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FOR PRIVATE CIRCULATION
CONTEXTUALISING CHANGING
CONTOURS OF ELECTORAL
POLITICS IN INDIA
Pramod Kumar
2010
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT AND COMMUNICATION (IDC)
SECTOR 38-A Chandigarh - 160014
Tel: 0172-2625941, Fax: 0172-2625942
email: [email protected], web: www.idcindia.org
© Institute for Development and Communication, 2010
Published by
Institute for Development and Communication, 2010
Sector 38A, Chandigarh - 160 014, India
Tel : 0172-2625941
Fax : 0172-2625942
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or
transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without prior permission in writing of Institute for Development and Communication and
respective publishers.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The monograph is a collection of three contributions made in three
different projects. The article on Coalition Politics: Withering of
National, Regional, Ideological Positions? has been written for a
forthcoming edited volume by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy to be
published by Sage. The article on Contextualising Religious, Caste and
Regional Dynamics in Electoral Politics: Emerging Paradoxes was
published in a volume titled India’s 2004 Elections: Grassroots and
National Perspectives edited by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy and
published by Sage. Third contribution was sponsored by University of
Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India (UPIASI), New
Delhi and Ford Foundation, New Delhi. These articles have been
compiled in the form of a monograph for private circulation.
I am grateful to Paul Wallace (for first two contributions) and E.
Sridharan (for third contribution) for their untiring efforts to inspire me
to put my thoughts in a cogent manner.
CONTENTS
List of Tables
ii -iii
List of Graphs
iv
List of Maps
iv
List of Charts
iv
I.
Introduction
1-3
II.
Coalition Politics: Withering Of NationalRegional, Ideological Positions?
4-23
III.
Contextualising Religious, Caste And
Regional Dynamics In Electoral Politics:
Emerging Paradoxes
24-42
IV.
Coalition Politics In Punjab
43-122
LIST OF TABLES
Table
No.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.9
4.10
Title
Performance of National and Regional Parties
Transfer from Centre to States as percentage of
Gross Revenue Receipts of the Centre: Finance
Commission period average
Trends in expenditure to GDP Ratio (percent)
Caste-wise candidate summary – Lok Sabha
Elections – 1971-2009
1994 and 2004 Vidhan Sabha elections in Andhra
Pradesh
Seats Won by Bharatiya Janata Party in Parliament
Elections (1984-2004)
Party Preference by Social Group
Performance of BJP and Congress in Gujarat
Parliament and Vidhan Sabha Elections
BSP Vote Support in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab
Legislative Assembly
Occupation and Party wise distribution of Activists
Religion and Party wise distribution of Activists
Location wise Major Party and Year wise Vote
Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won
Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled,
Constituencies Contested and Won
constituencies Contested and Won
constituencies Contested and Won
Caste-wise Party preference in 1997
Election and Electoral Coalitions in Punjab 1967-2007
ii
Page
No.
6
13
14
15
30
35
36
36
38
47
48
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
61
4.11
4.12
4.13
4.14
4.15
4.16
4.17
4.18
4.19
4.20
4.21
4.22
4.23
4.24
4.25
Caste, Year and Party Wise Distribution of MLAs
Year and Party wise Distribution of MLAs belonging
to Hindu and Sikh Religion
Election Year wise, Ministerial Representation
according to Party and Region
Bargaining power of different alliance partners :
Proportions of seats allocated to alliance partners
beyond normal quota (1997 Assembly Election
based on 1996 Parliament Election)
Party Activist Perception on Basis of the Coalition
between BJP + AKALI DAL (Badal)
Bargaining power of different alliance partners:
Proportions of seats allocated to alliance
partners beyond normal quota (2002 Assembly
Election based on 1999 Parliament Election)
Party Activist Perception on basis of the Coalition
between Congress and CPI or CPI (M)
Impact of rise in land prices
On lack of Congress-CPI Alliance
On SAD-BJP Coalition (SAD Supporters)
On SAD-BJP Coalition (BJP Supporters)
Bargaining power of different alliance partners:
Proportions of seats allocated to alliance
partners beyond normal quota (2007 Assembly
Election based on 2002 Assembly Election)
Election Year wise, Ministerial Representation
according to Party and Location
Taagepera and Shugart Index for General Assembly
Elections of Punjab from 1967 to 2007
Year and Caste wise Distribution of Council of
Ministers at the Initial Constitution of Ministries
iii
76
78
80
91
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
100
103
106
109
LIST OF GRAPHS
Graph
No.
Graph-1
Graph-2
Graph-3
Graph-4
Page
No.
Title
Partywise Support Base [Post Election (1967 –
1969) to Pre Election Coalition (1997-2002-2007)]
Party wise Support Base - Location wise
Party wise Support Base – Region wise
Durability of Government and Tenure
107
107
108
110
LIST OF MAPS
Map
No.
Map-1
Map-2
Map-3
Page
No.
Title
Percentage Share of Constituencies won:
Shiromani Akali Dal(Badal) 1967-2007
Percentage Share of Constituencies won: Bhartiya
Janta Party (BJP) 1967-2007
Percentage Share of Constituencies won: Congress
(INC) 1967-2007
49
57
59
LIST OF CHARTS
Chart
No.
4.1
Page
No.
Title
Post-Election Alliances, Single Party and PreElection Alliances
iv
70
I
INTRODUCTION
ELECTORAL POLITICS has come of age. It is marked by opulence, megamergers, media managers, a slew of promises and doles and politics of
amnesia. It has liberated politicial parties from consistent political
positions and ideological filters. The electoral process has also acquired
its own autonomous space. It has become a battle of false claims and
empty promises, of political leaders presenting themselves as
representatives of the common persons and servants of the privileged,
of trivialising of issues and appealing on a modelled image. In other
words, it has been reduced to a “parade of clowns and acrobats,
elephants and donkeys.
If politicians are to be believed, elections are a matter of Atta-Dal
subsidies, freebies, shagun at the time of marriage, and enticements of
a foreign leave travel concession (LTC) for government employees. And
if you have pretensions of being a psephology literate, then you may
believe the pollsters that elections are a matter of incumbency levels, of
popularity ratings-that too of leaders and not parties, with vote swings
emerging from individual candidates. But can elections be absolved
from the reality of people’s fight for mere survival, demand for dignity
in governance and protection from abuse?
Elections have become a ritual of democracy. They have failed to make
democracy distributive and justice oriented. They use the popular
screen to make their politics appear pro-people. To provide content to
this, serious issues are reduced to doles rather than the right of
electorate.
Politics parties, however, are not expected to confess, particularly at the
time of elections, that they have ceased to govern. When the market is
allowed to govern, the government becomes powerless to effect any
radical changes. And the proponents of market reforms have no plans
for those who do not have the resources and income to buy even two
meals a day. These poorer sections of society are reduced to mere
victims, beneficiaries, client and recipients. In this dichotomous
relationship the state is seen as the ‘dole giver’ and the people the ‘dole
receiver’. In other words, a patron-client relationship defines the
boundary conditions for electoral discourse.
Introduction
Not only this, it has many more additionalities attached to it. In the
words of a well acclaimed political analyst Michael Parenti, “The
candidate sells his image as he would a soap product to a public
conditioned to such bombardments. His family and his look; the
experience in office and devotion to public service; his sincerity,
sagacity, and fighting spirit; his military record, patriotism, and ethnic
background; his determination to limit taxes, stop inflation, improve
wages, and create new jobs by attracting industry into the area; his
desire to help the desire to help the worker, farmer, and business
person, the young and old, the rich and poor, and especially those in
between; his eagerness to fight poverty but curb welfare spending while
ending government waste and corruption and making the streets and
the world itself safe by strengthening our laws, our courts, and our
defences abroad, bringing us lasting peace and prosperity with honour,
and so forth-such are the inevitable appeals that like so many autumn
leaves, or barn droppings, they cover the land each November”1 these
image building pronouncements without much content. In the
background of these the style of governance, doles and electoral
arithmetic emerge as preferable parameters for participation in
elections.
With political parties ideologically supporting economic reforms,
pauperisation people do not find voice in the popular arena of electoral
politics.
Economic reforms encourage privatisation of health,
employment and other public facilities such as electricity, water,
transportation without providing them with means of livelihood.
Real issues like the challenge posed by the WTO agreement to small and
marginal farmers, decline in the social development index with the
status of women being the lowest in India, increasing non-productive
youth population, unemployment, etc. thus remain outside the realm of
electoral politics. Elections then are treated like events where the
voters need to be ‘managed’. Anti-incumbency becomes a saviour by
providing parties rotational preference.
Besides anti-incumbency that provides a safe passage to issueless
politics, winability criteria allow faceless politicians to find entry into
1
Michael Parenti, Democracy For the Law, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1974),
p. 146.
2
Contextualising changing contours of electoral politics in India
political management. In the course of the selection of candidates,
political parties use this novel criterion. It does not matter whether a
candidate is with or without a criminal record, has or does not have the
capacity to do pro-people work. But if he has the capacity to
manipulate votes and is himself ‘manageable’, there is every chance of
his being selected. Above all, the money a candidate can invest with the
hope of recovering it at a later date is a major facilitating factor.
All these tendencies are symptomatic of the erosion of the ideological
support base of political parties. This led to a methodological infirmities,
for instance, to categorise political parties as pro- and anti-economic
reforms, communal and non-communal, casteist and non-casteist. This
also hampers the mapping of performance in relation to electoral
promises made by political parties. All these issues in this monograph
have been contextualised in the qualitative shift from a command
economy to a competitive liberal market economy, from one party
dominance to coalition of parties, from nation-building to
representation of polarised socio-economic reality into politics.
3
II
COALITION POLITICS: WITHERING OF NATIONALREGIONAL, IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS?
Electoral politics in the 20th century has been mirrored by a nationbuilding project propelled by a one-party dominant system. Politics
since 1989 redefined the role of national and regional political parties,
as it transformed the content of electoral discourse and use of
ideological filters as per convenience. In this chapter, an attempt has
been made to capture the tensions between state politics, populist
politics and people’s politics. It also deals with the politics of ‘presence’
and of ‘representation’ in their interaction with democracy, federalism
and diversity as reflected in elections. To undertake this task, there is a
need to capture the changing spectrum of interactive relationship
between political parties, citizens and the policymakers in formulating
and setting the agenda for governance. These interactive relationships
shape the nature and level of political participation of the citizens,
regions and their diversities. All of these considerations have vital
implications for federalism, the electoral system and social democracy
in terms of the stakes of social cleavages in political decision-making,
and the extent of social and economic inclusiveness.
The shift from a command to market economy has redefined the role of
the state. The mandate of governance changed from welfarism to fiscal
management, public sector growth and employment to leveraging
public resource for private growth and retrenchment of jobs in the
public sector and subsidies to the private sector for making provision for
health and education and imposition of user charges on the citizens.
This shaped two divergent kinds of discourse, one emanating from the
shift in the path of development manifesting in what has been termed
as ‘state politics’, and another found articulation at the time of elections
in the form of ‘populist politics’.
It has been argued that the practice of democracy has a select domain
restricted to those who govern and those who avail its governance. The
two have entered into a collaborative relationship and emerged as
custodians of the state shaping the terms of political discourse under
the banner of ‘state politics’. People on the margins outside the realm
of democratic practice need doles for their survival that is provided by
electoral politics, which becomes their mainstay lending content to
what is known as ‘populist politics’. This has provided dominant space in
mainstream politics to a coalition of interests in negation to the
participation of citizens, diversities and regions in democratic
governance.
This tension has been reflected in the dichotomous
relationship between populist politics and state politics. In populist
politics it emanates from an articulation of politics of representation as
synonymous with the presence of citizens, diversities and regions in
exclusion of their stake building in state politics.1 The ‘politics of
presence’ has overtaken politics of ideas, values and purpose. The
outcome of this vacillation is that the ideological difference between
political parties has got blurred while the difference between ‘populist’
and ‘state politics’ has become more manifest.
Political transformations in a decade starting from 1967 were significant
in so far as one-party dominant system is concerned. It led to the
polarisation of the Indian party system into two blocks with antiCongressism being the only unifying factor for the opposition parties.
From 1989 onwards, the Congress party’s hegemony of being an umbrella
party became questioned and the space thus vacated was appropriated by
regional political parties. Examples include the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP),
Janata Dal (U), Biju Janata Dal (BJD), Samajwadi Party (SP), DMK, and the
AIDMK. A perusal of the electoral results shows that since 1989, the multiparty character of the party system is illustrated by the fact that the values
of the Laakso-Taagepera Index (N) (of the effective number of parties) by
votes/seats were 4.80/4.35, 5.10/3.70, 7.11/5.83, 6.91/5.28, 6.74/5.87,
7.6/6.5 and 7.6/5.0 in 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004 and 2009
respectively, whereas prior to 1989, the effective number of the parties by
seats exceeded 3 only once (3.16 in 1967) and the effective number of
parties by votes exceeded 5 only once (5.19 in 1967).2
Further, within the multi-party character of the party system, the space
occupied by the regional political parties in terms of votes and the elected
members has increased. For instance, the percentage share of votes of the
national parties is on the decline. Their share of votes was around 78 per
cent in the 1984 parliamentary elections which declined to 64 per cent in
the 2009 parliamentary elections. And the share of the regional parties
increased from 12 per cent to 31 per cent during the same period. Further,
the share of the national political parties in the elected members of
parliament has decreased from 85 per cent to 69 per cent and that of the
5
Coalition Politics : Withering of National, Regional, Ideological Positions?
regional parties increased from 12 per cent to 29 per cent in 1984 and 2009
elections respectively.
Table 2.1
Performance of National and Regional Parties
Party
Party-wise representation amongst elected
members
Percentage votes
2009
2004
1999
1998
1984-85
2009
2004
1999
1998
1984-85
National parties
69.24
67.03
67.96
71.27
85.40
63.58
62.89
67.11
67.98
77.86
Regional parties
29.10
32.04
30.94
27.62
12.20
31.23
32.87
30.15
29.66
12.73
Independents
1.66
0.92
1.10
1.10
2.40
5.19
4.25
2.74
2.37
9.41
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Source: (i) Statistical Reports on General Elections from 1984 to 2004, Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
(ii) For 2009, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/results_of_the_2009_Indian_general_election_by_party
The change in the nature of party system from one-party dominance
with greater emphasis on the unitary aspects of Indian federation and
the moderate level of political participation of the citizens, regions and
social cleavages to the multiparty system, with higher participation of
the people on the margins of society in the elections and greater
presence of the diversities in legislatures has unfolded paradoxes of
India democracy.
In the political science literature, the first phase up to the mid-sixties
has been characterised as one-party dominance system.3 In this, the
agenda of governance and of electoral discourse were in consonance
with each other. This was the phase of one-party dominance in Indian
politics. In this phase, it was assumed that there is a consensus on stateled capitalism, where state intervention was meant to create conditions
of development in underdeveloped regions and groups. There was a
broad understanding in politics about the strategy of state-led
capitalism for moderating the uneven impact of development on
regions, citizens and social cleavages. For instance, there were
conscious attempts to assign central dole to the public sector to take
the economy to ‘commanding heights’ and ‘build a socialistic pattern of
society’. Election manifesto of the Congress Party in 1962 declared that
‘the public sector will increasingly expand and play a dominant role,
both for the purpose of accelerating the speed of industrialisation and
yielding additional resources. Public, private and co-operative sectors
should function in unison as parts of a single mechanism. Government
should exercise effectively its powers of control and the use of
appropriate fiscal measures.’4 Public investment was made to create
6
physical infrastructure; land reforms legislation was enacted; affirmative
action for providing reservations in jobs for the Scheduled Castes and
Tribes was taken, and the Community Development Programme for
creating rural infrastructure was also launched. The assumption was
that the logic of development and broadening the base of democracy
will lead to overall empowerment of the underprivileged sections and
create conditions for the withering away of the primordial identities
based on caste, region and religion. The outcome of these initiatives, no
doubt, blurred the divergence between economic policies under the
banner of state capitalism and political mobilisation for building
‘socialistic pattern of society’. But the contradiction between the path
of development, electoral promises and social expectations became
glaring. As a consequence, people’s politics found expression through
various protest movements of the youth, the Naxalite movement, and
unrest among the Dalits, peasantry and public sector employees.
In the sphere of electoral politics, people on the margins could see the
importance of their votes and political leadership realised that electoral
outcomes were dependent upon garnering the votes of the poor. The
Garibi Hatao slogan, nationalisation of banks and abolition of the privy
purses were used as major planks to woo voters in the 1972 elections.
Election manifesto of the Congress Party in 1977 made promises with a
tinge of apologetic welfarism. It assigned the private sector a national
role and hoped to make the public sector efficient. In its 1977 election
manifesto, Congress Party declared, “To enlarge the role and efficiency
of the public sector, to give proper scope to the private sector to play a
national role without concentration of economic power, to control
prices and ensure supplies of essential commodities.”5 These
pronouncements were adequately reflected in the plan documents and
government policies.
These policies and programmes provided content to these slogans by
introducing a number of poverty alleviation programmes. They sought
to provide income to the poor such as Food for Work and subsidies to
agriculture. In this phase also, the attempt was to reflect electoral
promises in the government programmes and policies. However, the
outcome of this phase was the emergence of regional politics as
reflected in multiparty competition in the electoral domain and protest
movements across the regions.
7
In the political domain, the Congress Party suffered a setback and a
number of regional parties emerged at the state level. The strategy
adopted was to vanquish dissent and negate regionalism. To the
contrary, the strategy strengthened the opposition parties. Then Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi attempted to curb the opposition through divide
and rule politics and an authoritarian mode which reached its peak with
the imposition of emergency rule in the country. Her emergency could
not be sustained as India’s multi-cultural ethos blended with political
democracy required an institutional mechanism which could articulate
the coalition of diverse regional, cultural and class interests. A new
political formation representing this diversity under the banner of the
Janata Party, a replica of the earlier Nehru Congress Party, captured the
political space and facilitated the return of political democracy. Political
instability continued and the Janata regime was replaced by Indira
Gandhi in 1980. The politics of populism was unleashed to woo the
regional interests, religious and caste spectrum and the poor for
electoral competition. The arena of conflict shifted from eradication of
poverty to decentralisation of power to the centre versus the states to
right to self-determination. Regional movements took the form of
terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab and in several parts of the north-eastern
states. The political system failed to cope with these issues.
Paradoxically, because of the excessive centralisation the leaders
became all powerful, but with a weak institutional base that rendered
them powerless to mediate between the conflicting interests, conflicts
and to bring about social transformation.
From 1989, the crisis in politics deepened coupled with economic
reforms and the emergence of coalition politics.
Electoral compulsions, which required the support of the
people through their votes, unleashed a competitive
politics of populism. Political parties and political leaders
across the board sought to woo the people with
sops…The number of promises made multiplied, but the
number of promises kept dwindled.6
The state increasingly abdicated its governing role to market forces and
in elections political parties made promises which were in contradiction
with the economic reforms agenda.
8
For example, the Congress Party in Punjab, caught between Assembly
elections (2002) and Parliamentary elections (2004), became a victim of
the paradox between electoral promises and government mandate. In
the 2002 Assembly elections, its promise of free electricity to farmers
contributed to its victory over its opponent the Akali Dal. After coming
to power, at both the state and central levels, the party started
implementing the government mandate to introduce economic reforms.
At the state level, it imposed electricity tariff on agriculture and,
consequently, it performed poorly in the 2004 national elections.
The Congress Party was quick to announce the implementation of sops
like free electricity to the farmers in the wake of the next elections in
2007. This ambivalence between electoral compulsions and their
commitment to implement an economic reforms agenda led to a
tension between populist politics and state politics. Not only the
national but even the regional political parties also promised sops to the
electorates at the time of elections. In the 2007 Assembly elections and
2009 Parliamentary elections, the SAD in Punjab promised free
electricity to the farmers. But in the wake of fiscal reforms in 2010, the
SAD-BJP coalition government imposed electricity tariff on the
farmers.7
Furthermore, the national and regional parties promised a number of
other sops at the time of elections. For instance, the answer to the price
rise was to subsidise Atta-Dal and this was used to spearhead their
election campaigns. For example, the SAD manifesto read:
Prices of wheat atta have gone up from Rs. 6.50 per kg
in 2002 to Rs. 17 at present. Similarly, the price of
ordinary pulses has also shot up from Rs. 18 per kg in
2002 to Rs. 65 at present. Diesel prices have gone up
from Rs. 14.50 per litre to Rs. 32 per litre whereas a
cooking gas cylinder which cost only Rs. 210 in 2002 now
costs Rs. 375. The new government will provide atta at
Rs. 4 per kg and dal at Rs. 20 per kg to the poor.8
And in Tamil Nadu, the DMK election manifesto promised the sale of
rice at the rate of Rupees 2 per kg. to the ration cardholders.9
9
Similarly, the Congress campaign took up this issue belatedly and their
manifesto read: “Strengthen Public Distribution System (PDS) in the
state to ensure timely availability of sufficient foodgrains and cereals to
the Dalits, economically weaker sections and BPL families at affordable
prices. Ensure provision of 35 kg of wheat/Atta and 10 kg of rice @ Rs. 2
per kg for the poorest of the poor (Antyodaya families). Ensure
provision of dal up to 5 kg to the poorest of poor (Antyodaya families)
@ Rs. 20 per kg.”10
Political parties have not cared to analyse the causes and ways to
reduce the prices and raise the purchasing capacity of the poor, and are
silent on formulating policies for ensuring food security. This situation
led to a disconnect between the people, the political parties and the
government. In government, these political parties give subsidies as doles
to the poor and as a right to the interest groups and stakeholders.
However, during elections, subsidies are promised as rights to the poor. It
is because of this reason that subsidies directed at the poor are termed
as doles and subsidies directed to protect profits are described as a
rescue package. The former is presented as populist and the latter a
survival need.
Coalition politics functioned more as coalition of interests between big
business, land speculators, big farmers and government contractors. As
a leading political analyst, Alan Altshuler, commenting on the claims of
political parties in the USA said: “Though their little favours went to little
men, the big favours went to land speculators, public utility franchise
holders, government contractors, illicit businessmen and, of course, the
leading members of the machines themselves.”11 Within the party system,
coalition politics functioned more as a “coalition of patronage for sharing
spoils between the national and regional political parties”. The state was
“increasingly unable to mediate between conflicting interests and
competing demands resorted more and more to a politics of patronage.
This patronage, which came to be extended in a bewildering variety of
ways, was a means of sharing the spoils among the constituents of the
ruling elite’.12
Consequently, in order to appease regional political parties so as to
form a coalition government at the national level, national political
parties shifted their stance in the electoral discourse in favour of greater
autonomy for the regions, while regional political parties also amended
10
their position from anti-centrism to co-operative federalism. In its 2009
election manifesto, the Congress Party claims that:
It is only the Indian National Congress that has
demonstrated its commitment to a strong Centre, to
strong States, and to strong panchayats and nagarpalikas.
India’s political system must have space for institutions at
each of these three levels. Each has a vital and specific
role to play.13
And the Bharatiya Janata Party in 2009 elections declared: “
We will place Centre-State relations on an even keel
through the process of consultation. The genuine
grievances of States will be addressed in a comprehensive
manner. The moribund National Development Council
will be revived and made into an active body’14…. for
devolution of more financial and administrative powers
and functions to the States. We will take suitable steps to
ensure harmonious Centre-State relations in the light of
the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission’.15
But, on the contrary, the BJP implemented policies which compromised
autonomy of the states and reinforced the tendencies of centralisation.
In the political domain, the emphasis on mutually acceptable trade-offs
between the national and regional political parties was loud in
accommodation and feeble in substance. It only meant reconciliation to
achieve power equilibrium. The language of political discourse was
strongly influenced to construct ‘coalition through patronage’ across the
ideological spectrum of political parties. Moreover, there is a
regionalisation of national political parties and nationalisation of
regional political parties. For instance, the Congress government in
Punjab passed the Punjab Repealing Act of 2004 on SYL much to the
annoyance of the central leadership of the Congress Party. In other
words, the Congress in competition with a regional alliance started
appropriating the anti-centre constituency in the state. The BJP changed
its position from a strong centre to greater autonomy for states.16
11
Similarly, the SAD shifted its position from anti-centrism to antiCongressism to co-operative federalism. The Akali Dal in its 1973
resolution proclaimed that “it would endeavour to have the Indian
Constitution recast on real federal principles, with equal representation
at the Centre for all the states.” The same Akali Dal through its
president Parkash Singh Badal, who was party to the 1973 resolution,
asserted in the year 2000, that “Our constitutional framework was for
more federal structure, but owing to the rule of the Congress
government, both at the Centre and in the states, the powers of the
states were slowly usurped and a unitary set-up was nearly
established.”
The shift in the Akali Dal’s position is mainly due to the emergence of
coalition politics and the decline of one-party dominance. As a result,
the thrust of the Akali Dal agenda changed from anti-centrism to cooperative federalism. “The Akali-BJP government has opened a new
chapter in Centre-State relations, ushering in the age of co-operative
federalism in the country. The era of confrontation has been effectively
ended and replaced with a forward looking thrust on working together
for the overall good of the state and the nation”.17
This position marks a radical shift from the anti-centre stance as
reflected in the 1973 autonomy resolution and in its later 1985
memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission. The shift was first made
public on the occasion of the Hola Mohalla festival near Gurdwara Takht
Keshgarh at Anandpur Sahib in a political conference. The resolution
passed stated, “Today’s conference demands of the centre that for the
prosperity of the country, in favour of development of people, the
centre-state relations should be redefined in the light of the Anandpur
Sahib resolution. Setting up of a true federal structure in the country
was the need of the hour.”18
The issue of greater autonomy for the states was nurtured in a political
climate marked by over-centralisation of power and one-party
dominance since Independence. This has worked in two ways: on the
one hand, it has provided greater access to regional parties to share
spoils of power reducing the alliance between the national and the
regional political parties as ‘coalition for patronage’ and, on the other
hand, it has made the regional parties stand on redefining the CentreState relations as ambivalent.19
12
Interestingly, in coalition politics, regional groups have become strong,
and the forces of regionalism have become weak. It has, no doubt,
created opportunities for the small regional opposition parties to have
important ministerial berths as rewards, but the same has weakened
the regional agenda and interests. Consequently, it has made Indian
politics less federal and more centralised, extending ad hoc benefits to
those regions which are strategic partners in the coalition. A few
illustrations to prove the point. In centre-state fiscal relationship, the
statutory transfer of funds to the states have become secondary and
the role of discretionary grants to finance the State plans by the Centre
have become more prominent.
This is especially noticeable between the eighth and ninth
Finance Commission even when the total transfers had
increased. Between the two components of transfers from
the Finance Commission, the share of grants has
substantially increased in the reform period, suggesting a
declining access to the collective pool of national tax
resources by the provinces put differently greater access to
revenue to the Central government.20
Table 2.2
Transfer from Centre to States as percentage of Gross Revenue Receipts of the Centre:
Finance Commission period average
Year
Share
in
central
taxes
1
Finance Commission transfers
Other
transfers
Total
Total
transfers
Grants
Non-plan
grants
(nonstatutory)
Other
transfers
(5+6)
(4+7)
Total transfer
through
Finance
Commission
(2+3)
Grants
through
Planning
Commission
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
VII FC
22.39
1.96
24.35
12.11
1.66
13.77
38.11
VIII FC
20.25
2.52
22.77
13.56
1.54
15.10
37.86
IX FC
21.37
3.42
22.79
14.48
1.06
15.54
40.33
X FC
21.40
2.34
23.75
10.57
0.63
11.19
35.79
XI FC (first
two years)
20.93
5.20
26.13
10.39
0.82
11.21
37.20
Source: 11th Finance Commission Report, Government of India.
Further, the Central Government expenditure has declined and States’
expenditure share has multiplied. This acquires significance in view of
the States’ declining access to resources.
13
Table 2.3
Trends in expenditure to GDP Ratio (percent)
Combined
Centre
1990-91
26.83
17.74
1991-92
26.3
16.52
1992-93
26.11
16.37
1993-94
25.89
16.49
1994-95
25.03
15.27
1995-96
24.2
14.66
1996-97
23.38
14.13
1997-98
24.16
13.64
1998-99
25.19
14.27
1999-00
26.26
14.79
2000-01
26.1
14.5
2001-02
28.1
15.2
Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics (IIPFS), various issues
States
14.3
14.84
14.43
14.21
14.37
13.78
13.46
13.76
14.06
14.95
14.8
15.8
Not only this, the centrally sponsored schemes funding has increased in
the social sector. In most of the cases, these schemes are not
commensurate with the needs of the local people. This results in nonperformance of the states which adversely affects their claim to central
resources.
In other words, the apportionment of resources are to the disadvantage of
the states irrespective of the fact that the regional parties have emerged as
important players in the national politics. And, the national parties
alongwith the regional parties have also promised to build a genuine
federal structure in the electoral discourse, but the character of the state
and the policy regime continue to be in favour of centralisation.
In practice, the emphasis of politics has shifted from ideology of
representation of the regions in governance to the distribution of
patronage to the regional parties and interest groups. Similarly, in the case
of common citizens and social cleavages, the focus has been to ‘privilege
political presence over common interests’. In the dominant discourse, the
arguments are advanced to make voting compulsory or provide reservation
of seats in the legislature on the basis of gender, social cleavages and
minorities or the apportionment of the state resources on the basis of
target groups.
The politics of presence was practiced not only to co-opt regions, but
also the citizens and social cleavages based on caste and religion. The
test of democratic participation is seen through voter’s turnout, number
of contestants and the representation of common people in the
legislatures rather than the outcomes in terms of mainstreaming the
14
poor and disadvantaged and also to achieve a more just and equitable
society. A study of voter’s turnover shows an increase from 58.07 in the
2004 elections to 58.43 per cent in the 2009 elections. The number of
contestants has also increased from 5435 in 2004 to 8070 in the 2009
elections. In addition, the representation of people from low social
origins has also multiplied. For instance, the number of Scheduled Caste
candidates increased from 10 per cent (63) in 1989 to 24 per cent
(1933) in the 2009 parliamentary elections. Similarly, the number of
scheduled tribes candidates increased from 4 per cent (224) in 1989 to 7
per cent (565) in 2009 elections.
