perspectives, they have received very
little attention within the framework of rural economies. This may be attributable to the
fact that the idea of clusters has been perceived as mostly related to competitiveness and
innovation, which are easier to link with automotives, electronics and biotechnology
within the manufacturing sector. The recent literature acknowledges the need for studying
clusters as a means of development in rural economies. Porter et al. (2004), as cited by
Thomas and Ward (2005, 34), state this need very precisely in the following quotation:
There is a lack of systematic evidence about the composition and evolution of
rural economies at the cluster and sub-cluster level… Research in these subjects
is among the most pressing priorities for enhancing policy thinking toward rural
areas.
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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Agriculture is viewed as a renewed area of interest in rural development. Through the
globalization, standardization and growth in demand for the food and biofuel industries,
the rules of the game in agriculture are rapidly changing. There is increasing market
pressure as well as a need for higher productivity in agriculture. Clusters are proposed as
a tool to promote productivity and competitiveness in the agricultural sector in the global
market (Galvez-Nogales 2010). According to the Cluster Meta Study, which is a study of
833 clusters from 49 nations, the percentage of clusters from developing nations is merely
20 percent, and of that less than one percent comprises agricultural clusters. Yet another
source, Cluster Initiative Greenbook (Sölvell et al. 2003), which surveys more than 250
cluster initiatives in the world, has very few examples from the agrifood sector. Out of 600
survey respondents in the processed food category only 13 belong to the agrifood sector.
Thus, there is a pressing need to analyze agricultural clusters in developing nations. In
the words of Eva Galvez-Nogales (2010, xi), “policies and programmes for supporting
agricultural clusters (i.e., AC initiatives) are very much needed in developing countries to
overcome market, government policy and systemic failures.”
Given the need to study rural economies and agricultural clusters in developing nations,
this paper aims to detect some potential clusters in rural Turkey. The purpose is to pinpoint
some common factors that arise in the cluster and network literature and use them in the
classification of some groups of enterprises in Turkey as either a cluster or a network.
A recent scan of the literature reveals four main concepts regarding the emergence
and development of clusters in both developed and developing countries. These are:
the significance of entrepreneurs at the initial stage of cluster formation, the collective
efficiency generated at later stages, the financial hurdle sharing while the cluster grows,
and finally the drawing of firms into the cluster as the cluster matures.
The first section of the paper presents a review of the literature concerning each of these
concepts. The second section covers the methodology and data collection issues. Research
results are presented in the third section. The fourth section presents an analysis of the data
and the fifth section concludes.
A Brief Review of the
Cluster Literature
The Role of
Entrepreneurs in the
Emergence of Clusters
Cases of individuals
triggering cluster
emergence
Khan (2004) attributes the emergence of clusters to local demand, prior existence of natural
resources, innovative firms and chance events. On the other hand, Ritvala and Kleyman
(2007), Nadvi (1999), Anderson and Schmitz (1997), Ketels (2003) claim entrepreneurs
play a vital part in the emergence of clusters. Sometimes as visionary individuals, sometimes
as part of private firms and at other times as part of business associations, entrepreneurs are
observed in numerous cases as the triggering force of cluster formation. Mangematin et al.
(2005, 23) introduce the concept of cluster-institutionalizing entrepreneurs who “redefine
tactics and rephrase the formulation of existing activities to nurture the cluster and
increasingly validate its constitution through progressively enrolling and locking partners
in.” They credit the rise of certain clusters to the efforts of these cluster-institutionalizing
entrepreneurs who bring local, national and international actors together.
McCormick (1999), Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999), Weijland (1999) and Feldman
(2001) all assert that there is a core individual, who initiates a business, around which
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120
the cluster forms. In the words of Audretsch and Kleibach (2001, 19), “clusters form not
because resources are initially located in a particular region, but rather through the work
of entrepreneurs.” Entrepreneurs organize resources and institutions to support their firms.
Kargon, Leslie and Schoenberger (1992), as cited by Feldman and Francis (2006, 122),
point to the influence of Frederick Terman in the foundation of Silicon Valley:
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
of co-ops in the development of clusters. Perceiving “farmer associations” as a means
towards employment generation and poverty alleviation, Birchall (2008) asserts that
clusters provide an environment for the prosperity of these associations.
Collective Efficiency in
Action
[Terman] orchestrated the creation of a world class research institute with strong
ties to the business community and an environment that encouraged students
to become entrepreneurs or at least be actively involved in corporate research
programs.
George Kozmetsky is reported as being instrumental in the development of Austin, Texas.
“Georges Freches’s vision is found to be the driving force of the high tech development of
Montpellier, while Neel, Merlin and Dubedout played the same role in the development of
Grenoble” (Voyer 1998, 104).
Cases of firms triggering
cluster emergence
According to Klepper (2002, 2004), as reported by Feldman and Francis (2006, 126),
the emergence of the Detroit automobile cluster is due to the “pedigree and experience”
acquired by entrepreneurs “from working for Old Motor Works, a leading innovator at
the time.” Saxenian (1998) also underlines the importance of specific firms in triggering
cluster formation, for the semiconductor industry:
The shared experience of working at the Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation
also served as a powerful bond for many of the region’s early semi-conductor
engineers. During the 1960s it seemed as if every engineer in Silicon Valley had
worked there. Even today, many of the region’s entrepreneurs and managers still
speak of Fairchild as an important managerial training ground and applaud the
education they got at Fairchild University (Saxenian 1998, 30).
Nadvi (1999) describes the various roles of “business associations” in the strengthening
of clusters as: 1) lobbying on behalf of their members; 2) coordinating / regulating the
organizations within the cluster; 3) providing services, such as technical and managerial
advice as well as information on markets, prices, competitors; and 4) establishing links
between members of the cluster to research and development institutions. Furthermore,
Nadvi (1999, 10) claims that “increased joint action through business associations
is required for by SME-dominated developing country industrial clusters to face the
challenges of the new competition” (emphasis added).
Citing the example of the Association of Fruit Producers as the driving force behind the
agricultural cluster in Eastern Poland, Szymoniuk (2003) emphasizes the importance
 atılım
Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer (1999) point to three passive benefits in locating within a
cluster: semi-skilled labor force availability, easy access to raw materials and machinery,
and lower search costs for customers. Schmitz and Nadvi (1999), on the other hand,
emphasize the significance of “shifting gears from passive to active collective efficiency”
when a local area turns into a cluster. Examples of active joint action include the search
for international markets, trade fair attendance and establishment of links with research
institutions as a means of moving up in a value chain.
Knorringa (1999), as cited by Schmitz and Nadvi (1999, 1509) proposes joint action is a
distinguishing characteristic of clusters. Knorringa (1999) specifies the sharing of market
information with residents of the cluster as a form of joint action, while Weijland (1999)
points out that in Indonesia where she studies clusters, cooperative purchasing is more
popular than cooperative marketing.
Sharing of the
Financial Hurdle
Ketels (2003) claims sharing the same type of barrier in the external environment and
attempting to overcome that barrier via joint action is a distinguishing feature of a cluster.
Furthermore, Weijland (1999) states that a significant feature of rural clusters is the
“sharing of financial hurdle” by the people in the cluster. Gertler and Wolfe (2006) point
out an interesting structure of financial relationships in Canada. The biotechnology firms
in Canada are reported to rely heavily on local sources of investment capital from private
sources (angel investors, family, and friends) and are likely to have been born from another
local company or research institution at some time in the past.
Attracting New Firms
to the Region
Ketels (2003) points out that a greater number of businesses form in clusters than
elsewhere. This is mainly due to the fact that start-ups rely on external suppliers and
various partners, and they can find all that readily in a cluster. Therefore, it is easier for
new firms to emerge in a cluster. In addition to creating an environment where new firms
can flourish organically, clusters also attract new ventures to the area from outside. In the
words of Maskell (2001), cited in Gertler and Wolfe (2006, 221):
Sturgeon (2001) provides a historical view of the development of firms well in advance
of the renowned spin-offs originating from Fairchild Semiconductor and argues that the
strength of the aeronautical and electronics industries, championed by a small group
of people with a vision for the development of the region, created the high technology
conurbation.
Cases of associations
triggering cluster
emergence
121
… Once the cluster has emerged it acts as a magnet drawing in additional firms
whose activities require access to the existing knowledge or complement it in some
significant respect
The drawing of firms into the region is a sign of maturity of the cluster because in order for
these firms to be coming to the region there must be increased specialization needs and a
ready market for these needs. Thus, it is the opinion of this author that a cluster that breeds
new investment is a mature one.
Methodology and Data
Collection
Using different Internet media sources, ten different regions in the country were selected
as candidates for clusters or networks. These were Gedelek, Gödence, Suvarlı (Mardin),
Bademli, Kozak, Şirince, Ağaköy, DATÜB (Erzurum), Didim and Bartın. After collecting
all the available material on the Internet for these regions, contact details of individuals
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122
in each region were gathered again from the Internet. Telephone interviews were then
conducted with these individuals, except for one person in Didim. The interview consisted
of open-ended questions. With the permission of the interviewee, the interviews were
recorded on tape. During the telephone interviews, notes were also taken as back-up for
the tapes in case the recording failed for some technical reason. Following the completion
of the interviews, the tapes were listened to twice to record the data.
At this stage, it was obvious that Suvarlı, Kozak, Şirince and Ağaköy did not possess the
properties of either a cluster or a network. Suvarli turned out to be in a location where the
Fair Trade Organization had initiated a small international poverty alleviation project.
Kozak lacked the embedded institutional structure for a cluster, while Ağaköy did not
have the collective efficiency or the financial hurdle sharing properties, two of the main
indicators necessary to be a cluster candidate. We were then left with Bartın, Gödence,
Bademli, Gedelek and DATÜB (Erzurum).
Findings
Bartın Group of
Entrepreneurs
Corporation
Bartın Group of Entrepreneurs Corporation (Bartın Girişim Grubu A.Ş.) was founded
by 73 local industrialists in 2003 with the purpose of selling the forestry products of the
local area and providing employment and extra income to the villagers of the region.
Their business idea rests on employing the villagers as leaf-pickers, as they are the ones
who know where the leaves grow. The villagers collect laurel leaves and other forest
products from the areas designated annually by the Forestry Administration. Bartın Group
of Entrepreneurs (BGG) buys the leaves from the villagers at more than three times the
going rate in the market, processes the leaves and sells them to exporters who then send the
product to as far away markets as the US and the Far East (Tanyeri 2007).
General manager İlhan Özgür Yurt claims that if this firm was not established, the villagers
on their own could not have initiated this business. The essential element this firm provides
the local economy is a trade link to the rest of the world.
The rate of growth of the firm is very high. Only laurel production in 2006 was 100
tons. In 2007 this figure became 400 tons and in 2008 it reached 1200 tons. İlhan Özgür
Yurt proudly states that the increase in production goes in tandem with the increase in
employment and income earned by the villagers. He has personally witnessed a few
families that previously migrated to Istanbul, have returned to Bartın just to benefit from
the employment opportunity provided by BGG.
Mr. Yurt believes 150- 250 people from four regions around Bartın covering 30-40 villages
work for BGG as of 2008. However, this number is growing at a high rate. Given the
promising market opportunities and potential income from laurel leaf export business,
BGG has been able to make an expensive investment and purchased an industrial oven for
270000 Euro which they use to dry the leaves (Tuduk 2008).
Gödence
Gödence, a village of Izmir is renowned for its branded products of olive oil and olives
under the name “Gödence”. They have started the branding process in 1993, but Mr. Özcan
Kokulu, the president of the Gödence Agriculture Cooperative indicates that it took ten
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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years to promote and finally establish the brand name, but, as of 2008, their brand is known
from Gümüşhane to Finland (Tuduk 2008).
The distinguishing feature of Gödence is their cooperation with the Olive Research
Institutes (Zeytincilik Araştırma Enstitüleri), Provincial Directorates of Agriculture
(Tarım İl Müdürlükleri) and Ege University for research and development. They employ
an agricultural engineer as a manager-in-charge. In 2005, they invested heavily in a project
with all their financial resources and a loan from the ministry of agriculture. They do not
use bank loans because they are too risky.
The first collective action of this village is the foundation of the cooperative under the
leadership of Abdullah Duran with the aim of overcoming the barrier of two mills’
dominance in the village. Although the cooperative allowed the bypassing of the mills,
then the villagers ran into the barrier of large industrialists of Izmir who purchased their
olive oil. Facing a stronger dominance, this time the villagers realized that they had to
differentiate their product via improved quality, packaging, reliability. Finally in 1993,
they founded their own brand to reach the final consumer directly. But this time, they ran
into problems such as finding the right customers, using the right packing, warehousing
and the right amount of working capital. Having no professional managerial knowledge,
they learned through trial and error and created their own goal in the form of five years’
development plans.
The president of the cooperative claims running a cooperative is more challenging than
running a company because in a cooperative one administers peers who can turn their
back at one’s smallest mistake such as missing someone’s greeting. However, in a firm,
the president has power over his subordinates and does not have to worry about breaking
hearts. So there are tacit rules cooperative administrators are expected to comply. Trust is
an essential element in running a cooperative. In Gödence, trust in the cooperative actions
are established via wide participation in decision making. There is a board of consulting
made up of 11 people, a board of directors of 5 people and an audit board of 3 people. A
decision is made by the consent of the majority of all these people and once the decision
is agreed upon, no one defies the decision. However, the people in all these boards are
specially selected for their knowledge that they can contribute to the decision making
process. The wider the expertise of these people, the better decisions are made and disputes
minimized. Mr. Kokulu claims that trust depends upon participation in decision making
and selection of qualified individuals for the boards.
Gödence enjoys semi-skilled labor power because children are born into a world of olives.
In 1992-1996 the cooperative held training in the villages in collaboration with Ege
University.
Mr. Kokulu emphasizes that the significance of open communication in the resolution
of disputes. He claims they have created an environment of open communication so
that people can talk with each other and see each other’s point of view in order to reach
common ground. They use peer pressure to install tacit rules. For instance, children in
Gödence now warn those who throw trash on the street and ask them not to do it again.
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124
This has been established in time after telling the people over and over again how this does
not suit clean, nice people of Gödence (Kokulu 2008).
Bademli
Bademli is a village in Izmir known for its ornamental plants and fruit saplings. The local
co-operative Bademli Nursery Agricultural Development Cooperative was founded on
January 1, 1971. Its founding president, M. Selçuk Bilgi, has been in charge ever since.
Bademli is quite an innovative village. Mr. Bilgi proudly states that Bademli was the first
village in Turkey to establish an olive oil processing plant in the year 1975. They were
again the first to apply budding. Towards the end of the 1970s they initiated a relationship
with Ege University and applied the technology of budding, the university researchers
had developed. In 2001, they have organized the first National Saplings Conference. The
co-op has 300 members, and produces 10 million saplings a year. The co-op employs
about 10 agricultural engineers. Its members have a cellular phone network upon which
they receive market information from the co-op. Almost all the members have personal
computers and they are planning to communicate over the net in the coming years (personal
interview, 2008). Mr. Bilgi claims that they provide employment to 500-600 people every
day (Tuduk 2008).
The main role of the cooperative is to market saplings and olive products. Bademli and
Potemia are the two patented brands of the co-op. The co-op attends international trade fairs
to find new markets. Among their consultants and research partners are The Agricultural
Faculty of Süleyman Demirel University and Dicle, Ege, and Marmara Universities.
One of their research goals is to be able to raise region-specific saplings that grow in the
northeast or southwest or middle Anatolia.
A distinguishing feature of Bademli is their use of commercial loans instead of relying
on governmental loans. Another fascinating element that is not found in the other cases
presented in this paper is that Bademli sends 45 individuals every year to France, Italy
and Holland for agricultural training. They observe the advanced agricultural techniques
in the developed countries and apply them upon return. Mr. Bilgi states that they have
tremendously benefited from these training trips. The international links of Bademli is
not limited with Europe. Every year Bademli hosts students of agricultural studies from
Arizona University who visit the village to observe production techniques and local
products.
The co-op also gives scholarship to the children of the members, but those who attend
agricultural studies are supported more than the others so that an incentive mechanism
leads the coming generation to agricultural studies. The current aim of Bademli is to invest
in Bulgaria in order to overcome the customs barriers of Ankara. The interview with Mr.
Bilgi took place at the CHP premises in Ankara, where Mr. Bilgi and his colleagues had
come to ask for the party representatives’ help to get the word out to CHP municipalities
to buy their saplings from the Bademli co-op.
Gedelek
Gedelek, a village of Bursa, is famous for its pickles. This cluster dates back to 1929 when
Rifat Minare has brought the pickling business to the region. After seeing Minare’s success
in selling pickles to luxury hotels, current demarch Osman Trak’s father starts working
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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for Minare. In 1950, Trak leaves Minare to set up his own firm. Later on the villagers
pick up the pickling business from this firm and today rather than raising their own pickle
vegetables themselves, Gedelek residents are organizing surrounding villages for pickle
production and purchasing the vegetables from them. More than 50 villages in the region
work in this business generating about 50 million YTL per year (Tuduk 2008).
Osman Trak claims their local spring’s water is especially suitable for pickling. Therefore,
their competitive advantage is partly based on this natural resource. However, another
competitive advantage is the specialization and generation of a value chain. For instance,
there are two tin manufacturing plants to provide the packaging needs of the pickle
producers. These plants belong to two local firms established as partnerships by local
residents.
Direct exports to Germany, France, Middle Eastern countries, Iran, Israel, and Greece
are made by Zeytursan, a firm established by a local resident and a foreign partner in
Switzerland. This firm supplies pickles to Burger King in Europe.
Another distinguishing factor in Gedelek is the fact that its firms use commercial bank
loans. This is an interesting fact as no other case presented in this paper was able to use
bank loans. Thus, Gedelek stands out with its capability to find other means of financing
than traditional means.
Innovation and product improvement is initiated by complying with the conditions of the
export firms. Mr. Trak reports that Mr. Tamer, who is now producing for export, had once
stated that the standards the foreign customers demanded seemed impossible to achieve at
the time, but in time Mr. Tamer himself was surprised at the achievement of those standards
via the acquisition of new technology. Mr. Trak claims they do not need to cooperate with
research institutes or universities for research and development as all the innovation is
coming into the region from the demanding foreign customers. He also points out that
universities do not approach them to work together. Mr. Trak boasts that they are highly
successful as they supply more than 50 percent of the pickle market of Turkey.
Mr. Trak reports that in cooperation with the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture, they
started to train local firms, giving them certificates of apprenticeship, qualified-workman,
and master worker. However, these formal training courses had only been undertaken in
the past two years, but Chamber of Food Engineers has objected to these courses. For the
time being these courses have been aborted.
Their major export customers are Spain, Switzerland, and Azerbaijan. Another interesting
factor about Gedelek is their lack of concern about European Union’s customs protection.
There is so much specialization in this region that pickle producers totally rely on
exporters to deal with all customs problems and simply pay attention to their own business;
production.
Last year in 2007, they have established a cooperative with the aim of helping the small
firms overcome barriers created by economies of scale. When asked for the reason of
choosing the form of a cooperative instead of a corporation, Mr. Trak says in a cooperative
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
DATÜB employs 5 agricultural engineers who travel from village to village, training
peasants on organic farming methods. The CDs Mr. Ilıcalı has brought back from a fair in
Germany are another source of training. Even though the peasants do not understand the
language, by watching the farming methods, they learn from those films in German.
everyone has equal power regardless of the capital invested, but in a corporate form, power
is automatically generated by the share of capital.
The only crisis they appear to face is an overvalued domestic currency. It is quite interesting
that they state that neither the 2001 economic crisis nor drought hampers their business as
much as the overvalued Turkish lira does.
