hypermasculinity

Transkript

hypermasculinity

AİBÜ Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 2014, Cilt:14, Yıl:14, Sayı:2, 14: 233-262
RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND IRAN AFTER THE
ARAB SPRING: THE EXTENT OF A PRAGMATIC
RAPPROCHEMENT
Burak KÜNTAY*
ARAP BAHARI SONRASI TÜRKİYE İRAN İLİŞKİLERİ:
PRAGMATİK UZLAŞMANIN BOYUTU
Abstract
This article is attempting to find an answer to the questions of “How are Turkish
and Iranian relations affected by the recent happenings in the Middle East and
what is the possible extent of pragmatic rapprochement?” It is believed that both
countries’ contradicting ways of understanding the reasons and the outcomes of
the Arab Spring together with several regional issues have put Turkey and Iran
into a competitive atmosphere. However, due to the interdependence between
Turkey and Iran together with the regional balances, a severed relationship
between these particular countries is not expected. But although there is a
considerable enhancement in Turkish-Iranian relations since 2002 encouraged
both by the current Turkish government and regional as well as international
atmosphere, it is not free from any tensions and therefore it would be
miscalculating to claim that both countries have formed matured cooperation that
is very strong.
Keywords: Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish Iranian Relations, Arab Spring,
Interdependence, Foreign Policy Analysis
Öz
Bu makale Ortadoğu’da yaşanan son gelişmelerin Türkiye-İran ilişkileri üzerine
nasıl etkilediği ve bu iki ülke arasındaki pragmatik yakınlaşmanın muhtemel
kapsamının ne denli olacağı sorularına yanıt aramaya çalışmaktadır. Her iki
ülkenin Arap Baharı’nın nedenleri ve sonuçlarına yönelik farklı yaklaşımlara
sahip olmasıyla beraber diğer bölgesel meseleler Türkiye ve İran’ı rekabetçi bir
ortama sürüklemiştir. Bunlara rağmen, iki ülkenin arasındaki karşılıklı bağımlılık
ve bölgesel dengeler değerlendirildiğinde bu ülkeler arasındaki ilişkilerin
tamamen kopması beklenmemektedir. Yine de tüm bunlara rağmen, 2002 sonrası
Assist. Prof., Bahçeşehir University Faculty of Economics and Administrative
Sciences, Department of Political Science and International Relations;
[email protected]
*
233
AIBU Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, Vol:14, Year:14, Issue:2, 14: 233-262
mevcut Türk Hükümetiyle beraber bölgesel ve uluslararası ortamın teşvikleri
sayesinde iki ülke arasındaki ilişkiler kayda değer bir şekilde gelişmiş olsa da bu
ilişkiler devam eden ve ileride olabilecek gerginliklerden de asla muaf tutulamaz.
Bu nedenle, Türkiye ve İran’ın tam anlamıyla olgun ve güçlü bir işbirliğine
gireceğini değerlendirmek çok da doğru bir tahmin olmaz.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Dış Politikası, Türkiye-İran İlişkileri, Arap Baharı,
Karşılıklı Bağımlılık, Dış Politika Analizi
1. Introduction
With the emergence of so-called “Arab Spring”, the Middle East has
entered into a new era of significant transformation process. These
political movements have impact on the countries located in the region
and on Turkey as well. Turkey’s Justice and Development Party1 (AKP
henceforth) government established very close relations with the Middle
Eastern countries irrespective of their regime types since 2002. However,
as the uprisings have broken out Turkish policy makers began to
emphasize the need for the promotion of democracy in the region and
supported the protesters. Iran, on the contrary, has also welcomed the
uprisings, except the one in Syria, but with a more colored ideology. Both
countries’ contradicting ways of understanding the reasons and the
outcomes of the Arab Spring together with several regional issues have
put Turkey and Iran into a competitive atmosphere. This article is aimed
at finding out the effect of the Arab Spring on the relations of Turkey and
Iran and whether their pragmatic rapprochement can be durable. In
accordance with this given aim, the article is going to begin with TurkishIranian relations since 2002 and Turkey’s perception of the Arab Spring.
The next section is going to mention how Iran views the events that have
taken place since late 2010. Afterwards, the article is going to touch upon
several disputes between these two countries that have emerged after the
Arab Spring accordingly or not and try to express their effects on
Turkish-Iranian relations. The following section is going to refer to the
extent of Turkish-Iranian dependence. Consequently, the article would try
to reach a conclusion about these countries’ relations in the near future
under given political and economic data. Thus, with these sections the
article would give detailed interpretation of Turkish and Iranian course of
relations from 2002 until the recent happenings in the region and would
clarify the extent of their rapprochement.
1
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) in Turkish.
234
2. Turkish-Iranian Relations Since 2002 and Turkey’s Attitude
towards the Arab Spring
With the rise to power of AKP in 2002, Turkey’s perception of the
Middle East together with its national identity as a Western and secular
state have been altered with AKP’s civilizational, cultural and Islamic
approach. Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu’s impact on the government and
his various foreign policy understandings, namely, rhythmic diplomacy,
multi-dimensional foreign policy, zero problems with neighbors, order
instituting actor, and proactive foreign policy (Davutoğlu 2012:4) have
also been significant.
Turkey has become gradually and relatively active player in the region
under the AKP government since 2002. Turkey redefined its geographical
security environment over the last decade by deepening its engagement
with the Middle Eastern countries (Öniş 2012:45). Turkey has established
closer ties with Syria, Iran, and Iraq, assumed a leadership position in the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), attended Arab League
conferences as permanent observatory state since 2006, and contributed
to UN forces in Lebanon. She has also mediated in the Syrian - Israeli
conflict as well as the nuclear standoff with Iran (Taşpınar 2012:127).
