eleven

'slam Ass e
rnar
The Advent of t h e
41
11111'
MARTIN KRAMER
I.
ISLAM
ASSEMBLED
TheAdvent of the Muslim Congresses
MARTIN KRAMER
New York Columbia University Press 1 9 8 6
ELEVEN
I N DEFENSE OF
JERUSALEM
The General Islamic Congress,
1931
T
HROUGH THE Jerusalem Mus lim congress o f December 1931,
that faction of Palestine's Arabs under the leadership of Amin al-Husayni ( 1 8 9 7
port
for the cause of Mus lim Palestine. The aim was to challenge the
Western
1 9 7 4 ) sanction accorded the League o f Nations mandate and the
projected
establishment of a Jewish national home. The proposed cona t t e m
gress,
ostensibly to the preservation of the Mus lim holy places
p t edevoted
d
in
Jerusalem,
was
ruled by British authorities to be of a religious nature,
t
o
and
while
the
mandatory
power was out of sympathy with the aims
c
o
of the congress, it thus did little to impede the efforts of the organizers.
m
m
These were left to surmount only those obstacles raised by Mus lim
i
t
opponents at home and abroad. Such opposition, whic h was considw
i
erable, was either overcome or ignored, and the congress, once convened,
d
e
endorsed a series of resolutions for the defense of the holy places against
rencroachment, and the preservation of the Muslim-Arab character of
M
Palestine.
u Because
s these resolutions entailed a number of ambitious and costly
lprojects,
i such as the building of a Muslim university and the purchase
m land, the participants went further, establishing a permanent secreof
o
tariat
and scheduling future congresses at two-year intervals. The perp
manent
i secretariat functioned for perhaps as long as five years, but with
steadily
n
i diminishing results, and the congress was not reconvened. The
failure
of
the secretariat to raise funds to effect the congress resolutions
o
appears
to have been the principal cause of the withering of this inin
tiative.
In
1937, with the fl ight of Amin al-Husayni from Palestine to
t
an
exile
abroad,
the organization fi nally ceased to function, although
o
the
s network of political and personal ties which it created continued
for years afterward to work on behalf of the Palestine Arab cause.
u
Because of the widespread interest in the conflict over Palestine and
p
the conscious efforts of the organizers to seize the limelight, the congress
-
1.24
I
N
DEFENSE O F J E RUS A L E M
won coverage more extensive than that accorded any of its predecessors.
In addition to the Palestinian press, which was consumed with the event,
the Western and foreign Arab press showed a sustained interest in the
proceedings. The prelude, proceedings, and aftermath of the congress
were therefore amply covered in the open press, and it was a participating journalist, Muhammad cAli al-Tahir, who left one of the fullest
accounts of events behind the scenes, written only six months after the
congress.'
As was to be expected, Rashid Rida's al-Manar also covered the congress, but from the narrow vantage point of his own contribution to its
proceedings.
the
2 APalestinian Arab historian Muhammad cizzat Darwaza, who had
served
secretary to the congress.
f a i rasl recording
y
the
most
interesting
ofmthese
3
L
a
t
e
r
c
a
e by 'Ajaj Nuway hid.
s t r a i
The
desire
to
write
about
the Jerusalem proceedings while they were
4
o
g ht t hf o e r
still
scholars and publicists. H. A. R.
m
ea rmwasoalsoi great
r sfor Western
,
r w fresh
Gibb's
account
was
the
most
infl
uential
of these several studies,
d
5
which
a
l
l
were
o
superseded
f
once
British,
French,
Palestinian Arab, Zionist,
a
c
and Egyptian archival materials became available. A number of docuc
o
mented historical studies then appeared, some more thorough than othu
ers.6 n
t
There remains an important source which has yet to reappear and
ifully illuminate the congress: the archive of the congress itself. The
n
location of these documents was known as recently as 1955, when the
A
papers were searched by an Azhar historian for a manuscript autorbiography of Shakib Arslam The material was then stored in a disora
ganized
fashion in a room near al-Aqsa, but now cannot be located.
b
7
i
c The Palestinian Arab initiative for a general Mus lim congress dated
in
w a sense from the dispatch of an Islamic mission to the Hijaz in 1922.
At
a that time, the delegation prevailed upon Husayn of Mecca to convene
precisely
this sort of gathering, and then actively participated (see chaps
ter
8).
Large
Palestinian Muslim delegations also figured in the subsew
quent
congress
of 1926, organized under Saudi auspices (see previous
r
ichapter). Personal ties were forged at these encounters with the Indian
Khilafat Committee leaders Muhammad and Shawkat 'Ali. Upon their
t
disappointment with Ibn Sacud's policies, these brothers were in search
t
of an alternative Arab alliance, and in early 1929 Muhammad cAli first
esuggested the creation of a Supreme Islamic Council in Jerusalem comnposed of representatives drawn from throughout the Mus lim world!'
bThe bond was sealed in early 1931 upon Muhammad cAli's death, when
yAmin al-Husayni wired Shawkat cAli asking him to inter his deceased
brother in Jerusalem.9
I N DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
1
2
5
From the interaction of Amin al-Husayni and Shawkat cAli on this
occasion, the idea of a general Muslim congress in Jerusalem was reborn.
Earlier, in 1928, when it became evident that the congress organizations
established in Cairo and Mecca two years before had collapsed, Amin
al-Husayni had convened in Jerusalem a "general" Muslim congress in
defense of the holy places, but it had been attended only by delegates
from neighboring territories.
10 Indian
the
W i t Khilafat
h
t Committee,
h e
a new Jerusalem congress was sure to
attract
and attention. The Khilafat leaders, in
p r far
o wider
m i participation
s e
turn,
would
o
f then perhaps be in a position to forge that Muslim alliance
which
them, most recently in their falling out
c o had
o repeatedly
p e r eluded
a
with Ibn Sacucl.
t i o n
committee
was established, which entered into widef A preparatory
r
o
spread
correspondence
with
infl uential Muslims abroad, while Amin
m
al-Husayni and Shawkat cAll began to lobby in public and private on
behalf of the projected congress.
holy
11 Tplaces,
h e i and
r their concrete project was the establishment of a new
Muslim
university
t h e m e s in Jerusalem. A third theme, the restoration of the
Hijaz
w
erailroad
r toe Mus lim control, emerged with the sudden seizure of
the
Damascus
t
h
estation's premises by French authorities while the congress
was
in
preparation.
d
e
f
e
n
sBut the prelude to the congress was a round
of
e confrontations with those who opposed the organizers personally or
the idea of a Jerusalem Mus lim congress generally. Both forms of opo
f
position were either reconciled or defeated, but not without influence
t
h
e
upon the congress itself.
Because Palestine was a territory under British mandate, it was first
necessary to secure British acquiescence in the congress plans. There
was much concern at the Foreign Office over the possible effects of the
congress on British relations with certain states, and the banning of the
congress was briefly entertained. The most worrisome of these considerations, to judge from the offi cial correspondence, concerned Italian
apprehensions about the congress. Italian forces had just crushed the
last vestiges of Muslim resistance in Libya, and in September 1931 had
captured and executed its leader, cUmar al-Mukhtar. A wave of revulsion
had swept the Muslim world, and the Italian government greatly feared
that it would be made the butt of the resolutions of any such congress.
The Foreign Office was given to understand that were this to happen
in Jerusalem, Anglo-Italian relations would s uffer.
12But there were weightier considerations. It was the view of the Colonial Offi ce that any step to ban the congress "might be so much
resented [within Palestine] as to precipitate disorder possibly even on
the scale of an Arab rebellion."
Office,
was
by the Government of India that " Mu13 A whic
s ihm
i l informed
a r
hammadan
feeling
[
in
India]
is very unsettled and disturbed," that
t h r e a t
w
a
s
s
e
e
n
b
y
t
h
e
I
n
d
i
a
1 26
I
N
DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
"causes of discontent to Muslims should be avoided so far as this is
possible," and that "the proposal to prohibit the Conference be defi nitely abandoned."" In the face of these reiterated appeals, the Foreign
Office relented in its opposition, and the strength of these purely pragmatic arguments was then link ed to a principle by a Foreign Offi ce
official: " I think there is so much to be said for maintaining our traditional attitude o f non-intervention in such quasi-religious matters,
that we had better adopt the line the C.O. [Colonial Office] suggest."
That line fi nally prevailed.
15
The subsequent efforts of British authorities concentrated upon extracting various assurances from Amin al-Husayni, to the effect that
issues liable to embarrass Great Britain or disturb public order would
not be raised at the congress. Such assurances were readily given by
Amin al-Husayni to the new British High Commissioner in Palestine,
Sir Ar thur Wauchope, who wrote advising that "prohibition o f the
congress should not be contemplated. It would cause deep resentment
and would, in addition, be impossible to enforce, since even if Shawkat
Ali and other intending participants were to be refused entrance into
Palestine, local adherents of the Muf t i would probably meet in [the]
Haram area and go through [the] agenda of [the] congress.'"
case,
6 I n" I believe
a n yhe w ill carry out his pledges and so he w ill go far to
make me feel that we can work together when his word has once been
given in the cause of law and or der .'
replied
17 T hto ea pointed parliamentary question on the congress in this
fashion:
S e c r"As
e at result
a r y of inquiries made of the High Commissioner for
Palestine,
I
am
convinced
that the Mufti [Amin al-Husayni], who has
o
f
issued
S
t invitations
a
t for
e the congress, realises his responsibilities and is
anxious
to
conduct
the congress in such a manner as to cause no emf
o
r
barrassment
to
His
Majesty's
or
C
o
l
o
n
i
e the Palestine administration."
ious
stages,vBritish
thus brought pressure to bear upon the
18
a r authorities
s A t
organizers, but there was never any serious doubt that the congress
would be permitted.
There were two parties in Palestine who were disquieted by British
policy. The Zionists first had hoped that the congress would be banned
outright.
efforts
upon diminishing participation in the congress. Publicly it was
19
declared
O n c the policy of the Jewish Agency to maintain "absolute silence
with
regard to the preparations for this conference. We consider this in
e
the
present
case the more wholesome, I may say only useful, tactics,
t h
and
e I am glad that we have succeeded in winning the Hebrew press
over
B r toi a similar attitude. Any interference on our part would have
immensely strengthened the Mufti's position both in Palestine and
t i s
abroad."° But the Agency did go so far as to secretly employ a minor
h
d e
c i
s i
o n
w
a
s
IN DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
1
2
7
Arab journalist to conduct a covert campaign against the congress in
Palestine, Syria, and Egypt, a service for which he was paid. The results
of this effort were negligible.