But the basic issue remains: how far has the increase in participation in
elections benefitted people with low social origins in the decisionmaking process and created conducive conditions for equity? Not only
this, it is worth analysing the shift in political discourse from, to use
Benedict Anderson, categories “unbound serialities” and “bound
serialities”. In electoral politics in the earlier phase, the language of
politics referred to nation-building. Citizen rights, equality for all
religion, castes and ethnicity largely remained within the domain of
“unbound serialities”.21
Table 2.4
Caste-wise candidate summary – Lok Sabha Elections – 1971-2009
Year
1971
1977
1980
1984-85
1989
1991-92
1996
1998
1999
2004
2009
All India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
ALL India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
All India
% from Total
Gen.
2263
81.73
2026
83.07
3913
84.53
4661
84.85
5306
86.14
7508
85.82
12123
86.89
3936
82.86
3816
82.10
3674
67.60
5572
69.05
SC
343
12.39
291
11.93
502
10.84
592
10.78
630
10.23
899
10.28
1356
9.72
571
12.02
602
12.95
1372
25.24
1933
23.95
ST
163
5.89
122
5.00
214
4.62
240
4.37
224
3.64
342
3.91
473
3.39
243
5.12
230
4.95
389
7.16
565
7.00
Source: Statistical Reports on General Elections, Election Commission of India, New Delhi.
15
Total
2769
100
2439
100
4629
100
5493
100
6160
100
8749
100
13952
100
4750
100
4648
100
5435
100
8070
100.00
In 1962, the Congress party in its election manifesto declared it would
build:
a social order based on justice and offering equal
opportunity to every citizen… The social services and, more
especially, education and health should be expanded,
greater attention being paid to economically and
educationally backward people. The test of giving particular
attention should be that of economic backwardness. Thus,
low income groups, irrespective of castes and communities
should receive special consideration.22
In the 1977 elections, the Congress party promised “to safeguard the
interests of the minorities and weaker sections, to end privy purses and
other such privileges, to provide the basic requirements of the people,
speedily through dynamic rural programmes, to provide new
employment avenues”.23
However, after the mid-eighties, sectional interests based on caste and
religion were articulated in the elections and the slogan of ‘justice for
all’ was replaced by ‘justice for backward castes, Dalits and minorities’.
These exclusive category usages for ‘inclusive governance’ led to
polarisation in the elections. For example, in 2009 parliamentary
elections, the projection of Mayawati, a dalit leader, as the prime
ministerial candidate by the Third Front led by Communist Parties, may
have polarised the middle class non-Dalit votes to the advantage of the
Congress party. This can be seen from the increase in the urban votes in
favour of the Congress party. The main thrust of the argument is that in
the post-economic reforms, competition for the scarce resources is
being shaped around sectional interests and identities. The tension
between economics of the market, i.e. state politics and populist
politics, led to the inclusion of sectional interests based on religion and
caste. This became a major factor for electoral mobilisations by the
competing political parties. For instance, Mandal Commission has
promised job opportunities to the Backward Castes in an environment
where jobs opportunities in the public sector are shrinking. And, it also
acknowledges that politics of populism can only promise hope.
It is not at all our contention that by offering a few
thousand jobs to the OBC candidates we shall be able to
16
make 52 per cent of the Indian population as forward,
but we must recognize that an essential part of the
battle against the social backwardness is to be fought in
the minds of backward people, when a backward class
candidate becomes a Collector or a Superintendent of
Police, the material benefits accruing from his position
are limited to the members of his family only. But the
psychological spin-off of this phenomenon is
tremendous, the entire community of that backward
class candidate feels socially elevated.24
The state has abdicated its responsibility to build a secular society
through affirmative action, where caste shall not be the basis of
dispensation of justice, and religious identities shall not be the basis of
entitlement of national resources. On the contrary, it consolidated the
hold of regional, communal and caste-based parties in elections. Most
of the regional parties have provided impetus to the “sons of the soil”
and articulated these concerns in their electoral discourse.
For example, in Maharashtra, it has been reported that the Congress
party benefitted in the 2009 parliamentary and state assembly elections
due to the radical assertions of Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS)
Chief Raj Thackeray. These assertions brought about a division in the
vote bank of Shiv Sena. MNS Chief Raj Thackeray attempted to involve
‘sons of the soil’ parochialism when he asserted that “Nashik was facing
an influx of north India. They are earning here and sending the money
to their native place…I am not against them, but they should have some
affection for Maharashtra…He warned that north Indians who did not
speak Marathi and did not respect Marathi culture would be driven
away,”25
The Congress government in Maharashtra has made their support to the
MNS agenda explicit in announcing it would strictly implement the
eligibility criteria for a driving taxi permit, which stipulated that a person
must be a resident of Maharashtra for a minimum 15 years and can read,
write and speak Marathi.26 These articulations acquire significance in the
backdrop of the political parties mobilising support for elections on the
basis of region, caste and religious group affiliations. A perusal of the
election manifestos of the political parties clearly shows that the parties
17
promised subsidies, social security and safety nets to the electorates
based on social cleavages.27
In the 2009 elections, the Congress party asserted that ‘The
empowerment of the weaker sections of society — scheduled castes,
scheduled tribes, OBCs, minorities and women — has been an article of
faith with the Indian National Congress. This will be carried forward with
emphasis on education, particularly skill-based and professional
education’.28 For instance, communalism has been used to even present
problems like unemployment as affecting the Hindus or the Muslims or
the Sikhs. Articulation of the findings relating to backwardness of
Muslims in the Sachar Commission Report, reservation of jobs for
backward castes and social and economic backwardness of Dalits have
been used as vote catching devices.
The logical outcome of this approach is the feeling of a deep sense of
discrimination amongst those who are either denied access to
employment opportunities or who remained on the margins of the
employment market. ‘Coalition of presence’ became rather the norm to
co-opt social cleavages and offer doles to the common citizens under
the banner of citizen-centric governance.
But a majority of the women representatives in the local bodies, as per
a pre-election survey conducted in 2008, were dissatisfied as they were
promised at the time of election that the ‘politics of presence’ shall
provide answers to their claims to equity, access and accountable
governance.29 But these political parties, while in government pursued
an agenda of downsizing the public sector and have, in fact, leveraged
public sector resources to the private sector with a claim to provide
efficient and accountable governance to the people. People have been
reduced to ‘consumers with the ability to choose and complain
(although) not the ability to proactively shape services’.30
Results in developing countries especially have shown
that the interests of the powerless, the hardcore poor,
the ethnic minority and the aged have been sidelined
while the existing democratic institutions (the
representative democracy) have been hijacked by the
rich and the lobbyists and continued to function as a
platform for the vested interests and not that of the
18
poor. This has mirrored the regulatory dimension of the
‘state politics’ and the abdication syndrome ingrained
into the practice of politics.31
The post-colonial state has failed to transform the status of people from
colonial subjects to citizens. It has been very aptly described by Nicholas
Dirks when he termed the colonial states as ethnographic states.32 In
other words, the states do not seek participation of the citizens in
decision making, but claim to provide for the welfare of population. This
made governance less a matter of politics and more of administrative
policy. The foremost ingredient of this has been mistrust in the subjects
or populace. It can be exemplified in a number of ways, but the most
visible is the filing of affidavits for almost every interaction with the
government.
These affidavits are required in support of the facts given by the
applicants for various services provided by the government. In other
words, these are affirmations by the applicants in some cases supported
by third parties. These affidavits in most of the cases are given on legal
papers sworn before a Magistrate or public notary. For instance,
affidavits are even required for public utilities such as new connections
for electricity, sewerage and water supply. Besides resulting in citizen’s
harassment and corruption, it has perpetuated the dichotomy between
the state and the nation. Instead of providing universal representation
for the citizens as expected, these elections contribute nothing, but
“plundering rotating government…in many of these countries, multiparty elections are but a vehicle to legitimise an existing political
economy and perpetuate an equation of patron/client dependency
relationship in a society.”33
A major casualty of this is citizen-centric democratic governance. If the
citizens are treated as population and targets of governance, rather
than participatory stakeholders guiding the democratic processes,
democracy becomes redundant and citizens’ backlash is built up even
against the right kind of intervention.
Conclusion
Coalition politics in pre and post-election 2009 has shown that it is the
politics of presence that played a predominant role in shaping issues
19
relating to citizenship, federalism and multi-culturalism. Political parties
have formed coalitions in contradiction to their professed electoral
ideological pronouncements. While in partnership with each other, they
nurtured coalitions for patronage rather than articulation of their
professed political agenda. For example, most of the regional political
parties bargained for the ministries of their choice rather than the
restructuring of the policies which govern centre-state relations.34 The
regionalisation of the national political parties and nationalisation of the
regional political parties as reflected in the electoral discourse melts
down in the power-sharing coalition matrix. It is not only the economic
meltdown, but the political meltdown in the coalition era which should
merit the attention of political analysis. It is a coalition of bargaining
through which stability of the tenure of government is ensured.
The coincidence between ideological flux and dichotomous relationship
between populist politics and state politics with an emphasis on
privileging presence over representative stakeholding of the regions,
social cleavages and citizens is not accidental through patronage. There
are heterogeneous needs which defy any general formula and its
solutions are situational, strategic and historical-specific. How far a
coalition of interests and coalition through patronage shall be able to
balance the needs to transform entitlements of regions, diversities and
citizens particularly living on the margins into rights is a moot question?
ENDNOTES
1
This distinction between politics of representation and politics of presence
has been very aptly described by Zoya Hasan who argued that politics of
presence blurs the underrepresentation and the representation of interests of
the constituents specifically vulnerable sections. Zoya Hasan, Constitutional
Equality and the Politics of Representation in India (Delhi: Sage; 2006). London,
Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, http://dio.sagepub.com.
2
E. Sridharan, “Coalition Strategies and The BJP’s Expansion, 1989-2004,”
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, 2005, pp. 194-221.
For 2009, the data were gathered from the Institute for Development and
Communication (IDC) Unit.
3
The distinction between one party dominance system and one-party system
has been described by Rajni Kothari. He noted that one-party dominance
system is competitive party system, but one in which the competing parties
play rather dissimilar roles. It consists of a party of consensus and parties of
pressure.
20
See for details, Rajni Kothari, ‘The Congress System in India’, Asian Survey, Vol.
4, No. 12, 1964, pp. 1161-73.
4
Lok Sabha Elections 1962: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress.
5
6
Deepak Nayyar, “Economic Development and Political Democracy: Interaction
of Economics and Politics in Independent India”, in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.),
Democracy in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 381.
7
The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh), January 23, 2010.
8
Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal).
9
Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The DMK.
10
Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress.
11
Quoted in Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few, (New York: St. Martin
Press, 1974), p. 141.
12
Deepak Nayyar, op. cit., 2001, p. 381.
13
14
Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Bhartiya Janata Party.
15
Lok Sabha Elections 1999: Manifesto of The National Democratic Alliance.
16
The BJP in its 1962 election manifesto declared that “The present
Constitution which, by calling the Centre as ‘Union’ and provinces as ‘States’,
has recognised a separate and somewhat sovereign status of the constituents,
is also a hindrance to national unity. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh will amend the
Constitution and declare India a Unitary State, with provision for
decentralisation of power to the lowest levels”. The Congress Party manifesto
was more explicit on issues relating to national integration and unity in
diversity. The issue of centre-state relationship did not find any expression in
its 1962 manifesto.
17
Lok Sabha Elections 1998: Manifesto of The Shiroman Akali Dal..
18
The Hindu (Delhi), March 24, 1997.
19
For instance, the Akali Dal in Punjab in its 1973 autonomy resolution and,
later in its 1985 memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission, asked for
apportionment of financial resources within the framework of command
economy. In the 1973 resolution, the Akali Dal demanded, “Complete
nationalisation of the trade in food grains and, as such, shall endeavour to
nationalize the wholesale trade in food grains through the establishment of
state agencies.”
21
It further stated that “the SAD shall try to fix the prices of the agricultural
produce on the basis of the returns of the middle class farmers. Such prices
would be notified well before the sowing season and only the State
governments would be empowered to fix such prices.” However, in its 2007
election manifesto these issues were not raised.
20
For detailed analysis of this aspect, please see Atul Sood, ‘”Deepening
Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway” in Social Watch India
(Delhi: Sage, 2007), Chapter II, pp. 89-94.
21
Partha Chatterjee has very perceptively reflected on Anderson’s
categorisation of bound and unbound serialities and has observed that for each
category of classification any individual can count only as one on zero, never as
a fraction, which in turn means that all partial or mixed affiliations to a
category are ruled out. For limited purpose, in this paper these categories have
been used with a qualification that the identity perceptions are real and that
which of the elements of ethnic identity like caste, religion, language etc. shall
acquire dominant manifestation is history-specific and contextually-based.
Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed. (Delhi: Permanent Black,
2006),p.6.
Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, South-East Asia
and the World (London: Verso, 1998).
22
23
24
B.P. Mandal, Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Government of
India, 1980) Vol. 1, Chapter XIII, Recommendations, pp. 57-60.
25
http://www.rediff.com/election/2009/apr/27slde1-raj-thackeray-attractscrowds-everywhere.htm.
26
The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh), January 21, 2010.
Subsequently, the Congress government in Maharashtra moderated its
statement in response to adverse reactions from North-Indian states.
27
The Congress commits itself to amending the Constitution to establish a
Commission for Minority Educational Institutions to provide direct affiliation
for minority professional institutions to central universities. Special steps will
be taken to spread modern and technical education among women in minority
communities particularly… (Congress: 2004). A comprehensive national
programme for minor irrigation of all lands owned by Dalits and adivasis will be
introduced. Landless families will be endowed with some land through the
proper implementation of land ceiling and land redistribution
legislation…(Congress: 2004).
22
28
29
The study indicated that women representatives were assigned the task to
look into social engagements such as marriage alliances, information on birth,
health and household activities in the domain of gender segregated roles.
See for details, Rainuka Dagar, Authority Systems and Construction of
Masculinities, (Chandigarh: Institute for Development and Communication,
2008).
30
M. Adil Khan, “Engaged Governance”: A Strategy for Mainstreaming Citizens
into the Public Policy Processes (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 13.
31
M. Adil Khan, ibid., p. 13.
32
For an elaborate analysis of this aspect, please refer to Partha Chatterjee,
op.cit., 2006.
33
M. Adil Khan, op. cit., 2005, pp. 8-9.
34
In post-2009 elections, DMK, the key ally of the Congress, demanded an
increase in its ministerial berths as compared to 2004. It also made a
determined pitch for lucrative ministries like Telecom, Information Technology,
Surface Transport and Shipping. On the other hand, Trinamool Congress
smoothly bargained for the Ministry of Railways and five Ministers of States. It
also demanded the imposition of President’s Rule in West Bengal in
contradiction to the demand of the regional parties for the imposition of
Central rule in any state only in extreme circumstances.
The Tribune (Chandigarh), May 22, 2009.
23
III
CONTEXTUALISING RELIGIOUS CASTE AND REGIONAL
DYNAMICS IN ELECTORAL POLITICS: EMERGING
PARADOXES*
Indian politics is confronted with a new set of issues and challenges
posed by the dynamic process of development. This is reflected in the
qualitative shift from a command to a competitive liberal market
economy1, from one party dominance to coalition of parties2, from
nation building to representation of polarised socio-cultural reality into
politics3. These shifts have brought to the surface certain paradoxes as
reflected in the electoral process.
The paradox in electoral promises and mandate of governments, in
threat from and need of democratic institutions, in ideological
monotheism and ideological pluralism has been reflective of the Indian
electoral system since the mid-sixties. As a result it may not be possible
to evolve neat categories of political analysis for labelling political
parties as pro and anti-economic reforms, communal and noncommunal, casteist and non-casteist. In fact, the two national political
parties, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Indian National
Congress (INC), while in power favour economic reforms, but oppose
reforms at the time of elections. Similarly, both parties have
compromised with communal persuasions. For instance, the Congress
has been accused of being anti-Sikh and branded as communal in
elections in Punjab, whereas, elsewhere in India the Bharatiya Janata
Party has been labelled as communal by the Congress-led front.
Therefore, it would be appropriate to analyse the 2004 elections in an
historical context and as a process rather than through often misleading
labels, pronouncements of political parties and their shifting coalition
partners.
Historically, the state-led nation-building project has provided the
necessary conditions for the existence of divergent phenomena and also
the emergence of paradoxes in electoral politics in India. The nationbuilding project attempted to bridge the gap between organised
interest groups and people without means with a well entrenched
*
Published in a volume titled India’s 2004 Elections: Grass Roots And National Perspectives edited by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy, sage New Delhi (2007), pp. 58-75.
middle class4. The Congress which has been the main protagonist of the
nation-building project claimed in its manifesto for the 2004
parliamentary elections, the creation of the middle class as its main
achievement without integrating marginalised sections into the market
and decision making system. This strata in collaborative arrangement
with the organised interest groups became the custodians of the state
while the nation consisting of people without means looked the other
way5. These poorer sections of society are reduced to mere victims,
beneficiaries, clients and recipients. In this dichotomous relationship the
state is seen as ‘dole giver’ and the nation the ‘dole receiver’. In other
words, a patron-client relationship defines the boundary conditions for
electoral discourse.
The relationship uncovers itself in a variety of ways. Political leaders
mediate between the state and the electorate through:
(i)
policies, whereby subsidies are given as doles for poverty
alleviation, debt redemption, augmentation of income;
(ii) facilitating access to schemes, government services and protection
from crime and violence. For providing access to doles, the
discretion available with government functionaries, enlarges the
scope of political patronage. For instance, to have access to these
doles, the poor need ration cards, identity proof and a residential
certificate which are to be provided by the functionaries, often
mediated by political leaders;
(iii) application of ideological filters at the level of policies and their
implementation. Non-secular categories like caste, religion, region
and secular categories like aam admi (common man) are used to
acquire legitimacy for their political claims.
This complex interaction between aam, admi and electoral politics is
dynamic in nature and has been undergoing a change. The
transformation agenda within the nation building project dominate
Indian electoral politics.
PROMISES AND PERFORMANCE: FROM GAP TO PARADOX
The paradox between the transformational discourse and economic
reforms agenda has shaped the electoral politics in India. This discourse
occupied a large space in electoral politics until the eighties. Populist
slogans like “garibi hatao”, “land to the tiller”, “social justice for all”,
25
Contextualising Religious Caste and Regional dynamics in Electoral Politics
“anticorruption” and “fight against authoritarianism” have been raised
for election purposes. The theme of elections has undergone a change
with successive political leaders. Under India’s first Prime Minister,
Jawaharlal Nehru, it was social justice for all, expressed in various forms
like land to the tiller. In the 1971 parliamentary elections, Congress
leader Mrs. Indira Gandhi won with the slogan “garibi hatao” (poverty
eradication), and under the non-Congress leadership in the 1977
parliamentary elections, it was restoration of democracy and antiauthoritarianism.
All these slogans, along with the promise of building a socialist society
remained the hallmark of Indian politics. The Congress promised what
Nehru called the socialistic pattern of society by following a policy of
industrialisation with increased government ownership so as to
command the heights of the economy. The state took upon itself the
task of building infrastructure like dams, steel plants, oil refineries and
machine tool factories. In fact, these were essential for the fast growth
of private industries. Indian industrialists were unwilling and unable to
undertake the construction and management of these capital intensive
heavy industries.
In other words, the national political leadership sought to realise the
goal of socialism by creating a large industrial and agricultural base and
by developing science and technology. This process of industrialisation
and even the policy of nationalisation were used for increasing
production and not as a means of attaining social justice.
Another populist slogan of land reforms was used to create a vision of
equality. Land reforms and the way they were implemented
transformed big land owners from a class solely dependent on land and
feudal privileges to a class of rural entrepreneurs. These rural
entrepreneurs, no doubt, retained substantial interest in land, but made
considerable investment in transport, warehouses and rice mills. All
these measures threw up a class of privileged people who were gripped
by a kind of ‘scarcity psychology’. On the other hand, the same process
multiplied and marginalised the poor sections of the population. The
strategy adopted was to attain self-reliance by assigning lead role of
public investment in agriculture and industry leading to import
substitution. This strategy was implemented within the broad
protectionist framework to ensure domestic markets for goods and
services produced.
26
For one, there was a conscious attempt to limit the degree of
openness and of integration with the world economy, in pursuit of a
more autonomous, if not self-reliant, development. For another, the
state was assigned a strategic role in development because the
market, by itself, was not perceived as sufficient to meet the
aspirations of a latecomer to industrialisation.6
This strategy was being implemented in a society intermeshed with
feudal attitudes, capitalist practices and egalitarian pretentions.
Correspondingly, the political discourse, presented state-led capitalism
as ‘socialism’, state-patronage extended as doles to eradicate poverty
and affirmative action package as a deal to dispense with primordial
identities like caste, religion, linguistic. The outcome was paradoxical.
The mid-sixties mirrored a discernible qualitative shift in Indian politics.
Efforts were made to co-opt emerging interests to provide continuity to
the ruling coalition. The co-option of peasantry was operationalised
through introduction of subsidy regime by lowering the prices of inputs
like fertilizers, power and water and higher procurement prices. And, at
the popular level, slogan of garibi hatao was raised to connect with the
commonperson. The co-option strategy did work to the advantage of
the Congress party in 1971 general elections, but simultaneous
deepening of economic crises nurtured number of protest movements.
These protest movements became more widespread and intense in
view of the incapacitated institutions of the state. Consequently,
attempts to control these protest movements and silence dissent within
the political system and, more so, within the Congress party through
authoritarian modes led to imposition of Emergency. The postemergency events changed the character of political democracy in India,
but economic policies became more dole-oriented. The only difference
was that the slogan of ‘justice for all’ was replaced by ‘justice for
backward castes, Dalits and minorities’. It provided hopes to the
downtrodden without providing any concrete gains. The Mandal
Commission itself acknowledged it.
When a backward class candidate becomes collector or a
superintendent of police, the material benefits accruing from his
position are limited to the members of his family only. But the
psychological spin-off of this phenomenon is tremendous; the
27
entire community of that backward class candidate feels socially
elevated.7
The Mandal Commission had little to do with equality and social justice.
It focused on a strategy of co-option by multiplying caste cleavages and
attempting to achieve a balance of group interests. This, in a limited
way, provided continuity to the discourse on transformational politics.
In the nineties the emphasis was shifted from the public sectoradministering of prices, subsidies, control of wages and poverty-to
structural reforms with a veneer of liberal non-regulatory state.8 The
major initiative for economic reforms was taken during the tenure of
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Within months after taking office, the
Prime Minister announced new policies to accelerate India’s slow
industrial growth – liberalising imports, providing new economic
incentives for exports, permitting the import of technologies,
encouraging foreign investment through joint ventures, reducing taxes
and de-regulating the economy so as to make it more competitive.9
Thereafter, a near consensus on economic reforms package among the
major political parties and actors was built, notwithstanding the
occasional noises relating to Swadeshi. For instance, the Congress and
the Bharatiya Janata Party election manifestos for 2004 on economic
reforms reinforced each other. The Bharatiya Janata Party highlighted
its commitment to:
further broadening and deepening the economic reforms based
on a self-reliant approach, sustained double-digit GDP growth
rate to achieve complete eradication of poverty and
unemployment, end of regional and social disparities and
bridging the urban-rural divide.10
The Congress manifesto asserts that,
The Congress would broaden and deepen economic reforms. The
overriding objectives would be to attain and sustain year after year a 810% rate of economic growth and to spread this growth over all sectors,
particularly agriculture and industry… aimed at local level economic and
social transformation that directly benefit the poor in rural and urban
28
India, bringing prosperity to the 6 lakh-odd villages of India and
improving the living conditions of the urban poor.11
The space vacated by slogans like ‘garibi hatao’ was allowed to go
unattended with symbolic references in election manifestos. The
dichotomy between electoral promises and the mandate of governance
became pronounced. Earlier, electoral promises used to be in line with
the ideological commitment of the government. Now with the adoption
of economic reforms, electoral promises were in contradiction with the
government’s mandate.
In elections, political parties ideologically support economic reforms but
find it difficult to politically popularise them. This is because the content
of economic reforms is to reduce employment in the public sector
without creating corresponding employment in the private sector, to
encourage people to participate in self-help groups and launch small
businesses in the face of intense competition. Nor, can they tell the
people to mind their own health and give subsidies to private hospitals
and above all, in the name of building their stakes, ‘motivate’ them to
pay for life saving services even if they do not have the opportunities to
earn a livelihood.
It is important to note there has been a wide gap between electoral
promises and government performance in both the phases, i.e. 1947 to
1977 and 1977 onwards. The difference is that in the earlier phase, the
electoral promises were ideologically in convergence with the mandate
of the government, whereas in the later phase the electoral promises
and the government’s mandate were ideologically divergent. The
reasons identified for this crisis of non-performance range from
structural causes to political behaviour of leaders. However, in the first
phase it became manifested in the form of a leadership crisis, whereas
in the second phase it took the form of a crisis of trust in leadership.
The 2004 elections have empirically shown that the legitimacy of the
government in power declines faster due to the mismatch between the
electoral promises and the stark realities of the new economic policies.
The National Democratic Alliance, particularly the Bharatiya Janata
Party, made implementation of economic reforms a major poll plank in
the 2004 elections. The campaign was labelled “India Shining”. Congress
raised issues relating to “Aam Aadmi” (common man) and branded the
29
Bharatiya Janta Party anti-poor. The mismatch between the electoral
mandate of the 1999 elections and the performance of the BJP-led
government contributed to poor electoral results in the 2004
parliamentary elections. It won 138 seats with 22.16 per cent vote
share.
Further, this paradox between electoral promises and government
performance can be captured clearly from two case studies, i. e. Andhra
Pradesh and Punjab. Andhra Pradesh was considered the best governed
state with shifting emphasis from state as provider of services to being
merely a facilitator. In the 1994 elections the Telgu Desam Party won by
opposing the economic reforms of the Congress. A decade later, in
2004, the Congress launched itself into a pro-poor bandwagon and
against economic reforms to defeat the TDP-led by Chandrababu Naidu
government.12
Table 3.1
1994 and 2004 Vidhan Sabha elections in Andhra Pradesh
1994
2004
Seats
Seats
% of
Seats
Seats
% of
Contested
won
votes
Contested
won
votes
polled
polled
Loss or
gain %
increase in
seats won
Congress
294
26
33.85
234
185
38.56
611.54
TDP
251
216
44.14
267
47
37.59
-78.24
Left
37
34
6.35
26
15
3.37
-56.0
BJP
280
3
3.89
27
2
2.63
-33.34
TRS
54
26
6.68
Others
2357
15
11.78
1288
19
11.17
26.67
Source: Statistical Report on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Andhra Pradesh
(various years).
The Congress made electoral promises like
free electricity for agriculture, subsidies on crop loans, more funds
for irrigation projects, relief package to the families of suicide
victims, loans to women self-help groups at 3 per cent interest per
annum, and the sanction of a revolving fund to all DWACRA
groups which completed six months, 2.5 lakh jobs for the youth by
lifting the ban on recruitment in government service,
enhancement of old-age pension, and revival of the subsidised
cloth scheme13.
Chandrababu Naidu opined that
the Congress was making fantastic promises that could not be
implemented by anyone in power and that it was resorting to
30
populist promises to deceive the voters. He said international
financial agencies, such as the World Bank, would not approve
free electricity to the agriculture sector and that would mean the
stoppage of loans to the state. The Congress immediately termed
the TDP government as anti-farmer and pro-World Bank.14
The results of the elections were dismal for the TDP and the Congress
won the elections. The first step the Congress government took after
coming to power was to announce free electricity for the farmers as was
promised in its election manifesto.
In Punjab, the Congress demonstrated this paradox between electoral
promises and government mandate in a blatant manner as it was caught
between Assembly elections (2002) followed by Parliamentary elections
(2004). In the 2002 Assembly elections it promised free electricity to
farmers, removal of octroi and registered a victory over its major
opponent, the Akali Dal. The election manifesto committee was chaired
by Dr. Manmohan Singh, present Prime Minister of India.15
After coming to power it backtracked from its electoral promises and
announced a number of initiatives for introducing economic reforms.
Consequently, it did poorly in 2004 parliamentary election. Learning
lessons from its defeat, the Congress government announced sops like
free electricity to farmers in the wake of the forthcoming Assembly
elections in early 2007. Interestingly, these sops were opposed by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh. The Chief Minister, Capt. Amarinder Singh,
reminded the Prime Minister that he chaired the election manifesto
committee which made these promises in 2002 elections.
The patron-client relationship is carefully nurtured by offering doles in
the name of subsistence subsidies to the electorate. Doles have been
used as a poverty-alleviating and vote catching device. People without
means constitute the backbone of Indian electoral politics.
There are more illiterates, rural-based people, Scheduled
Castes and OBCs who comprise voters today than earlier…. In
1996 over the average polling of 58 per cent there were 1 per
cent more OBCs voting as against merely 2 per cent less than
the upper castes; that is 59 per cent OBCs voted as against 56
per cent upper castes. It becomes more pronounced if we
31
look at the Scheduled Castes who are 2 per cent above the
average, that is, about 60 per cent of them voted as against
56 per cent upper castes.16
It is this reality that sustains the paradoxical response of the political
parties not only in terms of electoral promises, but also in their
performance. The politics of populism became more pronounced with
the introduction of economic reforms. Political parties, in order to
compete with each other, promise doles. Consequently, it has liberated
political parties from the burden of adopting political positions based on
transformational politics.
