September 2004 Mark Dutz* The World Bank Melek Us

September 2004 Mark Dutz* The World Bank Melek Us

TURKEY’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CHALLENGES:
COMPETITION, THE RULE OF LAW, AND EU ACCESSION
Mark Dutz*
The World Bank
Melek Us**
SETBIR
Kamil Yılmaz
Koç University
September 2003
Revised: September 2004
* At the time of the writing of the paper, Mark Dutz was GTZ Advisor to the Undersecretariat of
Treasury.
** Melek Us is the General Secretary of the Association of Dairy, Beef and Food Manufacturers and
Producers (SETBIR) of Turkey. At the time of the writing of the paper, she was the Director General of
Foreign Investment at the Undersecretariat of Treasury
1. Introduction
After following inward-oriented development strategies for fifty years, Turkey switched
to outward-oriented policies in 1980. The policy of further opening up the economy was
pursued with the aim of eventually integrating into the EU. The Helsinki European Council
summit held on December 10-11, 1999 produced a breakthrough in EU-Turkey relations by
officially recognising Turkey as a candidate state on equal footing with other candidate states.
With accession, Turkey would be part of the European single market. Joining the EU will
require Turkey to adopt and implement the whole body of EU legislation and standards – the
acquis communautaire – and also participate eventually in the European Monetary Union
(EMU).
Over the last four years, Turkey has been undergoing a series of serious social,
economic and institutional transformations with the clear political objective of EU membership.
The definitive prospect of EU membership should make Turkey very attractive for FDI, given
among other strengths its highly skilled and adaptable labour force, large domestic market, and
geographical proximity both to Europe and to the Middle East, Northern Africa and Central
Asia markets. The recent bout of both export- and domestic market-oriented investments in the
automobile industry are a clear indication of Turkey’s attractiveness for FDI flows. However,
over the last decade Turkey lost ground to Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in
attracting foreign investments, especially those from Europe. While the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland combined (jointly with a smaller population than Turkey) have received 71
billion U.S. dollars in FDI flows between 1995 and 2000, Turkey has received only 5.1 billion
dollars over the same period, almost 14 times less. And it appears from other countries’
experiences that unless there is a major paradigm-shift in a country’s or its competitors’ FDI
policies, there is likely to be very little change in FDI inflows.
The approach taken in this paper will be to explore how Turkey may be different from
most CEECs, and what this implies for appropriate FDI policy in light of EU accession
prospects. The paper begins by outlining the benefits of FDI based on an overview of economic
concepts together with an assessment of the Turkish experience. FDI inflows are not considered
as an end-goal but an instrument to create a globally competitive economy. Through FDIstimulated productivity increases, Turkey seeks to be positioned at the higher value-added end
of the fast-changing worldwide division of labour. In its analysis of obstacles to foreign
investment, the paper will emphasise competition-related and legal/judicial barriers.
Having analysed the benefits from and impediments to FDI, the paper will review what
has been done to improve the policy and regulatory framework, and analyse what Turkey still
must do to meet EU requirements and fully benefit from FDI. In summary, Turkey should
benefit significantly from EU accession in terms of a step-change in sizeable FDI inflows,
largely because the accession process would help Turkey overcome its rule of law and
competition-related constraints to foreign direct investment. More rapid and consistent
implementation of rules and regulations that ensure a level playing field for all companies
would be assisted by the EU accession process, and in turn would enable Turkey to take full
advantage of investment-related benefits.
2. The benefits of FDI
2.1 The role of FDI in economic growth
Being a capital-scarce country, Turkey can benefit substantially from injections of
foreign capital through their role in the expansion of productive capacity and the creation of
new jobs. However, the type of capital inflows matters. Unlike portfolio investments and loans
to the private sector, FDI inflows involve direct equity ownership plus significant ownership
control, and therefore are more stable. They do not easily flee in a domestic market downturn.
1
Unlike loans, FDI inflows ensure that business risks are borne by foreign investors.
FDI differs from other forms of capital flows in other crucial aspects. FDI does not only
entail the transfer of financial resources and the creation of new jobs. It is a bundle that
involves the transfer of fixed assets, technology, know-how and international market access.
FDI connects the country to international best practices, helps upgrade the management and
workforce, and establishes stronger ties between domestic and international markets.
As it entails the transfer of technology and know-how, FDI is expected to have both a
direct and an indirect impact on the economic growth of a country. Because FDI involves
significant ownership control as well as the transfer of technology, its impact on economic
growth will take place through increased productivity, human capital accumulation, R&D
activity, and technological and productivity spillovers. In addition, its impact on economic
growth can be greater if the types of FDI that the country receives stimulate, in other words
crowd-in, domestic investment activity.
There are several studies that establish a link between FDI and economic growth. Using
data on FDI flows from industrial countries to 69 developing countries over the 1970-89 period
and using a cross-country regression framework, Borensztein et. al. (1998) show that FDI flows
has a positive impact on economic growth. They also show that the impact of foreign
investment exceeds the impact of domestic investment on growth. Not all countries benefit from
FDI however. According to Borensztein et. al. (1998), countries need to have a minimum stock
of human capital in order for the growth effects of FDI to be realised. Zhang (1999) shows that
FDI inflows helped stimulate economic growth in several East-Asian countries. Gruben and
McLeod (1998) show that in a sample of 18 countries, FDI had a significant impact on
economic growth, especially in Latin American countries.
2.2 The role of FDI in raising productivity and stimulating spillovers
One of the important contributions of FDI companies is to enhance the transfer and
diffusion of technology to the host country. As a multinational corporation undertakes
investment in a country, it brings its production technology, its access to global production and
distribution networks, its know-how and experience to that sector. Being generally larger
corporations, FDI companies have access to large and low-cost investment funds that could be
used to finance investment in more advanced technology than available and accessible in the
host country.
Obviously, the direct technology transfer effect may not be realised in all FDI projects.
If the FDI is an export-oriented investment, the impact on technology diffusion will generally be
more significant than a domestic-market oriented investment. The impact of FDI on technology
diffusion was rather limited in the import-substitution era, as the main incentive for a foreign
company to undertake investment was the heavily-protected domestic market. In such an
environment, foreign companies prefer to transfer old and outdated technology to their factories
in developing countries, creating little technology diffusion.
Today, however, FDI decisions cannot focus only on the domestic market. Following
the push for more liberal trade relations throughout the world, FDI companies do face
competition in domestic markets of the host country through imports. Consequently, FDI
decisions, especially in the manufacturing sector, often are made with the serious consideration
of international competitiveness of the affiliate firm. The affiliate firm must have the
technological capability and the resulting efficiency which renders it flexible enough to target
export markets as well as the domestic market. Consequently, one would expect to observe
higher productivity in FDI companies compared to domestic enterprises.
The impact of FDI on the host country economy is not just limited to the direct channels
of technology transfer and diffusion. The presence of multinationals may affect local
2
companies through several channels. The first type of these effects takes place through
intensified domestic market competition. As the FDI companies become major players in the
domestic market, this will force local companies to adopt newer and more advanced
technologies and use existing resources of the firm more efficiently in order to survive. (See
Blomström and Kokko, 1998.) This channel is similar to the effect of import liberalisation,
even though the impact on local companies may be more significant than imports. The
technology transfer may take embodied (machinery and equipment imports) and/or disembodied
(know-how, knowledge, licenses) forms. The transfer of embodied technology is not difficult to
be organised by the local enterprises. What is more difficult is the transfer of disembodied
technology, which requires absorption capacity of the local enterprises. However, the workers
and engineers employed by FDI companies will gain experience and accumulate knowledge
through their tenure there. In the medium-to-long-run, these employees will have the
opportunity to transfer this experience and knowledge to local enterprises.
Other channels through which the presence of FDI companies affects the local
companies mostly take the form of spillovers. Productivity spillovers from FDI take place when
the entry or presence of multinational corporations increases productivity of domestic firms in a
host country and the multinationals do not fully internalise the value of these benefits.
Spillovers may take place when local firms improve their efficiency by copying technologies of
foreign affiliates operating in the local market either based on observation or by hiring workers
trained by the affiliates. Besides horizontal spillovers to other firms in the same sector, the
presence of FDI companies may also affect local firms in other sectors of economy. These
vertical spillover effects can be through backward (purchases of inputs from local suppliers) and
forward linkages (supply of outputs to local downstream purchasers).
In line with findings for other countries, in Turkey FDI companies have higher labour
productivity relative to local enterprises.1 In 1991, the average labour productivity in FDI
companies was 35% higher than average labour productivity in all manufacturing plants. Over
time, the productivity gap between FDI companies and the sector average was closed slightly to
30% by 1996. Average labour productivity in foreign-owned plants increased from 4.1 to 4.7
million TLs in 1990 prices (from $1611 to $1803). Average labour productivity in all plants, on
the other hand, increased from 3.1 to 3.6 million TLs (from $1189 to $1550). These numbers
are clear indication of the fact that the labour productivity gap between foreign and domesticowned plants is significant and does not vanish over time.
These annual average values support the case for significant labour productivity
differences between FDI and local enterprises, but the possibility cannot be ruled out that these
differences stem from plant characteristics other than foreign ownership. Based on regression
results using various measures of foreign participation, Yılmaz and Ozler (2004) show that
plants with foreign partners have higher total factor productivity even after other plant
characteristics and sector and time effects are accounted for.2 Finally, Yılmaz and Ozler (2004)
show that in sectors with a greater FDI involvement, domestic plants tend to have higher TFP
productivity compared to others where FDI involvement is low. All else being equal, as the
foreign-ownership weighted sectoral output shares of foreign-affiliated plants increases by 1
percentage point, the total factor productivity of local plants in the same sector increases by 0.82
1
This analysis is based on plant level data collected by the Turkish State Institute of Statistics through
annual manufacturing surveys However, the data have limitations. They cover only a small portion of the
FDI companies that are active in the Turkish economy, reflecting only a subset of manufacturing-related
FDI. While the records of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury indicate 581 FDI companies to be active in
the Turkish manufacturing sector in 1991 increasing to 922 by 1996, the SIS manufacturing survey
includes only 210 plants increasing to 273 plants by 1996 as partially or fully-owned by foreigners.
2
Variables used to control for other characteristics that could affect productivity include firm size as
measured by employment, imported license use, percent share of the output exported, imported
machinery and equipment use, whether the firm is incorporated or not, sub-contracted input use and subcontracted output sale, measures of agglomeration at the provincial level, and the share of skilled
production workers.
3
percentage points.
However, horizontal spillovers from all foreign-owned plants are not
similar. As the output share of FDI companies with less than 50% foreign participation
increases by 1 percentage point, TFP in local firms increases on average by 0.72 percent, while
the spillover effect from plants with foreign share ownership greater than or equal to 50% but
less than full foreign ownership jumps to 1.1 percentage points. Finally, fully foreign-owned
plants tend to generate external benefits that would increase the productivity of local plants in
the same sector by 0.4 percent.
3. The current state of FDI
FDI can have strong, positive effects for national economies. In the previous section, we
showed that FDI in the Turkish manufacturing sector also had both direct and indirect
productivity enhancing benefits. The evidence is based on plant-level studies and can be viewed
as the most reliable available. However, this finding and the results discussed only establish that
FDI is desirable for Turkey. The next step in the analysis consists in characterising the level
and other features of FDI in Turkey relative to comparator countries, and exploring why it is so
low in spite of being highly desirable for the country.
3.1 FDI in Turkey relative to Eastern European comparators
The most striking feature of foreign investment flows to Turkey is their low level
relative to comparator emerging market economies in the CEECs (Table 1). In terms of
population in 2000, Turkey is larger than Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary combined. In
terms of GDP in 2000, Turkey’s economy is four times as large as that of Czech Republic or
Hungary, and one quarter larger than Poland. And in terms of gross fixed capital formation, that
is, the total value of producers’ acquisitions of fixed assets, Turkey’s investments during 2000
are 3 to 4 times larger than Czech Republic and Hungary, and roughly a sixth larger than
Poland. However, as highlighted in Table 1, in terms of average annual inflows of FDI during
the 1990s, the level that Turkey has been attracting, at USD 800 million, is roughly one-fifth of
FDI inflows to Poland, at 4.1 billion, and also significantly lower than Czech Republic and
Hungary, each attracting roughly 2.1 billion per annum.
A second striking feature in comparing Turkey with Poland, Hungary and Czech
Republic is that there has been no closing of the FDI gap throughout the 1990s. To the contrary,
with the formal announcement at the December 1997 European Council summit in Luxembourg
of the opening of EU accession negotiations with Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic on 31
March 1998, these countries appear to have benefited from a virtuous cycle. The enhanced
likelihood of EU accession and further FDI flows improved credit ratings and in turn attracted
more FDI, thereby increasing the difference between these countries and Turkey. As is clear
from Table 1 and Figure 1, average annual FDI inflows increased in the 1997-2000 period more
than 3-fold in Poland, from USD 2.1 to almost 7 billion, and more than 4-fold in Czech
Republic, from USD 0.9 to over 4 billion, while in Turkey they remained completely unchanged
relative to gross fixed capital formation. It is remarkable that the Turkish announcement of its
EU Customs Union in 1996 had no discernable effect on aggregate FDI flows.
It should be taken into account that when FDI inflows across countries are compared,
the FDI definition used by Turkey is much narrower than that of some countries and
international institutions, leading to systematic undervaluation of FDI inflows to Turkey. As
will be seen below, Turkey adopted the OECD definition for FDI in 2001, followed by its
inclusion in the new FDI law of 2003.3 Table 2 compares the elements included in Turkey’s
definition of FDI (both in the 1954 and 2003 laws) to other OECD countries, highlighting the
omission of preferred stocks traded in the stock exchange, long-term loans, other marketable
securities & bonds and financial derivatives from the previous definition (short-term loans,
3
See, for instance, OECD (1996) and OECD (2003).
4
commercial/retail loans and leasing are still not included in the new law). In addition, even
though the law may allow certain flows to be included, local statistical data collection and
recording practices may preclude their inclusion in the official statistics. Capital in kind is one
such example, where statistics are generally not calculated and therefore not included. Even
though the precise figures are not available, for some big projects Turkey’s previous narrower
definition and statistical processing can underestimate FDI inflows by significant orders of
magnitude. As an example, Turkey has traditionally not recorded long-term credits from foreign
partners as FDI, including such flows only if the foreign partners’ receivables are added to the
company’s capital; otherwise it is not recorded as an increase in FDI but rather as an increase in
external debt. However, for the first time in 2001, due to a particularly large intra-company
long-term foreign credit and in response to internal discussions on the matter, it was decided to
classify it as an FDI flow in conformity with international norms. Therefore, the USD 1.4 billion
credit provided by the mobile phone arm of Telecom Italia, the foreign partner of the GSM IşTim Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.Ş. company, has been included in 2001 inflows.
In terms of type of investment, most of the growth of FDI companies world-wide over
the decade of the 1990s has been via cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), in
particular the acquisitions by foreign investors of privatised state-owned enterprises, rather than
green-field investments: less than 3% of the total number of global cross-border M&As during
the 1990s are officially classified as mergers, with the rest being different types of acquisitions.
In terms of ownership, roughly two-thirds of cross-border M&As were full acquisitions and the
remaining one-third were minority acquisitions (10-49% control). In terms of value, 70% of
cross-border M&As are functionally classified as horizontal, between firms in the same
industry.4 Figure 2 highlights how this global trend also was critical in driving FDI especially in
Poland, but also in the Czech Republic and Hungary, in contrast to a significantly lesser
influence in Turkey. Figure 3 presents suggestive evidence of the importance of privatisations
in fuelling M&A-related FDI inflows, highlighting the relatively much more important role of
privatisations in the CEECs throughout the 1990s in contrast to Turkey. However, while a
significant share of FDI in transition economies may have been generated by the privatisation
process, it is important to stress that the privatisation process in Poland has involved a sizeable
amount of stock market flotation, where privatisation-related capital inflows would be reported
as portfolio inflows rather than FDI, while the Czech Republic has actively promoted
privatisation to local investors, which was usually debt financed and thus linked either to
domestic or foreign credit rather than FDI.
In terms of industrial sub-sector allocation, a majority of FDI inflows to Turkey has
been directed to the tertiary sector. Table 3 illustrates that over 57% of total FDI stocks in
Turkey by end-2000 were dedicated to services, including 3 of the top 5 sub-sectors – transport
& communications, banking and other financial services, and trade & repairs, a similar pattern
as Poland. The other major recipients of FDI inflows to Turkey have been in the manufacturing
sector, namely the automotive & auto parts sub-sector, and the petroleum, chemicals, rubber &
plastic products sub-sector. The sub-sectoral pattern in the smaller countries, the Czech
Republic and Hungary, which do not benefit from as large a domestic internal market, is even
more concentrated in the tertiary sector, with all 5 top sub-sectors dedicated to the production of
services rather than manufacturing goods. Table 4 reports the identity of the largest FDI
companies by world-wide sales in each of the 4 economies, highlighting the important role of
the automotive & auto parts sub-sector and petroleum, chemicals & rubber sector in Turkey,
with 9 of the top 20 Turkish FDI companies in these 2 sub-sectors, followed by the electronics
& electrical machinery sub-sector. The absence of service sector companies in the Turkish list is
explained by the investment-to-sales profile typical in these sub-sectors, where there usually is a
lag between the large, lumpy up-front investments required and the subsequent stream of sales
revenues generated by the installed infrastructure service networks.
In terms of country of origin, a striking feature of FDI stocks is the significantly greater
4
For a detailed description of this trend world-wide, see UNCTAD (2000).
5
concentration of investment from EU countries to the officially-recognised EU accession
countries than to Turkey. Table 5 highlights that, in contrast to Poland, Hungary and Czech
Republic, which have received 79, 80 and 84% of their FDI flows respectively from EU
countries, Turkey had received a significantly lower 68.7% from EU countries. Turkey, in
contrast, has received significantly more FDI inflows from Japan, Saudi Arabia, as well as offshore locations such as Panama and the Dutch Antilles. Interestingly, in spite of important
investments from the US in the top 20 Turkish FDI companies (motor vehicles, rubber and
glass), the relative share of US investment is not significantly different in Turkey than in the
CEECs.
3.2 Determinants of FDI
The investment climate can be defined as the policy, institutional and behavioural
environment, present and expected, that influences the perceived returns and risks associated
with investment in terms of both quantity and productivity of investment flows.5 Investment
climate depends on a wide array of factors that can be grouped under three broad headings:
macroeconomic and trade policies, infrastructure, and governance and institutions. These factors
help explain both the strong potential attractiveness of Turkey as a global location for FDI and
the shortcomings that have led Turkey to fall so far below its potential in this area.
a. Macro policies, infrastructure and the automotive sector
Macroeconomic and trade policies. Since the 1980s, Turkey went through significant
changes in its economic relations with the outside world. Following the January 24, 1980
decision, the government put great emphasis on export orientation. This first step was followed
by gradual import liberalisation that started in 1984 and finally culminated in the Customs
Union with the EU in 1996. However, despite the gradual removal of trade barriers and
increased export-orientation, Turkey was unable to attract large FDI inflows. One of the main
culprits behind this failure was the uncertain macroeconomic environment. With its heavy dose
of patronage relations and rent-seeking activities, domestic politics never allowed the creation
of a stable macroeconomic environment. Fiscal imbalances continued throughout the 1990s, to
be transformed into rather stark debt dynamics by the end of the decade (Table 6). Public sector
borrowing requirements increased from 5% of GNP in 1995 to as high as 15.5% in 1999 and
2001. Chronic budget deficits and the rapidly increasing public debt lie at the root of the high
and chronic inflation problem that Turkey suffered over the last 25 years. The average
consumer price inflation rate throughout the last 25 years was 63%. Throughout the last two
decades annual inflation has never seen values lower than 30%. Through the second half of
1990s and early 2000s, the real interest rate was quite high. With the exception of 1997 and
2000, ex-post real interest rates on bonds and t-bills were above 20%, reaching as high as 36%.
In addition to high real interest rates that inhibit domestic and foreign investment, the exchange
rate devaluation risk created an extra burden on foreign investors who are willing to invest in
the country with a long-term perspective.
As a result of the uncertainties stemming from domestic politics, the macroeconomic
environment and the ensuing high real interest rates, the country followed a very erratic growth
performance. Following the capital account liberalisation in 1989, Turkey was able to attract
foreign capital to be used to finance public sector borrowing requirements and generate growth
rates of around 5%. Thanks to the availability of external funds, successive governments were
‘unable’ to bring budget deficits and hence inflation under control. As the country’s inability to
cope with its economic woes became evident towards the end of the 1990s, external funds dried
up and growth rates declined sharply. The 2001 economic crisis was the final blow that
underlined the need for a new economic policy framework in Turkey.
5
For this definition, see Stern (2002).
6
Throughout the last two decades, Turkey had put many decisions that could help foreign
investors cope with high inflation on hold. One of the critical measures has been an inflation
accounting framework. In a country that lived with an average of 60% inflation, an inflation
accounting framework has not been implemented until now.
Infrastructure-related factors. The quantity and quality of Turkey’s broadly-defined
infrastructure, including geographical and demographical endowments, and physical and
financial infrastructure help position Turkey as a potentially powerful magnet for FDI inflows.
Turkey enjoys a very special location at the crossroads between East and West, overlapping
Europe and Asia geographically and culturally. The proximity to the Balkans and the rest of
high-income Europe as well as to growing emerging markets in Russia, Caucasia and Central
Asia, and expanding markets of the Middle East and North Africa offer the potential of over 1
billion consumers.
