The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of
Transkript
The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of
THE ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? on Stateness Reflections in an Era of Globalization By PETER EVANS* J. classic 1968 article on the state aimed to convince his P. NETTL'S scientists social fellow restructuring ceptual that "the thing exists and no amount of con it."1 Analysis of the state was "not can dissolve much in vogue," asNettl put it, and he considered this an intellectual aberration. trality He was that "stateness"?the convinced in important of the state?varied ways institutional and nations, among cen that political behavior and institutions could be understood only if the state were decades center into the back brought since have thoroughly of political Nettl. three analysis. The re Issues of stateness vindicated gained and retained the kind of centrality that he argued they should revive continues unabated. that he helped content of his vindi form and the vindicated, are full of ironies. The state to econom interest in of the spread have. The While cation debate Nettl ics, a discipline has been almost ignored completely in Nettl's article,2 has been central to the revival of debate. In part because of this disciplinary shift, the stakes ness" were are defined systems to "state For Nettl, the alternatives differently. in which of public authority other kinds of institu tions (parties in Britain, the law and legal institutions in the United States) were institutions salient. than Current about the debates are less about extent to which the form private of public can (or power should) be checked by public authority. Reinvigorated political faith in the efficacy of markets combined with a rediscovery of civil society ere like to thank Fred Block, Ha Joon Chang, Neil Fligstein, Stephan Haggard, Atul Kohli, Theda Skocpol, John Stephens, and especially the members of my graduate seminar in an early draft of this paper and, of course, comparative political economy for their useful criticisms of to absolve them from any responsibility for the directions taken by my response. 1 "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics 20 (July 1968), 559. Netd, 2 footnotes Netd was interdisciplinary?his refer to a wide range of sociologists, political scientists, or economic in 1968 he found references to economists in deal and historians?but logic unnecessary on the state. with debates ing *Iwould John Ruggie, WorldPolitics 50 (October 1997), 62-87 This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? ates a charismatic 63 and a corre set of substitutes institutions for public for the "eclipse of the state." set of arguments theoretical perspectives Changing sponding cannot be separated from real his torical changes in the position of the state. In the brief decades since on the state have In the OECD the demands wrote, burgeoned. in transfer payments countries driven increases have demographically as a of in a doubling resulted of government proportion expenditures more GDP. In countries de the desire for rapid economic developing Nettl a similar expansion. development Lagging produced velopment in an ominous institutions resulted litical and administrative of po "capacity most some of the In Africa, world, parts dramatically developing gap." institutional real eclipses of the state, in the sense of full-blown collapse, ero there was no threat of collapse, aworrisome took place. Even where to be under way. It was seemed sion of institutional capacity public much harder to ignore the state in the 1990s than itwas in the 1960s. most is how of Netd's ironic, from the perspective analysis, arena have affected "stateness." For Nettl, international rein the international role vis-?-vis system was "invariant," Perhaps changes the state's forcing decades in the stateness even when later the international domestic arena institutions is viewed denied very differendy. it.3 Three The col lapse of the old bipolar world has diminished the power of statecentric Si international relations. rivalries to dominate and military economic for transnational of the opportunities multaneously, growth about why for a new series of arguments gains has laid the foundation to these arguments, the intensified states are anachronisms. According transactions that cross national boundaries of economic development as an it marginalized the power of the state, leaving has undermined now saw as stateness arena that Netti is actor. The economic securing as seen the power of the nation-state. transcending political Changes in the global ideological climate are as crucial as new flows a of money and goods, and Netd's key aspect of analysis does anticipate was "stateless the For those changes. Nettl, society par excel England self-examination lence" and "an American simply leaves sociopolitical no room for any valid notion of the state."4 Thus, the relative neglect of 3 Netd (fh. 1) saw the international arena almost purely in realist terms, arguing that in the interna arena the state was "the almost exclusive and acceptable locus of resource mobilization" (p. 563). state is the basic, irreducible unit, equivalent to In Netd's view, "Here [in the international system] the function is invariant," "even where the individual person in a society" (p. 563). Since the "international the notion of the state is very weak, as in Britain and the United States, the effective extrasocietal or in tional ternational role is not affected" (p. 564). 4Netd(fn.l),562,561. This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 64 the concept of the state during the twenty-five his arti years preceding cle was a logical consequence of the "shift of the center of gravity of so cial science to the United the untrammeled States."5 Today, hegemony is one of the most of Anglo-American salient ideological premises forces the specific shaping of the current character cluding the extent to which globalization global economy, in is viewed as entailing the state. eclipse of the In this environment a different starting as a feature pursuing Nettls agenda requires can no Statelessness longer be treated simply point. of Anglo-American political culture. It must be dealt with as a domi nant global ideology and potential institutional reality.Therefore, the the eclipse of the state is likely and, if so, what the an shift would of such institutional be, takes precedence. of whether question consequences The trick is to deal with the question of eclipse seriouslywithout taking a answer positive for granted. Iwill argue that while eclipse is a possibility, it is not a likely one. the discourse What uine crisis is to make has done to a gen responses and defensive. The negative capacity unrelentingly states will end up as but that institutions marginal s the state role will be ac repressive ways of organizing is not danger meaner, of eclipse of state that more as the institutions. the collapse of public only way of avoiding consideration of with positive eclipse cripples Preoccupation possibili so that can more effec to increase states' ties for working they capacity meet them. The goal should be to the new demands that confront tively cepted work back paring with more attention explicit I begin to Nettls closer something kinds of "stateness" toward different com agenda of this time consequences, original their to the effects at the impact by looking and of globalization. on stateness of globalization and ar guing that the structural logic of globalization and the recent history of the global economy can then be read as providing rationales for "high as well stateness" a clear logic as "low stateness." That connecting economic Iwill globalization argue that the absence of to low stateness makes the normative and ideological side of the global order a key determinant of how globalization tion to a discussion guing affects of current that these perspectives stateness. I will theoretical are both then move perspectives sources of insight from globaliza on stateness, ar into the nature of the contemporary global order and influential shapers of the political and ideological face ofthat order. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of what 5 this analysis implies for future forms of stateness. Ibid., 561. This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? and the Role Globalization 65 of the State "Diminished," "defective," and "hollow"were typical adjectives applied to the state in a recent Glob contemporary special issue o? Daedalus.6 reason not is for the perception alization the only that "state authority and downwards" and in some has leaked away, upwards, sidewards, but it is a central one. The effects of global "just evaporated,"7 two in ization flow through interconnected but distinct channels. The of transnational economic character and changing creasing weight have created a new, relations over the course of the last three decades more context for state action. The effect of these constraining political matters structural changes has been channeled by the growing global hegemony of Anglo-American ideology. The New Global Economy Political one con assertion remains that "[t]here only the concluding actor in invariant development of stateness for each national invari has been Now the the international field" inverted.8 presumed ant is the international arena's negative effect on stateness. As wealth transactions that take and power are increasingly by private generated Nettl's stant?the place come across the borders harder to sustain of states the image rather of states than within them, as the preeminent it has be actors the global level.No one questions that the traditionalWaltzian "national interests" competing tem,"9 but the muted great relations leave international continues to drive at logic of the "interstate sys of the post-bipolar world struggles contaminated and often over increasingly power shadowed by the private logic of the global economy. Nettl likened the to a states were the "society" in which "people," but status of states must be order the unique political global most the "citi fact that balanced the against economically empowered arena are transnational zens" of the international (TNCs).10 corporations con of transactions and organizational The growing relative weight cross cornerstone is of the nections that national boundaries globaliza international arena in the current tion. and Exports than domestic more than imports growing transactions around the world one and a half times and a doubling of the are to OECD GDP in countries the of the exports just begin proportion as fast as investment three times has been direct growing ning. Foreign faster 6 Daedalus 24 (Spring 1995). 7 124 (Spring 1995), 56. Susan Strange, "The Defective State," Daedalus 8Netd(fn.l),591. 9 Cf. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 10 is quoted in fn. 3. Netd s formulation This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 1979). WORLD POLITICS 66 trade, and other subcontracting, sorts of transnational connections (alliances, corporate even faster.11 and so on) have probably been growing The impact of both trade and investment ismagnified by the chang than being an exchange of goods between ing character of trade. Rather a flow of domestic trade is increasingly systems, productive goods that are organized rather than na within networks production globally are created tionally.12 Commodities through in a tion processes performed multiplicity Whether the integration of national of produc territories. any given territory is included in global production networks or excluded on the decisions actors. from them depends of private can to cannot make their territories but they dic States attractive, try tate the structure of networks. global production In the classic realist world traditional forms of statecraft military were intertwined with possibilities closely to have actors were economic presumed military capacities est in the capacities for economic gain. Powerful an interest in the and political of "their" states, just as state managers had an inter economic of "their" entrepreneurs. National prowess was the foundation of military (and therefore diplomatic) strength.Ter was a route to control over new assets. A expansion productive of global production networks makes the prospective economic from territorial the returns to realist dubious, conquest reducing ritorial world gain statecraft. on al strategic capital and technology depends liances with those who control global production rather than networks, a on the control of any piece of territory. In global economy particular a over amounts where there is surplus of labor, control of territory large to Access can be more of a burden and population than an asset. on the actors were As long as private economic dependent political a sense it environment made for them to state, provided by particular successes the political and aspirations of that state. Na identify with tional aggrandizement sovereignty might Robert Reich calls out the prospect of private profit; threats to threats to profit. The operators of what reason to have much less webs"13 "global identify held also contain 11 Robert Wade, and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy Are "Globalization and Global Capi in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity Greatly Exaggerated," talism (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University offers a compilation of other such statistics, Press, 1996). Wade a nicely account of the ways in which such statistics may along with skeptical and carefully balanced exaggerate globalization. 