21Another opposition group was that faction of Palestinian Arabs personally opposed to Amin al-Husayni. Their challenge was somewhat
more effective.
22
congress
T h as
e ay tool for self-aggrandizement from which they, his rivals,
were
s u likely
s p to
e suffer most. This faction, headed by the Nashashibi and
Khalidi
of Jerusalem, fi rst attacked the congress and its prec t e families
d
paratory
committee
in a manifesto that claimed the entire effort to be
t
h
unrepresentative
of
Palestinian
Muslims on account of their own exa
t
clusion.
A
mThey then called for a restructuring of the preparatory committee
to
i
n include them.
a
refutation,
as did Amin al-Husayni himself, in a counter-manifesto
23
a Tl h -e
to
the Mus lim wor ld.
H
H u us as y n i
24
unilaterally
s announced
a
that several new members—among them two
fa a A
y c tn i o n
Nashashibis—would
be
added to its ranks,
g
'i se s t u r e ,
rejected.
last-minute
a
fs f e r mediation
t h aeffort
t by Shawkat cAli and the prestn25
e
eh n A
wo
w
Young
Men's
Muslim
Association
in Egypt, cAbd al-Hamid
tpidentrahofethe
e
p p ea rr
o
Sacid,
then
failed,
and
the
Palestinian
opposition
opened a relentless
a
tp e op rto ys o i t i o n
ro
u
against
the congress throughout its deliberations.
crcampaign
o
t
em
d
l26
so
far
as
to
convene
aecounter-congress,
attended by about 1,000 local
T
h
e
y
w
n t
m
i
ti
t
w
d
notables
and shaykhs, under the presidency of Raghib al-Nashashibi.
e
tu Theepresence
h
of so vocal an opposition to the congress among so
27
t
h
many
Muslims just beyond the congress hall not only made for bad
s
epress, but split
n the failed negotiators Shawkat cAli and cAbd al-Hamid
e
Sacid
from Amin al-Husayni. "The mufti and his party would not allow
t
the
h others to share in the planning of the Conference and the invitations
to
e it," Shawkat cAli wrote to a friend. "I protested, and I must say that
the opposition behaved nobly; they made it known that they were in
sympathy with the Conference and willing to support the universityto-be, but they could not but oppose the multi's directing the whole
affair. I f the mufti would have followed my advice we should have
obtained even better results."
25Different results perhaps would have been obtained if Shawkat cAli
himself had not spoken of the caliphate during the preparatory stages
of the congress. To the distress of the Palestinian organizers, he made
no secret of his continued allegiance to the deposed Ottoman caliph
Abdillmecid, then in exile in France. " D o the Muslims now have a
caliph?" he was asked in an interview. "Yes," replied Shawkat cAli,
"and he is an exile in Nice. In my heart and mind, he remains caliph;
I accepted him and swore allegiance to him already in the past, and I
cannot go back on what I have done."29
128
I
N
DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
The exiled Ottoman pretender apparently believed that the caliphate
indeed would figure in the congress agenda, and through his secretary
he reminded the Mus lim world and the impending congress that the
allegiance pledged to him upon his ascension in 1922 was still binding.
There were parties who made a connection and immediately feared that
30
Shawkat cAli envisioned a restoration of Abdillmecid to the caliphate
at the Jerusalem congress.
Egyptian circles were the fi rst to respond with suspicion, since the
Azhar committee which convened the Cairo caliphate congress of 1926
had expressly repudiated Abdiilmecid's c laim.
minded
31 T hAmin
e al-Husayni
A z h aof rthe conclusions of this congress, in which
delegates
of
his
had participated.
j o u r n own
a faction
l
hoped
for
full
Egyptian
participation
32
A em i n - a l - H u s a y and
n i had
, written King Read rer
questing
of offi cial delegates,
w
hthe dispatch
o
Egyptian
33 w a authorities
s
t h uthat
s the congress had anything to do w it h the
caliphate,
and
maintained
that
f o r c e d
t rumors
o to the contrary were fabrications
manufactured
d
e
n by the
y Zionists.
age
Shawkat
cAli
had
done, Amin al-Husayni traveled to Egypt a month
34
F
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
t
o
before
the
congress,
to
i
n
a
n reassure the king and other worried parties that
athe caliphate
t t e was
m not
p on
t the agenda.
Shawkat
cAli's
detailed
comments on the role of the projected Muslim
t
o
university
in
Jerusalem
also
had direct repercussions in Egypt. The uniu
n
d
o
versity,
as
he
imagined
it,
would
have fulfi lled many of those tasks
t
h
e
dcoveted by
a al-Azhar.
m
al-Ahmadi
al-Zawahiri, was distressed, and told Amin al-Husayni s o.
35
Rashid
36
that this response was unjustifi ed, and that the
N a t uRida
r a believed
l l y
proposed
t
h
enew university would not detract fr om al-Azhar's central
rSole.h a y
37
gendered
by the Azhar-sponsored caliphate congress of 1926. This had
k h
revealed
B
a u l -the frailty of al-Azhar's claim to primacy among Islamic institutions,
no reassurance could alleviate. Amin al-Husayni first
tA z hwhich
a
retaliated,
and
his
paper published a scathing attack on Zawahiri.
tr ,
38
Amin
B
al-Husayni
u
t
later
apologized, and offered his assurances. He deh
tclared that
h the new Muslim university, planned on a modest scale, was
e
eintendednonly to counter the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and not
cM
u
h har.
to challenge
al-Az
o
a39These
massurances, on both the issues of the caliphate and the unin
m
d
versity, awere embodied
in a letter from Amin al-Husayni to the Egyptian
c
premier Sidqi Pasha, but King Read remained unconvinced of Amin
e
al-Husayni's s inc erity .
rparty,
40 T rivals
h e to the palace, had accepted their invitations to Jerusalem
n
further
Egyptian authorities, who asked that British consular
f a c concerned
t
d
authorities
issue
visas
to these opponents only with the warning that
t h a t
rs e v e r
e
a l
w
m
e
m
b
u
e
r
s
p
o
o
f
n
t
h
te
I N DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
1
2
9
they behave themselves." All this had so unnerving an effect in offi cial
Cairo that no offi cial delegation was dispatched from Egypt, although
care was taken to covertly finance an unoffi cial delegation that would
defend the royal palace's interests against the Wafd in the congress
sessions.
The sons o f Husayn o f Mecca---cAbdallah, Faysal, and cAli—also
required assurances on the question of the caliphate, for they too had
an interest here, and while they now advanced no claim, it was certainly
undesirable that some act of the congress exclude the possibility of a
future claim on their behalf. Husayn himself had died earlier in the
year, and Amin al-Husayni had been permitted by the sons to arrange
for his burial in Jerusalem near Muhammad 'Ali. The Egyptian consul
in Jerusalem felt certain that part of this understanding was a secret
agreement with Amin al-Husayni to secure the caliphate, probably for
Faysal of Iraq, at a future congress. For the existence of such a deal
there is no other evidence, but Amman and Baghdad certainly did insist
on guarantees similar to those given to Cairo, and these Amin al-Husayni
made during a trip to Amman."
Saudi suspicions, on the other hand, could not be alleviated. There
remained a profound distrust of Shawkat 'Ali, who had so incensed the
organizers of the 1926 Meccan Muslim congress. And there was a general
reluctance to see others succeed where cAbd al-cAziz Ibn Sacud had not.
Saudi annoyance was expressed to British diplomats," and while Ibn
Sacud pleaded that the congress inv itation sent to him by Amin alHusayni simply had arrived too late, it is certain that a decision was
taken against sending a representative to Jerusalem." The Saudis furthermore threatened the Palestinian project by encouraging the circulation of a rumor that the Meccan congress first held in 1926 was about
to be reconvened."
Among those consumed by rumors of a resurrected Ottoman caliphate
were Turkish diplomats. They were particularly concerned lest Abdulmecid be admitted to Palestine as a participant in the congress, a possibility raised by Shawkat cAli. The deposed caliph resided at Nice, and
so the Turkish ambassador to France personally applied to the Quai
d'Orsay. Milnir Bey explained that a new caliph inevitably would group
around him all of the forces hostile to the Turkish republic, and that
European powers w ith Mus lim interests, including France, could not
afford this permanent menace t o their tranquility. T he ambassador
hoped that the French government would offer new proof to the Turkish
government of its amicable disposition, and would abstain from facilitating the departure of the deposed caliph for Palestine. The French
government was unreceptive. Mill-lir Bey was told that Abdillmecid had
always exhibited reserve and correct demeanor in France; the French
130
I
N
DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
government neither could encourage nor impede his ambitions. The
Turks were advised to take their problem to the British who, after all,
held the mandate for Palestine:
16This the Turkish foreign minister did. Tevfik R üt ü [Aras] informed
the British ambassador at Ankara that a revived caliphate would constitute a "subversive force," a "focus of intrigue and rebellion" against
the British Empire, and an instrument of reaction within Turkey. The
Turkish government did not fi nd Abdillmecid alarming; he was a harmless old gentleman. I t was the institution, not the figurehead, whic h
disturbed Tevfik g o v e r n m e n t .