As highlighted in Tables 7a and 7b, Turkey’s demographical endowments present both
strengths and weaknesses to foreign investors when compared with Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic. Turkey’s huge and growing domestic market reflects favourably with the
comparator CEECs. Turkey is projected to continue to constitute one of the largest populations
in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. The domestic market is predominantly urban, with at
least 17 major cities having a population in excess of 1 million, led by Istanbul, Ankara and
Izmir. The population is much younger than European countries, with over 60% of the
population below the age of 35. On the negative side, the purchasing power of the average
citizen is still significantly lower than the CEECs, with GDP per capita 30% less than Poland’s,
and less than half that of Hungary and the Czech Republic. On the other hand, Turkey’s
improving consumption patterns and purchasing power, with a growing middle class, are
important positive features of the domestic market. With Turkey’s population growth rate
having fallen from over 3% to under 2.5%, it is on the verge of entering a ‘golden demographic
period’ similar to what East Asia experienced in the 1980s, where the productive working
population is largest relative to children and retirees, providing a critical ingredient for rapid
income growth. Only a few emerging markets in the world have the potential of attracting
investment both for export as well as for their domestic market. Turkey is in such a privileged
position to create a ‘virtuous investment cycle’, with a more competitive domestic business
environment further strengthening the country as a platform for exports, and exports in turn
stimulating firms to upgrade and better serve the domestic market.
In addition to geography and demography, another area where Turkey compares
favourably with its comparator CEECs is its highly skilled, flexible and business-oriented
labour force. As reported in Table 7a, Turkey’s workforce is considered to be significantly more
flexible, adaptable and entrepreneurial than its comparators.6 On the other hand, the levels of
actual employment, of adult literacy, secondary school enrolment and female labour force
participation are low relative to the CEECs, indicating the strong positive role still to be played
by more widespread and improved nation-wide education services. While Turkey scores
comparatively well in terms of availability of competent senior managers, training of employees
is less of a priority in Turkish companies on average than in the CEECs.
Regarding traditional basic infrastructure measures, Turkey is characterised again by
areas of strength and weakness (Tables 7a and 7b). In communications and transport, Turkey
stands out for its relatively low Internet costs –the costs of Turkey’s Internet access for a basket
of 20 hours at peak time is the lowest of all countries included in the 2002 report—and is
perceived as providing adequate communications standards. Turkey also is rated highly for both
6
Many of these measures are based on surveys, which in this context are arguably the most appropriate
measures, as they reflect the perceptions of actual investors. In 2002, 3,532 executives responded to the
World Competitiveness survey, reflecting widespread business knowledge about each country and crosscountry international experience.
7
air transport quality and internal distribution infrastructure. On the other hand, Turkey lags
behind in terms of its energy infrastructure. Though it has recently passed new electricity and
natural gas framework laws designed to spur significant market-driven improvements in line
with Turkey’s underlying endowments, it will take some time for effective implementation to
yield expected results. Turkey also lags the CEECs in the areas of computerisation and
technological cooperation. Finally, in the area of finance, Turkey stands out with respect to the
breadth of its private sector-relevant finance skills and access to credit cards. But Turkey
performs less well in areas critical for starting new indigenous businesses not connected to
existing industrial groups, with venture capital for business development not so easily available
and credit not flowing very easily from banks to businesses.
The automotive industry. A natural implication of Turkey’s large domestic market is the
presence of FDI directed largely towards the internal market. However, the automotive industry
is a good example of how an initially protected home market can be transformed into a
competitive and increasingly export-oriented industry through FDI inflows, largely the
availability, cost and quality of Turkey’s labour force. During the debate on the Customs
Union, the automotive industry was expected to be the worst affected from lowering protection
on EU imports. However, that prediction was proven wrong. Over the last couple of years, the
automotive industry has become the second largest exporter.
By the mid-1990s, there were four FDI companies that had more than 20 years of
experience in the Turkish automotive industry (Fiat, Ford, Mercedes and Renault).7 In the mid1990s with the increasing prospects of a Customs Union agreement with the EU, Japanese and
Korean companies (Honda, Hyundai, Isuzu and Toyota) started investing in Turkey in jointventures with Turkish industrialists.8 Perhaps because of the uncertain business environment in
Turkey, these companies did not make substantial investments initially and built plants with
small production capacity. Once the Customs Union with the EU went into effect in 1996, the
domestic market became gradually opened to tough competition from EU. Actually, in the first
couple of years of the Customs Union, the sector struggled with wild fluctuations in domestic
demand as well as competition from imports. However, there was a lot at stake. There was
already a substantial production capacity coupled with a competitive parts and accessories
industry. In addition, domestic business establishments with years of experience in the
automotive industry and low-cost but good quality labour induced FDI companies in the
automotive sector to increase their investments in Turkey and build new capacity to produce
motor vehicles for the European market. None of the aforementioned companies decided to
close shop in Turkey. Only Opel decided to close its small plant near Izmir that used to
undertake the assembly of some of its car models.
In the meantime, the auto parts industry has also been attracting foreign investors. Most
of the world leaders of the sector have joint ventures with Turkish partners. Some of them are
big suppliers like Robert Bosch, Valeo, Delphi Packard and Mannesmann Sachs. Altogether,
between 1992 and 2000, the automotive industry realised a total of $3.4 billion worth of
investment. Of this amount, $750 million was used for capacity development, $976 million for
new model development, $497 million for modernisation, $300 million for localisation and
$195 million for quality improvement. Moreover, due to new investment projects towards the
production of new models, in the 2000-2002 period this investment amount increased further by
7
Though there were other producers active in the domestic market, the listed four had the largest market
presence in the automotive industry at the time.
8
Of these four, Honda and Toyota became the sole owners of their production units once they decided to
target their production towards the European rather than the domestic market. This fact can be taken as an
example of the difficulty that foreign investors face while entering the domestic market without an insider
on board. This argument is strengthened by the fact that the other two MNCs retained their local partners
given that they continued to target the local market. Anadolu Isuzu focuses on light trucks and midi buses
and mainly targets the local market. Hyundai Assan also sells half of its production on the local market.
8
close to $1 billion.
The success of the automotive industry in attracting FDI flows, despite the continuing
constraints arising from macro and governance/institutions factors (see below) is largely driven
by the relevance of all the positive aspects of trade and infrastructure for this industry. That is
why automobile-related MNCs decided to invest in Turkey. If other obstacles were not present,
the Turkish auto industry would have likely attracted FDI inflows in multiples of current levels.
b. Governance and institutions: Case studies
Bottlenecks related to insufficient respect for the rule of law and weak competition in
local markets, reinforced by uneven application of bureaucratic red-tape and of competition
rules to all economic actors in the market, are profoundly damaging to any country’s investment
climate. In these critical areas requiring improved governance and more effective institutions,
Turkey unfortunately compares unfavourably to the comparator CEECs, as reflected by the
perceptions of global investors and experts that have compiled these rankings. According to the
Heritage Foundation economic freedom index 2003, Turkey ranks 105th (with a score of 3.3), in
contrast to Poland, 45th (2.7), and Czech Republic and Hungary, both tied at 32nd (2.4).
According to PricewaterhouseCoopers’ opacity index 2001, Turkey ranks 74th, compared with
Czech Republic at 71, Poland at 64 and Hungary at 50. And according to Transparency
International’s corruption perception index 2002 , Turkey ranks 64th (with a score of 3.2), in
contrast to Czech Republic, 52nd (3.7), Poland, 45th (4.0), and Hungary, 33rd (4.9).
To help illustrate what may be the key underlying factors accounting for Turkey’s poor
performance according to these widely-cited indices, three case studies reflecting recent
experiences of actual foreign investors are presented. The case studies have been selected as
representative of the primary sector (Normandy’s experience in gold mining), the secondary
manufacturing sector (Cargill’s experience in agro-processing), and tertiary services (Iş-Tim’s
experience in the mobile telecoms market). Figure 4 provides a summary of main facts. A
discussion of common elements across the case studies follows.
(1) The Eurogold investment. Due to its complex geology, Turkey possesses a diverse
and rich array of minerals. Turkey is a major world producer of boron minerals (possessing twothirds of the world’s borate reserves), marble, copper and chrome ores, feldspar, magnesite and
others. Total mineral industry revenues (primary and secondary mineral production including
cement, glass, refined petroleum products, steel and certain inorganic chemicals) are estimated
to account for roughly 10% of GDP. The mining sector is still overwhelmingly controlled by
state-owned companies, though a number of public companies have been placed under the
privatisation process. To-date, the peak points with respect to value of FDI approvals in the
sector have occurred after the enactment of the Mining Law 3213 in 1985, with the following
major investments: in 1990 in the Omya calcite mine, a joint venture involving the Swiss
company of the same name; in 1991 in the Ovacik gold deposit by Eurogold; and in 1995 in an
Eskişehir magnesite mine by Magnesit A.Ş., a subsidiary of the Dutch-based Societe d’Interests
Magnesians.
Normandy Madencilik A.Ş. (formerly Eurogold, but subsequently purchased by
Australia-based Normandy Mining Limited) was registered in 1989 as a 100% FDI company
and found total reported gold reserves of 24,000 tons (and another 24,000 tons of silver) near
the village of Ovacik, Bergama, in Izmir province. According to the initial application, the mine
was to be operated for 8 years, if no more reserves would be discovered in the interim. The ore
would be mined by both open pit and underground mining methods, followed by cyanide
leaching. Gold and silver doré metal were to be produced as the final products. In response to a
request by the company in August 1991, the Ministry of Environment issued a letter of no
objection in October 1994 indicating no health and environmental drawbacks and allowing the
mining and processing facility to operate. The company also secured the required permit for
mining activities from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, and related permits,
9
licenses and investment certificates from relevant government entities. The amount of total
investment was USD 100 million. As part of its application in 1991, Normandy prepared an
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report. Following the enactment of a formal EIA
regulation in 1993, Normandy committed to meet the new discharge limits even though it was
exempt from the EIA as the mining rights were granted before the regulation took effect.
Accordingly, the waste material from the facility would be stored in a water retention-type
tailings dam lined with clay and geo-membrane liners, with no discharge to the environment.
The judicial problems facing Normandy started with a court case initiated by local
inhabitants of Ovacik and some NGOs in 1994, based on a suit to annul the original Ministry of
Environment decision authorising the project. Long-lasting and repeated legal procedures
followed. In 1997, after a long judicial process and just as construction of the facility had been
completed and the mine was ready to operate, Turkey’s highest relevant court, the Council of
State (Danıştay) overturned the initial government authorisation and ordered the mine and
processing plant to be sealed by 1999. The ruling stated that the facility’s proposed use of
cyanide posed risks for health and environment, and thereby violated Article 17 of the
Constitution granting all citizens the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment.
Danıştay’s decision that the technical method for mining was hazardous for human health has
been criticised by some lawyers on the grounds that setting rules on such a technical issue and
prohibiting the use of a technical method is not under the responsibility of Danıştay, but rather
resides with the related Ministries or government institutions.
In response to this ruling, Normandy took additional safety measures in 1998 and reapplied for a new administrative permission to the Ministry of Environment, adding a cyanide
destruction system for the effluents from the facility, a sealed tailings pond and a zero discharge
system for wastewater. With these measures, the Ovacik facility in terms of environmental
protection was considered one of the better examples in the world.9 The Ministry of
Environment, in turn, consulted with the Prime Ministry. The Prime Ministry appointed a team
of scientists under the governance of the Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Institute
(TUBITAK) to evaluate the process. Based on a positive report from TUBITAK, the company
was allowed to operate the facility for a one-year trial period, and began operations in June
2001. Normandy has been operating the facility since then, and publicising the results of
periodic independent environmental monitoring showing results well below national and
international limits.
Project opponents have continued to challenge government decisions in various
Administrative Courts in Izmir, with at least 10 separate court cases filed since August 2000
involving local plaintiffs and as defendants the Prime Ministry, Ministry of Environment,
Ministry of Health and Ministry of Forestry. In late February 2002, an Administrative Court in
Izmir ruled that the trial permit was violating the public good, and issued an injunction against
the facility, ordering it to close on April 2, 2002. However, the government passed a special
permit for Normandy to continue operations.
Based on Normandy’s involvement, the Turkish mining sector has benefited in terms of
improvement of environmental standards in the mining sector, application of state-of-art
technology in gold mining and processing, and improvement of local technical training. Since
start of operations in June 2001, the facility has provided direct employment for 250 persons
plus indirect employment of an additional 1200 persons including through the formation of new
businesses in supporting industries. The acquisition of Normandy Mining Limited by US-based
Newmont Mining Corporation has been completed in February 2002.
The case highlights problems for investors arising from insufficient clarity and respect
for the rule of law. In this instance, Normandy followed established rules and procedures. An
initial government authorisation (by the Ministry of Environment) based on Normandy having
adhered to the prescribed rules did not protect the company from successive legal challenges.
Following an initial order for plant closure, subsequent authorisations based on the company
observing newly-prescribed rules (the new EIA regulation) by the Ministry of Environment, the
9
See, for instance, Arol (2002).
10
Prime Ministry and TUBITAK again were overturned, and the plant was ordered to be closed
for a second time. In the end, the legal problems still have not been solved permanently and
there still is not a technical standard issued by the government regarding the permitted methods
for gold mining and specifically for cyanide leaching. It is indeed striking how this area of
critical concern to potential investors has been left insufficiently defined in the existing laws and
regulations. This in turn discourages Normandy and other existing and new entrant companies
from making investments.
(2) The Cargill starch-based sugar investment. Turkey’s sugar production can be
divided into traditional beet sugar (sucrose, or ordinary table sugar) processed from crushed
sugar beets, and starch-based sugar (glucose and fructose), a lower cost alternative processed
from maize. While fructose can be used as a substitute to sucrose (it is sweeter and metabolised
more slowly, hence often used in food products designed for people with diabetes), glucose is
not a substitute – though both are used as important sweetener inputs into food processing
industries. The more traditional beet sugar is produced by 29 companies, with state-owned
production capacity accounting for 80% of the total. Starch-based sugar, on the other hand, is
produced by 5 private companies, of which 3 are MNCs. In 2001, Turkey produced 2,000
thousand tons of beet sugar, over 5.5 times more than the privately-produced 360 thousand tons
of starch-based sugar (235 of fructose, 125 of glucose). The sugar industry is characterised by
substantial excess capacity, with total production capacity of 2,250 thousand tons of beet sugar
and 930 thousand tons of starch-based sugar. However, given un-competitively high local
production costs of beet sugar, even current levels of beet sugar production are only feasible
with extremely high nominal rates of protection of 78.5% and effective rates of protection of
1500%. The excess capacity of starch-based sugar, on the other hand, is not market-based but is
artificially created by the new Sugar Law (No. 4634) announced in April 2001, which imposed
a quota limiting starch-based sugar production to 10% of total beet sugar production—in
response to pressure from beet sugar farmers and processors.
U.S.-based but Dutch-registered Cargill Inc. began starch-based sugar production in
Turkey in 1990, having obtained required investment certificates (10 separate certificates
between 1990 and 1997) for a wet corn milling (starch) processing plant in Pendik, Istanbul
with a capacity of 220 thousand tons. Based on the success of that plant, Cargill obtained an
additional investment certificate for a USD 90 million investment in a second facility at
Orhangazi, in Bursa province in January 1998, again with a capacity of 220 thousand tons. As
with the first facility, this plant was constructed in full compliance with the provisions of all the
relevant legislation in force, and the plant has held all consents, permits, licenses and
authorisations (with a special condition within the foreign investment certificate recognising the
High Planning Board decision transferring the former agricultural area land into industrial area
land). Significantly, 800 families and 4000 people in the region were making their living out of
the Orhangazi facility based on production activities between 1998 and 2002, with 70% of the
maize processed in the facility in 2002 purchased from domestic growers.
In response to intense lobbying from the more expensive beet sugar producers, the
Orhangazi facility has since 2001 faced 2 separate but related problems. First, there are 4
pending court cases commenced in 2001 challenging the initial government granting of
construction, discharge and emission permits. The plaintiffs, supported by the Bar Association
of the city of Bursa, various professional chambers of Bursa and a number of national MPs from
Bursa commenced these actions against the Prime Ministry, the Governorship of Bursa, and the
Ministry of Public Works and Housing. Although a case commenced at the 6th Administrative
Chamber of the Council of State was initially unanimously ruled in favour of Cargill and the
government, it was subsequently appealed by the plaintiffs. Eventually the initial decision was
overruled, with the plaintiffs then seeking that the initially-granted discharge and emission
permits be cancelled. It was also separately ruled that the High Planning Board initially gave
inappropriate permission for facility construction on ‘first priority agricultural land’, a
permission that is claimed to be in contradiction with the Constitution. It was therefore ruled
that the Orhangazi facility must be torn down. At the moment, the company is operating on a
special permission by the government, but a permanent legal solution is still required for the
11
company to plan for future activities.
The second problem is related to the unpredictable introduction of quotas on starchbased sugar production in 2001, following the initial government policy of creating substantial
additional capacity by promoting starch-based production to substitute for higher-cost beet
sugar. Although the initial quota for the period 2002-03 was restricted to 234 thousand tons, it
was increased by a subsequent Council of Ministers’ decision by 50%. However, the
government’s decision to increase the production quota has been ineffective so far as it has not
been implemented by the responsible independent regulatory board (the newly-instituted Sugar
Board).
This case highlights similar problems for investors as with the Eurogold investment,
again arising from insufficient clarity and respect for the rule of law. Cargill also followed
established rules and procedures. An initial government authorisation granted in 1998
(supported by a High Planning Board decision) based on Cargill having followed the prescribed
rules again did not protect the company from successive legal challenges, nor did subsequent
support by the government (Prime Ministry, Ministry of Public Works and Housing,
Governorship of Bursa) protect the company from plaintiffs eager to find legal loopholes to
force plant closure. Again, the legal problems still have not been solved permanently. In
addition, this case highlights the negative impact on investments arising from the lack of a level
playing field for all firms. In effect, unpredictable and uneven changes in rules with the
introduction of highly-restrictive quotas on some market players and not on others, together
with the biased and anti-competitive decision of the Sugar Board in favour of entrenched local
incumbents, have a negative effect on investments not only by efficient companies in the sugar
industry but by efficient companies in all sectors.
(3) The Iş-Tim mobile telecom investment. The move to liberalise the Turkish
telecommunication industry’s state-run monopoly began in 1994, with legislation to corporatise
(as a state economic enterprise) the sole fixed line operator, Turk Telekom, removing telecom
services from direct government involvement. Also in 1994, the mobile telecoms market was
opened to limited competition with two private operators, Turkcell and Telsim starting business
under revenue-sharing agreements with Turk Telekom. These duopoly providers were granted
25-year licenses in 1998, though this initial assignment of spectrum was not competitively
determined. In January 2000, new legislation (Law 4502) established an independent authority,
the Telecommunications Authority, while Turk Telekom was granted independence in business
operations together with a decision to end its monopoly in fixed voice telephony by 31
December 2003. The third mobile license was allocated on the basis of a competitive tender in
April 2000, with the condition that the minimum bid for a fourth license be equal to that paid by
the third operator. Iş-Tim, a consortium of domestic Iş Bankasi and the mobile phone arm of
Telecom Italia (TIM) operating under the Aria brand, won the third tender with an unexpectedly
high bid price of USD 2.525 billion, suspected to have been an attempt to prevent a fourth
operator from entering.10 The tender offer for a fourth license failed, and the fifth licence was
granted to Turk Telekom (through a newly-created subsidiary Aycell) at the same price as IşTim. Iş-Tim entered the market in March 2001, and Aycell in December 2001. By end-2001,
the mobile penetration rate reached 28.7 per 100 inhabitants, surpassing that in the fixedtelephony market. By end-2002, Turkcell had a market share of 64.3%, Telsim 30.2%, Iş-Tim
4.7% and Aycell 0.8%. Unlike the other two cases which involved 100% FDI companies, IşTim is a joint-venture investment with TIM owning 49% and where the domestic partner is one
of the largest banks and holding companies in Turkey.
The main problem facing Iş-Tim since its entry into the Turkish market arose from its
inability to conclude mutually-acceptable roaming agreements with the incumbent competitors,
Turkcell and Telsim. Following failure of the parties to resolve the tariff dispute among
themselves, the Telecom Authority was requested to intervene by Iş-Tim in March 2001. The
10
It is known that as part of the final communications prior to the bid, Iş-Tim received a verbal promise
from the Ministry of Tranport regarding roaming privileges.
12
regulator determined terms, conditions and tariffs for roaming in October 2001, but Turkcell
and Telsim obtained preliminary injunction decisions in November 2001 with the aim of
suspending implementation of these terms and conditions, and applied to international
arbitration. Subsequently, the Telecom Authority adopted ‘Regulation on the Procedures and
Merits concerning the Execution of National Roaming Agreements’ in March 2002, but
Turkcell and Telsim again obtained preliminary injunction decisions and applied to international
arbitration for the second time. Iş-Tim raised an objection against both injunction decisions as
the third party suffering from the decision, but its objections were rejected. Iş-Tim sent a letter
as a last warning to the Telecom Authority in February 2003, and filed a lawsuit against the
Authority with the Paris-based International Chamber of Commerce’s International Court of
Arbitration on March 31, 2003 seeking nearly USD 3 billion in damages as a result of the
negative response to its letter (the full value of the paid license fee plus VAT because Turkey
did not make available the roaming rights it had purportedly promised). However on May 13,
following a negotiation involving Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and Turkish Prime Minister
Erdoğan, Iş-Tim announced a merger plan with Aycell (TIM and Turk Telekom each to hold
40% of the merged provider with Iş-Bank holding the remaining 20%). With the announcement
of the merger plan, Iş-Tim withdrew its lawsuit as the merger is expected to furnish Iş-Tim with
national roaming capacity, given Aycell’s sizeable network of base stations. The Turkish
government accepted the merger of the two companies to prevent any further damage to the
already poor reputation of Turkey for foreign investors. The merger was completed in February
2004. The new company is called TT-Tim and is operating under the Avea brand, with a
market share of 16%.