Threat and Need Paradox of Democracy
The interaction of the state-led nation-building project with the path of
development produced shifts in political discourse from a
transformational thrust to the consolidation of sectional interests. The
waning away of the aura of national freedom movement and the
weakening of the central leadership in post-Nehruvian phase led to the
strengthening of the regional politics. It also brought about a shift from
the need of democratic institutions to meet a perceived threat from
these same institutions leading to institutional collapse in the eighties.17
As a result, participatory institutions were either made defunct or
ineffective and consequently led to the decreased power of liberal
democratic institutions and their leadership.
There has been centralisation of authority and deinstitutionalisation of
governance in the midst of popular revolts in Gujarat, the mass
movement in Bihar led by Jayaprakash Narayan leading to the
imposition of internal emergency in 1977. This process of
deinstitutionalisation was attributed to the then Prime Minister, Smt.
Indira Gandhi, by some political analysts. Myron Weiner opined that ‘in
Mrs. Gandhi’s view, these institutions – state Congress organizations
with local leaders independent of the Centre, a hostile opposition, a
critical press and an independent judiciary – had impeded the
movement towards a modern, socialist, equalitarian social and
economic order.’18 The structural and historical causes were not
analysed and reflected available political options and choices. The issue
of deinstitutionalisation was identified as a principle reason for the nonperformance and collapse of democratic political processes.19. No
32
doubt, there has been gradual dedemocratisation and whittling down of
the basic rights of the people and abdication of the basic obligation of
the system leading to downgrading the most precious facet of
democratic system, i. e. legitimacy. Retrospectively, it can be
conceptualised as a cyclical process and can be termed as a threat and
need paradox of Indian democracy.
The institutional collapse which was caused by the threat perception of
these leaders was selectively reversed. Having curtailed the democratic
functioning of various institutions, these leaders frequently misused the
paramilitary forces to overcome the crises. The eighties saw the revival
of law enforcing agencies with an overactive police; as a result, the
heroes of the eighties were the supercops. The nineties produced an
‘overactive judiciary’ which took upon itself most of the functions of the
state, including the moral and ethical role of the non-state institutions.
The Chief Election Commissioner shared the glory of performing the role
of reforming the system single handedly.
This selected restoration of institutional framework did not ‘restore the
secular institutional culture.20 However, competitive electoral politics
became activated leading to the decline of one party dominance.
Competing political parties in order to mobilise regional electoral
constituencies based on
caste, language, tribal and religious
considerations, built bridges with ideologically divergent groups. This
‘bridge politics’ blurred ideological differences. For instance, the party
responsible for atrocities against Sikhs in 1984 was being wooed by all
secularists and parties known for their communal outbursts were in
alliance with former socialists and liberal democrats.
POLITICS OF IDEOLOGICAL MONOTHEISM AND MULTI-CULTURAL
SECULARISM
This seeming paradox contributed to a shift from one variety of
ideological monotheism to another and the negation of forces of
ideological pluralism. Nehruvian institutional secularism was replaced
by ideological monotheism having its basis in unified conception of
indigenous (Hindu) nationhood, negating the policies of appeasement of
minorities and in opposition to secular nationhood terming it as pseudosecularism. On the other hand regional, caste and tribal groups became
mobilised for the expansion of electoral constituencies. It has been
33
argued that democracy in India has been vacillating between reconciling
the claims of communities vis-à-vis each other and finding ways to
harmonise the citizenship rights and claims of the collectivities.
The project of democracy is, thus, confronted by at least two
kinds of problems: first, making democracy receptive to the
claims of communities in a plural society, and preventing it
from degenerating into majoritarianism in a way that
consistently disprivileges the minorities; and second,
searching for ways of rendering compatible conflicting
identities, without the effacement of either and, in a manner
that safeguards the equal rights of citizenship. The Shah Bano
case and its aftermath are adequately illustrative of both
these problems.21
The mono-cultural secular nation-building project, in interaction with
multicultural social reality, led to the subversion of the rights of various
cultural and linguistic groups. This provided a context to strengthening
of communal assertions and currency to caste groupings as electoral
capital.
There are at least three crucial events in this chronology; the
Shah Bano-Muslim Women’s Act affair of 1985-86, the BJP’s
defection in 1990 from the United Front government of V.P.
Singh, and the ongoing Mandir-Masjid saga’…. By overturning
the Shah Bano decision in the widely publicized case, available
and explicable to a nation-wide audience, the Rajiv Gandhi
Government gave apparent credence to the widespread and
long-held charge against the Congress that the substance of
its secularism was “pseudo-secularism,” communally divisive
“vote bank politics,” and “pampering” Muslims in order to get
their votes.22
Communal Monoliths as Vote Banks
The Ram Janam Bhoomi movement consolidated the Hindu majority
vote bank and consequently the Bharatiya Janata Party increased its
electoral tally in Parliament from 2 seats in 1984 to 182 seats in the
1999 elections. As a ploy to fragment and weaken the Hindu vote bank,
34
a caste based political co-option strategy in the form of Mandal
Commission was unleashed.
To illustrate, the Bharatiya Janata Party won two seats in the 1984
elections with 8 per cent vote share. It increased its tally as it won 85
seats in 1989, 120 seats in 1991, 161 seats in 1996, 182 seats in 1998
and in 1999 and 138 seats in 2004.
Table 3.2
Seats Won by Bharatiya Janata Party in Parliament Elections (1984-2004)
Seats
Seats won
% of votes
% of seats won out of
Contested
polled
contested seats
1984
224
2
7.74
1
1989
225
85
11.36
38
1991
468
120
20.11
26
1996
471
161
20.29
35
1998
388
182
25.59
47
1999
339
182
23.75
54
2004
364
138
22.16
38
Source: Statistical Report on General Elections to the Lok Sabha (various years).
Political mobilisation of backward castes found expression in parties like
the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Janata Dal, Samajwadi Party, Samata
Party and other regional parties. Dalit politics also emerged as a
powerful force and found articulation through the Bahujan Samaj Party.
The participation of Dalits in elections increased.
In 1996 parliamentary elections the percentage of SC voter
turnout was 89.2 per cent as against the national average of
87.3 per cent in the case of upper castes. This trend
continued in the 1998 elections where voter turnout of the
SCs and the upper castes was 93 per cent and 91.9 per cent
respectively. In 1971 SC voter turnout was 78.7 per cent
(CSDS data unit, CSDS Delhi).23
In the initial years of post-independence India, the dominant political
discourse was secular in its thrust and was not consistent with areas
governed by caste or religious domains. Whereas since the mid-eighties,
the dominant political discourse increasingly became consistent with a
communal, sectarian and caste based cultural reservoir. The political
parties transformed this reservoir into electoral capital. Therefore, to
label electoral battles between political parties as communal versus
non-communal is a misnomer.
35
Political formations in Punjab labelled the Congress as communal as it
was seen as responsible for Operation Bluestar at the Sikh religious
shrine, the Golden Temple at Amritsar and anti-Sikh riots following the
assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Similarly, Bharatiya
Janata Party could be labelled communal as being allegedly responsible
for the communal carnage in Gujarat. In 2004 parliamentary elections
and even in 2002 Assembly elections in Gujarat the Bharatiya Janata
Party could consolidate the Hindu vote and win with massive margins.
Table 3.3
Party Preference by Social Group
Congress – NCP
BJP
N
Upper Castes
33
60
161
Patidars
18
75
158
OBCs
55
40
230
Dalits
67
*23
89
Adivasis
46
48
172
Muslims
60
*20
79
Note: The Sample size for Dalits and Muslims voting for the BJP is too small to be statistically
significant.
Source: National Election Study 2004; weighted data set.
Table 3.4
Performance of BJP and Congress in Gujarat Parliament and Vidhan Sabha Elections
Lok Sabha
Vidhan Sabha
1999
2004
1998
2002
BJP
Congress
BJP
Congress
BJP
Congress
BJP
Congress
Seats
26
26
26
25
182
179
182
180
Contested
Seats Won
20
6
14
12
117
53
127
51
% of vote
52.48
45.41
47.37
43.86
44.81
34.85
49.85
39.28
Source: Statistical Report on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Gujarat (various years)
Statistical Report on General Elections to the Lok Sabha (various years)
In the 2002 Gujarat Assembly elections, out of 182 constituencies 154
were affected by communal riots. And the BJP could win in 127
constituencies. Can communal riots influence people’s response to
political parties?
In fact, the results do not validate the thesis that the riot-hit
constituencies or even those with high rioting had BJP as the sole
claimant. Gandhinagar and Dessa were among the worst affected by
riots yet they returned Congress candidates. Thus, the Congress has
won in a significant number of constituencies (12 per cent) which
witnessed a high degree of riots and others which had moderate riots
(24 per cent). On the other hand, among the riot-free constituencies,
36
more seats went to the BJP than to the Congress (more than 60 per
cent), even in the proclaimed anti-incumbency heartland of Saurashtra.
In other words, the BJP won irrespective of the presence or the extent
of riots in Gujarat, where it could win more than 60 per cent of the
constituencies which had no rioting or low rioting. The Congress, on the
other hand, did win seats in the heavily and moderately riot hit
constituencies.24
The Gujarat elections have produced a major shift from one variety of
ideological monotheism to another, i. e. from the minority religious
group to the majority religious group, from nationalisation of Hindutva
to regionalisation of Hindutva. The nurturing of regional sentiments and
aspirations around Hindutva is a unique experiment which has serious
implications for the nation-building project. It has not only reversed the
secular nation-building project launched at the time of Independence,
but has also distorted the RSS concept of nationalisation of Hindutva.
The whole tenor of electoral mobilisation in Gujarat was a clever blend
of Gaurav of Gujarat25 and Hindutva identity. Providing a saffron garb to
regional aspirations cannot be explained as a consequence of postGodhra developments. In fact, the Godhra episode and the riots that
followed are the products of an ideological fermentation carefully
nurtured by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the BJP.
The massive response to regionalisation of the Hindutva ideology and
regional leadership can be understood in the backdrop of globalisation.
The process of globalisation has undermined the concept of a nation.
Having compromised on economic sovereignty, countries like India and
Pakistan have surrendered their political sovereignty, as maintenance of
domestic peace has been pushed into the realm of global politicaldecision making and diktats. It is in this context that President Pervez
Musharraf raised the question of Gujarat riots at the United Nations and
the ‘Mian Musharraf’ symbolism gained currency in the Gujarat
elections. The process of globalisation provided an impetus to son-ofthe-soil movement, particularly in Gujarat, which has a long history of
communalising the job market.
In the 2004 parliament elections Congress could win in 12 out of 26 Lok
Sabha seats as compared to six seats held in the 1999 elections. The
Congress was leading in 92 of the 182 assembly segments as compared
to 51 assembly seats in the 2002 elections. The moot question is that in
37
less than 15 months, is it possible that anti-incumbency could become a
potent factor overriding communal polarisation? Or did the defensive
response of the Congress under the leadership of former RSS activist
Shanker Singh Vaghela provide the electorates a choice between soft
and hard communalism.26
Caste as a Political Capital
Similarly, caste as a political capital has found varied responses blended
in regional flavours covering a vast political spectrum. The content of
the emerging Dalit identity includes an assertion of de facto recognition
of their rights, occupational mobility, status parity and parallel religious
symbols. The local cultural context has shaped Dalit response to political
parties. For instance, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) could find a positive
response in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), whereas, in Punjab with the highest
percentage of Dalit population in the country, it could find a nominal
response. To illustrate, the BSP vote share in Uttar Pradesh increased
from 11 per cent in 1993 to 23 per cent in 2002.27 Both in Punjab and
Uttar Pradesh the initial response was to identify with the BSP as there
was a low degree of representation of the Scheduled Castes. But in
Punjab there is a trend to move away from the BSP.
Table 3.5
BSP Vote Support in Uttar Pradesh and Punjab Legislative Assembly
Uttar Pradesh
Punjab
2002
1996
1993
2002
1997
1992
Seats contested
401
296
164
100
67
105
Seats won
98
67
67
0
1
9
% of vote
23.06
19.4
11.12
5.69
7.48
16.32
Source: 1. Statistical Report on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh
(various years).
2. Statistical Report on General Election to the Legislative Assembly of Punjab (various years)
Why couldn’t the BSP make electoral inroads in Punjab? Punjab has
been known for its liberal ritualistic religious practices in relation to
caste. Both Sikhism and the Arya Samaj have liberated the Dalits from
the stringent purity-pollution based behavioural patterns. For instance,
equality in religious gatherings, establishment of common kitchen and
the institution of langar were initiated to overcome caste-based
superior and inferior relationships. Not only this, offering of ‘Karah
Prasad’ by any one irrespective of his caste was a symbolic departure
from the notion that forbade food sharing by the upper and lower
castes.28
38
Interestingly, in Punjab Dalit assertion has usurped the idea of purity to
present itself as a competing identity. Notions of honour, revenge and
levirate marriages (‘chaddar’ system) that were considered exclusive to
peasant groups are now being adopted by the Dalits29. Levirate
marriage, a customary practice of Punjabi peasantry in which a widow is
‘married’ to her deceased husband’s brother or other male relative by
performing a specific ritual. The patriarchal family thus retains land,
assets and children within its fold, while also providing legitimate
protection and space to the widow. Levirate marriages are now also
being practised by Dalits in Punjab, claiming parity with the Jat
peasantry by providing protection to ‘family honour’.
For the Dalits, it meant preventing ‘pollution’ of their exclusive identity.
At the individual level, the Dalits are resentful of being unable to protect
their women from what they now perceive as transgression of their
manhood and identity. Sharing the common cultural reservoir to
acquire social parity without getting assimilated into the hierarchical
system provided them with a greater political bargaining capacity
without becoming hostage of a particular Dalit party.
Further the ideological content of BSP has been unable to capture the
regional, cultural and economic specificities of Punjab. The puritypollution and Manuwad that are the BSP’s main ideological planks do
not find expression in the socio-cultural domain of Punjab in its
fundamental form as it exists in Uttar Pradesh. Therefore, it would be
appropriate to see the impact of globalisation and regional dimension
on the communal and caste-based political formations and their
electoral performance.
To sum up, the above analysis shows that the promises and
performance of political parties may not be analysed in terms of gap,
but as a paradox. Further, the crisis of leadership has acquired a
systemic form leading to a crisis of trust in politics and political
leadership. Ideological filters have become convenient labels for
acquiring legitimacy for what is otherwise a blatantly legislative power
game.
39
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1
Robert E. B. Lucas and Gustav F. Papanek (eds.), The Indian Economy: Recent
Development and Future Prospects (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).
2
E. Sridharan, “Electoral Coalition 2004 General Elections”, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 51, December 18, 2004, pp. 5418-25. Paul R.
Brass, “India, Myron Weiner and the Political Science of Development”,
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 29, July 20, 2002, pp. 3026-40.
3
Robert W. Stern, Changing India: Bourgeois Revolution on the Subcontinent
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
4
“A nation which had two-thirds of its people under the poverty line at
independence is now a nation with two-thirds of its population above the
poverty line in the half century since independence. The middle class of India is
the proud creation of the Congress.” Lok Sabha Elections 2004: Manifesto of
the Indian National Congress.
5
Pushpendra, “Dalit Assertion Through Electoral Politics”, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 36, September 4, 1999, p. 2611.
6
Deepak Nayyar, ‘Economic Development and Political Democracy: Interaction
of Economics and Politics in Independent India’ in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.),
Democracy in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 370.
7
B. P. Mandal, Report of the Backward Classes Commission, (Government of
India, 1980), Vol. I, p. 57.
8
To quote, P. N. Dhar, the then advisor to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi:
“The broad purpose of policy changes now is to move away from directives,
regulations and controls to a greater role for market incentives and to indirect
policy instruments as against direct physical controls. Greater importance is
now being attached to productivity, competitiveness and technological
modernisation with a view to promoting more rapid growth of manufactured
exports. Similarly, quantitative limits on imports are being replaced by tariffs to
expose domestic industry to a reasonable amount of external competition.
Some more items have also been added to the open general licence.” P.N.
Dhar, “The Indian Economy: Past Performance and Current Issues”, in Robert
E.B. Lucas and Gustav F. Papanek (eds.), The Indian Economy: Recent
Development and Future Prospects (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988), p.15.
9
Myron Weiner, The Indian Paradox: Essays in Indian Politics (Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1989), p. 297.
10
‘Bharatiya Janata Party: Vision Document – 2004’ p. 2.
40
11
‘Lok Sabha Elections 2004: Manifesto of the Indian National Congress’, p. 8.
12
He undertook a 1,500 km-long padayatra across Andhra Pradesh in May
2003. During his campaign, he called Chandrababu Naidu an agent of the World
Bank and alleged that the reforms pursued by the TDP government had landed
the state in a debt trap and resulted in underdevelopment. He charged huge
loans taken from international agencies had been spent on unproductive
sectors, and much of it had been pocketed by Telugu Desam functionaries. K. C.
Suri, “Andhra Pradesh: Fall of the CEO in Arena of Democracy”, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 51, December 18, 2004, p. 5494.
13
Ibid. p. 5495.
14
Ibid.
15
Punjab Congress Election Manifesto, 2002
16
Javed Alam, ‘What is Happening Inside Indian Democracy’, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 37, September 11, 1999, p. 2654.
17
Pramod Kumar, “Flaws in the System”, The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh),
June 30, 1999.
18
Myron Weiner op.cit., 1989, p. 269.
19
To quote, Rajni Kothari, “among other things, I have focused on what I
believe to be the principle malaise, namely the erosion of institutions and the
challenge of both ‘restoring political process (by which I have meant restoring
political institutions) and reinstitutionalising the political terrain in terms of
processes and interactions that emerge from the grassroots upwards to macro
‘political structures”. Rajni Kothari, “Fragments of a Discourse: Towards
Conceptualization”, in T.V. Sathyamurthy (ed.), State and Nation in the Context
of Social Change (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 42.
20
Paul R. Brass, op. cit., 2002, p. 3027.
21
Niraja Gopal Jayal, ‘The State and Democracy in India or what Happened to
Welfare, Secularism, and Development’ in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.), Democracy
in India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 205-206.
This appeared as a footnote to above quote, is being reproduced to
contextualise the argument. The case of Shah Bano vs. Mohammed Ahmed
Khan (Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1981) was decided by the Supreme Court in a
landmark judgement delivered in April 1985. The case pertained to the claim
for maintenance of a seventy-three year old divorcee, Shah Bano. Her husband,
Ahmed Khan had moved the Supreme Court in appeal against a High Court
judgement making the payment of a small maintenance allowance incumbent
upon him. Ahmed Khan argued that sine he had fulfilled his obligations under
Muslim Personal Law by paying her an allowance for the three months of the
iddat period, and paid her mehr as well, he was not bound to do more. The
41
Supreme Court was thus implicitly asked to pronounce on the relationship
between religious personal law and some provisions of the Criminal Procedure
Code of 1973, which relate to destitution and vagrancy, and were being
regularly invoked for maintenance petitions by abandoned wives. The Court
upheld the High Court judgement, ruling that the criminal law of the country
overrides all personal laws, and is uniformly applicable to all, including Muslim
women. This judgement sparked off a political storm in which guarantees were
demanded for safeguarding personal law, ground in the claim of rights to
cultural community. In deference to the opinion of the politically influential
community leadership, the Rajiv Gandhi government hastily drafted a
legislation which explicitly excluded Muslim women from the purview of the
criminal law, to which all citizens otherwise have recourse.
22
Robert W. Stern, op. cit., 2003, pp. 185-86.
23
Pushpendra, op. cit., 1999, p. 2609
24
Pramod Kumar, “Ideology Overrides Anti-incumbency”, The Hindustan Times
(Chandigarh), December 24, 2002.
25
The Gaurav of Gujarat means pride of Gujarat. The Chief Minister of Gujarat
on August 12, 2002 said, “I am determined to take out the yatra and tell the
world the Gaurav Gatha [Story of Pride] of five crore [50 million] people in the
state. It is not the story of Godhra, Naroda Patia or Gulmarg. Gujarat was not a
state of murderers and rapists as the pseudosecularists, fanatic and powerhungry Congress leaders are attempting to project”
India:
Modi Determined to Take out Gaurav Yatra in Gujarat.
Http://www.rediff.com, August 12, 2002.
26
The BJP was ahead of the Congress by 7 per cent votes in LS polls of 1999.
Winning 12 seats in 2004 from six in 1999 was a great boost to the Congress,
which was terribly demoralized after the 2002 verdict. Then and now, the
Congress has been clueless about countering the religio-communal propaganda
and mobilization of the BJP. Priyavadan Patel, “Gujarat: Anti-Incumbency
Begins”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 51, December 18, 2004, p.
5475.
27
A. K. Verma, “Uttar Pradesh: Caste and Political Mobilisation”. Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 51, December 18, 2004, pp. 5463-66.
28
Pramod Kumar, “Checking Caste Antagonism to Prevent Violence”, The
Hindustan Times (Chandigarh), August 13, 2003.
29
Pramod Kumar and Rainuka Dagar, ‘Gender in Dalit Identity Construction in
Punjab’ in Harish K. Puri (ed.), Dalit in Regional Context, (Jaipur: Rawat
Publication, 2004), p. 279.
42
IV
COALITION POLITICS IN PUNJAB*
The history of Punjab is replete with its political parties entering into
mergers, post-election coalitions and pre-election alliances. Pre-election
electoral alliances are a more recent phenomenon, occasional seat
adjustments, notwithstanding. While the mergers have been with
parties offering a competing support base (Congress and Akalis) the
post-election coalition and pre-election alliance have been among
parties drawing upon sectional interests. As such there have been two
main groupings. One led by the Congress, partnered by the communists,
and the other consisting of the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) and Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP). The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) has moulded itself to
joining any grouping as per its needs. Fringe groups that sprout from
time to time, position themselves vis-à-vis the main groups to play the
spoiler’s role in the elections.
These groups are formed around common minimum programmes which
have been used mainly to defend the alliances rather than nurture the
ideological basis. For instance, the BJP, in alliance with the Akali Dal,
finds it difficult to make the Anti-Terrorist Act, POTA, a main election
issue, since the Akalis had been at the receiving end of state repression
in the early ‘90s. The Akalis, in alliance with the BJP, cannot revive their
anti-Centre political plank. And the Congress finds it difficult to talk
about economic liberalisation, as it has to take into account the
sensitivities of its main ally, the CPI, which has campaigned against the
WTO regime. The implications of this situation can be better understood
by recalling the politics that has led to these alliances.
These contexts can be understood in the backdrop of nation-building
projects in their interaction with Punjab’s political; economic and
cultural specificities. This interaction has shaped and nurtured regional
aspirations and political and electoral articulations. This can be
categorised around three axes. Historically, Punjab has a culture and
language which transcends religious group boundaries, unified politicoadministrative unit and has promoted a modern culture which has
*
Sponsored by: University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India
(UPIASI), New Delhi And Ford Foundation, New Delhi.
Coalition Politics in Punjab
initiated the integration process of diverse religious, caste and other
ascriptive group identities. Inspite of the process of formulation and
reformulation of the composite linguistic cultural consciousness, the
tendency to evolve a unified sub-nationality with a common political
goal remained weak in Punjab. This, in a way, provided sufficient space
for a competitive multi-party system and emergence of coalition
politics.
‘Dwarfed’ Identity Assertions
The state and its interaction with the structural conditions dwarfed, the
articulations of a secular Punjabi identity and assertions of communal
groups and distinct religious identities. All these identities co-existed.1
To illustrate, linguistic and regional issues were articulated within the
communal frame, the most obvious examples, of this were the Hindi
agitation, the Punjabi suba movement in the pre-reorganisation phase
and Khalistan assertions in the mid-eighties. At the same time, a secular
Punjabi identity also coexisted. For example, an estimated 47 per cent
of the Punjabi Hindus, according to the 1971 census, mentioned their
mother tongue to be Punjabi, even though the language question had
got communalised and in 1991 it increased to 84 per cent2. The
adoption of the Moga Declaration by the SAD and the BJP emphasising
Punjab, Punjabi and Punjabiat is a testimony to this fact.3
Minority-Majority Persecution Complex
The second axis emerges out of the peculiar demographic composition
which has provided space for this co-existence of competing identities.
Of the three religious groups i.e. the Hindus, the Muslims and the Sikhs,
as per the 1931 census, the Sikhs were in a minority. No doubt, the
percentage share of the Hindus was 28, as compared to the Muslims 56
and the Sikhs 134. This configuration provided a conducive ground to
coalition politics in the state as all religious groups considered
themselves to be in a minority.5
To illustrate, in 1937 the Akali Dal fought the elections in alliance with
the Congress on Congress-cum-Akal ticket. In the Legislative Assembly
they shared seats with the Congress and their representative became
the Leader of the Opposition. In 1942, difference arose between the
parties on the issue of supporting the war. The Congress was opposed
44
to participation in the war. The Akali Dal decided on the contrary as
they argued it would adversely affect the interests of the Sikhs in the
Army. Consequently, a pact was signed between the Muslim League and
the SAD and the Akali Dal representative, S. Baldev Singh, joined the
Cabinet.
At the time of partition, the migration of population made a significant
impact on the future course of political, economic and social events. The
Sikh population increased from 13 per cent to 33 per cent and the Hindu
population from 28 per cent to 64 per cent as per the 1961 census.
During this period Punjab was divided in two regions i.e. Punjabi
speaking and Hindi speaking. In eight of the 12 Punjabi speaking
districts, the Sikhs were in a majority.6
Further with the reorganisation of the state in the mid-sixties, the Sikhs
constituted a majority with 60 per cent and the Hindus were 37 per
cent7. This introduced a situation as both the Hindus and the Sikhs
continued to suffer from the minority persecution complex but with a
difference.
Interestingly, the Hindus suffered from a majority-minority complex as
they perceived themselves to the majority in India and a minority in the
reorganised Punjab. Similarly the Sikhs perceived to have a minoritymajority complex as they were majority in Punjab and minority in India.
This complex was not based merely on numbers, but their involvement
in diverse occupations provided the basis for interest articulation in
secular spheres on religious group lines.
Caste-Religious and Class Axis
The third important aspect was the interaction of caste with politics
within the broad boundary conditions reformulated by religious reform
movements. Punjab has been known for its liberal ritualistic religious
practices in relation to caste. Both Sikhism and the Arya Samaj liberated
the Dalits from the stringent purity-pollution based behavioural
patterns. This can be termed as regionalisation of caste. For example,
the dalits, as per the 2001 census, constitute nearly 29 per cent of the
total population of the state, perhaps the highest in the country8. A
unique regional feature is that the dalits are sharing the common
cultural reservoir to acquire social parity without getting assimilated
into the hierarchical system9. This has provided them with a greater
45
political and social bargaining capacity without becoming hostage to a
particular dalit party. Therefore, it would be appropriate to see the
relationship of these axes with party dynamics and coalition politics.
Interface of ‘Axes’ with Party Dynamics
These characteristic features have shaped the politics of the state,
whereby caste has yet to become an idiom of politics, and religious,
linguistic and regional identities have got so much intermeshed that
none of these parameters have emerged as an exclusive factor in
electoral mobilisations and coalitions. A perusal of background of
elected representatives and core support base shows that the major
political parties represent the diversity despite changing political
context since mid-sixties. For example, the Sikh majority was clearly
reflected as nearly 70 per cent of Legislators belonged to this religion.
However, the number of Sikh Legislators had been more than the
average in 1969 (76 per cent), 1977 (74 per cent) and 1997 (74 per
cent). In these elections the Akali Dal emerged as a majority party and
formed the government. In contrast in 1992, the Akali Dal boycotted the
elections and number of Sikh Legislators decreased to its lowest of 58
per cent. Of the total legislatures elected on the Akali Dal ticket, 97 per
cent belonged to the Sikh religion. Its coalition partner the BJP averages
88 per cent in all the elections from the Hindu religion.
The Congress party maintained a more healthier representation with 55
per cent the Sikhs and the remaining being the Hindus. In the Congress
party the selection of the candidates remained fluid in response to the
political context. For instance, in 1985 the Congress returned to power
with 69 per cent Hindus and in 1992, 62 per cent of the MLAs belonging
to the Sikh community got elected on Congress ticket (the Akalis
boycotted the elections).
The stunted dimension of caste politics in Punjab can be gauged from
the fact that the BSP has almost equal number of its legislators from
both the Hindus and the Sikhs.
The religious, caste and class dimensions are intermeshed, but the
dominant formations are located in exclusive demographic spaces. For
example, the Sikh-Jat-Peasant identity is predominantly rural and
Hindus-Khatri-Trader is urban. The Akali Dal is dominated by the SikhJat-Peasants and the BJP by the Hindu-Khatri-Traders. However, the
46
Congress party represents both these competing identities. To illustrate,
out of the total legislators 31 per cent were Sikh-Jat-Peasants. However,
the number of Jats elected is 44 per cent between 1967 to 2007. It is
clear that Punjab politics is dominated by Sikh-Jat-peasants. In other
words, it is religio-caste and class axis which had become a currency in
Punjab politics. For example, the Shiromani Akali Dal’s political
assertions ranged from religious identity to secular Punjabi identity. And
its birth on January 24, 1921, can be traced to anti-casteist thrust of
social and religious interactions.10 The underlying politics was to attain
freedom in political, social and religious domains. However, its core
support base has been the Sikhs and its leadership and cadre comes
from Sikh Jats with a rural background particularly in the postreorganisation phase and electoral support from the rural Sikh Jat
peasantry, dalit Sikhs, a section of urban Sikh traders and small
commission agents and shopkeepers from small towns.11 A sample
survey of party activists of the SAD in 2004 shows that 42 per cent are
farmers, 27 per cent belong to business and industry, and 25 per cent
are petty shopkeepers. An overwhelming majority of 85 per cent of
these are Sikhs (see table 4.1 & 4.2).
Table – 4.1
Occupation and Party wise distribution of Party Activists
CONGRESS
24
Executive (Business
and Trade)
(38.10)
1
Lower executive
(teacher etc.)