4 7 Ta responsive
struck
h i s
tchord.
i mThe
e Colonial
,
Office asked Sir Arthur Wauchope,
British
t
h
e High Commissioner in Palestine, whether " it would be
practicable
visa on grounds of public order
T u r tokrefuse
i [Abdillmecid's]
s h
should
a
pan application
p
e foraone be
l received." While awaiting Wauchope's
reply, an interdepartmental meeting held at the Colonial Office agreed
that once Abdtilmecid was admitted to Palestine, it would be impossible
to get him out, and so it was best to bar his entry. Until Wauchope's
reply was received, passport authorities were asked not to issue Palestine
visas to the deposed caliph or any of his entourage.
answer
a visit to Palestine by Ab49 T hfrom
e Jerusalem
e v e nwas
t unequivocal:
u a l
dillmecid was undesirable, and any visa application should be refused:
On
5 this recommendation, consular and passport control officers were
instructed
not to grant the deposed caliph a visa for Palestine without
cl
first consulting the Foreign O ffi c e.
unaware
experienced by the Turks, distraught over
51 A mofi the
n discomfort
a l the
rumor
of
the
Ottoman
caliphate's
revival, and announced that AbH u s a y n i
citilmecid
to the congress.
h i mwould
s not
e bel invited
f
Having
thus
fulfi
lled
the
desiderata
of the Turkish government on
w
a
s
this
point,
Amin
al-Husayni
attempted
to inv ite an offi cial Turkish
n
o
t
delegation, and approached the Turkish consul in Jerusalem w ith a
request that the consulate forward an invitation to Ankara. The consul
refused to accept any communication, and Amin al-Husayni was forced
to send his message by ordinary post. Tevfi k Rtistil did not intend to
reply: the mufti held no representative office in Palestine which qualified
him to invite the head of a foreign state to send offi cial delegates to an
unofficial gathering.
had
52 hoped
A t that
t h the
e congress would be prohibited altogether, and "was
distinctly
and somewhat cross and resentful" upon learning
s a mdisconcerted
e
that
British
authorities
intended to permit the gathering. "He thought
t i m e ,
it
t an easy
h matter
e to prohibit what purported to be a pan-Moslem conference
summoned
T
u
r
k by a minor religious dignitary of a town of secondary
sacred
importance
who had no standing for issuing invitations to Govi
s
h
ernments, and that the anti-British and anti-Jewish character of the
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
IN DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
1
3
1
mufti's invitation would have afforded sufficient cause for suppression
of the congress."
ensure
53 B that
u t the Republic was not alone in declining the invitation. This
was
a sthe decision of Mustafa Kemal himself, who told a French diplomat
that
t htheecongress was contrary to the principles which he himself had
championed,
c o n g and
r that he was determined that no independent Mus lim
country
participate.
e s s
Albania,
54
w T oaEgypt, and Iraq, while the Turkish consul in Jerusalem acted
personally
ts h i s to defeat the congress. Not only did he decline his invitation
to
a reception for the delegates; he discouraged the Egyptian consul
e
t n d ,
from attending as well." When the Turkish consul learned that the
T
o u r k
Turkish
flag fl ew among the flags of Muslim states in the assembly hall
e
b y
of
the
congress,
he successfully insisted upon the banner's removal.
a
p p r
e
Tevfik
made Turkish policy a matter of public record in his reply
o
a Rilstil
h
ec hfrom a member of the National Assembly:
to a question
e
d d
l
I, It is rtrue that we also received invitations fro m the promoters of the
a
nu but republican Turkey can have nothing to do with undertakings
T congress,
,r of this
k kind, which aim at holding peoples back on the way of progress,
andf which
have,
A
h undeniably, deplorable consequences. We are especially
e
y g
opposed
to
the
a
n
i
s use of religion as a political instrument in internal and
w foreign
policy. We are watching developments closely. As long as it shows
to a
n
,
no near or distant connexion with our national affairs, this undertaking
u will remain a matter of local importance for the regions represented by
l those assembled there, but immaterial to us."
d
Among the results of the Turkish diplomacy of opposition was the
reluctance of other states to send official delegations, for fear of harming
relations with Turkey. Following the congress, Shakib ArsIan wrote a
lengthy indictment of Turkish policy toward the congress, in which he
focused on the activity of Tevfik Rütü. To oppose the Jerusalem congress, he wrote, was not the business of a state that considered itself
secular; and he pointed to the discrepancy between Turkish participation
in the Meccan Muslim congress of 1926, and hostility to the Jerusalem
congress of 1931. In Arslan's opinion, Turkish policy was directly responsible for the absence o f Muslims fr om Afghanistan, the Soviet
Union, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Greece. In particular he cited Turkish
pressure brought to bear on Greece, which prevented the participation
of the former Ottoman s e
y Thus the Jerusalem congress was reduced to a gathering of unoffi cial
hparticipants,
t i l i s l a msome important and others self -important.
Rashid
came
58 uF sRida
r ot m
y p cAbd
t , al-Rahman cAzzam, later secretary
M
a f Eonce
a g again.
general
of
the
Arab
League,
was
also in attendance, on behalf of the
S a b r i ,
Wafd.
came
t
hFrom Syria
e
n Riyad al-Sulh (1894-1951), later prime minister;
i
G
e
e
.
5
n
r
k
x
7
e
i
l
e
132
I
N
DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
Shukri al-Quwwatli ( 1 8 9 1
-grandson of the Algerian resistance leader cAbd al-Qadir and president
for the Defense of the Hijaz Railway .
1of9the
6 7 Damascus
) , l a t Society
e r
Tunisian
reformist
cAbd
al-cAziz
al-Thacalibi, a participant in two pre59
T
h
e
p r e s i d e n t ;
vious
Mus
lim
congresses,
contributed
much to the organization and
a
n
d
deliberations
ofi this congress.
And for the first time, an important MoS
a
d
roccan delegation attended, led by Muhammad al-Makki al-Nasiri and
Muhammad al-Kattani, two leading activists from Rabat and Fez respectively. A large delegation of Bosnian Muslims also participated, and
they established ties with Amin al-Husayni which became important
during the mufti's subsequent wartime exile (see chapter 13). From India
came Sir Muhammad Iqbal ( 1 8 7 6
poet-philosopher.
speak
Muslim territories. Among them was the Volga
6
1 9 3 8for
) , Soviet-ruled
t h e
Tatar
'n Ao author
t e and
d journalist Ayaz Ishaki [Idi ( 1 8 7 8
in
European
exile.
-n
u
m
b
e
U
r
d r u Ishaki had been a friend o f Gasprinskii's.
6
present
was
1
a danother
t
tTatar
h activist,
i s Musa Carullah Bigi ( 1 8 7 5
o
a 9 5 4f )n, yet
who
-'tiP Ami had
l espmbeen
o ro einvited
s
ito the
a Cairo congress and had participated in the
Meccan
congress.
He
had
now opted for exile. The organizers made
1
9
4
9
)
,
rn t a n t
much
of
the
presence
of
a
grandson of the Imam Samil, Said Samil,
e x p a
who conducted a vigorous campaign from exile against Soviet rule in
t r i a
the Caucasus:
t e s
prime
of Iran then in exile in Switzerland.
62 A minister
l s o
p
u
r
Of
particular
interest to many contemporary observers was the presi n
p
o
r
Muhammad al-Husayn Al Kashif al- G hite ( 1877/8
aence
t of
t eShaykh
n
t1954),ethe fidrst noted Twelver Shici cleric to participate in a Mus lim
-d a n c
t
econgress. His father, Shaykh ' Ali A l Kashif al-GhitaD, had been very
o
much
a aMuslim cosmopolitan in the nineteenth-century tradition, havw
sing lived both in Iran and Iraq, and having traveled in the Hijaz, Syria,
Turkey, and India.° His son had also traveled widely as a youth, spendZ
i
ing several years in Syria and Lebanon after a pilgrimage to the Hijaz.
y
a
During a short stay in Cairo, he lectured at al-Azhar, and impressed a
D
number of noted Egyptian ulama.
againedl fame for his published correspondence with the Maronite man
64 S h a y k h
-of letters, Amin al-Rayhani,
M u h a m m a d
D
in Iraq
return
in 1914, when he joined a group of Shici ulama to fi ght
65
a la to
-d
nin
the
Ottoman
a
e yd He
H t tu r as c at jihad.
n then embarked upon a period of great literary
T
a
productivity,
and
nearly
ffi u r t r h e s r all of his theological works appeared in both
Arabic
Persian.
ba t a and
t e n t i
t
66
to It was
na this mujtahid of standing whom Amin al-Husayni invited to
attend
bu
a thep Jerusalem
o Muslim congress of 1931, and Shaykh Muhammad
accepted. That he agreed to participate was almost certainly
ial-Husayn
n ,
due
to
the
repeated assurances of Amin al-Husayni that the caliphate
fh
i
os
r
m
e
r
1
3
would not figure in the agenda of the congress. Shaykh Muhammad
3
al-Husayn's departure for Jerusalem was made the occasion of a celebration in Najaf, and a motorcade of more than thirty cars accompanied
him to Baghdad, the fi rst leg of his jour ney .
met the
67
O nmany
c e assembled
i n delegates, and led them all in prayer at the
Jopening
e r celebrations
u s a l einmthe, Aqsa mosque." Shaykh Muhammad alhHusayn also
e addressed the congress, and later visited Haifa, Jaffa, Nablus, Jenin, Tyre, Sidon, and Beirut.° Much was made of the multahid's
presence by the congress organizers and by outside observers:
was
nohSunni—Shici
dialogue on religious questions at Jerusalem, nor
70 T
e r e
were there advances in the moderation of doctrinal differences. But a
political understanding was reached that had important implications
later, for Shaykh Muhammad al-Husayn remained for many years the
most consistent critic of Zionism in Shici clerical circles. The pattern of
participation at Jerusalem, then, did not differ from that of the earlier
congresses. Known figures w ith reputations that spanned Africa and
Asia mingled w ith obscure local notables. Yet the participants from
distant parts were overwhelmed numerically by what were essentially
local delegations of Palestinians, Transjordanians, Lebanese, and Syrians.
As soon became clear, these were nearly all supportive of Amin alHusayni's view of how the congress should unfold, and were poised to
sweep all opposition aside.
By all reports, the opening of the congress stirrea the participants.
Accounts relate that the choice of Muhammad al-Husayn Al Kashif alGhitaD to lead in prayer had a marked effect on the participants, and
another noteworthy innovation at the opening of the congress was a
collective oath-taking " to defend the holy places w ith every bit o f
strength." These opening exercises seemed auspicious, although even
the first evening's ceremonies were marred by a verbal altercation between two Egyptians, one of whom was beaten by the assembled crowd
and had to be extricated by the polic e.
71But more serious differences soon surfaced. Once convened, the congress divided into committees, and then split in the plenum along lines
anticipated by the controversies that raged in the preparatory period.
On the issue of the Mus lim holy places of Jerusalem, a broad general
consensus obtained. All agreed that some action was necessary to protect
these sites from possible encroachments. But a heated debate arose as
to whether the defense of the holy places required an end to the British
mandate, and Palestinian Arab independence. All recognized the value
of the proposed Muslim university, but a dispute erupted over whether
Arabic should predominate on campus, which subjects should be taught,
and the general spirit which would prevail in the institution. On all of
these central issues, Shawkat cAli found himself opposed by a bloc that
I N DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
IN DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
1
3
had4drawn closer to Amin al-Husayni as he himself had drawn away
during the preparations. He warned the congress of the possible reaction
by Great Britain to any broad condemnation of the mandate for Palestine, and insisted that the university be multilingual and teach law
and medicine, thus assuring its essentially liberal and cosmopolitan character. These positions perhaps owed less to principled conviction than
to a lingering ambition to lead or at least defi ne the themes o f the
congress.
But Shawkat cAli and his supporters were simply outnumbered. Only
two days into the congress, he made these angry remarks to his own
small bloc, the leadership of which he shared with fellow mediator cAbd
al-Hamid Sacid:
Shame them, gentlemen, by your greatness; the greatness which I expected
from Haj A min eff[endi] I have found in you. You have behaved remarkably. Wallah " my friends" have hurt me. You have shamed them.