In the meantime, on June 9, 2003, Turkey’s Competition Board fined Turkcell USD
15.4 million and Telsim USD 6.1 million (1% of the companies’ net sales in 2001) for refusing
to allow Iş-Tim access to their networks. The Competition Board ruled that Turkcell and Telsim
have been deliberately stifling competition in the mobile services market. The Competition
Board also urged the Telecom Authority to provide the requisite remedy by better regulating the
market in order to end competition rule violations of this kind.
The request for arbitration arose out of the right for national roaming for national
operators, and the presumption by Iş-Tim that this right was not adequately ensured by the
Telecom Authority. The right of Iş-Tim to benefit from national roaming is contained in Article
6 of Law 4502, which requires mobile operators ‘to satisfy reasonable, economically
proportionate and technically feasible roaming requests of other operators working in the same
field’, and requires the regulator ‘to issue regulations setting out the principles of
implementation of this provision and the details to which standard reference tariffs,
interconnection and roaming agreements are subject’. National roaming rights are also
presumed to arise out of Article 35 of the concession agreement between Iş-Tim and the
Telecom Authority, which requires the regulator ‘to provide a necessary, sufficient and fair
competitive environment since Iş-Tim entered the market’, though it also specifies that ‘the
coverage area of the (new) companies should cover 50% of the population of the country in 3
years and 90% in 5 years by investments exclusively made by the operators themselves without
any national roaming support’. The presumed shortcoming of the Telecom Authority is that it
has been late in coming up with own regulations regarding roaming, that standard
interconnection tariffs based on the Long Run Incremental Cost accounting methodology have
not been established yet, and that no requirement is in place ensuring that regulatory decisions
remain in force while court proceedings are undertaken.
The Iş-Tim case, as with the Cargill case, highlights the negative impact on investments
arising from the lack of a level playing field for all firms. While the relevant regulatory body in
the sugar industry took an anti-competitive decision in favour of entrenched local incumbent
enterprises, the anti-competitive impact in this instance arose from the lack of the ability of the
Telecom Authority to impose a pro-competitive decision regarding roaming rights with Turkcell
and Telsim in a timely manner. The origins of the problem in this case are related to the tooslow evolution of rules and regulations in the telecommunications sector and the lack of
authority of the regulatory body, driven no doubt at least in part by a natural learning process on
the part of the Authority.
13
Common governance and institutions-related constraints. One of the common features
of the three cases examined is the lack of credible industrial policy framework statements that
could otherwise provide investors with confidence of the expected rules of the game in each
industry. There is no such available document for any industry. Even the changes made in the
legislative framework for telecommunications in May 2001 that gave more power to the
Telecom Authority were made without a clearly-articulated policy framework. They hardly
form the basis for providing confidence to investors about the government’s long-term vision
for the industry and for the economy as a whole. To help give credibility to such policy
framework statements, related legislation including implementing decrees in line with the policy
statements are essential, as is subsequent consistent implementation of such legislation.
The case studies highlight two distinct but related classes of constraints accounting for
Turkey’s poor performance in attracting FDI: legal and judicial constraints related to
insufficient clarity and respect for the rule of law, and competition constraints related to the
absence of a level playing field where all firms compete on an equal basis. Lack of clarity refers
to insufficiently defined, missing, incoherent and changing rules. Lack of respect for the rule of
law refers to the practice of decision-making based not on ex-ante defined rules but on
opportunistic motives irrespective of the prevailing rules. It refers to both a reluctance to apply
rules when they should be applied as well as allowing loopholes and ambiguities to persist in the
legal framework. The lack of respect for the rule of law creates an environment where multiple
appeals are common and where successive appeals attempt to over-rule the previous court’s or
public authority’s ruling. The ineffectiveness of many of the recently-established regulatory
boards intensifies the adverse effects of this constraint on foreign investors. In such an
environment, it is only natural for investors to lack confidence that established rights will be
respected by the courts.
In each of the presented cases, the government as rule-maker has not been able to solve
the underlying problems in a timely manner. In those instances where the government has
strived to help the investor, its attempts have been met with judicial challenges. These judicial
challenges, when circumvented by government as in the Eurogold and Cargill cases, were done
so without addressing the underlying legal bottlenecks. This fundamental problem of
unaddressed underlying legal ambiguities appears to be one of the most critical problems. It
raises the question of whether lack of clarity in the underlying rule of law is intentional, in order
to give public decision-makers the required degrees of freedom to grant special treatment and
exemptions whenever politically convenient. Unfortunately, the substantial cost of such
unpredictability in the rule of law in terms of foregone current and future investments amplifies
the impact of the distortions caused by government allocations based on personal connections
rather than market allocations based on underlying efficiency-related rules.
Competition-related constraints lead state-owned, local, joint-venture and fully foreignowned companies not to compete on an equal footing. In both the Cargill and Iş-Tim cases, the
failure of the relevant regulatory body rapidly to enforce a pro-competitive order has sent
negative signals for future investments by existing or new potentially efficient enterprises. It is
of course natural for entrenched local incumbents, whether in primary, secondary or tertiary
sectors, to seek to maintain market power and prevent new investors from challenging their
local dominance. However, it is the role of properly-enforced competition policies, both
through the independent regulatory bodies and through the Competition Board, to ensure that
incumbent companies only do so by lowering their costs and offering improved products, rather
than by seeking to dull the competitive market process, either on their own or through alliances
with organs of government.
This analysis of governance and institutions-related constraints in Turkey is consistent
with a broader analysis of politics and democracy in Turkey as populist patronage, allowing the
14
people greater access to the resources of the state through the help of political parties.11 In a
cultural environment where interpersonal trust is low, regional solidarity ties, blood relations,
clientelistic networks, favouritism and nepotism have deeply influenced and moulded the
political culture.12 For patronage to work, authorities must distribute favours to their clientele,
which is hard to do if allocation of contracts and contract monitoring, recruitment, promotion,
tariff decisions and the expansion of new entrants occur purely on meritocratic grounds and
through transparent procedures as required by EU standards. Only when rules and laws are
applied evenly for all market participants (and not directly modified for politically influential
firms) will non-market based favouritism be overcome, and more substantial investments driven
by underlying efficiencies be forthcoming.
4. FDI-related policies and institutions and EU accession
Turkey scores better than its competitors along many dimensions. A huge and growing
domestic market, a skilled and cost effective labour, strong local companies, and access to other
expanding markets are all strengths of Turkey. Furthermore, Turkey has a liberal legal
framework for FDI since 1954 and a convertible currency for almost 15 years, far earlier than its
competitors. However, relatively low levels of FDI inflows over the past years show that
Turkey has not been able to translate these competitiveness-related strengths into a sufficientlylarge number of concrete FDI projects. In comparison to other candidate countries, Turkey’s
EU candidacy has not positively affected the inflow of FDI, and figures show that even the
Customs Union has had a negligible effect. 13
The policies Turkey must follow to foster its future competitiveness include all the
traditional components needed to attract more FDI, such as further harmonisation of trade and
industrial policies and the adoption of related legislation and administrative procedures.
However, these components are necessary but not sufficient conditions for a more competitive
economy and will not automatically result in increased inflows of FDI. All candidate countries
also have applied the acquis but each country also has country-specific rules, policies and
institutions to seek FDI. In addition to meeting EU requirements in a broad range of traditional
harmonisation-related areas, Turkey must make efforts to improve its legal/judicial and
competition-related environment in order to ensure predictable respect for the rule of law and a
level playing field for all firms, not only on paper but also in terms of implementation.
4.1 EU requirements
Turkey’s EU candidacy status and obligations as a member of the Customs Union do
not directly impose EU requirements on FDI policy. Until the 2003 Accession Partnership
(AP), there was no explicit clause on FDI policy neither in accession partnership nor in regular
reports, even though limits on foreign ownership for certain sectors were criticised in the
context of freer movement of capital. However, FDI as well as domestic investments are very
much related to the overall business environment, and policy decisions regarding taxes and state
aids, intellectual property rights, sectoral licences, customs and standards. Furthermore, broader
competition policy areas have a direct impact on how a country performs with respect to
attracting FDI. Thus, the previous AP documents and the National Programme of Turkey had a
long list of legislation to be amended, which in turn could positively affect the investment
11
See, for instance, Kalaycıoğlu (2001).
Among 44 countries included in the World Values Survey of 1989-90, Turkey ranks the lowest with
less than 10% of its population believing that most fellow human beings are trustworthy. See
Kalaycıoğlu, op. cit.
13
The CU agreement does not provide as strong a signal as the prospects of a full EU membership
because it entails only market integration, without ensuring the deeper political, social and legal
transformations that would bring greater comfort to investors.
12
15
climate.
The 2003 Accession Partnership for Turkey has for the first time clauses related to FDI
policy. The two requirements explicitly stated in the AP document, both as short-term
priorities, are that Turkey should “facilitate and promote the inflow of FDI” (in the Economic
Criteria section) and “remove all restrictions affecting FDI (originating from the EU) in all
sectors in Turkey” (in the Free Movement of Capital section).14
Regarding broader EU requirements for FDI, the 2002 Regular Report contains
criticism of the limitations on foreign ownership in some sectors, of the authorisation system for
investment and of the obligation to provide USD 50,000 to establish a company or open a
branch in Turkey.15 Regarding the restrictions on foreign ownership in certain sectors such as
civil aviation, maritime transport, port enterprises, radio and television broadcasting,
telecommunication, and mining and energy, the government argues that most of the other
candidate countries still have similar restrictions and that Turkey should not remove them until a
more definite road map for EU accession is agreed upon. However, it is also argued that these
restrictions should be removed not only for compliance with the EU acquis, but to develop a
more competitive investment environment for Turkey.
4.2 Reform efforts to-date
Turkey has adopted an ambitious structural reform program in 2001 to lay the
foundation for sustainable growth, driven by private investments and supported by a smaller but
more effective government. The main private sector development-related pillars of the
government’s economic programme include: an improved investment climate; a smaller, more
transparent and effective public sector; a sound and competitive financial system; accelerated
privatisation; and a more efficient business infrastructure, with a particular focus on
communications and energy. The ongoing reform efforts are closely linked to Turkey’s
objective to accede to the EU. The government realises that Turkey has fallen behind many
other developing countries with respect to effective liberalisation, enforcement practice as well
as with respect to legal and judicial reforms. Pushing on with the ongoing reforms is crucial to
the country’s economic future.
Currently Turkey is implementing a major fiscal adjustment program to increase the
effectiveness of the public sector while reducing its size. Fiscal and public sector reforms are
imperative to ensure a sustainable domestic public debt profile, which is itself critical for
establishing macroeconomic stability with low inflation. These actions are critical to allow
lower interest rates, facilitate long-term investment planning and more robust private sector
growth. To complement these reforms and ensure their sustainability, Turkey also is
undertaking fundamental reforms of expenditure and taxation systems. The new Banks Act in
1999 established the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK) as an independent
authority to regulate and supervise the banking sector. The BDDK has implemented a
comprehensive banking restructuring program to promote more efficient financial
intermediation for the enterprise sector. To strengthen the scope for private sector investment in
telecoms, an amending Law in 2000 created the Telecommunications Authority, and
independent regulatory body responsible for licensing, tariffs, spectrum allocation and other
supervisory activities. Similarly, to strengthen the scope for private sector investment in energy,
separate electricity and natural gas Laws in 2001 established the independent Energy Market
Regulatory Authority. Amendments to Turkey’s Constitution were made in August 1999
establishing the legal basis for privatisation, and allowing public services to be performed under
private law. Importantly, the amendments also allow international arbitration of disputes. A
new public procurement law also has been enacted in 2002. While all these policy
14
15
Council Decision on Accession Partnership with Turkey, 2003 (COM 2003)
Regular Report on Turkey’s Accession, 2002 (COM 2002, 700 final)
16
announcements are desirable and in the right direction, the government needs to ensure careful
and consistent implementation without undue hesitation not to adversely affect business
expectations.
In order to address the feedback received from international investors about the
difficulties in Turkey’s investment climate, the government in 2001 launched a reform process
to improve administrative procedures under the title ‘Reform Program for Improving the
Investment Climate’. The idea behind this initiative was that administrative barriers can make
the difference between being an attractive location for investment and one that is not
competitive, since complex and time-consuming administrative procedures appear to be among
the most important disincentives to investment, and can discourage investors despite other
attractive features that a country might have to offer. Taking into account the findings and
recommendations of a diagnostic study and the project on administrative barriers to investment
conducted jointly by the government and the Foreign Investment Advisory Service, a joint
facility of the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank, the Government enacted a
“Decree on Improving the Investment Climate in Turkey” on December 11, 2001 as part of a
national strategy to increase the overall level of income and productivity and to raise the level of
competitiveness of firms operating in Turkey.16
The challenge facing the government was how to implement this reform vision in a
manner that would streamline administrative procedures while incorporating private sector
feedback on the measures to be taken. Within this framework, a three-phase strategy was
designed and started to be implemented to facilitate the reform process. First, a clear vision and
a consistent direction for the reform were embodied in the December 2001 ministerial decree in
order to demonstrate political commitment and consensus behind the reform scheme. The
decree established a coordinating body comprised of senior public and private sector decisionmakers, the Coordination Council for the Improvement of the Investment Climate (YOIKK),
with the mandate to identify and remove regulatory and administrative barriers to private
investment. Second, a clear and precise action plan defining the priorities, the timing and
responsibilities was formulated. Last but not least, YOIKK has been scheduled to hold regular
monthly meetings in order to monitor progress made, with quarterly reports submitted to the
Council of Ministers.
As shown in Figure 5, key areas of reform have been identified and grouped under nine
technical committees to deal with the following constraints:
-
Company registration: time consuming, unnecessary and duplicative transactions
-
Employment: problems related to short-term work visas, employment of special groups, and
high social contributions by employers.
-
Sectoral licences: licensing procedures are unnecessarily complicated in a number of
industries, primarily due to overlapping authorities, highly centralised approval procedures,
and with little involvement by the private sector.
-
Location: access to public lands and site development by the private sector is very timeconsuming and has some restrictions.
-
Taxes and incentives: corporate income tax rate is comparatively high, and the system is
complex. Incentives should be aligned to the EU state aids regime and the process should be
simplified and automatic where possible.
-
Customs and standards: despite major reform initiatives, customs procedures still cause
some delays due to significant documentation requirements, lengthy testing procedures,
delayed VAT reimbursement and discretionary decision-making with incidences of
corruption,
16
See FIAS (2001).
17
-
Intellectual property rights: protection of patents, trademarks, and copyrights is insufficient,
mainly because of remaining gaps in the existing legislation, weak implementation and
enforcement of laws, and cumbersome procedures,
-
Investment promotion: There is no one single entity that effectively conducts a targeted
investment promotion and policy advocacy
-
FDI legislation: Legislation on FDI at the time of the formation of YOIKK was based on the
1954 law.
The first YOIKK meeting was held in March 2002, and set targets and timelines for these
technical committees. One core dimension of the reform process has been private sector
involvement in all efforts through disseminating the information and sharing the results obtained
over time. This emphasis is in line with the government’s conviction that joint evaluation of the
needs and identification of appropriate solutions is of utmost importance for the success of the
reform initiative.
The reports of the technical committees have been quite positive. The government
already has taken several steps in compliance with the recommendations of the committees.
Even though there was an election and change in government, the reform program has proved to
be effective and various legislative changes have been made and draft laws prepared. Following
the November 2002 elections, the new government has amended the Council of Minister’s
Decree to include another technical committee on small and medium enterprises. To increase
the influence of YOIKK, the government decided to head YOIKK by a minister. Enacted laws
as a direct result of the YOIKK process to-date include: a new up-to-date FDI law (that serves
as a declaration to foreign investors of their rights and that will enable a shift from an ex-ante
control-based “investment permission system” to a “promotion and facilitation approach” with
minimal ex-post monitoring to continuously improve the investor climate, in conformity with
international best practices); a law that redesigns the company registration process (by
diminishing the prior 19 required steps to 3 and reducing turnaround from two and a half
months to one day); a law on employment of foreign personnel; and a law on the investment
allowance system (which enables a shift to an automatic state aids system in line with EU
requirements). Among the drafted laws which have been sent either to the Prime Ministry or to
the Parliament are: a law on the duties and responsibities of the Patent Institute (which will
enable the Institute to deal with intelllectual property rights issue in a more professional way);
and a law on the establishment of an investment promotion agency.
Although there have been some investment promotion initiatives underway by several
public and private institutions, Turkey at present does not have an agency with a strong and
clear mandate, set-up and budget to carry out effective investment promotion, including
functions such as investor servicing, investment generation and policy advocacy, and governed
jointly by public and private sectors. The draft new law submitted to the parliament incorporates
these issues.
YOIKK efforts also have borne fruitful results in several other areas such as recruitment
of expatriates, sectoral licencing, customs, and intellectual and industrial property rights. With
respect to customs reform, the Undersecretariat of Customs has been implementing an
ambitious reform program to improve its administrative efficiency and effectiveness. The
customs automated system has been rolled-out to 99% of all customs offices and further
enhanced to assist customs in controlling movement of goods. Important steps taken include
modernising customs laws, regulations and procedures in line with those of EU legislation, and
simplifying and harmonising forms, procedures and control techniques in line with those
internationally recommended by the World Customs Organisation. Necessary legislation to
strengthen the capacity and infrastructure of the Turkish Patent Institute has been submitted to
parliament. The intent is to ensure effective implementation of the regulations on protection of
intellectual and industrial property rights.
18
Finally, land acquisition and site development for investment is a critical issue for both
local and foreign investors. A very useful discussion forum involving public and private sector
representatives has led to the creation of a priority list of problems and measures to be taken in
this field. The technical committee working on this issue will begin by formulating solutions to
the most urgent problems.
4.3 Outstanding priorities
While current efforts have largely focused on the introduction of new laws in pre-identified
areas to spur administrative reforms, predictable implementation of existing and new legislation
is far more important. And regarding competition-related reforms, it is vital for all investors—
existing producers as well as new entrants, whether local, joint venture or wholly foreignowned—to face a level playing field in the way that laws, regulations and administrative
procedures are implemented. Certain critical problems still exist for investors in these areas, as
highlighted by the case studies.
a. Legal and judicial reforms
The improvements on the legislation front, many of which were achieved in the last few
years, were necessary but not sufficient to create an attractive legal framework for foreign
investors. Improvements in FDI legislation in the narrow sense fall in this category of necessary
but not sufficient changes required to generate sustainable increases in FDI inflows. One of the
critical outstanding impediments to investment is that implementation of the laws in both the
executive and judicial branches of the government is fraught with problems for investors. The
most important but also likely the most difficult reforms needed in this arena are basic changes
in the legal and judicial systems, and in the way that administrative procedures more generally
are implemented.
The way that the legal and judicial systems work is a critical determinant of FDI –
especially high-value FDI destined for export markets which can go anywhere and which need a
reliable and hassle-free environment. Lengthy and non transparent procedures combined with
unpredictable outcomes, in both the executive branch of the government and in the courts, are
among the main problems in this area. Incomplete reforms and poor implementation of laws
and regulations are the overarching issues. Adopted laws are often not implemented on time. All
this contributes to the general perception of an unpredictable legal framework. Not only are the
administrative procedures time-consuming, but also enforcement procedures for commercial
cases at the courts take much longer than many other countries. The high workload of judges is
the major reason for these delays. Cases in Turkey take often longer than a year. In a survey
carried out by FIAS, another point frequently raised by investors is the lack of confidence in the
impartiality and quality of the commercial courts.17 Even if the legal issue appears clear, foreign
investors routinely state that the judgments are still much more unpredictable than they would
be in their home country. Foreign companies and bigger companies are very visible and laws
may be applied more strictly to them than to domestic and smaller companies. While the laws
themselves respect the principle of equal treatment stipulated in the 1954 Law on Foreign
Capital and the new Foreign Direct Investment Law, implementation often has been different.
The government is taking steps to reform the judicial system and enhance its
predictability as a component of its EU Accession Program. The commitments made in this area
as well as the short- to medium-term plans are reflected in the National Program. These targets
will require some years to achieve. However, these reforms should also help to improve the
perception of Turkey in foreign investors’ eyes. One desirable step would be for Turkey to
institute a comprehensive legal and judicial review to identify and address important items in
existing private sector-related laws that are in contradiction with each other or that are not
17
FIAS, op.cit.
19
sufficiently clearly defined. Furthermore, a specific institution should be entrusted with
improved oversight responsibilities to reduce the likelihood of such re-occurrences in the future.
Such a review should also include in its terms of reference the removal of detailed sectoral
issues—such as those related to allocation of land, first priority agricultural land, privatisation
and arbitration—from the Constitution and their introduction instead in appropriate laws. Two
related recommendations that could be acted on immediately are to refrain from allowing so
much time to pass between the adoption of laws and of implementing legislation, and to seek
maximum input from private sector participants, both local and foreign, at the legal preparation
phase. Best practice would be to draft implementing regulations parallel to the law or at least to
have a detailed draft on how the implementation will look like at the time the law is adopted.
Seeking significant input from business associations before laws and regulations are adopted
will result in adequate legislation based also on the concerns of the private sector. This
procedure, common practice in most OECD countries, increases the knowledge base on which
legislation is drafted.
b. Competition-related reforms
The general aim of creating a more competitive environment has been dealt with as part
of the process of meeting basic EU accession requirements. Turkey’s competition law was
developed while Turkey was negotiating its Customs Union with the EU, and was adopted in
1994, taking the EU treaty as its substantive basis. The Competition Board (RK) has been
actively applying Turkey’s competition law since the end of 1997. However, in addition to
competition law implementation, industrial policy, company law, the free movement of goods,
capital and service provision, taxation, sectoral policies, regional policies and SME policy are
all related to competition. Progress in all of these areas to comply with the EU acquis will help
Turkey to have a better competitive environment.