Assembly of
Eastern Anatolian
Agricultural
Producers in Erzurum
Assembly of Eastern Anatolian Agricultural Producers (Doğu Anadolu Tarımsal Üreticiler
Birliği) (DATÜB) is an organic farming association formed under the leadership of Nazmi
Ilıcalı, a retired Turkish literature teacher. In 1997, Mr. Ilıcalı, learns at the first agriculture
council that a group of Germans are looking for organic potatoes. At the time, the price
they offer is much higher than the going market rate. This induces Mr. Ilıcalı to start
organic potato farming which he personally performed until 2002. In 2001, feeling the
need to organize the poor peasants of the region so that they can make a living out of
organic farming, he established DATÜB, a nonprofit organization. Mr. Ilıcalı says that
Erzurum peasants’ lots are each under 50 acres, which means individually they can not
compete in the market because the cost of fertilizer, seed and other agricultural inputs are
much higher when purchased individually versus collectively. Also, the farmers’ poverty
in Erzurum is so much that they can not buy fertilizer or pesticides. Therefore, the land in
Erzurum is unpolluted with chemical fertilizers and the climate is so tough that there is not
much need for pesticides since harmful insects can not grow in that weather.
Analysis of the
Findings
Bartın, a potential
cluster
As of 2008, DATÜB has 3000 members and completed 12 projects from the European
Union, started organic husbandry, hygenic milk processing and built 15 milk collection
centers in the region. In order to differentiate their dairy products from the rest in the
market, Mr. Ilıcalı resorts to Evliya Çelebi’s Seyahatname where a local “flax seed,
stinging nettle cheese” recipe is given as a special local product of the region.
Even though DATÜB has a number of large investment projects, most of these have been
completed with the 3 YTL subscription fee per member. There is a huge financing problem.
 atılım
We consider Bartın to be a potential cluster. BGG could be seen as the driving force in
the establishment of the cluster because looking for an area of investment; the wealthy
industrialists of Bartın come up with the idea of benefiting from Bartın’s vast forest
resources.
After founding the firm, they hold training sessions which continue, to teach the local
peasants how to pick leaves without damaging the trees and how to stack them without
harming the leaves. Thus, BGG acts as the founding father for potential firms that can
emerge through the current employees of BGG.
As far as collective efficiency is concerned, BGG, as an institution with 73 partners, is
providing the market search for potential customers and exporters which is a task that
villagers cannot perform on their own. Employing an agricultural engineer and a general
manager who is a forestry manager, BGG passes on scientific knowledge to the villagers
regarding the well-being of the forest and the preservation of the natural environment.
The financial burden sharing is seen in the purchasing of the industrial oven by BGG.
Without the establishment of the firm, there is no way that an asset as costly as this oven
could have been purchased by the local residents.
In 2003, 633 peasants plant wheat through a project funded by the UNDP. In 2005, these
producers receive their organic farming certificates. Their product gets purchased by
Istanbul municipality as part of a project to prevent migration to Istanbul. Seeing how
much these peasants earn motivates others to accept the leadership of Nazmi Ilıcalı.
Recalling the barriers they had to overcome, Nazmi Ilıcalı states that he had especially hard
times when the peasants came up to him asking for help to battle with the numerous insect
diseases at the fields. The challenge in organic farming is handling all these problems
without using any chemicals or pesticides. Mr. Ilıcalı explains how frustrated he was then,
but later he initiates a competition with a prize of a quarter-gold coin for providing him
the information on how to combat agricultural diseases in natural ways. The old, wise men
from different villages tell Mr. Ilıcalı about their ancestors’ completely natural combat
methods. From then on, Mr. Ilıcalı acquires the nickmane “Organic Nazmi” and afterwards
people from all over Europe find out about him and approach him with e-mails to ask
remedies for organic farming diseases.
127
Mr. Yurt states that the skilled labor is easily found in the area. By “skill” he means people
who have the knowledge of where laurel leaves can be found in the forest and through
training villagers learn about the correct ways of picking leaves, so there is not much
trouble in finding skilled labor.
Despite their efforts to work with Bartın School of Forestry in research and development,
they could not succeed, yet they have not given up. They state that they would be most
willing to cooperate with a university or a scientific institution to find new uses for their
forestry resources.
Gödence, a growing
cluster
It is the opinion of this author that Gödence is a true cluster because the cooperative
acts as the founding father that sets the rules of the olive oil business in the region. The
collective efficiency is observed via the patented brand name: Gödence. The financial
burden of new investment is shared by all members of the co-op while government aid and
training are also facilitated by the co-op. Research and development efforts are undertaken
in cooperation by the universities and other research institutes. The distinguishing feature
of the Gödence co-op is its trust-based relationship with all the residents in the village. It
seems that the governing board of the cooperative is made up of much respected individuals
of wisdom who are consulted in all matters in the village. These people are so powerful
that they can even lay new rules without facing much resistance. Gödence also boasts to
host the Annual Agricultural High Achiever Competition which has been expanded to a
national scale in 2008.
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128
Bademli, another
growing cluster
The founding father of Bademli is the local co-op, which, in a sense, is a business
association. Throughout its history of 37 years, this co-op has established two brand
names in the market, and now is in the process of helping launch its members’ brands.
The co-op finds international markets and allows its members to serve these markets. The
relationship of the co-op with various universities provides its members the advantage
of benefiting from the research outputs of these institutions. This certainly is a result of
collective efficiency. Training trips to European countries is also a distinguished service of
the co-op, a goal which Bademli residents cannot achieve on their own.
The ownership of the olive oil and hygienic milk processing plants, the efforts to make
direct investment such as the co-op in Bulgaria all indicate sharing of the financial hurdle
by the members of the cluster. The fact that the co-op is targeting region-specific sapling
raising is a sign of specialization which is another feature of clusters frequently mentioned
in the literature.
The lobbying activities in Ankara, the capital, and the provision of higher amounts of
scholarship to the children who study agricultural science is a strategic investment in the
future of the cluster. As such, the co-op acts as a local strategic business association which
has turned Bademli from a small village to a cluster with quite a promising future.
Gedelek, a mature
cluster
The cluster in Gedelek was initiated by the efforts of Rıfat Minare, an entrepreneur who
recognized the suitability of the local spring’s water for pickle production and pursued this
business full heartedly. Upon seeing his success, local residents followed course and the
Gedelek pickle cluster was borne. In time, through joint action, villagers started organizing
other villages in the vicinity to produce their vegetables for them. Eventually the number
of villages that earned their livelihood within this cluster reached fifty, with about 10000
people estimated to be making their living in the pickle business. Nearly half of Turkey’s
pickle consumption is currently provided by Gedelek.
Customer demand is a motivating force for producers in Gedelek to move up along the
value chain. They do not feel the need to establish a relationship with research institutions
simply because they believe that keeping up with international demand provides a sufficient
impetus for innovation and development. Although their ability to use bank loans if the
need arises sets them apart from the previous cases presented in this paper, the overvalued
Turkish lira presents an important vulnerability for producers in this cluster.
The presence of another large producer and exporter, Zeytursan, a firm owned by
Mustafa Ünal, who is an investor from İstanbul, distinguishes Gedelek from the other
clusters, because Gedelek, with its proven record of success, appears to be able to draw
new investors into the region. Furthermore, the presence of two packaging plants is an
indication that specialization has taken place in the cluster. Thus, Gedelek deserved to be
called a “mature cluster”.
DATÜB, a network in
Erzurum
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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a strategic vision and goodwill, Mr. Ilıcalı has been able to gain people’s confidence and
has been able to receive European Union projects in the region in order to pursue his goal
of economic development through organic farming. Even though DATÜB has a number
of facilities and staff consisting of branch representatives and agricultural engineers, due
to extreme poverty in the region, most of the financial investment is undertaken via the
mortgaging of Mr. Ilıcalı’s personal assets. In the absence of foreign investment in the
region and given the neglect of the government when it comes to financial assistance,
the growth potential of this network appears to be seriously threatened. Yet, Mr. Ilıcalı
believes that by the time the second generation takes over the administration from him, a
trustworthy group with greater potential will arise and replace him.
Concluding Remarks
In this exploratory work, we looked for signs of clustering or networking in various rural
areas of Turkey. Bartın was found to be a potential cluster, while Gödence and Bademli
appeared to be growing clusters. Gedelek with the oldest history and the most established
institutions was identified as a mature cluster, and DATÜB in Erzurum could at best be
called a network.
A common point of concern mentioned in all of the cases, except for Gedelek, is the
problem of finance. Notwithstanding the undisputed success of some of these clusters, and
the potential capacity present in the Bartın region, all of the interviewees complained of
the lack of financing options, the high risks involved with bank loans and the ignorance
of government officials when approached for a financing request. The frequently cited
“venture capital” concept of the developed world cluster literature is unheard of in these
regions. As far as crisis management and financial growth are concerned, these clusters
are literally on their own relying on accumulated savings. Therefore, in the absence of
venture capital, which is cited as a normal component to boost cluster growth, these
developing country clusters are most likely to generate a path that is different from that of
their counterparts in the developed countries.
Another significant factor that was present in all the cases was their links with international
markets. Except for Gedelek, all cases were quite positive in attempting to cooperate with
universities, and so far Bademli seemed to be the champion in this respect. There seems
to be a challenge in creating relationships with universities and other research institutes.
What is revealed as a result of this research is that there is a need to work on these clusters
and present their potential capacity for growth and problems to the policymakers. Follow
up work on this topic could use surveys to gather more quantitative data and come up with
a more comprehensive description of these cases.
DATÜB is a network of 3000 people organized around one individual, Nazmi Ilıcalı, a true
believer in people and social inclusion. As it is a seven-year-old non-profit organization,
heavily reliant on personal efforts of Mr. Ilıcalı, DATÜB cannot be called a cluster. Yet, with
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 E. Kalaycı
132
Öz
Türkiye’de Kırsal Kümeler Üzerine Keşifsel Bir İnceleme
Kümelenme birçok açıdan araştırılmış olmasına rağmen kırsal alanda çok fazla
çalışılmamıştır. Fakat son zamanlarda kırsal ekonomilerde kümelenme çalışmasına ihtiyaç
olduğu literatürde belirtilmiştir. Gelişmekte olan ülkelerde tarımsal ve kırsal alanlarda
kümelenme çalışması ihtiyacına karşılık bu çalışma Türkiye’de kırsalda potansiyel
kümeler belirlemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada birkaç kırsal alanda kümelenme
veya ağ oluşumu var mıdır sorusuna cevap aranmaktadır. Çalışma sonucunda Bartın
potansiyel küme olarak görülürken, Gödence ve Bademli büyüyen kümeler şeklinde
nitelendirilmişlerdir. Gedelek ise en eski tarihi ve yerleşmiş kurumları ile olgun bir küme
olarak dikkat çekerken Erzurum’daki Doğu Anadolu Tarımsal Üreticiler ve Besiciler
Birliği (DATÜB) henüz sadece bir ağ oluşumu olarak nitelendirelebilir.
ÇEVİRİ
MAKALE
Anahtar kelimeler
Kırsal kümelenme, girişimcilik, potansiyel kümeler, Türkiye.
About the Author
Ernesto Laclau, Popülizm: Bir Ad Ne İçerir?
Elif Kalaycı is an instructor at the Department of Management of Atılım University
since 2005. She is also a PhD candidate at the Science and Technology Policy Studies
of Middle East Technical University. She holds an MBA from Texas A&M University,
USA. Her areas of interest include research and development’s effect on the productivity
and efficiency of manufacturing firms, the impact of foreign ownership on research and
development activities of Turkish firms, the digital divide, clusters and the significance of
clusters in regional development.
Peter Dahlgren, İnternet ve Yurttaşlık Kültürünün
Demokratikleştirilmesi
Yazar Hakkında
Elif Kalaycı, Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi’nin Bilim ve Teknoloji Politikası Çalışmaları
Bölümü’nde doktora çalışmalarına devam etmekte ve Atılım Üniversitesi İşletme
Bölümü’nde 2005 yılından bu yana öğretim görevlisi olarak görev yapmaktadır. Amerika
Birleşik Devletleri’ndeki Texas A&M Universitesi’nde işletme yüksek lisans diplomasına
sahiptir. İlgi alanları arasında araştırma geliştirmenin verimliliğe ve teknik etkinliğe etkisi,
yabancı sahipliğinin Türk firmalarının araştırma geliştirme faaliyetlerine etkisi, dijital
bölünme, kümelenme ve kümelenmenin bölgesel gelişime etkisi konuları sayılabilir.
 atılım
Çeviren, Hayriye Özen
Çeviren, Oya Sırma Tekvar
P
opüli̇zm:
Bi̇r Ad Ne İçerir?1
Ernesto Laclau
Çeviren
Hayriye Özen
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, Atılım Üniversitesi.
Her tanım, tanımlanana anlam verecek bir kavramsal çerçeveyi varsayar. Bu anlam- tanım
nosyonunun ima ettiği üzere- ancak tanımlanan terimi, tanımın dışarıda bıraktıklarından
farklılaştırarak oluşturulabilir. Bu da, içinde farklılıkların algılanabileceği bir alanı
varsayar. İşte bu alanın ne olduğu bir hareketi (?), bir ideolojiyi (?), bir siyasi pratiği
popülist olarak adlandırdığımızda açıkça belli değildir. İlk ikisini- hareketler ve ideolojilerpopülist olarak nitelendirmek bu niteliği, aynı tanım düzeyinde yer alan ‘faşist’, ‘liberal’,
‘komünist’ gibi diğer niteliklerden ayırt etmeyi gerektirecektir. Bu ise bizi karmaşık
ve sonuçta kendi kendini hezimete uğratacak bir iş yapmaya götürür: diğer alternatif
niteliklere indirgenemeyen ‘saf’ populizmi bulabileceğimiz nihai mevziye ulaşmak.
Eğer bunu yapmaya kalkışırsak, popülizme toplumsal ve ideolojik bir içerik yüklemeye
yönelik her teşebbüsün derhal bir istisnalar çığı ile karşı karşıya kalacağı bir oyunun
içine gireriz. Dolayısıyla bu terimi kullandığımızda, belli bir anlamın dilsel pratiklerimiz
tarafından varsayıldığı, ama bununla birlikte, böyle bir anlamın herhangi bir tanıma
tercüme edilemediği sonucuna varmak durumunda kalırız. Üstelik bu anlamla (bu anlamı
kapsayacak) tanımlanabilir herhangi bir göndergeye daha da zor işaret edebiliriz.
1
Özgün Metin: Laclau, Ernesto (2005). Populism: What’s in a Name? Populism and the
Mirror of Democracy içinde, der. Francisco Panizza, 32-49, London, New York: Verso.
Ernesto Laclau ve Verso Yayınevi'nin izniyle çevrilmiştir.
136
Analiz birimi olarak hareketler ve ideolojilerden siyasi pratiklere geçersek ne olur? Her
şey bu geçişi nasıl tasavvur ettiğimize bağlıdır. Eğer siyasi pratiklere ideoloji veya siyasi
hareketler düzeyinde oluşmuş bir öznenin hakim olduğunu düşünürsek, neyin spesifik
olarak popülist olduğunun belirlenmesinde, açıktır ki, tek bir adım bile atmış olmayız.
Belli pratiklerin öznelerinin popülist karakterini belirlemedeki güçlükler, bu pratiklerin
analizinde, bu pratikler basitçe öznelerinin iç doğasını ifade eden pratikler olarak
görüldüğü sürece, yeniden ortaya çıkarlar. Bununla birlikte ikinci bir olanak daha var- bu
da, siyasi pratikleri toplumsal ajanların doğasını ortaya koymayan, fakat bunun yerine,
toplumsal ajanları oluşturan pratikler olarak görmektir. Bu durumda siyasi pratik ajanın
üzerinde bir tür ontolojik önceliğe sahip olacaktır- ajan yalnızca siyasi pratiğin tarihsel
sonucu olarak oluşmuş olacaktır. Biraz farklı terimlerle ifade etmek gerekirse, pratikler
toplumsal gruptan daha temel bir analiz birimi olacaktır- yani, grup yalnızca toplumsal
pratiklerin eklemlenmesinin bir sonucu olacaktır. Eğer bu yaklaşım doğruysa, bir
hareketin, politikalarında veya ideolojisinde popülist olarak tanımlanabilecek bir içeriğe
sahip olduğu için değil, bu içerikte -içerik ne olursa olsun- belli bir eklemleme mantığı
gösterdiği için popülist olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.
Tartışmamızın esasına geçmeden önce son bir söz daha gerekli. ‘Eklemleme’ kategorisi
teorik dilde -özelikle Althusserci ekol ve bu ekolün etkisi altında olan alanlarda- son otuz
veya kırk yıldır belli bir geçerliliğe sahiptir. Ancak Althusseryanizm tarafından geliştirilen
eklemleme nosyonunun, eklemleme sürecine giren ontik içeriklerle (ekonomik, politik,
ideolojik) sınırlı olduğunu belirtmeliyiz. Eklemleme söz konusu olduğunda bazı ontolojik
kavramsallaştırmalar da (‘son kertede belirlenim’ ve ‘göreli özerklik’ nosyonları) var
olmakla birlikte, bu formel mantıkların bazı kategorilerin ontik içeriklerinden zorunlu bir
şekilde türetilmiş olarak gözükmeleri nedeniyle (örneğin, son kertede belirlenim yalnızca
ekonomiye tekabül edebilirdi), toplumsalın ontolojisini geliştirme ihtimali en baştan bir
hayli sınırlı oldu. Bu sınırlılıklar altında popülizmin siyasi mantığı tasavvur edilemezdi.
Aşağıdaki bölümlerde, üç teorik önerme ileri süreceğim: 1) popülizmin özgüllüğünü ortaya
koymak, analize toplumsal gruptan daha küçük birimlerle başlamayı gerekli kılar (ister
siyasi ister ideolojik düzeyde olsun); 2) popülizm ontik değil ontolojik bir kategoridir -yani,
popülizmin anlamı herhangi bir grubun pratiklerini tanımlayan herhangi bir siyasi veya
ideolojik içerikte değil, içerikleri ne olursa olsun belli bir toplumsal, siyasal veya ideolojik
eklemleme biçiminde bulunur; 3) bu eklemleme biçimi, içeriğinden bağımsız olarak,
kendilerini öncelikle temsil biçimleri düzeyinde belli eden yapılandırma etkileri üretir.
Toplumsal talepler ve
toplumsal bütün
Yukarıda ortaya koyduğumuz gibi, başlangıç noktamız gruptan daha küçük birimlerin
ortaya çıkarılması ve bu birimlerin eklemlenme biçimlerinin dikkate alınması olmalıdır.
Popülizm bu eklemlenme biçimlerinden biridir. Öncelikle, analizimizin bir bütün olarak
cemaat (‘toplum’) ile bu cemaat içinde hareket eden herhangi bir toplumsal aktör arasında
bir asimetriyi varsaydığını söyleyerek başlayalım. Yani, iradesi, bir bütün olarak toplumun
gerçek işleyişi ile örtüşen herhangi bir toplumsal ajan yoktur. Rousseau, demokrasinin
şartı olarak gördüğü ortak iradenin kuruluşunun, boyutları ve heterojenliği nedeniyle
temsil mekanizmalarını zorunlu kılan modern toplumların şartları altında giderek daha
da zorlaştığının çok iyi farkındaydı; Hegel bu soruyu, tikelliği ve heterojenliği (‘sistemin
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
137
ihtiyaçları’) temsil eden sivil toplum ile bütünlüğü ve evrenselliği temsil eden politik
toplum arasında bir ayrıma giderek cevaplamaya çabaladı; Marx ise evrensel sınıfın
uzlaşmış bir toplumda oynayacağı rol sayesinde toplumsal alan ile kolektif irade arasında
tam bir örtüşme olacağı ütopyasında ısrar etti. Tartışmamızın başlangıç noktası, siyasi irade
ve toplumsal alan arasındaki uçuruma köprü kurma çabalarının hiçbirinin nihai olarak
başarılı olamayacağı, böyle bir köprü kurma çabasının ancak spesifik olarak toplumsal
kimliklerin siyasi eklemlenmesini tanımlayacağıdır.