(1.59)
20
Self-employed
(Shopkeeper etc.)
(31.75)
8
Land owners (5+
acre)
(12.70)
2
Cultivator (< 5
acres)
(3.17)
4
Labour work
(unskilled)
(6.35)
Artisan (and semiskilled worker)
4
Retired
(6.35)
SAD (B)
16
(27.12)
15
(25.42)
23
(38.98)
2
(3.39)
BJP
19
(50.00)
1
(2.63)
12
(31.58)
AKALI
DAL
(MANN)
2
(66.67)
1
(33.33)
3
(5.08)
1
(2.63)
5
(13.16)
59
(100.00)
38
(100.00)
Un-employed
63
(100.00)
Source: IDC Field Survey, 2004
Total
47
3
(100.00)
BSP
3
(9.68)
3
(9.68)
12
(38.71)
CPI (M)
/ CPI
1
(3.03)
5
(15.15)
16
(48.48)
2
(6.45)
2
(6.45)
2
(6.06)
1
(3.03)
8
(25.81)
1
(3.23)
31
(100.00)
8
(24.24)
33
(100.00)
TOTAL
63
(27.75)
10
(4.41)
75
(33.04)
33
(14.54)
9
(3.96)
7
(3.08)
1
0.44)
28
(12.33)
1
0.44)
227
100.00)
Table – 4.2
Religion and Party wise distribution of Party Activists
CONGRESS
Sikh
Hindu
Christian
Total
SAD (B)
AKALI DAL
(MANN)
BJP
BSP
CPI (M)
/ CPI
TOTAL
20
50
1
3
6
15
95
(31.75)
(84.75)
(2.63)
(100.00)
(19.35)
(45.45)
(41.85)
42
9
36
25
18
130
(66.67)
(15.25)
(94.74)
(80.65)
(54.55)
(57.27)
1
1
2
(1.59)
(2.63
(0.88)
63
59
38
3
31
33
227
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Source: IDC Field Survey, 2004
An analysis of seats won by the SAD in all elections between 1967 and
2007 shows that it has a clear edge in 22 seats and a majority of these
are predominantly rural (See map 1). A comparative analysis of the vote
share shows that the Akali Dal has secured the maximum votes in rural
constituencies i.e. 43 per cent in 1997 assembly elections and around 17
per cent in urban constituencies in 2007 assembly pre-election coalition
phase (see table 4.3). As a consequence, it articulates the agrarian
interests and appropriates Sikh religious symbols for blurring the
emerging contradiction between the agrarian and other sectors of the
economy. However, in the post-terrorism period, urban Hindu traders,
in response to the pre-election alliance of the BJP based on Hindu-Sikh
amity have shown preference for the Akali Dal. The Akalis urban vote
share in 2007 increased to 17 per cent from 16 per cent in 1997
assembly elections in pre-election alliance with the BJP.
There have been qualitative shifts in the Akali support base. First shift
took place at the time of reorganisation of Punjab coupled with green
revolution, the rural Jat Sikhs constituted its main support and
leadership also came from this section.12
Second shift to took place in the aftermath of Operation Blue Star and
anti-Sikh riots in 1985. The Akalis urban vote revolved around 5 per cent
but in 1985 it touched 12 per cent mark with the active support of
urban Khatri Sikhs. (see table 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5)
Third shift took place after the resurgence of democracy in 1997,
whereby a substantial number of urban Hindus supported the Akali
Dal13. (See table 4.6,4.7,4.8 and 4.9)
48
49
Table – 4.3
Location wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won
Rural
1997
Semi-Urban
Urban
Rural
2002
Semi-Urban
Urban
Rural
2007
Semi-Urban
Urban
1997
Won/ contested
Votes polled( %)
1997 Won/contested
Votes polled( %)
1997 Won/contested
Votes polled( %)
BJS/ BJP
CPI
CPM
INC
SAD
JP/JD
BSP
OTHERS
4/6
2/9
0/17
7/62
53/62
0/10
1/41
3/155
3.65
3.13
2.09
26.34
42.87
0.28
8.27
13.37
9/9
0/5
0/8
4/32
19/26
0/10
0/18
3/112
12.25
2.69
1.71
25.77
33.44
1.02
6.48
16.64
5/7
0/1
/
3/11
3/4
0/8
0/8
1/72
26.81
3.01
31.44
16.30
0.86
5.55
16.02
2002 Won/contested
1/6
1/8
0/11
32/61
32/62
/
0/61
4/298
Votes polled( %)
2.76
2.22
0.45
34.63
35.99
6.26
17.69
0/29
4/210
4.65
22.45
2002 Won/contested
2/9
1/2
0/2
19/33
9/26
Votes polled( %)
8.16
1.86
0.27
35.46
27.16
2002 Won/contested
0/8
0/1
/
11/11
0/4
18.41
2.75
46.51
8.57
2007 Won/contested
5/6
0/15
0/8
25/70
35/64
Votes polled( %)
3.74
7/9
0.69
0/9
0.31
0/5
39.99
17/35
41.99
11/26
2007 Won/contested
10.98
7/8
0.77
0/1
0.27
0/1
42.85
2/12
33.38
3/4
Votes polled( %)
29.94
1.09
0.07
40.29
17.14
Votes polled( %)
2007 Won/contested
Votes polled( %)
Source: Election Commission Reports Punjab, 1997-2007
50
/
/
0/10
1/71
5.52
18.25
/
0/69
5/336
/
4.54
0/35
8.74
0/235
/
3.67
0/12
8.08
0/95
2.64
8.83
Rural
1967
Semi-Urban
Urban
Rural
1969
Semi-Urban
Urban
Rural
1972
Semi-Urban
Urban
Rural
1977
Semi-Urban
Urban
Table – 4.4
Year of Election
BJS/BJP
CPI
CPM
INC
SAD/ASD
JP/JD
1967 Won/contested
/15
3/14
2/9
29/54
16/35
/
Votes polled (%)
3.39
6.43
4.50
38.35
24.34
1967 Won/contested
2/25
1/4
1/3
19/38
8/24
/
Votes polled (%)
12.10
3.16
2.02
37.80
19.74
1967 Won/contested
7/9
1/1
/1
/10
/
Votes polled (%)
39.79
6.14
0.80
30.48
1969 Won/contested
1/11
2/19
2/8
24/55
23/36
/
Votes polled (%)
4.79
6.08
4.65
38.44
30.67
1969 Won/contested
5/11
1/8
0/2
9/38
19/27
/
Votes polled (%)
9.56
2.81
1.47
39.63
33.23
1969 Won/contested
2/8
1/1
/
5/10
1/2
/
Votes polled (%)
32.75
5.56
41.88
5.12
1972 Won/contested
0/11
7/9
1/10
31/45
14/40
/
Votes polled (%)
1.36
8.19
4.54
39.53
31.58
1972 Won/contested
0/13
2/3
0/7
26/35
10/24
/
Votes polled (%)
4.93
3.96
2.16
46.81
27.21
1972 Won/contested
0/9
1/1
/
9/9
0/8
/
Votes polled (%)
27.53
7.05
46.31
5.00
1977 Won/contested
5/16
4/13
8/8
9/54
43/47
/
Votes polled (%)
8.05
7.43
5.98
31.07
36.66
1977 Won/contested
12/15
2/4
/
6/31
14/21
/
Votes polled (%)
19.43
5.18
36.95
30.05
1977 Won/contested
8/10
1/1
/
2/11
1/2
/
Votes polled (%)
41.02
6.09
37.79
5.78
51
BSP
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
OTHERS
6/182
22.99
7/144
25.18
2/34
22.78
4/117
15.37
4/77
13.28
1/41
14.68
3/121
14.79
0/93
14.94
0/30
14.10
1/241
10.82
1/136
8.40
0/72
9.32
Table – 4.5
Rural
1980
Semi-Urban
Urban
Rural
1985
Semi-Urban
Urban
Rural
1992
Semi-Urban
Urban
BJS/BJP
1/18
CPI
7/10
CPM
4/11
Votes polled( %)
3.24
6.39
1980 Won/contested
0/13
2/7
Votes polled( %)
7.58
7.53
1980 Won/contested
0/10
0/1
Votes polled( %)
1980 Won/contested
INC
30/70
SAD
28/45
6.15
44.59
30.56
1/2
21/35
9/23
1.40
44.66
26.54
/
12/12
0/5
22.59
3.37
50.62
5.98
1985 Won/contested
1/5
1/23
0/20
12/70
53/64
Votes polled( %)
1.58
4.84
2.62
35.96
42.40
1985 Won/contested
3/10
0/13
0/7
11/35
20/31
Votes polled( %)
7.14
3.82
1.11
39.12
37.33
1985 Won/contested
2/11
0/2
0/1
9/12
0/5
Votes polled( %)
19.47
4.07
0.18
45.67
12.03
1992 Won/contested
1/31
3/15
1/13
51/70
Votes polled( %)
10.98
4.76
3.23
JP/JD
/
BSP
/
OTHERS
0/217
/
/
2/159
/
/
0/84
/
/
3/249
9.07
12.29
17.45
12.61
/
/
1/188
/
/
1/111
2/36
1/21
9/63
2/81
41.74
6.05
3.04
19.47
10.73
11.47
18.57
1992 Won/contested
3/23
0/4
0/4
27/34
1/19
0/11
0/33
4/51
Votes polled( %)
18.20
1.89
2.29
42.97
5.97
1.46
16.41
10.79
1992 Won/contested
2/12
1/1
/
9/12
0/3
0/5
0/9
0/28
Votes polled( %)
29.95
4.16
52.49
0.65
0.93
6.10
5.73
52
Doaba
1967
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
1969
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
1972
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
1977
Majha
Malwa
Table – 4.6
Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, Constituencies Contested and Won
Year of Election
BJS/BJP
CPI
CPM
INC
SAD/ASD
JP/JD
1967 Won/contested
2/8
/4
1/3
12/23
1/9
/
Votes polled( %)
8.65
5.95
4.13
38.22
6.65
1967 Won/contested
4/13
1/3
1/2
12/22
5/15
/
Votes polled( %)
15.15
3.93
3.40
37.82
22.43
1967 Won/contested
3/28
4/12
1/8
24/57
18/35
/
Votes polled( %)
8.16
5.42
2.86
36.99
25.19
1969 Won/contested
1/9
1/6
0/4
14/23
5/9
/
Votes polled( %)
10.95
4.94
4.46
41.61
18.22
1969 Won/contested
3/8
1/6
1/2
7/23
10/14
/
Votes polled( %)
12.31
12.31
5.28
4.16
40.01
1969 Won/contested
4/13
2/16
1/4
17/57
28/42
/
Votes polled( %)
6.90
6.90
4.61
2.08
37.89
1972 Won/contested
0/8
1/2
0/4
20/21
0/11
/
Votes polled( %)
4.78
3.80
4.78
49.14
12.24
1972 Won/contested
0/13
3/3
0/3
18/19
2/15
/
Votes polled( %)
9.85
7.50
3.00
46.96
23.19
1972 Won/contested
0/12
6/8
1/10
28/49
22/46
/
Votes polled( %)
3.22
7.12
2.80
39.03
34.85
1977 Won/contested
9/14
1/2
3/3
4/21
8/9
/
Votes polled( %)
21.45
2.98
6.62
34.07
20.62
1977 Won/contested
6/10
1/5
2/2
3/22
14/15
/
Votes polled( %)
18.77
7.45
3.32
35.02
27.77
1977 Won/contested
10/17
5/11
3/3
10/53
36/46
/
Votes polled( %)
11.06
7.59
2.42
32.83
36.90
Source: Election Commission Report, Punjab, 1967-1977
53
BSP
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
/
OTHERS
7/87
36.40
0/76
17.27
8/197
21.38
2/58
19.82
1/58
10.44
6/119
14.11
2/47
25.26
0/46
9.50
1/151
12.97
0/117
14.27
1/84
7.66
1/248
9.20
Table - 4.7
Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, constituencies Contested and Won
BJS/BJP
CPI
CPM
INC/ CONGRESS
SAD
Doaba
1980
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
1985
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
1992
Majha
Malwa
1980 Won/contested
0/13
1/2
1/4
16/25
6/11
Votes polled( %)
6.44
3.52
6.43
45.09
20.83
1980 Won/contested
0/11
2/3
1/3
15/27
9/18
Votes polled( %)
9.76
5.17
3.49
46.13
27.16
1980 Won/contested
1/17
6/13
3/6
32/65
22/44
Votes polled( %)
5.22
8.03
3.42
44.87
29.06
1985 Won/contested
2/6
0/6
0/8
10/25
11/16
Votes polled( %)
4.64
2.46
2.47
41.25
27.28
1985 Won/contested
2/8
0/7
0/7
10/27
14/21
JP/JD
BSP
/
/
OTHERS
1/90
17.69
/
/
0/98
/
/
1/272
/
/
2/119
/
/
1/109
/
/
2/320
8.29
9.41
21.89
Votes polled( %)
9.23
4.56
1.78
39.25
35.07
1985 Won/contested
2/12
1/25
0/13
12/65
48/63
Votes polled( %)
3.61
5.12
1.76
36.14
42.92
1992 Won/contested
0/17
0/5
0/5
19/25
0/8
0/13
6/23
Votes polled( %)
13.04
2.14
3.54
42.35
1.80
2.85
25.18
9.11
1992 Won/contested
2/16
2/3
0/3
21/27
1/10
0/6
0/21
1/24
Votes polled( %)
26.39
4.25
1.60
51.93
2.52
2.57
5.60
5.15
1992 Won/contested
4/33
2/12
1/9
47/64
2/40
1/18
3/61
5/91
Votes polled( %)
14.50
4.23
2.08
41.48
8.11
1.61
15.64
12.35
Source : Election Commission Report, Punjab, 1980-1992
54
10.12
10.45
0/45
Table – 4.8
Region wise Major Party and Year wise Vote Polled, constituencies Contested and Won
Doaba
1997
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
2002
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
2007
Majha
Malwa
1997 ** Won/contested
Votes polled( %)
BJS/BJP
CPI
CPM
INC/
CONGRESS
SAD
JP/JD
BSP
5/8
0/1
0/4
5/25
13/16
0/9
1/22
1/66
OTHERS
14.77
0.20
1.65
26.67
28.60
0.50
16.98
10.61
7/8
0/3
0/8
0/24
18/18
0/6
0/13
2/69
14.10
2.45
2.22
28.03
37.32
0.31
2.61
12.95
6/6
2/11
0/13
9/56
44/58
0/13
0/32
4/204
Votes polled( %)
4.07
4.12
1.68
26.05
40.81
0.67
6.02
16.58
/
0/25
0/138
Votes polled( %)
2002 Won/contested
Votes polled( %)
2/8
0/1
0/4
16/24
7/15
10.36
0.33
0.81
39.02
23.34
13.91
12.22
/
0/18
3/105
1.48
18.75
/
0/57
6/336
4.50
21.68
2002 Won/contested
0/8
0/2
0/3
17/24
7/19
Votes polled( %)
9.00
1.21
0.17
37.58
31.80
2002 Won/contested
1/7
2/8
0/6
29/57
27/58
Votes polled( %)
2.99
3.06
0.27
34.15
33.34
2007 Won/contested
7/8
0/1
0/5
4/25
13/17
/
0/25
1/125
15.96
7/8
0.04
0/7
0.63
0/2
38.30
3/27
30.71
17/19
/
8.48
0/27
5.87
0/120
2007 Won/contested
12.75
5/7
1.03
0/17
0.12
0/7
40.12
37/65
36.70
19/58
/
1.87
0/64
7.40
4/421
Votes polled( %)
4.27
0.88
0.22
42.02
39.36
3.50
9.75
Votes polled( %)
2007 Won/contested
Votes polled( %)
Source : Election Commission Report, Punjab, 1997-2007
55
Table – 4.9
Caste-wise Party preference in 1997
AKALI (B)
BJP
Sikhs
RELIGION
38.00
34.00
Hindu SC
12.00
10.00
Sikh SC
23.00
11.00
Hindus
27.00
45.00
Source : IDC Sample Survey 1997
The BJP has been traditionally seen as a party of urban Hindus. Around
95 per cent of its party activists were Hindus. They are involved in trade
and business (50 per cent) followed by small business (32 per cent) (See
table 4.1 and 4.2).
An analysis of Assembly election results between 1967 and 2007 shows
that the BJP has its presence in urban and semi-urban constituencies
(See map 2). Traditionally, the BJP has opposed the Akali demands of
Punjabi Suba and a Sikh homeland. However, in the post-terrorism
phase, the shift in the stance of the BJP from strong Centre to greater
autonomy for the states and its opposition to Operation Blue Star and
the November 1984 riots increased its acceptability among the rural Jat
peasantry. It was mainly political considerations, rather than electoral
arithmetic which nurtured the pre-election alliance. S. Prakash Singh
Badal, President of the SAD, was of the view that the SAD’s alliance with
the BJP was historical and political. It was not an opportunistic
alliance.14 Another senior leader of the SAD who was opposed to the
alliance considered it as an electoral burden and which was diluting the
ideological base of the Akali Dal.15 A quick glance at the data show that
the SAD has gained in pre-election coalition. However, the Bharatiya
Janata Party has suffered major losses.
The BJP’s loss has been the gain of the Congress as both parties
compete for the same support base. The regionalisation of the Indian
National Congress has ensured its continuation as a major political party
in the state. In other words, its continuation has been shaped by
meshing its nation-building ideological thrust with pragmatic responses
of its regional leadership consisting of former Akalis and Hindu Maha
Sabhites. This three dimensional dissonance i.e. pronouncements of its
national leaders, Sikh leaders, and Hindu leaders not only provided the
much needed electoral sustenance, but also contributed to the existing
conflicts.16
56
57
Paradoxically, the Congress has to compete with a strong regional party,
but within the boundaries defined by the national leadership. The only
action which seems to have defied this has been the Punjab Agreement
Repealing Act 2004 on SYL passed by the Punjab Assembly much to the
annoyance of the national leadership of the Congress.17 The main
architect of this was the Chief Minister, Capt. Amarinder Singh, who
happens to be a former Akali.18 It was mainly focused on wooing the
rural Jat peasantry. Traditionally, its core support base consists of a
large majority of Hindu dalits with their ‘uncertain religious allegiance’,
and urban Hindu traders, Sikh Khatris and migrant landless labourers. A
small faction of the rural Jat peasantry also supports the Congress
because of village level factionalism, kinship ties etc. An analysis of party
activists shows that 67 per cent are Hindus. The activists are business
men (38 per cent), petty shopkeepers (32 per cent), farmers (16 per
cent) and unskilled workers (6 per cent). (See table 4.1)
An analysis of the percentage of seats won from 1967 to 2007 shows
that it has a strong base in the urban constituencies and the dalit
dominated Doaba region of the state (see map 3). Further, vote share
analysis between 1997 and 2007 shows that the Congress secured
maximum of 46 per cent of the votes in 2002 elections in the urban
constituencies and 39 per cent in the Scheduled Caste dominated Doaba
in 2002 elections (See table 4.4, 4.5, 4.3 and 4.6, 4.7, 4.8). However,
Operation Blue Star and brutal riots against the Sikhs in 1984 provided
content to anti-Sikh politics of the Congress19. Its alliance with the
Communist Party in 1990s was to overcome the accusation of being
anti-Sikh and therefore, communal.
The Congress party’s support base has kept changing in response to
political developments in the state. In the initial years till the mid-sixties
the rich and middle peasantry supported the Congress which under the
leadership of Partap Singh Kairon initiated reforms in the rural areas.20
Between 1967 and 1980, the Congress support base shifted to urban
Sikhs and Hindus, the Scheduled Castes and a small section of the
peasantry. In post-Operation Blue Star period, in 1985 a section of
urban Sikhs shifted to the Akali Dal.21 However, in 1992 elections held in
the background of pervasive terrorism most of the elected MLAs were
from rural background and were young. The change in leadership
shaped the future politics and brought a qualitative shift in the agenda
of the Congress Party.
58
59
In the 1997 elections, the urban and semi-urban vote bank of the
Congress moved away from it (see table 4.3). The alliance of the
Congress with the Communist Party of India (CPI) was termed as
political rather than electoral. The CPI has influence among a section of
small and marginal peasants and landless labourers in the districts of
Faridkot, Sangrur, Bathinda and Ferozepur and among the industrial
labourers in urban areas.
The Communist Party politics appropriated the pro-minority discourse
in negation to Hindu communal assertions and highlighted the
economic demands shorn of religious and communal content. It
spearheaded tenant movements, the anti-water agitations in different
areas of Punjab in the 1950s. It kept the discourse of social and
economic justice alive in Punjab. It secured maximum 10 seats in 1972
elections and entered into an alliance with parties opposed to the
Congress including BJS from 1967 to 1977. However, in the nineties, it
formed a pre-election alliance with the Congress. The Congress and the
Communists have a competing support base with the BSP. The BSP used
the dalit castes as a political capital for the first time in 1992.22 The BSP
is finding a declining response in Punjab. For example, in 1992 it secured
16 per cent votes in Punjab, which declined to 6 per cent and 4 per cent
in the 2002 and 2007 assembly elections respectively (see table 10). The
ideological content of the BSP has been unable to appropriate the
regional culture and economic specificities of Punjab. The puritypollution and Manuwad that constitute the BSP’s main ideological plank
do not find expression in the socio-cultural domain of Punjab. The
‘uncertain religious allegiance’ of the dalits made them easy prey to the
political parties in the state.23 A detailed analysis of the Dalit factor in
Punjab politics can help understand the larger issue of caste dynamics in
electoral politics. The ‘uncertain religious allegiance’ of the Dalits and in
the absence of caste as a defining parameter for social position, Dalits
found representation in all the political parties in the state. It is
interesting to note that even the Jat dominated Shiromani Akali Dal
gave substantial representation to the Dalits. For instance, in 1969, of
the 25 Scheduled Caste elected legislators, 44 per cent were in the Akali
Dal. Not only this, in 1977 (48 per cent), 1985 (62 per cent) and 1997 (77
per cent), a majority of the Scheduled Caste legislators were from the
Akali Dal. Similarly, in 1967 (52 per cent),1972 (61 per cent), 1980(45
per cent), 1992(63 per cent) and 2002 (48 per cent) a majority of the
elected Scheduled Caste legislators were from the Congress. Even the
60
Bharatiya Janata Party gave representation to the Dalits. For instance, in
1997, 13 per cent of the Scheduled Caste members belonged to the BJP.
It is interesting that Dalit legislators have been elected from political
parties other than the BSP and the Communist parties.
Table – 4.10
Election and Electoral Coalitions in Punjab 1967-2007
Year
1967
Party
BJS
ADM
ADS
CPI
CPM
INC
OTHERS
IND
Parliament
Contested
Won
8
1
7
0
8
3
3
0
2
0
13
9
9
0
25
0
Vote %
12.49
4.42
22.61
4.28
1.89
37.31
7.69
9.32
1969
1971
BJS
SAD
CPI
CPM
INC
OTHERS
IND
5
12
2
3
11
11
39
0
1
2
0
10
0
0
1977
9
3
1
13
8
45
9
0
1
0
3
0
Assembly
Contested
Won
49
9
61
2
59
24
13
3
17
3
9
0
19
5
102
48
18
1
255
9
30
8
65
43
28
4
10
2
7
2
6
1
103
38
62
2
160
4
Vote %
9.84
4.2
20.48
3.26
1.79
0.51
5.2
37.45
1.22
16.05
9.01
29.36
4.84
3.07
0.83
0.91
39.18
3.92
8.89
4.45
30.85
6.22
2.2
45.96
5.82
4.5
1972
SAD
CPI
CPM
INC
OTHERS
IND
Party
BJS
ADM
ADS
CPM
RPI
PSP
CPI
INC
OTHERS
IND
BJS
SAD
CPI
CPM
SSP
SP
INC
OTHERS
IND
42.3
1.65
4.94
34.85
12.97
3.29
61
BJS
SAD
CPM
CPI
INC
OTHRES
IND
SAD
JNP
CPM
CPI
INC
OTHERS
IND
33
72
17
13
89
39
205
70
41
8
18
96
14
435
0
24
1
10
66
0
3
58
25
8
7
17
0
2
4.97
27.64
3.26
6.51
42.84
2.49
12.29
31.41
14.99
3.5
6.59
33.59
0.33
9.58
Year
1980
1985
1989
1992
1996
Party
JNP
SAD
CPI
CPM
INC(I)
BSP
OTHERS
IND
BJP
SAD
CPI
CPM
INC
OTHERS
IND
BJP
SAD(B)
SAD
SAD(M)
CPI
CPM
INC
BSP
JD
OTHERS
IND
BJP
SAD
CPI
CPM
INC
BSP
JD
JP
OTHERS
IND
BJP
SAD(M)
SAD
BSP
CPI
CPM
INC
JD
JP
OTHERS
IND
Parliament
Contested
Won
9
0
7
1
1
0
1
0
13
12
1
0
10
0
105
0
3
0
11
7
3
0
3
0
13
6
2
0
39
0
3
0
9
0
4
0
8
6
4
0
3
0
13
2
12
1
4
1
28
0
139
3
9
0
3
0
1
0
3
0
13
12
12
1
4
0
1
0
3
0
32
0
6
0
7
0
9
8
4
3
3
0
3
0
13
2
1
0
1
0
31
0
181
0
Vote %
9.97
23.37
1.27
2.53
52.45
0.07
5.03
5.31
3.39
37.17
3.84
2.98
41.53
2.24
8.85
4.17
5.38
1.27
29.19
2.1
3.9
26.49
8.62
5.46
0.71
12.72
16.51
2.58
1.57
3.98
49.27
19.71
1.3
0.93
0.13
4.01
6.48
3.85
28.72
9.35
1.6
2.68
35.1
2.66
0.03
2.01
7.51
62
Party
BJP
SAD
CPI
CPM
INC
OTHERS
IND
Assembly
Contested
Won
41
1
73
37
18
9
13
5
117
63
84
0
376
2
Vote %
6.48
26.92
6.46
4.06
45.19
4.36
6.52
BJP
SAD
CPI
CPM
INC
OTHERS
IND
26
100
38
28
117
6
542
6
73
1
0
32
1
4
4.99
38.01
4.44
1.92
37.86
1.09
11.69
BJP
SAD
CPI
CPM
INC
BSP
JD
OTHERS
IND
66
58
20
17
116
105
37
9
151
6
3
4
1
87
9
1
2
4
16.48
5.2
3.64
2.4
43.83
16.32
2.15
0.74
9.24
Year
Party
Parliament
Contested
Won
Vote %
1997
1998
1999
BJP
SAD
JD
CPI
CPM
INC
BSP
SAD(M)
OTHERS
IND
BJP
SAD
DBSM
SAD(M)
CPI
CPM
INC
BSP
JD(S)
JD(U)
OTHERS
IND
3
8
1
1
3
8
4
4
21
49
3
9
1
1
1
1
11
3
2
2
29
57
3
8
1
0
1
1
2
1
1
8
0
Party
Assembly
Contested
Won
Vote %
BJP
SAD
CPM
CPI
INC
BSP
JD
JP
SAD(M)
OTHERS
IND
22
92
25
15
105
67
27
1
30
65
244
18
75
0
2
14
1
0
0
1
0
6
8.33
37.64
1.79
2.98
26.59
7.48
0.56
0.01
3.1
0.65
10.87
BJP
SAD
DBSM
SAD(M)
CPM
CPI
INC
BSP
JD(S)
JD(U)
OTHERS
IND
23
92
2
84
13
11
105
100
4
2
213
274
3
41
0
0
0
2
62
0
0
0
0
9
5.67
31.08
0.33
4.65
0.36
2.15
35.81
5.69
0.03
0.01
2.94
11.27
11.67
32.93
4.18
3.4
1.06
25.85
12.65
2.73
0.64
4.91
9.16
28.59
2.71
3.41
3.74
2.18
38.44
3.84
0.03
0.1
5.34
2.45
2002
63
Year
2004
Party
BJP
SAD
SAD(M)
CPI
CPM
INC
BSP
JD(S)
OTHERS
IND
Parliament
Contested
Won
3
10
6
1
1
11
13
1
26
70
3
8
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
Vote %
Party
Assembly
Contested
Won
Vote %
10.48
34.28
3.79
2.55
1.81
34.17
7.67
0.01
2.5
2.75
BJP
SAD
CPI
CPM
BSP
INC
SAD(M)
OTHERS
IND
2007
23
94
25
14
116
117
37
191
438
19
49
0
0
0
44
0
0
5
8.21
37.19
0.75
0.28
4.10
40.94
0.51
1.23
6.79
BJP
3
1
10.06
SAD
10
4
33.85
SAD(M)
3
0
0.36
CPI
2
0
0.33
2009
CPM
1
0
0.14
INC
13
8
45.23
BSP
13
0
5.75
OTHERS
59
0
1.94
IND
114
0
2.33
Source: Election Commission Reports 1967-2009
In fact, the Dalits could not emerge as a vote-bank for the BSP in Punjab.
For instance, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) could find a positive
response in Uttar Pradesh (U.P.), whereas, in Punjab which has the
highest percentage of Dalit population in the country, it could find a
nominal response. To illustrate, the BSP vote share in Uttar Pradesh
increased from 11 per cent in 1993 to 23 per cent in 2002. Both in
Punjab and Uttar Pradesh the initial response of the Dalits was to
identify themselves with the BSP as there was a low degree of
representation of the Scheduled Castes. But in Punjab there is a trend to
move away from the BSP. For instance, in 1989 BSP could win one seat
out of 12 contested seats with 8.62 per cent of votes polled. It secured
highest percentage of votes i.e. 19.7 per cent in 1992 elections and
64
could win only one seat. It secured highest number of seats in 1996
election when it entered into an alliance with Akali Dal (Badal). This was
a new phenomenon and it adversely effected the performance of
Congress party. In this election, BSP could win three seats of the four
contested with 9.3 per cent votes polled. The BSP in Parliament as well
as Assembly elections continued to act as spoilers mainly for Congress
party. It acted as a spoiler in 14 and 11 constituencies in 1997 and 2002
elections respectively. In 1998 parliamentary elections BSP could not
win any seat with 12.65 per cent of vote share.