In the area of competition law enforcement, a couple of outstanding issues still remain
that are crucial for effective private sector development. In particular, the current legislation
does not allow the RK to apply competition rules to all public undertakings, including those
with special or exclusive rights and to other entities of public administration. It is in Turkey’s
interest to change this and include the equivalent of EC Treaty Article 86 (ex Article 90 of the
Treaty of Rome). As privatisation progresses and public participation withdraws, care should be
given to better align the specific sectoral laws to the Competition Act in order to ensure the
efficient enforcement of competition rules. Therefore, it is essential that enhanced powers to act
during the privatisation process and in the regulated infrastructure sectors be granted to the RK.
In this respect, closer coordination between the RK and special sectoral regulatory authorities
should be secured. While sectoral regulatory authorities should focus more on ex-ante
regulation, the RK should concentrate on ex-post regulation. Following such a ‘specialisation’
the current state of competition between these two types of institutions will diminish. Instead, a
stable ground for cooperation and coordination will be laid. This need for improved
coordination is evident in the Cargill case where quotas imposed by the Sugar Board have
adversely affected private sector parties by inhibiting competition, and also in the Iş-Tim case
where earlier coordination would have helped address the situation sooner.
A recent study carried out by experts from RK on legislation not compatible with
competition supports the view that the government is not consistent in its application of
competition policy principles.18 The study lists various laws and regulations from different
sectors that contradict the enacted competition law, with almost all these sectors being
dominated by public enterprises. While such inconsistencies could be understandable for
legislation that dates back to the time when government applied an import-substitution strategy
and the public sector was the driving force of the economy, there is no economic rationale for
such contradictions in legislation adopted after the Competition Act was approved. In particular,
18
Ekdi, Öztürk, Ünlü, Ünlüsoy and Çınaroğlu, 2002.
20
such contradictions are most glaring in the case of regulatory bodies. As discussed in the Cargill
case, the Sugar Board should not have the unilateral authority to impose anti-competitive
quotas. More generally, there should be enhanced competition policy oversight to ensure that
the decisions of regulatory boards are not in contradiction with competition principles. A strong
case can be made for the desirability of strengthening the traditional competition advocacy
responsibilities of the RK, including granting the RK: the power to introduce or amend new
laws to promote competition; the power to modify existing laws that are anti-competitive in
their impact; the oversight responsibility to ensure that relevant institutions do not perform an
anti-competitive role; and the power to review whether decisions of all regulatory institutions
are in the public interest, with the mandate to submit their reports to parliament and other
appropriate public oversight entities.
A second key area of competition policy with an unfinished agenda concerns state aids.
Turkey has been criticised by the EU for not aligning its state aids system to that of the EU,
even though this has been a commitment of Turkey under the Customs Union. Progress has
been made in this area, but legislative changes and an independent monitoring authority have
not yet been established. Moreover, the current attempts to align the state aids rules only cover
the aids given to the private sector whereas public sector incentives also should be covered to
ensure a competitive environment.
The broader EU requirements shed light on other issues that Turkey should focus on
regarding a more competitive environment. These include alignment with the acquis on
intellectual and industrial property rights (company law), and removing limitations for foreign
ownership in certain sectors (free movement of capital).
c. The benefits of full EU accession
Turkey’s eventual EU membership is very crucial for FDI inflows. Irrespective of
numerous characteristics that render it an attractive place for foreign investment, Turkey cannot
attract as much FDI as its CEEC competitors unless the government takes further steps towards
full EU membership. Actually, Turkey would not have to wait very long to start reaping the
benefits of an eventual EU accession. With the opening of EU accession negotiations, Turkey is
already likely to attract larger sums of FDI. There are many reasons to expect such a
development to take place.
The opening of EU negotiations would act as a strong signal that Turkey will become a
full member of the EU in the future. Assuming that the government will continue on the current
path of structural reforms with a clear focus on the sustainability of public debt, the signalling
effect of the opening of accession negotiations will be strong. Such a decision will assure
foreign investors that the Turkish economy will be set on a stable growth path for the
foreseeable future. Equally important, the opening of EU accession negotiations would provide
all investors enhanced trust that the legal and judicial environment will improve across all
relevant areas of the common acquis, and that implementation of all required secondary
legislation also will improve – as the accession process in Turkey’s case requires not only
progress in enacting laws but progress in implementation. For Turkey, the benefit of stability,
together with institutional reforms that will improve application of the rule of law and enhance
competition, will be to convince foreign investors to channel more funds to Turkey for domestic
as well as export market-oriented projects. Especially with its domestic market potential, Turkey
will be very attractive for FDI in non-traded sectors. As the average size of investments in these
sectors is in general larger, attracting significant FDI inflows immediately after the opening of
negotiations is likely.
The attractiveness of Turkey for foreign investors will continue to increase as the
accession negotiations proceed. At each step, Turkey will move closer to becoming a full
member, closing the gap between CEECs and Turkey in terms of attracting FDI. Turkey will
undertake more steps towards the harmonisation with the EU framework. At one step, even
21
before becoming a full member, Turkey will be in a position to accept the authority of EU
agencies in the resolution of problems that may arise between foreign investors and the Turkish
government. This step will further ease some of the reservations that foreign investors may still
have vis-à-vis Turkey. After all, EU rules and regulations and the ways they are implemented
are well-known and predictable to foreign investors. It is at this stage that one of the most
important benefits from EU accession will be realised by Turkey, as rule of law and
competition-related constraints will be eased even further, with concomitant increases in private
investment flows for the benefit of enhanced growth and development in Turkey.
d. The role of pro-active investment promotion policies
In each of the anticipated stages in the accession process, as Turkey moves from its
current status as a country seeking the opening of accession negotiations to the desired endstatus as a full EU member country, a critical question is what the most appropriate set of
investment promotion policies, best adapted to the evolving Turkish reality, should be. In
addition to focusing on those elements of the investment climate most critical to moving from
one stage to the next in the accession process, including improved implementation of existing
laws and institutional reforms to improve application of the rule of law and to enhance
competition, what else should Turkey be doing on the policy side?
This brings us to the question of the desirability of more targeted FDI policies. Both
developed and developing country experiences show the potential benefits of specific policies to
stimulate investment, and of the establishment of an investment promotion agency (IPA) that
will be engaged in activities such as investment generation, policy advocacy, investor servicing
and image building.
According to UNCTAD, there are more than 160 national and over 250 sub-national
IPAs worldwide.19 A recent empirical study on the effectiveness of IPAs in 58 countries shows
that FDI inflows are positively correlated with investment promotion activities, and that the
quality of the investment climate and the level of development have a significant effect on IPA
performance.20 This finding suggests that countries are well advised to focus on basic
improvements in the investment climate first, and consider introducing an IPA at a minimum
concurrently with serious efforts to improve the investment climate. Moreover, political
visibility and participation of the private sector appear to be two critical elements that contribute
to the success of an IPA. Worldwide experience shows that IPAs are more effective when they
are autonomous from the government (though subject to policy oversight by the public sector),
and when they are a product of genuine joint effort of private and public sectors.21
At the moment, Turkey does not have an IPA. The government has been carrying out
promotion activities on a negligible budget. The promotion activities mainly consist of
publications, limited advertisement, and participation in seminars and trade-investment fairs.
Compared with many other countries, it is difficult to claim that Turkey has a coherent
promotion policy. Nor is it possible to claim that the budget allocated to promotion is sufficient.
Under the YOIKK reform program, the Technical Promotion Committee has tackled this
problem and decided to establish a promotion agency. Besides the already mentioned study that
was carried out as a joint effort of the World Bank and related Turkish institutions, and a draft
law has been prepared. Care has been taken to design an agency that could perform all the key
recommended IPA functions. The new FDI law recommends that the governance of the IPA be
carried out jointly by public and private sectors, with the majority vote in private hands. It is
also proposed that the agency have an autonomous structure and an independent budget. The
law has already been sent to the Prime Ministry, and is expected to be enacted as of 2004.
19
See UNCTAD (2000).
See Morisset (2003).
21
The key functions that a well-designed IPA should perform are summarised in an annex.
20
22
Aside from the public sector’s oversight role in establishing an appropriate institutional
framework, governments also have a key role to play in articulating an overall investment
policy, and specific FDI policy actions. Governments ideally should first decide on an overall
investment and FDI policy, and then use incentives where appropriate as tools to achieve the
stated objectives. The use of incentives will differ by country, but there are general rules
specified by WTO that each country should obey. For Turkey, there are additional rules
stemming from the Customs Union agreement with the EU. As part of cross-national efforts at
abolishing barriers to investment, bilateral or international agreements are signed between
countries to protect mutual investments, with clauses ranging from admission and establishment
to standards of treatment and dispute settlement mechanisms.
Attracting more FDI per se should not necessarily be the main target of a country’s FDI
policy. As important are the questions of how the country can benefit more from any level of
FDI, and how to prevent any potential negative effects of FDI. FDI policies ideally should
provide incentives for investors to act in ways that will contribute most to the development
process of the country. For this, countries can try to build local capabilities, using local
suppliers and upgrading local skills, technological capabilities and infrastructure.22 Typically,
policy makers attempt to understand the potentialities and the attractiveness of the country, and
then try to design a policy accordingly. The sectoral and regional capabilities of the country, the
needs of specific investors, be they market-seeking or resource seeking, the development level
of specific sectors relative to global trends all should be taken into consideration. Even
developed countries apply specific policies to attract FDI, and Germany’s provision of special
incentives for attracting ICT (information-communication technologies) investments is an
example of this.
Despite the general shift of attitudes in favour of FDI, significant concerns remain about
potential negative effects. So, countries should be careful in eliminating the possible negative
effects that FDI can have and design their policy accordingly. Crowding-out of local firms and
products, transfers of polluting activities or technologies, concessions given to investors in
special zones that allow them to skirt labour and environmental regulations are examples of
these negative effects. 23
Given the benefits that could accrue to Turkey from significantly higher levels of FDI,
there is indeed more that Turkey could and should do on the policy side – subject to WTO and
EU Customs Union constraints. Turkey indeed has negotiated investment agreements with 79
countries and signed 66 of these agreements, and also has signed “double taxation” agreements”
with 49 countries. Turkey has taken active part in the WTO negotiations for an international
investment agreement, and has participated in FDI-related issues in platforms such as
UNCTAD, OECD, WTO, and the EU Commission. However, comparing Turkey’s potential
with actual levels of FDI inflows suggests that policies implemented to-date need further
strengthening. In addition to enhanced legal/judicial implementation and more effective
competition across markets, Turkey would benefit from a coherent overall investment and FDI
policy, with a clear articulation of how specific policies and more activist promotion are
intended to achieve stated objectives.
5. Conclusion
This paper examines the main FDI challenges currently facing Turkey. The setting of the
analysis is that FDI can in principle be highly beneficial for a country’s growth and
development prospects. In a first section, we reviewed this claim in the Turkish context based
on existing studies. The available evidence suggests that FDI is indeed highly productive for
the Turkish economy as a whole, based on the significant direct and indirect benefits on
productivity in the manufacturing sector.
22
23
See UNCTAD (2003).
Op.cit, p.88
23
Despite its beneficial effects, however, recorded FDI inflows to Turkey have extremely
been low compared to the CEECs. The main FDI challenges facing Turkey, therefore, are why
FDI inflows have remained so low and how to increase the inflows to desirable levels. An initial
question addressed is to what extent recorded inflows fully reflect actual inflows. The paper
provides preliminary evidence that understatements may be significant in some years, though
changes in the new 2003 FDI Law coupled with improved statistical recording should help
alleviate discrepancies from international common practice.
The paper examines the determinants of low FDI inflows in greater detail. We argue
that one of the major culprits behind the laggard performance in FDI inflows is the country’s
long-running fiscal problems and the ensuing macroeconomic uncertainty. Turkey’s current
efforts at implementing a major fiscal adjustment, if sustained, should help achieve lower
inflation and macroeconomic stability. The introduction of inflation accounting will no doubt be
a welcome interim measure for local and foreign investors alike. Besides macroeconomic
uncertainty, specific infrastructure-related weaknesses also continue to diminish Turkey’s
attractiveness to investors. Although Turkey benefits from its skilled, adaptable and
entrepreneurial workforce, and communications and transport do not appear to be major
problem areas, Turkey lags behind in terms of its energy infrastructure, its level of
computerisation, and the availability of credit for the private sector. Turkey’s recently passed
new electricity and natural gas framework laws, to the extent that they are effectively
implemented, should spur significant improvements in line with Turkey’s underlying
endowments in the energy area. The successful implementation of the adjustment program will
ensure that more funds will be channelled to private sector rather than the funding of the huge
public sector deficit, at low real interest rates.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the paper is its examination of outstanding
rule of law and competition-related impediments to investment through detailed case studies.
Based on three cases from the primary, secondary manufacturing and tertiary services sectors,
we argue that the main unaddressed obstacles to increased FDI in Turkey are governance and
institutions-related problems related to rule of law and competition. The most important legal
and judicial constraints relate to insufficient clarity and insufficient respect for the rule of law.
In each of the analysed cases, the government as rule-maker has failed to address underlying
legal ambiguities in a timely fashion, raising the question of whether lack of clarity in the
underlying rule of law is intentional, in order to give public decision-makers the required
degrees of freedom to grant special treatment and exemptions whenever politically convenient.
Unfortunately for the country as a whole, the resulting unpredictability has resulted in
substantial foregone current and future investments. Competition constraints, in turn, are related
to the absence of a level playing field where all companies compete on an equal basis. In two of
the cases examined, the failure of the relevant regulatory body to enforce a pro-competition
ruling rapidly also has sent negative signals for future investments.
In terms of future policy priorities, we argue that predictable and uniform
implementation of existing and new legislation is of utmost importance. In the legal and judicial
area, the focus of reforms should be to remove legal ambiguities, by addressing all private
sector laws and implementing regulations that are in contradiction with each other or not
sufficiently clearly defined. In the competition area, it is in Turkey’s interest to empower the
Competition Board to apply competition rules to all public undertakings, aligning its
competition law to EC Treaty Article 86 and its state aids system to that of the EU. Improved
coordination between competition and other independent regulatory boards should yield more
rapid pro-competition outcomes.
The EU accession process should itself provide significant benefits to Turkey with
respect to FDI inflows by helping rule of law and competition constraints to be eased further.
The expected EU decision to start negotiations towards full membership of Turkey will be
crucial in finally convincing larger numbers of foreign investors to invest in Turkey. Finally, in
addition to aligning Turkey’s investment climate more closely with that of the EU, Turkey also
should follow a more pro-active approach by implementing more specific FDI policies and
24
active promotion.
25
References
Arol, Ali Ihsan, 2002, “Current Status of FDI and Environmental Issues in Mining in Turkey,”
OECD Global Forum on FDI and the Environment, February.
Blomström, Magnus and Ari Kokko, 1998, “Multinational Corporations and Spillovers,”
Journal of Economic Surveys, 12(2): 1-31.
Borensztein, Eduardo, Jose De Gregorio and Jong-Wha Lee, 1998, “How Does Foreign Direct
Investment Affect Economic Growth”, Journal of International Economics, Vol. 45, 1998, pp.
115-135.
Commission of the European Communities, 2003, Council Decision on Accession Partnership
with Turkey (COM 2003)
Commission of the European Communities, 2002, Regular Report on Turkey’s Accession
(COM 2002, 700 final)
Ekdi, Barış, Ebru Öztürk, H.Hüseyin Ünlü, Kürşat Ünlüsoy and Serpil Çınaroğlu, 2002,
“Rekabet Kuralları İle Uyumlu Olmayan Mevzuat Listesi”, Rekabet Dergisi, Issue 9, March.
FIAS, 2001, Turkey: A Diagnostic study of the FDI Environment, February.
Gruben, William C., and Darryl McLeod, 1998, “Capital flows, savings, and growth in the
1990s”, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 38, No. 3, Fall.
Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin, 2001, “Turkish Democracy: Patronage versus Governance”, Turkish
Studies, Vol. 2, No 1 (Spring), pp 54-70.
Morisset, Jacques, 2003 “Does a Country Need a Promotion Agency to Attract Foreign Direct
Investment?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3028, April 2003.
OECD, 2003, Foreign Direct Investment Statistics: How Countries Measure FDI, Paris.
_____, 1996, OECD Benchmark definition of FDI, 3rd Edition, Paris
Özatay, Fatih, ve Guven Sak, 2002, “The 2000-2001 Financial Crisis in Turkey”, mimeo, The
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey and Ankara University.
Stern, Nicholas, 2002, “Dynamic Development: Innovation and Inclusion,” Munich Lectures in
Economics, Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, November 19.
UNCTAD, 2003, World Investment Report: FDI Policies for Development: National and
International Perspectives, New York: The United Nations.
________, 2001, “The World of Investment Promotion at a Glance: A Survey of Investment
Promotion Practices”, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations
Advisory Studies number 17, UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/3.
________, 2000, World Investment Report: Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and
Development, New York: The United Nations.
Wells, Louis T. Jr. and Alvin G. Wint, 2001, “Marketing a Country: Promotion as a Tool for
Attracting Foreign Investment,” Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) Occasional Paper;
13.
26
Yılmaz, Kamil, Cevdet Akçay and Emre Alper, 2002, “Enflasyon ve Büyüme Dinamikleri:
Gelişmekte Olan Ülke Deneyimleri Işığında Türkiye Analizi,” (Inflation and Growth Dynamics:
An Analysis of Turkey in the light of Developing Country Experiences), TUSIAD (Turkish
Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association) Publication, December.
Yılmaz, Kamil and Şule Özler, 2004, “Foreign Direct Investment and Productivity Spillovers:
Identifying Linkages through Product-based Measures,” mimeo.
Zhang, Kevin H., 1999, “FDI and Economic Growth: Evidence from 10 East Asian
Economies”, Economia Internationale, November.
27
ANNEX: Functions of an Investment Promotion Agency (IPA)
The groupings of the different functions of an IPA can differ for developed and
developing countries or from one country to another. The four-fold grouping proposed by Wells
and Wint (2001) used for the studies carried out for the Turkish IPA, are described below.
Image building is the function of creating the perception of a country as an attractive
site for international investment. Activities commonly associated with image building include
focused advertising, public relations events, and the generation of favourable news stories by
cultivating journalists.
Investor servicing and facilitation refers to the range of services provided in a host
country that can assist an investor in analysing investment decisions, establishing a business,
and maintaining it in good standing. Activities in this area include information provision, “onestop shop” services aimed at expediting approval processes, and various forms of assistance in
obtaining access to sites and utilities.
Investment generation entails targeting specific sectors and companies with a view to
creating investment leads. Activities include identification of potential sectors and investors,
direct mailing, telephone campaigns, investor forums and seminars, and individual presentations
to targeted investors. Investment generation activities can be done both at home and overseas.
Policy advocacy consists of the activities through which the agency supports initiatives
to improve the quality of the investment climate and identifies the views of the private sector on
each relevant topic. Activities include surveys of the private sector, participation in task forces,
policy and legal proposals, and lobbying.
The emphasis of the IPA facility should depend on the purpose of the FDI policy: how
much promotion is needed depends on the kind of FDI to be attracted and the basic attractions
of the host country. A large and dynamic economy needs to promote itself less than a small one.
The bulk of massive inflows of FDI to China were not the result of active FDI promotion. And
promotion can only go so far. If the economic base is weak and unstable, no amount of
persuasion can attract large and sustained FDI flows (UNCTAD, 2003).
Of the main investment promotion functions that all countries consider, image building
and investor servicing & facilitation are typically the ones best left entirely to the separate
public-private IPA.
28
Table 1. FDI summary data: Turkey vs comparators
Czech
Turkey Poland Republic Hungary
199,267
157,598
51,433
46,604
44,542
39,212
14,550
11,269
Population (2000, millions)
67.4
38.7
10.3
10.0
FDI inflows, 1991-1996 (USD mn, annual avg.)
751
2,119
939
2,205
FDI inflows, 1997-2000 (USD mn, annual avg.)
878
6,971
4,072
1,957
FDI inflows, 2001 (USD mn)
3,266
5,713
4,924
2,440
FDI inflows/GFCF, 1991-1996 (annual avg.)
1.9%
10.7%
6.4%
26.8%
FDI inflows/GFCF, 1997-2000 (annual avg.)
1.9%
18.1%
26.5%
17.9%
12.4%
15.0%
30.6%
20.1%
FDI stocks, 1996 (USD mn)
5,825
11,463
8,785
14,193
FDI stocks/GDP, 1996
3.2%
8.8%
15.2%
31.4%
FDI stocks, 2000 (USD mn)
9,335
34,227
21,644
19,804
FDI stocks/GDP, 2000
4.7%
21.7%
42.1%
42.5%
12,601
42,433
26,764
23,562
FDI stocks/GDP, 2001
8.5%
24.1%
47.1%
45.4%
Exports of affiliates of foreign TNCs 1
2000 (USD mn)
3,684
12,267
10,876 2
19,558
26.5%
32.7%
2
61.1%
11,107
2
22,820
71,385
4
26,645
GDP (2000, USD millions)
GFCF (2000, USD millions)
FDI inflows/GFCF, 2001
FDI stocks, 2001 (USD mn)
7.2%
TNC Exports/Total Exports, 2000
Imports of affiliates of foreign TNCs, 2000
No of affiliates of foreign TNCs, 2000
12,628
23,554
5,334
3
35,840
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics CD-ROM; UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country
Profiles, 2003; UNCTAD, World Investment Report, selected years. v
1. An affiliate is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who is resident in
another economy, owns a stake that permits a lasting interest in the management of that enterprise (an
equity stake of 10% for an incorporated enterprise or its equivalent for an unincorporated enterprise).
2. For Czech Republic foreign trade, 1999.
3. For Poland number of affiliates, 1998. Includes all firms with foreign capital.
4. For Czech Republic number of affiliates, 1999. The number includes joint ventures. Out of this number,
53,775 are fully-owned foreign affiliates.