Yanlış anlaşılmaları önlemek için, bir bütün olarak toplum ve toplumsal aktörlerin
fiili ve kısmi iradeleri arasındaki bu örtüşmezliğin bizi toplumsal ajanın rolüne ilişkin
herhangi bir metodolojik bireyciliği benimsemeye yönlendirmediğini eklememiz gerekir.
Metodolojik bireycilik bireylerin anlamlı, kendinden menkul bütünlükler olduğunu
varsayar; bunun bir adım ötesi, toplumsal etkileşimi, kimlikleri bariz çıkarlar etrafında
şekillenmiş ajanlar arasındaki müzakereler olarak ele almak gerektiği sonucuna varmaktır.
Bizim yaklaşımımız ise, tam tersine, özgür irade ile oluşmuş toplumsal bütün nosyonunun
taşıdığı tamlık vaadinin erişilemez olduğu çekincesi ile birlikte, tamamen bütüncüldür.
Dolayısıyla, çeşitli kollektif iradeler üzerinden cemaat alanları inşa etme çabası asla
bir kontrat biçimini alamaz, zira kontrat bizim sorguladığımız çıkar ve özgür irade
nosyonlarını varsayar. Toplumsal bütünlüğün sağlayamadığı cemaatsel tamlık bireylere de
transfer edilemez. Bireyler tutarlı bütünlükler olmayıp, yalnızca, bir dizi özne pozisyonuna
bölünmek zorunda kalmış kimliklerdir. Bu pozisyonlar arasındaki eklemleme ise bireysel
değil toplumsaldır (‘birey’ nosyonunun kendisi bizim yaklaşımımızda herhangi bir anlam
ifade etmez).
Öyleyse, analizimizin başlangıç noktasını oluşturması gereken bu daha küçük birimler
nelerdir? Kılavuzumuz, toplumsal bağı geliştiren temel form olan, ‘talep’ kategorisi
olacaktır. Talep kelimesi İngilizcede muğlaktır: bir yandan ‘rica’ anlamını taşırken,
diğer yandan daha aktif bir anlam olan -bir isteği- bir iddiayı- başkalarına empoze
etmek anlamına sahiptir (‘açıklama talep etmek’te olduğu gibi). İspanyolca gibi diğer
dillerde bu iki anlam için farklı kelimeler kullanılır: ikinci anlama tekabül eden kelime
reivindicacion’dur. Analizimizde ‘talep’ terimini kullandığımızda açıkça ikinci anlamı
vurgulayacak olmamıza rağmen, iki anlam arasındaki muğlaklığın avantajları da yok
değildir, zira kullanacağımız talep nosyonu iki anlam arasında bir karar verilemezlik
içerir- gerçekte, daha sonra göreceğimiz gibi, ikisi iki farklı siyasi eklemleme biçimine
tekabül ederler. Buna her iki anlamın altında yatan ortak gizli bir varsayımın bulunduğunu
da ekleyelim: talep kendi kendini karşılamaz, dolayısıyla, orijinal olarak formüle edildiği
yerden farklı bir merciiye yönlendirilmesi gerekir.
Basit bir talep örneği verelim: belli bir semtte yaşayan bir grup insan ikamet ettikleri
semtten çoğunun çalıştığı semte ulaşımda kullanacakları bir otobüs hattı istemektedirler.
Belediyeye bu isteklerini bildirdiklerini ve isteklerinin karşılandığını varsayalım. Burada şu
yapısal özellikler vardır: 1) toplumsal bir ihtiyaç rica biçimini alır- yani, talep sahiplerinin
kendi çabalarıyla değil karar verme yetkisi olan diğer bir meciiye başvurmaları yoluyla
karşılanır; 2) bir ricanın dile getirilmesi daha yüksek merciinin karar verme yetkisinin
hiçbir biçimde sorgulanmadığını gösterir- yani tamamıyla talep kelimesinin ilk anlamının
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
içindeyizdir; 3) talep kendi içinde kapalı tam bir taleptir- aysbergin görünen yüzü veya
formüle edilmemiş çok çeşitli taleplerin sembolü değildir. Bu üç özelliği bir araya
getirirsek şu önemli sonucu formüle edebiliriz: talebin tam olduğu ve tek başına tatmin
edilebildiği bu tip ricalar toplumsalda bir uçurum veya bir sınır oluşturmazlar. Tam tersine,
toplumsal aktörler, tüm sürecin dile getirilmemiş bir varsayımı olarak, her bir aşamasının
meşruiyetini kabul ederler: hiç kimse ne rica etme hakkını ne de karar verme merciinin
karar hakkını sorgular. Her bir aşama oldukça kurumsallaşmış toplumsal içkinliğin bir
parçasıdır (veya farklı bir noktasıdır). Bu kurumsallaşmış ve farklılık modeline göre işleyen
toplumsal mantıkları farklılık mantıkları olarak adlandıracağız. Bunlar hiçbir toplumsal
bölünme olmadığını ve her meşru talebin çatışmasız, idari bir şekilde karşılanabileceğini
varsayarlar. Farklılıklar mantığının evrensel olarak işleyebileceğini savunan toplumsal
ütopya örneklerini kolayca verebiliriz: Disraelici ‘tek millet’ nosyonu, Refah Devleti, veya
Saint-Simoncu motto: ‘İnsanların yönetiminden şeylerin idaresine’.
Şimdi örneğimize geri dönelim. Varsayalım ki rica reddedildi. Bu karardan, hiç şüphesiz,
toplumsal bir hüsran durumu doğacaktır. Ancak, karşılanmayan yalnızca tek bir talep ise,
bu, mevcut durumu esaslı bir biçimde değiştirmeyecektir. Bununla birlikte, her ne sebepten
olursa olsun, tatmin edilmemiş talep sayısı fazla ise, [bunun sonucunda ortaya çıkan] çeşitli
hayal kırıklıkları tamamen farklı türdeki toplumsal mantıkları tetikleyecektir. Eğer, mesela,
daha iyi ulaşım taleplerinde hayal kırıklığı yaşayan insanlar, komşularının da güvenlik,
su, konut, okul ve benzeri isteklerinde aynı derecede bir memnuniyetsizlik yaşadıklarını
fark ederlerse, [bu insanların] hepsinin arasında bir çeşit dayanışma ortaya çıkacaktır:
hepsi taleplerinin karşılanmadığı gerçeğini paylaşacaklardır. Yani, talepler içeriklerinden
kaynaklanan pozitif farklılıklarının ötesinde negatif bir boyutu paylaşacaklardır.
Karşılanmamış taleplerin negatiflik temelinde kümelenme eğiliminde oldukları toplumsal
bir durum, popülizm olarak adlandırdığımız siyasi eklemleme biçiminin ilk ön şartıdırfakat hiçbir şekilde tek şartı değildir. Popülizmin, tartışmamızın bu aşamasında ortaya
çıkarabildiğimiz, yapısal özelliklerini sıralayalım: 1) Daha önce üzerinde durduğumuz
kurumsal düzenleme farklılık mantığında temellenmişken, burada, eşdeğerlik mantığı
olarak tanımlanabilecek, tam tersi bir duruma sahibiz- yani, farklı karakterlerine rağmen
bütün taleplerin bir araya gelme ve kümelenme eğiliminde olduğu ve böylelikle eşdeğerlik
zinciri olarak adlandıracağımız şeyi oluşturduğu bir durum. Bu her bir bireysel talebin
yapısal olarak bölünmüş olduğu anlamına gelir: bir yandan kendi tikelliğine sahiptir,
diğer yandan, eşdeğerlik zinciri ile diğer taleplerin toplamına işaret eder. Zihnimizde
canlandırırsak: her bir talep aslında aysbergin görünen yüzüdür çünkü kendini yalnızca
kendi tikelliği içinde göstermesine rağmen, isteğini daha geniş toplumsal istekler setinin
içinde yer alan isteklerden yalnızca bir tanesi olarak ortaya koyar. 2) Talebin öznesi ele
aldığımız iki durumda farklıdır. İlkinde talebin öznesi talebin kendisi gibi tamdır. Farklılık
[mantığı içinde bir] tikellik olarak kavranan bir talebin öznesini demokratik özne olarak
adlandıracağız. Diğer durumda özne daha kapsamlı olacaktır çünkü öznelliği pek çok
demokratik talebin eşdeğer kümelenmesinden kaynaklanacaktır. Bu mantık temelinde
oluşan özneyi popüler özne olarak adlandıracağız. Bu, popüler öznelliğin ya ortaya çıkma
ya da kaybolma şartlarını açıkça gösterir: başarılı bir kurumsal sistemde ne kadar çok
 atılım
139
toplumsal talep farklılıklarıyla absorbe edilirse, eşdeğerlik zinciri o kadar zayıf olacak ve
popüler öznelliğin oluşma ihtimali o kadar düşük olacaktır; tersine, pek çok karşılanmamış
talebin, bu talepleri kendi farklılıkları ve tikellikleriyle absorbe etme yeteneğini giderek
yitiren bir kurumsal sistemle birlikte varolduğu bir durum popülist kırılmaya yol açacak
şartları yaratır. 3) Buraya kadar yapılan analizin doğal bir sonucu popüler öznelliğin içsel
bir sınır yaratılmadan hiçbir biçimde ortaya çıkmayacağıdır. Eşdeğerlikler ancak hepsinin
içine işleyen bir yokluk, bir boşluk ile eşdeğerlikler olurlar ve bu da toplumsal negatifliğin
kaynağının teşhis edilmesini gerektirir. Eşdeğer popüler söylemler, bu yolla, toplumsalı
iki kampa bölerler: iktidar ve mağdurlar. Bu, taleplerin doğasını değiştirir: talepler basit
ricalar olmaktan çıkıp mücadele eden, çarpışan taleplere dönüşürler (reivindicaciones)diğer bir deyişle ‘talep’ teriminin ikinci anlamına geçmiş oluruz.
Eşdeğerlikler, popüler öznellikler, toplumsalın içsel bir sınır etrafında dikotomik kuruluşu.
Popülizmi tanımlamak için gerekli tüm yapısal özelliklere görünüşte sahibiz. Aslında, tam
olarak değil. Çok kritik bir boyut hala eksik ve şimdi onu dikkate almamız gerekiyor.
Boş ve yüzer
gösterenler
Buraya kadarki tartışmamız bizi, popülist kırılmanın ortaya çıkması için gerekli iki şartı
-yapısal olarak birinin diğerini gerekli kıldığı- tanımaya yönlendirdi: toplumsal alanın içsel
bir sınır oluşturularak ikiye bölünmesi ve karşılanmamış talepler arasında bir eşdeğerlik
zinciri kurulması. Bunlar, açık konuşmak gerekirse, iki ayrı şart değil, aynı şartın iki farklı
yönüdür, çünkü içsel sınır ancak eşdeğerlik zincirinin oluşması ile doğar. Her bir durumda
önemli olan eşdeğerlik zincirinin anti-kurumsal bir karaktere sahip olduğunu anlamaktır:
taleplerin farklı, tikel karakterlerini bozar. Bir ‘sistem’de [bu sistemin karşılaması üzere]
dile getirilmiş talepler ile bu sistemin talepleri karşılama kapasitesi arasındaki ilişkide,
bir noktada, bir kısa devre oluşur. Şimdi tartışmamız gereken bu kısa devrenin taleplerin
doğası üzerindeki ve bir bütün olarak kavranan sistem üzerindeki etkileridir.
Eşdeğer talepler karşımıza hemen spesifik olarak eşdeğer momentin temsili sorununu
çıkarırlar. Açıktır ki, eşdeğerliğe bağlanan daha evrensel boyut herhangi bir doğrudan ve
açık temsilden yoksunken, talepler daima tikeldir. Bizim iddiamız, eşdeğerlik momentinin
temsilinin ilk önşartının, popüler iradeyi oluşturan talepler toplamının karşı çıktığı
iktidarın (anlamlandırma yoluyla) totalize edilmesi olduğudur. Şu açıkça görülmelidir:
eşdeğerlik zincirinin toplumsal içinde bir sınır oluşturması için sınırın diğer tarafını da
bir şekilde temsil etmesi gerekir. Söylemsel olarak bir düşman oluşturulmadan popülizm
olmaz: ancient régime, oligarşi, müesses nizam veya her neyse. Bu noktaya daha sonra
döneceğiz. Şimdi konsantre olacağımız şey eşdeğerliklerden türeyen sınır etkileri
temelinde demokratik özne pozisyonlarının popüler olanlara geçişidir.
Peki, eşdeğerlik kendisini nasıl belli eder? İddia ettiğimiz üzere, eşdeğerlik momenti bütün
taleplerin altında yatan herhangi bir pozitif özellikte bulunamaz zira talepler -özellikleri
açısından- birbirlerinden tamamıyla farklıdır. Eşdeğerlik bütünüyle, eşdeğer taleplerin
hiçbirini karşılamayan, sınırın ötesinde yer alan iktidara karşıtlıktan hasıl olur. Bu
durumda, pekala, eşdeğerlik zincirinin kendisi nasıl temsil edilebilir? Başka bir çalışmada
 H. Özen
140
ileri sürdüğüm gibi2, bu temsil ancak herhangi bir tikel talebin, kendi tikelliğinden
tamamen vazgeçmeden, eşdeğerlik zincirini bir bütün olarak temsil eden bir gösteren
olarak da işlev görmeye başlamasıyla mümkün olur (tıpkı altının, tikel bir emtia olmaktan
vazgeçmeden, kendi varlığını değerin evrensel temsiline dönüştürmesi gibi). Tikel bir
talebin kendisi ile kıyaslanamaz bir eşdeğerlik zincirini temsil etmeye başlamasını içeren
bu süreç, şüphesiz, bizim hegemonya olarak adlandırmış olduğumuz şeydir. Solidarnosc’un
talepleri, örneğin, Gdansk’taki belli bir işçi sınıfı grubunun talepleri olarak başladı, ancak,
pek çok talebin karşılanmadığı baskıcı bir toplumda formüle edilmeleri nedeniyle, yeni
dikotomik [toplumsal alanı halk ve iktidar olarak ikiye bölen] bir söylemde halk tarafının
gösterenlerine dönüştüler.
Şimdi, bu evrensel popüler anlam oluşturma sürecinin popülizmi anlamamız için özellikle
önemli olan bir özelliği var. O da şudur: eşdeğerlik zinciri ne kadar çok genişletilirse,
evrensel temsil işlevini üstlenmiş tikel taleplerle olan bağı o kadar zayıflayacaktır. Bu bizi,
analizimiz için hayati öneme sahip olan bir sonuca götürür: popüler öznelliğin oluşturulması
ancak eğilimsel boş gösterenlerin söylemsel üretimleri temelinde mümkündür. Popülist
sembollerin sözde ‘yoksulluğu’, bu sembollerin siyasi etkileri için şarttır- işlevleri oldukça
heterojen bir gerçekliğe eşdeğer homojenlik kazandırmak olduğu için, bunu ancak kendi
tikel içeriklerini minimuma indirgeme temelinde yapabilirler. Nihai olarak bu süreç
homojenleştirme işlevinin tamamen bir adla yürütüldüğü bir noktaya ulaşır: liderin adı.
Bu noktada dikkate almamız gereken iki önemli durum daha var. Birincisi eşdeğerlik
mantıklarının ‘halkın’ ve ‘iktidarın’ düşman kutuplar olarak kurulmasında ortaya koyduğu
belli bir tür çarpıtma ile ilgilidir. Halk örneğinde, daha önce gördüğümüz gibi, eşdeğerlik
mantığı, sonuçları aynı anda hem zenginleştirici hem de yoksullaştırıcı olan bir içini
‘boşaltma’ya dayanır. Zenginleştirici: bir eşdeğerlik zincirini bütünleştiren gösterenler, bu
zinciri tamamlayan bütün bağlantıları içermek zorunda oldukları için, bir göstereni sadece
bir gösterilene bağlayacak olan tamamen farklılığa dayalı bir içerikten daha geniş bir
referansa sahiptir. Yoksullaştırıcı: tam da bu geniş (potansiyel olarak evrensel) referanstan
dolayı tikel içeriklerle bağlantısı büyük ölçüde azalma eğiliminde olur. Mantıksal bir
ayrım kullanarak, genişlikte kazandığını derinlikte kaybettiğini söyleyebiliriz. Aynısı
iktidar kutbunun inşasında da ortaya çıkar: bu kutup basitçe kendi farklılığa dayalı
içeriğinin materyalliği ile işlev görmez çünkü bu içerik halk kutbunun (halkın taleplerinin
karşılanmaması yoluyla) inkârını içerir. Sonuç olarak, temel bir istikrarsızlık, çalışmamızda
ortaya çıkardığımız çeşitli momentlere nüfuz eder. Tikel talepler söz konusu olduğunda,
hiçbir şey bu taleplerin, birbirinden farklı yalıtılmış içeriklerine göre, farklılık olarak
veya eşdeğerlik olarak nasıl eklemleneceklerini -bu tarihsel bağlama bağlı olacaktır- ve
(eşdeğerlik örneğinde) dâhil oldukları zincirin genişliğini ve kompozisyonunu öngöremez.
Halk/iktidar ikiliğinin iki kutbuna gelince, bunların fiili kimliği ve yapısı mücadeleye ve
tekrar tanımlanmaya eşit şekilde açık olacaktır. Fransa Orta Çağdan beri yiyecek isyanlarını
deneyimlemektedir, ancak bu ayaklanmalar, genel olarak, monarşiyi kendilerinin düşmanı
olarak teşhis etmemişlerdir. Yiyecek talebinin, siyasi sistemin tamamını kapsayan
2
Ernesto Laclau. 1996. Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics? Emancipation(s) içinde
London: Verso.
 atılım
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
141
devrimci eşdeğerlik zincirlerinin bir parçası olduğu aşamaya ulaşmak için on sekizinci
yüzyılın bütün karmaşık dönüşümlerinin olması gerekiyordu. Amerika’da on dokuzuncu
yüzyılın sonunda doğan, çiftçi popülizmi de başarılı olmadı çünkü mağdur grupların
taleplerini bütünleştirecek popüler eşdeğerlik zinciri yaratma çabaları, popülist çağrıdan
daha kuvvetli çıkan, bir dizi yapısal farklılıklara dayalı güçlü engellerle karşılaştı: siyah
ve beyaz çiftçileri bir araya getirmedeki güçlükler, çiftçiler ile kent işçileri arasındaki
karşılıklı güvensizlik, Güneyli çiftçilerin Demokrat Parti’ye derin bağlılığı ve diğerleri.
Bu bizi dikkate almamız gereken ikinci noktaya götürür. Önceki bölümler boyunca, iki
antagonistik eşdeğerlik zincirini bölen bir sınırın fiilen var olduğu gibi basitleştirici bir
varsayım ile hareket ettik. Şimdi tam da bu varsayımı sorgulamak zorundayız. Aslında
bir bütün olarak yaklaşımımız bizi bu sorgulamaya iter, çünkü eğer bir talebin neden
diğerlerine değil de belli bazı eşdeğerlik zincirlerine ve farklılığa dayalı eklemlemelere
girmesi gerektiğine dair önsel bir sebep yoksa, antagonistik siyasi stratejilerin siyasi sınır
yaratmanın farklı yollarına dayanacağını ve siyasi sınırların sarsılacağını ve dönüşümlere
maruz kalacağını beklememiz gerekir.
Eğer böyleyse, varsayımlarımız belli ölçülerde değiştirilmelidir. Her söylemsel element
birbirine zıt eklemleme çabalarının yapısal baskısına açık olacaktır. Boş gösterenlerin
rolünü kavramsallaştırmamızda, boş gösterenlerin ortaya çıkma ihtimali, daha önce
gördüğümüz gibi, içsel bir sınırı ihtiva eden eşdeğerlik zincirlerinin varlığına bağlıydı.