12 See Robert B. Reich, The Work ofNations (New York Vintage Books, 1992); Gary Gereffi and eds., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism Korzeniewicz, Miguel (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, see of global networks for social organization, vision of the consequences 1994). For a comprehensive Castells, The* Information Age: Economy, 1996). ciety13(Oxford: Blackwells, Reich (fn. 12). Manuel Society and Culture, vol. 1, The Rise This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions of theNetwork So ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? with nationalist territorial tive of these the ambitions and anxieties. interstate networks, infrastructure piece of economic of disruption and uncertainty. system and conflicts 67 From the perspec is an essential as a whole among states are a source Underlying the transnational mobility of capital and the construc tion of global production networks is a radically globalized financial a fundamental au to poses challenge public realm. There has always been foodoose capital on the fi of international depended cooperation whose system, operation in the economic thority and states have often but the changes that have taken place in the last two decades nanciers, are When Nettl was writing, the fixed exchange quite extraordinary. rate system was still in effect and most countries industrialized major to exercise continued controls 1980s, by contrast, capital of currencies was left more new framework institutional cation and information over capital flows. By had been dismanded controls to markets was the end and than to states.14 The magnified of the the value effect of the in communi by advances systems. a succinct of the current dispropor summary economic and the global leverage avail states: in the worlds able to individual "Foreign trading exchange centers exceeds a trillion dollars a financial greater than the total day... Vincent offers Cable tion between stock financial of foreign exchange markets reserves held by all governments."15 The re sult iswhat Fred Block has called "the dictatorship of international fi nancial state that engages in policies "unwise" deemed Any as the value of its currency traders will be punished its access to capital shrinks.16 markets." financial by private declines and These of globalization processes state of evaporation authority, but certainly contribute is not the connection to the perceived as straightfor ward as itmight first appear.The state is not eclipsed by the simple fact its becoming tistics suggest of creased on trade. cross-national dependent Existing that greater reliance on trade is associated with role for more the state rather than a diminished sta an in one. Moreover, 14 See Fred Block, The Vampire State and Other Stories (New York: New Press, 1996). 15 A Study in the Loss of Economic Nation-State: Cable, "The Diminished Power," Daedalus 1995), 27. (Spring 16 a 124 Politics of Block (fn. 14). See also Geoffrey Garrett, "Capital Mobility, Trade and the Domestic the surprising ex Economic 49, no. 4 (1995). Garrett emphasizes Policy," International Organization tent to which have been able to resist "the dictatorship of international fi social democracies European a nancial markets," but he leaves no doubt that resistance growing price. For example, he imposes concludes his study by saying: "[Financial markets have imposed significant interest rate premiums on the power of the left and labor, and these increased with the removal of barriers to cross organized border capital flows_In time, one might speculate that no government would be able to bear this burden" (p. 683). This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 68 look at the nations that have over successful economically stateness may even be a compet been most the last that thirty years suggests high itive advantage in a globalized economy. Cameron noticed years ago David Twenty that the statistical rela (as mea openness tionship was sured by the share of trade in GDP) and the size of government as a rather The than logic plausi positive negative.17 finding suggested shares in ble as that connecting and trade globalization eclipse. Higher crease a to induced traumas; a larger externally country's vulnerability a sector Peter Katzenstein's counterweight. public protective provides case studies of small out the insti social democracies spelled European the this of tutional infrastructure operation underlying logic.18 in advanced industrial economies between are not is now referred These relationships simply artifacts of what to as "the Recent age of capitalism" analy golden (roughly 1950-73).19 et al., and others shows how the sis by Garrett, Kitschelt configuration to continues of public institutions shape the impact of globalization.20 Dani Rodrik has replicated and extended Cameron's statistical findings using contemporary data. Looking at data on OECD countries for the 1980s and the early 1990s, Rodrik found "aquite strong correlation between the OECD countries (as a among government expenditures more are to to that trade: countries share of GDP) and exposure exposed the when he extends trade have bigger governments."21 Furthermore, one hundred most to more them of than countries, developing, analysis size of gov between he not only finds "a striking positive relationship to trade" case ernment and exposure (in this government consumption) but also finds that "the degree of openness during the early 1960's is a 17 of the Public Economy: A Comparative "The Expansion Cameron, Analysis," American Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978). 18 Small States inWorld Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y: See Katzenstein, Political Cornell Press, 1985). University 19 and Realities: Some Histor See Paul Bairoch and Richard Kozul-Wright, "Globalisation: Myths on in theWorld Economy" ical Reflections and Growth Industrialisation (Paper presented Integration, on "Transnational and at the UNU/WIDER conference in the Developed, Developing Corporations Transitional Economies: University, Sep Changing Strategies and Policy Implications," Cambridge tember 21-23,1995). 20 OECD countries over the period Garrett's Geoffrey analysis (see fn. 16) of data from fifteen to further elucidate institutional con included other measures of globalization, 1967-90, which helps of He found that a "coincidence nections between globalization and the expansion of government. to greater gov and trade leftist unions, strong strong high levels of trade led parties, capital mobility, are ernment in which the consequences of globalization spending." For another analysis of the ways see Herbert Kitschelt et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contem mediated by national institutions, Press, forthcoming). (New York: Cambridge University porary Capitalism 21 Lecture, delivered during the Rodrik, "The Paradoxes of the Successful State" (Alfred Marshall 1996a), Istanbul, August 22-24 [final version, September], meetings, European Economic Association 31-32. See also idem, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments" (NBERWorking no. 5537, Paper April 1996b). This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 69 ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? of the very good predictor three decades."22 expansion of government over the subsequent over the look at contrasting past thirty trajectories regional growth more stateness than simply insulate do may do years suggests that high a source traumas. It may mestic from external actually be populations A advantage in a globalizing of competitive growth leading major Asian of transnational^ economic headline competing economies. economy. The may organized production of the thirty years since Nettl headline has been Few would now over have dizzying been wrote, the but the of East the growth spectacular that the growth of East Asia dispute a historic hier shift in the economic the past fifty years represents one that could shift prove to be a regional eventually archy of nations, to the rise of Northwestern If earlier. the 250 years Europe comparable state is that the for the headline argument globalization provides grist on thewane, the East Asia headline has very different implications for the evolution of stateness. since Netd In the years wrote, East Asian states?from Korea in the North to Singapore in the South with the People's Republic of China in used the middle?have central role to effect various dramatic in which the state played a strategies in the interna in Asia's changes position the role of the state varies across these societies.23 They cases, argue that they are stateless conti offer a new variety of high stateness, quite different from Netd's terms. in economic but perhaps more effective model nental European successes the idea that effective force us to reexamine East Asian tional division of labor. Obviously but no one would participation state in a globalized economy is best achieved by restricting involvement in economic affairs. They suggest that successful par more intense ticipation in global markets may be best achieved through 22Rodrik(fn.21,1996a),32. 23 literature on the role of the state in the East Asian eco For a sampling of the now voluminous in East Asian see Yilmaz Akyuz Nexus and Charles Gore, "The Investment-Profits nomic miracle, on "East Asian Industrialization" paper prepared for the conference Development: (Background Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, Lessons for aNew Global Environment," 1,1996). February 29 and March See also the published version, World Development 24, no. 3 (1996); Alice Amsdtn, Asia's Next Giant South Korea and Late Industrialization Press, 1989); Jos? Edgardo Cam (New York: Oxford University Shared Growth Credible (Washington, pos and Hilton L. Root, The Key to theAsian Miracle: Making The "The Politics of Industrial Transformation: D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996); Tun-jen Cheng, of California, Case of the East Asia NICs" (Ph.D. diss., University Berkeley, 1987); Peter Evans, Em States and Industrial Transformation Press, 1995); (Princeton: Princeton University Countries The Politics of Growth inNewly Industrializing Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: Press, 1990); Chalmers (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Johnson, Mm and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); Robert Wade, in Taiwan's Industrialization and the Role of Government (Prince Governing theMarket: Economic Theory Bank (IBRD), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth ton: Princeton University Press, 1990); World and Public Policy (AWorld Bank Policy Research Report) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). bedded Autonomy: This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 70 state involvement. is the most Singapore obvious case in Singa point.24 pore is not only a highly internationalized economy in terms of its ex treme reliance on trade, but it is also exceptionally dependent for its local economic dynamism on foreign direct investment by transnational for the capacity At the same time it is equally renowned corporations. state and power of its bureaucracy. as it may be in terms of the conventional wis This case, anomalous dom, underscores what should obvious: be logically small countries bar gaining with large TNCsmay do better if a competent, unified national are many on the local side. There in the bargaining participates some to consistent of them with make ways rising wages quite profits, If a state can credibly promise an in and high rates of local reinvestment. a set consistent with such strategies, frastructure along with predictable agenda of rules and competent rulemakers with whom to dialogue, it is hardly surprising that there is no dearth of TNCs disposed to join the game.25 East Asia tween high stateness (albeit not Netd's success in a globalizing and Rodrik's regression of a positive the possibility demonstrates connection be classic European variety) and and puts historical meat on Cameron economy connection results. If such a positive exists, then the currendy pervasive belief that the institutional centrality of the state is incompatible with globalization must be explained in terms of the ideological face of the current Ideology and Interests global order. in the Global Order In any international regime, norms, formal rules, and shared assump in the role of the state as the flows of tions are as important shaping goods and capital. John Ruggie made the point impeccably fifteen years ago in his explication of how the global political economy of the golden liberalism."26 age came to be characterized by "embedded sense unrestricted freedom for global in the of relatively Liberalism, was capital, 24 and the role of the state bureaucracy in internationalized On Singapore's strategy of development and Root (fh. 23); Cheng this strategy, see Campos (fh. 23); Gillian Koh, "A Sociological Analysis of in an Evolving Developmentalist State" (Ph.D. Elite: The Bureaucracy the Singapore Administrative and National of Sheffield, England, 1995); Jonathan Quah, "The Public Bureaucracy diss., University Abroad (Washington, D.C.: in K. K. Tummala, Administrative in ta., Systems Singapore," Development and Public Administra of the Market Press of America, 1982); idem, "The Rediscovery University Administration from the Singapore Experience," Australian JournalofPublic tion: Some Lessons 51, no. L. Root, Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise ofEast Asia (Hong 3 (1993); Hilton Press, 1996). Kong: Oxford University 25 to the New," States: From the Old Internationalization See Peter Evans, "TTMCsand Third World Global and Robert Rowthorne, in Richard Kozul-Wright eds., Transnational Corporations and the (London: MacMillan, forthcoming). Economy 26 and Change: Embedded Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions 36 (Spring 1982). Economic Order," International Organization Liberalism This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions in the Postwar ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? in a social "embedded" that committed compact 71 the advanced indus trial states to insulating (at least partially) their citizens from the costs of such a Embedded system. liberalism was also an Anglo-American construction, but itwas the product of an Anglo-American ideology significantly constrained by post-World War II fears that failure to domestic protect populations the preceding decades. might reinitiate the political traumas of Like embedded liberalism, the current regime is ameans of uniting the contradictory principals of national sovereignty (the keystone of the interstate system) and economic liberalism (which presumes that states will restrain over sovereignty is distinctive What to exercise their desire cross economic transac their borders). about the current can be to which is first of all the economic regime gain degree pursued of of a version of the and, second, sovereignty independendy hegemony untrammeled precepts ideological remarkably Anglo-American by tions that anxieties over potential political instability. Finally, unlike embedded as a of primarily liberalism, which was conceived regime for the indus to to is trialized West, the current normative regime apply presumed rich and poor alike. Whether active state citizens involvement from can increase the global economy that proscribes using the benefits becomes that a a moot garner country's sover in an ideological climate territorial to limit the discretion actors. In the current of private economic eignty have been tran order global ideological Anglo-American prescriptions to which states must scribed into formal rules of the game, individual point commit or risk GATT and the economic becoming pariahs. the most obvious formal manifestations of the doctrine themselves are only that as far as capital as economic behave WTO negotiations, the message international international states and goods are concerned the less individual off the will the better world be.27 Bilateral actors, at least those to which the United States is a party, convey even more financial financial of The private representatives aggressively.28 case in the of countries, capital and, developing same like the IMF, organizations impart the tutelage. 