Therefore, these issues have occupied foreign affairs of Turkey for a long
time. AKP’s predecessors have actually, to varying degrees, emphasized
cultural and historical ties with the Middle East (Altunışık 2009:178) but
what AKP government has been doing is somewhat more than
emphasizing, as it tried to develop a vision that located Turkey to the
Islamic civilization and brought out Eastern and Islamic identity of it (Dal
2012:250). The other motivating factor that has led AKP to deal with the
region is the “belief that Turkey, as the inheritor of the Ottoman Empire,
holds a particular responsibility for the nature of international relations in
this region” (Oğuzlu 2008:13). AKP strongly believed that the history
and culture together with economic interdependence would consolidate
relations with the Middle Eastern countries and bring each party closer.
Besides AKP’s increasing role in foreign policy making, there are other
factors that we should also mention for greater concern of the region in
Turkish foreign policy. Economic factors, especially Turkey’s export-led
growth policy advanced with Iran’s huge market potential and economic
capacity led Turkey to spread its economic power and needs as a “trading
state” (Kirişçi 2009:29-56). Rising energy demand of Turkey also
required better relations with the states in the region, particularly with
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Iran. Moreover, the regional developments in the Middle East, like US
invasion in Iraq in 2003 in the name of Bush Doctrine, and Turkish
parliament’s decision in March 1, 2003 have worsened Turkish-US
relations and also increased anxiety in Turkey concerning its vital
interests. Hence, Turkey not only with Iran but also with Syria increased
its diplomatic and economic relations in order to “soft balance” the USA
(Ayman 2012:566-567). Iran believed that it was surrounded and
contained with US troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Turkey, on
the other hand, felt that it was sidelined and realized that there was an
increasing cooperation between the Iraqi Kurds and the USA leading the
way for a Kurdish state (Ibid.). Rising terrorism also have an effect in
Turco-Iranian rapprochement. Iranian former President Ahmadinejad
stated that “We have to have coordination between the governments of
Turkey, Iran and Iraq” (Today’s Zaman 2008). Hence, fighting
cooperatively against “cousin” terrorist groups, namely PKK and PJAK
became another factor that has increased strategic relations between
Turkey and Iran.
The deadlock in Turkey-EU relations in 2006 (Dal 2012:250) resulted
with the EU Council’s decision on suspension of eight chapters and
economic crisis that the world, particularly Europe was facing have also
provided an encouraging atmosphere for improvement in the relations
with the Middle Eastern countries and Iran in particular. Moreover,
Turkey decided to further its relations with Iran that is following a
nuclear program, as Turkey is highly worried about full-fledged war in its
southern borders. Turkey, for a long time, believes that an isolated and
marginalized Iran would not help to peace and stability in the region
(Ayman 2012:577-578). Furthermore, Turkey also believes that there is
no need to negotiate on military means to prevent Iran, as diplomatic
means are not fully exhausted (Ibid.). Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan
declared:
“We are against the possession of nuclear weapons in our
region. We always give advice to Iran about this issue, and
they tell us that they are not working on nuclear weapons.
But those who ask Iran not to produce nuclear weapons
should themselves give up their nuclear weapons first”
(Zıbak 2018).
Hence, Turkey always supported the rights of NPT signatory Iran for its
pursuits to develop its nuclear program to reach peaceful ends. Israel was
not mentioned directly by Erdoğan but it is clear that he criticizes the
West, particularly the USA for supporting a non-contracting state, namely
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Israel that is believed to have nuclear weapons. Turkey and Brazil voted
against to the UN Security Council’s sanctions on Iran and both countries
also offered a uranium swap deal to Iran in 2010, which indicated a very
concrete support for Iran.
The increase of the weight of the Middle East in Turkish foreign policy
and changing self-perception of Turkey caused Turkey to act like Iran in
some respects (Ayman 2012:570). Most clear example of this might be
Turkey’s worsened almost severed relations with Israel and Turkey’s
high degree of support to Palestinians (Ibid.) and its closer engagement
with Hamas. Israel’s attack on Turkish flagged Mavi Marmara, which
was going to Gaza, has also caused enhanced relations between Turkey
and Iran.
These policies and factors coincided with AKP’s steadily increase in
foreign policy making process, as it prioritized Turkey’s relations with
the Middle Eastern and North African countries and “…thus catalyzed a
significant revision of Turkish foreign policy toward its Middle Eastern
neighbors generally and a new era in Turkish-Iranian relations in
particular” (Habibi 2012:2). Thus, in recent years, Turkey and regional
countries, particularly Iran have moved markedly closer on trade,
diplomacy and strategic affairs.
Since the Islamic revolution in Iran, Turkish and Iranian relations
followed a rugged path, and they were indicated as uneasy neighbors
having totally different ideologies. Each country represented explicitly
divergent principles, while Turkey is having a secular democracy, being a
NATO member and an ally of Israel, in contrast, Iran having a theocratic
autocracy, believing the United States to be the world’s “Great Satan”
and openly calls for the destruction of Israel (McCurdy 2008:88). But
each country, downgrading all those ideological differences among their
regime types and not intervening into their domestic issues, they began to
come closer and realized that they were in need of one another. Iran’s
perception in Turkey and Turkey’s perception in Iran gradually changed
and lead to better economic and political relations and eliminated
competitive and confrontational expressions made by two parties to a
great extent (Keneş 2012:198).
The Arab Spring, however, caused reorientation in Turkish foreign policy
towards the region, as Turkish policy makers had to decide which party,
i.e. well established relations with the authoritarian leaders or the
protesters, to support. People who protested against their governments
were perceived as people fighting for more freedom, equality and
237
democracy by Turkish policy makers. Davutoğlu stated that “Turkey’s
value-based approach and emphasis on democracy and popular
legitimacy have underpinned its policy toward the uprisings in the Middle
East” (Davutoğlu 2012:8). It is understood from Davutoğlu’s statement
that Turkey is going to support the people seeking for democracy
regarding value-based approach, democracy and popular legitimacy, but
Turkey before the beginning of the uprisings formed very close relations
with former leaders of those countries facing with political transition
today. Those leaders or the governments, who were highly criticized for
oppressing and for not listening to their people by Turkish leaders, were
one of the closest friends of Turkish leaders. AKP’s initial close relations
with the authoritarian leaders were not really for the sake of democracy
or its promotion. Rather it was for the above mentioned reasons, namely,
“mutual gain through economic interdependence and close political ties
based on cultural affinity and Muslim brotherhood” (Öniş 2012:46).