Popülizmin klasik formları -örneğin, 1940 ve 1950’lerdeki Latin Amerika popülizmlerinin
çoğu- bu tanıma tekabül eder. Popülizmin siyasi dinamiği bu, sürekli yeniden üretilen,
içsel sınıra bağlıdır. Dilbilimden bir teşbih kullanarak, kurumsalcı siyasi söylemin dilin
sintagmatik kutbuna- kombinasyon ilişkisi tarafından eklemlenen farklı konumların sayısıöncelik verme eğilimindeyken, popülist söylemin paradigmatik kutba, yani, yalnızca iki
sintagmatik kutup etrafında kümelenmiş elementler (bizim örneğimizde talepler) arası
ikame ilişkilerine, öncelik verme eğiliminde olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.
Bununla birlikte, popülist söylemin üzerinde yükseldiği içsel sınır altüst edilebilir. Bu iki
farklı şekilde olabilir. Birisi, tikel taleplerin bireysel olarak karşılanması ile çeşitli tikel
talepler arasındaki eşdeğerlik bağlarını kırmaktır. Bu, popülist siyaset biçiminin ortadan
kalkması, içsel sınırların bulanıklaşması ve kurumsal sistemin daha yüksek düzeyde
bütünleşmesine geçişe giden yoldur- Gramsci’nin adlandırdığı gibi transformasyoncu bir
operasyondur. Bu, genel olarak ifade etmek gerekirse, Disraeli’nin ‘tek millet’ projesine
veya Üçüncü Yol ve ‘radikal merkez’ teorisyenlerinin idarenin siyasetin yerine geçmesine
yönelik günümüzdeki çabalarına tekabül eder.
İçsel sınırı yıkmanın ikinci yolu tamamen farklı bir karaktere sahiptir. Sınırları ortadan
kaldırmayı değil onların siyasi göstergelerini değiştirmeyi içerir. Daha önce gördüğümüz
gibi, popüler söylemin merkez gösterenleri kısmen boş bir hale gelince, bazı tikel içeriklerle
önceden olan bağlarını zayıflatırlar- bu içerikler çeşitli yeni eşdeğer eklemlemelere
tamamen açık hale gelirler. Şimdi, boş popüler gösterenlerin radikalliklerini -yani,
toplumu iki kampa bölme yeteneklerini- korumaları yeterlidir ama, bununla birlikte,
popülist operasyonun siyasi anlamının zıt bir siyasal gösterge edinmesi için bütünleştirdiği
 H. Özen
142
eşdeğerlikler zinciri farklı bir hal alır. Yirminci yüzyıl bu tür tersine dönmelere sayısız
örnekler sunar. Amerika’da, New Deal zamanında esas olarak sol çağrışımlara sahip olan
popüler radikalizm göstergelerini daha sonraları, George Wallace’tan ‘ahlaki çoğunluk’a,
radikal sağ kendisine mal etmiştir. Fransa’da Komunist Parti’nin sahip olduğu ‘halk jürisi
işlevi’, Ulusal Cephe tarafından bir ölçüde absorbe edilmiştir. Benzer bir şekilde, faşizmin
iki savaş arası dönemdeki yayılımı, devrimci geleneğin sahip olduğu talep ve temaların
sağ çağrışımlarla yeniden eklemlenmesine referans verilmeksizin anlaşılamaz.
Önemli olan bu yeniden eklemleme sürecinin örüntüsünü kavramaktır: bu, farklı bir
eşdeğerlik zincirine pek çok demokratik talebi kaydederken popüler radikalizmin merkez
gösterenlerini kısmen çalışır tutmaya bağlıdır. Bu hegemonik yeniden eklemlemeyi
mümkün kılan şey, hiçbir toplumsal talebin bu eklemlenmeye, ‘açık bir kader’ gibi, önsel
bir kayıt düşmemesidir- her şeyin hegemonik yarışa bağlı olmasıdır. Bir talep bir kez farklı
antagonistik projelerin eklemleme girişimlerine açık hale geldiğinde, antagonistik projeler
karşısında kimseye-ait-olmayan-topraklarda yaşamaya başlar- kısmi ve geçici bir özerklik
elde eder. Popüler gösterenlerin ve bu gösterenlerin eklemlediği taleplerin bu muğlaklığını
işaret etmek için yüzer-gezer gösterenler kavramını kullanacağız. Bu gösterenleri
oluşturan yapısal ilişkinin türü, boş gösterenlerin işleyişinde etkili olanlardan farklıdır:
boş gösterenler eşdeğerlik zincirlerinden kaynaklanan tam teşekküllü bir içsel sınıra
bağlıyken, yüzer-gezer gösterenler tüm sınırlara içkin bir muğlaklığın ve sınırların nihai
bir istikrar kazanmasının imkânsızlığının ifadesidirler. Bununla birlikte, ikisi arasındaki
ayrım esas olarak analitiktir çünkü pratikte boş ve yüzer gösterenler büyük ölçüde örtüşür:
toplumun içsel sınırının herhangi bir tahribata veya yer değiştirmeye maruz kalmayacak
denli pekişmiş olduğu hiçbir tarihsel durum yoktur ve hiçbir organik kriz bazı istikrar
formlarının [krizin] tahribat eğilimlerine sınırlar koyamayacağı kadar derin değildir.
Popülizm, siyaset ve
temsil
Tutarlı bir popülizm kavramı formüle etmek için argümanımızın çeşitli parçalarını bir
araya getirelim. Böyle bir tutarlılık ancak kavramın geliştirilmesine katkıda bulunan farklı
boyutların, basit bir sıralama ile bir araya getirilen birbirinden ayrık özellikler olmayıp,
teorik olarak eklemlenmiş bir bütünün parçaları olmalarıyla sağlanabilir. Başlangıç
olarak, popülizme ancak popüler bir özne oluşturan bir dizi siyasi-söylemsel pratiğin
olduğu bir durumda sahip olabiliriz ve böyle bir öznenin ortaya çıkmasının koşulu, daha
önce gördüğümüz gibi, toplumsal alanı iki kampa bölen içsel bir sınırın inşasıdır. Ancak
bu bölünmenin mantığı, bildiğimiz üzere, bir dizi toplumsal talep arasında eşdeğerlik
momentinin taleplerin farklı doğalarının önüne geçtiği bir eşdeğerlik zinciri yaratılmasıyla
dikte edilir. Son olarak, eşdeğerlik zinciri tamamıyla rastlantısal bir araya gelmelerin
sonucu olamaz, zinciri bir bütün olarak anlamlandırarak ona tutarlılık kazandıracak bir
elementin ortaya çıkmasıyla pekiştirilmelidir. Bu element bizim boş gösteren olarak
adlandırdığımız şeydir.
Bunlar, benim görüşüme göre, popülizm kategorisine giren tanımlayıcı yapısal özelliklerdir.
Görüleceği gibi, ortaya koyduğum popülizm kavramı kesinlikle formel bir kavramdır, zira
bütün tanımlayıcı özellikleri, eklemlenen içeriklerden bağımsız olarak, tamamen spesifik
bir eklemleme biçimi -eşdeğerlik mantığının farklılık mantığı üzerinde hüküm sürmesi- ile
ilgilidir. Bu yazının başında ‘popülizm’in ontik değil ontolojik bir kategori olduğunu ileri
 atılım
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sürmemin nedeni budur. Popülizmi tanımlamaya yönelik pek çok girişim, popülizme özgü
olanı tikel bir ontik içeriğe yerleştirmeye çalıştı ve bunun sonucunda, iki tahmin edilebilir
alternatif sonucundan birinin ya anında bir istisnalar çığı tarafından bastırılacak ampirik
bir içeriği seçmek veya herhangi bir kavramsal içeriğe tercüme edilemeyecek bir ‘sezgi’ye
başvurmak olduğu, kendi kendini baltalayan bir egzersizle sona erdi.
Kavramsallaştırmanın bu, içerikten forma, yer değiştirmesinin (siyasi formları grubun
önceden oluşmuş bütünlüğüne indirgeyen naif sosyolojizmden kaçınmanın yanı sıra) çeşitli
avantajları vardır. Öncelikle, sıklıkla karşımıza çıkan, popülizmin yaygınlığını -sosyoekonomik yapının farklı noktalarından ortaya çıkabileceği gerçeği- ele alma sorununu
gidermeye yönelik bir yaklaşıma sahip oluruz. Eğer popülizmin tanımlayıcı özellikleri
eşdeğerlik mantığının hüküm sürmesinde, boş gösterenlerin üretiminde ve mağdurun
adlandırılması ile siyasi sınırların oluşturulmasında bulunursa, bu eklemleyici mantıkta
temellendirilen söylemlerin sosyo-kurumsal yapıda herhangi bir yerden başlayabileceğini
hemen anlarız: klientalistik siyasi örgütler, siyasi partiler, işçi sendikaları, ordu, devrimci
hareketler ve diğerleri. ‘Popülizm’ bu örgütlerin fiili siyasetlerini tanımlamaz, sadece
onların temalarını -bu temalar ne olursa olsunlar- bir eklemleme biçimidir.
İkinci olarak, bu yolla, günümüzdeki siyasi manzarayı anlamak için esas olan bir şeyi
daha iyi kavrarız: radikal protestonun gösterenlerinin tamamıyla zıt siyasi göstergelere
sahip hareketler arasında dolaşması. Bu duruma daha önce atıfta bulunmuştuk. Yalnızca
bir örnek vermek gerekirse: İtalya’da Kurtuluş Savaşı (1943-1945) sırasında Mazzinizm
ve Garibaldiyanizmin gösterenlerinin dolaşımı. Bunlar İtalya’da radikal protestonun,
Risorgimento’ya kadar uzanan bir tarihten itibaren, gösterenleri olmuşlardır. Hem faşistler
hem de komünistler bunları kendi söylemlerine eklemlemeye uğraşmışlar ve sonuçta bu
gösterenler birçok siyasi eklemleme biçimi karşısında kısmen otonom hale gelmişlerdir.
Radikalizm boyutlarını korumalarına karşın bu radikalizmin sağ yönde mi yoksa sol
yönde mi ilerleyeceği başlangıçta belirsiz kalmıştır- bunlar tartıştığımız anlamda yüzergezer gösterenler olmuştur. Hangi toplumsal grubun kendisini bu popülist sembollerle
ifade ettiğini sormak açıktır ki boş bir egzersizdir: oluşturdukları eşdeğerlik zincirleri
pek çok toplumsal sektörü kapsar ve ifade ettikleri radikalizm tamamıyla zıt siyasi
göstergelere sahip hareketler tarafından eklemlenebilir. Gösterenlerin bu göçü ancak
popülizm formel bir eklemleme prensibi olarak görülürse tanımlanabilir; bu prensip, onu
farklı siyasi konjonktürlerde yeniden hayata geçiren, tikel içeriklerin arkasında gizlenirse
tanımlanamaz.
Son olarak, popülizm sorununa biçimsel olarak yaklaşılması, ele alınması oldukça güç
olan diğer bir meseleyi ele almamıza olanak tanır. Kendimize bir hareketin popülist olup
olmadığını sormak, aslında, yanlış soruyla başlamaktır. Bunun yerine kendimize sormamız
gereken şudur: bir hareket ne derece popülisttir? Bildiğimiz üzere, bu soru bir başka
soruyla özdeştir: eşdeğerlik mantığı hareketin söyleminde ne derece baskındır? Siyasi
pratikleri, reductio ad absurdum iki ucundan birinin saf bir farklılıklar mantığının hakim
olduğu kurumsal bir söylem, diğerinin ise eşdeğerlik mantığının hakim olduğu popülist
bir söylem olan, bir bütünün farklı noktalarında işler şekilde sunduk. Bu iki uca gerçekte
ulaşılamaz: sadece farklılıkların varlığı bir toplumun, idarenin ve toplumsal taleplerin,
 H. Özen
144
içsel sınırlar etrafında hiçbir mücadelenin -yani politikanın- doğamayacağı şekilde,
tekilleştirilmesinin tahakkümü altında olması anlamına gelir; sadece eşdeğerliğin varlığı
ise, toplumsal bağların, ‘toplumsal talep’i anlamsız hale getirecek şekilde, çözülmesini
içerir- bu ondokuzuncu yüzyıl kitle psikolojisi teorisyenlerinin (Taine, Le Bon, Sighele,
vb.) resmettiği ‘kalabalık’ ‘imaj’ıdır.
Saf farklılık ve saf eşdeğerlik uçlarının imkansızlığının ampirik bir imkansızlık olmadığını
görmek önemlidir- bu mantıki bir imkansızlıktır. Farklılığın bir eşdeğerlik mantığı ile tahrip
edilmesi, eşdeğerliğin farklılıkları tamamen yok ettiği bir forma dönüşmez. Bir eşdeğerlik
ilişkisi, içinde bütün farklılıkların kimliğe dönüştüğü bir ilişki değil, farklılıkların hala çok
aktif olduğu bir ilişkidir. Eşdeğerlik talepler arasındaki ayrılığı ortadan kaldırır, taleplerin
kendilerini değil. Eğer bir dizi talep -ulaşım, konut, istihdam gibi, baştaki örneğimize
dönecek olursak- karşılanmamışsa, bu taleplerin aralarında var olan eşdeğerlik- ve bu
eşdeğerlikten doğan popüler kimlik- bu taleplerin varlığını fazlasıyla gerektirir. Bu yüzden
eşdeğerlik kesinlikle hala farklılıkları eklemlemenin belirli bir yoludur. Dolayısıyla
eşdeğerlik ve farklılık arasında karmaşık bir diyalektik, istikrarsız bir uzlaşı vardır. Her
ikisinin mevcudiyetini, ama aynı zamanda da, aralarındaki gerilimi gerektiren türlü tarihsel
durumları deneyimleyebiliriz. Birkaç tanesinden bahsedelim:
1. Kurumsal bir sistem toplumsal talepleri farklılıklarıyla absorbe etmekte
giderek daha az yeterli olur ve bu durum toplumda içsel bir bölünmeye ve iki
antagonistik eşdeğerlik zinciri kurulmasına yol açar. Bu genellikle Gramsci’nin
‘organik kriz’ olarak adlandırdığı temsil krizinden kaynaklanan popülist veya
devrimci kırılmanın klasik deneyimidir.
2. Popülist kırılmadan doğan rejim kademeli olarak kurumsallaşır ve böylece
farklılık mantığı tekrar hüküm sürmeye başlar ve eşdeğer popüler kimlik
siyasetin fiilen işleyişini giderek daha az yöneten geçersiz bir langue du bois
haline gelir. Arjantin’de Peronizm başlangıçtaki -popüler öznesi descamisado
olan (sans-culotte’un eşdeğeri)- çatışmacı siyasetinden, ‘örgütlü topluluk’
(la comunidad organizada) olarak adlandırılan şeyde temellenen ve giderek
daha fazla kurumsallaşan bir söyleme geçmeye teşebbüs etti. Fiili taleplerle
eşdeğerlik söylemi arasında giderek artan bu asimetrinin diğer bir çeşidini
eşdeğerlik söyleminin devletin langue de bois’i olduğu örneklerde görürüz.
Bu örneklerde fiili toplumsal taleplerle hâkim eşdeğerlik söylemi arasındaki
artan mesafenin çoğunlukla taleplerin bastırılmasına ve eşdeğerlik söyleminin
zorla dayatılmasına yol açtığını görürüz. Pek çok Afrika rejimi dekolonizasyon
sürecinden sonra bu seyri izlemiştir.
3. Bazı hâkim gruplar giderek anti-kurumsal olan bir söylemle, içsel sınırları
sürekli olarak yeniden yaratmaya çabalarlar. Bu çabalar genellikle başarısız
olur. Sadece Fransa’da Jakobenizm’den Directoire’a giden süreci ve Çin’de
‘kültür devrimi’ döngüsündeki çeşitli aşamaları düşünelim.
Bir hareket veya bir ideoloji -veya, her ikisini ortak türlerinin altına alırsak, bir söylemiçeriklerinin eşdeğerlik mantığı ile eklemlenme derecesine bağlı olarak az ya da çok
 atılım
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
145
popülist olacaktır. Bu, hiçbir siyasi hareketin popülizmden tamamıyla muaf olmayacağı
anlamına gelir, zira hiçbir siyasi hareket ‘halkı’ bir düşmana karşı, toplumsal bir sınır
kurmak yoluyla, belli ölçülerde konumlandırmaktan geri durmayacaktır. Bu nedenle
popülist özellikleri, toplumun geleceğinin belirsiz olduğu siyasi geçiş dönemlerinde
özellikle açık bir şekilde ortaya koyulacaktır. ‘Popülizm’in derecesi, bu anlamda, siyasi
alternatifleri ayıran uçurumun derinliğine bağlı olacaktır. Ancak, bu bir sorun ortaya
koyar. Eğer popülizm toplumsal alanda radikal bir alternatif, bir toplumun geleceğinin
bağlı olduğu dönüm noktasında bir tercih, öne sürmekten ibaretse, popülizm siyaset ile
eş anlamlı olmaz mı? Cevap yalnızca olumlu olabilir. Popülizm, kurumsal düzeni, bir
mağduru tarihsel bir ajan- yani, var olan düzende öteki olan bir ajan- olarak inşa etmek
yoluyla sorgulamak anlamına gelir. Ama bu siyaset ile aynı şeydir. Siyaset ancak mevcut
durumu bir sistem olarak kavrayan ve ona bir alternatif sunan davranışımızla (veya
tersine, bu sistemi mevcut potansiyel alternatiflere karşı savunduğumuzda) ortaya çıkar.
Popülizmin sonunun siyasetin sonuna denk gelmesinin nedeni budur. Bir bütün olarak
algılanan toplum ve bu bütünü temsil eden irade birbirinden ayırt edilemez hale geldiğinde
siyasetin sonuna gelmiş oluruz. Bu durumda, bu yazı boyunca tartıştığım gibi, siyasetin
yerini yönetim alır ve toplumsal bölünmenin izleri gözden kaybolur. Mutlak hükümdarın
bölünmez iradesi olarak Hobbes’un Leviathan’ı veya Marx’ın sınıfsız toplumunun
evrensel öznesi siyasetin sonuna giden- şüphesiz zıt yönlere rağmen- paralel yolları temsil
ederler. Topyekûn, meydan okunamaz devlet ve devletin ortadan kalkmasının her ikisi
de toplumsal bölünmelerin izlerini ortadan kaldırmanın yollarıdır. Bu anlamda siyasetin
mümkünlük koşullarının popülizmin mümkünlük koşulları ile aynı olduğunu görmek
kolaydır: her ikisi de toplumsal bölünmeyi baştan varsayar; her ikisinde de, bir yandan
toplumun bir kesimi (mağduru) olan, diğer yandan kendini, antagonistik bir şekilde, tüm
toplum gibi sunan bir ajan olan, müphem bir demos buluruz.
Bu sonuç bizi son bir noktaya yönlendirir. Siyaset (ve eğer argümanımız doğruysa,
onun türevi olan popülizm) olduğu sürece toplumsal bölünmeler olacaktır. Bu toplumsal
bölünmenin tabii bir sonucu, toplumun bir kesitinin kendisini bir bütün olarak toplumun
ifadesi ve temsilcisi olarak sunacak olmasıdır. Siyasi bir topluma sahip olduğumuz sürece
bu uçurumun giderilmesi olanaksızdır. Bu ‘halk’ın ancak temsil ilişkileri zemininde
teşkil edilebileceği anlamına gelir. ‘Halk’ın içinden çıktığı temsil matriksini hâlihazırda
açıklamış bulunuyoruz: evrensel temsil işlevini üstlenen belli bir tikellik; eşdeğerlik
zincirlerinin kurulmasıyla bu tikelliğin kimliğinin değişmesi; bu yer değiştirmelerden
ortaya çıkan popüler tarafın kendisini bir bütün olarak toplumun temsilcisi olarak sunması.