27 of changes in regulatory fashion since the golden For a general discussion age, see Ha-Joon on Regulation in the Postwar Era," Working of Perspectives Chang, "The Evolution Paper (Washing Institute of theWorld ton, D.C.: Economic Development Bank, 1995). For a discussion of the way in as which the WTO constrains economically nationalist industrial policy, see V. R. Pan strategies such chamuki, "WTO and Industrial Policies," Study no. 7, UNCTAD Project on East Asian Development: Lessons for a New Global Environment (Geneva: United Nations, 1996). 28 and Assertive Industrialization: U.S. See, for example, Peter Evans, "Declining Hegemony in the Computer 43 (Spring 1989). Brazilian Conflict Industry," International Organization This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 72 The effect of global ideological consensus (sometimes apdy labeled the "Washington consensus") on individual states goes well beyond the econ imposed by any structural logic of the international more in trying to im fact that becoming omy. The actively engaged not economic local conditions risks the prove just of opprobrium, but of the also makes any state global hegemon private actors, powerfiil a intervention An that considers such very risky proposition. ideology constraints action neither local state from possible nor desirable does, for whatever responsibility suffer at the hands of the global may however, economic economy. at least release the woes Even its citizenry richer states, with more highly developed institutional capacities for insulating their pop ulations from are more metries economic likely of international power, are under the same pressure. They have done so,29 but given the asym state to shift it is hard for any individual uncertainty, to resist and indeed the balance. The maining current order fits the ideological and the private superpower of both proclivities firms that dominate the only re the global to their iswhether it speaks effectively economy. The question in practice If an economically stateless world could deliver equilibrium that met the needs of TNCs, then eclipse might interests. a global indeed be investors trying to integrate opera in the offing. In fact, transnational across a contexts need competent, of national pre shifting variety even more sector counterparts than do old-fashioned dictable public can concentrate on their time and energy investors who domestic tions a relations with individual government building particular apparatus.30 even more same argument to The strongly applies global financial of international is really closer to a finance" capital. The "dictatorship situation. The of the international financial operation hostage into chaos without fiscal and would descend system quickly responsible on actors. markets the Financial of international monetary part policies mutual can in the long run their returns de the principal na system in which the control of competent and "responsible" states, but easily punish deviant on the existence of an interstate pend tional state need are under economies actors. Those capable great magnitude who sit astride The the international at which lightning speed regulators. can be for great makes completed financial system transactions of allocational 29 Cf. Garrett (fn. 16); Kitschelt et al. (fn. 20). 30 For a general discussion of the extent to which effi firms rely on states to create and sustain markets, "Markets, Politics and Globalization" (Manuscript, Berkeley, 1996). See also idem, Fligstein, toMarket Institutions" American Sociological Re "Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural Approach view 6 (August 1996). see Neil This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? ciency in theory, but it also makes for great volatility 73 in practice. "Rogue traders" are (as the name implies) supposed to be aberrations; yet the returns from of enormous the activity makes possibility speculative a a role continual certain After the rogue temptation.31 point, reducing to more states to of interfere increases collective risk power exposure than it expands the possibilities for individual profits. The actors need competent, that private transnational capable than their own ideology admits does not eliminate the pos are of eclipse. The calculations of even sophisticated managers fact states more sibility biased by their own worldviews. Bent on maximizing its room for ma an could in the become neuver, transnational capital easily accomplice on which destruction of the infrastructure of public institutions its to a the ability of states to inter profits depend. Up point, constricting vene in increased profits. By the time state global markets may produce so reduced that the is of the business environ capacity unpredictability even to ment becomes actors who have wide latitude intolerable, major to do business, in choosing where could reconstructing public authority even an one. be a long and painful process, impossible connect interactions The that the complicated global order and do more mestic the prevail likely. Accepting politics make miscalculation to protect constrains the of governments ideology ability ing global costs of in the those who bear the shifts citizens, ordinary especially it is the of international networks. Whether configuration production Bolivian in order state for health and education cutting domestic expenditures or to remain in conformity with the latest restructuring plan the Clinton administration pushing through NAFTA in order to demon strate its full faith in the free international movement of goods and cap vis-?-vis of those who lack privileged ital, the perception positions state is is likely to be the same. The international markets perceived, not as the ultimate of national interests, but instead as representative the instrument of dimly understood but somehow "foreign" interests.32 were it in their interest to decide that transnational managers have to overcome of state capacity, they would foster the reconstruction reverse as as well institutional accumulated alienation, atrophy. political result of any iron If eclipse does occur, it will not be the inexorable Should clad structural logic. The economic logic of globalization does not in it 31 See Block (fn. 14). 32 there is, of course, a long-standing tradition of seeing the state in these terms, In the Third World that is, as a "tool of imperialism." In the United States a lively folk tradition is rapidly developing along as a as fears of "black helicopters" and visions of the U.S. government analogous lines. As nonsensical sense that U.S. administrations does reflect an underlying pawn of the UN may be, this folk mythology are more responsive to transnational actors than to domestic pressure from below. This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 74 self dictate eclipse.While exercise from globalization does make it harder for states to economic it also increases initiative, state action and the costs of effective both returns the potential incompetence. when Only viewed through the peculiar prism of our current global ideological movement toward statelessness. logically entail out of the in turn, as much order grows, preju order does globalization This global ideological dices and ideologies of dominant global actors as out of any logic of in terests. Given the degree towhich political effects of global economic change are mediated porary theoretical by superimposed interpretative on the state become perspectives contem frames, consequential, not just for the insights they offer, but also because of their potential im pact on policy. on the New Perspectives State a debate on the nature helped continuing, many-stranded spark and role of the state. Some of the strands consisted of efforts to dem Nettl onstrate ical and in stateness why variations economic analysis. They perspectives, like those of Weber, be a central must revitalized Hintze, and element in polit refined pre-Nettl and Gerschenkron, and added new arguments to them.33Other strands jibed better with the normative and ideological side of the emerging global order.The flour ishing of neoclassical political and economy the renewed fascination with civil society are two of the best examples. The logic of each is quite about globalization, of arguments independent on a with built order Anglo-American global These successful formulations must, politically yet both resonated well visions of statelessness. however, be considered salient counterposing less public that raise arguments together with new reasons for the stateness. Once of this is continuing importance new on as on state the of the lies much the done, weight perspectives as on stateness the side of side of persistent eclipse. New Economic Perspectives Of the many strands of thinking on the state that have emerged in the thirty years since Nettl wrote, rated into the public political none has been more debate of neoclassical political economy.While than thoroughly the "neoutilitarian"34 incorpo version this line of reasoningwas quite 33 For a review of early efforts in this direction, see Peter Evans, Dietrich Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University initial essay by Skocpol. 34 in Evans (fn. 23), chap. 2. See discussion and Theda Reuschemeyer, Press, 1985), especially the This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? 75 independent of arguments for the historical inevitability of eclipse based on the supposed exigencies of globalization, it reinforced them, suggesting that eclipse might be not only inevitable but also desirable. were to treat the the "golden age" most economists willing During was a source of state as a black box. Economics for poli prescriptions was not it economic but cies that would best promote growth, promi nent as a tool for the institutional analysis of the state itself. As capitalist growth began to look more problematic in the mid-1970s, the weak performance this changed. Ironically, in those countries where the 1970s and 1980s of market state in economies involvement was least extensive (that is, Britain and the United States) was advanced as evidence of excessive over power public the economy.35 Concern with optimizing state policies continued but itwas joined to by efforts the analyze institutional that underlay mechanisms "bad" policies (that is, those that did not jibe with economic prescriptions). of "rent Analysts in return change: seeking" conceptualized for political and material as an ex policy-making state bureaucrats support, actors to reap unproduc private economic not because of increased demand for col rules that enabled produced tive rents.36 States expanded, Rent of self-seeking bureaucrats. but because seeking goods, seen as aberrant, and took what had been traditionally corrupt practices in of transformed them into the core of the political economy public lective stitutions. In this framework approaches likeNettl s, inwhich and the maintenance the state s outputs, did not make tablishment the Reconceptualizing to easier much characterize ical. Older arguments state about state the of norms were preeminent the es among sense. as a vehicle intervention inefficiencies for rent seeking made it as intrinsically patholog of bureaucracy and the impossibility of gathering sufficient information to make good policy were If neoclassical economy. political by this reinvigorated were a state of the the negative effects of logical consequence policies more competent nature of then better information, institutions, public advisers were not remedies. The only officials, and more knowledgeable were then either for the rational strategies alleviating reducing problem an absolute to institutions these allocated the resources perverse by trumped 35 States and Economic Development: A Comparative Histori and John M. Hobson. Cf. Linda Weiss cal (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1995). Analysis 36 and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory ofRent See James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, ed., Neoclassi Press, 1980); David Collander, Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University DUP Activities and Mass.: cal Political Economy: An Analysis Ballinger, (Cambridge, of Rent-Seeking of the Rent-Seeking 1984); Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy Society," American