In 1999, Lok Sabha elections witnessed the BSP as a major spoiler for
Congress party. The BSP acted as spoiler for Congress in more than 20
assembly segments. In 2004 Parliamentary elections the BSP percentage
of votes increased from 3.84 per cent in 1999 elections to 7.67 per cent.
This increase was mainly due to all the 13 seats contested by the party.
Why could the BSP not make electoral inroads in the state? Punjab has
been known for its liberal religious practices in relation to caste. Both
Sikhism and the Arya Samaj have liberated the Dalits from the stringent
purity-pollution based behavioural patterns. Further the political and
ideological texture of the BSP has been unable to capture the regional,
cultural and economic specificities of Punjab. The purity-pollution and
Manuwad that are the BSP’s main ideological planks do not find
expression in Punjab in view of the role of Sikhism and the Arya Samaj.
It is in this backdrop the BSP-Akali Dal alliance in 1996 parliamentary
elections made a discernible impact in Doaba region which consists of
Hoshiarpur, Jallandhar and Phillaur constituencies.
In Malwa region as well the alliance worked to the advantage of the
Akalis, particularly in Ropar, Patiala, Faridkot, Bathinda, Sangrur and
Ludhiana. This reinforces the religio-cultural ethos which negate the
existence of exclusive caste categories for electoral mobilisations.
To sum up, the inter-party relationship can be contextualised in the
three axes. The dwarfed identity assertions are signposts within which
religious minority and caste along with demographic positioning shape
the intra and inter party interactions. This has also led to the defining of
regional space giving rise to a strong regional party. Regional interests
became a filter for the national parties in the political competitive
65
context and found an escape route in mergers i.e. the Indian National
Congress and the Akali Dal.
The national and regional parties in competition for sectional interests
having a bearing on electoral arithmetic, resorted to post-election
coalitions or pre-election alliances i.e. the Bharatiya Janata Party and
the SAD.
COALITION POLITICS: ELECTORAL OVERVIEW
Coalition politics in Punjab follows a history of electoral alliances
ranging from mergers in the post-partition phase to the more recent
pre-election alliances. The electoral coalitions can be mapped in four
distinct phases namely – (i) Politics of Mergers: 1947 to the mid-sixties;
(ii) Reorganisation of Punjab: 1966 to 1980; (iii) From Autonomy to
Secession: 1980 to 1992; and (iv) Resurgence of Democracy and Punjabi
Identity: Post-1992 phase.
Politics in post-Independence India and partitioned Punjab was shaped
by issues related to identity politics and access to political power. The
question of separate religious identity, communal and sectarian
mobilisation, secular, linguistic and strata based grouping remained
dominant in the political discourse. The dynamic interaction of the state
with the path of development in the background of co-existence of
competing identities produced diverse political formations ranging from
merger of political parties to post-election coalitions to pre-election
alliances.
In the first phase between 1947 and the mid-sixties the two main
competing political parties merged, whereas, parties representing
sectional interests resorted to agitational politics. The Indian National
Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal merged in 1948 and in 1956. The
merger was guided by the politics of accommodation by the dominant
party and shifting the arena of political activity from popular
movements to elite maneuvering. The parties that merged came out of
this arrangement within a short span, but a majority of the leaders
active in legislative politics continued to function in the Congress as was
the case in the pre-Independence phase. The politics of merger reduced
the Akali vote share from 15 per cent in 1952 to 12 per cent in 1962.24
66
The Communist Party of India (CPI) continued to agitate for the
economic interests of the agriculturists and landless labourers. The
Bharatiya Jana Sangh continued to agitate for the interests of urban
Hindus. The support base of the Jana Sangh increased from 5 per cent in
1952 to 9 per cent in 1962. The Communist Party support base
increased about 10 per cent in the Punjabi speaking rural areas. The
overall increase was from 5 per cent in 1952 to 7 per cent in 1962.
The second phase marked the end of one-party dominance in Punjab.
The re-organisation of the state in 1966, the introduction of the Green
Revolution strategy and demographic transformation to a Sikh majority
state, initiated a new process of political alliances and economic
differentiation. Political discourse revolved around restructuring of
Centre-State relations and anti-Congressism.
In this phase, four coalitions were formed and all during post-election.
The first post-election coalition was formed after the fourth general
election in 1967 under the Chief Ministership of Gurnam Singh
consisting of a United Front of parties opposed to the Congress, with
divergent ideological thrust. This minority coalition could last only eight
months and fell after the defection of 17 SAD members of the
Legislative Assembly (see graph – 4.4).
The main opposition party, the Congress gave outside support to the
Akali break away group and a minority government under the Chief
Ministership of Lachman Singh Gill was formed on November 25, 1967.
It could last only nine months as the Congress withdrew support.
The third coalition was formed after the mid-term elections in February,
1969, in which the Akali Dal and the Jana Sangh were the main partners.
The minority coalition government was headed by S. Gurnam Singh.
The Jana Sangh withdrew support. It could last only 13 months.
Differences among the coalition partners arose over issues like
language, Centre-State relations and the status of Chandigarh.
The fourth minority coalition government came into being after the
removal of S. Gurnam Singh as Chief Minister. S. Prakash Singh Badal
was sworn in as Chief Minister on March 27, 1970, with a new agenda of
the coalition government. The Jana Sangh withdrew from the coalition
in June, 1970, on the question of the jurisdiction of Guru Nanak Dev
67
University. However, the main differences were on issues relating to the
transfer of certain Panjabi-speaking areas to Punjab. This minority
coalition could last for 15 months.
The post-election coalitions were formed either to keep a political
formation out of power or by entering into convenient power-sharing
arrangements. These coalitions were marriages of convenience
between political parties and were tedious to sustain and relatively
unstable.
The third phase in Punjab politics brought about a qualitative shift in the
mechanics of government formation. The political discourse moved
away from autonomy to secession on communal basis. Competitive
electoral and moderate politics suffered a severe set-back and the
culture of violence became the dominant mode of articulation of
grievances. Popularly elected governments were dismissed and
elections were postponed. Elections were held to legitimize nondemocratic and communal politics in 1985, 1989 and 1992. An
important lesson learnt was that democracy was the only antidote to
terrorism.25 The revival of the democratic process witnessed a major
shift in the political agenda.
The fourth phase witnessed a major shift in the political agenda of the
parties. The Akali Dal shifted their stance from Sikh identity to Punjabi
identity, from the human rights of ‘Khalistan’ activists to peace at any
cost, from state autonomy to co-operative federalism. Similarly, the
Bharatiya Janata Party moved from a strong centre to greater autonomy
for states. The Congress apologised for Operation Blue Star and the
brutal riots of 1984. In view of these shifts and lessons learnt from the
decade of terrorism, the political parties entered into pre-election
alliances.26
In 1997 Assembly elections the Akali Dal and the BJP on the one hand
and the Congress and the Communist Party of India on the other,
entered into pre-election coalitions. It was a ‘surplus majority coalition’
of the Akali Dal and the BJP. It completed its full term.27
The Akali Dal-BJP alliance performed better because it provided the
Akali Dal with the much needed political space at the national level to
shed its anti-national image, and to the BJP it gave a political plank to
counter the Congress and the Left propaganda that its politics was anti68
minorities. The political parties having recovered from the terrorism
phase, started carving out their own autonomous space. The SAD, which
again started the pre-Blue Star politics of shaping the Sikh identity
coupled with anti-incumbency suffered massive defeat in 1999
election.28
In the 2002 elections, a pre-election alliance as in 1997 took place
between the Akali Dal and the BJP on the one hand and the Congress
and the CPI on the other. The Congress formed the government with
the outside support of the CPI. It was a single party majority
government. The merger of the two-member legislative wing of the CPI
into the Congress created fissures in the alliance between the two
parties. Consequently, in 2007 assembly elections the Congress and the
CPI did not enter into a pre-election alliance. However, the SAD and the
BJP entered in a pre-election coalition and formed the minority coalition
government.
The mergers, post-election coalitions and pre-election alliances have
their own dynamics. A detailed analysis, in term of political economy of
coalition, social matrix and representation, and mapping of party
ideologies in terms of policies, legislative and executive decision making
will be made. Above all, it would be relevant to analyse the impact of
coalitions on governance, democracy, party dynamics, centre-state
relations, conflicts and issues relating to the rights of vulnerable groups,
distributive justice and identity politics.
POLITICS OF MERGER: 1947 to MID-SIXTIES
In the first phase, from 1947 to the mid-1960s, one party dominance
negated the existence of regional interests and branded these
assertions as anti-national. The aura of the national freedom movement
led to the Congress Party hegemonizing the whole spectrum of Indian
politics. The politics of co-option of regional interests was practised by
the Congress to maintain its hold on power. It encouraged the Akali Dal
to merge with the Congress for the first time in 1948 and then in 1956.
The partition of Punjab necessitated consensus-based political
governance, and the Akali Dal legislative wing elected in 1946 was
invited to merge with the Congress.
The Akali Dal contested the 1946 elections in opposition to the
Congress. In the 175 member Punjab Assembly the Akali Dal won 23 of
69
Chart – 4.1
Post-Election Alliances, Single Party and Pre-Election Alliances
POST-ELECTION ALLIANCES
SINGLE PARTY
United Front
(Akali Dal +
Indian
Bharatiya Jan Indian
National
Sangh +
National
Congress
CPI +
Congress
(INC)
PSP + RPI)
(INC)
PRE-ELECTION
ALLIANCES
INC
SAD
INC
SAD
INC
BSP
(S.Akali
Dal
boycott)
BSP
(S.Akali
Dal
boycott)
Congress
(INC)
INC
Congress
(Interim)
BSP
(S.Akali
Dal
boycott)
INC +
CPI
SAD +
BJP
INC
Main Opposition / Alliance
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
United
Front
(Akali Dal+
PSP
+ RPI)
CPI
(M)
Supported
from
outside
(SAD +
Bhartiya
Jana
Sangh)
Janta
Outside
Ministry
Akali break support by
Congress Akali Dal (s),
away
other United
(Outside
Janta party
(Congress
Front
SAD +
support CPI CPI (M),
supported
partners
Bhartiya
seat
outside
from outside) (CPI(M) + Jan Sangh adjustments
support
SSp + RSP
+ S.P.
+CPI)
8.3.67–
24.11.67
Gurnam
Singh
(C.M.)
25.11.67–
23.8.68
Lachman
Singh Gill
(C.M.)
Minority
Coalition
Government
Single Party
Minority
Government
17.2.69–
26.3.70
Gurnam
Singh
(C.M.)
27.3.70 –
14.6.71
Prakash
Singh
Badal
(C.M.)
Minority Coalition
Government
17.3.72–
30.4.77
Giani Zail
Singh
(C.M.)
20.6.77–
17.2.80
P.S.
Badal
(C.M.)
Single Party
Government
Surplus
Majority
Coalition
INC
SAD
6.6.80–
6.10.83
Darbara
Singh
(C.M.)
29.9.85–
11.5.87
SurjitSing
h Barnala
25.2.92–
31.8.95
Beant
Singh
(C.M.)
31.8.95–
21.11.96
Harcharan
Singh Brar
Single Party Government
Time Period and Government
70
INC
SAD +
BJP
Congress
(elected CPI
MLA’s
defected to
Congress)
SAD +
BJP
21.11.96–
11.2.97
Smt.
Rajinder
Kaul
Bhattal
12.2.9724.2.02
P.S.
Badal
(C.M.)
3.2002 –
2-2007
Capt.
Amarinder
Singh
3-2007
P.S.
Badal
(C.M.)
Surplus Majority
Coalition
Minority
Coalition
Government
the 33 seats reserved for Sikhs.29 The Congress won 51 seats including
10 reserved for Sikhs.
The Unionist Party won 21 seats including 15 reserved for Muslims. The
Independent Christians won 1, Independent labour 2, Independent Dalit
1 and Anglo-Indians 2 seats. The Muslim League won 74 seats.
A coalition ministry was formed under the leadership of Sir Khizr Hayat
Khan, consisting of the Unionist Party, the Congress and the Akali Dal.
The ministry submitted its resignation on 3 March, 1947 and Governor’s
rule was promulgated in the state. After independence, the Congress,
the Akali representatives and six independent MLAs formed the ministry
under the leadership of Dr. Gopi Chand Bhargava. The SAD passed a
resolution on 22nd April 1949, to withdraw from the Congress
Government after the Constituent Assembly turned down safeguards
for the Sikhs30. Master Tara Singh in October 19, 1949, made a
statement that ‘every minority except the Sikhs had been given justice.
The Muslims demanded Pakistan and they got it.’31 The SAD adopted a
resolution and directed its MLAs to leave the Congress on 20th July,
1950. Interestingly, only one MLA resigned from the Congress
Legislative Party. The Akali Dal fought the 1952 general elections on the
issue of Punjabi Suba with emphasis on the creation of a Punjabi
speaking province.32 During this period in Punjab the issue of
reorganisation of the state on linguistic basis acquired communal
overtones. Though the Akali leaders emphasized language as the basis
for a division of the state, at the popular plane they tended to mix
religion with language.33
The indoctrination that the Sikhs were a single political entity and their
secular interests were common, provided continuity to the pre-partition
politics of the Akali Dal. The growing strength of Master Tara Singh
among all occupational groups created the fear that the movement for
a separate independent Sikh state might become stronger. To counter
the demand for a Punjabi Suba raised by the Akali Dal led by Master
Tara Singh, an agitation for Hindi was launched. This advocated a ‘Maha
Punjab’ irrespective of language. Communal overtones in this were
explicitly visible, though there was not much tension between the two
communal groups. The increasing strength of the Akali Dal alarmed the
Congress leadership.
71
In 1956 an understanding was reached between the ruling Congress
Party and the Akali Dal. Subsequently the Akali Dal stalwarts joined the
Congress.34 The Akalis accepted the regional plan at their meeting of
30th September, 1956. The new state was to be divided into so-called
Punjabi-speaking and Hindi-speaking regions and two regional
committees consisting of the members of the legislature belonging to
the respective regions were to be constituted.
The Akalis did not contest the second general election held in 1957. But
due to internal compulsions and dissensions among the Akalis, the
understanding with the Congress did not last long. The Akali Dal decided
to take part in politics on its own and asked its members in the Congress
to return to their parent organisation. Of the 28 Akali MLAs who had
joined the Congress, only 7 returned to the Akali fold.35 It is relevant to
note that most of the Akalis who joined the Congress, in 1937, 1948 and
1956 did not return to the Akali fold. Prominent among them were
Pratap Singh Kairon (later Chief Minister of the Congress Government),
Gurmukh Singh Musafir, (later President of the Congress Party), S.
Swaran Singh (later India’s Foreign Minister in the Congress
Government), Baldev Singh (later India’s Defence Minister) etc. It is
interesting that most of the ‘Sikh’ leaders in the Congress have had a
stint in the Akali Dal.36 The success of the Akalis in the SGPC elections
encouraged them to launch morchas for a Punjabi Suba in 1959 and
1961.37
The failure of the 1961 morcha discredited Master Tara Singh’s
leadership. The 1962 general election was projected by the Congress as
a referendum on the Punjabi Suba issue. This challenge was accepted by
the Akali Dal. Its defeat in the general election demoralised its
leadership. The Akalis won only 19 of the 154 seats and lost even in the
Punjabi speaking areas. Master Tara Singh was held responsible for this
defeat. He was also accused of sacrilege for he had broken his fast unto
death.
The data indicate that the Akali Dal lost considerable electoral support
in the 1962 elections. This erosion in the Akali support base led to
renewed attempts by the Akalis to accelerate the process of
communalisation. The demand for a Punjabi Suba was again raised. The
political demarcation of Punjab was not considered favourable by the
72
Akali Dal to its bid to capture political power in the state; hence the
demand for a Punjabi Suba.
The split of the Akali Dal in 1962 facilitated the concentration of power
in the hands of those speaking in the name of the rural Jat peasantry in
the organisation. In January 1965, the Sant Akali Dal won 95 of the 138
seats in SGPC elections, giving a crushing defeat to the Master Akali Dal.
It also increased its share in political power.38 It coincided with the
reorganisation of the state in September, 1966, on a linguistic basis and
initiation of the Green Revolution. This was the beginning of coalition
politics with anti-Congressism as its main plank.
REORGANISATION OF PUNJAB: 1967 TO 1980
In the period 1967 to 1980, the fourth and fifth Vidhan Sabha of Punjab
witnessed four coalitions and one minority government. The three
coalition governments were formed by the Akalis with the support of its
main coalition partner, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. The fourth coalition
was that of a breakaway group of the Akalis supported by the Congress.
This phase is characterised by the establishment of a Sikh majority with
the reorganisation of Punjab on the basis of language. The numerical
dominance of the Sikhs as a single political entity was now
unchallenged. The electoral dominance of the Congress receded. The
other factor that had an overarching impact on the state politics during
this period was the initiation of the Green Revolution strategy. The
Green Revolution strategy empowered the Sikh Jat peasantry, but led to
differentiations between the peasantry and the trading classes. This
phase then witnessed a shift in political discourse from political
deprivation of the ‘minorities’ to economic discrimination. Therefore,
the demand for a separate Sikh state could not find expression, but
greater state autonomy became an issue for the emerging agrarian
interests. This issue was, however, raised by the Akalis in 1973 and
acquired the character of a movement in 1978.
The first coalition was formed after the 4th General Election in 1967. In
this election, the Congress won 48 seats in the 104-member state
Legislative Assembly. The Akali Dal (Sant Fateh Singh) secured 24 seats,
the Jana Sangh 9, the Communist Party of India 5, the Communist Party
of India (Marxist) 3, the Republican Party 3, the Akali Dal (Master Tara
Singh) 2 (see table 4.10). A united front of all parties was formed with S.
73
Gurnam Singh as their leader. A minority coalition government was
formed. It was a combination of divergent ideological groups with the
sole purpose of keeping the Congress out. A common programme was
prepared and adopted at Khanna, and the resolution adopted read:
Whereas we stand for amity and goodwill among all
sections of Punjabis irrespective of caste or creed, and
promise to take steps to strengthen the new state of
Punjab economically and politically, we resolve to
oppose all separatist trends and moves aimed at
weakening the unity and integrity of the country.39
The common minimum programme was evolved to provide stability to
the government. Similarly, ministry formation was also guided by the
principle of giving adequate representation to coalition partners.40
The election results mirrored the social matrix and respective support
base of political parties and an effort was made to reflect this into in the
government formation. For instance, the Akali Dal won the highest
number i.e. 18 of the 24 seats from Malwa region and polled the highest
votes i.e. 25 per cent from Malwa as compared to 7 per cent and 22 per
cent from Doaba and Majha (see table 4.6). The Jana Sangh reflected its
strong urban hold by securing 40 per cent of the votes polled from
urban seats contested and with a negligible count of 3 per cent in rural
and only 12 per cent in the semi-urban constituencies of Punjab (see
table 4.4). The Communist Party made its mark in its pocket
constituencies.
The exclusive support base of the coalition partners is further reflected
in the MLAs’ backgrounds in terms of caste, occupation, religion and the
formation of ministry. Around 67 per cent of the Akali Dal MLAs were
from agricultural background and 75 per cent belonged to the rural Jat
community (see table 4.11). Whereas, dalits including Mazhabis and
Ramdasias were 25 per cent (see table 4.11). The representation of the
urban Sikh trading community was merely 4 per cent.
The Bharatiya Jana Sangh, the post-coalition partner of the SAD, had
more legislators coming from trading and industrial background. More
than 56 per cent of its legislators belonged to the urban Khatri and 22
per cent to the Bania castes. This is a reflection of its support base
among the urban Hindus.
74
The Communist Party of India had more legislators from agricultural
background but belonging to the Mazhabi Sikh and Rai Sikh castes. The
Congress had 44 per cent of its MLAs from among the rural Jat
peasantry. The number of legislators coming from the Scheduled Caste
group was twice that of the Akali Dal (see table 4.11). The
representation of urban Khatri traders in the Congress was competing
with the Jana Sangh. The coalition represented demarcated electoral
support base in the allocation of ministerial berths. The negotiations
between the SAD and Jana Sangh responded to leadership
considerations of S. Gurnam Singh and consequently Jana Sangh got the
best deal in Cabinet formation.41 With two ministers, it had the charge
of the ministries of Finance, Industry, Excise and Taxation, Local Bodies
and Health. This coalition proved unstable and could last only eight
months.
According to Akali activists, the concentration of power in the Jana
Sangh ministers led to discontentment among the Akali legislators. The
Congress got an opportunity and assured their support to the
disgruntled Akalis to defect and form their own ministry.42
In November, 1967, an Akali breakaway group led by Lachhman Singh
Gill formed a single party minority government with the outside
support of the Congress. The United Front with Akali Dal, the Bharatiya
Jana Sangh, CPI, PSP and RPI formed the opposition. This government
was also shortlived and survived nine months. The Congress withdrew
support from the government.
The fifth Vidhan Sabha witnessed the third post-election coalition led by
the Akali Dal with Gurnam Singh as Chief Minister. The main alliance
partner was the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. It had outside support from other
United Front partners of the CPI(M), SSP, RSP, SP and CPI. The Akali-Jana
Sangh entered into an agreement on the language question.43
Technically, this coalition can be termed as a minority coalition
government since the Akali Dal and the BJS had 51 of the 52 required
seats to form the government, with outside support from the Left
parties. The seat distribution in the government were 43 with SAD, 8
with BJS, 4 with CPI, 2 with CPI(M) and 38 with Congress. The
percentage of votes obtained by the SAD in Punjab was 29.36, perhaps
the only time that the semi-urban voters eclipsed the vote share of the
75
Table – 4.11
Caste, Year and Party Wise Distribution of MLAs
BJP
Year
SC
OBC
1967
1969
1
0.96
12.50
OTHER
8
7.69
88.89
5
4.81
62.50
JAT
1
0.96
11.11
2
1.92
25.00
16
13.68
64.00
2
1.71
8.00
1972
1977
4
3.42
16.00
1980
1985
3
2.56
12.00
1
0.85
100.00
1
0.85
16.67
1992
1997
4
3.42
22.22
2002
2007
Total
4
3.42
21.05
14
1.24
14.74
2
1.71
11.11
1
0.85
33.33
1
0.85
5.26
8
0.71
8.42
5
4.27
83.33
6
5.13
100.00
11
9.40
61.11
2
1.71
66.67
13
11.11
68.42
66
5.84
69.47
1
0.85
5.56
1
0.85
5.26
7
0.62
7.37
SC
2
1.92
40.00
1
0.96
25.00
2
1.92
20.00
4
3.42
57.14
4
3.42
44.44
1
0.85
25.00
1
0.85
50.00
2
1.71
100.00
17
1.50
38.64
CPI
OBC
1
0.96
20.00
1
0.96
25.00
1
0.96
10.00
1
0.85
14.29
1
0.85
11.11
1
0.85
100.00
1
0.85
25.00
1
0.85
50.00
8
0.71
18.18
OTHER
1
0.96
20.00
1
0.96
25.00
2
1.92
20.00
1
0.85
14.29
1
0.85
11.11
JAT
1
0.96
20.00
1
0.96
25.00
5
4.81
50.00
1
0.85
14.29
3
2.56
33.33
1
0.85
25.00
1
0.85
25.00
7
0.62
15.91
12
1.06
27.27
SC
OBC
CPM
OTHER
1
0.96
50.00
1
0.96
100.00
5
4.27
62.50
3
2.56
60.00
JAT
3
2.88
100.00
1
0.96
50.00
3
2.56
37.50
2
1.71
40.00
1
0.85
100.00
10
0.88
50.00
1
0.09
5.00
9
0.80
45.00
SC
12
11.54
25.00
10
9.62
26.32
14
13.46
21.21
3
2.56
17.65
13
11.11
20.63
10
8.55
31.25
20
17.09
22.99
1
0.85
7.14
14
11.97
22.58
7
5.98
15.91
104
9.20
22.08
OBC
5
4.81
10.42
5
4.81
13.16
7
6.73
10.61
3
2.56
17.65
8
6.84
12.70
2
1.71
6.25
9
7.69
10.34
5
4.27
8.06
2
1.71
4.55
46
4.07
9.77
INC
OTHER
10
9.62
20.83
8
7.69
21.05
17
16.35
25.76
6
5.13
35.29
24
20.51
38.10
15
12.82
46.88
22
18.80
25.29
4
3.42
28.57
21
17.95
33.87
11
9.40
25.00
138
12.20
29.30
JAT
21
20.19
43.75
15
14.42
39.47
28
26.92
42.42
5
4.27
29.41
18
15.38
28.57
5
4.27
15.63
36
30.77
41.38
9
7.69
64.29
22
18.80
35.48
24
20.51
54.55
183
16.18
38.85
Contd..
76
SAD
BSP
OTHER
ALL PARTY
SC
OBC
OTHER
JAT
SC
OBC
OTHER
JAT
SC
OBC
OTHER
JAT
SC
OBC
OTHER
1967
6
18
3
2
4
6
23
8
23
5.77
17.31
2.88
1.92
3.85
5.77
22.12
7.69
22.12
25.00
75.00
20.00
13.33
26.67
40.00
22.12
7.69
22.12
1969
11
3
2
27
1
2
1
5
25
11
17
10.58
2.88
1.92
25.96
0.96
1.92
0.96
4.81
24.04
10.58
16.35
25.58
6.98
4.65
62.79
11.11
22.22
11.11
55.56
24.04
10.58
16.35
1972
6
18
1
2
23
9
19
5.77
17.31
0.96
1.92
22.12
8.65
18.27
25.00
75.00
33.33
66.67
22.12
8.65
18.27
1977
15
2
2
39
2
31
9
25
12.82
1.71
1.71
33.33
1.71
26.50
7.69
21.37
25.86
3.45
3.45
67.24
100.00
26.50
7.69
21.37
1980
9
3
25
1
1
29
14
25
7.69
2.56
21.37
0.85
0.85
24.79
11.97
21.37
24.32
8.11
67.57
50.00
50.00
24.79
11.97
21.37
1985
18
4
17
34
2
3
29
9
40
15.38
3.42
14.53
29.06
1.71
2.56
24.79
7.69
34.19
24.66
5.48
23.29
46.58
40.00
60.00
24.79
7.69
34.19
1992
1
2
8
1
2
2
3
32
12
31
0.85
1.71
6.84
0.85
1.71
1.71
2.56
27.35
10.26
26.50
33.33
66.67
88.89
11.11
28.57
28.57
42.86
27.35
10.26
26.50
1997
23
7
4
41
1
1
1
5
30
11
20
19.66
5.98
3.42
35.04
0.85
0.85
0.85
4.27
25.64
9.40
17.09
30.67
9.33
5.33
54.67
100.00
14.29
14.29
71.43
25.64
9.40
17.09
2002
12
4
25
1
1
1
6
29
11
24
10.26
3.42
21.37
0.85
0.85
0.85
5.13
24.79
9.40
20.51
29.27
9.76
60.98
11.11
11.11
11.11
66.67
24.79
9.40
20.51
2007
16
6
2
25
2
2
1
29
11
26
13.68
5.13
1.71
21.37
1.71
1.71
0.85
24.79
9.40
22.22
32.65
12.24
4.08
51.02
40.00
40.00
20.00
24.79
9.40
22.22
Total
117
29
27
254
9
1
9
12
12
31
280
105
250
10.34
2.56
2.39
22.46
0.80
0.09
0.80
1.06
1.06
2.74
24.76
9.28
22.10
27.40
6.79
6.32
59.48
90.00
10.00
14.06
18.75
18.75
48.44
24.76
9.28
22.10
Source: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who's Who of Members (1960-2002), Chandigarh: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003.
Election commission Reports, Punjab (1967-2007)
Note: Parenthesis figures pertain to percentage of representation of MLAs from party total
Year
77
JAT
50
48.08
48.08
51
49.04
49.04
53
50.96
50.96
52
44.44
44.44
49
41.88
41.88
39
33.33
33.33
42
35.90
35.90
56
47.86
47.86
53
45.30
45.30
51
43.59
43.59
496
43.85
43.85
TOTAL
104
100.00
104
100.00
104
100.00
117
100.00
117
100.00
117
100.00
117
100.00
117
100.00
117
100.00
117
100.00
1131
100.00
Table – 4.12
Year and Party wise Distribution of MLAs belonging to Hindu and Sikh Religion
YEAR OF ELECTION
1967
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1969
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1972
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1977
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1980
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1985
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1992
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1997
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
2002
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
2007
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
Total
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
HINDU
9
8.65
100.00
7
6.73
87.50
19
16.24
76.00
1
0.85
100.00
6
5.13
100.00
6
5.13
100.00
17
14.53
94.44
2
1.71
66.67
17
14.53
89.47
84
7.43
88.42
BJP
SIKH
OTHERS
4
3.42
44.44
1
0.85
100.00
5
4.27
55.56
2
1.71
50.00
1
0.85
50.00
1
0.85
50.00
CPI
SIKH
4
3.85
80.00
2
1.92
50.00
7
6.73
70.00
5
4.27
71.43
8
6.84
88.89
1
0.85
100.00
2
1.71
50.00
1
0.85
50.00
1
0.85
50.00
5
0.44
50.00
5
0.44
50.00
13
1.15
29.55
31
2.74
70.45
HINDU
BSP
SIKH
1
0.96
12.50
6
5.13
24.00
1
0.85
5.56
1
0.85
33.33
2
1.71
10.53
11
0.97
11.58
OTHERS
HINDU
1
0.96
20.00
2
1.92
50.00
3
2.88
30.00
2
1.71
28.57
1
0.85
11.11
OTHERS
HINDU
1
0.85
12.50
CPM
SIKH
3
2.88
100.00
2
1.92
100.00
1
0.96
100.00
7
5.98
87.50
5
4.27
100.00
OTHERS
1
0.85
100.00
1
0.09
5.00
19
1.68
95.00
Contd..