Bu noktalar bazı önemli sonuçlar içerirler. Bunlardan ilki popülist söylemde yer alan
‘halk’ın asla verili olmayıp bir kurgu olduğudur- popülist söylem basitçe belli bir orijinal
popüler kimliği ifade etmez; bizzat o kimliği oluşturur. İkincisi, bunun bir sonucu olarak,
temsil ilişkilerinin başka bir yerde oluşturulmuş birincil bir toplumsal gerçekliği yansıtan
ikincil bir düzey olmadığıdır; temsil ilişkileri, tam tersine, içinde toplumsalın kurulduğu
birincil zemindir. Herhangi bir siyasi dönüşüm, böylece, temsil sürecine giren elementlerin
içsel yer değiştirmeleriyle ortaya çıkacaktır. Üçüncü sonuç, temsilin, Rousseau’nun
iddia etmiş olabileceği gibi, evrensel toplumsal alan ile fiilen mevcut kolektif iradenin
 H. Özen
146
tikelliği arasındaki giderek artan uçurumdan kaynaklanan en iyi ikinci durum olmadığıdır.
Tersine, bir bütün olarak toplum ile kolektif iradeler arasındaki asimetri, siyaset olarak
adlandırdığımız ve onda hem sınırlarımızı hem de imkânlarımızı keşfettiğimiz canlandırıcı
oyunun kaynağıdır. Pek çok önemli şey -diğerleri arasında, ‘halk’ın ortaya çıkışı- nihai bir
evrenselliğin imkânsızlığından kaynaklanır.
İ
nternet ve Yurttaşlık Kültürünün
Demokratikleştirilmesi1
Peter Dahlgren
Çeviren
Oya Sırma Tekvar
Halkla İlişkiler Bölümü, Ankara Üniversitesi.
1
 atılım
Özgün Metin: Dahlgren, Peter (2000). The Internet and the Democratization of Civic
Culture. Political Communication. 17, 335-340. Taylor ve Francis grubunun izniyle
basılmıştır. Copyright (2000)
148
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
Bu çalışmanın başlangıç noktası kurumsal yapıları, kanunları, partileri, seçimleri,
vb. kapsayan bir demokrasideki biçimsel siyasal sistem ile günlük hayata demir atmış
karmaşık, çok boyutlu yurttaşlık kültürü demokrasisi arasındaki şematik ayrımdan
geçmektedir. Yurttaşlık kültürü bu demokratik sistemi hem yansıtıp hem mümkün kılmakla
beraber, aynı zamanda kurumsal teminatı ve parametreleri nedeniyle sisteme bağımlıdır.
Dolayısıyla Habermasçı bir bakış açısından yurttaşlık kültürü, normlar ve değerler
müzakereleriyle yaşam dünyasının önemli bir alanı olarak görülebilir. Aslında yurttaşlık
kültürü siyasi ve ekonomik sistem tarafından sömürgeleştirilmesi konusunda kesinlikle
kırılgan bir konumdadır. Ancak aynı zamanda bu alanları yönlendiren normlar ve değerleri
etkileme gücüne de sahiptir. Siyasi sistem (daha az olmak üzere ekonomik sistemde) ve
yurttaşlık kültürü birbirine karşılıklı bağımlı olup her ikisi de birbirini geliştiren bir ilişki
içerisindedir. Yurttaşlık kültürü hem güçlü hem kırılgandır: yürürlükteki bir demokrasi
için gerekli olan normatif ve kültürel kaynakları oluştururken buna karşılık, siyasi ve
ekonomik gücün karşısında tehlike arz etmektedir. Devlet ve eğitim gibi Cruikshank’ın
deyişiyle (1999) çeşitli “vatandaşlık teknolojileri”nin (ben bunların arasına medyayı da
ekleyeceğim) vatandaşları yurttaşlık kültürü yoluyla güçlendirme ya da güçsüz kılma
özelliği nedeniyle yurttaşlık kültürü vatandaşlar tarafından şekillendirilebilirken bunun
tam tersi de söz konusu olabilir. Burada amacım, yurttaşlık kültürü kavramını yeniden
gözden geçirmek, kullanılırlığını irdelemek ve sonra bunu özet bir görgül çalışma
önerisiyle beraber internet ile ilişkilendirmektir.
Bir Kavramın
Yenilenmesi
Yurttaşlık kültürü tamamıyla sorunsuz bir kavram değildir. Hem görgül hem de normatif
boyutları kapsar. Ayrıca bir geçmişe de sahiptir: antik Yunanlılardan beri siyasetin kültürel
koşullara yansıması siyasi düşüncenin bütünleşik bir parçası olmuştur. İkinci Dünya
Savaşı’ndan sonra Amerikalı siyaset bilimciler demokrasinin kültürel değişkenleri üzerine
incelemeler yapmaya başladılar. Soğuk Savaş’ın siyasi ortamında sosyal bütünleşmeye
ilişkin Parsoncu görüşler eşliğinde geniş ölçekli araştırma teknikleri kullanarak yurttaşlık
kültürü nosyonunu temel bir uluslararası karşılaştırmalı araştırma alanı durumuna getirdiler
(Almond ve Verba 1963, 1980). Konuya güncellik kazandırmak amacıyla yaptığım bu
çalışmamda psikolojik indirgemecilik ve etnosetrisizm konularına değinmeyeceğim.
Ayrıca, kültüre değin görüşüm sistemik olmaktan çok inşacı ve materyalist olacaktır.
Disiplinler açısından ele alacak olursak, siyasal iletişim ile kültürel çalışmalar arasındaki
sınırda duracağım.
Kavramsal bir açıklık getirmek üzere yurttaşlık kültürü sivil toplumla da ilişkilendirilir.
Ancak pek çok değeri içinde barındıran ve kaygan bir zeminde bulunan sivil toplum
kavramı kurumsal yapıları ve sosyal süreçleri vurgulamaktadır. Yurttaşlık kültürü ise
kültürü, yani daha kolektif bir anlam kuruluşunu belirtmektedir. Denebilir ki, yurttaşlık
kültürü sadece “sivil toplum” adı altında toplanan öncül veya tek tip siyasi bir etkinlik
olmamakla beraber, onu tamamen açık bir siyasi katılıma desteklediğinden ötürü sivil
toplum içinde yer almaktadır (fakat bütün hikaye de bundan ibaret değildir). Bunun yanı
sıra kamusal alanın yurttaşlık kültürünün özelliklerinin bir parçası olduğu söylense de ikisi
birbirine eş değildir.
 atılım
149
Dilsel olarak uzun vadede kullanışsız olsa da vatandaşlar arası çeşitliliği göz önünde
bulundurarak kavramı yurttaşlık kültürleri olarak adlandırmamız, yani çoğul olarak
düşünmemiz daha doğru olacaktır. Normatif olarak, bir yurttaşlık kültürü vatandaşlar
arasında homojenlik sağlamamakta; fakat -cumhuriyetçi bir ruh içerisinde- asgari ölçüde
paylaşılan bir demokrasi görüşünü ve ilkelerini ileri sürmektedir. Dolayısıyla herhangi bir
düzeyde işleyen yurttaşlık kültürü bir grubun acil çıkarlarının ötesinde yatanı görebilme
kapasitesine erişir. Bu durumun sağlanmasının hassas bir dengede olması gerektiğini
söylemeye gerek yok. Ne var ki teorik olarak demokrasinin olasılıkları genişletilecek
olursa, farklı sosyal ve kültürel gruplar sivil halkı farklı şekillerde açıklayabilir. Gruplar
ve siyasi duruşları her zaman bir yere kadar akışkandır ve bireyler pek çok gruba sadık
kalabilirler: heterojen modern demokrasilerde “biz-lik” sınırları farklı taraflara kayabilir.
Giderek yayılan sosyal faklılaşma (ki bu sadece etnik ve kültürel çizgiler arasında değildir)
ile biçimlenen toplumlarda demokrasiyi oluşturma görevi karmaşık (Kymlica 1995;
Spinner 1994) olmakla beraber sorunları ortaya çıkarmanın oldukça verimli bir biçimidir.
Üstelik çözüm yaratma çabaları da yurttaşlık kültürü kavramı aracılığıyla mümkündür.
Dolayısıyla yurttaşlık kültürü kavramı sosyokültürel dünyanın özelliklerini vurgular ki bu,
tüm demokratik katılımlar için gereken günlük koşulları oluşturur: sivil toplum kurumları,
kamusal alana katılım ve geniş çapta anlaşılan siyasal etkinliklere katılım gibi. Bu
önkoşullar, demokratik yaşamda çeşitli yollarla işleyen, vatandaşlar arasında umumileşmiş
kültürel tutumları (demokratik yaşam tanımlarının siyasete çevrildiği süreçler de dahil)
içermektedir. Dolayısıyla bir kavram olarak yurttaşlık kültürü yeni değildir ve benim
bunu yeniden biçimlendirmem bile siyaset biliminden/siyasal iletişimden geleneksel
unsurlar taşımaktadır. Kanımca kavramın kullanışlılığını artıran şey, inşacı yaklaşımlar
ile geleneksel sosyal bilimler çerçevesinde anlam yapımını ilişkilendirmek ve kültürel
kuramla bağlantısını kurmaktır. Yurttaşlık kültürünü dört boyuta (görgül unsurlara)
ayırabiliriz. Bu dört boyut, modern demokrasi için esas olan çeşitli medyaları ampirik
olarak sorgulamak amacıyla bir başlangıç noktası olarak işe yarayabilir.
Dört Boyut
Uygun Bilgi ve Yeterlilik: Bu boyut açık ve nettir. İnsanlar güncel konularla ilgili güvenilir
raporlara, analizlere, tartışmalara, görüşmelere, vb. erişebilmelidirler. Burada medya
merkezi bir rolü olmakla beraber aynı zamanda sorunludur. Erişim sadece teknik ve
ekonomik açıdan değil, aynı zamanda dilsel ve kültürel yakınlıkla da ilintilidir. Katılımın
genişlemesi için gerekli olan bilgi kaynakları ve materyaller anlaşılır, farklı toplulukların
iyi iletişim kurabileceği biçimde olmalıdır. Elbette bu durum, farklı gruplara hitap
edebilmek amacıyla yeterli derecede özerk ve çeşitli olan kamusal alanların -veya yüksek
ölçüde heterojen olan grupların- ihtiyacını kuvvetlendirmektedir. Okur-yazarlığın belli
bir seviyede olması da önemlidir: insanlar kamusal alanda nelerin cereyan ettiğini ve
yaşadıkları dünyayı anlayabilmelidir. Aynı zamanda kamusal alanın fikir üretme sürecinde
yer alma ve/veya diğer siyasi etkinliklere katılma durumunda kişilerin kendi fikirlerini ifade
edebilmeleri gerekir; zira demokratik bir vatandaşlık için bu tür iletişim yetileri şarttır. Pek
çok biçimde eğitim ise haliyle demokrasi ile alakasını -içeriğinin ve hedeflerinin sıklıkla
eleştirel olarak incelenmesine ihtiyaç duyulsa da- devam ettirmektedir.
 O. S. Tekvar
150
Sosyolojik gerçekliğe göre, toplumun tüm bireyleri için bilgi ve yetilerin yeterli düzeyde
ulaşılabilir olduğu söylenemez. Üstelik vatandaşların bir yere bağlı kalmak zorunda
olmama hakkı da söz konusu. Ne var ki evrensellik ilkesi, bu şekildeki dışlamaya dair
herhangi bir sistematik mekanizmanın demokrasiye zıt olduğunu ve dolayısıyla bununla
mücadele edilmesi gerektiğinin altını çizmektedir. Bir yurttaşlık kültürünün kesin olarak
gerek duyduğu bilgi ve yetiler, bir defada ve herkes için elde edilemese de daima tartışmaya
açık olmalıdır. Günümüz medya aracılığıyla anlam yaratma hususunda ise (özellikle
genç seçmenlere bakacak olursak), önceki pek çok sınırın sorunlu hale geldiği bir medya
ortamında uygun bilgiyi neyin oluşturduğuna dair pek çok soru akla gelmektedir (örneğin,
popüler kültür üzerinden gazetecilik, kişisel ve siyasi olan, vatandaş ve tüketici olma, vs.
için bk. Street 1997; Van Zoonen 1998).
Demokratik Değerlere ve İlkelere Bağlılık: Demokratik ilkeleri ve prosedürleri takip
etmek için hoşgörülü ve istekli olma gibi erdemler günlük hayatın temelinde yer
almadığı sürece demokrasi işlemez. Yasal sistem bile (meşru olduğu düşünülürse) böylesi
erdemlerle desteklenmektedir: yasaların olmadığı bir ortamda demokrasi de ayakta
kalamaz. En iyi ve gerçek demokratik değerlerin ne olduğu ve nasıl uygulanması gerektiği
elbette ciddi bir tartışmanın temelidir ve prosedüre dayalı mekanizmaların fazladan
önem kazandığı bu tip durumlar için kesindir. Uzlaşmanın imkansız olduğu durumlarda
çatışmanın çözülmesi, uzlaşma için sarf edilen çabalar demokratik bir toplum için kilit
görevdir ve oyunu kurallarına göre oynamayı gerektirir. Medya demokratik değerleri
(sansasyonel skandallara davetiye çıkararak da olsa) büyük ölçüde kuvvetlendirmektedir.
Üstelik bireylerin demokratik hak arayışının medya temsilleri yolundan küresel olarak
yayılması özellikle tartışmaya açıktır. Schudson (1998) Amerikan vatandaşlığıyla ilgili
tarih araştırmasında, özellikle bireyin değerlerinin oluşmasında, demokrasinin istikbalini
dikkate alarak, nitelikli bir iyimserliğin temel olduğunu dile getirmiştir.
Pratikler, Rutin İşler ve Gelenekler: Demokrasi, farklı durumlarla ilintili olarak bireysel,
grup ve toplu olarak tekerrür eden pratikler çerçevesinde somut bir halde olmalıdır. Bu
tür pratikler, demokrasi idealleriyle ilintili olarak kişisel ve sosyal anlamı oluşturmaya
yardım etmekte olup yurttaşlık kültürünün bir parçası olmaları durumunda, kabul görmüş
olan rutin işlerin birer ögesi olmak durumundadırlar. Bu anlamda seçimler bir pratik
biçimi olarak görülebilir; fakat bir yurttaşlık kültürü, günlük hayattaki pek çok koşula,
sivil ve siyasi topluma uygun olacak birçok başka pratikler de gerektirmektedir. Örneğin,
bir oturumun nasıl açılacağı, bir tartışmanın nasıl idare edileceği, hatta nasıl tartışılacağı
yurttaşlık kültüründe mevcut olan yaşam dünyasının önemli özellikleri olarak görülebilir.
Vatandaşlar arası etkileşim kamusal alanın temel taşı olup böylesi etkileşimi biçimlendiren
türlü kurallar ve etiketler ya kamusal tartışma pratiklerini teşvik etmekte ya da bunların
uçup gitmesine neden olmaktadır (Kanımca, Nina Eliasoph’un siyasi konuşmayı teşvik
eden çeşitli pratikler üzerine yaptığı 1998 tarihli çalışması yurttaşlık kültürünün mükemmel
bir analizdir). Zaman içerisinde pratikler geleneklere, deneyimler kolektif hafızaya
dönüşmektedir. Günümüz demokrasisi, geçmişe takılı kalmadan onunla ilişkili olmak
durumundadır. Yeni pratikler ve gelenekler demokrasinin durağan olmadığının temini
olabilir ve olmalıdır da. Üstelik pratik ve gelenek noksanlığının, demokratik karakterini
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geliştirmekte olan pek çok toplumda nasıl bir engel teşkil ettiğini görebiliyoruz. Medya
ritüel ve sembolleri de içine katarak, süre giden siyasi hayata temsil ettikleriyle açıkça
katkıda bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca giderek daha fazla insan yeni etkileşim imkanlarını bu
vesileyle kullanmakta ve yurttaşlık kültürü pratiklerinin bir parçası olarak bu imkanları
bütünleştirmektedir.
Vatandaş Olarak Kimlik: Zaman zaman hangi haklar (ve zorunluluklar) üzerinde
uzlaşılacağı konusunda siyasi sorunlar çıksa da, geleneksel olarak vatandaşlık resmi bir
konum olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Vatandaşlık ile demokrasi ve iyi toplum kavramları
birbirinden ayrı tanımlanamaz. Modern demokrasilerde vatandaşlığa değin resmi statünün
kavram olarak siyasi hayatın büyük bir kısmını (örneğin, gerçek evrenselliğe ve eşitliğe
erişmek için verilen mücadeleler) çerçevelediği ve böylece çatışma halinin sürdüğü
söylenebilir.
Başka bir açıdan vatandaşlık kavramı, sadece feminist bakış açısı ve kadınların eşitlik ve
evrensellik haklarına erişmedeki engellere yönelik çalışmalardan (bk. Dean 1997; Voet
1998) ibaret olmayıp giderek sosyal kuram ve sosyal analizin konusu olmaya başlamıştır
(bk. Beiner 1995; Janoski 1998; Turner 1993). Literatürün çoğu vatandaşlık konusunu,
özellikle pratikler dizisi ve çevresinde oluşan koşullar olarak sosyal aracılık kapsamında
ele almaktadır. Vatandaşlık için bir önkoşul olarak içselleştirilen bazı değer ve normların
önemini vurgulayarak, gelenekçi sosyal bilimler araştırmaları bu tip çalışmaları bir şekilde
zaten yapmaktadır. Daha ziyade son çalışmalar farklı açılardan konuyu ele almaktadır.
Siyaset felsefesi (bk. Clark 1996; Mouffe 1993; A. Smith 1998; Trend 1996) kadar kültürel
kurama (bk. Isin ve Wood 1999; Preston 1997) da dayanan bu katkılar kimlik boyutuna, bir
sosyal aracı olarak vatandaşlığı anlamaya yönelik bir anahtar olarak aydınlık getirmiştir.
Kısacası, bir vatandaş olabilmek için bu sosyal kategorinin gerektirdiği tutumları öznel
olarak benimseyerek kişinin kendini bir vatandaş olarak görebilmesi önemlidir.
Tam olarak hangi tutumların vatandaşlıkla alakalı olduğu, giderek daha karmaşıklaşan bir
sorudur. Örneğin önceleri, vatandaşlık kamusal mekan ile ilişkilendirilerek tanımlanırdı.
Bununla beraber, kamu ve özel arasındaki hassas çizgi giderek daha sorunlu hale gelmiştir
(bk. Weintraub ve Kumar 1997). Bugün ise, bir “kamu” içeriği çok küçük bir ölçek bile
olsa, vatandaşlık kavramı hala genellikle öznel konumdaki kamusallığı yansıtmaktadır. Ne
var ki vatandaşlık benliğin bir boyutu olsa bile bu durum, insanların “vatandaş” sözcüğüne
benlikleriyle tınlayan bir anlam verdikleri anlamına gelmemektedir. Bunun için diğer
kelimeleri de kullanmaları söz konusudur. Bu çalışmanın ana noktasından yola çıkarak,
demokrasiyi anlamlı kılma ve demokrasiye katılım için kişilerin kendi stratejilerine karşı
duyarlı olunması gerekmektedir.
Geç modern toplumun özelliklerinden biri, benliği çoklu sosyal güçler, kültürel geçerlilikler
ve kişisel içerikler setinin neticesi olarak kimliğin biçimlenmesi ve yenilenmesi
sürecinin devam ettiği, yansımacı bir proje olarak benliği ortaya çıkarmasıdır. Üstelik
kimlik çoğul anlaşılmaktadır: günlük yaşantımızda farklı “dünyalar” veya gerçeklikler
bütününde yaşamakta, farklı koşullara göre içimizde farklı bilgiler, düşünceler, kurallar
ve roller taşımaktayız. Bu elementlerin bazısı kimliğimizin daha merkezinde kalırken
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İnternet Bağlantıları
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
153
diğerleri daha yüzeydedir. Yine de hepimiz bir dereceye kadar müşterek yaşamak
durumundayız. Kimlikler bütünlüğü düşüncesi aynı zamanda vatandaşlık ile de ilişkilidir.