Economic Review 64 (June 1974). This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 76 or somehow minimum "marketizing" on norms of public incentive systems. reliance replacing of marketlike structure the administrative service with the hard itself, constraints were as in favor of state intervention arguments Keynesian rejected some of taxes to channel outmoded. collective output Using society's was a into "the old practice of bleeding public endeavors equated with patient with leeches in order tomake the patient healthy."37The grudg of using ing acceptance the state as a means of ameliorating the lot of those disadvantaged by market outcomes, which had prevailed during the golden age, was supplanted by the firm conviction as that as surely private greed produced public good through the market, public welfare to stunt the economic virtues of its recipients. Pri only served as as economic litde power, constrained by the distorting possible hand of public policy, was once again touted as the best protector of the efforts vate public good, and edge. aggressive Neoutilitarian corruption reaucracies. on rent the ideology of statelessness took on a harder, more an did provide the elegant way of explaining that are undeniable facets of most public bu and venality As explanations of such pathologies, that focus perspectives seeking models are very usefid. If, however, they crowd out all other in terpretations of public behavior, leaving public authority a synonym for rent filling views run the a self-ful and venality, they danger of becoming extent that the To of the neoutilitarian prophecy. prevalence seeking a career in remov and legitimates strips public service of prestige resources real services to con need to deliver ing the public agencies rent becomes motivation the indeed reasonable stituents, seeking only norms and traditions of public ser the public sector. Once for joining vice have been destroyed, basis is an them on a piecemeal reinstituting task. overwhelming While neoclassical into pol economy was easily assimilated political more for with fundamental icy analysis, other innovations, implications economic theories of production and exchange, were harder to incor more "new growth porate. The theory," which provided elegant ways of formally endogenizing technological change and brought the idea of returns back into increasing as be read easily legitimating the center an expanded of economic could debates,38 role for the state,39 but was 37 38Speech For a by Senator Kyi in the Senate, January 20,1995, quoted in Fred Block (fn. 14). see Paul Romer "The Origins of Endogenous but nontechnical sophisticated exposition, Growth," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 8 (Winter 1994). 39 For example, in the view of Garrett (fn. 16), "'New Growth' theory contends that active govern ment involvement in the economy (for example, public spending on education, physical infrastructure, and hence competitiveness and research and development) may actually increase productivity by This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 77 ECLIPSEOF THE STATE? nonetheless difficult extremely to translate into prescriptions. policy the possibility of increasing returns also required accepting Admitting the fact that the evolution of markets was and competition often highly path dependent40 and consequendy characterized by multiple equilib in turn made ria. This be counted did not on to necessarily to argue that unfettered markets could maximize but (or welfare) automatically efficiency on market to that could strategies point improve it harder outcomes. are of this vision of economic consequences growth magnified an to the fact that number of software increasing by products?from more cost of media ideas than Since the images?are things. reproduc The an idea is essentially increase with zero, returns indefinitely an to In of "ideas" subject scope of the market. economy increasing turns rather than to ones, the distribution decreasing "things" subject ing the re of income and profits is especially dependent on appropriability. The of returns to an idea does not flow from a logic of marginal a sense of the term, but it does in production meaningful depend on authoritative like the determination of the duration of decisions, and the and intellectual property patent protection regime copyright more generally. more As an economy of enforcement ideas, authoritative produces more more to both and becomes difficult critical property rights prof a state this requires an active, competent itability. In global economy its rules. In that is able to secure the compliance of other states with magnitude costs the most short, privileged economic actors in a global information economy (that is, global companies likeDisney orMicrosoft whose as sets take stronger enforcers The from the form of ideas) do not need weaker states; ones, or at least states that are more sophisticated than the traditional state." "night watchman growing the global centrality economic last two decades. of the threatened cancellation over of struggles appropriability of the United States over policies From 301s" to GATT "super of China's most-favored-nation a is evident the course negotiations status because of software come they need and active of intellectual property piracy, the question rights facet of economic U.S. international key policy. While to has be other are like Paul Krugman, by the market" (p. 658). Others, providing collective goods that undersupplied would argue that government efforts to exploit the theoretical possibilities revealed by the new growth theory are likely to do more harm than good; see, for example, Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic in the Sense and Nonsense (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). Nonethe Age ofDiminished Expectations have been opened up. less, even Krugman would not deny that new theoretical possibilities 40 in the Economy," Scientific American (Feb See, for example, Brian W. Arthur, "Positive Feedbacks ruary 1990). This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 78 forms of regulation are in disrepute, this particular kind of policing is now as one of the cornerstones treated of economic civilization. are a a rights specific instance of general point. In the complex of novel authoritative normative exchange intangibles, are measure in which the become the structures, state, by provided large new institutional of efficient The with economics, keystones exchange. on the structures and the its of governance necessity pervasive emphasis trans to any kind of economic frameworks of institutional importance can exist further the that efficient markets actions, argument generalizes in the context of effective and robust nonmarket institutions.41 only Intellectual property Neoclassical political economy offers a good rationale for eclipse, but a broader at the evolution look that flowed conclusions itself. Powerful of economic our earlier from transnational economic reinforces the theorizing examination of globalization actors may have an interest in their own activities but they also the state's ability to constrain limiting on a state to protect their returns, those from especially capable depend assets. In this of the state's institutional optic, the persistence intangible centrality looks more likely than eclipse. Civil and the Society that allocational conviction The control of public dendy Neither creates efficiency a only partial can be achieved ideological frame indepen at best. idealized visions of individuals interrelating by means of bilat eral voluntary relieves basic exchanges anxieties suages nostalgia New perspectives civil State society Anglo-American for the nor the actual of capitalist markets experience the maintenance of public order or as ties. of traditional satisfactions community about on governance role of the potential that highlighted a nice to the economic side of complement provided were not they global per though ideology.42 Even new global order.The political spectives in themselves, they fit with the of the stateless Anglo-American triumph of state-socialist the implosion societies, the charisma of civil society. The world was revitalization order, an as reflected impetus important of civil society was por 41 in to C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance See, for example, Douglass The Economic Institutions of Press, 1990); and Oliver Williamson, Cambridge University (New York: Free Press, 1985). Capitalism 42 For a sampling of the variety of ways which civil society has captured the imagination of social sci Consolidation" Journal of entists, see Larry Diamond, "Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (New York: Democracy 5 (July 1994); Ernest Gellner, Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparisons (London: Polity Penguin Press, 1994); John A. Hall, ed., Civic Poli andWorld Activism "Politics beyond the State: Environment Press, 1995); Paul Wapner, tics," World Politics 47 (April 1995). (Cambridge: This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? at least by conservatives, trayed, side of public well-being, solete, just as as a solution 79 to the social and political one that could make the state politically ob global markets made the state economically obsolete. To fit with the prevailing global order, a focus on civil society had to repress the possibility that social and political malaise might flow from the pervasive marketization of social relations instead of from the over state. This, of course, was conser intrusion of the bearing precisely what vative interpreters did. Rather than seeing the unchallenged dominion of as the to a revitalization of traditional primary obstacle saw intrusive the efforts of the state, ostensibly ties, they community as aimed at enhancing welfare, out" Just as neo community.43 "crowding market relations classical political economy negated the state s role in the development of a more and efficient productive society, the growing more and exclusionary (and other society parochial state s to to nonmarket the nity) negated ability speak In many cases, the vision of an engaged, organized ing oppressive movements charisma forms of civil of commu needs.44 unseat citizenry state elites fit the historical facts. The oppositional that helped state-socialist appara bring down moribund were a The of process Europe prime example. replac in Latin electoral democracies ing authoritarian military regimes with a similar surge of civil as a to America produced society counterweight in these cases, however, the leviathan of state power. Even the idea that tuses in Eastern civil society could provide a substitute for the organized public institu tions of the state In both Eastern Eu optimistic. proved unrealistically the reinvigoration of civil society rope and Latin America, proved to authoritarian harder to sustain once the unifying focus of opposition rule was more Here success. Even by political of relations. theory state-society dissipated complex again, contemporary as in the case of economic thinking on civil society these theorizing, reveals much cases a closer that for a called look at is at odds with the global order s assumption that fostering civil society requires the eclipse of the state. The proposition accelerating lation between the robustness of state institutions of a zero-sum and the vibrancy re of civil society is contested even by some of those most convinced of the indispensability of civic associations. A growing body of work suggests 43 James Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990), 321. 44 communities. Civil society was, of course, the most universalistic basis for organizing Exclusion ary ethnic and religious categories represented potent alternative bases for redefining the nation and re the footing of public authority. While Nettl did not anticipate the upsurge of neoclassical constituting see (fn. 1) the state and nation" as a political economy, he did "snapping of the link between (p. 560) reason for a general decline in stateness, in the world. projecting developing especially This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 80 that relations thought are more society or synergy. empowerment the state and civil between of in terms of mutual productively Robert Putnam's brief polemic with Joel Migdal provides a good starting point. Based on his reading of the relationship between "social in takes capital" and the efficacy of regional governments Italy, Putnam seems to issue with which that societies work, suggest strong Migdal's states and that one of the necessary result in weak for the conditions se of strong states is a "massive societal dislocation, which emergence social associa weakens Not "civic control."45 so, argues Putnam, verely . . . tions are powerfully institutions associated with effective public Putnam's is strong society, strong state."46 What suggests perspective on economic that just as modern markets decisions depend being nested ment in a predictable more flourishes institutional framework, groups when they have have drawn Others civic likewise citizens engage and easily among private organized a sector as an interlocutor. competent public contexts. the same lesson from very different Looking atAfrica, the region inwhich the disintegration of both state and civil organizations a for argues "symbiotic During society has been most relationship between Chazan dramatic, Naomi state and civil society."47 the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s "both state agencies and social a process of implosion."48 where Conversely, experienced of intermedi there has been recovery from the crisis, the "reemergence ate social the definition and reasser groups" has "come together with tion of state capacities, the close connection between civil highlighting networks society and stateness."49 Vivienne Shue, looking at what might be con 45 in the Third and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities Migdal, Strong Societies World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 269. 