29
Table 2. FDI Definition in OECD Countries
Preferred
Preferred Stocks Other Kinds of
Indirectly- Capital Long Short
Bonds &
Reinvested
Financial
Commerce /
StocksTraded in Not Traded in Non Preferred
owned FDI
in
Term Term
Leasing Marketable
Earnings
Derivatives
Retail Loans
Stock Exchange Stock Exchange
Stocks
Enterprises Kind Loans Loans
Securities
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Re.
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey (6224)
Turkey (4875)
England
USA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
NA
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
NA
Yes
Yes
NA
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
NA
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Source: OECD, 2002 and 2003. NA: Not Available; * Excluding State Bonds
30
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
NA
No
Yes
Yes
NA
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
NA
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
NA
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
NA
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes(*)
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
NA
NA
No
No
No
No
NA
Yes
NA
NA
No
No
No
No
NA
No
Yes
NA
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Table 3. FDI stocks by industrial sector, 2000 (Share, %)
Sector / Industry
PRIMARY SECTOR
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
Mining, quarrying and petroleum
SECONDARY SECTOR
Food, beverages and tobacco
Textiles, leather and clothing
Wood, paper, publishing and printing
Petroleum, chemicals, rubber and plastic products
Non-metallic mineral products
Basic metal and metal products
Machinery and equipment
Electrical machinery and apparatus
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment
Precision Instruments
Other manufacturing
Unspecified secondary
TERTIARY SECTOR
Electricity, gas and water
Construction
Trade and repairs
Hotels and restaurants
Transport, storage and communication
Finance
Real estate and business activities
Education
Health and social services
Other services
TOTAL
TURKEY
1.5
0.8
0.7
41.3
7.3
1.9
0.3
9.5
2.6
2.6
0.2
3.7
12.1
0.4
0.7
0.0
57.3
0.8
8.1
4.4
17.0
16.6
0.0
7.5
2.8
100
Poland
0.9
0.5
0.4
38.6
8.4
0.7
4.4
6.5
2.0
1.3
1.2
6.4
7.8
60.5
1.2
6.6
16.7
0.5
8.0
20.0
7.0
0.5
100
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country Profiles, 2003; Turkey GDFI database.
31
Czech Rep.
2.0
0.2
1.9
38.1
4.8
1.3
3.1
6.5
5.9
3.6
1.7
3.3
6.5
0.7
0.6
0.0
59.8
6.6
1.5
15.0
0.3
11.2
14.7
9.2
1.2
100
Hungary
1.5
1.1
0.4
36.8
8.9
1.6
1.9
6.8
2.3
2.2
1.9
7.2
3.6
0.4
61.7
9.4
1.2
12.4
1.8
7.7
11.3
15.7
0.0
0.1
1.9
100
Table 4. Largest Affiliates of Foreign TNCs (Sales in million USD)
Company
Home Country
Industry
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Turkey – 2001
Tofaş Türk Otomobil Fabrikası A.Ş.
Oyak Renault Otomobil Fabrikaları A.Ş.
Vestel Elektronik San. ve Tic. A.Ş.
Ipragaz A.Ş.
Sasa Dupont Sabancı Polyester Sanayi A.Ş.
Mercedes Benz Türk A.Ş.
Philsa PhilipMorris Sabancı Sigara-TütünA.Ş.
Bosch Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Siemens Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Paşabahçe Cam Sanayi
Ford Otomotiv Sanayi A.Ş.
Goodyear Lastikleri T.A.Ş.
Trakya Cam Sanayii A.Ş.
Profilo Telra Elektronik Sanayi ve Tic. A.Ş.
BSH Profilo Elektrikli Gereçler Sanayii A.Ş.
Alcatel Teletaş Telekomünikasyon End.
Türk Pirelli Lastikleri A.Ş.
Korsa Sabancı Dupont End. İplik San. A.Ş.
JTI Tütün Ürünleri Sanayi A.Ş.
İzmir Demir Çelik Sanayi A.Ş.
TOTAL
Poland – 1999
Fiat Auto Poland SA
Makro Cash and Cary Poland
Centrum Daewoo Sp ZOO
Volkswagen Poznan Sp ZOO
Reemtsma Polska SA
Thompson Polkolor Sp ZOO
Real Sp ZOO
General Motors Poland Sp ZOO
Procter and Gamble Polska Sp ZOO
Geant Polska Sp ZOO
Unilever Polska SA
International Paper Kwidzyn SA
Renault Polska Sp ZOO
Kulczyk Tradex Sp ZOO
Auchan Polska Sp ZOO
Electrocieplownie Warszawkie SA
Frantschah Swiecie SA
Philips Lighting Poland SA
Jeronimo Martins Dystrybucja Sp ZOO
British American Tobacco Polska SA
TOTAL
32
Italy
France
Netherlands
France
Netherlands
Germany
Netherlands
Germany
Germany
Saudi Arabia
United States
United States
United States
France
Germany
Neth. /Belgium
İtaly
Netherlands
Japan
Saudi Arabia
Motor Vehicles
Motor Vehicles
Electronics
Petroleum Prod.
Chemicals
Motor Vehicles
Tobacco
Autoparts
Electrical Mach.
Glass
Motor Vehicles
Rubber
Glass
Electronics
Electrical Mach.
Electronics
Rubber
Textiles
Tobacco
Iron -Steel
Italy
Germany
Rep. Of Korea
Germany
Germany
France
Germany
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
France
Netherlands
U.S.A.
France
U.K.
France
Sweden
Germany
Netherlands
Portugal
U. K.
Motor Vehicles
Distributive Trade
Motor Vehicles
Motor Vehicles
Tobacco
Electrical Equip.
Distributive Trade
Motor Vehicles
Distributive Trade
Distributive Trade
Distributive Trade
Paper Poducts
Motor Vehicles
Distributive Trade
Distributive Trade
Electricity
Paper Poducts
Electrical Equip.
Distributive Trade
Tobacco
Sales
875.5
748.4
690.2
375.5
333.3
284.9
264.6
245.7
231.3
223.0
212.9
193.5
192.0
189.0
185.0
176.7
173.7
173.2
168.6
161.0
6098.0
1,844.1
1,544.8
916.6
661.5
595.7
439.3
423.7
411.3
400.0
387.9
383.6
360.7
360.7
304.8
297.5
293.0
289.9
289.4
262.0
282.9
10,749.4
Table 4. (Cont’d) Largest Affiliates of Foreign TNCs (Sales in million USD)
Company
Home Economy
Industry
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Czech Republic – 1999
Skoda Automobilovi AS
Makro Cr Spol SRO
Rewe Spol. SRO
Tabak AS
Philip Morris
Jihomoravska Energetica
Tesco Stores Cr AS
IPS AS
Delvita AS
Penny Market SRO
Severoceska Energetica
Jilius Meinl AS
Siemens Automobilovl Technika SRO
Stavby Silnic A Zeleznic AS
Plzensky Prazdroj AS
Autopal SRO
Glaverbel Czech AS
Robert Bosch Spol. SRO
Nestle Cokoladovny AS
Siemens Elektromotory SRO
TOTAL
Hungary – 2000
Audi Hungaria Motor Kft.
Philips Magyarorszag Kft.
IBM Storage Products Kft.
Matav Rt.
Panrusgaz Magyar-Orosz Gazipari Rt.
Flextronics International Kft.
Metro Holding Kft.
GE Hungary Rt.
Opel Magyarorszag Jarmugyarto Kft.
Kromberg Es Schubert Kabeleket
Vogel and Noot Mezogepgyar Kft.
Westel 900 Mobil Rt.
Budapesti Elektromos Muvek Rt.
Elmu Rt.
Tesco Global Rt.
Suziki Rt.
Hungarotabak Tobaccoland Rt.
Shell Hungary Rt.
Alcoa Kofem Kft.
BorsodChem
TOTAL
Sales
Germany
Germany
Germany
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
Germany
U. K.
Finland
Netherlands
Germany
Germany
Austria
Germany
France
Netherlands
U.S.A.
Belgium/Japan
Germany
Switzerland
Germany
Motor Vehicles
Distributive Trade
Mach.& Equip.
Tobacco
Tobacco
Energy
Distributive Trade
Construction
Distributive Trade
Distributive Trade
Energy
Distributive Trade
Motor Vehicles
Construction
Beverages
Motor Vehicles
Non-metal mineral
Motor Vehicles
Food
Mach. & Equip.
3,292.5
736.2
509.2
416.2
402.5
382.2
335.0
327.6
318.6
294.8
285.0
218.4
208.6
207.9
203.9
201.3
196.3
162.6
148.7
147.5
8,995.0
Germany
Netherlands
U.S.A.
Germany
Russia
U.S.A.
Germany
U.S.A.
U.S.A.
Austria
Austria
U.S.A.
Germany
Germany
U. K.
Japan
Austria
Netherlands/U.K
U.S.A.
Austria
Motor Vehicles
Electronics
Electronics
Telecom.
Distributive Trade
Electronics
Distributive Trade
Electronics
Motor Vehicles
Basic Metals
Basic Metals
Telecom.
Electricity
Electricity
Distributive Trade
Motor Vehicles
Trade
Distributive Trade
Basic Metals
Chemical
3,190.6
2,266.3
2,239.7
1,565.3
1,027.6
868.1
715.1
658.1
629.5
628.0
584.4
541.9
483.6
483.6
447.6
446.4
442.3
420.5
395.1
393.5
18,427,2
Source: Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country Profiles, 2003; Turkey GDFI database.
33
Table 5. FDI stocks by country of origin, 2000
Country of Origin
Austria
Belgium and Luxembourg
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
European Union – Total
Japan
South Korea
Switzerland
USA
Other OECD Countries – Total
OECD – Total
Other East European Countries
Israel
Saudi Arabia
Panama
Dutch Antilles
Other Countries
Total
TURKEY
0.5
3.4
0.5
0.1
7.3
14.1
0.2
2.0
31.4
2.2
1.0
6.0
68.7
4.4
0.7
5.4
8.7
19.2
87.9
0.4
0.1
1.1
3.7
1.2
5.4
Poland
3.2
2.5
2.5
0.6
12.2
18.9
1.2
4.3
24.6
1.9
3.5
3.3
78.8
0.4
1.3
2.5
9.5
13.7
92.5
4.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.8
Czech Rep.
11.1
5.4
1.2
0.6
4.3
25.5
0.0
0.8
30.1
0.2
1.4
3.5
84.0
0.5
0.0
4.0
6.5
11.0
95.1
1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
2.5
Hungary
12.2
5.3
0.5
1.6
6.5
25.8
0.7
2.7
22.5
0.4
0.9
1.1
80.2
2.1
1.0
2.1
8.2
13.4
93.6
0.4
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.0
100
100
100
100
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Database (WID) Country Profiles, 2003; Turkey GDFI database.
34
Table 6. Macroeconomic Indicators
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Percent of GNP
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
Primary Surplus
Interest Expenditures (Consol. Budget)
Public Sector Debt Stock
Domestic
External
Percent per annum
Interest Rate on Bonds and T-bills (average)
Inflation (CPI, annual average)
Ex-post Real Interest rate (CPI-based)
GNP Growth Rate
124.2 132.2 107.4 115.5 104.6 38.2 99.6
89.0 80.2 85.7 84.6 64.9 54.9 54.4
24.4 25.0 12.4 30.7 32.1 -10.5 36.0
8.0
7.1
8.3
3.9 -6.1 6.3 -8.5
Real Exchange Rate (CPI based index)
Real Exchange Rate (WPI based index)
Average maturity of Borrowings (days)
100 102.7 109.4 118.5 123.1 136.5 112.5
100 101.2 107 110.1 107.4 114.3 98.3
188.0 186.6 393.5 235.1 502.3 426.8 146.3
5.0
2.1
7.4
37.6
14.6
23.0
8.6
1.3
10.0
40.3
18.5
21.8
7.7
0.0
7.7
40.5
20.2
20.3
9.4
2.1
11.5
41.3
21.7
19.6
15.6
-1.9
13.7
51.8
29.3
22.5
12.5
3.8
16.3
53.4
29.0
24.4
15.5
6.5
22.2
97.8
66.3
31.5
Source: Yılmaz, Akçay and Alper (2002) and Özatay and Sak (2002).
Table 7a. Infrastructure-related factors -- Strengths:
Turkey vs comparators
Turkey
Demography and business values
Population - market size (millions)
Labour force growth (% change)
Ave. no. of working hours per year
Flexibility & adaptability of people (survey)
Entrepreneurship (survey)
Availability of competent senior managers (survey)
Physical and financial infrastructure
Internet costs for 20 hours (USD)
Adequacy of communications (survey)
Quality of air transport (survey)
Adequacy of distribution infrastructure (survey)
No. of credit cards issued (per capita)
Availability of finance skills (survey)
Poland
Czech.
Republic Hungary
67.8
2.46
2074
7.53
7.03
6.5
38.7
-0.33
1870
4.77
4.12
5.21
10.3
-0.04
1976
5.83
6.44
4.92
10.1
-0.47
1988
6.74
6.74
6.37
11.4
6.66
7.44
6.06
0.57
6.88
39.16
4.93
4.55
3.68
0.13
5.26
42.92
7.17
7
5.67
0.21
4.78
42.61
7.19
5.93
4.89
0.29
6.52
Note: All measures are from IMD, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002. The survey measures are all reported
on a 0-10 scale, with 10 indicating the most positive perception.
35
Table 7b. Infrastructure-related factors -- Weaknesses:
Turkey vs comparators
Turkey
Demography and business values
GDP per capita (USD at PPP)
Employment (% of population)
Adult literacy (% of population over 15 years)
Secondary school enrolment (% relevant age group)
Female labour force (% of total labour force)
Employee training in companies (survey)
Physical and financial infrastructure
Electricity costs for industrial clients (USD/kWh)
Adequacy of energy infrastructure (survey)
Computers per capita (per 1000 people)
Technological cooperation between companies (survey)
Credit flows from banks to business (survey)
Venture capital for business development (survey)
Czech.
Republic Hungary
Poland
6,175
29.1
84.6
51
26.4
4.03
9,151
37.1
99.0
87
45.1
3.74
14,485
45.8
99.0
100
44.7
5.61
12,663
37.4
99.0
97
44.5
5.78
.082
3.94
53
4.00
2.84
1.97
.037
5.57
122
4.03
3.39
3.42
.043
7.94
179
6.17
3.28
3.17
.050
6.69
176
5.19
4.52
3.48
Note: All measures are from IMD, World Competitiveness Yearbook 2002. The survey measures are all reported
on a 0-10 scale, with 10 indicating the most positive perception.
Figure 1. FDI inflows: Turkey vs comparators
10000
9000
Turkey
8000
Czech Republic
Hungary
USD millions
7000
Poland
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Year
36
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Figure 2. M&A-related inflows: Turkey vs comparators
10000
9000
Turkey
8000
Czech Republic
Hungary
USD millions
7000
Poland
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
Year
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics CD-ROM; UNCTAD, UNCTAD, World
Investment Report, selected years.
Figure 3. Privatisation revenues: Turkey vs comparators
14000.0
12000.0
Turkey
Czech Republic
10000.0
Hungary
USD millions
Poland
8000.0
6000.0
4000.0
2000.0
0.0
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Year
37
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Figure 4. Case studies
(1) The Eurogold investment
MARKET HISTORY
- Turkey possesses a rich and diverse array of
minerals
- Enactment of Mining Law in 1985
- Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
regulation enacted in 1993
EUROGOLD COMPANY
• Formerly Eurogold but subsequently
purchased by Normandy Mining Ltd
• Registered in 1989 as 100% FDI company
• Found gold reserves of 24,000 tons
DYNAMICS OF EUROGOLD CASE
LOCAL INHABITANTS OF OVACIK
REGION WENT TO LITIGATION
OPERATING
UNDER SPECIAL
PERMIT:
PERMANENT
SOLUTION NOT
ACHIEVED
LONG-LASTING AND
REPEATED LEGAL
PROCEDURES
(2) The Cargill investment
MARKET HISTORY
- 29 companies in traditional beet sugar
production
- 80% of capacity of beet sugar state-owned
- 5 private companies in starch-based sugar
production
CARGILL COMPANY
• US-based but Dutch registered
• Began starch-based sugar production
in 1990
• USD 90 mn. investment at Orhangazi,
January 1998
DYNAMICS OF CARGILL CASE
- LOBBYING FROM BEET SUGAR
PRODUCERS
- INAPPROPRIATE PERMISSION OF
HIGH PLANNING BOARD
REGULATORY BODY UNABLE TO
CREATE A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD
4 PENDING COURT CASES
SINCE 2001 ON
CONSTRUCTION, DISCHARGE &
EMISSION
UNPREDICTABLE
INTRODUCTION OF QUOTAS
38
OPERATING UNDER
SPECIAL
PERMISSION:
PERMANENT LEGAL
SOLUTION
REQUIRED
UNDER-CAPACITY
PRODUCTION
Figure 4 (cont’d). Case studies
(3) The Iş-Tim mobile telecom investment
MARKET HISTORY
- Revenue share agreements between TT and
Turkcell and Telsim in 1994
- Telecom Authority established by Law 4502
in 2000
- Third GSM licence was allocated to İŞ-TİM in
2000
- Another GSM Licence was granted to
AYCELL (state-owned)
İŞ-TİM ARİA COMPANY
• 3rd GSM Operator of Turkey
• Consortium of İş-Bank and
Telecom Italia
• Paid a licence fee of USD $ 2.5
billion
MARKET SHARES
(by end 2002)
- Turkcell 64..3 %
- Telsim 30.2 %
- Aria
4.7 %
- Aycell
0.8 %
• Started to operate March 2001
DYNAMICS OF İŞ-TİM CASE
RULE-MAKER
UNABLE TO CREATE A LEVEL
PLAYING FIELD
ROAMING AGREEMENT
COULD NOT BE SIGNED
39
ARBITRATION
Figure 5. Investment climate reform areas
40
T.C.
BAŞBAKANLIK
HAZİNE MÜSTEŞARLIĞI
DOĞRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIM RAPORU
25 Kasım 2005
İÇİNDEKİLER
Sayfa
Tablolar Listesi
i
I- Yurt İçinde Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar
1
1- Yabancı Sermaye İstatistikleri
1
2- Uluslararası İlişkiler
2
3
3- Yatırım Danışma Konseyi ve Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Faaliyetleri
3.1. Yatırım Danışma Konseyi
3
3.2. Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Koordinasyon Kurulu (YOİKK)
4
II- Yurt Dışında Doğrudan Yatırımlar
17
TABLOLAR LİSTESİ
Sayfa
Tablo-1:
Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sayısı
Tablo-2:
Kuruluş Türlerine Göre Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketler
1
2
Tablo-3:
Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sayılarının Sektörlere Göre Dağılımı
3
Tablo-4:
Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Kuruluş Türleri Açısından Sektörlere
Göre Dağılımı
Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sermaye Büyüklüğü Açısından
Sektörlere Göre Dağılımı
4
Tablo-6:
Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sayısının Ülkelere Göre Dağılımı
6
Tablo-7:
Tablo-9:
Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Kuruluş Türleri Açısından Ülkelere
Göre Dağılımı
Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Sermaye Büyüklüğü Açısından Ülkelere
Göre Dağılımı
Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar (Fiili Girişler)
9
Tablo-10:
Yabancı Sermayeli Şirketlerin Yatırımlarına Verilen Teşvik Belgeleri
10
Tablo-11:
Ülkeler ve Yıllar İtibariyle Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışına Toplam Sermaye
İhracı
Ülkeler ve Sektörler İtibariyle Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışına Toplam
Sermaye İhracı
Ülke Grupları İtibariyle Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışına Toplam Sermaye
İhracı
Ülke Grupları İtibariyle Türkiye’nin Yurt Dışına Toplam Sermaye
İhracının Sektörel Dağılımı
Tablo-5:
Tablo-8:
Tablo-12:
Tablo-13:
Tablo-14:
i
5
7
8
18
19
20
21
I-
YURT İÇİNDE DOĞRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIM
1- Yabancı Sermaye İstatistikleri
Doğrudan yabancı yatırım istatistikleri; ülkemizde kurulan yabancı sermayeli şirketler,
mevcut şirketlere yapılan iştirakler ve şube sayıları baz alınarak hazırlanmıştır. Bu istatistiklere
istinaden hazırlanan tablolar, 1954 yılından 2005 yılı Ekim ayına kadar geçen sürede ülkemize
gelen doğrudan yabancı yatırımların yorumlanmasında katkı sağlamaktadır.
17 Haziran 2003 tarihinde yürürlüğe giren 4875 sayılı “Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar
Kanunu” ile doğrudan yabancı yatırımların gerçekleştirilmesinde izin ve onay sistemi kaldırılarak,
bilgilendirme sistemine geçilmiştir.
2005 yılı Ekim ayı sonu itibariyle 9.778 adet yabancı sermayeli şirket ve şube kurulmuş
olup, 1.929 adet yerli sermayeli şirkete de yabancı sermaye iştiraki gerçekleşmiş olup, toplamda
11.707 adet yabancı sermayeli şirket ülkemizde faaliyette bulunmaktadır (Tablo-1).
4875 sayılı “Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar Kanunu”nun 17 Haziran 2003 tarihinde
yürürlüğe girmesiyle şirket sayılarında hızlı bir artış gözlenmiş ve 2003 yılında yabancı sermayeli
şirket sayısı bir önceki yıla oranla %88,4 oranında artmıştır. 17 Haziran 2003-31 Ekim 2005
döneminde, kurulan yabancı sermayeli şirket sayısı, önceki yıllarda kurulan toplam şirket sayısının
%86,5’sine tekabül etmektedir (Tablo-2).
11.707 adet yabancı sermayeli şirketin, başta toptan ve perakende ticaret olmak üzere,
imalat sanayi, gayrimenkul kiralama ve iş faaliyetleri sektörlerinde faaliyette bulundukları
görülmektedir (Tablo-3).