Sağlıklı demokrasinin, çoklu benliklerimizin inşasında belirgin bir unsur olarak görülen
vatandaşlığa bağlı olduğu düşünülmektedir. Gellner (1994) bu düşünceyi kavramak
için “modüler insan” metaforunu kullanır. Sosyal gelişmeye ait olma (ve buna katılma)
duygusu ile beraber kişilerin vatandaş olarak kimlikleri, demokrasi hayatında oldukça
önemli bir öge haline gelmiştir. Vatandaşlığı kimliğin bir boyutu olarak görmek aynı
zamanda sosyolojik ve psikolojik anlamda gerçek dışı olan tek kalıp bir vatandaşlık
portresi oluşturan demokratik ideallerimizden kaçınmamıza da yardımcı olmaktadır. Eğer
demokrasi nüfusun çoğunluğunun bir erişkin gözcüler heyetine dönüşmesini öngörseydi,
o zaman durum umutsuz olurdu.
Bir araştırma projesi geliştirirken, (temsilci seçmek yerine) sivil veya siyasi ortama etkin
bir şekilde katılan, yurttaşlık kültürünün yeni gelişmelerinin ön cephesinde yer alan ve
internette güçlü bir mevcudiyeti bulunan ya da internet kullanımını kendi etkinlikleri
için kayda değer kılan belirli birkaç grubu tanımlayarak işe başlayacağım. Burada
görülmesi gereken nokta, internet kullanımının yanında getirdiği yurttaşlık kültürü için
“katma değer”in ne olduğudur. Seçilen gruplar elbette uygun olan kaynaklara bağımlı
durumdadırlar; ama esasen ben benzerliklerin ve farklılıkların belirleneceği karşılaştırmalı
bir tasarımı tercih ederim. Olası pek çok kategori arasından şunlar seçilebilir: görece yeni,
bir yere bağlı yerel bir aktivist grup, belirli bir konu veya temaya odaklı, Avrupa veya
küresel içerikte işleyen (örneğin, insani yardımlarla ilgili bir STK) bir örgüt ve çevre veya
feminizm alanında bir sosyal hareket.
Yurttaşlık kültürünün bu dört boyutu farklı maddeler listesi olarak değil, etkenleri karşılıklı
olarak güçlendiren bir ortam olarak görülmelidir. İnsanların kendini vatandaş olarak
görmesi ve yurttaşlık kültürünün zenginleşmesi, bilgi ve yetilerin karşılıklı olarak birbirine
bağımlılığı ve yerleşmiş pratikler ile gelenekler kadar demokratik değer ve prosedürlere
bağlılığı da getirecektir. Bir yurttaşlık kültürü, vatandaşların günlük hayatta yaptıklarına
ve düşüncelerine dayalı kalırken medya bu dolaşımı teşvik de edebilir, engel de olabilir.
Bilgi, yetkiler, değerler, pratikler ve kimlikler çerçevesinde araştırmanın tasarlanması
bireysel ve grup görüşmelerini, gözlemi ve internet metinlerinin çözümlenmesini
gerektirecektir. İlgili materyal, örneklemdeki vatandaşların stratejik olarak neler yaptığını
ve süreç içerisinde ortaya çıkan anlam inşasını yakalayacak şekilde toplanmalıdır. Bu tür
araştırmalarda meydana gelen pratik zorluklar da göz ardı edilmemelidir.
Modern demokraside siyasi eğilimler medyanın gelişimiyle beraber karmaşık yollarla dile
gelmektedir. Yurttaşlık kültürünün boyutları, yeni etkileşim biçimleri kadar temsil türleri
yoluyla da medyanın nasıl geleneksel siyasi hayatın bitişine ve yeni katılım biçimlerinin
ortaya çıkışına katkıda bulunduğuna yönelik incelemelere dair yöntemler sunmaktadır. Bu
gelişmelere ilişkin olarak görgül ve normatif çelişkiler mevcut olmakla beraber, bireylerin
ve grupların demokrasiyi yürütmekte (ve tahayyül etmede) yeni yollar bulduğunun altını
çizebiliriz. Yurttaşlık kültürü prizması daha kolay cevaplar bulacağımızın garantisini
vermez; fakat soruları formüle etmemize ve gelişmiş, kavramsal bir araç sunarken
araştırmanın gidişatını bulmamıza yardımcı olur.
İnternet ise yoğun derecede kuramsal, son zamanlarda da görgül çözümlemelerin konusu
olmuştur. İki akım bu çalışmayı özellikle ilgilendirmektedir: İnternet üzerinden/aracılığıyla
topluluk konusu (bk. Jones 1998; M. Smith ve Kollock 1999) ve internetin siyasetle ilişkisi
(ör., Hague ve Loader 1999). Bu akımlar pek çok işe yarar veriler sunsa da bu araştırmalar
üzerinde odaklanmak, özellikle internetin yurttaşlık kültürünün dört boyutu ile ilintili olarak
oynadığı rollerin çerçevesini çizebilir. Mevcut internet araştırmalarında dikkatimi çeken
önemli bir eğilim, çevrimiçi/çevrimdışı ayrımı üzerine yapılan çalışmaların azalmasıdır.
Siber alandaki belirli tutumlara ve ekranın dışındaki dünyadan nasıl farklı olduğuna dair
hala keşfedilecek çok şey var elbette. Bunun yanında, internetin birçok kurum, örgüt ve
günlük işlerle aşırı derecede birbirine geçmiş olması, bu teknolojinin nasıl kullanıldığını
ve insanların ellerindeki koşullar içerisinde nasıl çevrimiçi-çevrimdışı etkinlikler arasında
gelip gittiğini düşünmemize sevk etmektedir. Dolayısıyla kimileri sadece internet üzerine
odaklanarak yurttaşlık kültürünün bazı yanlarını çözümleme yoluna giderken ben,
internetin çevrimdışı etkinliklerle nasıl bir birleşme içerisinde kullanıldığını görmeyi
seçtim.
 atılım
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154
Kaynakça
Almond, G. ve S. Verba. 1963. The Civic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
_____ der. 1980. The Civic Culture Revisited. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Beiner, R. der. 1995. Theorizing Citizenship. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Clark, P. B. 1996. Deep Citizenship. London: Pluto.
Cruikshank, B. 1999. The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Dean, J. der. 1997. Feminism and the New Democracy. London: Sage.
Eliasoph, N. 1998. Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life.
Cambridge,UK: Cambridge University Press.
Gellner, E. 1994. The Conditions of Liberty. London: Allen Lane/The Penguin Press.
Hague, B. N. ve B. D. Loader. der. 1999. Digital Democracy. London: Routledge.
Isin, E. F. ve P. K. Wood (1999). Citizenship and Identity. London: Sage.
Janoski, T. 1998. Citizenship and Civil Society. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Jones, S. G. der. 1998. Cybersociety 2.0. London: Sage.
Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Mouffe, C. 1993. The Return of the Political. London: Verso.
Preston, P. W. 1997. Political/Cultural Identity. London: Sage.
Schudson, M. 1998. The Good Citizen. New York: Free Press.
Smith, A. M. 1998. Laclau and Mouffe. London: Routledge.
Smith, M. A. and P. Kollock. der. 1999. Communities in Cyberspace. London: Routledge.
Spinner, J. 1994. The Boundaries of Citizenship. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Street, J. 1997. Politics and Popular Culture. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Trend, D. der. 1996. Radical Democracy: Identity, Citizenship and The State. London: Routledge.
Turner, B. der. 1993. Citizenship and Social Theory. London: Sage.
van Zoonen, L. 1998. A day at the zoo: Political communication, pigs and popular culture. Media,
Culture and Society. 20, 183-200.
Voet, R. 1998. Feminism and Citizenship. London: Sage.
Weintraub, J. ve D. Kumar. der. 1997. Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives on
a Grand Dichotomy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 atılım
KİTAP
İNCELEMESİ
Robert W. Cox. Production, Power and World Order:
Social Forces in the Making of History
İnceleyen, Mehmet Gürsan Şenalp
Brzezinsky, Zbigniew. The Grand Chessboard: American
Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the
Remaking of the World Order
İnceleyen, M. Kemal Utku
Production, Power and World Order:
Social Forces in the Making of History
Mehmet Gürsan Şenalp
İktisat Bölümü, Atılım Üniversitesi.
Robert W. Cox. 1987 Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making
of History New York: Columbia University Press, 499 sayfa. ISBN 0-231-05808-X ISBN
0-231-06561-2 (pbk.)
Robert W. Cox, 1981 ve 1983 yıllarında yayınlanan iki önemli makalesinin yanı sıra, bu
yazıda inceleyeceğimiz kitabı 1987 tarihli Üretim, İktidar ve Dünya Düzeni (Production,
Power and World Order, bundan sonra ÜİDD) ile birlikte, güncel küreselleşme ve devlet
tartışmalarına yeni-Gramscici yaklaşımın temelini oluşturur. Bu çalışmalar, günümüzde
halen sürmekte olan küreselleşme tartışmalarından daha önce yapılmış olması itibarıyla
da dikkate değerdir. Cox’un çalışmalarında ilk bakışta öne çıkan olgu, uluslararası ilişkiler
(Uİ) disiplininde hakim olan neo-realist geleneğin eleştirisidir. Cox, öncelikle Kenneth
Waltz ve Robert Keohane gibi neo-realistlerin tarihsel olmadığını (ahistoric) düşündüğü
devlet merkezci analizlerine karşı çıkmaktadır (Bieler ve Morton 2004; Robinson 2004).
Bu açıdan Cox’un analizleri, uluslararası ilişkilerdeki realist yaklaşımın sınırlılıklarını
‘sivil toplum’ ve ‘devlet’ gibi Gramscici anlayış ve kavramları kullanarak aşmaya
çalışmaktadır (Robinson 2005). Cox’un çalışmaları sonraları kendisini izleyecek olan bazı
Uİ kuramcıları için de yol gösterici olmuştur.
158
Cox’a göre Gramsci’nin kullandığı genel kavramsal çerçeve, Uİ’de alternatif bir teorik
yaklaşım türetebilmek için gereken zemini sağlamakta olup, uluslararası düzeyde kurulu
hegemonya mekanizmasını açıklayabilmek için gerekli teorik zenginliğe sahiptir (Germain
ve Kenny 1998). ÜİDD’de hegemonik projelerin formülasyonlarını içinde yükseldikleri
toplumsal yapılar etrafında ve “uluslararasılaşan üretimin değiştirdiği küresel toplumsal
iktidar yapılarıyla” ilişkilendirerek açıklamaya çalışmaktadır (Picciotto 1991, 44). Bu
bağlamda Leo Panitch’in ifade ettiği gibi Cox, UİDD ile “devletin uluslararasılaşması
olgusunu tarihin yapımında sosyal güçlerin rolünü, tarihsel materyalist bir perspektiften
anlamaya çalışmak suretiyle, büyük ölçüde ortaya koyabilmiştir” (Panitch 1994, 68).
Cox, ÜİDD’deki tarihsel materyalist analizinde aktörler yerine tarihsel yapılara
odaklanmakta; ancak yapısalcılığın diğer biçimlerinin aksine, burada yapıların verili
olmadıklarını, bunların insanların bilinçli kolektif eylemleri tarafından inşa edilip
dönüştürüldüğünü söylemektedir (Cox 1987, 4). Bu bağlamda, içerisinde hegemonyanın
da üretildiği yapılar şu üç etkinlik alanı üzerine kurulur: 1) Toplumsal ilişkilerin, belirli
toplumsal güçleri meydana getiren maddi, kurumsal ve söylemsel biçimlerinin bütününü
kapsayan toplumsal üretim ilişkileri, 2) Tarihsel olarak birbirine bağlı devlet-sivil toplum
kompleksleri; yani devlet biçimleri ve 3) Asla sadece istikrar veya çatışmaları temsil
etmekle kalmayan, aynı zamanda alternatif dünya düzeni biçimlerini de düşünmemize
olanak sağlayan, dünya düzeni yapıları (Cox 1981, 135-8). Cox’a göre bu üç farklı alan/
düzey, o denli iç içe geçmiş ve karmaşık bir haldedir ki, onları birbirinden ayrı ele alma
imkânı yoktur.
Cox’a göre üretim ilişkileri, modelleri/biçimleri, hegemonya mekanizmalarının ve işleyiş
prensiplerinin çözümlenmesi bağlamında bir çıkış noktası olmalıdır. Ancak, bu eğilimin
bizleri, daha başlangıçta, her şeyi üretim sürecine indirgeyen ekonomistik bir yanlışa/
yanılgıya düşürmemesi gerektiğinin de altını çizmektedir. Bu nedenle üretimi, salt fiziki
malların üretimi olarak değil, fiziki mal üretiminin bir anlamda önkoşulu olarak bilginin ve
toplumsal ilişkilerin, değerlerin ve kurumların üretimi ve yeniden-üretimi olarak anlamak
gerekmektedir.
Üretim, sosyal varoluş biçimlerinin tümüne maddi birer zemin ve insan çabalarının
toplumsal hayatın diğer tüm alanlarını etkileyen üretken süreçler içinde -ki buna
siyaset de dahildir- birleştirildiği alanlar yaratır. Üretim, iktidar olma kapasitesi
üretir; ancak, iktidar üretimin gerçekleştirileceği yolları, biçimleri belirler (Cox
1987, 1).
Cox, yukarıdaki cümlelerle başladığı kitabın ilk bölümünde, kapitalist veya yenidendağılımcı diye adlandırdığı farklı gelişme süreçleri içinde, toplumsal üretim ilişkilerinin
mevcut biçimlerinin çözümlenmesine odaklanmış ve farklı gelişim aşamalarının tipik
özelliği olarak, bunların her birinde bazı üretim biçimlerinin diğerlerini tahakküm
altına alarak zamanla hakim ilişkiler haline geldiklerini göstermiştir. Sözü edilen
konfigürasyonlardan ilki 19. yüzyılın ortalarında İngiltere’de filizlenen ve fabrika
üretiminde girişimci-işgücü piyasalarıyla karakterize edilen “rekabetçi kapitalizm”dir.
Burada hakim-bağımlı (dominant-subordinated) biçim çelişkisi girişimci-işgücü
 atılım
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
159
ile bağımsız-işgücü (self-employment) arasında dolaylı yoldan; ancak, ilkel-işgücü
piyasasından gelen (girişimci-emek piyasalarında ücretleri aşağıya doğru çeken baskısıyla)
işgücü rezervi ve ev işçiliği arasında doğrudan doğruya kurulmaktadır (Cox 1987, 51-69).
İkincisi, “tekelci kapitalist” gelişimdir. Bu süreçte kapitalizmin tekelci gelişimi, tekelci
ve rekabetçi sektörler yaratarak, ekonomiyi adeta ikiye bölmüştür ve bu evrede diğerine
bağımlı olan ve tahakküm altına alınan ilişkiler rekabetçi olanlardır. Üçüncü konfigürasyon
ise “yeniden-dağılımcı kalkınma”dır. Bu, merkezi planlama ve komünal biçimler
arasındaki ikilikten doğmuştur.
Buradan Cox’u egemen Uİ disiplininden gelen diğer meslektaşlarından ayıran bir dizi
soruya (ve olası cevaplara) ulaşmaktayız. Bu bağlamda, üretim ve iktidar olguları
arasındaki ilişki hayati önem taşımaktadır ve bu ilişkiyi incelemek için “toplumsal bir
üretim ilişkisinde iktidarın, nasıl bazı toplumsal güçlerin yükselişine aracılık ettiğini,
bu toplumsal güçlerin nasıl devlet biçiminde iktidarın zeminine dönüşebildiğini ve bu
dünya düzenini nasıl şekillendirebildiğini” sorgulayabilen, bu noktalara odaklanabilen bir
kuramsal çerçeveye ihtiyaç vardır (Bieler ve Morton 2004, 89). Bu kuramsal çerçeve, elbette
tarihsel yapıların sosyal ontolojisi etrafında gezinmeli ve “insanların kolektif eylemliliği
tarafından gerçekleştirilen ve dönüştürülen ısrarlı toplumsal pratiklere” göndermede
bulunmalıdır (Cox 1987, 4). Bu çözümlemelerden yola çıkarak hegemonyanın, toplumsal
üretim ilişkileri tarafından oluşturulmuş ve temel kolektif özneler olarak toplumsal
güçlerle bağlantılı bir sınıf yönetimi olarak anlaşılması gerekmektedir.
Tam da bu noktada Cox, “sınıf” kavramını, durağan-çözümlemeci (static-analytic) değil,
devimsel-tarihsel (dynamic-historical) bir kategori olarak ele almayı yeğlemektedir. Bu
bakış açısında, sınıflar tarihsel bir süreçte, iktisadi sömürü olgusuna paralel olarak oluşur
ve gelişirler. Yani, “sınıf oluşumu verili; diğer bir deyişle, tarihsel süreçler tarafından
önceden belirlenmiş bir süreç demek değildir; tersine oldukça akışkan ve üretim
yapılarındaki değişimler ve bu değişimlere tepki olarak evrimleşen praksis tarafından
yaratılan fırsatların bir diyalektiğidir” (Cox 1987, 389). Cox’a göre, tahakküm altında
yükselen toplumsal gruplar arasındaki sınıf oluşumlarını engelleyen hakim sınıflarca
desteklenen büyük güçler iş başındadır (mesleki bölünmeler, etnik ve dini kimlikler
ve semboller, devlet ve egemen sınıfların baskı ve zorlamasından önce çaresizlik,
tüketimcilik ve küçük burjuva özentiliği gibi). Kitapta, “Sınıflar ve Tarihsel Blokların
Oluşumu” başlığı altında, sınıf oluşumu sürecinin kimi özellikleri sıralanmıştır. Buna göre
bir toplumsal üretim ilişkisi biçiminde yer alan her hakim veya tahakküm altındaki grubun
mutlak suretle bir sınıf kimliği sergilemesi gerekmez. Bazen bunlar bir sınıfı oluşturacak
ortak bir kimlik ve hareket kapasitesi sergileyemez ve sadece gizli veya potansiyel sınıflar
olarak kalırlar. Diğer yandan, iki ya da daha fazla toplumsal üretim ilişkisi biçiminden
hakim veya tahakküm altındaki gruplar, örneğin, örgütlü ve örgütsüz işçiler veya küçük
ölçekli girişimciler ve şirket yöneticileri, aralarında bir sınıf oluşturmak üzere, bir
dayanışma geliştirerek birleşebilir. Ayrıca, farklı toplumsal üretim ilişkisi biçimleri, kendi
aralarında hakim-yönetilen ilişkisi içerisinde hiyerarşik olarak ve bileşenlerinin mevcut
sınıf alışkanlıklarını etkileyecek şekilde bağlanabilir. Son olarak hakim toplumsal üretim
ilişkisi biçimi etrafında oluşan sınıf, tahakküm edilen toplumsal üretim ilişkisi biçiminden
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türeyecek muhtemel sınıf oluşumları ve alışkanlıkları üzerinde belirleyici etkiye sahip olur
(Cox 1987, 355-6).