46 Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions inModern Italy (Princeton: Princeton Univer result from their different sity Press, 1993), 176. In part, the differences between Putnam and Migdal of a strong society. Migdal focuses on vertical, clientelistic ties and parochial relationships definitions that fos based on primordial affinities like ethnicity and kinship. Putnam focuses on civic associations ter ties among social rather they may be deeply rooted in history, are modern equals and that, while in form. Putnam's version of society is, however, the one that is relevant to the vision than primordial that the emergence of civil society will permit the withering away of formal leviathans of repressive proponents of civil society have in mind when they work toward fos public authority. What optimistic in Latin America is presumably neither the tering its rebirth in Eastern Europe or its reinvigoration of clientelistic ties nor the reawakening of primordial loyalties and parochial prejudices strengthening but rather the kinds of horizontal civic associations that are the focus of Putnam's argument. I am in and for drawing this point to my attention; cf. Heller, "Social Mobilization debted to Patrick Heller from Kerala" (Paper presented at the annual meetings Democratization: Lessons of the Comparative Association for Asian Studies, April 1996). 47 in Joel Migdal, Atul Life in Sub-Sanaran Africa," the State: Associational Chazan, "Engaging and Transformation (Cam Shue, eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination Kohli, and Vivienne bridge: 48 Cambridge Ibid., 269. 49 Ibid., 278. University Press, 1994), 258. This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 81 ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? sidered the polar opposite case?the People's Republic of China?finds a similar kind of mutual of state and society. The vicis empowerment of state-society relations under communist and postcommunist ... between rule demonstrate, she says, "an intriguing the relationship a on one of robust of civil the associational life, hand, emergence sphere situdes and the consolidation state organization, in a of social power on the other."50 relatively strong or resilient Examining what he calls "the browning of Latin America" over the course sets out the converse of the 1980s, Guillermo O'Donnell argu a ment in way that is consonant with the mutual empowerment hy out that "current of Chazan and Shue.51 First, he points pothesis at the size and deficits of the state as bureaucracy... attempts reducing are also the state-as-law of and the ideological destroying legitimation then argues that the crisis of the state leads to a degen and civic en society in which community organization are an atomization."53 "angry replaced by the state."52 He eration of civil gagement These broad arguments that the fate of civil society is linked to the sector ability of the public at the microlevel. Studies to sustain itself have counterparts interesting the developing world throughout find evidence for "state-society development proj synergy."54 Effective ects at the microlevel in combina often involve state agencies working scattered tion with local social groups. The possibility of coproduction, inwhich a to and local communities work together produce or collective state appa is associated in turn with good, ratuses that have sufficient de and bureaucratic corps esprit sophistica set tion to move beyond mechanistically the simplest possible imposing case in of centralized is rules. The Taiwan's point archetypal irrigation state agencies service needed which associations, reaucratic decision substantial cluding allocation.55 are built making around a subde melding of centralized and real involvement of local villagers, community States with weaker control over bureaucracies bu in the process of local water are incapable of sustain 50 See Shue, "State Power and Social Organization in China" inMigdal, Kohli, and Shue (fh. 47), 66. 51 "On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems: A Latin American O'Donnell, at Some Postcommunist View with Glances 2\, no. 8 (1993). O'Don Countries," World Development nell uses the term "browning" to refer to "territorial evaporation of the public dimension of the state" areas in which both effective bureaucracies and "properly sanctioned (p. 1358), that is, the spread of are lacking. legality" (p. 1359) 52 O'Donnell (fn. 51), 1358. 53 Ibid., 1365. 54 in the special section on "Govern See articles by Burawoy, Evans, Fox, Heller, Lam, and Ostrom ment Action, World 24 (June 1996); and also Judith Social Capital and Development," Development in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Tendier, Good Government Press, 1997). 55 See the article by Lam (fn. 54). See also Michael P. Moore, "The Fruits and Fallacies of Neoliberalism: The Case of Irrigation," World Development 17r, no. 11 (1989). This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 82 ing the kind of locally oriented bureaucratic competence thatmakes co production possible.56 for positive-sum The evidence relations between the effectiveness of civic associations and state capacity is not limited to theThird World. ex historical there are interesting States, the founding of the Chil synergy. In examining amples of state-society one of the most in the dren's Bureau, successful early developments in the stateless Even United shows how a broad spectrum of geographi state, Skocpol were to this associations critical women's voluntary cally dispersed women notes the for and She also children."57 parallels "statebuilding effort and the relationship between volun between this "maternalist" U.S. welfare tary associations another example and economic of farmers and of state-society the U.S. Department synergy generating of Agriculture, social widespread change.58 If thiswork is right, a sustained efflorescence of civil society may well on the simultaneous of robust, competent organi a state. the syn counterparts state-society Conversely, states toward less capable and involved ergy view implies that a move to achieve their goals will make it more difficult for civic associations depend zational construction within and will thereby diminish incentives for civic engagement. In the most extreme case, "browning."59 the result would Once be a globalized version of O'Donnell's examination of recent theoretical a closer again, this time an in rather than economic, suggests perspectives, political or ca state not in in maintenance of but the terest, expansion eclipse, members of it is interests of this the In case, however, ordinary pacity. are at elites. civil society that play rather than those of transnational of Stateness The Future contain in economics, as in state capacities results that produces itself. Together, of globalization like those perspectives, political in of favor arguments strengthening of these perspectives eclipse. Analysis Newer those drawn guments the analysis lead us to expect states from to play a persistent as many favor of parallel these ar role in the future of 56 See Ostroms (fn. 54) discussion of Nigeria. 57 Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers andMothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 480-91. 58 Inter "State Capacity and Economic Ibid., 486. See also Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold, vention in the Early New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (Summer 1982). For a recent reprise of see Skocpol, from Above," American Prospect 25 (March-April "Unravelling Skocpol's perspective, 1996). 59 O'Donnell (fn. 51). This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? 83 the global political economy, but such an outcome can hardly be taken for granted. Just because an information-oriented, globalized system of even more seem to would than prior production depend exercise of public authority does not mean the competent on economies that the insti tutional bases of such authority will survive. Just because the historical experience of those most countries successfid at to the modern adapting globalized economy has been characterized by high levels of state in volvement does not mean that their experience will in the be reflected of all, a institutional that prevail globally. Most obvious arrangements ca a more vibrant civil more between association society and positive pable state institutions will not prevent both from disappearing. then can be said about What the future prospects of stateness in this era of globalization? One reasonable and optimistic hypothesis looks to the return of the ideological pendulum. In this view, the recent push to a natural reaction to the the role of the state represented previ state managers. The and of capac glaring overreaching politicians reduce ous ity gap led to a period during which, inDani Rodriks words, "excessive optimism about what the state would be able to accomplish was re placed by excessive pessimism." Rodrik suggests further that, having now surmounted serious we are "on the threshold of a pessimism," one that of the role of the state in development, "excessive reconsideration will lead to an improved understanding of the role that governments can (and have to) play."60 This makes perspective sense. took on more States handle during the period followingWorld War than they could II.Dealing with the ca was the state s role. Readjustment gap clearly required rethinking s in the state and overzealousness role, natural. The necessary, reducing a return to the past, but it return of the not sanction need pendulum new efforts to turn states into effective instruments would legitimate pacity is whether the question is likely to come point that reflects dispassionate pendulum to the relative ef with of accumulated regard analysis global experience forms and strategies of state action. fectiveness of different for the achievement of collective goals. to rest at a The Netd, however, brings a historical and ideological dimension to the story ment to attain. His argu self-examination simply leaves sociopolitical a for any valid notion of the state" suggests unlikely hegemon To this of the pendulum the proper position dispassionately.61 the efficient that makes middle seem harder that "an American no room to assess 60 Rodrik (fn. 21,1996a), 61 Nettl (fn.l), 561. 2-3. This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 84 must actors most the problem that the nonstate are normative order private corporate global be added the defining powerful elites whose in view of where the pendulum belongs is colored by their irreducible in terest global mands a set of in protecting private managerial prerogatives. Generating norms to that will the search for reduce de encourage ways on institutions but also support the necessary enhance public ment of state capacity will require substantial ideological revisionism. for expecting Grounds a shift such are scanty, but there are some. The shifting balance of economic dynamism in the interstate system is a source possible of revisionism. success economic extraordinary So far, the implications for the kind of stateness of East Asia's that ismost ef fective in a globalized economy have found surprisingly little place in official discourse. Official (as opposed to academic) analysis has been remarkably East Asia's tinctively the state tenuate The mon, in its of the revisionist of suppression implications the eventual assimilation of dis Nonetheless, experience.62 on of stateness into global discourse East Asian experiences obdurate seems increasing the burden movement Any toward eclipse. reluctance of the United in this direction inevitable.63 the current would at bias of delivering what to shoulder, as hege to be valuable perceive States others as an for ideological may impetus current of for that argues asymmetries change. Strange, example, a interstate power have created situation in which "the most powerful are able to block, even veto, any exercise of in global issues of authority global collective also goods serve Susan or of the universal the environment, of financial of regulation, provision for shelter and health care."64 then fur needs She food, presses the present hegemonic, do ther, saying that "the only way to remove basic nothing veto on better global governance based is to build, bit by bit, a on embracing the same but opposition European-Japanese cooperation some Asians and Africans who Latin Americans, share of remote the interests and concerns for the future."65 However prospects for this kind compelling of collective action, Stranges argument does identify another potential impetus for ideological shift.66 62 Bank and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance," See, for example, Robert Wade, "Japan, theWorld Review 217 (May-June 1996). 63Left Some would argue that the East Asian experience already constitutes a competing model, at least countries of the region itself. See Barbara Stallings andWolfgang for the developing Streeck, "Capi in Stallings, talisms in Conflict? The United States, Europe and Japan in the Post-Cold War World," Context ofDevelopment ed., Global Challenge, Regional Response: The New International (New York: Press, 1995). Cambridge University 64 Strange (fn. 7), 71. 