Hence, this dilemma indicates us the fact that the uprisings were clearly
surprising for Turkish policy makers, who have been living in a spring
with their counterparts in the Middle East and North Africa.
3. Iran’s Attitude towards the Arab Spring
Unprecedented uprisings in several Arab countries caused shockwaves in
the region and in Iran particularly. The narrative illustrated by Iran
towards the uprisings in the region was, supportive to some extent, but
with a specific emphasis on ideology. Hence, uprisings in the region were
perceived as “Islamic Awakening” aimed at overthrowing Western
oriented, secular dictatorships, sharing similar traits with the 1979 Islamic
revolution in Iran (Uygur 2012:11). Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei alleged that “What I firmly announce is that a new movement,
with the grace of God, has started in the region... This widespread
awakening of nations, which is directed towards Islamic goals, will
definitely become victorious” (Davari 2011). According to CBN News
Sr. Reporter George Thomas, Iranian former President Mahmud
Ahmadinejad, like Khamenei believed that the uprisings were inspired by
the Iranian brand of Islam and on the day when Hosni Mubarak was
ousted he stated that “The final move has begun...a great awakening is
unfolding. One can witness the hand of Imam in managing it” (Thomas
2011). Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi has also stated in line with
other two leaders; “The revolution of the people of Tunisia and Egypt is
modeled after Iran's Islamic Revolution” (Molavi 2011). Iranian media,
on the other hand, have also followed the same track and qualified the
238
uprisings as Islamic awakening. As Ali Parchami, visiting research fellow
at the University of Reading, cited from the Kayhan newspaper of Iran;
“the popular stirrings … – represent a wave of ‘Islamic awakening’
which is long overdue and now represents an unstoppable force. Its
headlines refer not only to the uprising of the Arab masses but also to the
impending ‘Islamic Revolution’” (Parchami 2012:37). According to these
declarations of Iranian leaders and the mass media, we can come to a
conclusion that commonalities and correlations were tried to be found
between the uprisings and the raison d’être of the Iranian state and it was
believed by the Iranian leaders that at last, “the wave of the Islamic
awakening resonated through the Islamic world as an export of the
Islamic Republic of Iran” (Rafati 2012). This way of explaining the
uprisings does not cover all the reasons of the happenings, and does not
really mesh with the reality so we can claim that it is a little more than a
partial explanation.
Despite Iran’s claims that the Arab Spring was in line with her Islamic
revolution, recent developments seem to indicate the otherwise that
should be the result of Iran’s inability to adjust its foreign policy to
sudden changes. Newly established governments in Tunisia and Egypt
detached from Iranian model of government (Uygur 2012:12), or in other
words, Iranian theocracy. Although the former President of Egypt
Mohammed Morsi, both as the President of Egypt and the former Head of
non-aligned Movement, paid a visit to Tehran, the effect of a long lasting
discredit among Tehran and Cairo was still explicit. A member of the
Foreign Relations Unit from the Muslim Brotherhood’s political wing
stated:
“We believe that Iran has very bad practices in international
relations whether with the Gulf countries or with the Syrian
revolution, and we have a permanent problem with the Shia
issue - they're trying to spread this all over the region…
We're not willing to stress this relationship or fortify it or
build new links. We're trying to have normal relations, very
slow in pace and very alert because we don't trust their
foreign relations at all” (Knell 2012)
The coup in Egypt left Iran in serious fears, as Iranian officials were
afraid of the crisis in Egypt to spread around. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
warned on 9th of August that the political crisis in Egypt could spark a
civil war (Hashem 2013). He said that “We are worried about what is
happening in Egypt,” he said, adding, “Speculation about an impending
civil war is gaining momentum on a daily basis; this would be a disaster
239
with dire consequences” (Ibid.). In general, Iran does not want Egypt to
be influenced by Western states.
We should keep in mind that both Tunisia and Egypt are predominantly
Sunni Muslim countries, so this fact can be one of the reasons that Iran
had hard time in reaching to those states. In realistic terms, Iranian
leaders might not have thought that all of a sudden, Islamists would seize
the power and follow an Iranian like government model rather they might
have thought, or at least hope for the uprisings to lead to “an outcome
along the lines of the Iraqi model: a fragile state with flawed, albeit
democratic institutions, which provides Islamist parties – and their
Iranian patron – ample opportunity to influence and shape the character
of the government” (Parchami 2012:39). Taking the above mentioned
argument and Iranian perception of the Western powers into
consideration it would be righteous for us to claim that Iran would
definitely criticize any foreign interference.
Bahrain, for example, is another country that demonstrations inspired by
the Arab Spring were taking place. Bahrain is mainly a Shiite country
ruled by a Sunni Muslim family (Richter 2011) with state of emergency
laws (Mohammed 2012). Like in other instances demonstrations held in
the Pearl Square were initially aimed at “political and constitutional
reform, which was to pave the way for greater popular participation in
governance, equal access to socio-economic opportunities and
development, action against corruption, and termination of the alleged
practice of political naturalization” (BICI 2011). Hence we can claim that
protests were not directed to the King of Bahrain initially. But the turmoil
was escalated after the death of several protesters and it resulted in an
increase in criticisms against the monarchy. The Monarchy in Bahrain
requested military help from the member states of Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC)2. As a result, protests have been suppressed by the help of
Saudi and UAE-led GCC forces. Iran, severely criticized Arab forces
intervention into Bahrain and suppressing the protesters. Several Iranian
officials, mainly military officials, even threatened Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia (BİLGESAM 2011:11-12). Another instance that frustrated Iran is
Libya, as former leader Qaddafi was forced out of power by the help of
NATO operation. Hence, in general Iran does not want any foreign,
mainly Western intervention into the region.