Cox’a göre devletler, üretken süreçlere doğrudan veya dolaylı müdahalelerde bulunarak
üretim için gereken çerçeveyi oluşturur ve aynı anda bir arada bulunan, mevcut toplumsal
üretim ilişkileri biçimleri arasında hiyerarşik bir yapı kurarlar. Devletin üretimi düzenleme
şekli onun sınıf yapısına bağlıdır. Sınıf yapılarındaki radikal değişimler de üretimde devletin
rolünü farklılaştırır. Dolayısıyla, sınıf, bir yanda devlet, diğer yanda üretim süreci arasında
aracılık işlevi gördüğü için önemli bir kategoridir. Tarihsel blokların inşası ve çözülmesi
ise sınıf oluşumlarının, hem devletleri hem de üretimin örgütlenişini dönüştürebildiği
süreçlerdir. Cox, toplumda egemen konumdaki sosyal grupları (dominant social groups)
şu şekilde sıralamaktadır: 1) Dünya çapında faaliyetler yürüten dev şirketleri “kontrol”
edenler, 2) Ulusal-temelli büyük girişimleri ve sanayi gruplarını kontrol edenler ve 3)
Bölgesel nitelikli küçük kapitalistler. İkinci kategori heterojen bir yapı arz etmekte olup
kapitalist ülkelerdeki ulusal ölçekli özel ve kamu sektörü şirketlerinin yönetimlerini ve
sosyalist ülkelerdeki devlet girişimlerini içerir. İlk gruptakiler, belirgin biçimde bir sınıf
bilincine sahiptirler ve kendilerini açıkça öyle tanımlamasalar bile “ulusötesi yönetici
sınıf” (transnational managerial class) olarak adlandırılabilirler (Cox 1987, 356). Bu
noktada belirtilmesi gereken husus, bir sınıfa dahil olmanın sınıfın diğer üyeleriyle hiçbir
şekilde bir çıkar çatışması yaşanmayacağı anlamına gelmemekte olduğudur. Kaldı ki
kapitalistler arası sürmekte olan rekabet, bu sistemin tam da özünü oluşturur. O halde
buradan çıkan sonuç şudur: Ortak kaygılar ve çıkarları konusundaki farkındalık, sistemin
devamını ve sistem içerisinde bu sınıfın hakimiyetini pekiştirir/güçlendirir. Cox’a göre
Üçlü Komisyon, OECD, Dünya Bankası ve IMF gibi kurumlar, ulusötesi yönetici sınıfın
farkındalık düzeyini artırmak ve sistemin bekasını sağlamak işlevini sürdürmektedir.
Bu ulusötesi yönetici sınıf, sadece çokuluslu şirketlerin yönetici kadrolarında görev alan
bazı kişiler ile onların aileleri ve yakınlarından ibaret değildir. Bu sınıf, aynı zamanda
ekonomi yönetimiyle ilgili ulusal ve uluslararası kurumlarda çalışan kamu memurlarını ve
geniş bir uzmanlar kesimini de içermektedir. Cox’a göre uluslararası finansal işletmelerin
önemi, bu sınıfın en önemli tamamlayıcı parçalarından birisi olarak giderek artmaktadır.
Finans, dünya ekonomisi üzerinde bir sınıf hakimiyeti sağlamak açısından, askeri gücün
yanında temel bir mekanizma durumundadır. Ülkeler, dünya ekonomisine ve birbirine
finans yoluyla bağlanmakta; hükümetler ise ulusötesi yönetici sınıfın gelişmesi için
gerekli politikaları uygulamaya zorlanmaktadır. Diğer iki kategori, yani ulusal sermaye ve
yerel-küçük kapitalistler ise görece daha heterojen ve farklıdır. Bunlar, ulusötesi yönetici
sınıfın hakim konumuna ve dünya ekonomisindeki gelişmelere karşı tepkisel bir karakter
sergiler (Cox 1987, 360).
Bilindiği üzere Gramsci, devlet ve sivil toplum üzerine yazılarında, kapitalist toplumun
liberal ideologlarınca geliştirilen devlet kavramsallaştırmasını; ilk olarak devlet, “ekonomik
ve siyasalın birbirinden ayrıştırılmasından türetildiği” ve ikinci olarak “kendinde bir şey,
ussal bir mutlak olarak kavrandığı” için eleştirmekteydi. Halbuki, Gramsci’nin -Marx,
Polanyi ve Poulantzas’ta da görebileceğimiz- bakış açısına göre liberal ideolojide doğal
ve organik olarak ele alınan kapitalizmde toplumsal bütünün siyasal ve iktisadi alanlarının
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
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birbirinden ayrılması gerçek değil yanılsamadır. Bu yanılsama, ‘kamusal’ ve ‘özel’ ayrımı
biçiminde tezahür eder ve Gramsci’nin işaret ettiği üzere, ilki ‘siyasal toplum’ diğeri ise
‘sivil toplum’ görünümü alır. ‘Kendinde bir şey’ olarak devletin mutlaklaştırılması ise
bireylerin “gerçeklikte kendilerinin üzerinde, özgül bir varlığın kafasına sahip olmayan
fakat düşünebilen, gerçek ayaklara sahip olmaksızın hâlâ hareket edebilen hayali bir
kendiliğin varolduğunu düşünmelerine izin veren şeyleşmiş ya da fetişistik bir görüşle
sonuçlanır” (Robinson 2002, 130). Cox, kendi sözleriyle, Gramsci’nin çalışmalarında
kullandığı hegemonya ve ilgili diğer bazı kavramları (tarihsel blok, pasif devrim, karşıhegemonya ve mevzi savaşı gibi) uluslararası ilişkiler analizine uyarlamaya çalışmaktadır.
Bunu yaparken devletin önemini göz ardı etmez. Devlet, bu bağlamda, uluslararası
ilişkilerin temel unsuru olarak, sosyal çatışmaların meydana geldiği ve sosyal sınıfların
hegemonyalarını inşa ettikleri yerdir.
Cox, Gramscici anlamda hegemonya kavramının uluslararası ilişkilere uygulanıp
uygulanamayacağını sorgulamakta ve kavramın yaygın olarak kullanılan biçimlerini
eleştirmektedir. Ona göre literatürdeki mevcut hegemonya anlayışları ve tanımları,
aslında Gramscici anlamda hakimiyet (domination) kavramına karşılık gelmektedir.
Yani, hegemonya ve hakimiyet terimleri birbiriyle karıştırılmaktadır. Oysa ki, bir devletin
dünya çapında ya da bölgesel düzeyde hakimiyetini kabul ettiriyor oluşu, her zaman
dünya ölçeğinde -Gramscici anlamda- hegemonik olduğu anlamına gelmez. Bir devletin
dünya ölçeğinde hegemonik olabilmesi için bir dünya düzeni tesis edebilmesi ve bunu
evrensel kabullerle meşrulaştırabilmesi gerekir. Yani, hegemonik bir düzen, bir devletin
diğerlerini doğrudan ve/veya açıkça sömürdüğü değil; diğer pek çok devletin de kendi
menfaatlerine uygun fırsatları bulabildikleri bir düzendir. Şüphesiz ki bu tür bir düzenin
salt devletler-arası terimlerle açıklanması zordur. ÜİDD’de son iki yüzyıl içinde kurulan
dünya düzenleri, şu üç farklı yapı temelinde sınıflandırılır: Liberal uluslararası ekonomi
(1789-1873); rakip emperyalizmler (rival imperialisms) çağı (1873-1945) ve neoliberal
dünya düzeni (2. Dünya Savaşı sonrası dönem). Cox’a göre yukarıdaki her bir evreye ve
onun özgüllüklerine uygun düşen bir devlet biçimi, yeni bir “tarihsel blok oluşumu” ve
nihayet üretim ilişkilerinin yeni bir konfigürasyonu söz konusu olacaktır.
Cox’un çalışmaları ve kuramsal yaklaşımlarının sınıflandırılması ve tanımlanması kolay
olmamıştır. Kimileri onu bir ‘Gramscici’, kimileri ise bir ‘eleştirel kuramcı’ olarak görmeye
çalışmıştır. James H. Mittelman, bir ‘Coxgil Tarihsicilik’ten söz ederken, Chris Brown,
onun, Lenin’in emperyalizm kuramıyla, neo-Marksist bağımlılık yaklaşımının zorlama
bir sentezini yapmaya çalışan geleneksel bir Marksist (hatta Marksist-Leninist) olduğunu
öne sürmüştür. Martin Shaw ise Cox’un Marksizm’in zararlı taraflarını sansürlediğini
düşünmektedir. John Adams’a göre ise Cox’un Marksizmi, ‘sulandırılmıştır’. Peter
Burnham, Cox’un yaklaşımının temel sorununun, Weberci ve Marksist metodolojilerin
birarada kullanılması olduğunu öne sürmekte ve Cox’un tarzını bir hayli eklektik
bulmaktadır. Bütün bu tanımlama ve değerlendirmeler bir tarafa, kendi ifadesiyle Cox bir
‘tarihsel materyalist’tir (Cox ve Schechter 2002, 3-14).
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162
Kaynakça
Bieler, Andreas ve Adam D. Morton. 2004. A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and
historical change: Neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations. Capital & Class. 82,
85-113.
Cox, Robert W. 1981. Social forces, states and world orders: Beyond International Relations theory.
Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 10 (2),126-55.
___________. 1983. Gramsci, hegemony and International Relations: An essay in method.
Millenium:.Journal of International Studies. 12 (2), 162-75.
___________. Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History
New York: Columbia University Press.
___________. ve M. G. Schechter. 2002. The Political Economy of A Plural World. London:
Routledge.
Germain, Randall D. ve Michael Kenny. 1998. Engaging Gramsci: International Relations theory and
new Gramscians, Review of International Studies. (24), 3-21
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. der. ve çev. Q. Hoare ve G. NowellSmith, London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Hardt, Michael ve Antonio Negri. 2002 [2000]. İmparatorluk, çev. A. Yılmaz, İstanbul: Ayrıntı.
Panitch, Leo. 1994. Globalisation and the state. Socialist Register. 30, 60-93.
Picciotto, Sol. 1991. The internationalisation of the state. Capital & Class. 43, 43-63.
Robinson, William I. 2002. Küresel kapitalizm ve ulusötesi kapitalist hegemonya: Kuramsal notlar
ve görgül deliller. Praksis. 8, 125-168.
Robinson, William I. 2004. A Theory of Global Capitalism: Production, Class and State in a
Transnational World, The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London.
Robinson, William I. 2005. Global capitalism: The new transnationalism and the folly of conventional
thinking. Science and Society. (69) 3, 316-328.
The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy
and Its Geostrategic Imperatives
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking
of the World Order
M. Kemal Utku
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, Atılım Üniversitesi.
Brzezinsky, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives, New York: Basic Books. ISBN-10: 046502 7261; ISBN-13:
978-0465027 262.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World
Order, New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN-10: 0684844419 ; 0-684-84441-9; ISBN 13:
9780684844411.
Uluslararası siyaset veya Amerikan siyaseti ile ilgilenenlerimiz Zbigniew Brzezinsky’i
Soğuk Savaş yıllarının en önde gelen ideologlarından biri olarak anımsarlar. Kendisi
aynı zamanda Kissinger ve Schlessinger gibi ABD başkanlarına Milli Güvenlik
Danışmanlığı da yapmıştır. Uygarlıklar Çatışması’nın yazarı olan Samuel Huntington ise
Amerika’nın en ünlü uluslararası siyaset bilimcilerindendir. İkinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan
hemen sonra hegemonyalarını kuran Amerikan sosyal bilimcilerinin öncülüğünü yaptığı
‘davranışcı’ akımın en çok bilinen birkaç ismi arasındadır ve uzun yıllar boyunca Harvard
Üniversitesinde hocalık yapmıştır.
 atılım
164
Bu iki kitabı bir arada incelememizin ana nedeni ikisinin bir şekilde birbirlerini
tamamlıyor olmaları.Her iki yapıt da halen güncelliğini koruyan ve ülkemizi de çok
yakından ilgilendiren konuları ele alıyorlar: Soğuk Savaş sonrası global siyaset ve yeni
kurulan uluslararası düzende Batı uygarlığının ve onun lideri durumundaki ABD’nin
hegemonyalarını nasıl koruyabilecekleri. Brzezinsky incelemesini ulusal devlet ve
‘Amerika ile müttefiklerinin çıkarları’ temeline oturturken, Huntington ulusal devletin
artık uluslararası arenada yeterince güçlü olmadığını savunuyor; araştırmasını da bu
devletlerin mensup olduğu uygarlıklar çerçevesi içinde sürdürüyor. Yazara göre bundan
sonra çıkabilecek olası bir global savaş kesinlikle farklı dinlere bağlı uygarlıklar arasında
olacaktır.
Batı’nın dışındaki uygarlıkların ekonomik, askeri ve siyasal güçlerinin gittikçe artması
ve İslam’ ın etkisinın gittikçe daha çok hissedilmekte olması farklı uygarlıklar arasındaki
güç dengelerini hem zorlamakta hem de daha düşmanca yapmaktadır. Makro düzeyde bu
düşmanlık açık ve seçik olarak Batı uygarlığı ile diğer bütün kültürler arasındadır. Daha
spesifik olmak gerekirse bu global savaş, ya Batı’yla Huntington’ın hem çekindiği hem de
saygı duyduğu Çin uygarlığı arasında, ya da Batı’yla Huntington’ın hem sevmediği hem
de küçük gördüğü İslam uygarlığı arasında olacaktır.
Brzezinsky de, Batı’nın görece üstünlüğünü yavaş yavaş kaybettiğini kabul ediyor ve bunu
durdurmanın yollarını arıyor. Yalnız Huntington’dan farklı olarak dünyayı bir uygarlıklar
haritası olarak görmüyor. Brzezinsky’e göre ulusal devlet hala uluslararası politikanın
temel birimidir ve dünya üzerindeki kavgaların kökünde hala dine bağlı çatışmalardan çok
‘toprak’ için rekabet yatar.
Huntington, Türkiye’ye özellikle atıfta bulunduğu bölümlerde tarih dersini iyi çalışmamış
bir öğrenciyi andırıyor. Türkiye’nin tarihini yetersiz kaynaklardan okumuş ve bizlere
aktardığı bilgiler oldukça yüzeysel. Yazı stilini ve kullandığı üslubu da tuhaf bulduğumu
söyleyebilirim.
Yazar’a göre tarihsel olarak bakıldığında, Batılı olmayan ülkelerin Batılılaşma ve
evrenselleşmeye tepkilerinin farklı olduğu görülmektedir. Bazı ülkeler her iki oluşumu da
reddederlerken, Türkiye’nin de içinde bulunduğu bir grup ülke, hem Batılılaşmayı hem
de modernleşmeyi amaç edinmiştir. Ancak Kemalist doktrinin, ülkenin İslami geçmişini
reddetmesi ve kendisine tamamen yabancı olan Batı kültürüne kucak açması, Türkiye’yi
‘parçalanmış’ bir ülke durumuna sokmuştur. Başarı için Batı uygarlığının da Türkiye’yi
kabul etmesi gerekirken bu olmamıştır ve olmayacaktır. Müslüman Türkiye, Avrupa
Birliği üyeliği için bekledikçe halk içinde Batı karşıtı duygular gittikçe güçlenecek ve
Atatürk’ten kalan miras zamanla yavaş yavaş eriyecektir.
Peki, Huntington’a göre Türkiye ve onun durumundaki diğer parçalanmış ülkeler bu
durumdan nasıl kurtulabilirler? Huntington özellikle Türkiye’nin İslam dünyasının lideri
olmak için gereken vasıflara sahip olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Özellikle Türkiye, İslam
dünyasının lideri olmak için gereken vasıflara sahiptir. Tarihi geçmişi, askeri gücü, orta
derecede de olsa gelişmiş ekonomisi ve ‘milli beraberlik ruhu’ olan Türkiye’nin yapması
gereken en önemli şey laik Kemalist ideolojiyi reddederek İslam’a geri dönmektir. Güney
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2011, VOL.1 NO 1
165
Afrika nasıl Apartheid ideolojiyi reddettiyse, Türkiye de Kemalist geçmişini reddetmelidir;
parçalanmış ülke durumundan ancak böyle kurtulabilir.
Evrensel uygarlığı reddettikten sonra Huntington’ın dünyası artık birden fazla uygarlığın
bir arada yaşadığı bir yer haline gelir. Yalnız, kendisinin bu çok uygarlıklı dünyada
mutlu bir şekilde yaşanabileceği konusunda ciddi kuşkuları vardır. Mikro düzeyde en
sorun çıkarabilecek ilişkiler İslam ve onun Ortodoks, Hindu, Afrikalı ve Batılı Hristiyan
komşuları ile olan ilişkileridir. Makro düzeyde en önemli sürtüşmeler ise Batı ile Batılı
olmayan diğer bütün uygarlıklar arasında, yani muhtemelen “kendini beğenmiş” Batı ile
“toleranssız” İslam ve kendini ön plana çıkarma isteği ile dolu bir Çin arasında olacaktır.
Huntington gelecekte çıkabilecek böyle bir savaşın bütün sorumluluğunu Müslümanların
üzerine yıkar. İslam, ona göre, ortaya çıkışından beri sürekli kılıç gücüne dayalı bir din
olmuş, askeri erdemi hep yüceltmiştir. İslam ile Hristiyanlar veya Budistler arasındaki
çatışmalarda kabahati Müslüman köktendincilerde bulmak yanlıştır. Sorun, İslam dininin
kendisinde, öğretilerinde ve öz kültüründedir. Bu din Batı’yı hep düşman olarak görmüştür;
İslam doktrinleri Batı’ya, yani ‘kafirlere’, kutsal savaş ilan etmiştir. Müslümanlara göre
asıl düşman CIA, IMF veya Pentagon değil, Batı’nın kendisi ve onun lideri durumundaki
Amerika’dır.
Huntington’ın uygarlıklar paradigması çok eleştirilerek olumlu ve olumsuz yanları
belirtildi.Ben de bu kuramsal çerçevenin yetersiz ve bazen de yanıltıcı olduğunu
düşünüyorum. Brzezinsky’nin de iddia ettiği gibi, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında bile global
anlaşmazlıkların temel nedeni hala toprak talepleri ve ekonomik çıkarlardır. Dinsel ve
kültürel anlaşmazlıkların olumsuz etkileri tabi ki önemlidir fakat çatışmaların temel
nedeni olarak salt din ve kültür farklılıklarını görmek, aysbergin sadece su üzerindeki
kısmını görmektir. Aynı uygarlığa, aynı dine bağlı ülkeler arasındaki anlaşmazlıkları, bu
tip paradigmalar kolay açıklayamazlar. Günümüzde ulusal devlet hala uluslararası siyasal
düzenin temel taşıdır. Diğer yandan siyasal, ideolojik ve ekonomik anlaşmazlıklar dünya
barışı için hala en önemli tehdittir. Soğuk Savaş döneminde etkin olan devlet merkezli,
‘gerçekçi’ uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin yeni dönemi anlamada yetersiz olduğuna
inanan Huntington’ın kendi ‘çatışma’ tezi de birçok tutarsızlıklar, metodolojik hatalar ve
cok gerçekçi olduğunu söyleyemeyeceğimiz genellemelerle doludur. Ayrıca kendisi bu
yazısında hem tarihi ‘okuyuş’ tarzı açısından hem de ikincil kaynakları fazla kullandığı
için eleştirilebilir.
Diğer taraftan pek çok düşünür, Huntington’ın çatışma tezinin öngördüğü medeniyetler
çatışması olgusuna bizzat tezin kendisinin neden olabileceğine dikkatimizi çekmişlerdir.
Huntington’ın tezi, ‘güvenlik ikilemi’ olarak adlandırılan ve Soğuk Savaş’a damgasını
vuran olgunun, kültürel karşılığını oluşturduğunu belirtir ve bu ‘ikileme’ göre diğer
aktör hakkında var olan yanlış algılamaların iki taraf arasındaki tansiyonu arttırdığını ve
nihayetinde çatışmaya bile neden olabildiğini öne sürer.
Brzezsinsky ise, uygarlıklar savaşını tümüyle reddetmemekle beraber Huntington’dan
daha farklı bir görüş ileri sürer. Ona göre son beş yüz yıldır dünyamızın güç merkezi
Avrasya denilen bölgedir. Haritadan da görüleceği gibi Avrasya yeryüzünün en büyük
 M. K. Utku
166
kıtasıdır. Buraya egemen olan güç dünyanın en gelişmiş iki ekonomik alanını kontrol
edebilme durumundadır. Bunun yanı sıra dünya nüfusunun neredeyse yüzde yetmiş beşi
burada yaşar ve bilinen enerji kaynaklarının da dörtte üçü burada yer alır. İşte yazarın
kitabına konu ettiği satranç tahtası burasıdır.