65 Ibid. 66 source of normative to be found Another unlikely but still intriguing?is potential change?also in the networks of public organizations and officials that are part of the global order. John Meyer, in a New This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? relatively implausible fonts of ideological change are likely to These as consequences only insofar they help ambivalent relation of transnational ready as TNCs value the elimination eclipse. Much have restrict 85 their managerial prerogatives, they to further undercut the al to any project of of the ability of states to also recognize the benefits business of dealing with robust and capable public interlocutors. They have an interest in keeping on state managers the defensive?something that escalating rhetoric on the inevitability and desirability of eclipse ac complishes stitutional an interest in the real in avoiding they also have a state. This of the above all else makes marginalization nicely. But return of the pendulum likely. main The that it is easily problem with conflated with a return-of-the-pendulum a return to "embedded is perspective liberalism." Even if a return of the pendulum ismore likely than eclipse, the threat of envi the current global still shapes stateness. What ideological eclipse ronment does is to ensure that responses to a crisis of capacity genuine state at in order will be defensive. aimed increasing capacity Strategies to meet social and look demand for collective goods protection rising denies the state's poten in an ideological climate that resolutely foolish state managers to the and Beleaguered general welfare. as an on to preserve institution the state leaders, bent trying political come some own innovative with their (and may up organi positions), the scope of and some salutary ways of reducing zational improvements states attempt, but their what strategy is likely to be reneging primary tial contribution on the old commitment to embedded ing the capacity gap is redefined meaner kind of stateness. In the most sinister version as a of this The problem of constructing liberalism. project of clos a leaner, stateness, leaner, meaner politi in for the state as an institution state managers gain support essential for sustaining the state's role to activities for restricting ser to deliver markets. The of transnational the profitability capacity can for themselves vices that the affluent (for example, supply privately institu restricted the more is sacrificed, while health and education) to deliver essential business services and secu tional capacity necessary cians and return classic article, presents a strong case for the collective power of public officials to shape global norms at in Al of the Nation-State," "The World the transnational level; seeMeyer, Polity and the Authority bert Bergesen, Press, 1980). Meyer's ed., Studies in theModern World System (New York: Academic more recent changes in global ideology, but there is unconvincing, especially in view of general model in public institutions are some very interesting, if modest, examples of transnational networks rooted order. See, for example, Peter Haas, that have effected "Banning change in the global normative International Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," Chlorofluorocarbons: Community Epistemic 46 (Winter 1992). Organization This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WORLD POLITICS 86 rity (domestic and global) ismaintained. means more devoting and reckless among In turn, delivering security resources to the repression the excluded, both domestic of the more desperate and international. Rescuing embedded liberalismwould require a very different config of state-society and a relations different correspondingly one founded on relations of mutual stateness, empowerment uration of kind be tween state institutions and a broadly organized civil society of the kind suggested by Chazan and her colleagues.67 Engaging the energy and in the of citizens and communities of ser imagination coproduction vices is a way of enhancing the state s ability to deliver services without scarce material resources from to demand more in having society. The creased social service then approbation an becomes that comes with more effective, responsive reward for those who intangible important such a strategy simultaneously rewards the of civil the reservoir of po society, thereby augmenting reinvigoration to in in it is almost certainly tential participants subject coproduction, returns. Like the returns to the bureaucratic of creasing development in an earlier era, the returns to more forms of organization innovative on stateness forms of based synergy could be prodigious. state-society work the state. Since within Unfortunately, the movement toward eclipse has already made this kind of institutional development unlikely. The kind of capacity neces a sary to make the state a dependable partner in strategy of state-society scarce are less synergy is already in supply. Civic groups correspondingly to be attracted to of mutual that involve empowerment strategies likely to disillusionment with the state s capacity agencies. Legitimate antistate the discourse exacerbated of the deliver, pervasive by Anglo state American global order, has solidified into a domestic political climate the state as an ally seem farfetched. and Finally, are to see a elites threat likely important, political perhaps private in any form of state-society synergy that involves subordinate groups. are slim, but of The synergy prospects state-society political they that makes engaging most or state managers For beleaguered altogether. meaner at with the stateness, leaner, political politicians It promises tractions of a strategy of state-society synergy are obvious. away out of the to It also currendy asphyxiating capacity gap. promises should not be discounted disenchanted generate of public a set of allies much less ambivalent potentially elites who institutions than are the business about the value constitute the principal political pillar of the leaner,meaner state.The logic is equally 67 See Migdal, Kohli, and Shue (fn. 47), especially and Accommodation Forces: On Political Contention Kohli and Shue, "State Power in the Third World." This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions and the Social ECLIPSE OF THE STATE? powerful from the point of view 87 of civic organizations. Leaner, meaner will do little for them. They need capable state organizations their policy to guarantee preferences the global into practice business climate. likely, but the possibility civic liances with no less implausible labor organizations tieth even more Leaner, to put than TNCs need meaner states is still more that state apparatuses might forge new al in the early decades is of the new millennium than the alliances that were actually forged between and the state during the early decades of the twen actors century. Probing beneath the rhetoric of globalization problematic quite consistent with Netd's original and eclipse reveals a admonitions. Project ing the institutional evaporation of the state provides little more illu it altogether. with Preoccupation eclipse serious ongoing shifts in the nature of state ness. It also inhibits forms of stateness. of more promising exploration and ex mesmerized by the power of globalized Becoming production in the is equally counterproductive. Whether the future unfolds change a leaner, meaner state or embodies more of direction unlikely probable on the economic elements of state-society synergy does not depend mination than distracts attention ignoring from logic of globalization alone. It also depends on how people think about stateness. This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions C14. ULUSLARARASI POLİTİK EKONOMİ İçinde Şaban Kardaş ve Ali Balcı, Uluslararası İlişkiler’e Giriş: Tarih, Teori, Kavram ve Konular, Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2014 Ziya Öniş ve Mustafa Kutlay GİRİŞ ..................................................................................................................................................... 1 DİSİPLİNİN DOĞUŞU VE GELİŞİMİ .............................................................................................. 2 KÜRESELLEŞME, ÇOK-‐KUTUPLULUK VE YENİ BÜYÜK SORULAR ..................................... 4 TÜRKİYE’NİN EKONOMİ POLİTİĞİ .............................................................................................. 8 SORULAR ............................................................................................................................................. 9 EK OKUMA ÖNERİLERİ ................................................................................................................... 9 KAYNAKÇA ...................................................................................................................................... 10 GİRİŞ Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi (UPE), devletler ile piyasaların dinamik etkileşimi ve birbirlerini nasıl şekillendirdiklerini araştıran disiplinlerarası sosyal bilimler yaklaşımının genel adıdır. Uluslararası siyasetin temel örgütlenme biçimi olan devletlerin ‘güç’, iktisadi hareketin temel örgütlenme zemini olan piyasaların ise ‘refah’ üretiminde kurucu unsurlar olduğu varsayımından hareketle, Robert Gilpin (1975: 43), UPE’yi “uluslararası ilişkilerde güç ve refah arayışının karşılıklı ve dinamik etkileşimi” olarak tanımlamaktadır. Kutu C14 1: Politik Ekonominin Kökenleri Modern UPE disiplini 1970’lerde ortaya çıkmış olmakla birlikte, disiplinin teorik kökenleri çok daha gerilere gitmektedir. Realist politik ekonomi teorilerinin kökeni 15. yüzyıl merkantilizmine dayanmaktadır. Merkantilist perspektif, devletlerin ihracatı teşvik etmesini, korumacı duvarlarla ithalatın kısıtlanmasını önermektedir. Liberal politik ekonomi teorilerinin kökeni, 19. yüzyılda serbest ticareti ve kapitalist iş bölümünü refah artışının temel dinamiği olarak öneren Adam Smith’in Milletlerin Refahı isimli klasik çalışmasına dayanmaktadır. Marksist teorilerin menşei ise yine 19. yüzyılda Karl Marks’ın abidevi çalışmalarına dayanmaktadır. Marks ve Engels, eserlerinde kapitalizmin üretim, değişim ve bölüşüm dinamiklerini ortaya koymayı hedeflemiş, tarihin akışının sınıflar ve sınıf çatışması ekseninde şekillendiğini önermişlerdir. (Watson, 2005) Devletler ve piyasalar arasındaki girift ilişki, aynı zamanda iki farklı mantığın karşılıklı rekabet ve iş birliğini simgelemektedir. Giovanni Arrighi’ye göre devlet-‐piyasa ilişkisi, ‘sınır mantığı’ ile ‘sermaye mantığı’ etkileşimi çerçevesinde ele alınabilir. Sınır mantığı, daimi güç arayışındaki modern devletlerin belli sınırlar ve bu sınırlar içindeki beşeri ve doğal kaynaklar üzerinde egemenlik/otorite tesis etme çabasına işaret eder. Sermaye mantığı ise daimi refah arayışındaki piyasa aktörlerinin çoğu 1 kez sınırları aşarak genişleyen bir hacimde ticaret, para akışı, teknoloji transferi vs. yoluyla sermaye birikimlerini azami kılma çabasına karşılık gelmektedir (Arrighi, 2005: 27-‐30). Devlet mantığının, güç elde etmek için piyasanın ürettiği refahtan yararlanmaya çalışması, refahını daha da artırma amacındaki sermaye mantığının ise devletin kural koyucu, düzenleyici ve rant yaratıcı otoritesini yedeğine alma gayretleri, karşılıklı etkileşimin iş birliği boyutunu oluşturmaktadır. Diğer taraftan, devlet mantığı ile sermaye mantığının hedefler ve öncelikler konusunda çatışması, karşılıklı iş birliğinin rekabete dönüşmesine de sebep olabilmektedir (Balaam ve Veseth, 1996). Örneğin, çok-‐ uluslu şirketlerin ticari liberalleşme taleplerine karşı, devletlerin gelişmekte olan sanayilerini koruma gayretleri bu tarz rekabetin sayısız örneğinden birini oluşturmaktadır. Bu çerçevede UPE, uluslararası düzlemde güç ve refahın nasıl organize edildiğini anlamaya çalışır. Mevcut siyasi ve ekonomik düzende ‘kimin ne kazandığı’ ise politik ekonomi analizlerinin temel hareket noktasını oluşturmaktadır (Strange, 1988). DİSİPLİNİN DOĞUŞU VE GELİŞİMİ Bağımsız bir sosyal bilimler disiplini olarak UPE, 1970’lerde uluslararası sistemde yaşanan derin Kutu C14 2: Amerikan Ekolü vs. İngiliz Ekolü krizlerin yeni yaklaşımları zorunlu kılması sonucu ortaya çıkmıştır. İlk olarak 1971 yılında UPE’nin önemli isimlerinden Benjamin Cohen 2008 yılında yayınlanan kitabında UPE literatürünü iki ABD Başkanı Nixon, dolara dayalı sabit kur ana ekole ayırmıştır: Amerikan Ekolü ve İngiliz sisteminin çöktüğünü ilan etmiş, ardından Ekolü. Bu tasnif, coğrafya ya da ulusal tabiiyete göre 1973-‐1974 tarihlerinde yaşanan petrol krizleri değil, teorik ve metodolojik hassasiyetlere göre yapılmıştır. Amerikan Ekolü, pozitivizm ve Batı ekonomilerini beklenmedik biçimde ampirizm esaslarına dayanarak, “bilimsel” politik etkilemiştir. 1970’lerde üçüncü dünya ekonomi anlayışına vurgu yapmaktadır. Bu ekol ülkelerinin ‘yeni uluslararası ekonomik düzen’ daha çok mevcut yapıları ve güç ilişkilerini verili alarak, siyasetin uluslararası ekonominin işleyişini sloganıyla mevcut sisteme şekillendiren güç nasıl etkilediğini rasyonel aktör modeli ilişkilerini sorgulamaya başlaması, bu tarihe çerçevesinde anlamaya çalışmaktadır. İngiliz Ekolü ise mevcut yapıları verili almak yerine, bu yapıların kadar birbirinden ayrı kabul edilen ekonomi ve nasıl ortaya çıktığını incelemekte ve içerdikleri güç siyasetin aslında aynı madalyonun iki yüzü ilişkilerini, ideolojileri ve değer yargılarını eleştirel olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Bu tarihten bir perspektifle anlamayı ve yorumlamayı hedeflemektedir. Gittikçe artan oranda nicel itibaren uluslararası ticaret, kur rejimleri, tekniklere dayanan Amerikan Ekolü tema ve doğrudan yatırımlar, çok-‐uluslu şirketler ve konulara ağırlık verirken, İngiliz Ekolü uluslararası ekonomideki üretim, değişim ve bölüşümün yapısal hegemonya gibi kavramların uluslararası dinamiklerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Cohen’in tabiriyle siyasetin ihmal edilemez öğeleri olduğu Amerikan Ekolü “ağaçlara, İngiliz Ekolü ise ormana anlaşılmıştır. Oysa 1970’lere kadar Bretton odaklanmaktadır.” (Cohen, 2008: 141) Woods kurumsal yapısı çerçevesinde göreceli olarak istikrarlı seyreden uluslararası kur, ticaret ve finans sistemleri siyaset yapıcılar tarafından teknokratik yönetim alanı olarak değerlendirilmiş, bu açıdan ‘yüksek siyaset’ gündemine dahil edilmemiştir. 1970’lerle birlikte ise uluslararası ekonomide yaşanan oyun değiştirici kırılmalar, ‘uluslararası ekonomik ilişkilerin siyasallaşmasını’ beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu eksende öncü makalelerden birini Susan Strange yazmıştır. 1970 tarihli “Uluslararası Ekonomi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: Bir Karşılıklı İhmal Vakası” başlıklı çalışmasında Strange, uluslararası ekonomik ve siyasi sistemin kapsamlı bir dönüşümden geçtiğini öne sürmüş, uluslararası ilişkiler uzmanlarının 2 ekonomik dinamikleri yeterince dikkate almadığını, ekonomistlerin ise uluslararası ekonominin adeta siyasetten arındırılmış bir ortamda faaliyet gösterdiğini varsayarak en baştan hatalı davrandığının altını çizmiştir. Bu karşılıklı ihmalin sosyal bilimlerin ufkunu daralttığı tespitinden hareketle Strange, ekonomi ve siyasetin zararlı ayrılığını sonlandırmak gerektiğini vurgulamıştır (Strange, 1970). 