I know it is very hard fo r you, but I want more sacrifice from you. I
swear by God that the whole Moslem world will be at your feet. I beg
you in the name of Islam to sacrifice. You have done greatness—do more.
And "those people," they talk in the name of God!
In two days I have heard things which have staggered me. Mad people
do not talk like th e m.
72
Amin al-Husayni's publicist, Muhammad cAli al-Tahir, wrote at some
length of the obstructionist activities of the Shawkat cAli-cAbd al-Hamid Sacid faction, which he identified as a bloc (kutla) seated separately.
But this group was too small, and resolutions were carried by the plenum
73
over their objections. Another faction, also described as a separate bloc
by Tahir, disrupted the proceedings on occasion, perhaps in cooperation
with an offi cial of the Jewish Agency, but this had little effect on the
proceedings.
his
opponents outside the congress hall left little doubt as to
74 personal
O n
the
outcome
of the deliberations.
t h e
w The
h policy
o l which he chose was to make the congress memorable for
its
militant
posturing. This called for delicate maneuvering, for he had
e ,
drawn
up
an
agenda for approval by the authorities that shunned all
t
h
issues
of possible embarrassment to the mandatory government, and
e
was confined to the theme of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem and their
s u
welfare. Framed in narrow religious terms, this was not a controversial
c c
or exciting issue; to charge the atmosphere of the congress, the discussion
e s
of more overtly political subjects was necessary. This Amin al-Husayni
sencouraged by never explicitly informing the participants themselves
o
of those assurances whic h he had given to British authorities. As a
fresult, the deliberations were punctuated by moments of overexuberA
m
i
n
a
l
H
u
s
a
I N DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
1
3
5
ance, and by speeches and resolutions which went far beyond the scope
of the approved agenda.
The impassioned speech by the Egyptian participant cAbd al-Rahman
cAzzam, on the subject of Italian "atrocities" in Libya, so contradicted
the organizers' prior assurances that the British High Commissioner did
not wait for the inevitable Italian representations, but immediately ordered the offender's expulsion from Palestine.
Palestinian
75 c A wIstiqlalist
n i
c and
A a bpillar
d of the congress, made a speech on
Zionist
by the authorities to have exceeded all
a l -aspirations
H a dconsidered
i ,
acceptable
bounds,
but
which
went unpunished. A general resolution
a
against colonialism (istrmar) was also carried, and colonialism's various
manifestations in different Mus lim lands were attacked by many participants in their plenary speeches. When reproached by a distraught
British High Commissioner over the course of the deliberations, Amin
al-Husayni pleaded that he had been unable to restrain the participants
involved, and so had not violated his prior pledge.
made
even
participants with whom he was
76 I no
n effort
f a cto tinform
,
h those
e
closely
h
a allied
d of the assurances which he had given. In public, he was
reluctant to admit that he had even discussed such assurances at all. By
this tactic, Amin al-Husayni had assured the transformation o f the
congress from a forum devoted to one issue in its narrowest religious
sense, to a general assembly concerned w it h the politic al causes o f
Muslims everywhere.
When the organizers made provisions for a permanent bureau and
subsequent congresses (see appendix 7), this was done with a very real
anticipation of success, and a desire not to allow the congress to expire
on any account. This zeal was conveyed to participants and observers.
The optimistic note upon which the fi nal session concluded, in such
marked contrast to the disillusionment in whic h past congresses had
disbanded, excited much optimism in H. A. R. Gibb. He attributed the
change to the development of an organizational aptitude in Islam. The
congress, he wrote, "undoubtedly achieved a very substantial measure
of success." O f the proposals, he concluded that "there is every likelihood that they will have practical results of some kind. If this should
be so, we may regard it as certain that the congress movement w ill
steadily gain in strength, and that its work for the maintenance o f
cultural unity will assume decisive importance."
77an" epoch-making
as
I t d e s econference
r v e s for this reason," wrote George Antonius,
"that
for
t
o the firstrtimeain centuries
n
k Moslem effort has at last found its
expression in a systematic and business-like organization. I have
no hesitation in regarding this as potentially the most important constructive effort among Moslems in recent years, and one which is fraught
with far-reaching pos s ibilities ."
136
I
N
DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
Less sympathetic observers were less sanguine, but were disturbed
nonetheless by the potential of the congress. As a Zionist leader pointed
out in internal correspondence, "a conference which is almost a failure
may become the starting point of a development which in the future
leads to a conference which is a success."
Wauchope
79 B r i t ifelt
s hstrongly
H that
i g "a hsecond Moslem Congress might arouse
great
excitement
in
Palestine;
to the position of the Jews
C o m m i s s i o that,
n e owing
r
in Palestine, it is an unsuitable country in which to hold further Moslem
Congresses." But he was "loath to suggest at this moment that a decision
should now be taken to prohibit the holding of any Moslem Congress
in the future," on account of "legal diffi culties" and Muslim opinion.s°
In the view of the French consul in Jerusalem, "a dangerous instrument
of propaganda and agitation has been put in Hadj Amin's hands which,
if he uses it s k illfully , could complicate the task o f those powers in
authority in Mus lim lands ."
8
'
Early in the congress, the question of an executive committee was
raised.
from
82 forty-one Muslim regions. India would be entitled to three members;
S h Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Egypt, China, Java, and Sumatra would
each
a w have two members on the committee; and the rest would have
one.
members would be selected not by the congress then ask a These
t
sembled
but by the regions whic h they were to represent. And this
'
division
would
also serve as the basis of voting in future congresses.
A
Precisely such a method had been instituted, at least formally, at the
l i
Meccan congress of 1926, where votes were reserved even for territories
a
from which no participants were in attendance.
r
But the idea did not carry at Jerusalem six years later. "Let us not
g
grasp at fantasies," retorted one participant. cAbd al-Rahman cAzzam
u
argued that Shawkat cAll's proposal demanded a measure of local ore
ganization that was exceptional in the Mus lim world:
d
f We ask f or a logical, democratic wa y t o giv e t he congress t he right t o
o elect the executive committee. I f some of y ou fear that the congress wi l l
r fall under a clique of people, this will never happen. We wi l l be obedient
and we will represent freedom. No one will tyrannize another. The election
a
of the committee is the prerogative of the congress. O u r I ndian brethren
l are right in that, in their country, there is an organized Islamic movement,
a and we hope it wi l l become so in our country. [But] they speak f or t heir
r country, whereas we are factions and parties, and are unable to agree on
g one v iew and send representatives t o the executive c ommit t ee.
e 83
c Ziy a
mittee
opposed all conventional norms of congresses and assemblies. A
o 3
a
l
m
mi D i
t n
t T
e a
e b
IN DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
1
3
7
smaller administrative arm for the congress would be far more efficient,
and he argued for a maximum of five members. In the end, the congress
adopted a compromise figure of twenty-five, all of whom were elected
by the participants in a secret ballot.
intention
84 F e of
w immersing
o f themselves in the work of the congress after its
adjournment,
t h o s so
e that a position on the executive committee became an
honorary
distinction.
e l e c t e The
d real work was left to a seven-man permanent
bureau
with
wide
powers,
which was to function in Jerusalem between
h
a
d
congresses.
a
n Shawkat
y 'Ali responded to this course of events by resigning
the seat to which he was elected on the executive committee:
During the conference I tried to counteract the disagreement, when it
appeared, but I did not succeed, so one of the leading Egyptians [ A b d
al-Hamid Sacid] was kept out of the Standing Committee that is to carry
into practice the resolutions o f the conference. On ly those whom the
majority wished were elected to the Committee. I myself was elected
nearly unanimously, but when I saw how things were, I said I wanted
to be an ordinary member of the Conference only.—This is rather sad,
but don't lose heart; the good people in Palestine understand this, and
later on our efforts will no doubt bring about a reconciliation. We are
sure of success and victory, but the leaders must understand that they
are to sacrifice. Next summer I shall return to Palestine, then we shall try
again to bring about peace.
85
Shawkat cAli's resignation in protest signaled his break with the congress and its passage completely into the hands of his opponents. The
participants furthermore agreed that Amin al-Husayni, as president of
the congress in session, would also be president of the executive committee, and that future congresses would meet at two-year intervals.
There had been a debate on all of these issues. Some were afraid of
losing momentum during an interregnum of two years, and Shawkat
cAli strongly favored not only an annual congress, but its meeting in
India the following year. But cAbd al-cAziz al-Thacalibi pointed out that
those participants who came fr om afar could not bear the repeated
expense, and the resolutions were too ambitious for execution in one
year. Rashid Rida pointed out that the congress had been convened
specifically in defense of Palestine, and so should always be held in
Jerusalem. In the end, it was decided to meet every two years, and to
recognize Jerusalem as the seat of the congress."
The members of the executive committee, on the day after the congress and before dispersing, elected a series of officers to the permanent
bureau. They chose as secretary general the former prime minister of
Iran, Z iy e al-Din Tabatabapi, who had been among the more active
participants at the congress. Ziya' al-Din was famous for his crucial role
in the ascent of Riza Shah.
was
87 later
A t exiled,
t h took
a t up residence in Geneva, and befriended Amin alt i m e ,
h
e
w
a
s
p
r
i
m
e
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
,
138
I
N
DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
Husayni, Shakib Arslan, and other activists. An able organizer, he was
urged by many delegates to supervise the permanent secretariat of the
congress. Ziya al- D in fi nally agreed, and upon his shoulders fell the
burden of administration and fundraising after the close of the congress.
hope
88 that Iran might be drawn into the congress in the future. But in
Iran,
I t Ziya' al-Din had ceased to count for much, according to an American
w observer:
a After
s being Prime Minister for a few months he was forced to leave the
t hcountry and had long since been almost forgotten. It is astonishing, in
e this
o land of bazaar rumours, how little is known by usually well informed
r ipersons as to his subsequent movements. "He appears to have lived by
z his
e pen, principally in Scandinavia" is about all the Legation has been
able to ascertain through casual informal inquiry."
d
To
b dispel any doubt, Iran and other Iranian newspapers denied the rumor
that
y Tabataba'i represented his country at the Jerusalem congress, and
affirmed
that the government had not appointed any representative:
s
In
90
o fact, Ziya' al-Din then played an elusive role in Muslim émigré circles
in
m Europe that has yet to be clarified. Shakib ArsIan relates that Ziya'
al-Din
was in fact the instrument of the ex-Khedive 'Abbas HiImi, who
e
had
promised to finance a Muslim information center in Geneva under
t
Ziya' al-Din's directorship. According to Shakib, the Geneva plan fell
h
through when 'Abbas H iImi decided that the idea would be opposed
a
by Mustafa Kemal, who had promised the Syrian throne to the extKhedive."
h But another more complex Geneva plan tied 'Abbas H iImi to Taibatabai. In November 1931, the ex-Khedive announced the creation in
s
Geneva
of an Alliance Musulmane Internationale. The charter of this
sorganization dictated that it would compete directly with the Jerusalem
e
congress.