78
YEAR OF ELECTION
1967
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1969
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1972
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1977
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1980
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1985
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1992
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
1997
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
2002
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
2007
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
Total
% out of total MLAs
% out of party MLAs
HINDU
16
15.38
33.33
13
12.50
34.21
27
25.96
40.91
8
6.84
47.06
34
29.06
53.97
22
18.80
68.75
32
27.35
36.78
6
5.13
42.86
30
25.64
48.39
7
5.98
15.91
195
17.24
41.40
INC
SIKH
31
29.81
64.58
25
24.04
65.79
38
36.54
57.58
9
7.69
52.94
28
23.93
44.44
10
8.55
31.25
54
46.15
62.07
8
6.84
57.14
31
26.50
50.00
36
30.77
81.82
270
23.87
57.32
OTHERS
1
0.96
2.08
1
0.96
1.52
HINDU
7
6.73
46.67
2
1.92
22.22
1
0.96
33.33
1
0.85
1.59
1
0.85
1.15
1
0.85
1.61
1
0.85
2.27
6
0.53
1.27
3
2.56
60.00
3
2.56
50.00
2
1.71
28.57
1
0.85
11.11
1
0.85
20.00
20
1.77
31.75
OTHER
SIKH
8
7.69
53.33
7
6.73
77.78
2
1.92
66.67
2
1.71
100.00
2
1.71
100.00
2
1.71
40.00
3
2.56
50.00
5
4.27
71.43
8
6.84
88.89
4
3.42
80.00
43
3.80
68.25
OTHERS
HINDU
JD
SIKH
OTHERS
HINDU
1
0.96
4.17
1
0.85
1.72
2
1.71
2.74
1
0.85
100.00
1
0.09
100.00
3
2.56
4.00
1
0.85
2.44
4
3.42
8.16
12
1.06
2.81
SAD
SIKH
23
22.12
95.83
42
40.38
97.67
24
23.08
100.00
57
48.72
98.28
37
31.62
100.00
70
59.83
95.89
3
2.56
100.00
71
60.68
94.67
40
34.19
97.56
45
38.46
91.84
412
36.43
96.49
OTHERS
104
100.00
1
0.96
2.33
104
100.00
104
100.00
117
100.00
117
100.00
1
0.85
1.37
117
100.00
117
100.00
1
0.85
1.33
117
100.00
117
100.00
117
100.00
3
0.27
0.70
Source: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who's Who of Members (1960-2002), Chandigarh: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003.
Election commission Reports, Punjab (1967-2007)
Note: Parenthesis figures pertain to percentage of representation of MLAs from party total
Sikhs predominantly represented in Akali Party, while Hindus predominantly in the BJS/BJP. Both religions find representation in Congress, as also in BSP (Religion permeates the caste base in Punjab)
79
TOTAL
1131
100.00
Table – 4.13
Election Year wise, Ministerial Representation according to Party and Region
Akali
BJS/BJP
INC
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
Total
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
Total
Majha
Malwa
Doaba
1969 Ministers
4
15
5
24
2
1
1
4
MLAs
10
28
5
43
3
4
1
8
**
40.00
53.57
100.00
55.81
66.67
25.00
100.00
50.00
1972 Ministers
4
8
5
MLAs
18
28
20
22.22
28.57
25.00
1977 Ministers
1
7
3
11
1
2
2
5
MLAs
14
36
8
58
6
10
9
25
7.14
19.44
37.50
18.97
16.67
20.00
22.22
20.00
1980 Ministers
2
10
4
MLAs
15
32
16
13.33
31.25
25.00
1985 Ministers
6
18
4
28
MLAs
14
48
11
73
42.86
37.50
36.36
38.36
1992 Ministers
8
14
9
MLAs
21
47
19
38.10
29.79
47.37
1997 Ministers
9
17
7
33
2
3
3
8
MLAs
18
44
13
75
7
6
5
18
*
50.00
38.64
53.85
44.00
28.57
50.00
60.00
44.44
2002 Ministers
8
10
7
MLAs
17
29
16
47.06
34.48
43.75
2007 Ministers
5
6
2
13
2
3
5
MLAs
17
19
13
49
7
5
7
19
29.41
31.58
15.38
26.53
28.57
0.00
42.86
26.32
Note : Minister/MLAs. With Percentages the proportion of ministers to MLAs. (Data pertains to the time of the Constitution of Ministry)
** 5 MlA from Other Paries joined Akali in 1969
* 1 MLA from other party shifted to Akali in 1997
Source: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who's Who of Members (1960-2002), Chandigarh:Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003
Election Commission Reports, Punjab (1967-2007)
80
Total
17
66
25.76
16
63
25.40
31
87
35.63
25
62
40.32
Majha
6
13
46.15
4
18
22.22
2
20
10.00
2
15
13.33
6
14
42.86
8
21
38.10
11
25
44.00
8
17
47.06
7
24
29.17
Total(SAD+BJP+INC)
Malwa
Doaba
16
6
32
6
50.00
100.00
8
5
28
20
28.57
25.00
9
5
46
17
19.57
29.41
10
4
32
16
31.25
25.00
18
4
48
11
37.50
36.36
14
9
47
19
29.79
47.37
20
10
50
18
40.00
55.56
10
7
29
16
34.48
43.75
6
5
24
20
25.00
25.00
Total
28
51
54.90
17
66
25.76
16
83
19.28
16
63
25.40
28
73
38.36
31
87
35.63
41
93
44.09
25
62
40.32
18
68
26.47
rural constituencies when it drew 33 per cent of the votes in
comparison with 31 per cent of the vote shared from the rural areas.
The vote share of the Jana Sangh was in tune as a subsidiary partner
with 9 per cent votes. (See table 4.10).
The elected members continued to showcase the traditional support
base of their representative parties. The Akali Dal had as many as 60 per
cent of its MLAs belonging to the peasantry. In contrast, the party
already had only 5 per cent of its MLAs drawn from trading and
industrial occupations. Slightly out of tune with its customary base, the
Jana Sangh in 1969 elections had 37 per cent of its MLAs from
agriculture background. Regionally also, the Jana Sangh had 50 per cent
of its MLAs from Malwa rather than its domain of Majha or Doaba (See
table 4.6). The demarcations on the basis of religion were most stark
and most reflective of the social base of the party. None of the 43 Akali
MLAs was Hindu and the BJS had a lone Sikh legislator and 87 per cent
of its MLAs were Hindu (see table 4.12). The shift in the representation
in Akali political leadership became apparent since 63 per cent of the
legislators were rural Jat peasants and 25 per cent were dalits (see table
4.11). In contrast, in BJS a majority of 62 per cent MLAs were from the
Hindu Bania/Khatri caste. The Congress reflected its wider social base as
its elected members predominantly came from the Scheduled and
Backward Castes (39 per cent), Hindu and Sikh Khatris (21 per cent) and
Sikh Jats (39 per cent) (see table 4.11). While the Congress did have a
dominant representation of the elites i.e. peasantry (53 per cent) it
differed from the other parties by having an equitable distribution of
votes polled among the rural, semi-urban and urban constituencies,
increasing its vote share towards the urban areas (38 per cent in rural,
40 per cent in semi-urban and 42 per cent in urban) (see table 4.4). But
its regional share in this election came starkly from Doaba with 42 per
cent votes polled and a nominal of 4 per cent and 2 per cent in Majha
and Malwa (see table 4.6). The 1969 coalition was shortlived with the
Jana Sangh withdrawing its support within 13 months over differences
on language, Centre-State relation and the status of Chandigarh.
This was a minority coalition government ridden with factionalism in the
Akali Dal44, high expectations of the Jana Sangh and the fear of
defections in the shadow of the numerical strength of the Congress.
81
There were 28 ministers at the time for the formation of the ministry.
The Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal got around 50 per cent of its MLAs as
ministers (see table 4.13). The allocation of portfolios to the Jana Sangh
got reduced even though they had more ministers. Important
departments of Finance, Excise and Taxation and Health were not
allocated to them and later it seemed to have provided a reason for the
withdrawal of support. The then Chief Minister Gurnam Singh made a
statement on the floor of the Assembly which reinforced this
interpretation.
My honourable Jana Sangh members created a lot of
noise over the allocation of Finance to another colleague
who does not belong to their party. I must take the
House in confidence that at no stage it was agreed that
Finance portfolio would be given to the Jana Sangh. It
was my prerogative as the Chief Minister and I exercised
it. Nevertheless, beneath this demand for key portfolios
by the Jana Sangh, in reality is the desire to use the State
machine to rehabilitate themselves among the people.45
Further executive business in the Assembly centred on the coalitions’
concern over economic development and on Centre-State relations and
language.46 While economic development was the rallying point, the
language issue and Centre-State relations remained contentious among
the coalition partners. This along with factionalism within the Akali Dal
led to the downfall of the Gurnam Singh ministry.
A fourth collation, also a minority coalition government, came into
being within the fifth Vidhan Sabha itself after S. Gurnam Singh was
replaced by Prakash Singh Badal as Chief Minister. He was sworn in with
a new agenda for the coalition government.47
The Jana Sangh bargained for three cabinet berths and one minister of
state. The Jana Sangh could get the Ministry of Finance and Industry
with change in the leadership of the Akali Dal Legislature Party. Akali
factions, clamouring for ministerial berths, threatened to destablise the
government. The Chief Minister amended the rules to co-opt these
legislators as chairpersons of financial corporations which were earlier
treated as offices of profit.48 The Jana Sangh again withdrew support to
the coalition on the issue of transfer of Punjabi-speaking areas to
Punjab. The withdrawal was sparked by the question of Guru Nanak Dev
82
University’s jurisdiction and the exclusion of Hindi language by Punjabi
University.
The 1977 election was unique in that it was an anti-emergency election
that saw the Janata Party and its allies voted to power in the Lok Sabha
and the Vidhan Sabha. A surplus majority coalition government was
formed. The Akali Dal also fought under the banner of the Janata Party.
The Akalis won 58 seats, the Janata Party 25, CPI 7 and CPI(M) 8 (see
table 4.10). The Janata Party in Punjab was led by the SAD Chief
Minister Prakash Singh Badal and had the smallest ministry (16) with
only 20 per cent of its MLAs provided with ministerial berths, in
contravention of the trend in coalition governments. The legislature saw
dissentions on account of both intra-party Akali factionalism (AkaliNirankari conflict, limits to state autonomy) as well as clash of interests
between the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and the SAD.49
These post-election coalitions revolved around anti-Congress and anticentralism. The Akali Dal supported by the Sikh majority of the newly
organised state found itself within striking distance of forming a
government. As an alternative to the Congress, the other parties of the
state such as the Jana Sangh and the CPI rallied to ally with and support
the Akalis in a post-election coalition. Such coalitions were marked with
the co-option of leaders representing divergent ideological frameworks
and regional interests. These were marriages of convenience of the
leadership with the sole aim of capturing power with their ranks
regarding each other with suspicion, and a clash of ideological
moorings. Even in the CPI’s support base itself, the inherent
contradiction between the landed peasantry and the landless workers
resulted in a decline in this base. While the flavour of religious symbols
was stark in its differentiation, economic issues cut across religious
divides to regroup people according to their agrarian and trade
interests.
The social matrix was represented in the power structure as a
differentiated group in Akali led coalitions, whereas in the Congress
government diverse elements were given representation. In other
words, these elements were not presented as representing
differentiations, but as articulating specific cultural and linguistic
interests in the decision making process.
83
These coalitions brought a competition between a single party and
multi-party alliance. For instance, this led to appropriation of the
dominant political discourse of religious symbolism by the Congress
Party.
The post-election coalition brought into focus elite manoeuvrings rather
than massification of democracy. To illustrate, a large number of offices
of profit were declared offices of non-profit in the 1970s to
accommodate legislators. This distorted governance in the state with
disproportionate discretion granted to the legislatures. The legislature
became an arena to raise contentious ideological issues to appeal to
differentiating support bases.
From autonomy to secession: 1980s to 1990s
This phase is characterised by an assertion for state autonomy. The
differentiation in the economy was sharpened with the political
assertion of the Sikh Panth. Three simultaneous trends emerged during
this period and these included demand for state autonomy without
unduly disturbing the existing political arrangements; the demand for
self-determination within the constitutional framework and the slogan
of Khalistan. The path of development and the denial of legitimate
claims of people to access their own language, culture and resources
produced conditions of structural disequilibrium. The differentiation in
the economy sharpened political assertions. Their range, from state
autonomy to the demand for Khalistan, reflected the factionalism in the
Akalis and their inability to congregate under one banner. Political
demagogues used communal and religious symbols and their forms to
outdo and eliminate each other with a view to increasing their support
base for greater leverage in politics. This provided an ideological cover
to the use of violence. The differentiation in the economy sharpened
political assertions but the political process represented sectional
interests.
Demands were articulated by using methods ranging from peaceful to
just short of physical violence to even violent acts. The first major
agitation after 1980 was launched in February, 1982, against a bus fare
hike by the Akalis, the CPM, the CPI and the Janata Party. These parties
gheraoed the State Assembly and the Governor could not open the
budget session for over two hours.
84
The Congress Party, which was faction ridden, allowed the situation to
drift and then degenerate into communal conflict. In the meantime,
sacrileges were committed in religious places, the demand was raised
for relaying Gurbani from the Golden Temple, and banning the sale of
tobacco, meat and liquor in Amritsar. However, all these assertions, to a
very significant extent, could not adversely affect the four-party
opposition alliance. In April, 1982, Indira Gandhi came to Kapoori village
in Punjab to formally launch the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) project. The
four-party alliance sensed Indira Gandhi’s strategy to use this to win the
Haryana Assembly election to be held in May that year and, therefore,
launched a morcha in Kapoori against the SYL.50
At the same time, the ruling party also started appeasing the extremist
sections in the Akali Dal like Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, with
disastrous consequences. The emergence of a strong Sikh leadership in
the form of Sant Bhindranwale started questioning the SGPC leadership.
In order to counter the threat posed by the extremists, moderates
within the Akali Dal shifted the venue of the morcha from Kapoori to
the Golden Temple. This was the end of the four-party alliance. This
further led to the communalisation of the secular demand. The Akali Dal
continued its morcha but called it dharma yudh from August 4, 1982.
Akali volunteers continued to court arrest, off and on. Even after the
arrest of over two lakhs persons, no compromise could be reached.
It is this state of affairs that enhanced the appeal of the militants among
the middle and small peasantry. The morcha started waning because of
increasing state repression and factional flights within the Akali Dal.
Instead, the Akali leadership took recourse to specific programmes. On
April 4, 1983, it organised a rasta roko agitation on July 17, a protest day
and on August 29 a rail roko. Efforts were made to stop work in all
offices with a kaam roko call.
On its part, the Congress allowed the situation to drift. It half-heartedly
pressed for or offered negotiations and blamed the Opposition and the
Akali Dal for blocking a solution to the economic and secular demands.
However, the ruling party unilaterally accepted the religious demands of
the Akali Dal on February 27, 1983. It was an attempt to shelve real
issues such as the demand for more autonomy, water and territorial
issues. This strategy produced two results:
85
(a) It made it difficult for the Akalis to mobilise support for other
economic demands. Acceptance of religious demands further
aggravated the problem, as the Akali Dal-L coined new demands to
protect and promote the economic and political interests of the
rural elite. For instance, in January, 1984, the Akali Dal-L raised the
demand for the amendment of Article 25 of the Indian Constitution.
This demand was not raised by the Akali Dal-L in any of its earlier
resolutions or charter of demands; and
(b) It helped the Congress to establish its bona fides with the Akali
support base.
The demand for an independent Sikh state could not find effective
expression in political discourse as it was raised as a slogan by a
marginal political leadership rather than the mainstream political forces.
The demand for Khalistan did not acquire mass support despite the
ruthless political and administrative initiatives and the brutal and
senseless killings by its protagonists. The manifestations of this violence
like Operation Blue Star of 1984, the assassination of Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi in November 1984, and the subsequent anti-Sikh riots
thwarted the democratic process.
However, attempts were made to hold elections to legitimize nondemocratic and communal politics. The 1985, 1989, and 1992 elections
were held in this background. The 1985 Assembly and Lok Sabha
elections took place in the context of the Rajiv-Longowal Accord signed
in 1984, while the 1989 Lok Sabha elections were held in the
background of the failure to honour the same accord.51 In the 1985,
Assembly elections, the Congress secured 32 seats with 38 per cent
votes and the Akalis secured 73 seats with 38 per cent votes52 (see table
4.10). In the 1989 Lok Sabha elections, the Akali Dal (Mann) won 10
seats with 39 per cent votes.
Election to the State Assembly were postponed on the pretext that the
gun would influence voting and the victorious militants would dictate
terms. This was patently an afterthought to rationalize the success of
the Mann-led Akali Dal in the 1989 election and to ward off future
electoral losses of the same shattering magnitude. Incidentally, parties
opposing the election secured more than 61 per cent of the votes. In
these elections, the agenda of peace was dominant as was reflected in
the signing of the Rajiv-Longowal accord in 1984, creating conditions for
86
political participation of the hardlines in Sikh politics in 1989 and
providing a ‘façade’ of representative politics in 1992.
The 1992 elections were boycotted by the Akali Dal, resulting in a
turnout of only 24 per cent. It was, therefore, rightly labelled as an
“apology for a representative character of democratic polity.”53
During the destabilisation of the democratic polity in the violent phase
of militancy and state control, the 1985-89 and 1992 elections were
used to revive legislative politics. In fact the agenda for the 1992
elections was restoration of peace, unemployment, better returns for
the crops rather than issues like state autonomy or the Anandpur Sahib
Resolution.
Resurgence of democracy and Punjabi identity: Post- 1990 phase
The triumph of democracy and assertion of the people’s agenda for
peace over that of party sectional interests characterised the politics of
this period. The Akali Dal was quick to respond to the people’s demand
for peace within the gamut of its identity-based politics by widening its
agenda from politico-religious identity confined to the Sikh identity to
the broader agenda of Punjabiyat.
The Shiromani Akali Dal President, Mr. Prakash Singh Badal, brought the
notion of Punjabi unity to the centrestage of Punjab politics mainly to
draw legitimacy for its slogan of ensuring lasting peace in the state.
This gave the Akali Dal an added advantage over the Congress which
was seen as anti-Sikh due to its role in the November 1984 riots. It is in
this background that the Akali Dal structured its campaign with a major
thrust on anti-Congressism. In a statement the Akali Dal president,
Prakash Singh Badal asked “All Punjabis to join hands in the massive task
of social restructuring and economic rebuilding by making sure that
anti-people and anti-Punjab Congress regime is routed in the state, lock
stock and barrel.”54
The main plank of the Akali Dal was that the unity of all Punjabis could
be the only true and dependable basis of lasting peace and there could
be no social and political stability without Punjabi unity. This seems to
have been prompted by the fact that during the phase of terrorism,
legitimate demands like state autonomy, a greater share in river waters
87
and the transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab had degenerated into the
movement for Khalistan which played havoc with the people’s lives.
Both the single party governments stuck to the people’s agenda of
peace with the Beant Singh Government promoting prosperity with
peace. The marginal shift in the Congress agenda in the post-Beant
Singh phase was from an emphasis on liberal market reforms to an
emphasis on economic subsidies for most sections of society. The
concessions covered the peasantry, urban traders, landless labourers
and dalits.
The revival of democratic politics and institutions was accompanied by a
resurgence of Punjabi identity. Political parties, which had been
historically articulating the language question on communal lines,
shifted their stance. For instance, the Akali Dal-BJP in their Common
Minimum Programme (1997) asserted, “Punjabi being our mother
tongue is the state language of Punjab. Every Punjabi is proud of the
richness of the Punjabi language and culture.” This was a major shift
because the underlying thrust of the dominant political discourse in the
pre-1992 phase was that Punjabi was the language of the Sikhs and the
Hindus never owned Punjabi as their language.
In addition, the Akali Dal in its policy programme adopted on 14 April,
1995, emphasised disputes over the apportionment of river waters,
allocation of Punjabi-speaking territories as a discrimination against
Punjab rather than the Sikhs (as it used to be in pre-1992 resolutions),
and linking the prices of agricultural products with the price index. To
quote:
Over the decades, Punjab has continually been a victim
of the discriminatory and repressive policies of the
Centre, in particular the rights of Punjab in respect of its
left-out territories and the river waters have been
ruthlessly suppressed and undermined ... For pursuance
of the above objectives, the spirit of Punjabiat would be
strengthened so that these matters get projected as
common problems of the entire Punjabis rather than a
section thereof (emphasis added) 55.
The resolution indicated a shift in the Akali Dal stance from its earlier
political pronouncements. The resolution reflected a change in the
88
social category of analysis from the Sikhs to the Punjabis. The resolution
implies that the demands raised pertain to Punjabis and their nonacceptance is a discrimination against Punjabis rather than Sikhs. And
the struggle for realisation of these demands has to be launched in the
spirit of Punjabiat rather than as Khalistanis or Sikhs.
Another major shift in the political discourse was on issues relating to
greater autonomy for the states. The BJP changed its position from a
strong centre to greater autonomy for states. The BJP’s 1997 election
manifesto reinforced this shift. To quote;
We [BJP] shall pursue with the centre for the implementation
of the main recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission56,
(a) Restore the balance of resources in favour of the states,
(b) Ending the misuse of Art 356 of the Indian
Constitution57,
(c) Consulting states on the choice of governors.
All these issues were incorporated in the Common Minimum
Programme 1997 evolved by the Akali-BJP alliance. However, it was
interesting to note that the thrust of the Akali Dal agenda changed from
anti-centrism to co-operative federalism.
The Akali-BJP government has opened a new chapter in
Centre-State relations, ushering in the age of cooperative federalism in the country. The era of
confrontation has been effectively ended and replaced
with a forward looking thrust on working together for
the overall good of the state and the nation.58
This position marks a radical shift from the anti-centre stance as
reflected in the 1973 autonomy resolution and later in its 1985
memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission. Further, there was a
noticeable shift in the Akali Dal (Badal) resolutions and assertions with
emphasis on human rights. The main plank of the Akali Dal was that the
unity of all Panjabis would become a reality only if lasting peace was
ensured.59 There was also a pragmatic consideration of cementing the
Akali-BJP alliance which demanded human rights to be played down and
peace at any cost to be reinforced.
89
Peace in Punjab is very dear to us. We will make all
endeavours to ensure peace and harmony that will last.
The unity of all Punjabis could be the only true and
dependable basis of lasting peace and there could be no
social and political stability without Punjabi unity.60
This gave the Akali-BJP alliance an advantage over the Congress which
was seen as anti-Sikh due to its role in Operation Blue Star and the 1984
anti-Sikh riots. The Congress continued to harp on the restoration of
peace as its main achievement; whereas the Akali Dal-BJP alliance
presented the maintenance of peace as their main agenda. The
Congress wanted to take credit for the restoration of peace, but was
reluctant to own the manner in which peace was brought, particularly
when a large number of policemen were being hauled up by the
judiciary.61 This ambivalent position led to a shift in the mood of the
electorate.
For the smooth functioning of the pre-election alliance between the
Akalis and the BJP a committee was constituted to allocate seats. The
main criterion listed by the committee was to allocate seats on the basis
of ‘status-quo claim’ and ideological support base62. The BJP staked its
claim to 34 seats and was allocated 22 for 1997 and 23 seats for 2002
and 2007 assembly elections. Thus most of the BJP seats were urban
and had Hindu candidates. The Akalis, on the other hand, were confined
to their traditional support base in the rural and semi-urban areas and
the Malwa region of the state. The ‘status-quo claim’ was based on the
following principles;
(a) Seats which have been contested by one of the coalition partners in
previous elections. From this quota 14 and 42 seats were allocated
to the BJP and the Akali Dal respectively
(b) Seats which the coalition partners have contested against each
other in previous elections were allocated on the basis of the
number of times a seat was contested by a party irrespective of the
outcome.
There were 23 seats in this category. The BJP had contested more
often from 9 constituencies as compared to the Akali Dal. In the
1997 elections it was allocated 8 seats and in 2002 elections it was
allocated 9 seats from this category.
90
Of the remaining 14 seats, the BJP staked its claim on 7 seats. Its
claim was not conceded. There were 3 seats which were contested
by the both parties on equal occasions and the Akali Dal was ahead
of the BJP in two and the remaining seats were rural and closer to
the Akali ethos. The other four seats were contested more often by
the SAD.
(c) There were 38 seats which the BJP and the SAD had contested, but
not in opposition to each other. The BJP staked its claim to 4
constituencies. The SAD had contested three seats more often and
therefore these were allocated to the SAD and one seat remained
contentious.
An analysis of seat sharing in terms of bargaining of coalition partners
shows that the BJP managed 12 seats (55 per cent) beyond its quota in
1997 elections as compared to its performance in 1996 parliamentary
elections, whereas, the SAD managed 17 seats (18 per cent) beyond its
quota. (See table - 4.14 )
Table – 4.14
Bargaining power of different alliance partners : Proportions of seats allocated
to alliance partners beyond normal quota (1997 Assembly Election based
on 1996 Parliament Election)
Performance in 1996 in Assembly Segments
of Parliamentary Election
Seat managed to
Winner
Runner
get beyond Quota
Alliance in 1997
Assembly
Election
No. of Seats
Contested in 1997
Assembly Election
BJP
22
2
8
SAD
92
59
16
17 (18%)
CPI
15
0
0
15 (100%)
CONG
105
32
77
-4 (-4%)
12 (55%)
Source: Election Commission Reports, 1996-1997
The Akali Dal and the BJP pre-election coalition won the 1997 elections.
This was a surplus majority coalition. It was for the first time in the
electoral history of Punjab that the Akali Dal could have formed the
government on their own.
The SAD won 75 seats out of 92 contested seats and was polled 38 per
cent votes (see table 4.10). It maintained its dominance in rural areas
with 53 legislatures (71 per cent) from semi-urban 19 MLAs (25 per
cent) and from urban 3 MLAs (4 per cent) (see table 4.3). The BJP as a
minor partner in the coalition won 18 of the 22 contested seats with 8
per cent votes. A majority of these were Sikh Jats (55 per cent) (see
91
table 4.11) and agriculturists (60 per cent). The urban Hindus, traders
and professional were nominal. Interestingly, the 31 per cent of the
MLAs belonged to scheduled castes and 9 per cent to backward castes
(see table 4.11). The urban Khatris also found representation in Akali
Dal. In other words, the SAD represented a wide spectrum of social
matrix. Whereas, a majority of BJP legislators (i.e. 14 (78 per cent) were
from urban and semi-urban areas and four could win from rural areas
(see table 4.3). Among the BJP MLAs, a majority were Hindus belonging
Khatri and Bania castes (61 per cent) involved in trading and
professional work. It continued to provide representation to scheduled
and backward castes constituting around 33 per cent of its legislatures.
It would be worthwhile to examine the linkage between social matrix
and legislative representation with the ministerial representation. It was
a jumbo cabinet with 41 ministers. The Chief Minister Prakash Singh
Badal allocated berths to its pre-election coalition partner in proportion
to the MLAs elected. The SAD had 81 per cent of the legislators and its
share in the cabinet was 80 per cent. Similarly, the BJP had 19 per cent
of the legislators and its share in the cabinet was 19 per cent (see table
4.13). The wide spectrum of social representation of its SAD MLAs
influenced its decision for allocation of portfolios.
The portfolio on which the BJP has been traditionally staking its claim
were kept with the SAD. The portfolios such as finance, industry, excise
and taxation were not allocated to the BJP but were now shifted into
the domain of the Chief Minister and his loyalists.
The BJP leadership did negotiate for allocation of their traditional
portfolios to cater to their support base. To quote a senior BJP leader;
‘We have put forward our claims for Local Bodies, Industry, Finance,
Housing and Urban Development, Food and Civil Supplies, Excise and
Taxation and Health in this order of priority.’63
A senior Akali leader in an interview mentioned that the BJP’s claim for
Finance Ministry was discussed in the Political Affairs Committee (PAC)
of the Akali Dal which unanimously rejected it. The BJP could retain
some of its traditional departments like Local Bodies, Health and Family
Welfare. Other portfolios included Food and Supplies, Forest, Legislative
and Legal Affairs, Education and Excise and Taxation (Minister of State),
Rural Development and Panchayats (Minister of State).
92
This clearly indicated that the respective traditional support bases of
political parties have branched into other sectors of economy and preelection coalition works more to the advantage of major partner
specially if its is surplus majority coalition. As is evident BJP’s bargaining
capacity was much higher in post-election coalitions particularly when
the Akali Dal was faction ridden.
The other competing political formation i.e. the Congress and the CPI
could not register its presence in diverse social, economic and regional
support base. The Congress could win 14 seats with 25 per cent votes
(see table 4.10). It could win only 3 urban and 4 semi-urban seats (see
table 4.3). Not only this, the Congress could only elect 7 per cent of its
legislators from Scheduled Castes. Its vote share was lowest so far.
In 2002 election, the Congress and the CPI pre-election coalition formed
the government. This was mainly because the Akali-BJP coalition formed
around a common minimum programme, used to defend the alliance
rather than nurture the ideological basis carved in 1997. The process of
redefining the religious identities and building bridges with the Sikh
fundamentalist fringe elements sharpened factionalism within the SAD
and alienated a large section of urban voters.64 The noticeable shift
from Punjabi identity to reinforcement of Sikh identity made urban
Hindu voters align with the Congress party. The efforts of the SAD to
represent a large section of scheduled caste in the 1997 legislature
suffered a set back as its policies like free power to peasant landowners
made rural based scheduled caste apathetic to the SAD-BJP alliance. A
sample survey in 2004 of the SAD (39 per cent) and the BJP (34 per cent)
party workers perceived that communal amity is the basis of coalition
(see table 4.15).