2
GCC consists of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Ibid.,
p.132
240
Although Iran has supported the protesters in above mentioned countries,
it followed a totally different policy in Syria. Close relations with Iran
and Syria dates back to 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini and Hafez alAssad formed an alliance called “marriage of convenience” that greatly
affected the balance of power in the region (Cafiero 2012). Syria is the
only Arab country that has very close relations with Iran and Assad
regime and Iran also have belief in similar faith so that Iran never wants
Syrian regime to be vested in the hands of any group of people who
would follow policies against Iran.
4. Regional Confrontation or Silent Confrontation between
Turkey and Iran
The Arab Spring has a significant effect on the region in general, “as well
as forcing a reconsideration of Turkish and Iranian policies towards Arab
nations, the events of the Arab Spring have also affected how Turkey and
Iran view each other” (Iskander 2012). These countries were actually on
the same side, as they both supported revolutionary movements in
Tunisia and Egypt. But while Iran was supporting the protesters, as they
were believed to be acting for “Islamic Awakening”, Turkey, on the other
hand, perceived them as freedom and democracy fighters. Hence, there
was a huge ideological difference in the perception of the basic reasons of
the uprisings in the region. Although Iran claims that the Arab Spring was
equivalent to her own revolution, recent developments seem to indicate
the otherwise. Newly elected governments and the people living in the
Middle East are, seemingly, praising the “Turkish model” not the
“Iranian theocracy” according to recent surveys made by several
organizations (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012). Turkish model is used to
define a state which is moderately Islamic but secular in general and
enjoys the earnings of democracy and free market economy, whereas the
Iranian theocracy by definition refers to the opposite.
There has been a long standing debate whether Islam and democracy can
work properly in a predominantly Moslem society. Turkey’s relevance to
the issue of modernization in the Middle East and the Islamic world is not
entirely new (Altunışık 2008:41). After the end of the Cold War, during
the period of political reforms and transitions, Turkey was shown by
many Western circles as an example for newly founded, Muslim
populated states. The Economist even named Turkey as the “Star of
Islam” (Kirişçi 2012:34). Although the Arab Spring “encompasses a
variety of distinct social movements in various countries … common
241
history, culture, language, and complaints unite the Arab Spring
movement” (stevens 2012). This debate over Turkish Model resurfaced
after the uprisings but,
unlike in the past, this time the debate is occurring against a
backdrop of successful uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia that
have raised the genuine prospects of actual reform. This
time Turkey is being shown as a model by the very people
who are involved in efforts to bring about reform and
transformation to the Arab world (Kirişçi 2011:34-35)
Hence, not the Westerners or foreigners this time the people protesting
for more freedom, equality, democracy and respect to human rights have
desired to establish a Turkey-like model in their changing countries. As a
result, there is a popular opinion that Turkey and Turkish model could
best serve for a better future in transforming societies. TESEV’s recent
survey on the perception of Turkey in the Middle East indicates that
Turkey is perceived as a model country and people who support Turkish
model favor it mainly because of its economic advantages and its
democratic and secular traits (Akgün and Gündoğar 2012). Another poll
that was made in 2011 by the Arab American Institute Foundation
indicates that Turkey is more sympathized than Iran and perception of
Iran in the Arab world is in a decreasing trend.
Graph1 (Zogby 2011):
There has been a dramatic decrease in Iran’s favorable ratings since 2006.
242
Graph 2 (Ibid.): This graph shows the answer given to the question of “Please
tell us if your opinion of each of the following is favorable or unfavorable?”
In every county except Lebanon, Iran has a net unfavorable rating with
highest negatives in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and UAE. Iran’s
favorable rating in Lebanon is driven by strong support from that
country’s Shiite community (CIA World Factbook), with mixed Sunni
and Christian attitudes towards Iran. Iran’s contribution to peace in the
region is also lower than Turkey’s ratings (Zogby 2011). All of these data
increase Iran’s concerns about Turkey’s increasing popularity in the
region. Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan is perceived as a leader who
speaks for the Arab street and his visits to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya were
highly welcomed. His speech in Egypt about secularism3 has sounded
differently but positively in general in the region except Iran. Iran’s
prominent figure in religious affairs and politics, Ayatollah Hasimi
Sahrudi blamed Turkey on fostering “liberal Islam” for the sake of a
better position in the period of transition (Ayman 2012:580). Turkish
government seems to wish for a significant role in the region and tries to
become the leading power in the newly established order. In this regard,
in a Parliamentary meeting on the issues on Syria Turkey’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu asserted:
“We will manage the wave of change in the Middle East.
Just as the ideal we have in our minds about Turkey, we
have an ideal of a new Middle East. We will be the leader
and the spokesperson of a new peaceful order, no matter
what they say” (Davutoğlu 2012).
Hence, Turkey’s eagerness to be a leader in the region coincided with its
increasing popularity has discounted Iran naturally.
3
“…don’t be afraid of secularism. I hope that Egypt will be a secular state”
243
4.1. Dispute over the NATO Operation in Libya
Despite opposite thoughts of the reasons and the aims of the uprisings,
Turkey and Iran were actually in the same side, as they both supported
revolutionary movements in Tunisia and Egypt. However, Turkey’s
participation in NATO operation on Libya against Qaddafi and Iran’s
support for Shiite regime in Syria and Turkey’s support for rebels tinted
their opposing policies. Turkey, in the case of Libya, due to significant
economic interests, remained cautious about providing support for the
protesters and reluctant to give its approval to the NATO intervention
(Öniş 2012:51). Prime Minster Erdoğan even claimed that the NATO
intervention “would be absurd, unthinkable and useless” (Head 2011).
Davutoğlu was also in line with Erdoğan, as in his article titled
“Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring”
stated that “we expressed our opposition to foreign intervention because
this region’s future has to be decided by its people” (Davutoğlu 2012:8).