İmalat sanayiinde faaliyette bulunan yabancı sermayeli şirketlerde tekstil ürünleri imalatı
birinci sırada yer alırken, bunu gıda ürünleri içecek imalatı ile kimyasal madde ve ürünleri imalatı
izlemektedir.
“Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımlar Kanunu” nun yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten sonra ülkemizde
faaliyete geçen 5.429 adet yabancı sermayeli şirketin 232 adedinde kayıtlı sermaye 500.000 doların
üzerindedir (Tablo-5).
11.707 adet yabancı sermayeli firmanın ülke gruplarına göre dağılımına bakıldığında ise
AB ülkeleri ortaklı firma sayısının 6.076 adet ile birinci sırada yer aldığı görülmektedir (Tablo-7).
AB ülkeleri ortaklı yabancı sermayeli firmaların içinde Almanya 2.013 adet firma ile birinci
sırayı alırken onu Hollanda (922 adet) ve İngiltere (907 adet) izlemektedir (Tablo-7).
17.06.2003 – 31.10.2005 tarihleri arasında faaliyette bulunan AB ülkeleri ortaklı yabancı
sermayeli firmaların 128 adedinde kayıtlı sermaye 500.000 doların üzerindedir (Tablo-8).
T.C. Merkez Bankası tarafından yayımlanan ödemeler dengesi istatistiklerine göre; 2004
Ocak-Eylül döneminde 2.180 milyon ABD Doları olan fiili giriş, 2005 yılı aynı döneminde yüzde
71,6 oranında artarak, 3.742 milyon dolara ulaşmıştır (Tablo-9).
2005 Ocak-Eylül döneminde nakit sermaye girişinin %88,5’i AB ülkeleri kaynaklıdır. Bu
oran 2004 yılının aynı döneminde %81,6 olarak gerçekleşmiştir.
1
Yabancı sermayeli şirketlerce gerçekleştirilecek yatırımlar için, 2005 yılında Ekim ayı sonu
itibariyle 173 adet teşvik belgesi düzenlenmiştir. Bu yatırımların toplam tutarı 2.785,9 milyon ABD
Doları değerindedir (Tablo-10).
Söz konusu yatırım teşvik belgelerinde öngörülen toplam yatırım tutarının (2.785,9 milyon
ABD Doları) %54,6’ı yabancı ortaklar tarafından karşılanacaktır.
173 adet Yatırım Teşvik Belgesinin 136 adedi imalat, 28 adedi hizmetler, 2 adedi tarım, 7
adedi de madencilik sektörlerinde düzenlenmiştir.
2- Uluslararası İlişkiler
Ülkemiz girişimci sermayesinin yabancı ülkelere açılması, aynı zamanda yabancı sermaye
ve ileri teknolojinin ülkemize gelmesi yolu ile ekonomimizin küreselleşen dünya ekonomisi içinde
etkin bir şekilde yer alması, genel ekonomik politikaların ana hedefleri arasındadır. Bu çerçevede,
ülkemizde yapılan yabancı yatırımların korunması ve daha fazla yabancı yatırım gelişinin
özendirilebilmesi için, yatırım ve ticari ilişkilerimizin yoğun olduğu veya bu ilişkilerin
genişlemesine yönelik potansiyele sahip olduğu düşünülen ülkelerle, Yatırımların Karşılıklı Teşviki
ve Korunması (YKTK) Anlaşmalarının imzalanmasına 1962 yılında başlanmıştır. Ülkemizin
sermaye ihraç eder hale gelmesi ile bu süreç hızlandırılmıştır.
Bu kapsamda 2005 yılında Avustralya, Tayland ve Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri ile
müzakereleri tamamlanan YKTK Anlaşmaları imzalanmış olup, 2005 Kasım ayı itibari ile 74 ülke
ile imzalanmış bulunan YKTK Anlaşmaları’ndan 54’ü yürürlüğe girmiştir.
OECD “Yatırımlar Komitesi” kapsamındaki çalışmalar ve OECD – Çok Uluslu Şirketler
Rehberi Ulusal Temas Noktası fonksiyonunu Hazine Müsteşarlığı Yabancı Sermaye Genel
Müdürlüğü (YSGM) üstlenmiştir. Ayrıca, bir Avrupa-Akdeniz inisiyatifi olan Avrupa-Akdeniz
Yatırım Promosyon Ajansları Ağı (ANIMA) platformunda da Hazine Müsteşarlığı YSGM ulusal
koordinasyon noktası olarak görev yapmaktadır.
Yine çok taraflı ilişkiler kapsamında, Ekonomik İşbirliği Teşkilatının Bölgesel YKTK
Anlaşması müzakereleri ve promosyon amaçlı çalışmaları takip edilmekte ve DTÖ’nün “yatırımlar”
odaklı bazı çalışmalarına katılım sağlanmaktadır.
2
3- Yatırım Danışma Konseyi Ve Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Faaliyetleri
3.1. Yatırım Danışma Konseyi
Yatırım Danışma Konseyi (YDK), yatırımların önündeki engellerin azaltılması ve
Türkiye'nin uluslararası alanda yatırım yeri olarak imajının güçlendirilmesi ve yatırım ortamının
iyileştirilmesi alanında hükümet tarafından yapılan çalışmalara uluslararası bir bakış açısı
kazandırılması
amacıyla
dünyanın
önde
gelen
çokuluslu
şirket
yöneticilerinin
katılımıyla oluşturulan bir platformdur. YDK'nin oluşturulmasında hedeflenenler aşağıda
sıralanmıştır:
•
•
•
Çokuluslu şirketlerin üst düzey yöneticilerinin, yatırım yeri seçimi konusundaki bilgi
birikimlerinden faydalanarak, Türkiye'deki yatırım ortamının iyileştirilmesi çalışmalarına
uluslararası bir perspektif kazandırmak,
Türkiye'nin dünya ekonomisinde sahip olduğu rekabet gücünün artırmasına yönelik
çalışmalara katkı sağlamak,
Türkiye'nin yatırım ortamının iyileştirilmesi konusunda sağladığı ilerlemelerin, uluslararası
alanda duyurulmasına katkıda bulunmaktır.
YDK bu hedefler doğrultusunda ilk toplantısını Başbakan Sn. Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan'ın başkanlığında 15 Mart 2004 tarihinde İstanbul'da gerçekleştirmiştir. Toplantıda, Konsey
Üyeleri tarafından, Türkiye'nin yatırımcılar nezdinde rekabet gücünü artırabilmesi için öncelikle
uygulamaya konması gereken tedbirler sıralanmıştır. Bu tedbirler arasında, idari ve bürokratik
engellerin kaldırılması, yatırım yeri temini için imkanların genişletilmesi, KOBİ’lerin
güçlendirilmesi, eğitim ve altyapı imkanlarının iyileştirilmesi, yargı hizmetlerine etkinlik
kazandırılması, vergi ve yatırım teşvikleri konusunda iyileştirmeler yapılması gibi farklı alanlara
ilişkin hususlar yer almıştır.
Konsey toplantısında gündeme gelen önerilerle ilgili olarak alınan tedbirleri Sayın
Başbakan’a ve Üyelere sunmak üzere, ilgili kurum ve kuruluşların yanısıra YOİKK Teknik
Komiteleri’nin sağladığı bilgiler doğrultusunda Hazine Müsteşarlığı tarafından bir “İlerleme
Raporu” hazırlanmıştır. Müsteşarlık internet sayfasında da yayımlanan İlerleme Raporu’nda,
belirlenen alanlarda Konsey’in ilk toplantısından sonra uygulamaya konan tedbirler ve bu alanlarda
halen yürütülmekte olan çalışmalar detaylı olarak yer almaktadır.
29 Nisan 2005 tarihinde Sn. Başbakan’ın başkanlığında İstanbul'da gerçekleştirilenYDK’nin
ikinci toplantısına 19 çokuluslu şirketlerin üst düzey yöneticileri, Dünya Bankası, IMF ve Avrupa
Yatırım
Bankası
gibi
uluslararası
kuruluşların başkanları ile
Türk
özel
sektör
temsilcileri katılmıştır. 2005 yılında yapılan bu toplantıda, YDK üyeleri 2004 yılında
gerçekleştirilen toplantı sonucunda belirtilen hususlarla ilgili olarak İlerleme Raporu’nda yer alan
gelişmelerle ilgili olarak Türkiye'nin sağladığı başarıları takdirle karşılamışlardır. Toplantının sonuç
bildirisinde katılımcılar, birinci toplantı sonucunda belirlenen başlıklardaki gelişmelerin takibine
devam edilmesi ve “Sosyal Güvenlik”, “Kurumsal Yönetim” alanında da tedbirler alınması
gerektiğini vurgulamışlardır.
3
3.2. Yatırım Ortamını İyileştirme Koordinasyon Kurulu (YOİKK)
Makro ölçekde elde edilen başarılı sonuçların yanı sıra, ülkemizde yatırım ortamını hem
yerli hem de uluslararası yatırımcılar açısından daha cazip hale getirmek için oluşturulan YOİKK
çalışmalarına devam etmektedir.
Şu ana kadar belirlenen anahtar reform alanlarının hemen hemen hepsinde tatmin edici
gelişmeler kaydedilmiştir. Bu gelişmelerden bazıları aşağıda yer almaktadır.
“İş yeri açma ve çalışma ruhsatlarına ilişkin yönetmelik” 10 Ağustos 2005 tarihinde
yürürlüğe girmiştir. Yönetmelik ile işyeri açma ve çalıştırma ruhsatlandırmasında yerel
yönetimlerin yetkileri artırılırken ruhsat alımında bürokrasi azaltılmıştır.
Bunun yanısıra, aynı tarihte “Gayri Sıhhi Müesseseler Yönetmeliği” yürürlükten
kaldırılmıştır.
Kamu kesimi, özel kesim ve sivil toplum kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğini geliştirmek,
kaynakların yerinde ve etkin kullanımını sağlamak ve yerel potansiyeli harekete geçirmek suretiyle,
ulusal kalkınma plânı ve programlarda öngörülen ilke ve politikalarla uyumlu olarak, bölgesel
gelişmeyi hızlandırmak, sürdürülebilirliğini sağlamak ve bölge içi gelişmişlik farklarını azaltmak
üzere “Bölgesel Kalkınma Ajanslarının Kuruluşu, Koordinasyonu ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun
Tasarısı” hazırlanmıştır.
Bölgesel Kalkınma Ajansları’nın il birimleri, başvuruların yapılacağı, takip ve koordine
edileceği tek mercii olacaktır. Anılan tasarı, Meclis Genel Kurulu’ndadır.
16 Nisan 2005 tarihinde yürürlüğe giren “5331 sayılı Kanun” kapsamında; KOBİ tanımına
ilişkin esaslar, Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığı’nca hazırlanacak ve Bakanlar Kurulunca yürürlüğe
konulan yönetmelikle belirlenecektir.
Buna istinaden, “Küçük ve Orta Büyüklükteki İşletmelerin Tanımı, Nitelikleri ve
Sınıflandırması Hakkında Yönetmelik” 18 Kasım 2005 tarihinde yayımlanarak yürürlüğe girmiştir.
Anılan yönetmelikle, Avrupa Birliği mevzuatına uyumlu tek bir KOBİ tanımı yapılarak, bu tanımın,
içinde "KOBİ", "Orta Büyüklükteki İşletme", "Küçük İşletme" veya "Mikro İşletme" terimleri
geçen tüm kurum ve kuruluşların mevzuat ve programlarına uygulanması sağlanmaktadır.
Elde edilen bu kazanımların yanısıra, YOİKK kapsamında yapılan çalışmalara ivme
kazandırmak amacıyla, Mayıs 2005 tarihinde, yatırım ve yatırımcılarla doğrudan ilgili bakanlıklar
ve özel sektör temsilcilerinin daimi üye olduğu bir “Yönlendirme Komitesi” kurulmuştur.
Yönlendirme Komitesi ayda bir kere toplanmakta, Teknik Komite Başkanları ile istişare yapmak
suretiyle Teknik Komitelerin çalışmalarının hızlandırılmasını ve öncelikli konuların belirlenerek
YOİKK gündemine getirilmesini sağlamaktadır.
4
Uluslararası İşletme Geliştirme Enstitüsü (Institute for Management Development-IMD)
tarafından her yıl, ekonomik performans, devlet kurumlarının etkinliği, iş aleminin etkinliği, altyapı
başlıkları altında toplanan 314 farklı gösterge üzerinden yapılan değerlendirmeler sonucunda elde
edilerek yayımlanan Dünya Rekabet Gücü Sıralaması’nda da Türkiye’nin 2005 yılı sıralamasındaki
değişim, son dönemde alınan tedbirlerin etkisini ortaya koyar niteliktedir.
2004 yılında 60 ülke arasında rekabet gücü sıralamasında 55. sırada yer alan Türkiye bu yıl
7 sıra ilerleyerek 48. sıraya yükselmiştir. Bu ilerleme ile Türkiye, kendisiyle belirli açılardan
kıyaslanabilir, Yunanistan, Brezilya, İtalya, Rusya ve Polonya’nın önünde yer almıştır. 2005 ayında
yayımlanan rekabet gücü sıralamasına baz teşkil eden verilerin, bu yılın başında toplandığı
düşünülecek olursa yıl içinde ulaşılan performansın yansıltılmadığı sıralama sonuçlarının
Türkiye’yi daha da üst sıralara taşıyacağını söylemek mümkündür.
Dünya Rekabet Gücü Sıralamasında Değişiklik 2004-2005
-8
Türkiye
Çek Cum.
İsviçre
Macaristan
Finlandiya
Hollanda
Norveç
İrlanda
Almanya
İtalya
İsveç
Avusturya
Portekiz
Yunanistan
İspanya
Slovakya
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
lu
m
u
Ol
D
z
su
m
u
Ol
Kaynak:IMD (Uluslararası İşletme Geliştirme Enstitüsü) Dünya Rekabet Yıllığı 2005
Nitekim Türkiye’nin son dönemde yatırım ortamının iyileştirilmesi konusunda atmış olduğu
adımların olumlu sonuçlarını, kıyaslamalı olarak ortaya koyan farklı kaynaklara dayalı
değerlendirmeler de vardır.
Dünya Bankası ile Avrupa Yeniden Yapılanma ve Kalkınma Bankası tarafından yayımlanan
“İş Ortamı ve Girişimci Performans Anketi” (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey -BEEPS), Türkiye’nin bu anlamda 2002 ve 2005 yıllarında çekilen iki farklı fotoğrafını
kıyaslamaktadır. Ülkemizdeki 559 şirketin katılımıyla gerçekleştirilen anket sonuçlarına göre, 3
yıllık dönemde;
• vergi,
• makro ekonomi,
• hükümet politikaları,
• yolsuzluk, rekabeti önleyici uygulamalar ve
• maliyetin finansmanı
konularında önemli ilerlemeler sağlanmıştır.
5
Bu kapsamda, sözkonusu çalışmada açıkça ifade edilen, Türkiye’de son üç yıllık dönemde
bürokratik formalitelerin önemli ölçüde azaltılmış olduğu hususu, yine Dünya Bankası’nın ülkelerin
iş ortamını değerlendiren diğer önemli bir çalışması, “2006 İş Yapma Raporu”nun (2006 Doing
Business Report) aynı mahiyetteki değerlendirmelerini destekler niteliktedir. Alınan tedbirlerle, 9
güne indirilen Türkiye’de iş kurma süresinin Dünyadaki en kısa sürelerden biri olduğu yine bu
çalışmada yer almaktadır.
Anket sonuçlarına göre, son dönemde sıkça gündeme gelen bir diğer husus olan adalet
hizmetlerinin etkinliği ile ilgili olarak da olumlu bazı gelişmelerden sözetmek mümkündür. Aynı
anketin uygulandığı Avrupa Birliği’nin yeni üyesi olan sekiz ülke ile kıyaslandığında, Türkiye’de
adalet mekanizması ankete katılan firmalara göre daha etkin işlemekte ve kararların uygulanması
konusunda daha güvenilir görülmektedir.
İncelenen dönemde altyapı imkanlarının farkedilir ölçüde iyileştirildiği ve iş piyasasına
ilişkin düzenlemeler konusunda Türkiye’nin sözkonusu yeni AB üyesi ülkelere göre daha iyi
durumda olduğu da yine anketin bulguları arasında yer alan diğer olumlu gelişmelerdir.
Ayrıca, Türkiye’nin ekonomik potansiyeli ile orantılı olarak Doğrudan Yabancı Yatırımların
artırılması, bu meyanda YOİKK kapsamında faaliyetlerini sürdürmekte olan 10 Teknik Komitenin
çalışmalarının ele alınarak bu çalışmalar sonucunda yürürlüğe giren mevzuat ve iyileştirilen
uygulamaların etki analizlerinin yapılabilmesi için perspektif oluşturulması ve Avrupa Birliği (AB)
mevzuatına uygunluğunun eşleştirilmesi amacıyla bir Eşleştirme Projesi başlatılmıştır.
6
TABLO:1- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SAYISI
( Adet)
1954-1999
(Kümülatif)
Ocak
Şubat
Mart
Nisan
Mayıs
830
309
341
386
309
Haziran
Temmuz
343
341
Ağustos
330
Eylül
Ekim
Kasım
Aralık
Toplam
309
343
353
386
4.580
2000
22
31
54
38
48
35
44
24
45
27
70
54
492
2001
46
40
32
35
37
54
38
48
38
47
49
40
504
2002
39
34
38
41
44
40
53
41
45
43
35
64
517
2003
36
35
41
23
38
37
132
151
160
183
117
188
1.141
2004*
157
114
194
189
225
235
157
140
191
187
165
196
2.150
180
1.310
214
777
229
929
228
940
260
961
271
1.015
268
1.033
213
947
270
1.058
190
1.020
-789
-928
2.323
11.707
2005*-Ekim
Toplam
* Geçici Veriler
Kaynak: Hazine Müsteşarlığı Yabancı Sermaye Genel Müdürlüğü (HM-YSGM)
7
TABLO:2- KURULUŞ TÜRLERİNE GÖRE YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLER
(Adet)
1954-1999
Yeni
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004*
2005*-Ekim
Toplam
3.928
356
351
371
899
1.608
1.887
9.400
İştirak
495
116
119
123
206
478
392
1.929
Şube
Toplam
157
20
34
23
36
64
44
4.580
492
504
517
1.141
2.150
2.323
378
11.707
* Geçici Veriler
Kaynak: HM-YSGM
8
TABLO:3- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SAYILARININ SEKTÖRLERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI
(Adet)
ISIC
Kodu
A
B
C
D
Sektörler
Tarım, Avcılık ve Ormancılık
Balıkçılık
Madencilik ve Taşocakçılığı
İmalat Sanayii
15 Gıda Ürünleri ve İçecek İmalatı
17 Tekstil Ürünleri İmalatı
24 Kimyasal Madde ve Ürünlerin İmalatı
29 B.Y.S. Makine ve Teçhizat İmalatı
31 B.Y.S. Elektrikli Makine ve Cihazların İmalatı
34 Motorlu Kara Taşıtı , Römork ve Yarı-Römork İmalatı
36 Mobilya İmalatı; B.Y.S. Diğer İmalat
Diğer İmalat
E
F
G
Elektrik, Gaz ve Su
İnşaat
Toptan ve Perakende Ticaret,
1954-1999
(Kümülatif)
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004*
2005*-Ekim
Toplam
55
11
72
1.229
130
126
162
90
80
105
27
509
54
156
1.690
6
-10
102
8
3
12
11
13
14
2
39
11
14
164
6
2
8
96
8
13
8
6
15
10
4
32
6
25
182
5
1
18
81
7
13
5
7
5
8
6
30
7
18
220
27
2
14
277
19
70
26
21
23
18
15
85
9
30
445
30
2
33
372
49
61
46
28
19
19
30
120
17
140
929
25
3
42
382
34
69
33
29
14
16
39
148
9
275
663
154
21
197
2.539
255
355
292
192
169
190
123
963
113
658
4.293
51
1.514
125
506
309
85
270
17
14
45
64
1
2
4.580
10
140
14
40
49
10
62
--6
18
--492
7
153
22
56
50
6
45
1
3
4
14
--504
12
195
13
45
46
16
43
--6
11
--517
22
366
57
64
93
14
92
3
7
21
42
1
-1.141
17
839
73
79
219
8
236
3
12
27
43
--2.150
37
553
73
136
228
17
408
7
17
38
70
1
2
2.323
156
3.760
377
926
994
156
1.156
31
53
147
262
3
4
11.707
Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Motosikletlerin Satışı, Bakımı ve Onarımı;
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
50 Motorlu Taşıt Yakıtının Perakende Satışı
51 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Top. Tic. ve Tic. Komis.
52 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Perakende Tic.