The Alliance, according to this document, would organize a
lworld Mus lim congress every three years, attended by a hierarchy of
e
dues-paying
and honorary members. From this congress, too, would
emerge
a supreme council and an executive committee.
c
ative
The space left for "found92
Theohad tattracted
h i s no organizer
i n i t ofi stature.
t
ing
i members" in his own copy of the charter was blank. Rashid Rida
described
what was then learned about this initiative:
o
n It was rumoured that H. E. Prince cAbbas HiImi Pasha, former Khedive
w of Egypt, had created a society in Geneva called the Alliance Musulmane,
a which would hold periodic Muslim congresses. Then we learned that he
s had made Sayyid Ziy e al-Din TabatabaDi secretary general o f this o rm ganization. No w the executive committee o f the fi rst General Mu slim
Congress [in Jerusalem] also had chosen this Tabatabei to be their seca
d
e
i
n
t
h
e
IN DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
1
3
9
retary general, and he hesitated to accept the post. He travelled to Europe,
promising the president of the congress [Amin al-Husayni] that he would
write to him as to whether or not he would accept. When it became clear
that he worked for cAbbas HiImi, his acceptance became problematic. He
nonetheless wrote to Amin al-Husayni accepting, and asked Amin alHusayni to consult with the other members of the executive committee
in this matter. From what we understand of the Alliance Musulmane, he
will have to wo rk to annex the executive committee of the Jerusalem
congress to the European Alliance Musulmane, and entrust the matter of
a second congress to the latter, to expand the Alliance's breadth, on
account of the wealth of the Alliance and the freedom that prevails at
the site of its headquarters [Geneva]. This contradicts an official decision
of the executive committee of the congress, and the president of the first
congress [Amin al-Husayni] cannot decide the issue alone.
Rashid Rida obviously disapproved, claiming that Tabatabaii could not
serve both these masters at once, nor could he absorb one organization
into the other.
93Two possibilities thus suggest themselves. ZiyaD al- Din may have
continued his close relationship with 'Abbas Hilmi even after accepting
his new position, with the ultimate intention of making the Jerusalem
congress an avenue for the ex-Khedive's return to Mus lim politics. Or
perhaps he was offered the office of secretary general as an inducement
to abandon the Geneva congress plan which he had drawn up w ith
'Abbas H i imi, and whic h was liable to compete w ith the Jerusalem
congress. Following the adjournment of the congress, Z iy e al-Din returned to Geneva to wrap up his affairs and arrange to move his family.
According to an intelligence source, his return to Palestine was "delayed
for various reasons, one of which was the proposed formation at Geneva
of the International Islamic Association. The policy o f the proposed
Association in relation to the Islamic Congress of Jerusalem was not
definitely decided and it was suggested that the persons who were
interested in the Association had agreed to dispense with the services
of Dia el D in in order to secure through him control of the Islamic
Congress. It, however, appears that the proposed Association at Geneva
failed to materialize."
94What is certain is that he took to his offi ce w ith an unrestrained
zea1.
cedures
for the permanent bureau.% The resolutions of the congress on
95
the
H eHijaz railway, and protests against Jewish encroachments on Muslim
holy
i m places, Italian atrocities in Libya, and the Berber dahir, were all
formally
conveyed to the mandatory power, various governments, and
m
the
League
of Nations .
e d
and
beyond
Palestine proceeded apace. Ziya al- Din completed a detailed
97
T
h
e
i a
ft eo r m a t i o n
o
f
l y
b
r
a
n
d
cr
h
ce
o
m
m
iw t
t
e
e
su
w
i
t
p
1 40
I
N
DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
set of regulations for these branches, outlining the dues structure and
the division of revenues between the central treasury and the branches.
Nearly all the branches were located in Palestine, Transjordan, and Syria,
98
and in a speech to an assembly of representatives of local branches,
Ziyap al-Din set a target of 50,000 members for Palestine.
99By late 1932, however, the crucial issue had become one of money,
for Ziya al- D in wished to show real progress in the construction of the
Muslim university before the next congress, scheduled for 1933. The
development of the three faculties planned by Ziya' al-Din—theology
and religious law, medicine and pharmacy, and engineering—required
substantial sums for the hiring of faculty, the construction of a building,
and the purchase of equipmenew Ziyap al-Din hoped to raise the starting
expenses within Palestine, and the fi gure he gave in an open appeal
was EP5,000.'m Amin al-Husayni explained to an American visitor that
EV4,000 per annum would be raised by subscriptions, and a slightly
larger sum, the annual revenue of a valuable wag!' building, would be
dedicated in perpetuity to the univ ers ity .'
02 Aissued
ously
n
ato pMuslim
p e kings,
a l amirs, and infl uential persons.
diffi cult to raise money strictly through postal appeals,
w But ait proved
103
s
so
s Amin
i m al-Husayni,
u l t aZiya'
n al-Din,
e - and treasurer Muhammad 'Ali 'Alluba planned a fund-raising tour to Iraq and India. The party set out
in May 1933 for Iraq, where they remained for two weeks, and visited
the Shici shrine cities as the guests of Muhammad al-Husayn Al Kashif
a1-Ghitap.
this
1 trip, both financial and political, was unsatisfactory. Antonius wrote
that
was made concerning the sums collected, "but
" T no
h announcement
e
Idhave
been
given
privately
to understand that they fell far short of
e l e
expectations."
g a t i
1
to carry forth the university plan, the permanent bureau began
o Unable
n
to sink into inactivity. A respite was offered by the outbreak
"tgradually
h
of war between Ibn Sacud and the Imam Yahya of Yemen, and this
e
n
opportunity was seized to send a mediation delegation to Arabia conp r
sisting of Amin al-Husayni, Muhammad 'Ali cAlluba, and Shakib AroslamcFor a time, the mission captured headlines, and was not without
eeffect.
e But in settling that dispute, a different breach widened, this time
dbetween
e
Amin al-Husayni and Muhammad cAli cAlluba. cAlluba, on
dhis return to Egypt, attempted to have the permanent secretariat transtferred to Cairo, a move which Amin al-Husayni resisted successfully.106
oThis case for moving the headquarters to some site outside of Palestine,
Iand hence away from Amin al-Husayni, was enhanced by the failure
nof negotiations between Amin al-Husayni and his Palestinian opposition
dover the delayed second congress. Many of those from beyond Palestine
iwho participated in the first congress urged Amin al-Husayni to arrive
a
.
T
h
e
o
u
t
IN DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
1
4
1
at some kind of accord, so that a second congress would not be accompanied again by a counter-congress of his own opponents across town.
Shawkat cAli briefly tried his hand as mediator in these negotiations in
1933, and two Syrians made a similar attempt in early 1935.
that
107year
L athe
t econgress
r
had virtually ceased to function, and Z iy e alDin again spent the better part of his time in Europe.
continued
to employ his title of congress president on occasion, and did
1
°so in 1936 when issuing a latwa declaring the cAlawis of Syria to be true
8Mus
A lims
m i. n
a l - H u s a y n i
throughout
Palestine, and a Jerusalem Mus lim congress would never
1
again
be convened in Palestine under mandate.
°
9 Amin al-Husayni may have considered the reconvening of the congress
B u tin Mecca once it was no longer possible to do so in Jerusalem,
and
b ehis
f pilgrimage planned for February 1937 gave rise to much talk
about
o r ethe possibility. But Ibn Saud, consistent with his policy, informed
Amin al-Husayni that no such congress could be permitted.
t
h
Husayni
was forced to declare that his visit was "solely for religious
11
e
purposes"
would take plac e.
° A m i and
n that
a no
l congress
y
111
of
pilgrims
W h met
e ninformally
a to discuss various issues, Amin al-Husayni
e
addressed
onlyr reluctantly, and was careful to avoid all political
n u m them
b e
a
references, never once mentioning even Pales tine.
r112
Amin al-Husayni later settled upon Berlin as his chosen place of exile,
w
and he passed the war years there (see chapter 13). Much of his time
a spent attempting to convince the German Foreign Offi ce that he
was
sexercised greater influence than other Arab exiles in Berlin, leading him
to
o make this assertion:
u There is a supranational association, the "Muslim Congress," under his—
t the Grand Mufti's—leadership. Delegates of all Muslim countries belong
, to this congress. The congress, he said, still exists and functions today.
a The political possibilities for Germany which might stem from cooperation
n with the congress are, he says, undoubtedly significant. The Grand Mu fti
repeatedly expressed his regret that the existing possibilities for working
A
together are not being fully exploited. He and his collaborators could do
r much more for the German cause if closer cooperation could exist between
a the German authorities and himself .
b 113
Like Kawakibi's fiction, the Jerusalem congress fi nally became a figment
r
of one man's imagination.
e
b
e
l
l
i
o
n
h
a
d
s
p
r
APPEN D I X SEVEN
CHARTER OF T H E
GENERAL I S L A M I C CONGRESS
Adopted by the Congress in its fourteenth session
held on Tuesday, Shacban 6, 1350/December 10, 1931
Ar t. 1. —A periodic, general congress of Muslims from throughout
the world shall be held and known as the General Islamic Congress.
Ar t. 2. —The aims of the Congress are:
a). to promote cooperation among Muslims of whatever origin or sect,
to spread Islamic culture and virtues, and to promote the spirit of
general Islamic brotherhood;
b). to defend Muslim interests and preserve the holy places and lands
from any intervention;
c). to combat Christian missionary efforts and campaigns among the
Muslims;
d). to establish universities and scholarly institutions to work for unification of Islamic culture and the instruction of the Arabic language to Islamic youth, through the founding of a university in
Jerusalem to be known as the al-Aqsa Mosque University;
e). to examine other Islamic matters of importance to the Muslims.
Ar t. 3. —Future congresses shall be composed of the following persons:
a). those who were present at the first congress;
b). those invited by the preparatory committee to future congresses,
whether as individuals or as representatives of Islamic organizations;
c). those Muslims whom the Congress its elf invites to participate
during its sessions.
Ar t. 4. —The Congress may regard any individual as a member, even
though he may be absent from its sessions, provided he has rendered
notable cultural or material services to the Muslims.
Ar t. 5. —The Congress shall meet once every two years. The exSOURCE: Al-lamica ale'arabiyya, December 18, 1931.