1970’ler boyunca yaşanan politik ekonomi krizleri sadece Strange’i haklı çıkarmakla kalmamış, günümüz UPE anlayışının kurucu metinlerinin hızlı bir şekilde üretilmesine olanak sağlamıştır. Bu eksende, 1972 yılında Keohane ve Nye, Ulus-‐ötesi İlişkiler ve Dünya Siyaseti isimli çalışmalarında uluslararası siyasetin realist paradigmanın dar kalıplarıyla anlaşılamayacağına vurgu yaparak ulus-‐ötesi ilişkiler Kutu C14 3: Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi Teorileri (transnational relations) kavramını yeni bir analitik REALİZM LİBERALİZM MARKSİZM çerçeve olarak önermişlerdir. Söz konusu yaklaşımı zaman Tarihsel köken 15. yüzyıl 19. yüzyıl 19. yüzyıl içinde daha da geliştiren Önde gelen Hamilton, List, Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Lenin, Keohane ve Nye, ‘karmaşık kuramcıları Krasner, G ilpin, Kant, Hayek, Frank, C ox karşılıklı bağımlılık’ kavramını Keohane ulus-‐ötesi ilişkilerin kurucu unsuru olarak ortaya Türleri Merkantilizm, Serbest ticaret, Eleştirel teori, atmışlardır. Buna göre, hızla realizm karşılıklı bağımlılık ekolü, bağımlılık dünya sistemleri genişleyen ticaret, finans ve iletişim ağları ile bu ağların Analiz düzeyi Devlet-‐ Birey-‐merkezli Yapı-‐merkezli hayat bulmasına imkan merkezli tanıyan uluslararası örgütler (bilardo topu ve çok-‐uluslu şirketler gibi modeli) devlet-‐dışı aktörler, dünya Analiz birimi Devlet Firmalar, Sınıf, küresel siyasetinin karmaşık karşılıklı devletler, kapitalizm bağımlılık içerisinde hareket uluslararası ettiği bir zemin doğurmuştur. örgütler Karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılık ‘Devlet’ Homojen Çoğulcu platform Hâkim sınıfların üç noktaya odaklanmaktadır. tasavvuru otonom aktör temsilcisi Bu noktalar, devletler ve devlet-‐dışı aktörler arasında Davranışsal Rasyonel bir Rasyonel bir Toplum-‐içinde ve çoklu-‐diyalog kanallarının dinamikler aktör olarak aktör olarak toplumlar-‐ devlet birey arasında sömürü oluşması, farklı temalar arasında önem açısından ‘Sistem’ Anarşik, İş birlikçi, Hiyerarşi, hiyerarşi farkının ortadan tasavvuru çatışmacı karşılıklı çatışmacı kalkması (yani ‘yüksek siyaset’ bağımlılık kavramının anlamını Küresel Sıfır toplamlı Pozitif toplamlı Sıfır toplamlı yitirmesi) ve askeri gücün ekonomi oyun oyun oyun eskiye nispetle daha az önemli hale gelmesidir. Uluslararası Çok önemli Küresel iş birliği Merkez ülkelerin örgütler değil için oldukça çıkarları için Keohane ve Nye’ın önemli 3 önemli O’Brien ve W illiams, 2004: 26’dan değiştirilerek alınmıştır. vurguladığı üzere, 1970’lerle birlikte, güvenlik-‐merkezli ve ulus-‐devlet eksenli realist uluslararası siyaset yaklaşımlarının yeni ortaya çıkmakta olan karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılığı yeterince analiz edememesi, UPE’nin ekonomi-‐siyaset etkileşimini sistematik açıdan inceleyen bir disiplin olarak Amerikan akademyasında popülerlik kazanmasını beraberinde getirmiştir (Cohen, 2008: 28-‐31). UPE, belli bir teorik ve metodolojik yaklaşımın değil, yukarıda aktarıldığı üzere temel amacı uluslararası düzende güç ve refahın birbirini nasıl şekillendirdiğini anlamak olan bir disiplinin adıdır. Kökenleri çok eskiye dayanan UPE’nin eklektik ve kapsayıcı yapısı değişik teorik ve metodolojik yaklaşımların UPE çatısı altında toplanması sonucunu doğurmuştur (Kutu C14 1). Bu nedenle, ‘UPE’ye teorik yaklaşımlar’ şeklinde özetlenebilecek bir sınıflandırma oldukça zordur. Yine de analitik kolaylık sağlaması ve disipline yeni giriş yapanlar açısından Robert Gilpin’in 1987 tarihinde yayınlanan ve politik ekonomi alanında bir klasik haline gelen Uluslararası İlişkilerin Politik Ekonomisi isimli kitabında önerdiği sınıflandırma faydalı olabilir: liberalizm, ulusalcılık ve Marksizm. Farklı araştırmacılar tarafından değişik isimler tercih edilse de bu üç temel yaklaşım halen daha geçerliliğini korumaktadır (O’Brien ve Williams, 2004). Liberalizm genellikle aynı kalmakla birlikte, ulusalcılık yerine değişik çalışmalarda ‘merkantilizm,’ ‘realizm,’ ve ‘ekonomik milliyetçilik’ kullanılmakta, Marksist yaklaşımlar ise ‘radikal teori,’ ‘eleştirel yaklaşım,’ ‘bağımlılık okulu’ ve ‘dünya sistemleri kuramı’ gibi farklı başlıklara ayrılmaktadır. Kitabın diğer bölümlerinde detaylı ele alındığı ve her bir yaklaşımın burada kısaca incelenemeyecek kadar derin bir entelektüel geçmişi olduğu göz önünde bulundurularak (Tayfur, 2011) bu bölümde bu yaklaşımlar detaylarıyla tartışılmayacaktır (C14 3’teki kutu üç temel yaklaşımın başlıca UPE kavramları hakkındaki görüşlerini özetlemektir). Bu teorik tartışmalar çerçevesinde, Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca, uluslararası ticaret, uluslararası finans, çok-‐uluslu şirketler, Kuzey-‐Güney ülkeleri arasındaki gelişmişlik farkının neden ve sonuçları, Amerikan hegemonyasının önemi ve akıbeti gibi konular politik ekonomi disiplininin temel uğraş alanlarını oluşturmuştur. Bu konulara yaklaşım tarzı açısından ekoller arasında zamanla büyük farklılıklar oluşsa da (Kutu C14 2) her ekolü meşgul eden ortak ‘büyük sorular’ bağımsız bir UPE disiplininin oluşmasını mümkün kılmıştır. KÜRESELLEŞME, ÇOK-‐KUTUPLULUK VE YENİ BÜYÜK SORULAR Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesiyle birlikte UPE’nin çerçevesi ve ilgilendiği ’büyük sorular‘ da kapsamlı bir değişim geçirmiştir. 1990’lar boyunca yaşanan hızlı küreselleşme dalgası ve Sovyetler Birliği’nin bakiyesi ülkelerin sancılı bir şekilde kapitalizme eklemlenmesi yeni sorunsalları beraberinde getirmiştir. Her şeyden önce, Sovyetler Birliği’nin temsil ettiği politik ekonomi modeli ve dünya tasavvurunun iflas etmesi, ABD’nin uluslararası sistemde tek hegemonik güç olarak yükselmesine sebep olmuştur. Ancak 2000’li yıllarla birlikte tek-‐kutuplu uluslararası sistemin yerini hızlı bir şekilde çok-‐kutupluluk tartışmasına bıraktığı yeni bir dönem başlamıştır. Bu eksende UPE yazınında en başından beri önemini koruyan tartışmalara ek olarak ana hatlarıyla iki ’yeni büyük soru‘ ve onların alt-‐soruları öne çıkmaktadır. Bu sorular, küresel güç kayması ve küreselleşme ve demokratikleşme arasındaki ilişkidir. 4 Günümüz UPE disiplininin ilk büyük sorusu, küresel sistemde yaşanmakta olan güç Kutu C14 4: Hegemonyasız Bir Dünyada İş Birliği Mümkün mü? kaymasının mahiyeti ve boyutlarına ilişkindir. 2000’li Günümüz UPE disiplininin en önemli konularından birisi hegemonya yıllarla birlikte gelişmekte olan tartışmasıdır. Batılı güçlerin, yükselmekte olan Batı-‐dışı aktörlere karşı ülkelerin hızla küresel görece güç gerilemesine girdiği bir dönüşüm süreci yaşanmaktadır. Söz ekonomiye dahil olması, diğer konusu dönüşümün küresel yönetişimin politik ekonomisi açısından iki önemli etkisi bulunmaktadır. Birinci sorun, çok-‐kutuplu bir dünyada taraftan 2008-‐2009 küresel küresel yönetişimin ve küresel ekonominin istikrarının nasıl ekonomik kriziyle birlikte sağlanacağıdır. Hegemonik İstikrar Kuramı perspektifine göre, küresel Batı’nın derin bir bunalıma ekonomik sistemin belirli kurum, kural ve normlar çerçevesinde girmesi, hegemonik dönüşüm istikrarlı işleyebilmesi ve gerektiğinde ekonomik krizlere etkin bir tartışmalarını yeniden şekilde müdahale edilebilmesi için -‐Kindleberger’in (1973) tabiriyle-‐ sistemde “bir hegemonun ve yalnızca bir hegemonun” bulunması alevlendirmiştir (Kutu C14 4). gerekir. Bu nedenle Hegemonik İstikrar Kuramı teorisyenleri küresel Bu eksende ABD yönetişimin çok-‐kutuplu dünyada zorlu bir döneme gireceğini hegemonyasının sonbaharını öngörmektedirler. yaşadığı, orta-‐vadede Çin’in yeni hegemonik güç olarak Robert Keohane gibi yeni-‐kurumsalcı teorisyenlere göre ise anarşik bir uluslararası sistemde hegemonya-‐sonrası dönemde de iş birliği uluslararası politik ekonominin yapmak mümkündür. Keohane, Hegemonyanın Ardından isimli temel aktörü haline gelebileceği kitabında hegemonik bir aktörün yokluğunda dahi devletlerin iddiaları popülerlik kazanmıştır. uluslararası örgütler yoluyla küresel iş birliğini ve yönetişimi Çin, 1970’lerde başlayan sağlayabileceğini iddia etmiştir. Buna göre uluslararası örgütler, (a) işlem maliyetlerini azaltarak, (b) bilgi asimetrilerini gidererek, (c) liberalleştirme politikalarına devletlerin taahhütlerinin inanılırlığını arttırarak hegemonyanın paralel olarak son otuz yılda yokluğunda dahi etkin küresel yönetişimi mümkün hale getirmektedir. ortalama yüzde 10’luk bir Bu çerçeveden çok-‐kutuplu dünya düzeninde küresel yönetişim büyüme oranıyla küresel sorunsalına yaklaşan analistler, BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkelerinin de hasıladaki payını 2012’de üçe dahil olduğu bir yönetişim sisteminin kurulabileceğini iddia etmektedirler. Uluslararası ekonomi son 30 yılda gittikçe artan oranda katlayarak yüzde 15’e küreselleşmekle birlikte, uluslararası yönetişim mekanizmalarında çıkarmıştır. Mevcut trendin yükselmekte olan aktörlerin söz hakkını yeterince dikkate alan devam etmesi durumunda ise demokratik kurumsal dönüşüm henüz gerçekleşmemiştir. IMF tahminlerine göre ABD’yi 2016 yılında yakalayarak dünyanın en büyük ekonomisi olması öngörülmektedir. Bu noktada zor bir soru karşımıza çıkmaktadır: Çin’in ABD’yi ekonomik büyüklük olarak geride bırakması yeni hegemon olacağı anlamına gelir mi? Ayrıca her hegemonik düzenin belli değer yargılarını önceleyen normatif bir boyutu olduğu dikkate alınırsa, alternatif bir dünya düzeninin temel parametreleri neler olabilir? Bu önemli UPE sorusuna Strange’in Devletler ve Piyasalar isimli kitabında geliştirdiği ‘yapısal güç’ kavramsallaştırmasıyla yaklaşmak aydınlatıcı olabilir. Strange, ’güç' kavramını ikiye ayırmaktadır: ilişkisel güç ve yapısal güç. İlişkisel güç, “bir aktörün diğer bir aktörü kendi çıkarları çerçevesinde yönlendirebilme kapasitesi” olarak tanımlanabilir. Yapısal güç ise aktörlerin içerisinde hareket ettikleri uluslararası yapının kurum, kural ve mekanizmalarını tesis etme ve yönetme kapasitesidir. Strange, yapısal gücün dört temel öğesini güvenlik, üretim, finans ve bilgi yapıları olarak tanımlamıştır. Buna göre hegemonik aktör, söz konusu dört temel güç yapısını ‘zor’ ve ‘rıza’ yoluyla kontrol edebildiği ölçüde hegemonyasını sürdürebilmektedir (Kutu C14 5). ABD hegemonyasının ne 5 derecede gerilediğini, Çin’in ise ‘yeni hegemon’ olarak potansiyel ve limitlerini Strange’in çizdiği çerçevede analiz etmek bu çalışmanın sınırlarını aşmakla birlikte UPE öğrencileri açısından iyi bir başlangıç noktası oluşturabilir. Günümüz UPE disiplininin ikinci büyük sorusu, çok-‐kutupluluk tartışmasına paralel olarak, Kutu C14 5: Hegemonya Nedir? küresel yönetişim ve küreselleşme-‐ UPE disiplininin temel demokratikleşme ilişkisidir. Bu tartışma, Hegemonya, kavramlarından birisidir. Hegemonya, ‘küreselleşmenin demokratikleşmesi’ ve uluslararası politik ekonomi sistemini yapısal ‘demokrasinin küreselleşmesi’ şeklinde olarak şekillendirmeye ve idare etmeye muktedir lideri tanımlamak için kullanılır. kavramsallaştırılabilecek iki temel sütundan Eleştirel ekolün önemli temsilcilerinden İtalyan oluşmaktadır. Birinci boyut, uluslararaları siyaset bilimci Antonio Gramsci hegemonyanın sistemdeki güç kaymasının devletler-‐arası ilişkilere “’zor” ‘ (coercion) ve “’rıza” ‘ (consent) olmak üzere iki temel boyutu olduğunu doğrudan yansıması mahiyetindedir. vurgulamaktadır. Buna göre hegemonik güçler, Küreselleşmenin bir ürünü olarak Batı-‐dışı aktörler liderliğini pekiştirmek için gerektiğinde “’zor”,’ gerektiğinde ise “’rıza” ‘ üretmek durumundadır. -‐başta Brezilya, Rusya, Hindistan, Çin ve Güney “’Zor” hegemonik güç açısından caydırıcılık, Afrika (BRICS)-‐ olmak üzere küresel ekonomide “’rıza” ise meşruiyet üretir. Bu iki unsuru gittikçe artan oranda etkili haline gelmişlerdir. gerektiği şekilde üretemeyen hegemonik aktörlerin zaman içerisinde düşüşe geçmesi ve BRIC grubuna ek olarak yükselişe geçen yakın-‐ yerini yeni hegemonik güce bırakması beklenir. BRIC-‐S ülkeleri (Türkiye, Meksika, Endonezya, Bu sistemik dönüşüme, UPE literatüründe Güney Kore) de önemli bölgesel aktörlere hegemonik döngü denilmektedir. (Morton, 2007) dönüşmüş durumdadırlar. Ancak bu ülkeler, küresel politik ekonominin yönetişiminde yeterince söz sahibi değildirler. Örneğin, 2. Dünya Savaşı’nın hemen ertesinde ABD’nin jeo-‐ekonomik ve jeopolitik tahayyülünün bir ürünü olarak kurulan IMF, Dünya Bankası, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü gibi uluslararası kuruluşlar halen daha Batılı aktörlerin karar alma süreçlerinde hakim konumlarını sürdürdükleri yapılanmalardır. Oysa bu örgütlerin etkin çalışabilmek için ihtiyaç duydukları meşruiyeti üretebilmeleri ancak gelişmekte olan ülkelerin de karar alma süreçlerine aktif olarak katılabilmeleri ile mümkün olacaktır. Dolayısıyla, söz konusu dönüşümün, yani küreselleşmenin demokratikleşmesinin, nasıl ve hangi koşullarda gerçekleşebileceği ya da bu dönüşümün gerçekleşmemesi durumunda küresel yönetişimin geleceğinin ne olacağı önemli bir tartışma sorusu haline gelmiştir. Küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme diyalektiğinin ikinci boyutunu ise ‘demokrasinin küreselleşmesi’ tartışmaları oluşturmaktadır. Demokrasinin küreselleşmesi, sosyal bilim disiplinlerini yatay kesen ve ortay hattını politik ekonominin oluşturduğu girift bir tartışmadır. Bu eksende iki zıt hareketin günümüz tartışmalarının odak noktası haline geldiği görülmektedir. Bir taraftan, Streeck’in (2013) vurguladığı gibi neoliberal küreselleşmenin son otuz yılda yarattığı gelir adaletsizliği, ekonomik krizler ve ‘daimi kemer sıkma’ odaklı hakim ekonomik paradigma, gelişmiş Batı demokrasilerinde demokratik norm ve değerlerin aşınması riskini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Gelişmiş ülke vatandaşları, gittikçe artan oranda siyaset alanının daraldığını, iktidarların değişmesinin mevcut politika tercihlerini etkilemeyeceğini düşünmeye başlamıştır. Batı demokrasilerinde halkların de-‐politizasyon sürecine girmeleri, mevcut ekonomik paradigmaların siyasi yansımaları hakkında Batı ülkeleri açısından yeni sorunları gündeme getirmiştir. Zira kitlesel işsizlik, zayıf ekonomik büyüme performansı, gerileyen sosyal devlet anlayışı, artan gelir adaletsizliği ve mevcut siyaset kurumlarının bu sorunları çözmekteki başarısızlığı Avrupa demokrasilerini oldukça zorlamaktadır (Wade, 2013). 