Whereas, the Congress (27 per cent) and the CPI (52 per cent) party
workers opined that this alliance was to exploit religion sentiments. The
politics of confrontation of the then Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal
with Gurcharan Singh Tohra, the then SGPC President and Bhai Ranjit
Singh, the Akal Takht Jathedar led to the division within the Akali
support base.65 All these factors did not weaken the alliance. The BJP
was allocated 23 seats as compared to 22 seats in 1997 elections.
93
Table - 4.15
Party Activist Perception on Basis of the Coalition between BJP + Akali Dal (Badal)
Party
Congress
SAD (B)
BJP
Amity
Between
The
Hindus
and Sikhs
Electoral
Arithmetic
Anti
Congress
2
23
4
17
(3.17)
(36.51)
(6.35)
(26.98)
27
(39.13)
National
Development
Traditional
allies
No Idea
Good
Governance
17
Total
63
(26.98)
(100.00)
8
11
15
8
69
(11.59)
(15.94)
(21.74)
(11.59)
(100.00)
2
4
12
7
4
44
(34.09)
(4.55)
(9.09)
(27.27)
(15.91)
(9.09)
(100.00)
1
2
3
(33.33)
(66.67)
(100.00)
1
14
5
5
6
31
(3.23)
(45.16)
(16.13)
(16.13)
(19.35)
(100.00)
CPI (M) / CPI
Total
Exploit
Religious
Sentiments
15
Akali Dal
(Mann)
BSP
Promote
Interests
of upper
castes
9
3
17
4
33
(27.27)
(9.09)
(51.52)
(12.12)
(100.00)
45
49
16
8
39
23
22
29
12
243
(18.52)
(20.16)
(6.58)
(3.29)
(16.05)
(9.47)
(9.05)
(11.93)
(4.94)
(100.00)
Source : Party Activists Survey, 2004
94
The seat sharing principle was based on the status-quo claim as was the
case in 1997 elections. The bargaining power of alliance partners
indicates that the BJP could manage to get 3 seats (13 per cent) less
than its quota as compared to its performance in assembly segments in
the 1999 parliamentary elections. The SAD could manage to get 16 seats
(17 per cent) beyond its quota.
The CPI and the Congress alliance proved to be more beneficial to the
CPI as it could manage 2 seats (18 per cent) beyond its quota and the
Congress could get 6 seats (6 per cent) beyond its quota (see table
4.16).
Table – 4.16
Bargaining power of different alliance partners: Proportions of seats allocated to alliance
partners beyond normal quota (2002 Assembly Election based on 1999 Parliament Election)
Alliance in 2002
Assembly Election
No. of Seats
Contested in 2002
Assembly Election
BJP
Performance in 1999 in Assembly Segments
of Parliamentary Election
Winner
Runner
Seat managed to get
beyond Quota
23
11
15
-3 (-13%)
SAD
92
22
54
16 (17%)
CPI
11
8
1
2 (18%)
CONG
105
66
33
6 (6%)
Source : Election Commission Reports, 1999-2002
The state Congress leadership was opposed to alliance with the CPI with
so many seats allocated to it.66 It was the direct intervention of the
Congress high command which made this alliance functional. On the
other hand, the CPI leadership opined that it was allocated seats for
which it did not stake its claim, for instance, Pakakalan instead of
Khanna, Panjgrahin instead of Rampura Phul. In three constituencies67
the Congress rebel candidates were in the contest. Interestingly, 21 per
cent of the Congress Party activists reported that the alliance was based
on the decision of the central leadership. In contrast, 91 per cent of the
CPI activists felt that the coalition was to fight communal forces (see
table 4.17). The SAD (78 per cent) and the BJP (84 per cent) viewed the
Congress-CPI coalition as mere electoral arithmetic.
95
Table – 4.17
Party Activist Perception on basis of the Coalition between Congress and CPI or CPI (M)
If yes, give To remove
name of
communal
the party
parties
Congress
SAD (B)
30
(47.62)
1
(1.69)
BJP
Akali Dal
(Mann)
BSP
CPI (M) /
CPI
Total
1
(3.23)
30
(90.91)
62
(27.31)
No idea
2
(3.17)
5
(8.47)
4
(10.53)
2
(66.67)
8
(25.81)
21
(9.25)
Electoral
Arithmetics
8
(12.70)
46
(77.97)
32
(84.21)
20
(64.52)
3
(9.09)
109
(48.02)
No other
Natural
Decision
party is
allies / Ideological
of Central
ready for
same commonalties
Leadership
coalition
ideology
2
13
12
67
(3.17)
(20.63)
(19.05)
(100.00)
7
4
63
(11.86)
(6.78)
(100.00)
2
4
42
(5.26)
(10.53)
(100.00)
1
3
(33.33)
(100.00)
2
3
34
(6.45)
(9.68)
(100.00)
33
(100.00)
13
24
13
242
(5.73)
(10.57)
(5.73)
(100.00)
Source: Party Activist Survey, 2004
If we analyse the election in terms of votes polled we find that the Akali
vote bank has remained intact but it was divided between the SAD
(Badal) which secured 31 per cent and the Akali Dal (Tohra) got 5 per
cent votes in 2002 elections. The SAD could win 61 seats. There has
been major shift in the vote banks of urban Hindus and Scheduled
Castes. The shift adversely affected SAD’s main ally Bharatiya Janata
Party as could win only 3 seats and 6 per cent votes. Shift in urban
Hindu votes and the factionalism within the Akalis caused defeat to the
Akali Dal (Badal) – BJP alliance.68 The SAD suffered defeat in the semiurban and the BJP was routed the urban areas. There has been a major
decline of Sikh Jat peasants and Scheduled Caste MLAs in SAD.
The Congress and the CPI alliance formed the government in the state
with outside support of the CPI. This was a surplus majority coalition.
The Congress could win 62 seats with 36 per cent votes. The Communist
Party of India could win 2 out of 11 seats allocated (see table 4.10).
The Congress made significant improvement in all the three cultural
zones. The Congress fielded 44 Sikh Jat candidates and 21 won in the
elections. The Congress gained largely from the urban electorates as it
was seen to pursue anti-Sikh extremist politics even though the urban
votes polled itself declined. The Congress elected almost equal number
of Sikh Jats and urban Khatri and Bania traders followed by Scheduled
Castes.
96
In the 2007 election, the Congress and the CPI could not enter into an
alliance. This was mainly because of the opposition of the state level
Congress leadership, particularly the then Chief Minister, Capt.
Amarinder Singh. Capt. Amarinder Singh in a press statement said that
the Left parties had failed to transfer their votes to the Congress in the
2002 assembly elections. He further added that the Left parties had
collected their workers from all over the state to work only in
constituencies where their candidates had been fielded.69 The Left
parties attributed the break in the alliance to the differences on policies.
The CPI(M) General Secretary, Mr. Prakash Karat, said that the Left
mantra for the polls would be to defeat the SAD-BJP combine and
expose the Congress. “We will give a call for the defeat of the SAD-BJP
combine and expose the Congress which for the past five years has
been pursuing policies that have been harmful to the state as well as
the people.”70 The impact of this break in alliance was visible in the
political agenda advocated by the Congress. The Congress Party’s
political campaign lost its aam admi thrust. For example, one of the
advertisements released by the Congress Government claimed that it had
“inspired top industrial houses to invest Rs. 86,161 crore in 282 mega
projects, thereby generating 20 lakh jobs”. It was also claimed that if the
opposition party, the Akali Dal was brought back to power, land prices
would crash. A large section of the voters i.e. 53 per cent, as per a sample
survey, mentioned that the increase in land prices had no impact on them
as they had no stake in land. And 30 per cent opined that it had benefited
land speculators and illicit businessmen. Around 12 per cent said that it had
benefited rich peasants. Another 5 per cent were of the view that it had
become impossible for the common man to own a shelter (see table 4.18).
Table – 4.18
Impact of rise in land prices
Frequency
Per cent
No stakes in land
164
52.90
Rich land owners
39
12.58
Land speculators and illicit businessmen
93
30.00
Difficult to own a shelter
14
4.52
Field Survey, February, 2007
Such a claim was contrary to the ideological filter of aam admi used by the
Congress-CPI alliance in the last elections. Those who did not have the
means might be deprived by the rising prices of land of even their own
shelter or a house. The irony of the situation was that the compensation
received by the farmers, ranging from Rs. 40 lakh to Rs. 60 lakh for an acre
97
of land, was not adequate to get them a shelter of 5 marlas on the same
land. Had the Congress Party, aligned with the Communists, it may not
have marketed this as its main electoral plank. Further, alliance with the
Communists might have checked the Congress Party’s vacillation between
religious identity and a secular Punjabi identity. The Congress Party focused
more on the rural Jat peasantry and the Sikh identity by highlighting the
termination of river waters agreement and overactive participation in
religious celebrations of the Sikhs and the SGPC elections. These policies
and pronouncements had an adverse impact on the poll performance of
the Congress in 2004 parliamentary elections. In these elections the urban
and the dalit vote shifted away from the Congress. The 2007 assembly
election results were a reflection of the 2004 parliamentary elections. The
Congress Party’s vote share in the 2004 parliamentary elections in semiurban constituencies decreased from 40 per cent to 35 per cent and in
urban constituencies from 54 per cent to 48 per cent as compared to 1999
parliamentary elections. Similarly, in 2007, the Congress Party’s vote share
in semi-urban constituencies decreased from 35 per cent to 43 per cent
and in urban constituencies from 47 per cent to 40 per cent as compared to
the 2002 assembly elections (see table 4.3). Traditionally, its core support
base consists of a large majority of Hindu Dalits with their ‘uncertain
religious allegiance’, urban Hindu traders and migrant landless labourers.
The shift from Punjabi identity to a narrow religious identity testifies to the
fluid response of the voters. In a sample survey conducted before the
elections, around 26 per cent mentioned that the lack of alliance between
the Congress and the Communist parties should work to the advantage of
the SAD-BJP alliance. Ten per cent viewed that it would work to the
advantage of the Congress, whereas, 64 per cent said that it would make
no difference to the elections (see table 4.19).
Table – 4.19
On lack of Congress-CPI Alliance
Frequency
Per cent
Advantage Congress
32
10.32
Disadvantage Congress and CPI
80
25.81
No impact
198
63.87
Total
310
100.00
Field Survey, February, 2007
The election results showed that the Congress Party had won 7 of the 11
seats which in the 2002 elections were allocated to the CPI, whereas, the
Communists acted as a spoiler for the Congress in four seats i.e. Batala,
Balachaur, Dina Nagar and Bhadaur. It is clear that the alliance between the
98
Congress and the Communists had political advantages rather than merely
electoral. Therefore, the impact of the alliance should be measured in the
political domain rather on an electoral arithmetic scale.
The Akali-BJP pre-election coalition formed the government after the 2007
assembly elections. The SAD-BJP alliance won 68 seats and 45 per cent of
the total votes polled. The Congress could win 44 seats with 41 per cent
votes. The Communist parties could not win a single seat, but could secure
one per cent of the votes. The alliance articulated its 1997 election plank of
Panjabiat, Punjabi identity and peace along with issues relating to price
rise, corruption and mega projects.
The rise in the prices of essential commodities, food subsidy and
poverty found mention perhaps for the first time since 1967, and
emerged as the main issues in the elections. Other traditional issues
such as danger to the “Sikh Panth”, federalism and Sikh identity could
not find much space in the electoral discourse. To the discomfort of the
Congress, a ‘Sikh’ Prime Minister could not emerge as a star campaigner
and vote catcher. Most of the election rallies addressed by the Prime
Minister were thinly attended and without the usual Punjabi
enthusiasm. The fact that the Prime Minister has never presented
himself as a ‘Sikh’, but as a professional economist, cannot be denied.
Therefore, the extent to which he mirrors the economic reforms agenda
and the price rise as its fall-out along with his opposition to free
electricity and water to the farmers may have distanced him from the
“aam admi”.
Similarly, the changed political context from Sikh identity to Punjabi
identity has pushed leaders like Uma Bharti and Narendra Modi to the
margins of electoral politics in Punjab.
In a sample survey in 2007, a majority of SAD supporters (72 per cent)
considered alliance with the BJP a symbol of communal amity rather
than an electoral arrangement (see table 4.20).
Table – 4.20
On SAD-BJP Coalition (SAD Supporters)
Frequency
Per cent
Electoral liability
63
Electoral savvy
24
7.74
For communal amity
223
71.94
Total
Field Survey, 2007
310
100.00
99
20.32
On the contrary, a majority of BJP supporters (85 per cent) considered it
an electoral necessity (see table 4.21).
Table – 4.21
On SAD-BJP Coalition (BJP Supporters)
Frequency
Per cent
For community amity
43
13.87
Electoral liability
2
0.65
Electoral useful
265
85.48
Total
310
100.00
Field Survey, 2007
Seat sharing was based on the status-quo claim as was the case in 1997
and 2002 elections. The bargaining power of the alliance partners
indicates that the BJP could manage to get 2 seats (9 per cent) beyond
its quota share as compared to its performance in the assembly
elections of 2002. The SAD could get 9 seats (10 per cent) beyond its
quota (see table 4.22).
Table – 4.22
Bargaining power of different alliance partners: Proportions of seats allocated to alliance
partners beyond normal quota (2007 Assembly Election based on 2002 Assembly Election)
Performance in 2002 Assembly Election
No. of Seats
Contested in 2007
Assembly Election
Winner
Runner
Seat managed to
get beyond Quota
BJP
23
3
18
2 (9%)
SAD
94
41
44
9 (10%)
Alliance in 2007
Assembly Election
Source : Election Commission Reports, 2002-2007
If we analyse the elections in terms of votes polled and seats won, the
SAD managed to get 37 per cent votes and 49 seats and the BJP polled 8
per cent votes and got 19 seats. The Congress managed to get 41 per
cent votes and 44 seats (see table 4.10). The SAD could not get a
majority on its own and therefore became dependent on the BJP to
form a government. The SAD could not perform in its traditional support
base of the Malwa region of the state. In 1997, the SAD got 44 seats in
this region which declined to 19 in the 2007 elections (see table 4.8).
Many of the SAD stalwarts suffered defeat in this region. Support to the
SAD in this region is continuously declining. However, in this elections
an open support declared for the Congress by a popular religious sect
(Dera Sacha Sauda)71 contributed to the defeat of the SAD. In the other
100
two regions i.e. the Doaba and the Majha, the trends of 1997 elections
were repeated in 2007. The Congress did not learn from the Akali-BJP
alliance in 2002 and its own defeat in the 2004 parliamentary elections
that it was not electoral wisdom to cater to sectional interests and to
indulge in overactive involvement in identity politics. It could make
inroads into the Akali Dal bastion, but suffered a major loss in its own
support base of dalits, urban traders, slum dwellers etc. The Congress
suffered defeat in the semi-urban areas and was routed in the urban
constituencies.
The SAD could get elected only 25 Sikh Jats in 2007 as compared to 41 in
the 1997 elections. In 2007, the Congress could get elected almost an
equal number of Sikh Jats as compared to the SAD. This clearly signifies
that the Sikh Jats are not exclusive supporters of the SAD. This shift is
significant in the post-Blue Star phase. On the contrary, the number of
dalit MLAs in the Congress was reduced from 14 in 2002 to 7 in 2007.
And the BJP could maintain in 2007 its 1997 tally of 4 dalits. The number
of dalit MLAs in the SAD is 16 as compared to 23 in the 1997 elections
(see table 4.11). It is interesting to note that the main political parties
represent evenly the caste configuration. The linkages between the
social matrix and legislative representation in terms of religious
affiliation has shown that the number of MLAs who belonged to the
Hindu religious group increased in the SAD in 2007 as compared to 2002
and 1997 elections. Whereas, a majority of BJP MLAs were Hindus
belonging to Khatri, Brahmin and Bania castes (58 per cent), a majority
of the SAD MLAs were rural based (71 per cent). It represented semiurban (22 per cent) and urban constituencies (6 per cent). Interestingly,
it has given increased representation to urban areas as compared to
1997 elections. The number BJP MLAs in the urban areas increased from
28 per cent in 1997 to 37 per cent in 2007 elections. It has also given
more representation to rural areas which increased from 22 per cent in
1997 to 26 per cent in 2007. Both the parties could represent a wide
spectrum of the social matrix. (See table 4.3)
Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal was authorised to give
representation to its coalition partner the BJP. The SAD has 72 per cent
of the legislators and its share in the Cabinet is 72 per cent. Similarly,
the BJP has 28 per cent of the legislators and its share in the Cabinet is
28 per cent. The number of legislators of the SAD decreased as
101
compared to 1997 elections and so in their representation in the
Cabinet.
The BJP, however, did negotiate for such portfolios as were linked with
urban areas.72 It was also reported in the Press that the BJP staked its
claim to portfolios like Industries, Excise and Taxation, Local Bodies,
Health, Transport and Urban Development. The BJP could retain
portfolios like Local Bodies, Health and Family Welfare, Forests and
Medical Education, Industries and Commerce. But it could not get Urban
Development, Excise and Taxation. It also staked its claim to Deputy
Chief Minister’s post.
In terms of representation of social coalition in the Ministry, 39 per cent
were from Majha, 33 per cent from Malwa and 28 per cent from Doaba.
The SAD, however, gave proportionately higher representation to
Malwa (31 per cent), Doaba (15 per cent) and Majha (29 per cent).
Whereas, the BJP gave higher representation to Doaba (43 per cent) and
Majha (29 per cent) from among the MLAs elected from each region
(see table 4.13).
The coalition gave higher representation to rural areas (50 per cent)
followed by semi-urban (39 per cent) and urban (11 per cent). The SAD
gave proportionately higher representation to semi-urban areas (36 per
cent), followed by rural (26 per cent) from among the MLAs elected
from these regions. It has not given any representation to urban MLAs
in the ministry. The BJP has also given higher representation to MLAs
from semi-urban areas (43 per cent) followed by urban (28 per cent)
and no representation to rural MLAs from among the elected MLAs
from these areas (see table 4.23).
Interestingly, the representation of the Jats continued to remain higher
i.e. 55 per cent in the ministry. However, the representation of the
dalits declined to 11 per cent from 22 per cent in 1997 and that of the
backwards increased to 11 per cent from 7 per cent in 1997. The SAD
gave proportionately higher representation to the Jats i.e. 40 per cent.
But it has decreased from 49 per cent in 1997 ministry. There is a
noticeable decrease in the dalit representation from 35 per cent in 1997
to 6 per cent in the 2007 ministry.
102
Table – 4.23
Election Year wise, Ministerial Representation according to Party and Location
Rural
1969
MINISTERS
MLAs
**
MINISTERS
MLAs
13
23
56.52
1977
MINISTERS
MLAs
6
43
13.95
1980
MINISTERS
MLAs
1985
MINISTERS
MLAs
1972
22
53
41.51
1992
MINISTERS
MLAs
1997
MINISTERS
MLAs
*
MINISTERS
MLAs
23
53
43.40
MINISTERS
MLAs
9
35
25.71
2002
2007
Semi
Urban
10
19
52.63
5
14
35.71
6
20
30.00
10
19
52.63
4
11
36.36
Akali
Urban
1
1
100.00
0
1
0.00
0
3
0.00
3
0.00
Total
Rural
24
43
55.81
1
1
100.00
11
58
18.97
1
5
20.00
BJS/BJP
Semi
Urban
Urban
1
2
5
2
20.00
100.00
2
12
16.67
2
8
25.00
INC
Total
Rural
Semi
Urban
Urban
Total
4
8
50.00
6
31
19.35
8
26
30.77
3
9
33.33
17
66
25.76
9
30
30.00
4
21
19.05
3
12
25.00
16
63
25.40
15
51
29.41
12
27
44.44
4
9
44.44
31
87
35.63
14
32
43.75
5
19
26.32
6
11
54.55
25
62
40.32
5
25
20.00
28
73
38.36
33
75
44.00
13
49
26.53
0
4
0.00
5
0.00
6
9
66.67
3
7
42.86
2
5
40.00
2
7
28.57
8
18
44.44
5
19
26.32
Note : Minister/MLAs. With Percentages the proportion of ministers to MLAs. (Data pertains to the time of the Constitution of Ministry)
** 5 MlA from Other Paries joined Akali in 1969
* 1 MLA from other party shifted to Akali in 1997
Source: Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who's Who of Members (1960-2002), Chandigarh:Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003
103
Rural
14
24
58.33
6
31
19.35
7
48
14.58
9
30
30.00
23
53
43.40
15
51
29.41
23
57
40.35
14
32
43.75
9
40
22.50
Total(SAD+BJP+INC)
Semi
Urban
Urban
11
3
24
3
45.83
100.00
8
3
26
9
30.77
33.33
7
2
26
9
26.92
22.22
4
3
21
12
19.05
25.00
6
20
30.00
12
4
27
9
44.44
44.44
16
2
28
8
57.14
25.00
5
6
19
11
26.32
54.55
7
2
18
10
38.89
20.00
Total
28
51
54.90
17
66
25.76
16
83
19.28
16
63
25.40
28
73
38.36
31
87
35.63
41
93
44.09
25
62
40.32
18
68
26.47
The Akali-BJP coalition functioned smoothly in the first two years as the
BJP central leadership decided to allow a free hand to the SAD chief
Minister S. Prakash Singh Badal. In the midst of Parliamentary elections
in 2009, the BJP central leadership also used SAD platform to present
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) as a formidable and united forum,
in a massive rally organised by SAD leadership in Ludhiana. However, in
the background of 2009 parliamentary election results, weakening of
L.K. Advani and nomination of Nitin Gadkari as BJP President, this
coalition came under scrutiny. In Parliamentary elections, the SAD could
win only four seats as compared to eight in 2004 Parliamentary
elections, with 34 per cent votes while the BJP managed to retain only
one seat out of four seats secured earlier in 2004 with 10 per cent
votes. Interestingly, in 2009 Parliamentary elections, the BJP won only
in one assembly segment as compared to 19 seats won in 2007
Assembly elections. However, the SAD could win in fifty-one assembly
segments in 2009 Parliamentary elections as compared to forty-one
assembly seats won in 2007 Assembly elections. Within the BJP, this
defeat was attributed to indifferent attitude of the SAD leadership
towards their urban support base and the party activists. The coalition
partners bargained with each other to share the spoils of power in
negation to the norms of secular and democratic governance. For
instance, the State BJP core committee demanded a complete rollback
of the revised power tariff in the State. And, it expressed concern over
continuation of free power supply to farming sector and “that too at the
cost of taxing other categories of consumers”. 73 Historically, the BJP has
support amongst urban Hindus and the SAD support base is amongst
the rural Jat-Sikh peasantry. The tinge of communal arithmetic is being
increasingly invoked by a faction of the state BJP leadership. This faction
has been nurtured and guided by the communal political ethos of the
first four unsuccessful SAD-BJP coalition governments formed in the
pre-Operation Blue Star phase.
It is worth noticing that in the post-2009 Parliamentary elections and in
anticipation of the 2012 Assembly elections, political bargaining
amongst the coalition partners for everyday governance is acquiring
communal overtones.74
A comparative analysis of the SAD led coalition with the Congress led
coalition in terms of reflection of social coalition in the cabinet shows
following trends:
104
(a) The Akali-BJP coalition gave higher representation to the Sikh,
whereas the Congress tried to balance it.
(b) The Akalis overrepresented their stronghold Malwa region and the
Congress overrepresented Doaba and Majha regions.
The impact of pre-election coalitions brought exclusive support bases of
political parties into the competitive spectrum. The major parties i.e.
the Congress and the Akalis increased their vote share in other parties
stronghold. For instance, the Akalis increased their support in urban and
semi-urban, three cultural zones and other than Sikh Jat castes. The
Congress could expand its base in rural Punjab. These two parties having
diluted their ideological positioning, relied on policy interventions.75 The
BJP could not compensate for their ideological compromise with
proactive policy interventions to keep their support base intact. There
has been a sense of neglect and perception of relative deprivation
amongst the urban voters as compared to rural.
The social spectrum was represented in the legislative coalition but
power sharing at the level of decision making was seen to be
discriminatory by a section of dalits. Their assertions have become
visible in non-electoral spaces.
The culture of coalition formation has its roots in the pre-independence
phase. The Congress and the Muslim League were the two axes around
which the coalition politics revolved. The Akali Dal and the Hindu Maha
Sabha clearly stated that to protect the interests of their support base
they might even form a coalition with the Muslim League. After
independence, in partitioned Punjab, the SAD merged with the Congress
twice and regionalised the national politics of the Congress. For
instance, factions in the Congress supported the Punjabi Suba and Save
Hindi agitations, whereas, the mandate of the Indian National Congress
was to oppose both. This politics of merger was replaced by coalition
politics in the reorganised Punjab.
Therefore, it would be appropriate to characterize the phase between
1967-1980 as the initiation of coalition politics which coincided with the
decline of one-party dominance in legislative politics. The decline of one
party dominance initiated two distinct trends in the party dynamics in
Punjab. The effective number of parties by seats were more in post-
105
coalition phase i.e. 3.5 in 1967 and 3.2 in 1969. Whereas, in the preelection coalition phase it was 2.4 in 2002 and 2.9 in 2007. The effective
number of parties by votes was the highest i.e. 4.5 in 1967(see table –
4.24).
Table – 4.24
Taagepera and Shugart Index for General Assembly Elections of Punjab from 1967 to 2007
Election Year
Effective Number of Parties by
Votes
Effective Number of Parties by
Seats
1967
4.5
3.5
1969
3.9
3.2
1972
3.5
2.1
1977
4.0
3.1
1980
3.4
2.5
1985
3.3
2.1
1992
3.9
1.8
1997
4.2
2.2
2002
4.1
2.4
2007
3.1
2.9
Source: Calculated from the data of Election Commission Report, 1967 - 2007
It can, therefore, be hypothesised that at the micro level political parties
follow the strategy of expansion in post-election coalitions and the
strategy of consolidation in pre-election coalition. However, the
Congress remained capable of forming a government on its own,
averaging above 30 per cent of the votes. Whereas, the SAD with
consistent vote share needed a coalition partner to be electorally viable
and more so politically stable.
It is interesting to note that only the SAD base which was 25 per cent of
the vote share in post-election increased to 35 per cent in pre-election
coalition formation (see graph – 4.1). Whereas, the support base of the
Bharatiya Janata Party, the Communist Party of India, and the Indian
National Congress decreased in pre-election coalition politics.
106
GRAPH - 1
Graph
– 4.1
PARTY WISE SUPPORT BASE
Partywise Support Base
Election
1969)
to PreCOALITION
Election(1997-02-07)]
Coalition (1997-2002-2007)]
[POST[Post
ELECTION
(1967 - (1967
1969) TO–PRE
ELECTION
45.00
40.00
38.36
34.92
30.00
25.14
25.00
0.77
20.1 to 35.1
3.16
0 to 10
1.87
0 to 10
5.01
0 to 10
7.46
0 to 10
5.00
More than 35.1
9.40
0 to 10
10.00
0 to 10
15.00
More than 35.1
20.00
20.1 to 35.1
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE POLLED
35.45
35.00
0.00
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
POST
PRE
ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION ELECTION
SAD SUPPORT BASE
BJS /BJP SUPPORT
BASE
Based on constituency wise
data for assembly elections
CPI SUPPORT BASE
CPM SUPPORT BASE
INC SUPPORT BASE
PRE AND POST COILATION SUPPORT BASE
Source : Election Commission Report, Punjab 1967-2007
The Bharatiya Janata Party support base declined as it underplayed its
ideological thrust and could not make policy interventions for its urban
base through executive decisions. The Congress gained in urban areas
not because of executive decisions but because it was seen to pursue antiSikh minority politics. In the absence of urban centric policy interventions the
urban votes polled continued to decline (see graph – 4.2).
Graph – 4.2
Party wise Support Base - Location wise
RURAL
SEMI URBAN
URBAN
45.00
40.39
39.24
38.4038.76
36.43
40.00
36.12
35.36
34.11
35.00
31.49
30.00
27.66
26.83
25.56
25.00
20.00
More than 35.1
More than 35.1
20.1 to 35.1
More than 35.1
More than 35.1
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
5.84
4.581.730.38 0.90 0.71 0.03
1.921.69
6.25
2.20
2.98
0 to 10
0 to 10
3.41
10.01 to
20.1 to 35.1
10.50
10.01 to
20.0
than
More
35.1
4.13
0 to 10
More than 35.1
10.77
20.1 to
0 to 1035.1
20.1 to
2.67
0 to 1035.1
5.00
20.1 to 35.1
10.00
More than 35.1
14.36
15.00
0.00
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
SAD
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
BJP
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
CPI
107
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
CPM
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
INC
The pre-election coalition helped the SAD to increase its support base,
outside its stronghold i.e. Malwa, i.e. in Doaba and Majha (see graph –
4.3).