CHA RTE R OF G E NE RA L IS L A MIC CONGRESS
1
9
3
ecutive committee, by a three-fourths majority, may convene the Congress in the interim should unforseen circumstances warrant it.
Ar t. 6. —The seat of the Congress shall be Jerusalem. The Congress
may choose another seat for its activities, and each session may choose
the site of the following session. The executive committee shall determine the site of extraordinary sessions.
Ar t. 7. —The Congress, while in session, shall be directed by a board
composed of the president, four deputies, four observers, and four secretaries, to be elected by the Congress in accordance with its internal
statutes.
Ar t. 8. —The Congress, while in session, shall establish such committees as it deems necessary, to study projects and submit reports.
Ar t. 9 . —The Congress shall elect an executive committee fr om
among its members, to be composed of twenty-fi ve members representing as many Islamic peoples as possible. The executive committee's
special tasks w ill be:
a). to implement the resolutions of the Congress, and supervise its
committees and bureaus;
b). to take measures to convene the next Congress and defi ne its
agenda;
c). to establish branches throughout Islamic lands, and send delegations abroad to explain the aims of the Congress.
The executive committee shall set down internal statutes to regulate
its work, sessions, and finances, and these statutes shall be presented
to the next meeting of the Congress.
Ar t. 10. —The executive committee shall elect a bureau of seven
persons from among the Congress members, among them a secretary
general, an assistant secretary general, and a treasurer, with these responsibilities:
a). to implement the decisions of the executive committee;
b). to conduct the secretarial and accounting tasks.
The secretary general shall organize the meetings of the bureau and
implement its decisions. The bureau shall be collectively responsible to
the executive committee.
Ar t. 11. —The president of the Congress shall preside over meetings
of the executive committee.
194
A
P
P
E
N
D
I
X
E
S
Ar t. 12. —The executive committee and the bureau shall continue
their work until the next congress, at which time a new executive committee shall be elected, which shall in turn elect a new bureau. Members
of the executive committee and bureau may be reelected.
Ar t. 13. —The finances of the Congress shall be drawn from subscriptions, contributions, and other sources.
Ar t. 14. —The treasurer shall be responsible for the funds, accounting, and financial transactions of the Congress. These shall be examined
annually by a certified accountant.
Ar t. 15. — All funds received on behalf of the Congress by any of
its members or committees must be turned over to the treasurer. Expenditures shall be authorized only upon the approval of the bureau,
and in accordance with the resolutions of the executive committee and
the Congress. The funds of the Congress are to be kept in accounts
opened by the bureau, in the name of the General Islamic Congress.
No funds may be withdrawn without the signatures of two members
of the bureau, one of whom must be the treasurer.
Ar t. 16. —The Congress may decide by a two-thirds majority of
those present to expel a member, if it is established that he has conspired
against the Congress or has worked to frustrate it. The accused shall
have the right to defend himself in person or through a representative.
Ar t. 17. —This Charter may be altered only by a two-thirds majority
decision of Congress members in attendance, provided that the change
and its purpose are presented to members of the Congress at least two
days before debate over the matter.
IN DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
217
67. T he Sovi et M usl i m delegates described collection of the m oney necessary for the
jour ney. See the i nter vi ew i n al-Siyasa, June 16,1926.
68. R i da (Mecca) t o Ar slan, June 19,1926, i n Ar slan, Sayyid Rashid Rida, 445.
69. Jor dan (Jidda), enclosure i n dispatch of July 31,1926, L/P&S/10/1115, E4937/367/
91. T he T aw fi q R epor t also gives the sums o f var ious gi fts, and the i denti cal fi gur e of
E1,000 for Am i n al - H usayni .
70. F or details on the cam paign, see al-Manor ( October 17,1926) , 27( 7) : 548- 55. See
also the unsi gned m em or andum enti tl ed " T he Khi l afati st W ahabi Case," Jerusalem, Januar y 8,1927, ISA, di vi si on 65, fi l e 31. Rashid Rida' s r epl y t o M uham m ad ' Al i appear ed
in al-Manor (June 18,1928) , 29(3): 162- 80.
71. Intel l i gence R epor t no. 31, Gover nm ent of Indi a, F 0371/11433, E5595/20/91.
72. T ex t i n N or m an M ayer s (Jidda), di spatch of Januar y 9,1927, L/P&S/10/1155, P.
1527.
73. Shafiq, A'mali ba‘da mudhakkirali, 285-86.
74. Sir dar Ikbal Al i Shah to Shuckbur gh, Augus t 8,1928, F 0371/13043, E4125/2492/
65.
75. Shakib Arslan, al-Irtisamat al-lu/a/fl khahr al-hajj aortas math!:
76. Ahm ad al-Sharabasi, Am i r al-bayan Shakib Arslan, 2: 522.
77. Ther e was some confusi on i n 1928, as m any thought thi s was the over due second
congress. T he choice of thi s site m ay have been i ntended t o leave that impression. See
M uham m ad al - Sai d (Jidda), di spatch o f June 5, 1928, i n D W Q, ' Abdi n: al - khi l afa al islamiyya, uncatal ogued box; unsi gned dr aft dispatch (Cairo), M ay 31,1928, AFC car ton
131, fi l e 26/3; Llmm al-oura, June 8,1928.
11. I N D EFEN SE O F JER U SALEM
1. Muhammad ' Ali al-Tahir, Nazariyyat al-shura fi'l-ahwal al-sharaiyya al-hadira, 96-100,
162- 66,189- 93,203- 8,226- 31,234- 40. O n the author , see Khayr i yya (2asimiyya, " M uhammad ' Al i al- Tahir , cialam fi l asti ni fi M i sr ."
2. Al- M anar (February 1932), 32(2): 113- 32; ( M ar ch 1932), 32(3): 193- 208; ( Apr i l 1932),
32(4): 284- 92. See similar account i n al-Shihab (February 1932) , 8(2): 80- 95.
3. M uham m ad cIzzat Darwaza, Hawla al-ha raka al-'arabiyya al-haditha, 75- 82. Dar waza for
a ti m e w as t he tr ustee o f the congress archives. See al-jami'a al-'arabiyya, Decem ber 18,
1931.
4. ' Aj aj N uw ay hi d, " al - H aj j M uham m ad A m i n al - H usayni . H adha al - m u' tam ar al islami al-calami fi l - Q uds aw akhi r 1931 j udhur uhu fi M ak k a 1926."
5. H . A . R . Gi bb, " T he Islamic Congress at Jerusalem i n Decem ber 1931." See al so
Louis Jovelet, " L' ev ol uti on sociale et pol i ti que des Pays Ar abes," 575- 88; Eugene Jung,
Le reveil de l'Islam et des arabes, 15- 31, 99- 107; and M i c hael Assaf, " D i e m usulm anische
Konfer enz i n Jerusalem und der Panislamismus."
6. The major general accounts are those by Uri M . Kupfer schm i dt, " T he General M uslim
Congress of 1931 i n Jerusalem"; ' Adi l Hasan Ghunaym , " al - M u' tam ar al-islami al-' amm,
1931"; Yehos hua Por ath, The Palestinian National Movement, 2: 8- 13; and Yuv al A m o n -
Ohanna, The Internal Struggle Within the Palestinian Movement 1 9 2 9
- 7. Ahm ad al-Sharabasi, Amir al-bayan, 2: 584- 86. Am i n al - H usayni said that he had l eft
the
1 9 3autobi
9 , ogr
7 aphy,
7 - 9entr0usted to
( him
i byn Ar slan for publication, am ong the congress papers,
but
H Shar
e babasi
r die d nwo t )fi n d. i t. Year s l ater another c opy sur faced i n Bei r ut, and w as
published as Ar sl an, Sira dhatiyya. M y ow n search for the ar chive yi el ded no results. T he
per m anent secretariat also had pl anned the publ i cati on of a detailed book on the congress
and its antecedents, but no such vol um e ever appeared. For a descr iption of the pl anned
volume, see al-laml'a al-'arablyya, Jul y 3,1932.
218
I
N
DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
8. O n thi s pl an, see Secret Political Repor t, dated Cairo, Febr uar y 22, 1929, i n F 0371/
13749. For a contem por ar y' s reminiscences of M uham m ad ' Al i and hi s i nvol vem ent i n
the cause of Palestine, see ' Aj aj N uw ay hi d, " M aw l ana M uham m ad ' Al i al-za' im al - hi ndi ,
1878- 1931."
9. T exts o f telegrams fr om Am i n al - H usayni (Jerusalem) t o Shaw kat ' Al i ( London) ,
January 7, 1931, and texts o f replies, i n al-Rabila al-sharaiyya (January 1931) , 3(4): 5- 18.
Further details of the cer em ony i n Afzal Iqbal , Life and Times of Mohammed Ali, 387- 93.
10. Resolutions i n al-Manar (December 12, 1928) , 29(8): 628- 32. T he Syr ian publicists
Shakib Ar sl an, Ihsan al-Jabiri, and R i yad al - Sul h, w er e signatories t o a peti ti on t o t he
League of N ati ons Per m anent Commission on M andates, " i n the names of, and as r epresentatives of, the M usl i m congress r ecently hel d i n Jerusalem." T ext of peti ti on dated
December 11, 1928, i n F 0371/13745, E1629/204/65.
11. For the tex t o f the standar d i nvi tati on, see al-Manar (February 1932) , 32(2): 117—
18; tr ansl ated texts o f i nvi tati ons i nter cepted by postal author i ti es i n Indi a, i n L / P & S /
10/1314, fi l e 1350.
12. M am el i ( Italian ambassador) m em or andum to Br itish Foreign Offi ce, N ovem ber 17,
1931, F 0371/15282, E5725/1205/65.
13. N ote by O. G. R . W illiam s ( C ol oni al Offi ce) on hi s m eeti ng w i t h For eign Offi c e
and Indi a Offi ce representatives, N ovem ber 17, 1931, C O732/51, fi l e 89205, par t 1. M i nutes of the m eeti ng on N ovem ber 16, 1931, i n F 0371/15282, E5711/1205/65.
14. Gover nm ent of Indi a to Secretary of State for Indi a, N ovem ber 23, 1931, C 0 7 3 2 /
51, fi l e 89205, par t 2.
15. M i nute by G. F. A. W ar ner , N ovem ber 25, 1931, F 0371/15283, 5831/1205/65.
16. W auchope to C unl i ffe- Li ster , N ovem ber 21, 1931, F 0406/68, E5831/1205/65.
17. W auchope to C unl i ffe- Li ster , F 0406/68, E6040/1205/65.
18. T ex t i n F 0371/15283, E6087/1205/65.
19. H ai m Ar l osor ov (Jerusalem) t o Br odetsky ( London) , Augus t 24, 1931, CZA, S25/
5689.