Oteller ve Lokantalar
Ulaştırma, Haberleşme ve Depolama Hizmetleri
Mali Aracı Kuruluşların Faaliyetleri
Gayrimenkul Kiralama ve İş Faaliyetleri
Kamu Yönetimi ve Savunma, Zorunlu Sosyal Güvenlik
Eğitim Hizmetleri
Sağlık İşleri ve Sosyal Hizmetler
Diğer Toplumsal, Sosyal ve Kişisel Hizmet Faaliyetleri
Evlerde Yaptırılan Hizmet İşleri
Uluslararası Örgütler ve Temsilcilikleri
Toplam
* Geçici Veriler
Kaynak: HM-YSGM
9
TABLO:4- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN KURULUŞ TÜRLERİ AÇISINDAN SEKTÖRLERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI
(Adet)
ISIC
Kodu
Sektörler
A
B
C
D
Tarım, Avcılık ve Ormancılık
Balıkçılık
Madencilik ve Taşocakçılığı
İmalat Sanayii
15 Gıda Ürünleri ve İçecek İmalatı
17 Tekstil Ürünleri İmalatı
24 Kimyasal Madde ve Ürünlerin İmalatı
29 B.Y.S. Makine ve Teçhizat İmalatı
31 B.Y.S. Elektrikli Makine ve Cihazların İmalatı
34 Motorlu Kara Taşıtı , Römork ve Yarı-Römork İmalatı
36 Mobilya İmalatı; B.Y.S. Diğer İmalat
E
F
G
Elektrik, Gaz ve Su
İnşaat
Toptan ve Perakende Ticaret,
Diğer İmalat
2004
Yeni
İştirak
2005 -Ekim
Şube
Toplam
Yeni
İştirak
Şube
Toplam
22
-20
270
37
41
36
21
11
16
22
86
11
110
686
8
2
9
91
12
18
8
7
5
3
7
33
5
25
225
--4
11
-2
2
-3
-1
2
1
5
18
30
2
33
372
49
61
46
28
19
19
30
120
17
140
929
17
2
32
306
30
48
25
24
11
14
35
119
5
244
507
7
1
9
67
4
18
8
3
3
1
3
27
4
27
145
1
-1
9
-3
-2
-1
1
2
-4
11
25
3
42
382
34
69
33
29
14
16
39
148
9
275
663
10
614
62
57
160
5
193
3
11
19
41
--1.608
7
209
9
21
44
1
38
-1
7
1
--478
-16
2
1
15
2
5
--1
1
--64
17
839
73
79
219
8
236
3
12
27
43
0
0
2.150
28
419
60
108
178
11
369
6
13
31
55
1
2
1.887
9
124
12
28
42
5
33
-4
7
13
--392
-10
1
-8
1
6
1
--2
--44
37
553
73
136
228
17
408
7
17
38
70
1
2
2.323
Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Motosikletlerin Satışı, Bakımı ve Onarımı;
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
50 Motorlu Taşıt Yakıtının Perakende Satışı
51 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Top. Tic. ve Tic. Komis.
52 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Perakende Tic.
Oteller ve Lokantalar
Ulaştırma, Haberleşme ve Depolama Hizmetleri
Mali Aracı Kuruluşların Faaliyetleri
Gayrimenkul Kiralama ve İş Faaliyetleri
Kamu Yönetimi ve Savunma, Zorunlu Sosyal Güvenlik
Eğitim Hizmetleri
Sağlık İşleri ve Sosyal Hizmetler
Diğer Toplumsal, Sosyal ve Kişisel Hizmet Faaliyetleri
Evlerde Yaptırılan Hizmet İşleri
Uluslararası Örgütler ve Temsilcilikleri
Toplam
Geçici Veriler
Kaynak: HM-YSGM
10
TABLO:5- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SERMAYE BÜYÜKLÜĞÜ AÇISINDAN SEKTÖRLERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI
(Adet)
2004
ISIC
Kodu
Sektörler
A
B
C
D
Tarım, Avcılık ve Ormancılık
Balıkçılık
Madencilik ve Taşocakçılığı
İmalat Sanayii
15 Gıda Ürünleri ve İçecek İmalatı
17 Tekstil Ürünleri İmalatı
24 Kimyasal Madde ve Ürünlerin İmalatı
29 B.Y.S. Makine ve Teçhizat İmalatı
31 B.Y.S. Elektrikli Makine ve Cihazların İmalatı
34 Motorlu Kara Taşıtı , Römork ve Yarı-Römork İmalatı
36 Mobilya İmalatı; B.Y.S. Diğer İmalat
E
F
G
Elektrik, Gaz ve Su
İnşaat
Toptan ve Perakende Ticaret,
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
50 Motorlu Taşıt Yakıtının Perakende Satışı
51 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Top. Tic. ve Tic. Komis.
52 Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Moto. Dışında Kalan Perakende Tic.
Oteller ve Lokantalar
Ulaştırma, Haberleşme ve Depolama Hizmetleri
Mali Aracı Kuruluşların Faaliyetleri
Gayrimenkul Kiralama ve İş Faaliyetleri
Kamu Yönetimi ve Savunma, Zorunlu Sosyal Güvenlik
Eğitim Hizmetleri
Sağlık İşleri ve Sosyal Hizmetler
Diğer İmalat
200.000$ 500.000$
2005 -Ekim
Toplam
<50.000$
50.000$ 200.000$
30
33
372
49
61
46
28
19
19
30
120
17
140
929
14
2
25
221
18
39
19
17
5
11
20
92
4
152
447
8
-7
112
11
22
6
7
7
3
15
41
5
93
166
-1
6
29
2
2
5
4
2
1
3
10
-19
28
3
-4
20
3
6
3
1
-1
1
5
-11
22
25
3
42
382
34
69
33
29
14
16
39
148
9
275
663
-12
2
5
10
2
4
--2
17
839
73
79
219
7
236
3
12
27
22
380
45
90
159
9
299
5
13
28
9
135
22
32
50
2
88
1
2
6
3
21
4
6
13
-13
-2
1
3
17
2
8
6
6
8
1
-3
37
553
73
136
228
17
408
7
17
38
2
--97
43
0
52
1
2
1.523
15
--587
1
--119
2
--94
70
1
2
2.323
<50.000$
50.000$ 200.000$
17
1
18
211
25
37
25
16
10
10
19
69
8
95
662
6
-6
91
10
18
13
7
6
2
2
33
2
31
226
6
-3
32
8
3
5
2
2
-4
8
1
8
27
1
1
6
38
6
3
3
3
1
7
5
10
6
6
14
14
593
55
54
147
2
197
3
10
17
1
209
16
17
43
3
28
-2
8
2
25
-3
19
-7
----
35
--1.477
6
--471
---105
>500.000$
200.000$ 500.000$
>500.000$
Toplam
Motorlu Taşıtlar ve Motosikletlerin Satışı, Bakımı ve Onarımı;
O
P
Q
Diğer Toplumsal, Sosyal ve Kişisel Hizmet Faaliyetleri
Evlerde Yaptırılan Hizmet İşleri
Uluslararası Örgütler ve Temsilcilikleri
Toplam
Geçici Veriler
Kaynak:HM-YSGM
11
2.150
TABLO:6- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SAYISININ ÜLKELERE GÖRE DAĞILIMIa
(Adet)
Ülkeler
AB Ülkeleri (25)
Almanya
Hollanda
İngiltere
Fransa
İtalya
Diğer AB Ülkeleri
Diğer Avrupa Ülkeleri (AB Hariç)
İsviçre
Rusya Federasyonu
Kuzey Kıbrıs T.C.
Ukrayna
Bulgaristan
Diğer
Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri
Diğer Afrika Ülkeleri
Kuzey Amerika
A.B.D.
Kanada
Orta Amerika ve Karayipler
Güney Amerika
Yakın ve Orta Doğu Ülkeleri
İran
Irak
Suriye
Suudi Arabistan
Azerbeycan
Diğer
Diğer Asya
Çin Halk Cum.
Japonya
Güney Kore Cum.
Pakistan
Afganistan
Diğer
Avustralya ve Yeni Zellanda
Diğer Okyanusya ve Kutup Böl. Ülkeleri
Toplam
a
Not:
1954-1999
(Kümülatif)
2.363
833
368
317
228
188
429
569
202
162
58
26
19
102
52
18
307
283
24
32
5
928
302
133
129
80
67
217
268
73
44
37
21
17
76
11
27
4.580
2000
286
82
70
34
25
25
50
41
10
18
2
4
1
6
36
1
6
-4
13
-73
16
12
7
1
7
30
27
12
2
3
1
3
6
3
6
492
2001
260
70
42
41
14
26
67
50
16
16
-4
4
10
7
2
37
35
2
4
2
81
20
18
4
2
12
25
51
16
10
12
2
1
10
-10
504
2002
236
67
46
35
22
17
49
51
20
13
-3
4
11
14
1
45
41
4
1
-114
29
27
13
2
14
19
44
13
6
4
2
5
14
1
10
517
2003
475
159
73
68
33
32
110
144
17
50
8
10
19
40
21
11
65
58
7
3
-285
113
41
19
6
41
65
123
51
6
18
11
5
32
1
13
1.141
Yabancı sermayeli şirketler, kuruluş türlerine göre yeni şirket kuruluşlarını, mevcut bir şirkete iştirakleri ve şube kuruluşlarını içermektedir.
Firma adedinde baskın ülke, sermaye büyüklüklerinde ise ortağın ülkesi esas alınmıştır.
* Geçici Veriler
12
Kaynak: HM-YSGM
2004*
1.087
381
145
144
75
81
261
299
34
110
23
28
29
75
27
18
111
101
10
8
4
385
135
55
21
16
61
97
174
59
15
18
10
5
67
21
16
2.150
2005*-Ekim
1.369
421
178
268
61
52
389
292
27
107
17
28
29
84
36
13
101
87
14
9
2
352
109
57
32
17
50
87
127
24
6
14
9
6
68
13
9
2.323
Toplam
6.076
2.013
922
907
458
421
1.355
1.446
326
476
108
103
105
328
193
64
672
605
65
70
13
2.218
724
343
225
124
252
540
814
248
89
106
56
42
273
50
91
11.707
TABLO:7- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN KURULUŞ TÜRLERİ AÇISINDAN ÜLKELERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI a
(Adet)
Ülkeler
AB Ülkeleri (25)
Almanya
Hollanda
İngiltere
İtalya
Fransa
Diğer AB Ülkeleri
Diğer Avrupa Ülkeleri (AB Hariç)
Rusya Federasyonu
İsviçre
Bulgaristan
Ukrayna
Kuzey Kıbrıs T.C.
Diğer
Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri
Diğer Afrika Ülkeleri
Kuzey Amerika
A.B.D.
Kanada
Orta Amerika ve Karayipler
Güney Amerika
Yakın ve Orta Doğu Ülkeleri
İran
Azerbeycan
Irak
İsrail
Suriye
Diğer
Diğer Asya
Afganistan
Çin Halk Cum.
Japonya
Güney Kore Cum.
Diğer
Avustralya ve Yeni Zellanda
Diğer Okyanusya ve Kutup Böl. Ül
Toplam
a
2004
Yeni
827
290
108
116
57
52
204
216
84
26
20
16
18
52
22
13
78
69
9
3
2
296
113
43
38
28
15
59
129
51
11
8
7
48
13
8
1.608
İştirak
227
80
33
25
17
23
49
75
24
6
9
10
5
21
4
4
28
27
1
4
2
83
22
17
16
6
6
16
38
7
6
0
6
13
6
7
478
2005 -Ekim
Şube
33
11
4
3
7
0
8
8
2
2
0
2
0
2
1
1
5
5
0
1
0
5
0
1
1
0
0
3
7
1
1
2
2
3
2
1
64
Toplam
1.087
381
145
144
81
75
261
299
110
34
29
28
23
75
27
18
111
101
10
8
4
385
135
61
55
34
21
79
174
59
18
10
15
64
21
16
2.150
Yeni
İştirak
1.137
335
140
237
43
55
327
242
94
21
23
24
16
64
30
9
74
65
9
8
1
272
91
40
41
20
23
57
98
6
21
5
11
67
10
6
1.887
Yabancı sermayeli şirketler, kuruluş türlerine göre yeni şirket kuruluşlarını, mevcut bir şirkete iştirakleri ve şube kuruluşlarını içermektedir.
Firma adedinde baskın ülke, sermaye büyüklüklerinde ise ortağın ülkesi esas alınmıştır.
13
Geçici Veriler
Kaynak: HM-YSGM
Not:
207
74
35
29
8
6
55
45
13
4
6
3
0
19
6
3
22
18
4
1
1
77
18
10
16
6
9
18
25
0
3
1
3
18
2
3
392
Şube
25
12
3
2
1
0
7
5
0
2
0
1
1
1
0
1
5
4
1
0
0
3
-----3
4
0
0
0
0
4
1
0
44
Toplam
1.369
421
178
268
52
61
389
292
107
27
29
28
17
84
36
13
101
87
14
9
2
352
109
50
57
26
32
83
127
6
24
6
14
89
13
9
2.323
TABLO:8- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN SERMAYE BÜYÜKLÜĞÜ AÇISINDAN ÜLKELERE GÖRE DAĞILIMI a
(Adet)
Ülkeler
AB Ülkeleri (25)
Almanya
Hollanda
İngiltere
Fransa
İtalya
Diğer AB Ülkeleri
Diğer Avrupa Ülkeleri (AB Hariç)
İsviçre
Rusya Federasyonu
Kuzey Kıbrıs T.C.
Ukrayna
Bulgaristan
Diğer
Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri
Diğer Afrika Ülkeleri
Kuzey Amerika
A.B.D.
Kanada
Orta Amerika ve Karayipler
Güney Amerika
Yakın ve Orta Doğu Ülkeleri
İran
Irak
Suriye
Suudi Arabistan
Azerbeycan
Diğer
Diğer Asya
Çin Halk Cum.
Japonya
Güney Kore Cum.
Pakistan
Afganistan
Diğer
Avustralya ve Yeni Zellanda
Diğer Okyanusya ve Kutup Böl. Ül
Toplam
<50.000$
756
266
94
111
51
58
176
211
20
72
19
21
22
57
15
15
74
67
7
7
3
251
76
36
12
8
48
71
118
39
10
13
7
3
46
17
10
1.477
50.000$ 200.000$
224
74
29
24
18
15
64
51
6
21
1
6
6
11
10
3
22
21
1
-1
114
58
16
7
6
9
18
41
19
1
2
3
2
14
1
4
471
2004
200.000$ >500.000$
500.000$
56
51
25
16
11
11
6
3
1
5
3
5
10
11
18
19
3
5
9
8
3
--1
-1
3
4
1
1
--8
7
7
6
1
1
1
---12
8
1
-3
--2
1
1
3
1
4
4
7
8
1
-1
3
2
1
----3
4
2
1
-2
105
97
Toplam
1.087
381
145
144
75
81
261
299
34
110
23
28
29
75
27
18
111
101
10
8
4
385
135
55
21
16
61
97
174
59
15
18
10
5
67
21
16
2.150
a
<50.000$
911
287
118
196
40
33
237
198
18
73
13
18
20
56
27
10
61
55
6
7
2
211
68
29
18
8
28
60
86
11
4
6
9
4
52
7
3
1.523
50.000$ 200.000$
331
96
42
54
16
13
110
64
6
25
2
8
4
19
8
3
26
20
6
1
-116
35
22
10
5
20
24
32
11
2
7
-2
10
4
2
587
Yabancı sermayeli şirketler, kuruluş türlerine göre yeni şirket kuruluşlarını, mevcut bir şirkete iştirakleri ve şube kuruluşlarını içermektedir.
Firma adedinde baskın ülke, sermaye büyüklüklerinde ise ortağın ülkesi esas alınmıştır.
Geçici Veriler
Kaynak: HM-YSGM
Not:
14
2005-Ekim
200.000$ >500.000$
500.000$
64
63
22
16
9
9
10
8
2
3
3
3
18
24
19
11
2
1
8
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
5
4
1
---7
7
6
6
1
1
1
---18
7
4
2
4
2
4
-2
2
2
-2
1
5
4
-2
---1
----5
1
2
-2
2
119
94
Toplam
1.369
421
178
268
61
52
389
292
27
107
17
28
29
84
36
13
101
87
14
9
2
352
109
57
32
17
50
87
127
24
6
14
9
6
68
13
9
2.323
TABLO:9- DOĞRUDAN YABANCI YATIRIMLAR (Fiili Girişler)
(Milyon $)
Sermaye
Diğer Sermaye*
Sermaye
Giriş
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Ocak
Şubat
Mart
Nisan
Mayıs
Haziran
Temmuz
Ağustos
Eylül
2005 Ocak-Eylül
2004 Ocak-Eylül
Çıkış
Net
Kullanım
Geri Ödeme
Toplam
Net
Giriş
Çıkış
Net
Gayrimenkul
(Net)
Toplam
(Net)
934
914
852
953
813
1.707
3.288
590
659
1.225
-49
-192
-47
-13
-30
-725
-22
-5
-8
-100
885
722
805
940
783
982
3.266
585
651
1125
-------512
324
555
--------98
-236
-258
-------414
88
297
934
914
852
953
813
1.707
3.288
1.102
983
1.780
-49
-192
-47
-13
-30
-725
-22
-103
-244
-358
885
722
805
940
783
982
3.266
999
739
1422
--------987
1343
885
722
805
940
783
982
3.266
999
1.726
2765
88
259
97
264
109
202
1.057
508
734
3.318
983
-30
-2
-76
-169
-1
-36
-5
-1
-13
-333
-5
58
257
21
95
108
166
1.052
507
721
2.985
978
7
13
52
5
9
31
14
42
41
214
475
-15
--103
-21
-212
-63
--9
18
-405
-147
-8
13
-51
-16
-203
-32
14
33
23
-227
328
95
272
149
269
118
233
1.071
550
775
3.532
1.458
-45
-2
-179
-190
-213
-99
-5
-10
5
-738
-152
50
270
-30
79
-95
134
1.066
540
744
2.758
1.306
118
91
130
69
122
132
92
131
99
984
874
168
361
100
148
27
266
1.158
671
843
3.742
2.180
Not: Kaynak: T.C.Merkez Bankası
* Yabancı Sermayeli Firmaların Yabancı Ortaklarından Aldıkları Kredi
Geçici Veriler
15
TABLO:10- YABANCI SERMAYELİ ŞİRKETLERİN YATIRIMLARINA VERİLEN
TEŞVİK BELGELERİ
Belge Adedi
Toplam Yatırım
(Milyon $)
Yabancı Ortak Payı
(%)
251
198
228
225
11.459,6
2.546,9
1.429,7
1.747,1
45,6
38,6
40,5
72,4
21
22
20
23
23
21
21
9
16
16
21
26
239
79,2
278,9
126,0
132,3
130,7
304,0
148,8
193,2
43,9
91,2
235,1
2.107,1
3.870,3
48,3
50,2
33,5
41,0
56,6
46,9
55,8
56,5
41,0
67,6
69,1
55,5
41,2
10
24
16
27
11
19
19
10
17
20
257,6
554,0
58,1
153,2
162,3
65,1
126,6
32,3
910,2
466,5
45,4
55,0
61,5
79,1
88,0
75,2
47,1
66,1
45,7
58,1
2005 Ocak-Ekim
173
2004 Ocak-Ekim
192
2.785,9
1.528,1
54,6
47,2
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Ocak
Şubat
Mart
Nisan
Mayıs
Haziran
Temmuz
Ağustos
Eylül
Ekim
Kasım
Aralık
Toplam
2005
Ocak
Şubat
Mart
Nisan
Mayıs
Haziran
Temmuz
Ağustos
Eylül
Ekim
Kaynak: HM-YSGM
16
II- YURT DIŞINDA DOĞRUDAN YATIRIMLAR
Türk Parası Kıymetini Koruma Hakkında 32 sayılı Karar’ın 13. maddesine göre;
Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilerin yurtdışında veya Türkiye’deki serbest bölgelerde yatırım
yapmak veya ticari faaliyette bulunmak üzere şirket kurmaları, ortaklığa katılmaları ve şube
açmaları için, 5 milyon dolar veya eşiti dövize kadar nakdi sermayeyi bankalar veya özel
finans kurumları aracılığıyla, ayni sermayeyi ise gümrük mevzuatı hükümleri çerçevesinde
ihraç etmeleri serbest olup, 5 milyon dolar veya eşiti döviz miktarını aşan nakdi ve/veya ayni
sermaye ihracına Hazine Müsteşarlığı’nın bağlı bulunduğu Bakanlıkça izin verilmektedir. Bu
çerçevede, 1 Ocak 2005–31 Ekim 2005 tarihleri arasında, Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilere toplam
1,27 milyar dolar tutarında sermaye çıkış izni verilmiştir. Bu dönem içerisinde, Türk
yatırımcılar tarafından yurt dışında kurulan şube/şirket veya iştirak edilen firma sayısı 27’ye,
toplam sermaye ihracı ise 671 milyon dolar tutarına ulaşmıştır.
Yurt dışına doğrudan sermaye ihracında bulunan Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilere ait gerek
bankalar, özel finans kurumları, gümrük idareleri, gerekse bizzat bu kişilerce T.C. Hazine
Müsteşarlığına intikal ettirilen bilgi ve belgeler çerçevesinde oluşturulan kayıtlara göre,
Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilerce 1980 yılından itibaren 2005 yılı Ekim ayı sonu itibariyle yurt
dışında toplam 1609 adet şube/şirket kuruluşunda bulunulmuş veya kurulu şirketlere iştirak
edilmiş olup, 7.791.083.984,-ABD Doları tutarında sermaye ihracı gerçekleştirilmiştir.
2000 ve 2001 yıllarında yurt dışına doğrudan yatırım amacıyla gerçekleştirilen
sermaye ihracı tutarlarında, diğer yıllara nazaran büyük artışlar meydana gelmiştir. 2000
yılındaki artışın en önemli nedenini, vergi avantajı sağlayan Hollanda’ya özellikle Türk mali
sektörü ve kısmen imalat sektörü tarafından gerçekleştirilen büyük miktarlı sermaye ihraçları
oluşturmaktadır. 2001 yılı içerisinde de mali sektör tarafından vergi avantajı sağlayan ülkelere
sermaye ihracı gerçekleştirilmeye devam edilmiş olmakla birlikte, 2001 yılındaki artışın
hemen hemen tamamı Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığının (TPAO) Azerbaycan ve Orta
Asyadaki yatırımlarını artırmasından kaynaklanmıştır.
Türkiye’den gerçekleştirilen sermaye ihracı toplamı, 2002 ve 2003 yıllarında 400
milyon ABD Doları civarındaki tutarla istikrarlı bir seyir izlemiş olup, 2004 yılında %100’ün
üzerinde artarak 856 milyon ABD Doları tutarını bulmuştur. 2004 yılındaki artış, büyük
oranda TPAO’nun enerji yatırımları ile Hollanda aracılığıyla diğer ülkelere gerçekleştirilen
telekomünikasyon ve imalat yatırımlarından kaynaklanmıştır.