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
167
Harita II: Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin Küresel Üstünlüğü
Harita I: Avrasya Satranç Tahtası
MIDDLE SPACE
American Global Supremacy
WEST
U.S. Oceanic Control
U.S. Political Influence
U.S. Geopolitical Preponderance
SOUTH
EAST
The Eurasian Chessboard
Brzezinsky’nin bize anımsattığı üzere, yirminci yüzyılın ilk yarısında, dünya tarihinde ilk
kez Avrasyalı olmayan bir ülke dünyanın en güçlü ülkesi haline geldi. ABD, özellikle de
Sovyetler Birliği’nin dağılmasından sonra ilk gerçek güç olarak bu satranç oyunundaki
yerini aldı. Yazarın da vurguladığı gibi kitabının temel amacı tek global güç olan ABD’nin
statüsünü nasıl devam ettirip pekiştirebileceğini araştırmak ve bu yönde stratejiler
oluşturmaktır. ABD bu egemen durumunu devamlı olarak askeri güç kullanarak devam
ettiremiyeceğine göre, küresel çıkarlarını nasıl koruyacaktır?
Huntington’a göre, Amerika’nın muazzam askeri gücü ve aba altından sopa gösterme
politikası hemen her zaman etkili olabilmişse de, uzun vadede yeterli olmayacaktır.
ABD, ekonomi, teknoloji ve iletişim alanlarındaki üstünlüğüyle de global çıkarlarını
denetleyebilir. Hemen hemen bütün dünyayı saran ve pek çok ülkeyi bir şekilde içine
alan ittifaklar ve koalisyonlar sistemi de yine Amerikan çıkarlarına hizmet eder. Örneğin
NATO, Avrupa’nın en önemli ülkelerini ABD’ye bağlar ve onu da Avrupa’nın iç
politikasına katılımcı bir devlet haline getirir. IMF ve Dünya Bankası gibi uluslararası
finans kuruluşlarının işlevleri de buna çok benzer.
Brzezinsky, Huntington ile hem Batı uygarlığının hem de Amerikan hegemonyasının kalıcı
olamayacağı hususunda hemfikirdir. Her iki yazarın da üzerinde anlaştığı diğer bir husus,
ABD hegemonyası bittikten sonra dünyamızın yaşamak için berbat bir yer olacağıdır.
Huntington’ın çok önem verdiği ve gelecekte savaşların bunların yüzünden çıkacağını
söylediği dinler arası ihtilaflar, uluslararası kavgalar ve uygarlıklararası çatışmalar
Brzezinsky için ancak ikincil derecede önemli konulardır. O, toprak’ için rekabetin hala
dünya üzerindeki kavgaların temel nedeni olduğuna inanır. Satranç Tahtası da zaten
böyle bir durum için tüm ayrıntılarıyla uzun vadeli bir Amerikan jeostratejisi’nin nasıl
planlanması gerektiğini gösteren bir kitaptır.
Amerika’nın kısa ve orta vadeli dış politika hedefleri, yani global üstünlüğünün korunması
ve bunun kurumsallaştırılması belli olduğuna göre, bu amaçlara hizmet edecek bir ‘grand’
politika’nın kilit noktaları ortaya çıkar. Ancak bu politika açık seçik ortaya konduktan
 atılım
 M. K. Utku
168
sonradır ki Amerika, Avrasya satranç tahtası üzerindeki hamlelerini saptayabilir. Örneğin
Amerika nasıl bir Avrupa, nasıl bir Rusya istiyor, bu doğrultuda neler yapıyor, ne gibi
politikalar üretiyor? Gerek bunlarla gerekse Çinle ilgili politikaları nelerdir? Bu politikalar
yeterli midir? Çin’e Uzak Doğu da düşünülen rol nedir? Amerikan-Japonya ve JaponyaÇin ilişkileri nasıl olmalıdır? Avrasya’da Amerikan çıkarları yararına veya zararına ne gibi
yeni koalisyonlar olasıdır? Amerika için zararlı olabilecek koalisyonlar nasıl önlenebilir?
Amerikan dış siyasetinin birinci derecede görevi, bütün bu sorulara yanıt vermektir.
Burada ilginç bir noktanın altını çizmemiz gerekir. Türkiye’yi hemen hemen her konuda
başarısız bulan ve gelecekte de fazla bir ilerleme şansı vermeyen Samuel Huntington’ın
aksine, Brzezsinsky Türkiye’yi Amerikan çıkarları açısından jeopolitik önemi yüksek olan
on ülkeden biri olarak görür. Osmanlı sonrası Türkiyesi’ni sık sık Rusya’ya örnek olarak
gösterir ve Rusya’da Atatürk gibi bir liderin çıkmamasını şanssızlık addeder. Brzezinsky’e
göre Türkiye’nin jeopolitik önemi, Karadeniz Bölgesi’ni etkili bir şekilde kontrol etmesi,
oradan Akdeniz’e çıkışı denetlemesi, Kafkaslarda Rusya’ya karşı bir denge unsuru
olabilmesi ve İslam köktendincilerine karşı bir ‘panzehir’ olabilmesidir.
Brzezinsky’nin Avrasya jeopolitik haritasındaki son durağı Uzak Doğu ve Çin’dir.
ABD için temel sorun, gittikçe güçlü bir hale gelen Çin’e ne kadar geniş bir etki alanı
tanımlanabileceğidir. Yani, Amerika, Çin’in bölgedeki üstünlüğünü kabul etmek
durumunda kalırsa ne büyüklükte bir fatura ödemeye hazırdır. Bunun tam aksi olursa,yani
ABD, Çin’in etki alanını ve üstünlüğünü kabul edilemez olarak algılarsa ne yapacaktır,
bu ülkeyle bir savaşı ğöze alabilecek midir? Bu savaş ABD çıkarlarına ne kadar uygun
olacaktır? Çin’in gittikçe artan gücü ve buna paralel olarak büyüyen etkisi ABD için bir
Çin - ABD jeo-stratejik işbirliğini kaçınılmaz kılmaktadır. Bu konuda Çin ile anlaşmaya
varılmadan Amerika’nın Asya kıtasında siyasal olarak tutunması olanak dışıdır.
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
169
dayalı olacaktır. Ancak bu yolla artık antikalaşmış ve çağımızın güncel uluslararası
sorunlarına cevap vermeyen Birleşmiş Milletler’in yeni gerekçeler ışığında örgütlenmesi
için ön koşullar oluşturulabilir.
Kaynaklar
Brzezinsky, Zbigniew. 1997. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic
Imperatives, New York: Basic Books. ISBN-10: 046502 7261; ISBN-13: 978-0465027 262
Huntington, Samuel P. 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, New
York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN-10: 0684844419 ; 0-684-84441-9; ISBN 13: 9780684844411
Mills, Wright C. 1968. The Power Elite, New York: Oxford University Press.
Braudel, Fernand. 1980. On History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1977. Geopolitics and Geoculture, Cambridge: Cambridge Unıversity Press.
Rostow, Walt W. 1960. Modernization and the Structure of Societies, Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Brzezinsky, kitabının sonuç kısmında, bütün bu global değişikliklerin ışığı altında Amerika
için artık Avrasya’nın tümünü kapsayacak uzun vadeli, kalıcı ve gerçekci bir jeo-strateji
oluşturmak ve uygulamaya koymak zamanı gelmiştir der. Bu gereksinme, ona göre, şu
anda varolan iki temel gerçeğin birbirleriyle olan ilişkisinden kaynaklanmaktadır: ABD,
şu anda tek global süper güçtür ve Avrasya dünyanın en önemli arenasıdır. Bu arenada
yer alabilecek herhangi bir güç dağılımı değişikliği, Amerika’nın global üstünlüğünü
ciddi olarak etkileyebilecektir. Amaç bu üstünlüğün kalıcı ve istikrarlı olmasını sağlamak
olduğuna göre, gerek önemli stratejik oyuncuların, gerekse kilit rol oynayan Türkiye gibi
jeopolitik piyonların satranç tahtasına doğru yerleştirilip, doğru yönlendirilmeleri hayati
bir önem taşımaktadır. Tabi bu arada Amerika’nın objektif gücünün ve siyasal etkisinin çok
doğru ve gerçekçi olarak hesaplanması önemlidir. Brzezinsky’e göre Amerikan siyasetinin
hiç taviz vermemesi gereken iki yönlü bir hedefi vardır. İlk hedef, uluslararası arenada
Amerika’nın üstün durumunun mümkün olan en uzun süre korunmasıdır. Diğeriyse,
uluslararası arenada meydana gelebilecek kaçınılmaz sosyal ve politik değişikliklerin
yaratacağı şok ve gerginlikleri başarılı bir şekilde karşılamak ve barışçı bir global düzen
için gerekli müşterek gayreti aksettirerek jeopolitik bir çerçevenin nüvesini yaratmaktır.
ABD tarafından önerilecek ve bu ülkenin tam desteği ile tesis edilecek bu yeni çerçeve,
ABD ve onun Avrasyalı müttefiklerinin uzun süreli ve devamlı genişleyen işbirliğine
 atılım
 M. K. Utku
ATILIM SOSYAL BİLİMLER DERGİSİ
Yazarlar İçin Notlar
ATILIM SOCIAL SCIENCES JOURNAL
Notes for Contributors
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
173
ATILIM SOSYAL BİLİMLER DERGİSİ
ATILIM SOCIAL SCIENCES JOURNAL
Yazarlar İçin Notlar
Notes for Contributors
Taslak makalelerini Atılım Sosyal Bilimler
Dergisi’ne göndermeyi planlayan yazarların
aşağıdaki hususları dikkate almaları
gerekmektedir:
Authors who wish to submit their manuscript to
Atılım Social Sciences Journal should take into
account the following:
Gönderilen eser daha önce başka bir yerde
yayımlanmamış olmalıdır.
Gönderilen eser eş zamanlı olarak başka bir
dergiye ya da derlemeye yayımlanmak üzere
yollanmamış olmalıdır.
Taslak makalenin tümü, notlar, tablolar ve
referanslar da dâhil olmak üzere çift satır
aralıklı olacak şekilde düzenlenmelidir.
Taslak makalenin ilk sayfasında aşağıdaki
bilgiler bulunmalıdır:

makale başlığı,
yazarların isimleri ve kurumları,
iletişim kurulacak yazarın iletişim bilgileri
en fazla 200 kelimelik bir öz
3-4 anahtar kelime
The manuscript should be an original work
not published elsewhere.
Manuscripts simultaneously submitted to
other journals or publication outlets will not
be considered.
The manuscript should be double-spaced
throughout including footnotes, tables and
references.
The first page of the manuscript should
include
The title of the manuscript
The names of the author(s) and their affiliations
Contact information of the corresponding
author
An abstract of not more than 200 words
Three to five keywords
Taslak makale içersinde, ilk sayfa dışında,
eser sahibinin kimliğini açık edecek herhangi
bir bilgi bulunmamalıdır. Teşekkür ve diğer
bilgilendirme amaçlı açıklamalar ilk sayfada
yer almalıdır.
Except for the first page, the manuscript
should not contain any information that
may reveal the identity of the author(s).
Acknowledgements should also appear on
the first page.
Derginin yayın dili Türkçe ve İngilizce’dir.
İngilizce makaleler ABD imlâsına göre
hazırlanmalıdır.
The manuscripts may be in Turkish or
English (US spelling).
Taslak makaleler MS-Word formatında
e-posta yoluyla [email protected] adresine
gönderilmelidir.
Taslak makalelerin değerlendirilmeye
alınabilmeleri için 3500 kelimeden az
ve 8000 kelimeden fazla olmamaları
gerekmektedir. Kitap değerlendirmeleri için
bu kıstas 600-800 kelime arasıdır.
Yazarlara yapılacak bilgilendirmelerin tümü
e-posta yoluyla yapılacaktır.
Dergiye gönderilen makaleler ilk önce
Editör Kurulu tarafından incelenir. Konu ve
içerik bakımından uygun görülen makaleler
 Yazarlar İçin Notlar - Notes for Contributors
Manuscripts should be submitted
electronically in MS-Word format to the
following e-mail address: [email protected]
Manuscripts should be between 3500-8000
words. Manuscripts that are outside these
limits will not be considered. Book report
length should be between 600-800 words.
All correspondence with the author(s) will be
made by e-mail.
Manuscripts submitted to the journal are first
evaluated in terms of their suitability for the
journal and their compliance with the journal’s
format requirements. Manuscripts meeting
these criteria are sent to two referees for
174
hakemlik sürecine dahil edilir. Hakemler
belirlenirken hakemle makale sahibi arasında
ilgi ve çıkar ilişkisi olup olmadığı gözetilir.
Hakemlere gönderilen makalelerde makale
sahiplerinin kimliği gizli tutulur. Gelen
hakem raporları doğrultusunda, makalenin
basılmasına, eser sahibine rapor çerçevesinde
düzeltme istenmesine ya da makalenin geri
çevrilmesine karar verilir. Basımı uygun
bulunan makalelerin, derginin hangi sayısında
yayımlanacağına Yayın Kurulu karar verir.
evaluation. Based on the recommendations of
the referees, the manuscript may be accepted,
accepted subject to minor revision, accepted
subject to resubmission (requiring major
revision and reevaluation by the referees) or
not accepted. The editorial board makes the
final decision on which issue accepted papers
will appear in.
2011, VOL.1 NO 1
175
Kaynakça için Örnekler
References Section:
Tek Yazarlı Kitap
Book, Single Author
Buğra, Ayşe. 2000. Devlet-Piyasa Karşıtlığının
Ötesinde: İhtiyaçlar ve Tüketim Üzerine Yazılar.
İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
Gifis, Stephen H. 2008. Dictionary of Legal Terms. 4th ed.
Hauppauge, NY: Barron’s Educational Series.
İki Yazarlı Kitap
Collins, Jane L. and Victoria Mayer. 2010. Both Hands
Tied: Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom in the
Low-Wage Labor Market. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Tuncay, A. Can ve Ömer Ekmekçi. 2009. Sosyal
Güvenlik Hukuku’nun Esasları. İstanbul: Legal
Yayınevi.
Üç veya Daha Fazla Yazarlı Kitap, Derlenmiş
Makale Yazım Kuralları
Referencing Examples
Metin içinde referansların belirtilmesi
In-text referencing:
Tek yazar: (Buğra 2000)
Single author: (Buğra 2000)
İki yazar: (Tuncay ve Ekmekçi 2009)
Two authors: (Tuncay and Ekmekçi 2009)
Üç veya daha fazla yazar: (Köse, vd. 2003)
Three or more authors: (Köse, et al. 2003)
Sayfa numaralarının belirtilmesi: (Buğra 2000,
22-24)
Indicating page numbers: (Buğra 2000, 22-24)
Birden fazla eserin beraber belirtilmesi: (Buğra
2000, 15; Köse, vd. 2003).
Citing two works together: (Buğra 2000, 15;
Köse, et al. 2003).
Yazarın aynı yıl içinde birden fazla eseri
bulunuyorsa: (Tansel 2002a; 2002b)
Citing two or more works by same author
published in the same year: (Tansel 2002a;
2002b)
Çeviri eser: (Ollmann 2001 [1979])
Translated work: (Ollmann 2001 [1979])
Gazete: (Hürriyet 24 Ocak 1997, Pazar Eki)
Newspaper: (New York Times 12 September
2004, 19-20)
Dipnotlarda: bk. Uygur (2001).
Yazarın, gazetenin veya kurumun adı metinde
geçiyorsa: Tuncay ve Ekmekçi’ye göre (2009,
53)...
Hürriyet gazetesinde yer alan habere göre (24
Ocak 1997)...
Citations in footnotes: see (Uygur 2001)
When author, newspaper or institution names
are used in the text: According to Tuncay and
Ekmekçi (2009, 53)...
New York Times (12 Sept. 2004, 19) reported…
Köse, Ahmet H., Fikret Şenses ve Erinç Yeldan, der. 2003.
İktisat Üzerine Yazılar II: İktisadi Kalkınma, Kriz ve
İstikrar. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. Çeviri Kitap
Duverger, Maurice. 2006. [1961] Sosyal Bilimlere Giriş.
çev. Ünsal Özkay. İstanbul: Kırmızı Beyaz Yayınları. Not: Orijinal eserin basım yılı köşeli parantez içinde
belirtilmelidir.
Kitapta Bölüm, Çeviri
Fine, Ben, ve Degol Hailu. 2003. Birleşme ve konsensus:
İstikrar, yoksulluk ve büyümenin politik ekonomisi.
İktisat Üzerine Yazılar II: İktisadi Kalkınma, Kriz ve
İstikrar içinde, der. Ahmet H. Köse, Fikret Şenses ve
Erinç Yeldan, 69-124. çev. Erdemir Fidan. İstanbul:
İletişim Yayınları. Basılı Makale
Uygur, Ercan. 2001. Enflasyon, para ve mali baskı: İktisat
politikasında geri kalmışlık. İktisat, İşletme ve Finans
16(189), 7-23.
Not: Derginin cildi ve sayısı cilt(sayı) formatında
verilmelidir.
Basılı Makale, Çeviri
Ollman, Bertell. 2001. [1979] Marksizm ve siyaset bilimi:
Marx’ın yöntemi üzerine bir başlangıç. Praksis 2001(3),
131-153. çev. Beycan Mura ve Emre Arslan.
Not: Orijinal eserin basım yılı köşeli parantez içinde
belirtilmelidir. Derginin cildi ve sayısı cilt(sayı)
formatında verilmelidir.
Elektronik Doküman, Tartışma Metni
Bulutay, Tuncer. 2005. Türkiye’de yüksek öğrenimlilerde
işlendirme ve işsizlik. Türkiye Ekonomi Kurumu Tartışma
Metni No. 2005/16. Ankara: Türkiye Ekonomi Kurumu.
http://www.tek.org.tr/dosyalar/BULUTAY.pdf
Not: Elektronik doküman sık sık güncellenip içeriği
 atılım
 Yazarlar İçin Notlar - Notes for Contributors
Book, Two Authors
Book, Three or More Authors, Edited
Kibritçioğlu, Aykut, Libby Rittenberg, and Faruk Selçuk.
eds. 2002. Inflation and Disinflation in Turkey. Aldershot,
UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Translated Book, Reprint Edition
Sümer, Faruk, Ahmet E. Uysal, and Warren S. Walker,
ed. and trans. 1991. [1972] The Book of Dede Korkut:
A Turkish Epic. Reprint, Lubbock: University of Texas
Press.
Note: The original publication date of the translated book
is given in square brackets.
Article in Book
Cantwell, John. 2006. Innovation and competitiveness. In
The Oxford Handbook of Innovation. eds. Jan Fagerberg,
David C. Mowery and Richard N. Nelson, 543-567.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Journal Article
Dankoff, Robert. 2005. The Seyahatname of Evliya Çelebi
as a literary monument. Journal of Turkish Literature
1(1), 71-84.
Note: The volume and issue numbers should be given in
the following format volume(issue).
Electronic Documents, Working Paper
Acemoglu, Daron and Veronica Guerrieri. 2006. Capital
deepening and non-balanced economic growth. NBER
Working Papers No 12475. Cambridge, MA: National
Bureau of Economic Research. http://econpapers.repec.
org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12475.
Note: For electronic materials that are frequently updated,
the date of access should also be included in parantheses
following the web link as follows (accessed 10 June
2007).
Unpublished Conference Paper
Kenter, Yıldız and Talat Halman. 2010. Turkish love:
Love poetry of Anatolia. Paper presented at the fifth
international IDEA conference: Studies in English, April
14-16, Atılım University, Ankara.
176
değişiyorsa web adresinin sonuna parantez içinde erişim
tarihi eklenmelidir: (erişim tarihi: 30 Haziran 2009)
Yayımlanmamış Konferans Tebliğ
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