Both leaders were mostly afraid of facing an “Iraq-like scenario”
(Taşpınar 2012:135) again that would probably cause trouble. Increasing
turmoil in Libya, French government’s rising role in this particular case
and the fear of both losing the support of the Arab street and prestige in
the international arena, Turkey decided to take generally a passive part in
NATO intervention into Libya. On March 24, 2011 Turkish Parliament
approved Turkish participation in NATO intervention. The Turkish Navy
participated with five ships and one submarine in the NATO-led naval
blockade to enforce the arms embargo (Head 2011). Iran, on the other
hand, believed that the intervention was another example of imperialism
and warned Arabs not to be fallen into the hands of the Western powers.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei declared:
“Muslim nations in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen or other
countries need vigilance today. They should not allow
enemies confiscate the victories they’ve achieved…They
should not forget that those who have come to the scene in
Libya [NATO] today and consider themselves owners of the
uprising are the same people who used to sit and drink with
those who once suppressed the Libyan nation” (Dareini
2011).
Although Iran supported the protesters, its stance against NATO
operation in Libya was highly condemning.
244
4.2. Syrian Deadlock
Syria marks the most serious source of discord in Turkish-Iranian
relations. Ankara’s determined criticism of Syrian President Bashar alAssad, as well as its explicit support for the Syrian opposition and Syrian
immigrants4, has angered Iranian leaders. Syria is definitely Iran’s closest
ally in the region and Assad’s defeat would probably cause trouble to
Iran’s regional ambitions and also leave Tehran ever more isolated
(Larrabee 2012). It is also often argued that, any change in Syrian regime
would dismantle the so called “Shiite crescent”. Iran’s efforts to ensure
the continuation of the Assad regime can be viewed as an indicator of its
goal of having Shiite regimes in the region stay in power. Syria’s
geographical position is also very significant for Iran, as it is close to
Israel and it acts as a channel to Hezbollah and Hamas. Thus, “the
collapse of the Shiite regime in Syria would mean the end of Iran’s ability
to exert influence in Lebanon and Jordan through Syria” (Kaya 2012:6).
Turkey, initially tried to convince Assad to make several social,
economic and political reforms and provide peaceful transition. But
Turkish policy makers were not successful to persuade Assad’s
government to resolve the crisis in Syria in peaceful means and proAssad groups began to resort unpleasant confrontation to repress the
protesters. Davutoğlu stated:
“Our efforts to find a diplomatic solution, carried out in
coordination with the regional actors and the international
community, have fallen on deaf ears in Damascus. The
regime’s indiscriminate killings have reached such massive
proportions that they constitute crimes against humanity”
(Davutoğlu 2011:6).
Thus, Ankara blames Damascus of killing innocent people and not taking
any step to find a proper solution for the problem. Erdoğan also appeared
to be insulted personally by the fact that Assad had effectively lied to him
about the reforms, “much as he had been personally angered by Ehud
Olmert’s hiding the December 2008 Gaza war from him in a meeting, just
days before Israel launched that operation” (Taşpınar 2012:137). Hence,
tension between Ankara and Damascus is very high nowadays.
Iranian General Yahya Rahim Safavi blamed Turkey of being acting in
line with the West and pro-Westerners located in the region. He officially
Deputy Prime Minister of Turkey Beşir Atalay claimed that there are 105.000 Syrian immigrants in
Turkey. http://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/94370--suriyeli-gocmen-sayisi-105-bin
4
245
stated that “The Americans, Israelis, and some European and Persian
Gulf nations, in particular Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have delegated to
Turkey the task of achieving their goal to weaken or topple Bashar alAssad’s government or make it surrender” (Agence France-Presse 2012).
Iranian former Revolutionary Guards commander have also claimed that
Turkey was working cooperatively with the Zionists to confront Iran and
its allies. He declared that “Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are acting in
the interests of the US and the Zionists to weaken the resistance axis
comprising Iran, Syria and Hezbollah” (Ibid.). Turkish Prime Minister
Erdoğan, on the other hand, in an interview with the Turkish media had
stated that he had talked with Iranian former President Ahmadinejad and
told him that “the Assad administration is getting spoiled with your
encouragement” (CNNTurk 2012). Tensions increased at the end of June,
after Syria downed a Turkish fighter jet. In response, Erdoğan bluntly
warned Damascus to keep troops away from the Turkish-Syrian border
and requested a special meeting with its NATO allies to discuss a
common approach (Larrabee 2012). Iran would definitely oppose
severely to a similar scenario that was played in Libya. After the election
of Hassan Rouhani as the new President of Iran began to outmaneuver its
assertive policy on the Syrian issue but still any Western led intervention
would not be welcomed by Iran. So there is still highly conflicting
approaches to the Syrian turmoil between Turkey and Iran.
4.3. NATO Radar System Stationed in Malatya/Kürecik
In September 2011 Turkey agreed to host one of the early-warning radars
of NATO’s early warning missile defense system in its southeast, 700km
west of the Iranian border (Associated Press 2011). Tehran perceives this
system as a US led intrigue aimed at protecting Israel against a possible
counterattack by Iran, in the event that Israel targets Iran’s nuclear
facilities. Iran has threatened to make the radar in Turkey its first target in
the event of an attack (Kaya 2012). Turkish policy makers claim that the
radar system is not positioned with any particular country in mind and
have expressed their opposition to identifying Iran explicitly as a
potential attacker (Ibid.). Turkey has also intensely opposed sharing any
intelligence gained from the radar with Israel. Turkish President Abdullah
Gül, concerning the above mentioned issue, admitted:
“This is definitely not the case. Israel is not a NATO
member, thus it cannot benefit from NATO capabilities,
especially when Turkey is [involved]. Every move within
246
NATO comes via unanimity. These accusations are black
propaganda from the Israelis” (Hürriyet Daily News 2012).