Graph – 4.3
Party wise Support Base – Region wise
MAJHA
MALWA
45.00
DOABA
40.00
38.97 37.46
37.95
39.99
35.54
34.82
34.74
35.38
35.00
30.03
30.00
27.76
25.24
25.00
20.00
20.1 to 35.1
More than 35.1
20.1 to 35.1
More than 35.1
More than 35.1
More than 35.1
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
4.31
3.80
0.80 0.68 1.01
2.45
0 to 10
0 to 10
0 to 10
0.18
0 to 10
1.53 2.53
0 to 10
0 to 10
5.00 5.42
0 to 10
0 to 10
3.82
0 to 10
10.01 to
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
4.64
0 to 10
10.01 to
20.0
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
9.86
7.50
10.01 to
0 to 10 20.0
0 to 10
More than 35.1
5.00
12.02
More than 35.1
20.1 to 35.1
10.00
13.84
13.66
12.71
20.1 to 35.1
20.1 to 35.1
10.01 to 20.0
15.00
0.00
SAD
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
BJP
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
CPI
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
CPM
(POST
ELECTION
1967 AND
1969)
(PRE
ELECTION
1997, 2002
AND 2007)
INC
In so far as the representation of the social matrix in the legislature and
cabinet formation is concerned, there are imbalances. For example, out of
the 1131 MLAs in the state from 1967 to 2007, the plurality i.e. 44 per cent
were from among the rural Jat peasants, whereas dalits were 25 per cent,
OBC were 9 per cent and urban traders (Khatris) were 22 per cent (see table
4.11). The representation of rural Jat peasants is much higher than their
population. The representation of various caste groups in the legislature in
pre-election coalition became more distributive, for instance, in postelection coalition Sikh Jat peasants had a greater share than in pre-election
coalition in the Akali Dal. In fact, in pre-election coalition the SAD had a more
even representation of the dalits and OBCs. Similarly, the Bharatiya Janata
Party had more dalits, OBCs and relatively reduced number of urban Khatri
and Bania traders. It clearly shows that pre-election coalitions capture the
social spectrum relatively in an even manner.
The SAD in 1969 gave less representation to BJP MLAs as compared to 1997
and 2007 pre-election coalitions. The BJP was in power at the Centre in 1997
which empowered the state BJP leadership to have a better bargain which
108
could not be reversed as survival of coalition in terms of number was
dependent on the BJP. Interestingly, the share of ministers of the SAD was
higher in pre-election coalitions rather than in post-election coalitions.
However, the social matrix was better represented in the cabinet in preelection coalition. The share of Jats in the ministry declined from 64 per cent
in 1969 to 51 per cent in 1997 and 55 per cent in 2007 elections, (see table
4.25) whereas, the share of the dalits in the ministry increased in 1997 but
again decreased to 11 per cent in 2007 elections.
Table -4.25
Year and Caste wise Distribution of Council of Ministers at the Initial Constitution of Ministries
Caste
YEAR
1969
1972
1977
1980
1985
1992
1997
2002
2007
Total
Total
SC
OBC
Other
Jat
4
4
2
18
28
14.29
14.29
7.14
64.29
100.00
2
1
5
9
17
11.76
5.88
29.41
52.94
100.00
2
2
3
9
16
12.50
12.50
18.75
56.25
100.00
3
2
5
6
16
18.75
12.50
31.25
37.50
100.00
6
1
9
12
28
21.43
3.57
32.14
42.86
100.00
8
4
8
11
31
25.81
12.90
25.81
35.48
100.00
9
3
8
21
41
21.95
7.32
19.51
51.22
100.00
5
2
8
10
25
20.00
8.00
32.00
40.00
100.00
2
2
4
10
18
11.11
11.11
22.22
55.56
100.00
41
21
52
106
220
18.64
9.55
23.64
48.18
100.00
Source : Punjab Vidhan Sabha Compendium of Who’s Who of Members (1960-2007), Chandigarh:
Punjab Vidhan Sabha Secretariat, 2003.
Resume, Punjab Legislative Assembly
In post-election coalition, the SAD gave higher representation to rural
Jats as compared to dalits. The BJP tried to accommodate the dalits and
Jats to increase its support base. However, in pre-election coalition the
109
Bharatiya Janata Party negotiated higher representation for urban
traders.
Further, in post-election coalition higher representation was given to
legislators from Doaba where the coalition base was weak whereas, in
pre-election coalition regional representation was in proportionate to
the number of MLAs.
The coalitions have tended to give relatively even representation to the
active social spectrum in government formation, which in turn has
made an impact on its durability. The post-election coalitions in Punjab
were the least durable as is evident from the number of days the
ministries could last. The pre-election coalitions have completed their
full terms (see graph – 4.4).
Graph
– 4.4
GRAPH - 4
DURABILITY
OF GOVERNMENTand
AND Tenure
TENURE
Durability
of Government
2000
1870
1838
1825
1800
TIME SPAN IN DAYS
1600
1400
1283
1217
1200
972
1000
800
589
600
402
400
261
448
444
272
200
82
0
United Front
Gurnam
Singh
Akali Break
Away (INC
support)
Lachman
Singh Gill
Post Election Alliance . 4th
SAD + BJS
(United
Front)
Gurnam
Singh
SAD + BJS
Parkash
Singh Badal
INC Giani
Zail Singh
Janta
INC Darbara
Ministry
Singh
Parkash
Singh Badal
SAD Surjit
Singh
Barnala
INC Beant
Singh
Interim
Harcharan
Singh Brar
INC Smt.
SAD + BJP
Rajinder Kaur
Parkash
Bhattal
Singh Badal
Post Election Alliance. 5th Single Party . Pre election Single Party Single Party Single Party Single Party. Single Party
6th
Coalition .7th
.8th
.9th
.10th
10th
.10th
Pre Post
Election
coalition
.11th
Cong + CPI
Capt.
Amrinder
Singh
Pre election
defection
.12th
VIDHAN
SABHASTRENGTH,
NUMBER, CM
OFOF
GOVERNMENT
VIDHAN
SABHA
CMAND
ANDTYPE
TYPE
GOVERNMENT
Source : Resume of Punjab Assembly
Coalition politics has mirrored the changing character of Indian
democracy. The dynamic relationship between electoral promises and
performance of the party system has provided alternative space for
coalition politics. During the phase of one party dominance, electoral
promises were commensurate with the mandate of the government.
Non-fulfilment of electoral promises, therefore, raised issues relating to
the path of development and the nature of state and institutional
arrangements. With the introduction of economic reforms electoral
promises were not in convergence with the mandate of the
government. In other words, in the earlier phase, electoral promises
were ideologically in convergence and in the later phase these were
ideologically divergent. This shift created a crisis of trust in the
110
leadership and the party system. Political parties stared relying
excessively on electoral arithmetic through the appropriation of social
differentiations and pro-poor discourse.76
Not only this the alliance of the Congress with the CPI was to provide
content to its pro-aam admi and anti-communal stance. It is worth
noticing that the Congress in Punjab is branded a communal party.
The Congress and the CPI alliance is guided more by immediate political
and electoral needs. It is precisely because of this reason that the local
Congress and the CPI leadership were not inclined to enter an electoral
alliance and consequently in 2007 elections alliance could not
materialise. Therefore, it is the political context which brings out
differentiation between the behaviours of historical political coalitions
and pragmatic coalitions. On the other hand, the Akali-BJP coalition has
arisen from a historical context. It has shown a tendency to evolve
broad boundary conditions for linkages between the social matrix,
legislative and executive coalition. It is within these boundary conditions
that dynamics of coalition takes place i.e. from seat allocation to cabinet
formation.
Another trend which acquired currency in the coalition era is that multidimensional ideological spaces are increasingly replaced by social
differentiations in a political space. These differentiations are
articulated in policy interventions to compensate for the absence of
ideological mobilisation. It has been noticed that if the interactive
relationship between legislative policy interventions and social
polarisation remains static, the coalition becomes weak and unstable. If
the coalition partners become dynamic in legislative (policy
compatibility) and social spectrum (ideological compatibility) the
possibility of the coalition becoming more durable and stable increases.
For instance, the SAD has formulated policies which are consistent with
the social base. On the other hand, the BJP did not make much effort in
this direction and lost its electoral base to the Congress, which led to
the weakening of the Akali-BJP coalition.
It may be correct to state that democracies in transition have the
tendency to register short-term power gains by forming coalitions,
leading to a sharpening of social polarisation to maintain their exclusive
electoral base.
111
ENDNOTES
1
This has posed a dilemma for political analysts to capture competing
identities. Although Punjab political history provides evidence to support
contradictory viewpoints, namely, that political parties sometimes reflect
communal antagonisms and sometimes moderate them, the predominating
tendency in Punjab legislative politics has been towards political communal
coalition-building, whether this is done by a single broadly aggregative party or
by inter-party alliance and coalition.
Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in North India. (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1974), p. 362.
2
Even a pamphlet published by the Shiromani Akali Dal on May 19, 1960, held
the view that only a small minority of urbanite Hindus were opposed to the
formulation of a Punjabi-speaking state. To quote:
“Recent agitation over the Punjabi-Hindi controversy has highlighted the
fact that it is the Hindu urbanites living in the cities of Amritsar, Jullundur,
Ludhiana and Ambala who alone appose the formation of the Punjabispeaking state. These urbanite Hindus do not form the majority of the
Hindu population and can in no way form a substantial minority in the
Punjabi-speaking zone.”
A Plea for a Punjabi State. Amritsar: Shiromani Akali Dal, p. 27.
According to the 1971 Census, the total population was 13,472,972 with 37.54
per cent being Hindus, i.e. 5,057,754. The number stated Hindu as their mother
tongue stood at 2,711,490; assuming all these to be Hindus, the percentage of
Hindus mentioning Hindi as their mother tongue is estimated at 53.61.
Pramod Kumar et.al., Punjab Crisis: Context and Trends. Chandigarh: Centre for
Research in Rural and Industrial Development, 1984, p. 39.
3
The Moga declaration was adopted on April 14, 1995. To quote, ‘the spirit of
Punjabiat would be strengthened so that these matters get projected as
common problems of the entire Punjabis rather than a section thereof’.
Kanwaljit Singh, The Policy Programme of Shiromani Akali Dal. April 14, 1995, p.
4.
4
J.H. Hutton, Census of India 1931: India: Imperial Tables, 1933, Vol. 1, pt. II, p.
582.
5
The argument advanced that wherever, the Hindus, the Sikhs are in minority
and the Muslim League ministry is a possibility, it is desirable to join the
coalition to protect ‘Hindu’ and ‘Sikh’ interests. Vir Savarkar the leader of Hindu
Maha Sabha described its policy in 1943 and later in a telegram to the Master
Tara Singh. To quote:
112
In the Hindu minorities provinces wherever a Muslim ministry seems inevitable
– whether it was sponsored by the Muslim league or otherwise – and Hindu
interest can be better by joining it, the Hindu Maha Sabha should try as a
matter of right to capture as many seats as possible in the ministry and do their
best to safeguard the interests of the Hindu minority.
He further added, “coalition ministry if they are actuated by just and patriotic
motive can be an effective process which will train us in a team work, remove
the sense of annihilation and lead to national consolidation in spite of
differences of race and creed”.
Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: the Story of the Struggle. (Delhi: U.C. Kapur
and Sons, 1970), p. 73.
6
Ibid. p. 152.
7
Census of India 2001. 2004. First Report on Religion Data. New Delhi: Registrar
General & Census Commissioner.
8
Census of India. 2001. India: Final Population Totals. Series 1, p.1.
9
Pramod Kumar and Rainuka Dagar, ‘Gender in Dalit Identity Construction in
Punjab’ in Harish K. Puri (ed.) Dalits in Regional Context. (Delhi: Rawat
Publications, 2004).
10
In 1920, a religious conference where ‘Amrit Parchar’ took place and many of
the members of congregation there belonged to the scheduled castes. Some of
them had been baptised and they were later taken to Sri Darbar Sahib for
‘Ardasa’ (Prayer) and distribution of Karah Parashad. The irony of the situation
was that the priests present at Sri Darbar Sahib refused to allow participation
of these “Harijans” (scheduled castes) who had been baptised, in the Ardas,
and this annoyed the congregation present there, who protested at this unSikh-like discrimination and insisted at the participation of the Harijans in the
Ardasa and their sharing in the distribution of Karah Parshad.
Ajit Singh Sarhadi, op.cit., 1970, p. 20.
11
Till mid-sixties a coalition of the urban Sikh traders, peasantry and Sikh
service class under the leadership of Master Tara Singh dominated the Akali
politics. But in post-reorganisation phase rural Jat peasantry became dominant
both in the Akali Dal and the SGPC.
12
The Jat Singh legislators in general and of the Akali Dal in particular belonged
to the upper strata. The two groups into which the Akalis had split represented
different tendencies and styles of functioning. Sant Fateh Singh represented
the incremental-conformist group and a section of the religious
fundamentalists, whereas the Master Akali Dal represented the extremists and
a minority of the religious fundamentalists and incremental conformists.
113
H.S. Deol, Analysis of Political Elite in Punjab with special reference to the
Legislature, (Ph.D. thesis submitted to Panjab University, 1979).
13
Pramod Kumar, ‘Transcending the Divide’. Deccan Herald, February 16, 1997.
14
Interview with Prakash Singh Badal, President Akali Dal, February 5, 2005.
15
Interview with senior Akali leader, December 7, 2005.
16
To illustrate, Sachar Formula was adopted by winning the support of the
“Akali Congressmen” (who joined Congress in 1948) and was opposed by Arya
Samajist Hindu Congressmen. Factional fight between Bhim Sen Sachar group
and Gopi Chand Bhargava group kept on conceding demands of Akali or Hindu
Congressmen. The national leadership seem to be distraught by this game.
Sardar Patel reported having reprimanded the state leadership. You do not
seem to understand... the political and religious game behind it.
Harish K. Puri, ‘Religion and Politics in Punjab’ in Moin Shakir (ed.) Religion,
State and Politics in India. (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 331.
17
‘SC orders centre to construct SYL canal’. The Tribune, June 4, 2004.
18
Stated in an interview by Amarinder Singh, Chief Minister, Punjab 10
September 2004, ‘I have to protect the interests of Punjab farmers’.
19
Pramod Kumar, ‘Electoral Politics in Punjab: From Autonomy to Secession’ in
th
Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (eds.) India’s 1999 Elections and 20 Century
Politics. (New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2003), p. 379.
20
Harish K. Puri, op.cit., 1989, p. 331.
21
M.S. Dhami, ‘Religio-Political Mobilisation and Shifts in the Party Support
Base in 1985 Punjab Assembly Elections’ in Moin Shakir (ed.) Religion, State
and Politics in India. (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 352.
22
The BSP was founded in 1984 by Kanshi Ram.
Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head
Counts in India. Cambridge: (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 145.
23
Paul R. Brass on the basis of his study of Punjab Assembly elections over the
period 1952-1972 argues:
‘A thorough going polarization of Punjab politics has been prevented by
the presence of a large Scheduled Caste population, of uncertain religious
allegiance, to whom all parties must appeal. Second, the leading secular
parties in Punjab, particularly Congress and the CPI, have successfully
appealed to both Hindus and Sikhs in the past.’
114
Paul R. Brass, ‘Ethnic Cleavages in the Punjab Party System, 1952-72’ in Myron
Weiner and J. Orgood Field (eds.) Electoral Political in the Indian States: Party
Systems and Cleavages. (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1975), p. 60.
24
Pramod Kumar et.al., op.cit., 1984, p. 45.
25
Pramod Kumar, ‘Need for Reposing Faith in People’. The Tribune, May 13,
1990.
26
In the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the Akali Dal entered into pre-election
alliance with the Bahujan Samaj Party and seat adjustment with the Bharatiya
Janata Party. The alliance adversely affected the Congress Party’s performance
and resulted in an erosion of the support base of the Congress among the
Scheduled Castes. (Of the 13 parliamentary seats, the SAD won 8 and the BSP
3).
27
The SAD and the BJP formed the ministry together irrespective of the fact
that the SAD was in majority show that the alliance is based on mutual
understanding and to advantage Punjab.
Interview with Sukhbir Singh Badal, SAD Member Parliament. January 2006.
In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the Akali Dal entered into an alliance with
the BJP. The Shiromani Akali Dal won the largest number of seats i.e. 8 and
polled 33 per cent of the votes. The Bharatiya Janata Party won 3 seats and
polled 12 per cent of the votes. The Congress, the BSP, and the communists
entered into a pre-election alliance and could not win even a single seat.
28
In the 1999 Lok Sabha elections, the pre-election alliance of SAD-BJP failed
miserably with the Congress-CPI alliance winning nine seats.
29
Gur Rattanpal Singh, The Illustrated History of the Sikhs. (Chandigarh: Akal
Printmatics, 1979), p.84
Paul R. Brass, op.cit., 1974, p. 358.
30
The Sikh members of the assembly prepared a charter of demands in
November, 1948 which was not accepted.
1. Representation to be given to the Sikhs on the basis of 1941 census without
excluding Sikhs who had migrated to other provinces.
2. They should be given 5 per cent representation in the Central Cabinet.
3. Sikhs should have one Minister and one Deputy Minister in the Central
Cabinet.
4. The post of Governor and premier of the province should alternatively go to
a Hindu or a Sikh.
115
5. 50 per cent representation in the Provincial Cabinet should be given to the
Sikhs.
6. Gurgaon district and Loharu State should be separated from the East Punjab.
7. 40 per cent of the services be reserved for the Sikhs.
8. If the above demands were rejected the Sikhs should be allowed to form a
New Province of 7 districts, i.e. Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ludhiana, Ferozepur,
Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Ambala.
31
Ibid. p. 190.
32
“The Shiromani Akali Dal is in favour of the formation of provinces on a
linguistic and cultural basis throughout India, but holds it as a question of life
and death for the Sikhs that a new Punjab be created immediately.”
33
The SGPC which was under the control of Nationalist Sikhs which was
captured by the Akalis. At the same time Government of India later its
acceptance of regional formula paved the way for its merger in the Congress. In
1955, the Akali Dal won 112 seats and the Khalsa Dal supported by the
Congress could win only 3 out of 132 contested seats. This convinced the
Congress of the growing strength of the Akalis and the Government of India in
December 1953 appointed the State Re-organisation Commission. In 1954 the
Akalis launched a vigorous agitation for the Punjabi Suba demand. For example,
processions were taken out, by Akalis at Ludhiana (on the eve of Guru Gobind
Singh’s birthday) and at Amritsar (the Hola Mohalla procession) on December,
1954, and March, 1995, respectively. The continued and persistent agitations
and protests worsened the situation. The morchas launched acquired
communal colouring.
34
The State Reorganisation Commission recommended the merger of Punjab,
PEPSU and Himachal Pradesh. PEPSU was merged in Punjab in 1956. The new
State was divided into so-called Punjabi-speaking and Hindi speaking regions
and two regional committees, consisting of the members of the legislature
belonging to the respective regions, were provided. Thus in October, 1956, a
convention was held at Amritsar. It was attended by the members of the Akali
Dal Working Committee, the Akali MLAs from Punjab and PEPSU the Jathedars
and other prominent leaders. It formally resolved to amend the Constitution of
the Akali Dal so as to continue its activities towards the religious, educational
and economic welfare of the Sikhs.
Interview with Capt. Kanwaljit Singh, General Secretary, SAD on December 7,
2005.
116
35
Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966), p. 125.
36
Ibid. p. 129.
37
In January, 1960, elections to the Shiromani Gurdwara Prakandhak
Committee were held. Giani Kartar Singh opposed Master Tara Singh but failed
miserably. He could win only four seats against 132 of the Akali Dal out of the
total number of 140 seats.
38
In the fifties, when Master Tara Singh (a Khatri himself) was President of the
SGPC, the non-Jat Sikhs controlled 54.6 per cent of the key positions in this
institution. Now, the SGPC came under the control of Jat Sikhs whereby the
influence of non-Jat Sikhs diminished drastically.
39
‘Sangh-Akali Bid to Form Government: Complete Accord Reached’. The
Tribune (Ambala), March 2, 1967.
40
S. Gurnam Singh speech in Punjab Vidhan Sabha on 26 March 1970. The Chief
Minister emphasised that he made every effort to accommodate its coalition
partner.
41
Interview of Balramji Das Tandon, senior BJP leader, October to December
2005.
“In 1967, the Jana Sangh had two minister but had all the relevant portfolio’s
like Finance, Industry, Health, Excise and Taxation, Local Bodies etc.”
42
The C.M. preferred Jana Sangh Ministers over the Akali Ministers and did not
care for the Akali Jathedars. It created resentment in senior Akali Minister and
Akali Jathedars who were not prepared to tolerate it for a longer period…
Congress Govt. in the centre contacted S. Lachhman Singh Gill the senior most
Akali Minister in Front Govt. and assured him that if he defected with a
considerable number of MLAs, the Congress Assembly party will give him an
unconditional support and all the defectors will be designated as Ministers.
White Paper on Sikh Issues. Batala: S. Narinder Singh Bhuler, 1983, Vol. 1, p.
103.
43
Devinder Pal Sandhu, Sikhs in Indian Politics: Study of a Minority. (New Delhi:
Patriot Publishers, 1992), p. 113.
44
Keeping in view the mandate and the decision of the Akali Dal, I brought the
Bill in the Legislative Assembly for abolition of the Legislative Council. Sant
Chanan Singh came to Chandigarh and persuaded the members not to abolish
the Council…. Even after that both the Sants tried their utmost to flout the
decision of the legislators and the Shiromani Akali Dal by persuading several
members of the Parliament to see that Council was not abolished.
117
Speech made by outgoing CM Gurnam Singh on the floor of the assembly on
26.3.1970.
S.C. Arora, Turmoil in Punjab Politics. (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1990), p.
132.
45
26.3.1970.
46
I frankly tell the House that though the Jana Sangh in Punjab had staged right
about turn on its attitude towards the Punjabi language after the creation of
the Punjabi speaking State, their outlook on this crucial question is still
revolving in the old grooves. Though they claim that Punjabi should be given
the status of a State language and should be developed as a lever to unify the
Punjabi speaking people irrespective of their religion, they in their own way are
persisting in the policy of making Punjab a bi-lingual state. Naturally, I opposed
all the attempts of the Jana Sangh leaders in this direction, though all along I
did my best to promote Hindi as the National Language.
26.3.1970.
47
1. Besides steps to “restore Hindu-Sikh unity, the Government will develop
and promote Punjabi as the state language and Hindi as the national
language.
2.
Educational facilities will be extended both in the rural and urban areas
with a view to achieving hundred per cent literacy in the state within the
next few years.
3.
The Government will root out corruption from public life as well as from
the administration.
4.
And try to bridge the gap between the common man and the
administration.
5.
Special emphasis will be placed on schemes for the welfare of members of
the Scheduled Castes and the Backward Classes.
6.
Immediate steps will be taken to distribute the evacuee lands to landless
Harijans. A sizeable revolving fund will be created for their welfare
schemes.
7.
In the field of agriculture, a new strategy will be evolved to maintain
Punjab’s position as the granary of India and also to promote the
cultivation of commercial crops. Small land-owners will be given special
incentives.
8.
The programme for rural electrification as also rural development works
and construction of link roads in the state will be streamlined with a view
118
to electrifying every village and connecting every village with the main
roads.
9.
A blueprint for the growth of industries, particularly large and mediumscale industries, both in the private and public sectors, will be prepared
and special incentives will be given to new industrial entrepreneurs.
10. Industrial workers, government employees and teachers will be given a fair
deal, and all loopholes in the existing legislation relating to them will be
plugged.
11. Efforts will be made to remove anomalies in the Pay Commission and
Kothari Commission grades.
S.C. Arora, op.cit., 1990, p. 129
48
Ibid. p. 130.
49
It was primarily the intra-party conflict among the coalition partners which
continued to rock the working of the ruling alliance. The inter-party differences
and the ideological incompatibilities of the two partners did not pose a serious
obstruction in the working of the coalition.
Arun Mehra, ‘Akali-Janata Coalition: An Analysis’. Punjab Journal of Politics,
1985, 9(1), p. 85.
50
Pramod Kumar, ‘Punjab Crisis: A Political Diagnosis’. Mainstream, Nov. 14,
1987, p. 18.
51
Mr. S.S. Barnala the then Akali Chief Minister, was alleged to be appeasing
the militants and consequently the Congress government in the centre
dismissed the ministry. The moderate leaders like Mr. Prakash Singh Badal and
Mr. G.S. Tohra were arrested and hundred of others were sent to distant
Jodhpur Jail to languish in detention for some years. Liberals who had full faith
in the system were isolated and those nursing serious grievances against the
system were patronised. This approach adopted to counter the people who
were a potential threat to the legislative power of the ruling party at the
centre. Political rivals (even when they subscribe to the same political beliefs)
were attacked and political forces representing extreme views were
patronized. President’s rule was thought to be the most conducive, if not the
sure instrument, to put down militancy. That these measures failed is not a
surprise.
52
The massive Akali victory of 1985 should not be termed as an expansion of
the support base of the SAD. It is evident from the aggregate votes polled by
the SAD and Cong. (I) that SAD polled only one per cent more votes than Cong.
(I).
119
Jatinder Kaur, Punjab Crisis: The Political Perceptions of Rural Voters. (Delhi:
Ajanta Publications, 1989), p. 126.
53
Pramod Kumar and Yogendra Yadav, ‘The Real Contest in Punjab’. The
Tribune, February 9, 1992.
54
Statement issued by Sardar Prakash Singh Badal at meet the Press Club,
November, 1996.
55
Kanwaljit Singh, op.cit., 1995.
56
The Sarkaria Commission was set up on June 9, 1983 to restructure India’s
Centre-State Relations.
57
Art 356 of the Indian Constitution deals with the provision in case of failure
of constitutional machinery in state.
58
Lok Sabha Election 1998: Manifesto of Akali Dal.
59
‘In the following year when elections for the state assembly were held,
‘peace’ continued to be the core issue. Recognising the changing political scene
at the national level, and the growing significance of BJP, the Badal Akali Dal did
everything possible to consolidate its alliance with the state unit of the BJP. It
merely abandoned its politics of regional identity and spoke a very different
language.’
Surinder S. Jodhka, ‘Return of the Region: Identities and Electoral Politics in
Punjab’. Economic and Political Weekly, 2005, 41(3), p. 227.
60
Statement issued by Prakash Singh Badal at Meet the Press at Chandigarh
Press Club, November 1996.
61
Sarbjit Pandher, ‘A Peace Card Which May Spell Trouble’. The Hindu (New
Delhi), January 25, 1997.
62
For 1997 and 2002 assembly elections a committee consisting of Capt.
Kanwaljit Singh and Sukhdev Singh Dhindsa of the SAD and Balramji Das
Tandon and Madan Mohan Mittal of the BJP was constituted to decide about
the seat sharing. The BJP asked for 35 seats. After number of meetings 22 seats
were allocated to BJP.
63
In 1967s ministerial allocations were according to our choice.
In 1997 claims were registered but the portfolios of Industry and Finance could
not be given to the Bharatiya Janata Party as the CM kept Industry and Finance
was allocated to a senior Akali leader. The allocation of the Finance portfolio
was not contested as the state finances were in doldrums.
Series of Interviews with Balramjit Das Tandon, Senior BJP leader, October to
December, 2005.
120
64
Pramod Kumar, op.cit., 2003, p. 384.
65
P.S. Verma, ‘Akali-BJP Debacle in Punjab: Wages of Non-performance and
Fragmentation’. Economic and Political Weekly, 1999, 34(50), pp. 3519-3531.
66
Capt. Amarinder Singh was not in favour of allocating 11 seats to CPI. He was
of the view “Every Single seat allotted to the CPI is to add to the tally of the
SAD”. Interview with Capt. Amarinder Singh, Chief Minister, Punjab, 10
September, 2004.
In a press statement on 23 August, 2006, Capt Amarinder Singh, Chief Minister
of Punjab maintained, “I have told party president Sonia Gandhi that alliance
with the left parties – CPI and CPI(M) would not benefit the Congress in any
manner since their votes do not get transferred to us”.
“I was the PCC president then and I had a harrowing time trying the convince
the left leaders to send their cadres for Congress support but they failed to do
so”.
‘Capt., Dullo don’t See right on left’. Hindustan Times, August 24 , 2006.
67
These constituencies were Sri Hargobindpur, Mansa and Dhuri.
68
If the percentage of votes of the BJP, the Akali Dal (B) and the Akali Dal
(Tohra) are added and converted into seats, the Akali Dal and the BJP would
have formed the government.
69
Raveen Thukral, ‘Capt., Dullo don’t see right on left’. The Hindustan Times,
August 24, 2006.
70
‘No Alliance with Congress: Karat’. The Hindustan Times, October 11, 2006.
71
Raveen Thukral, ‘Sirsa Dera Add Spice to Malwa Contest’. The Hindustan
Times, February 9, 2007.
72
Gautam Dheer, ‘SAD-BJP Fissures on Portfolios’. The Indian Express. March 3,
2007.
73
‘BJP Demands Complete Power Tariff Rollback’, The Hindustan Times,
December 23, 2009.
74
The BJP state leadership charged the SAD for discrimination of their support
base in terms of allocation of funds, conferring ministerial status to their
appointees as Chairpersons of boards and corporations and sharing of various
other spoils of power.
Interview on February 12, 2010 with Sh. Balramji Das Tandon, Member BJP
Core Committee.
75
The continuation of coalition politics in Punjab has not only witnessed the
competitive populism but on a positive note has led to the ‘gradual discarding
121
of radical stances by political parties all over the state’. This has been evident in
the form of the Manifestos of Akali Dal and its ally BJP to maintain ‘peace,
brotherhood, communal harmony, socio-economic welfare, all round
development and sustainable and profitable agriculture through diversification.
Ashutosh Kumar, ‘Electoral Politics in Punjab: Study of Akali Dal’. Economic and
Political Weekly, 2004, 39(14-15), p. 1519.
76
For example, the Congress party in Punjab was caught between Assembly
election (2002) and Parliamentary elections (2004) became victim of the
paradox between electoral promises and government mandate. In the 2002
Assembly elections its promise of free electricity to farmers contributed to its
victory over its opponent the Akali Dal. The election manifesto committee was
headed by Dr. Manmohan Singh, present Prime Minister of India. After coming
to power, it started implementing the mandate of government to introduce
economic reforms and consequently it performed poorly in 2004 Parliamentary
elections. The Congress party was quick to announce the implementation of
sops like free electricity in the wake of forthcoming Assembly elections. This
was opposed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Not only this it also passed
Punjab Repealing Act of 2004 on SYL much to the annoyance of the Central
leadership. In other words, the Congress in competition with a regional alliance
started appropriating anti-centre constituency in the state.
122

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