2007-‐2008 ekonomik kriziyle ‘demokrasi açığı’ eleştirilerinin kuvvetlenmesi, buna paralel olarak ırkçılık ve yabancı 6 düşmanlığının kıta içinde ciddi bir tehdide dönüşmesi Batı tipi politik ekonomi modellerinin sürdürülebilirliğine ilişkin yeni soru işaretleri oluşturmaktadır. Bütün bunların yanında, ‘stratejik kapitalizm’ olarak adlandırılan heteredoks modelleriyle Çin ve Rusya gibi aktörlerin krizden güçlenerek çıkması, otoriter kalkınma stratejilerinin gittikçe artan oranda popülerlik kazanmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkeleri arasında bu konuda bir türdeşlikten bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Zira, Çin ve Rusya gibi otoriter rejimlerin yanında, Hindistan, Brezilya, Türkiye gibi daha demokratik rejimlerin varlığı, ‘demokrasinin küreselleşmesi’ tartışmalarının açık uçlu doğasını ortaya koymaktadır. Küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme tartışması, aynı zamanda günümüz UPE disiplini ile Karşılaştırmalı Politik Ekonomi (KPE) disiplini arasındaki sınırların da giderek muğlaklaşmasına neden olmuştur. KPE, ülkelerin iç siyasi yapılarının ekonomi politikası tercihlerini ve ekonomik performanslarını nasıl etkilediğini mukayeseli açıdan anlamayı amaçlayan disiplindir. Küreselleşme süreçleri ile birlikte ülkelerin iç siyasi ve ekonomik yapılarının/rejimlerinin uluslararası etkilere daha açık hale gelmesi, UPE disiplinini, KPE’nin temel sorularından bağımsız ele almayı pratikte imkansız hale getirmiştir. Bu eksende son dönemdeki en önemli tartışmalardan birini ‘kapitalizmin türleri’ tartışması oluşturmaktadır. Hall ve Soskice 2001 yılında yayınlanan Kapitalizmin Türleri isimli kitaplarında gelişmiş Batı ekonomilerini liberal piyasa ekonomileri (liberal market economies) ve koordineli piyasa ekonomileri (coordinated market economies) olmak üzere ikiye ayırmıştır. Liberal piyasa ekonomileri, firmaların serbest piyasa koşulları içerisinde rekabet ettikleri, finansal piyasaların mümkün olduğunca az denetlendiği Anglosakson modelini simgelemektedir. Koordineli piyasa ekonomileri ise kapitalizmin yine temel çerçeveyi oluşturduğu ancak firmaların çoğu kez piyasa-‐dışı dinamikleri de dikkate aldıkları, finansal sistemin daha sıkı denetlendiği hiyerarşik kıta Avrupası modeline işaret etmektedir. ‘Kapitalizmin türleri’ tartışmasına göre her model kendi kurumsal önceliklerine göre küreselleşme süreçlerine entegre olmaktadır. Hall ve Soskice’in başlattığı tartışma, özelleştirme, serbest ticaret, finansal liberalleşme ve sanayi politikaları gibi alanlarda tek bir politika reçetesinin olamayacağını teyit etmesi açısından UPE disiplinine önemli bir katkı olarak değerlendirilebilir. Ancak ‘kapitalizmin türleri' tartışması, devletlerin ekonomide oynadığı merkezi rolü bilinçli bir şekilde analitik çerçevesinin dışında bıraktığı ve ülke-‐içi kurumsal mekanizmalara odaklandığı için küresel ekonomik kalkınmanın dinamiklerini açıklayamamaktadır. Ayrıca, Batılı sanayileşmiş ülkelerin kurumsal dinamikleri üzerine yoğunlaşmış olan söz konusu tartışma, BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkelerindeki ekonomik modeller konusunda tamamen sessiz kalmaktadır (Nölke ve Claar, 2013: 33). ‘Güneydeki kapitalizm türleri’ olarak isimlendirilebilecek ve devletin kalkınmacı rolünü vurgulayan ‘stratejik kapitalizm’ tartışması günümüz politik ekonomi disiplinindeki önemini giderek arttırmaktadır. İlgili yazın, gelişmekte olan ülkelerde devletin, donanımlı ve özerk bürokrasi, devlet-‐iş dünyası iş birliği, akıllı ticaret politikaları, kademeli finansal serbestleşme ve kapsamlı sanayi stratejileriyle kalkınma süreçlerini hızlandırabileceğini ortaya koymuştur. Örneğin Ha-‐joon Chang (2003), Kalkınma Reçetelerinin Gerçek Yüzü isimli kitabında esasında bugünün gelişmiş ülkelerinin de kalkınma süreçlerinde benzer politikalar uyguladığını ikna edici bir şekilde ortaya koymuştur. Kalkınmacı devlet yazını, devletin piyasa dinamiklerinden el çekmesi gerektiğini vurgulayan neoliberal kalkınma tezlerine ciddi bir meydan okuma oluşturmaktadır. Bu nedenle, UPE disiplini ile KPE disiplini arasında inşa edilecek teorik ve metodolojik köprüler, günümüz politik ekonomisinin dinamiklerini daha iyi anlayabilmek için iyi bir fırsat oluşturabilir. 7 TÜRKİYE’NİN EKONOMİ POLİTİĞİ Türkiye’nin ekonomi politiği üzerine pek çok önemli çalışma kaleme alınmış olmakla birlikte (Öniş, 1998, 2009; Keyman ve Öniş, 2007; Öniş ve Şenses, 2009; Boratav, 2012; Ünay, 2013) Türkiye’de ‘politik ekonomi çalışmaları tarihi’ üzerine henüz kapsamlı bir çalışma yapılmış değildir. Bu başlıkta, günümüz UPE disiplininin ‘büyük soruları’ ekseninde Türkiye’nin karşılaştırmalı ekonomi politiği ana hatlarıyla incelenecektir. Bu eksende, uluslararası ilişkiler ve dış politika açısından iki güncel tartışmanın altı çizilecektir. Birinci tartışma, Türkiye’nin ekonomik büyümesinin sürdürülebilirliğine ilişkindir. Son on yıllık başarılı bir dönüşümün ardından Türkiye orta gelir tuzağına yaklaşmış bulunmaktadır (Kutu C14 6). Bu eksende büyümenin sürdürülebilir kılınması ve Türkiye’nin yüksek gelirli ülkeler grubuna dahil olabilmesi için kurumlarını kapsayıcı bir şekilde dönüştürebilmesi, ileri teknolojiyi önceleyen sanayi politikalarını hayata geçirebilmesi ve insan sermayesini yüksek katma değer üreten bir ölçeğe taşıyabilmesi gerekmektedir (Öniş ve Kutlay, 2013). Çünkü Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumunda yapısal iyileşme ve dış politika performansının sürdürülebilirliği, söz konusu ekonomik ve siyasi kurumsal dönüşümün gerçekleştirilebilmesiyle yakından ilgilidir. Aynı şekilde ‘ticaret devleti’ vasfına sahip bir bölgesel güce dönüşebilmesi de söz konusu değişkenlere bağlı olarak şekillenecektir (Kirişci, 2009; Kutlay, 2012). Kutu C14 6: Orta Gelir Tuzağı Bir ekonominin belirli bir kişi başına gelir düzeyine ulaştıktan sonra durağanlaşmasına ve daha üst aşamalara ulaşamaması durumuna orta gelir tuzağı denir. Yani orta gelir düzeyindeki bir ülkenin kişi başına düşen GSYH’si daha yüksek gelir seviyelerine doğru yükselmek yerine sürekli iniş-‐çıkış halinde olduğunda, söz konusu ülkenin orta gelir tuzağına düşmüş olduğu kabul edilir. Farklı tanımları ve alt kategorileri olmakla birlikte, Dünya Bankası tanımına göre orta gelir tuzağı kabaca 12.000 dolar seviyesine tekabül etmektedir. Bu eşiğe yaklaşan ülkelerin üst gelir düzeyine ulaşabilmeleri için yüksek teknoloji üretimine önem vermesi, yetişmiş insan kapasitesini arttırması ve kurumlarını kapsayıcı bir yapıya kavuşturabilmesi gerekmektedir. İkinci tartışma ise Türkiye’nin küresel ölçekte yaşanan küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme tartışmalarında hangi eksende yer alacağı ile ilgilidir (Öniş, 2013). İlgili bölümde değinildiği gibi BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkeleri arasında yaşanan yol ayrımı Türkiye’yi yakından ilgilendirmektedir. Halihazırda ‘seçimsel demokrasi’ ya da ‘liberal olmayan demokrasi’ olarak adlandırılan bir rejime sahip olan Türkiye’nin sürdürülebilir politik ekonomi performansı açısından ‘derinlikli demokrasi’ seviyesine ulaşabilmesi gerekli bir şarta dönüşmüş durumdadır (Öniş, 2012; Öniş, 2013). Kapsayıcı ekonomik ve siyasi kurumların inşa edilebilmesi, derinlikli demokrasinin sebebi ve sonucudur. Kurumsal inşa süreçlerinin mahiyeti ve sonuçları açısından ise sadece iç dinamikler değil, uluslararası ittifaklar da belirleyici olacaktır. Bu nedenle, Türkiye’nin dış politikasındaki ittifak sistemlerini nasıl organize edeceği, hem kalkınma performansını hem de uluslararası konumunu etkileyecektir. Ayrıca, Türkiye’nin küresel yönetişim platformlarında ve dış politika stratejilerinde akıllı koalisyonlar yoluyla demokrasinin küreselleşmesine sağlayacağı katkı ihmal edilemeyecek boyuttadır. Ana akım UPE disiplininin bugüne kadar gelişmiş ülkeleri merkeze alan bir teorik ve metodolojik hassasiyetle geliştirildiği dikkate alındığında, küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme-‐ekonomik kalkınma eksenli tartışmalar yeni yükselen güçlerin öncelikleri, değer yargıları ve dünyayı nasıl algıladıklarına yeterince odaklanmamaktadır (Blyth, 2009). Bu duruma Türkiye de bir istisna teşkil etmemektedir. 8 Dolayısıyla sadece pratikte değil, BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkelerinde UPE disiplininin teorik açıdan da yeni inşacılara ihtiyacı bulunmaktadır. Bu noktada, Türkiye’de politik ekonomi disiplininin diğer sosyal bilimler disiplinleriyle etkileşimini arttırması gerektiğini vurgulamak yerinde olacaktır. Zira politik ekonomi, bir kısmı kaynakçada belirtilen kimi önemli çalışmalar yapılmış olmakla birlikte, Türk uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin halen daha kayıp halkası konumundadır. Oysa, Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu ve Türk dış politikasının imkan ve kısıtları, küresel ekonomiye nasıl eklemlendiği ile doğrudan ilişkilidir. Türkiye’yi eşi benzeri olmayan bir ülke olarak inceleyen tekil incelemeler yerine küresel ve bölgesel dönüşümlerin bir parçası olarak ele alan karşılaştırmalı politik ekonomi analizlerinin çoğalması hem Türkiye’deki uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini hem de Türk dış politikası çalışmaları açısından özgün çalışmaların ortaya çıkmasına fırsat tanıyabilir. SORULAR 1. UPE hangi özellikleri nedeniyle disiplinler-‐arasıdır? 2. UPE’nin temel sorusu nedir? Bu soru neden önemlidir? 3. ‘Sınır mantığı’ ile ‘sermaye mantığı’ arasındaki ilişkinin temel dinamikleri nelerdir? 4. “UPE bir disiplin olarak fikirlerden değil, olaylardan doğmuştur” önermesinde kastedilen ‘olaylar’ nelere işaret etmektedir? 5. UPE literatüründe hegemonyanın tanımı ve kavramsallaştırılması üzerine temel tartışmalar hangileridir? 6. Hegemonik bir aktörün yokluğunda küresel iş birliği/yönetişim mümkün müdür? Tartışınız. 7. Günümüz UPE literatüründeki büyük sorular nelerdir? 8. Çok-‐kutupluluk hangi açılardan UPE için önemli bir tartışma maddesidir? 9. Küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme ilişkisini tartışınız? 10. Türkiye’nin temel politik ekonomi sorunları nelerdir? 11. Türkiye’deki uluslararası ilişkiler ve dış politika analizleri UPE’nin kavramsal çerçevesinden daha fazla yararlanmalı mıdır? Niçin? EK OKUMA ÖNERİLERİ Giovanni Arrighi, Uzun Yirminci Yüzyıl: Para, Güç ve Çağımızın Kökenleri, Çeviren: Recep Boztemur, İmge Yayınları, 2000 Robert Gilpin, Uluslararası İlişkilerin Ekonomi Politiği, Kripto Basın Yayın, 2012 Ha-‐Joon Chang, Kalkınma Reçetelerinin Gerçek Yüzü, İletişim Yayınları, 2003 Ziya Öniş ve Fikret Şenses, “Küresel Dinamikler, Ülkeiçi Koalisyonlar ve Reaktif Devlet: Türkiye’nin Savaş Sonrası Kalkınmasında Önemli Politika Dönüşümleri,” içinde Fikret Şenses (der.), Neoliberal Küreselleşme ve Kalkınma, İletişim Yayınları, 2009, s. 705-‐743. Fatih Tayfur, “Devletler ve Piyasalar,” İçinde Atila Eralp (der.), Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar, İletişim Yayınları, 6. Baskı, 2011, s. 183-‐216. Sadık Ünay, Kalkınmacı Modernlik: Küresel Ekonomi Politik ve Türkiye, Küre Yayınları, 2013. 9 KAYNAKÇA Arrighi, Giovanni (2005), “Hegemony Unravelling-‐I”, New Left Review, 32, pp. 23-‐80. Balaam, David ve Veseth, Michael (1996), Introduction to International Political Economy, New Jersey: Prentice-‐Hall. Blyth, Mark (ed.) (2009), Routledge Handbook on International Political Economy: IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge. Boratav, Korkut (2012), Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, İmge Yayınları. Cohen, Benjamin (2008), International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Gilpin, Robert (1975), U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, New York: Basic Books. Gilpin, Robert (1987), The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Hall, Peter and Soskice, David (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford University Press. Keohane, Robert (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph (eds.) (1972), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Harvard University Press. Keyman, Fuat ve Öniş, Ziya (2007), Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations, İstanbul Bilgi University Press. Kirişci, Kemal (2009), “Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 40, 2009, pp. 29–57. Kutlay, Mustafa (2012), “Yeni Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği: Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt. 9, No. 35, s. 101-‐127. Morton, David Adam (2007), Unraveling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy, Pluto Press. Nölke, Andreas ve Claar, Simone (2013), “Varieties of Capitalism in Emerging Economies”, Transformation, No. 81/82, pp. 33-‐54. O’Brien, Robert ve Williams, M. (2004), Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics, Palgrave Macmillan. Öniş, Ziya (1998), State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective, Boğaziçi University Press. Öniş, Ziya (2012), “The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 135-‐152. Öniş, Ziya ve Kutlay, Mustafa (2013), “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The Political Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICs”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 8, pp. 1409-‐ 1426. Öniş, Ziya ve Şenses, Fikret (2009) “Küresel Dinamikler, Ülkeiçi Koalisyonlar ve Reaktif Devlet: Türkiye’nin Savaş Sonrası Kalkınmasında Önemli Politika Dönüşümleri,” içinde Fikret Şenses, ed., Neoliberal Küreselleşme ve Kalkınma, İletişim Yayınları. 10 Strange, Susan (1970), “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect”, International Affairs, 46, 2, pp. 304-‐315. Strange, Susan (1988), States and Markets, Pinter Publishers. Ünay, Sadık (2013), Kalkınmacı Modernlik: Küresel Ekonomi Politik ve Türkiye, Küre Yayınları. Wade, Robert (2013), “How High Inequality Plus Neoliberal Governance Weakens Democracy”, Challenge, Vol. 56, No. 6, pp. 5-‐37. Watson, Mathew (2005), Foundations of International Political Economy, Palgrave Macmillan. 11