Turkish President also stated that the radar system is not deployed against
Iran rather it is a precaution against any missiles. In his own words: “We
are a country that helped stop communism in the region and this radar
system is a precaution against missiles, as part of NATO defenses. Thus,
it is not of an offensive quality. It is not against countries, it is against
missiles” (Ibid.). NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen have
also denied reports that the intelligence obtained from the radar system
stationed in Turkey has been shared with Israel and affirmed:
“We do stress that data within this missile defense system
are not shared with a third country. Data are shared within
our alliance, among allies, it is a defensive system to protect
the populations of NATO allies” (Press TV of Iran 2012),
Although Turkish President and many other Turkish officials, as well as
NATO Secretary-General made similar statements saying that the radar
system is not against the threat of Iran, there is a popular belief that
NATO missile defenses will be oriented toward defending member
countries first and foremost from the threat posed by Iran’s expanding
strategic arsenal (Berman 2012). Iranian officials have severely criticized
Turkey’s plans to host the NATO missile shield. General Yahya Rahim
Safevi, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s military advisor, threatened Turkey
with adverse consequences unless it abandons its policies regarding
NATO’s missile shield and Syria (Milliyet 2011). Similarly, Iranian
Brigadier General Hacizade said:
“We have prepared ourselves. If there is an attack on Iran,
our first target will be the missile shield systems in Turkey,
and then we’ll turn to other targets…The missile shield to be
placed in Turkey is there not because NATO wants it to be,
but because the US wants to protect Israel. They are trying
to deceive the entire international community, starting with
the Turks, into thinking that NATO wants to do this. In
today’s world, the Zionist regime (Israel) conducts its acts
with the US, and the US conducts its acts as NATO.
However, we believe that the Turks are knowledgeable
enough to prevent such a conspiracy. The Muslim Turkish
people will destroy this system when it’s time” (Fars News
Agency 2011).
247
Vice-Chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign
Policy Commission Hossein Ebrahimi have also echoed same response
saying that Iran would retaliate by striking the radar site in Turkey,
should Iran be attacked (Ibid.). Despite harsh criticisms from both Iranian
religious leaders and high ranked military officials any declarations from
the government officials in the similar tone of the formers were not made
(Uygur 2012: 22). This could be an indication of Iran’s cautious steps to
give a message of its close monitoring the situation but not willing to
further infringe Turkish-Iranian relations.
4.4. Sectarian Fragmentation and the Dispute over the Future
of Iraq
There is also a growing concern for a sectarian fragmentation in the
region, where Shiites and Sunnis are at the opposite camps. Iran is
predominantly a Shiite country and a leader of a so called “Shiite
Crescent”. Recent developments in the region pave the way for Iran to
utilize its Shiite identity as a foreign policy tool and it generates a greater
geopolitical area for Iran to maneuver. But Iran’s Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khamenei “denounced ‘Shiite crescent’ issue as a propaganda
effort to intimidate Sunni nations and government of empowerment of
Shiites” (Office of Supreme Leader Sayyid Ali Khamenei 2006).
Turkey, on the other hand, is mainly dominated by Sunni Muslims but
also has significant amount of Alevis, who are closer to Shiite way of
Islam. Although Turkey tried to stay out of such conflict, it seems that
Turkey is already one of the major actors in this particular conflict,
especially when its Syrian and Iraqi policies are considered. Thus, two
countries seem to be in a complete disagreement over the future of Iraq.
Since the end of 2011, Iraq has emerged as an important front line
between Turkey and Iran. The withdrawal of US combat forces has left a
power vacuum there that both countries would like to exploit. Iran
viewed Iraq as its natural sphere of influence and followed mainly a
sectarian strategy, which required influencing the country via the Shiite
population. As in Syria, Iran would like to see Iraq dominated by Shiites,
such that it could control the regime there. According to Huffington
Post’s citation from Professor Mehrzad Boroujerdi,
“…Iran is a significant political force in Iraq… They are
actively and aggressively trying to keep al-Maliki in power.
The fear is that the downfall of al-Maliki, coupled with the
uncertainties about Assad’s fate in Syria, could leave the
248
Iranians suddenly looking at unfriendly faces” (Abdul-Zahra
and Murphy 2012).
Turkey, on the other hand, has advocated Iraq’s integrity and a
democratic, representative and pluralistic structure based on the equal
participation of all religious and ethnic groups in Iraq (Kaya 2011).
Turkey, more importantly, hosts Iraqi vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi,
who has been sentenced to death in absentia. Al-Hashimi is one of the
most influential and senior Sunni Muslim in a mostly Shiite Iraqi
government. He is accused of organizing terror attacks against Iraqi
officials and security forces (BBC 2012). Turkish Premier Erdoğan has
said that Turkey will host al-Hashemi “as long as he wants” and “accused
Iraqi Premier Maliki’s government of corruption, discrimination, and of
fuelling sectarianism” (Ibid.). Increasing tension between Turkey and the
central Iraqi government lead Turkey to follow its policies with Iraq
through Northern Iraq. In general, it is believed that a sectarian
fragmentation in the region would lead to further conflicts and even a
full-fledged war.
4.5. Disputes over Energy Issues and Sanctions
Tensions over energy are also mounting implicitly. Despite the signing of
a road map for expanded cooperation in early 2011, Turkey and Iran’s
energy relationship has been fraught with complications (Berman 2012).
Turkey tries to balance its relations with the West and East but it is not a
very easy course of action and it needs a very precautious foreign policy.
EU decided to stop buying crude oil from Iran in July 2012 and Iran
immediately declared that the European countries were adversary and
decided to stop selling its crude oil to those countries (Ayman 2012:587).