20. Ar l osor ov t o Br odetsky, N ovem ber 13, 1931, CZA, Z 4/10042.
21. T he jour nalist was Taysir D uw aj i , an Isticilalist w ho vol unteer ed his services to the
Jewish Agency Ar abist, Haim Kalvar isky. See Duwaji' s letters to Kalvar isky i n CZA, S25/
5789; and H ai m Ar losor ov' s political di ar y for September 30, October 27, and December
4, 1931, CZA, Z 4/3663 ( II- III) . T he publ i shed ver sion of Ar losor ov' s di ar y conceals D uwaji's i denti ty, as i t does the identities of m any Ar ab inter locutor s. See H ai m Ar losor ov,
Yoman Yerushalayilm
22. O n the opposi ti on and the congress, see the general remarks of Rashid R i da i n alManar (February 1932) , 32(2): 124- 26.
23. T ypescr i pt o f t he m ani festo, w i t h a f ul l l i st o f signatories, i n uncatal ogued fi l e
enti tl ed " H i sab jar i m a' a al - bank al-carabi fi l - quds , " ISA.
24. R efutati on i n al-fami'a al-carabiyya, N ovem ber 25, 1931; Ar abi c tex t o f A m i n al Husayni' s r ebuttal i n al-Fath (Rajab 23, 1350) , 6(279): 10- 11.
25. Al-lami'a al-'arabiyya, December 4, 1931.
26. O n Sacid, see G. Kam pffm eyer , " Egy pt and W ester n Asi a." For the course of the
negotiations, see al - M ugattam, D ecem ber 5- 8, 1931; a n d r evi ew o f t he enti r e process,
December 18, 1931. For a copy of the Decem ber 4, 1931 pr ocl am ati on of Shaw kat ' Al i
and Sai d on the progress of negotiations, see ISA, di vi si on 65, fi l e 43. Rashid Rida gave
his o w n ver si on o f t he di spute, i n w hi c h he, too, attem pted t o m edi ate, i n al- M anar
(February 1932) , 32(2): 128- 32.
27. For accounts of the counter-congress, see W auchope (Jerusalem) to C unl i ffe- Li ster ,
January 30, 1932, L./M S/10/1314, fi l e 206; and the hostile account i n al-famica al-'arabiyya,
December 23, 1931.
I N DEFENSE O F J E RUS A L E M
1
9
2
28. Q uot ed i n Al fr ed N i el sen, " T he Inter nati onal Islam ic C onfer ence at Jerusalem,"
343.
29. Inter vi ew i n al-Mugattam, Decem ber 12,1931.
30. H i l seyi n N aki b (Nice), secretary to Abdi l l m eci d, pr ocl am ati on/l etter of N ovem ber
14,1931, tr anslated i n al-Mugattam, Decem ber 31,1931.
31. T he subject of Egypt and the congress has been studi ed by Thom as M ayer , " Egy pt
and the General Islamic Confer ence of Jerusalem i n 1931"; and Kedour i e, " Egy pt and the
Caliphate," 195- 97.
32. N ur al-islam (Cairo) (October—November 1931) , 2(6): 464.
33. Am i n al- Husayni to Ki ng R ead, October 29,1931, DWQ, Prime M i ni str y, al - khi l afa
al-islamiyya, uncatal ogued box.
34. C opy of pr oclam ation of October 27,1931, M RI, fi l e 1935. T ex t also publ i shed i n
al-jamica al-carabiyya, October 29,1931.
35. See hi s remarks as r epor ted i n al-famica al-'arablyya, N ovem ber 9,1931.
36. Zaw ahi r i , al-Siyasa wel-Azhar, 318. For another ver sion of thei r m eeting, see Tahir ,
Nazariyyat al-shura, 99-100.
37. Al - M anar (February 1932) , 32(2): 121- 24.
38. Al-jamica al-'arabiyya, N ovem ber 12,1931. See F 0141/728, fi l e 1132, for the discrete
Egypti an pr otest against the article, m ade to Br i ti sh author ities.
39. Al-Ahram, N ovem ber 6,1931; al-famra al-'arabiyya, N ovem ber 9,1931.
40. T ex t o f l etter i n al-lamt'a al-carabiyya, N ovem ber 11, 1931; C O732/51, fi l e 89205,
par t 2. For Fu' ad' s dispar aging views of these assurances, see r epor t on audience, i n Sir
Percy Lor ai ne (Cairo), di spatch of N ovem ber 17,1931, C O732/51, fi l e 89205, par t 2.
41. Si r Percy Lor ai ne (Cairo), cable to Jerusalem, N ovem ber 30,1931, C 0732/ 51, fi l e
89205, par t 2.
42. Egypti an consul (Jerusalem), undated dispatch (c. late October 1931), MRI, fi l e 1935;
another copy i n ISA, di vi si on 65 (captured archive of the Egypti an consulate i n Jerusalem),
fi le ( ol d num ber ) 1068; Egypti an consul (Jerusalem), di spatch of N ovem ber 2 or 3,1931,
in same fi l e.
43. C har gé d' affair es (Jidda), telegr am o f N ovem ber 14, 1931, F 0371/15282, E5667/
1205/65.
44. For the text of the belated Saudi letter to Am i n al- Husayni, see al-Mugattam, Januar y
10,1932.
45. T he Hijazi m inister of war , Jamal al- Ghazzi, was the m edi um for thi s r um or . See
inter view i n al-Mugattam, Decem ber 4,1931.
46. M i l ni r Bey appear ed at t he m i ni str y on Oc tober 23, 1931, and t he exchange o f
views w as descr ibed i n a r epor t o n pl ans f or t he Jerusalem congress, condensed fr om
"diverse sources," and circulated i nter nal l y i n the m inistr y on December 3,1931; see AFC,
carton 71, fi l e 13/4.
47. Sir George Clerk (Ankara), dispatch of Novem ber 12,1931, F 0406/68, E5784/1205/
65.
48. C unl i ffe- Li ster ( London) t o W auc hope (Jerusalem), N ovem ber 18, 1931, F 0406/
68, E5742/1205/65.
49. Rendel' s notes on meeting, Novem ber 20,1931, F 0371/15283, E5770/1205/65. The
Indi a Offi ce was r epor tedly i n agreement w i th this conclusion, but an undated dr aft letter
fr om t he Under secr etar y o f State f or Indi a t o t he Under secr etar y o f State f or For eign
Affai r s offer ed that " t he r efusal o f a passpor t to Abdul M aj i d m i ght have unfor tunate
effects on [Shaw kat ' Al i ' s] behavi our dur i ng hi s vi si t t o Palestine for the C onfer ence."
L/P&S/10/1314.
50. W auc hope (Jerusalem) t o C unl i ffe- Li ster ( London) , N ovem ber 20, 1931, F 0 3 7 1 /
15283, E5785/1205/65.
220
I
N
DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
51. C unl i ffe- Li ster ( London) t o W auc hope (Jerusalem), N ovem ber 30, 1931, F 0 4 0 6 /
68, E5920/1205/65.
52. G. C l er k ( Ankar a) , di spatch of N ovem ber 12,1931, F 0406/68, E5784/1205/65.
53. Cler k, di spatch of December 1,1931, F 0406/68, E6050/1205/65.
54. C ham br un ( Ankar a) , di spatch of December 14,1931, AFC, car ton 66, fi l e 12/2.
55. Egypti an consul (Jerusalem), dispatch of December 3,1931, ISA, division 65 (captured'
archive of the Egypti an consulate i n Jerusalem), fi l e 1068.
56. James M or gan ( Ankar a) , di spatch o f Decem ber 8, .1931, F 0406/ 68, E6172/1205/
65. For the Tur ki sh text, see T ev fi k R asta Ar as, Lozanin Izierinde 1 3 8 - 3 9 .
57. Al- Fath ( Januar y 15, 1932) , 6( 285) : 545- 48, 557- 59; La Nation arabe ( N ovem ber December 1931) ( no. 10- 11) : 9- 13.
58. See lists i n Kupfer schm i dt, " T he General M uslim Congress," 158- 62; F 0371/16009,
E753/87/65; and La Nation arabe ( Novem ber - Decem ber 1931) ( no. 10- 11) : 14- 19.
59. F or hi s r ol e i n Jerusalem and hi s activities o n behal f o f t he H i j az r ai l w ay, see
Muhammad Sa'id M u d h a k k i r a t i 'an al-qadaya al-'arabiyya wel-calam al-islami, 24060,270- 71.
60. For a tr ansl ati on i nto Ar abi c of his U r du address, see al-jamica aVarabiyya, December
16,1931. O n that occasion, he said: " Y ou have seen that I have not par ti ci pated m uch
in y our deliber ations, because of m y lack of fam i l i ar i ty w i th Ar abi c."
61. O n Ishaki, see the vol um e by Tahi r cagatay, et al., Muhammad Ayaz Ishaki. See also
his pam phl et subm i tted t o the congress, enti tl ed Risala khatira ila al-mu'tamar al-islami al-
'amm ' a n ha/at al-muslimin fi'l-Rusiya, a copy of which is preserved in MRI, file 1951.
62. See hi s pr ocl am ati on t o the congress enti tl ed Bayan ila al-mu'tamar al-islami al-'amm
. ' a n halal al-muslimin li'l-Qalqas, a c opy of w hi c h is preserved i n M R I, fi l e 1951. Al s o
preserved her e is a l etter fr om Ishaki and Sam il t o Ki ng Fu' ad o f Egypt, appeal i ng for
material and political aid for Russian Muslims. Thei r agitated remarks to the congress on
Soviet pol i cy appear i n ablami' a at-'arablyya, D ecem ber 20, 1931. T he pr esence o f t w o
leading Russian expatr iates evoked a Sovi et pol em i c agai nst t he congress b y L. I. Kl i -
movich, Musul 'manamdamn! khalila, summarized by N. A. Smirnov, Ocherki istorii izucheniia
islama v SS5R, 232-33.
63. Agha Buzurg al-Tihrani, Tabagat a'/am n u g a b e al-bashar a l - r a b i " a s h a r ,
1(4): 1437- 41.
64. Muhawarat al-imam al-muslih Kashil al-Ghite, 52-53.
65. M uham m ad al - H usayn Al Kas hi f al - Ghi ta' , al - M ur aj tat al-Rayhanlyya.
66. T i hr ani , Tabagat, 1( 2) : 613- 15.
67. Muhawarat al-imam al-muslih Kashil al-Ghite, 55.
68. For a defense of his r ole as pr ayer leader to a Sunni congr egation, see Hashim alDaftar dar al - M adani and M uham m ad ' Al i al - Zu' bi , al-Islam bayna al-sunna wel-shi'a, 1: 5657. For criticism by R ashi d R i da on the w ay i n w hi c h Shay k h M uham m ad al - H usayn
conducted hi m sel f on thi s occasion, see al-Manar (September 1933) , 33(5): 394- 95.