2005 yılında, Rusya Federasyonu, Ukrayna ve Türki Cumhuriyetlerdeki yatırımlar
dikkat çekmektedir. Hollanda’daki vergi avantajından yararlanmak isteyen Türkiye’de
yerleşik kişiler, bu yıl da diğer ülkelerdeki büyük ölçekli yatırımlarını Hollanda’dan finanse
etmeye devam etmektedirler. 2005 yılı içerisinde de TPAO tarafından, büyük enerji
projelerinin finansmanını teminen sermaye ihraçları gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bankalar, özel finans
kurumları ve yatırımcılar tarafından intikal ettirilen bilgiler doğrultusunda, 2005 yılında
Türkiye’de yerleşik kişilerce gerçekleştirilen sermaye ihraç tutarının 2004 yılı tutarını aşacağı
tahmin edilmektedir. 2005 yılındaki sermaye ihraç tutarları, imalat ve enerji sektöründe
gerçekleştirilen büyük ölçekli yatırımlardan oluşmaktadır.
17
TABLO 11-ÜLKELER VE YILLAR İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN YURTDIŞINA TOPLAM SERMAYE İHRAC
FİRMA
SAYISI
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
1998*
ÜLKE
A.B.D.
ALMANYA
ARJANTIN
ARNAVUTLUK
AVUSTURYA
AZERBAYCAN
BAHAMA ADALARI
BAHREYN
BELÇIKA
BEYAZ RUSYA
BIRLESIK AR.EMR.
BOSNA HERSEK CUM.
BREZILYA
BULGARISTAN
CAYMAN ADALARI
CEBELITARIK
CEK CUMHURIYETI
CEZAYIR
CIN
DANIMARKA
ENDONEZYA
FAS
FINLANDIYA
FRANSA
GÜNEY AFR. CUMH.
GÜNEY KORE
GÜRCISTAN
HINDISTAN
HOLLANDA
HOLLANDA ANTILLERI
HONG KONG
INGILTERE
IRAK
IRAN
IRLANDA
ISPANYA
ISRAIL
ISVIÇRE
ITALYA
JAPONYA
JERSEY ADALARI
K.K.T.C
KANADA
KATAR
KAZAKISTAN
KIRGIZISTAN
KUVEYT
LETONYA
LIBERYA
LIBYA
LITVANYA
LÜBNAN
LÜKSEMBURG
MACARISTAN
MAKEDONYA
MALEZYA
MALTA
MEKSIKA
MISIR
MOLDOVA
MONAKO CUMH.
NIJERYA
NIUE
OZBEKISTAN
PAKISTAN
POLONYA
ROMANYA
RUSYA FED.
SINGAPUR
SLOVAKYA
SUDAN
SURIYE
SUUDI ARABISTAN
TACIKISTAN
TAYLAND
TAYVAN
TUNUS
FİRMA
SAYISI
36
90
1
1
6
98
1
6
13
1
3
1
20
4
6.799.025
3.000.000
11.756.221
1.020.000
265.375
19.980
1.340.134
4.240.937
1.000.000
2
17
3
31.857.037
8.708.918
11
1
27
3
5
45
11.600.875
21.574
614.430.182
550.000
343.780
237.776.324
2
9
2
1.806.799
17.908.949
7.886
53
15
1
1
3
10
5
2
3
8
FİRMA
SAYISI
1999
60.158.852
281.413.686
12.000.000
34.722
16.692.815
112.554.746
474.410
24.235.000
50.781.550
4
2
3
2
1
32
6
1
5
80
2
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
80.368.595
479.428
78.064
2.838.120
45.763.990
299.948
72.099.409
22.638.222
42.152.230
15.604.169
2
6
11.054.353
18.040.403
180.000
1.056.516
29.268
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
FİRMA
SAYISI
2001
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
(ABD Doları)
FİRMA
SAYISI
2002
7
7
67.371.225
32.346.345
8
9
2.838.652
112.809.832
10
12
1
1
2
6.000.000
10.953.897
16.475.308
3
1
3
1
15.062
2.098
417.691.457
2
3
2
1
13.500.000
1.452.481
25.000
137.000
3
19.484.078
3
1.000.000
27.000
133.400
401.734
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
FİRMA
SAYISI
2003
6.303.686
3.985.839
1
2
28.800
733.627
177.374.137
49.999
187.500
58.613
2
569.200
7
9.299.104
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
2004
4
11
3.582.355
2.919.135
3
4
4
298.686.623
1
1
1.766.867
7.152.643
10.005.493
1
1
1
TOPLAM
FİRMA
SAYISI
(01.01.2005-31.10.2005)
2
2.506.500
2
5.646.074
1.486.766
365.662
269.367.176
2
1
55.404
1
42.532
3
339.257
3
1
235.000
9.790.134
1
1
1
1
7
5.119.944
1.000
713.290
12.096
1.121.333
1.642.738
4
2.006.402
80.000
5
2.131.525
1
1.800.000
93.333
4.949.837
6.000.000
1
1
264.942
3
83.500
25.887.959
1.000.000
1
3
1
458.002
125.000
61.000
3
231.708
200.000
4.977.371
200.000
489.749
343.000
21.500
1
1
2
10.000
21.089
10.367.048
1.770.000
1
3
47.729.497
6
2
1.640.210
942.000
146.562
1
7.672.500
10.200.000
4
1.113.459
11
49.415.443
6
746.046.593
11
463.355.694
10
157.705.981
10
1
2
347.300
199.273.129
5
70.872.716
3
11.544.177
3
195.738
4
584.070
1
6.500.000
754.777
128.421
1
1
1
2
1
184.900
4.079.510
865.049
6
1
1
2
1
11
4
312.103
4.842.163
4.865
42.000
3.183.000
937.817
70.000
13.882.949
444.921
40.851.961
346.327
3
252.120
3
47.260
1
2
2
5
16.483.572
100.000
50.000
13.813.697
9
1.503.197
12
1
3
2
2.980.000
3
302.295.684
728.344
469.339
1
200.000
1
206.968.744
1
1
1
278.643
0
3.035.456
35.582
3
1.828.489
431.844
93.220
150.736
106.774
47.910.789
1.300.000
10
1
199.354.910
6.000
1.376.001
465.741
3
6.768.290
1.218.300
1
1.115.292
1.316.581
215.662
2
2
1.175.114
125.187
1
2
89.858
4.004.383
18
810.162
50
49.055
2.705.728
248.000
1
6
1
138.000
4.888.151
6.800
593.308
7
0
825.933
12.421.069
1
8.532.000
2.000.000
2
1
1
12.824.501
15.344
85.227
2
1.500.000
2
187.934
0
4.168
102.799.714
3
564.901
4.959.634
165.200
1
725.000
3
4.413.840
1
2
1.296.000
9.140
50.187
2
206.750
1.009.500
6
1.085.257
16.520.225
12
11
3.957.582
7.366.240
3.877.748
3
1.705.126
1.487.629
69.794.250
3.119.383
12.854.461
442.160
16.662.097
1.961.566
332.470
10.200.000
1.292.570
50
2
6
90
62
3
12.178.055
678.786
1.253.725
75.793.479
99.197.557
162.000
5
1
1
115.407.256
40.000.000
47.670
1
1
1
1
40.040.754
2
307.693
2
1
1
2
8.301.500
359.340
1.108.100
100.435
2
5.623.954
1
435.000
607.879
21.445.435
2.522.541
1
9
4
1.540.248
34.392.843
13.298.406
332.500
1
5.353
39.372
1
1
1
150.000
2
4
1
482.110
1.283.571
45.399.830
5
1
140.000
3.720.000
375.000
1
7.922
2
497.380
8
7
1
1.661.000
1
47.840
1
1.140
4.030.093
388.118
541.465
2
10
7
313.259
8.039.588
1
2
1
1
54.225
1.785.000
1.785.000
2
373.447
10.081.604
6.104.874
218.627
17.790
1
1
4
3.794.555
20
23
26.938.916
4.057.037
1
2
43.850.000
762.090
1
1
125.139
4
1
1
60.000
2.462.156
390.000
75.000
2
150
262.880
856.347.836
759.995
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS
TÜRKMENISTAN
UKRAYNA
UMMAN
URDÜN
VIRGIN ADALARI
YUNANISTAN
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
581.452.038
10.000.000
8.528.198
6
FİRMA
SAYISI
1.100.000
6
3
1
1
1
6
FİRMA
SAYISI
2000
10
8
2
1
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
1
928
*31.12.1998 tarihi itibarıyla kümülatif toplam
2.128.546.343
1
1
4.271.394
833.948
101
185.750
649.908.806
3
4
7.286.054
1.955.300
1
2
17.236.394
767.500
89
1.189.972.388
1
2
6.026.323
126.330
2
7.878.535
65.960
1
5.030.134
1.124.957
1
2
98
900.000
64.505.000
52.233
1.458.862.464
4
1
104
910.746
8.904.258
189.795
425.657.073
1
1
112
821.110
187.740
410.643.984
18
2
9.998.000
60.000
10.007.028
27
317.068
671.145.090
72.455
İHRAÇ EDİLEN
SERMAYE
TOPLAM
80
143
1
5
11
118
2
12
18
2
10
4
1
45
5
1
8
10
13
2
1
4
3
35
3
1
16
1
86
5
5
63
1
9
18
5
2
37
20
1
6
188
2
2
79
16
2
1
1
8
3
1
19
9
8
3
12
1
12
5
1
2
1
62
2
11
138
94
3
4
2
3
7
1
1
2
5
1
25
39
1
3
10
6
1.609
186.680.367
461.877.722
12.000.000
7.565.350
39.802.452
1.891.641.888
10.704.409
39.380.750
52.419.848
105.000
1.280.457
25.117.357
3.000.000
67.723.574
1.021.000
9.713.290
481.304
27.884.129
4.790.814
4.262.437
1.000.000
1.410.002
146.089
94.277.095
10.478.918
200.000
30.622.416
21.574
2.485.188.336
1.856.000
2.067.081
520.990.538
0
19.722.839
31.948.769
1.653.727
135.220
84.971.471
108.752.683
78.064
2.908.120
79.057.826
844.869
188.000
442.207.572
24.132.893
2.980.000
725.000
1.100.000
19.365.968
1.487.629
0
249.894.761
43.143.867
13.345.238
481.532
26.463.597
499.340
8.193.850
432.905
10.200.000
1.688.610
585.000
37.054.215
678.786
7.920.372
158.402.760
170.400.956
162.000
2.053.078
2.003.627
2.225.630
4.030.093
0
1.140
125.139
5.316.640
9.998.000
57.551.356
20.632.716
390.000
19.194.595
118.847.868
1.195.466
7.791.083.984
TABLO 12- ÜLKELER VE SEKTÖRLER İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN YURTDIŞINA TOPLAM SERMAYE İHRACI
(1980 - Ekim 2005 dönemi kümülatif toplam
ÜLKE ADI
A.B.D.
ALMANYA
BANKACILIK
63.407.829
369.512.249
DİĞER
1.748.000
264.851
DİĞ. MALİ HİZ.
ENERJİ
15.000
ARJANTIN
ARNAVUTLUK
AVUSTURYA
AZERBAYCAN
6.000.000
36.899.355
4.752.872
1.820.433.668
BAHAMA ADALARI
BAHREYN
37.958.250
İMALAT
İNŞAAT
55.500.000
50.896.561
12.000.000
5.833.688
646.581
88.436
28.641.075
654.410
1.500.000
908.700
1.536.550
28.800
6.000
2.066.515
431.930
23.199.687
3.528.331
40.000
BEYAZ RUSYA
BIRLESIK AR.EMR.
15.141.101
BREZILYA
BULGARISTAN
450.000
22.792.671
120.000
1.011.000
CAYMAN ADALARI
CEBELITARIK
157.900
48.000
3.000.000
11.430.244
216.757
138.122
30.000
CEZAYIR
25.807.959
CIN
DANIMARKA
ENDONEZYA
1.384.249
1.329.000
4.113.039
1.000.000
FAS
68.000
264.808
50.000
10.000
FINLANDIYA
15.670.351
365.339
104.000
260.017
56.676.838
GÜNEY AFR. CUMH.
3.000.000
GÜNEY KORE
GÜRCISTAN
3.795.582
HINDISTAN
HOLLANDA
330.268.217
3.261.119
6.000
111.575.270
22.142.064
HOLLANDA ANTILLERI
21.574
882.096.682
12.592.124
7.218.003
IRAN
IRLANDA
50.000
26.050.262
43.072
ISPANYA
2.379.105
12.110.141
10.049.999
435.556
47.050.430
65.000
1.033.700
9.790.134
1.682.522
158.565
32.924.712
10.000
225.200
4.846
224.304
407.133
3.461.814
149.398
257.001
51.966.452
ITALYA
57.118
189.784
9.333.333
1.350.002
146.089
16.611.548
7.478.918
600.000
16.762.131
5.959
890.671.867
6.000
184.018.093
300.000
206.854.278
17.803.802
3.469.226
1.275.701
41.290
2.120.281
176.733.956
1.300.000
2.067.081
169.560.056
1.877.748
44.000
334.954
135.220
10.408.194
4.947.911
ISRAIL
ISVIÇRE
16.085 13.120.552
638.138 102.761.194
28.613
82.240
JAPONYA
61.937.015
KANADA
587.185
844.869
0
2.428.661
964.365
392.812
43.794.023
16.593.766
188.000
2.069.459
165.200
KATAR
KAZAKISTAN
KIRGIZISTAN
32.308.530
2.048.000
200.724
2.495.000
287.673.037
30.000
3.700.723
2.031.372
12.882.630
KUVEYT
LETONYA
19.980
3.755.002
3.597.367
41.125
133.416
2.908.120
1.203.106
19.013.506
5.325.927
2.980.000
5.723.640
58.948
38.770.663
3.000.000
1.100.000
19.365.968
LITVANYA
MAKEDONYA
1.462.629
89.500.000
2.601.297
12.691.122
26.961.054
40.528.528
471.032
350.160
6.120
MALEZYA
MALTA
300.001
11.746.000
9.140
47.670
11.145.037
MEKSIKA
MISIR
7.430.615
322.200
MOLDOVA
100.000
10.200.000
MONAKO CUMH.
NIJERYA
1.292.570
396.040
23.683.533
235.000
3.595.243
75.267.118
42.841.420
35.000
59.578
300.000
NIUE
OZBEKISTAN
4.618.132
PAKISTAN
196.050
443.786
POLONYA
ROMANYA
RUSYA FED.
20.036.637
70.234.716
98.129
108.238
2.112.501
50.000
SINGAPUR
SLOVAKYA
4.924
2.993.136 12.549.600
4.474.796
4.320.205
37.602.146
52.593.848
78.000
1.993.500
2.003.627
2.225.630
77.000
SURIYE
SUUDI ARABISTAN
1.500.000
435
50.000
4.900
7.112.181
97.938
49.000
554.312
4.030.093
TAYLAND
1.140
125.139
999.995
TAYVAN
TUNUS
4.316.645
TURKS AND CAICOS ISLANDS
9.998.000
2.884.904
UKRAYNA
59.100
2.254.530
41.695.410
5.033.166
1.049.543
9.400.797
8.617.302
34.000
UMMAN
URDÜN
VIRGIN ADALARI
65.231.110
YUNANISTAN
TOPLAM (01.01.1980-31.10.2005)
25.000
121.687.707
4.902
129.294
131.372
13.518.559
499.340
763.235
10.270
585.000
8.201.600
SUDAN
TÜRKMENISTAN
43.500
215.000
725.000
LIBYA
MACARISTAN
834.000
5.540.277
250.000
LIBERYA
LÜKSEMBURG
500.000
1.407.723
78.064
JERSEY ADALARI
K.K.T.C
TOPLAM
ULAŞTIRMA (01.01.1980-31.10.2005)
935.000
16.027.810
200.000
9.458.744
HONG KONG
INGILTERE
TURİZM
9.713.290
CEK CUMHURIYETI
FRANSA
TİCARET
56.790.850
22.213.247
1.422.500
BELÇIKA
BOSNA HERSEK CUM.
MADENCİLİKSİGORTACILIK TELEKOMUN.
1.368.950.553
40.576.476 1.037.808.789
72.455
1.786.949
272.040
2.158.682.508 1.614.617.699 186.555.349 26.824.457
19.047.140
5.146.966 326.791.890
19
500.403
3.851.123
390.000
75.000
44.712.500
733.675
920.854.473
2.803.794
7.117.309
4.001
94.727.324
185.750
9.547.500
186.680.367
461.877.722
12.000.000
7.565.350
39.802.452
1.891.641.888
10.704.409
39.380.750
52.419.848
105.000
1.280.457
25.117.357
3.000.000
67.723.574
1.021.000
9.713.290
481.305
27.884.129
4.790.814
4.262.437
1.000.000
1.410.002
146.089
94.277.095
10.478.918
200.000
30.622.416
21.574
2.485.188.336
1.856.000
2.067.081
520.990.538
19.722.839
31.948.769
1.653.727
135.220
84.971.471
108.752.683
78.064
2.908.120
79.057.826
844.869
188.000
442.207.572
24.132.893
2.980.000
725.000
1.100.000
19.365.968
1.487.629
249.894.761
43.143.867
13.345.238
481.532
26.463.597
499.340
8.193.850
432.905
10.200.000
1.688.610
585.000
37.054.215
678.786
7.920.372
158.402.760
170.400.956
162.000
2.053.078
2.003.627
2.225.630
4.030.093
1.140
125.139
5.316.640
9.998.000
57.551.356
20.632.716
390.000
19.194.595
118.847.868
1.195.466
7.791.083.984
TABLO 13- ÜLKE GRUPLARI İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN YURTDIŞINA TOPLAM SERMAYE İHRACI
(ABD Doları)
Ülke Grupları
Afrika
Batı Avrupa
Doğu Asya ülk.
Doğu Avrupa-Balkan ülk.
K.K.T.C.
Kuzey Amerika
Latin Amerika
Off-shore merkezleri
Orta Asya ve Kafkas ülk.
Orta Doğu
Toplam
1998*
15.777.589
1.405.751.640
4.066.498
216.951.084
45.763.990
60.458.800
15.000.000
100.929.627
258.010.223
5.836.892
2.128.546.343
1999
2.542.090
410.139.600
612.242
106.766.570
13.882.949
42.597.151
0
1.456.516
71.182.585
729.103
649.908.806
2000
1.241.500
954.660.462
0
52.199.982
16.483.572
67.471.225
359.340
23.569.000
53.399.013
20.588.294
1.189.972.388
2001
825.933
598.814.469
0
51.735.333
1.503.197
2.838.652
140.000
67.141.734
728.463.146
7.400.000
1.458.862.464
2002
42.494.952
167.383.641
1.040.512
11.328.159
6.303.686
0
9.141.757
186.343.360
1.621.006
425.657.073
*1998 yılı: 1980 yılı itibariyle kümülatiftir.
20
2003
4.294.755
67.217.601
200.000
14.770.177
810.162
3.582.355
0
9.621.110
307.247.532
2.900.292
410.643.984
2004
5.960.550
215.643.641
3.143.878
23.842.972
49.055
1.766.867
0
10.720.290
587.492.246
7.728.337
856.347.836
(01.01.2005-31.10.2005)
3.204.375
316.574.876
543.000
43.138.293
564.901
2.506.500
0
10.198.000
291.072.235
3.342.911
671.145.090
Toplam
76.341.744
4.136.185.930
9.606.130
520.732.570
79.057.826
187.525.236
15.499.340
232.778.034
2.483.210.340
50.146.834
7.791.083.984
TABLO 14- ÜLKE GRUPLARI İTİBARİYLE TÜRKİYE'NİN YURTDIŞINA TOPLAM SERMAYE İHRACININ SEKTÖREL DAĞILIMI
(1980 - Ekim 2005 dönemi, kümülatif toplam, ABD Doları)
Ülke Grubu
Afrika
Batı Avrupa
Doğu Asya ülk.
Doğu Avrupa-Balkan ülk.
K.K.T.C.
Kuzey Amerika
Latin Amerika
Off-shore merkezleri
Orta Asya ve Kafkas ülk.
Orta Doğu
Toplam
FİNANSAL HİZM.
0
1.958.185.613
21.574
151.807.045
68.066.399
63.422.829
0
117.067.898
53.334.950
0
2.411.906.308
ENERJİ
25.807.959
12.592.124
0
2.462.430
0
0
0
9.713.290
2.108.106.705
0
2.158.682.508
İMALAT
14.424.079
1.161.811.680
3.149.160
181.371.197
964.365
55.500.000
15.000.000
654.410
163.866.551
17.876.257
1.614.617.699
İNŞAAT
MADENCİLİK TELEKOMUN.
20.076.816
3.000.000
10.000
130.400.608
82.240
240.694.931
0
0
0
19.398.135
12.578.400
134.000
392.812
30.000
2.031.372
5.833.688
450.000
1.500.000
0
0
0
1.786.949
0
10.500.000
4.190.202
10.683.817
52.844.447
4.476.140
0
19.077.140
186.555.349
26.824.457
326.791.890
21
TİCARET
13.002.910
572.266.596
5.864.546
144.268.113
1.203.106
56.790.850
499.340
73.084.178
45.157.536
8.717.298
920.854.473
TURİZM
0
31.253.534
127.064
7.696.321
5.723.640
935.000
0
7.367.309
41.624.457
0
94.727.324
ULAŞTIRMA
19.980
2.618.329
0
745.343
58.948
500.000
0
2.600.000
3.004.900
0
9.547.500
DİĞER
0
26.280.275
443.786
271.587
587.185
2.592.869
0
10.004.000
396.774
0
40.576.476
TOPLAM
76.341.744
4.136.185.929
9.606.130
520.732.571
79.057.826
187.525.236
15.499.340
232.778.034
2.483.210.340
50.146.834
7.791.083.984