Turkey imports more than 30 percent of its daily consumption from Iran
and has so far given no indication that it will comply with a planned
European Union import embargo on Iranian crude. However, there are
now signs that Turkey is seeking to lessen its current, deep dependence
on Iranian oil and gas. Taner Yıldız, Turkish Minister of Energy and
Natural Resources, has declared that the amount of natural gas in
producing electricity is around 50 percent, so with the new investments
and resolutions we will try to restrain the role of natural gas in producing
electricity (Enerji Enstitüsü 2012). Turkish refiner TUPRAŞ, for instance,
is said to be in conversation with Saudi Arabian suppliers as part of a
concerted move to lessen Ankara's dependence on Iranian oil deliveries
and to diversify sources of energy supply (Ayman 2012). Recent data
249
indicates that Turkey’s crude oil imports from Iran fell by more than 30
percent to 75,281 barrels per day in October from September as volumes
of oil from other suppliers including Iraq and Saudi Arabia increased
(Coşkun 2012). But it is not the case in natural gas imports. Minister
Yıldız, said that Ankara tried to convince Washington not to impose
sanctions on its natural gas imports from Iran and continued by claiming
that “We said to them, if you tell us not to buy gas from Iran, that would
be a sanction on Turkey and not on Iran. They agreed not to include
natural gas agreements in the sanctions” (Ibid.). Iran is very significant
energy supplier, so it is not easy to decrease Turkey’s dependence on
Iran, due to economic, technological and geographical reasons.
5. Interdependence between Turkey and Iran
Turkish-Iranian relations have been very close since 2002. Besides
increased weight of the Middle East in Turkish foreign policy one of the
main driving factors behind increased Turkish-Iranian relations is
basically economic issues. There is a considerable increase in bilateral
commerce between these two countries. Bilateral trade has gradually
increased from around $1.3 billion in 2002 to $4.3 billion in 2005 and $
16 billion in 2011 (Sinkaya 2012:141).
Graph 3: This graph shows Turkey’s trade with Iran (TÜİK 2012)
The graph above indicates that Turkey’s trade with Iran is in an
increasing tendency. Decrease in trade in 2009 was because of global
economic crisis around the world. Hence, as a result of the effects of the
global economic crisis, Iranian exports dropped sharply in 2009 by
almost 60%, whereas Turkish exports remained stagnant in comparison to
the corresponding figures of the previous year. According to data of 2012
(until November) export and import levels have reached almost to the
same level and especially export level of that year has increased
250
noticeably. This might be the result of both Turkish businessman
eagerness to export more goods to Iran and imposition of sanctions on
shipping to and from Iran.
Turkish exports to Iran are mainly machinery, motor vehicles, iron and
steel products, boilers, electric devices, tobacco products (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs 2012). Turkish entrepreneurs are very interested in
investing in Iran, so Iran has become an increasingly important export
destination for Turkey. As an example “Iran imported 145 million dollar
worth of cars in the first seven months of 2008, a 167 percent increase on
the previous year’s figure” (McCurdy 2008:92). Moreover, Iran’s car
manufacturing giant Iran Khodro Company and Turkey’s Hema Endustri
are set to sign a deal worth 262 million $ to build two automotive
factories (Grove 2010). Another remarkable investment is GÜBRETAŞ’s,
a Turkish state owned fertilizer company, bought Iran’s giant in chemical
sector, namely, Razi Petrochemical Company in February 2008, by
paying 681 million $ to Iranian privatization administration (McCurdy
2008:92, Sinkaya 2012:142). Moreover, many Turkish construction
companies have numerous projects ranging from hotels to housing
complexes (Sinkaya 2012:142).
Besides all of these, Turkey is highly dependent on Iranian energy
exports. In 2011, Turkey imported 51% of its crude oil and 21% of its
natural gas from Iran (Babalı 2012:3). Recently, Turkey imports around
220.000 barrels of crude oil per day (Khajhepour 2012:21) from Iran, and
daily import of natural gas from Iran has reached up to 31,5 million m3
(Enerji Enstitüsü 2012). Hence, Iran is one of the most significant energy
suppliers of Turkey. Additionally, Iran is rather significant for Turkey’s
aim of becoming an energy hub and transit country. “Hence, through
friendly relations and energy cooperation with Iran, Turkey hopes to
become the energy corridor between the Caspian Sea region, the Middle
East and Europe” (Głogowska 2012). Despite severe opposition from the
United States in July 2007 former ministers in both countries signed an
agreement concerning transportation of both Iranian and Turkmen natural
gas to the European market via Turkey and Iran respectively (Kaya
2012:17). They also agreed to the development of South Pars field by
Turkish State Petroleum Corporation (McCurdy 2008:90). However, due
to further opposition from the United States and Europe’s decreasing
interest in resource diversification together with their reluctance in
cooperating with Iran led Turkey to cancel its investment to the above
mentioned project in 2009 (Kaya 2012:18). It was believed that with the
251
realization of the project Turkey would have become a significant
country for the EU and for whole Europe as well as a regional power.
It is believed that Iran, on the other hand, is also highly in need of Turkey
as an ally. Turkey is an opening gate for Iran’s strictly closed and
internationally isolated economy, where Turkey has significant economic
potential and access to wider region (Uygur 2012:25). Turkey, as an
economic partner and neighbor, combines some of the key characteristics
that Iranian stakeholders are favoring: “it is a Muslim country; it is one of
Iran’s strategic neighbors; and, its economy can offer Iran technological
and financial assistance in Iran’s projects” (Khajhepour 2012: 19).
According to the data of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, in the last
ten years, direct investments in Turkey from Iran exceeded 110 million $
(Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs). The driving force
behind rising investments to Turkey is that the Iranian companies want to
become stronger as a regional entity and want to learn from the
experiences of various successful Turkish companies. More importantly,
as Iran is facing with sanctions, Iranian companies are investing in and
began to operate from Turkey (Sinkaya 2012:142) so that they “can
continue their international business with less risk emanating from
international sanctions” (Khajhepour 2012: 21).
Moreover, place of Turkey in Iranian economy is in an increasing trend
due also to both increasing energy and non-energy exports (Habibi
2012:4) to Turkey and Turkey’s indispensable geographic position. With
the imposition of international sanctions Turkey plays an important role
as a transition route, as most of the western exports to Iran are transited
by land via Turkey (Khajhepour 2012: 21).