69. For the text of his address, see the pam phl et al-Khutba al-terikhiyya. T hi s was published under the auspices of the congress itself.
70. H. A. R. Gi bb wr ote that the i nvi tati on to Shi'is was a " str i ki ng i nnovati on, inasmuch
as i t was the fi r st outw ar d m ani festati on of a new spir it of co- oper ati on ( bor n i n par t of
common adversity) w hi ch hel d out the hope of healing the age- l ong breach betw een the
Sunni and Shi ' ah branches of Islam ." O f thi s " fanc i ful and pr em atur e" obser vation, Elie
Kedour ie w r ote that, "needless t o say, thi s spi r i t o f cooper ati on betw een Shi ' i tes and
Sunnis was visible nei ther then nor since." Gi bb, " T he Islamic Congress at Jerusalem,"
101- 2; Kedour i e, Chatham House Version, 384- 85.
71. T he alter cation occurred betw een ' Abd al- Rahm an ' Azzam , of W afdi st affi l i ati on,
and Sul aym an Fawzi, a j our nal i st o f r oyal i st sym pathi es w h o w as i n t he pay o f t he
Egyptian consulate i n Jerusalem. T he i nci dent attr acted m uch attenti on. See the account
I N DEFENSE O F J ERUSALEM
2
2
1
of the Egypti an consul (Jerusalem), dispatch of December 8, 1931, ISA, di vi si on 65 (captur ed ar chive o f the Egypti an consul ate i n Jerusalem), fi l e 1068. T he fi l e also i ncl udes
Fawzi's ow n handw r i tten account of the incident, dated December 7, 1931, and a di spatch
fr om the Egypti an consul o f Decem ber 13, 1931, r epor ti ng the disbur sem ent of E30 t o
Fawzi. F or the publ i shed account, see al-Arnica al-'arabiyya, Decem ber 7, 1931.
72. Statem ent by Shaw kat ' Al i at Palace H otel , December 5, 1931, i n presence of ' Abd
al- Ham id Sai d and other s, ISA, uncatal ogued fi l e enti tl ed " H i sab j ar i m a' a al - bank al ' arabi fi l - quds ."
73. Tahir, Nazariyyat al-shura, 190.
74. F or t he di sr upti ve activities o f thi s gr oup, w hi c h even i nc l uded sm oki ng i n t he
congress hal l w her e thi s was pr ohi bi ted, see Tahi r , Nazariyyat al-shura, 106- 7. I t was appar ently Kal var i sky w ho w r ote to t he Jewish Agenc y that " I ar r anged that a gr oup o f
four peopl e i n the congress hal l w oul d conduct affair s such that ther e w oul d always be
disaffection am ong the par ticipants." Those nam ed over lap the list given by Tahir . Letter
of December 10, 1931, CZA, S25/5689.
75. Ac c ount o f ' Azzam' s expl usi on i n W auc hope (Jerusalem), telegr am o f Decem ber
17, 1931 and attached com m uni qué, F 0371/15283, E6296/1205/65.
76. Notes of m ufti' s inter view w i th W auchope, December 17, 1931, F 0371/16009, E87/
87/65.
77. Gi bb, W hither Islam?, 362- 63.
78. Geor ge Antoni us, Annual Repor t to the Insti tute of Cur r ent W or l d Affai r s for year
endi ng September 30, 1932, i n Antoni us - Ox for d; also copy i n ISA, di vi si on 65 ( Antoni us
Papers), fi l e 707.
79. H ai m Ar l osor ov (Jerusalem) t o S. Br odetsky ( London) , N ovem ber 13, 1931, CZA,
Z4/10042.
80. W auc hope (Jerusalem), di spatch of M ar ch 26, 1932, L/P&S/10/1314.
81. R epor t on proceedings of the congress, enclosed i n di spatch fr om Foreign M i ni str y
to Gai l l ar d (Cairo), Januar y 29, 1932, AFC, car ton 66, fi l e 12/2.
82. T he discussion on thi s issue is dr aw n fr om al-lamfa al-'arablyya, Decem ber 16, 1931.
83. Ibi d.
84. Ibi d., Decem ber 17, 1931, f or the r esults o f the voti ng. F or the ful l l i st o f those
elected, see Mugarrarat almUztamar al-islami al-camm fi dawratihi al-'ula, 24-25.
85. Q uot ed by Nielsen, " T he Inter nati onal Islamic Confer ence at Jerusalem," 344.
86. a l - ' a r a b i y y a , Decem ber 15, 18, 1931.
87. Descr ibed by D onal d N . W i l ber , Riza Shah Pahlavi, 39- 55.
88. For his i nvol vem ent, see H i dayat Al l ah H aki m Il ahi Far iduni, Asrar-i siyasi-yi kudata:
zindigani-yi aqa-yi Sayyid Ziya' al-Din-i Tabatabei, 109-14, 118.
89. Char les H ar t (Teheran), di spatch of December 30, 1931, N A, R G59, 867n.00/138.
90. H ar t, di spatch of January 15, 1932, N A, R G59, 867m 00/143.
91. Ar sl an, Sayyid Rashid Rida, 641- 42.
92. Fr ench t ex t o f char ter i n AH P, 36:165ff.; Ar abi c tex t i n al- M anar ( M ar ch 1932) ,
32(3): 209- 12.
93. Al - M anar ( M ar ch 1932) , 32(3): 194- 95.
94. A . J. Ki ngsl ey, Assi stant D eput y C om m andant C . I . D . , t o C hi ef Secretary f or
Palestine, July 30, 1932, L/P&S/10/1314, fi l e 5326.
95. Z i ya al - D i n hi m sel f gave an account of the begi nni ng of his activities i n a l engthy
circular l etter t o members of the executive com m ittee, dated Augus t 14, 1932, ISA, uncatalogued fi le appar ently fr om seized papers of ' Aw ni ' Abd al- Hadi (hereafter: Tabataba' i
Report).
96. Typescr i pt copy i n ISA, di vi si on 65, fi l e 707; another copy appended to Tabataba' i
Report.
97. For texts, see Filastin, June 11, 1932.
222
I
N
DEFENSE OF JERUSALEM
98. Typescr i pt copy i n ISA, di vi si on 65, fi l e 707; another copy appended to T abatabei
Report.
99. For a list of branches, see T abatabal Report, appendi x 1. For Ziya al - D i n' s remarks,
see Pilastin, Augus t 13, 1932.
100. For Zi ya' al- Din' s detai l ed account of the var ious opti ons for pr oceeding w i th the
univer sity, see hi s undated l etter to the members of a com m i ttee for the uni ver si ty, i n
ISA, di vi si on 65, fi l e 864; another copy is appended to the Tabataba' i Repor t.
101. Al-jamica al-carabiyya, N ovem ber 23, 1932.
102. Record of conver sation of M ar ch 16, 1933, betw een Am i n al - H usayni and Charles
Crane, as r ecor ded b y Geor ge Antoni us , ISA, di v i s i on 65 ( Antoni us Papers), fi l e 854.
Numerous schemes to raise m oney—m ost based on some sort of tax for services pr ovi ded
by the Supreme M usl i m C ounci l of Palestine—were aired dur i ng the congress itself. See
al-carabiyya, Decem ber 12, 1931.
103. Filashn, Decem ber 4, 1932. For examples of appeals, see Tabataba' i (Jerusalem) to
Ki ng Fu' ad (Cairo), M ay 16, 1932, MRI, fi l e 1935; Tabataba' i (Jerusalem) to ' Abbas Hilm i,
June 26, 1932, AHP, 125:16- 17.
104. D epar tur e detai l ed i n Filashn, M ay 5, 6, 1933.
105. Antoni us , Annual R epor t to the Insti tute of C ur r ent W or l d Affai r s for the year
endi ng September 30, 1934, i n Antoni us - Ox for d. For accounts of the mission, see Oriente
Modern° (1933), 13: 293- 95, 336- 39, 558- 60, 402- 4. ' Al l uba has l eft an account o f hi s
jour ney to Indi a, i n al-Fath (June 21, 1935) , 9(450): 1220- 21; (June 28, 1935) , 10(451): 14–
17.
106. D ' Aum al e (Jerusalem), di spatch o f M ay 9, 1935, AF C car ton 66, fi l e 12/1. F or
earlier evidence of ' Alluba' s interest i n m aki ng Egypt the center of the congress functi ons,
see Filastin, Januar y 14, 1933. For an account of the m edi ati on m ission to Ar abi a, see alManar (July 1934), 34(3): 232- 35.
107. Secr et pol i ce r epor t, Palestine, no. 13/33, Apr i l 22, 1933, U P&S/ 12/ 2118; El y
Palmer (Jerusalem), di spatch o f M ar c h 6, 1935, N A , R G59, 867n.00/238; Palestine Post
(Jerusalem), Januar y 16, 1935.
108. F or a vi ew o f the secretariat as essentially closed, see Antoni us , Annual R epor t
to the Insti tute of C ur r ent W or l d Affai r s for year endi ng September 30, 1935, Antoni us Oxfor d.
109. Paul o Boneschi, " l i ne fatw a du Gr ande M uf t i de Jerusalem."
110. Al-Mudattam, Febr uar y 7, 1937.
111. Geor ge W adsw or th (Jerusalem), dispatch of February 19, 1937, NA, RG59, 86711.00/
440.
112. Enclosur e no. 1 i n R. Bul l ar d (Jidda), di spatch o f M ar ch 9, 1937, F 0371/20839,
E1868/201/25.
113. Fr itz Gr obba, Manner und Machte im Orient, 273.
12. SWISS EXILE
1. Sharabasi, Am ir al-bayan, 2: 8 1 5
- Ihsan El - D j abr i , " Le Congr es Isl am i que d' Eur ope" ; La Tribune dOrient, Oc tober 31,
2.
1935,
1 7 .for w hat the sponsors r egar ded as a " com pte- r endu exact."
3. " D er Muslimische Kongress von Europa, Genf September 1935" (republishes account
of La Tribune dOrient, October 31, 1935, w i th i ntr oducti on) ; Vi r gi ni a Vacca, " II Congress°
dei M us ul m ani d' Eur opa a Gi nevr a" (based on the Damascus al-Ayyam).
4. [l qbal ' Al i Shah], " Eur opean M usl i m Confer ence at Geneva." The author shi p of this
anonym ous piece has been deduced fr om its contents.