Graph 4 (Habibi 2012:4): This graph shows Iran’s Trade with Turkey in million
$
252
Many international companies, which are willing to invest in Iran, are
using Turkish Banks for major transactions (Khajhepour 2012: 21). Even
Iranian Central Bank also has accounts in Turkey to manage several
international transactions (Ibid.). Thus, Turkey has a vital role as it
constitutes the financial nucleus of Iranian economy.
6. Conclusion: Projections about the Future of Turkish-Iranian
Relations
There is a considerable enhancement in Turkish-Iranian relations since
2002 encouraged both by Turkish government preferences and regional
as well as international atmosphere, but it is not free from any tensions
and therefore it would be miscalculating to claim that both countries have
formed matured cooperation that is very strong. Especially open-ended
turmoil in Syria, sectarian disputes in the region, missiles deployed in
Turkey and possible deployment of Russian S-300 missiles in Syria
(BBC News 2013), normalization of Turkish Israeli relations (to some
extent) and many other factors affects the relations of Turkey and Iran. It
is believed that despite all of those disputes mentioned above any severed
relations and any armed conflicts between these given states are
detrimental and not likely to occur. Recent visits of both states’ Ministers
of Foreign Affairs indicate us the fact that the relations between these two
significant states of the region will continue in the near future.
Turkey and Iran have never been close allies in the past and seemingly,
never will be in the near future but because of their regional, especially
economic, interdependence they will continue to have relations at least in
low scale. Otherwise, it would be disastrous not only for these countries
but also for the wider region and for the World perhaps. Turkey does not
want a marginalized and isolated Iran that constitutes one of the most
significant energy suppliers to Turkey, in its southern border, whereas
Iran does not want to lose its significant economic partner and supporter
in international arena. Moreover, it is believed that Turkey’s relations
with Iran is also important for the United States and Israel as well, as
neither the United States nor Israel has direct channels of communication
with Iran. Hence, Israel’s normalized relations with Turkey and their
cooperation is very important especially for the United States. What this
process to conceive is still a huge mystery but Turkey’s role as a
communicator between parties before a possible military operation seems
very significant for all parties.
253
We should also touch upon to Israel’s apology. After Israel’s apology,
probably the first concrete steps towards normalization are going to be
taken by cooperating with Turkey and even including Turkey into the
process of energy deals in the Mediterranean. It is believed that the
United States is going to follow up the process, already US Secretary of
State John Kerry paid frequent visits to Turkey to negotiate this process
of normalization. Turkey, on the other hand, accepted the apology of
Israel and seems to espouse Obama’s mediation. However, only one out
of three requests of Turkey has been realized by Israel that is the apology,
remaining ones (compensation and lifting of the embargo) are yet to be
realized. So we cannot talk about total normalization, even Ambassadors
are not appointed to the capitals of each country.
Above mentioned disputes cause tensions among Turkey and Iran but not
as much as the one in Syria. It is believed that Iran is aware of the fact
that Turkey is a NATO member country for a long time and an ally of the
United States (despite several volatilities). As a result, it might have been
surprising if Turkey had not taken part in NATO operation in Libya, not
allowed NATO radar system to be stationed in Malatya and taken a closer
stand in Iraqi dispute to the United States. Government of Iran, most
probably due to economic relations with Turkey, did not take
significantly critical stance towards Turkey yet and whether they will
carry the burden of all economic and political problems if they lose
Turkey as a friend is rather debatable. Hence, apart from others, turmoil
in Syria seems to mark the most concrete dispute among Turkey and Iran.
So it would be righteous to claim that not the Arab Spring, in general, but
the crisis in Syria, mainly, caused so many problems for their relations.
However, for Iran there are growing messages coming both from
domestic and international circles to soften its stance against uprisings in
Syria. It is believed that, this way or another, the Assad regime is likely to
fall apart, as Syrian National Coalition (SNC hereafter) for revolutionary
and opposition forces is gaining recognition from most of the countries,
like the United States, Gulf states, the EU member states (Aljazeera
2012) and from Turkey as well. Moreover, Russia and China now assert
criticism to the killings of civilians and look for a resolution of the crisis.
Iran’s opposing circles have criticized Iranian policies in Syrian issue
saying that the resources and energy allocated to Syria should be used for
Iran’s future and its people (Kaya 2012:19). Reformists in Iran believe
that Iran should have taken a more calculated stand towards the crisis in
Syria by pressuring Assad to pull the army back from streets and carry
out substantial reforms (Ataie 2012). Former Deputy Foreign Minister,
254
Mohammad Sadr, “blamed Ahmadinejad’s government for failing to use
Iran’s regional capacity to coordinate with Turkey and international
bodies to reach a regional solution for Syria” (Ibid.). But throughout the
research, criticisms to Turkey and international entities came mostly from
the religious leaders and military officers of Iran not generally from
Ahmedinejad and his cabinet. Ahmadinejad, in an interview with CNN
condemned the use of violence by both parties in Syria and repeated
Iran’s recognition of the Syrian opposition and he stated that “We must
all say enough of this violence, right now,” he also add and said that “he
is working to organize a group to bring the two sides together” (CNN
Wire Staff 2012). Corresponding remarks have been uttered by the
Iranian former Foreign Minister, Akbar Salehi, who described the
protestors’ demands as legitimate (Ataie 2012). After the general
elections held in Iran, the newly elected President of Iran seems to keep
expectations at lower scale in regard to Iran providing military aid to
Syrian regime if Western forces attack him (Mostaghim and Williams
2013).
In light of all of these, it is believed that, high-level negotiations,
agreements on economic issues and a room for dialogue among these
states are likely to continue in the coming months and all of the
statements made regarding high-politics would remain in rhetorical level.
But it would be surprising if their relations will turn out to be a “strategic
ally” level, as their relations are not immune from the pressures coming
from major powers. But US dependence on Turkey, in Syrian crisis and
in the situation in Iraq is believed to limit its willingness to punish Turkey
for its relations with Iran. Also it is believed that, Turkey’s role is
important in keeping Iran away from taking unilateral steps and keeping
it incorporated in the international arena.
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