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OZAL'S POLITICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO RELIGION
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University
by
MURAT ÇEMREK
In Partial Fulfillment Of The Requirements for The Degree Of
MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
m
·' ,
THE DEPARTMENT OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
September, 1997
гГ>>
Оо
ОО
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in Political
Science and Public Administration.
Prof. Dr. Metin Heper
(Supervisor)
P fo f.^ .'E fg u n Ozbucipn
Examining Committee Member
*^sst. Prof. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu
Examining Committee Members
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
Prof. Dr. Ali Karaosmanoğlu
Director
ABSTRACT
ÖZAL'S POLITICS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO RELIGION
Murat (êmrek
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
August, 1997
Present thesis aims to analyze ÖzaTs politics while taking his special
reference to religion into consideration. About Özal's politics, domestic and
international politics, the Southeast problem, economy and religion form the
framework of this study. During 1983-1993, when Özal was on the stage either as
Prime Minister or President, religion became an important factor in the life of
Turkish society and the style of the relations between politics and religion
changed a great deal. Özal introduced a new identity to Turkey since he defined
himself as both a Muslim and a modern person. On the one hand, Özal stressed
that Turkey is a secular state, on the other hand, he indicated that Islam kept
society together. As a conclusion, Özal is evaluated as the last Ottoman sultan
who is an engineer-merchant one but not a mullah. This evaluation generates
from ÖzaTs style in policy formation as an engineer calculating the optimum
risks and as a merchant searching for the most profitable one.
Keywords: Turkish Politics, Turgut Özal, Religion, Islam
III
ÖZET
DİNE ÖZEL GÖNDERMEYLE ÖZAL'IN SİYASETİ
Murat Çemrek
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi
Ağustos, 1997
Mevcut tez ÖzaTm siyasetini dine yaptığı özel göndermeyi dikkate alarak
analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. ÖzaTm siyaseti hakkında, iç ve uluslararası
siyaset. Güneydoğu sorunu, ekonomi ve din bu çalışmanın çerçevesini
oluşturmaktadır. ÖzaTm sahnede Başbakan ya da Cumhurbaşkanı kaldığı 19831993 süresinde, din Türk toplumunun hayatında önemli bir faktör haline geldi ve
siyaset ve din arşındaki ilişkinin şekli oldukça değişti. Özal kendisini hem bir
Müslüman hem de modern bir kişi olarak tanımladığından dolayı Türkiye'ye
yeni bir kimlik tanıttı. Özal bir yandan Türkiye'nin laik bir ülke olduğunu
vurgularken, diğer yandan da İslamın toplumu birarada tuttuğunu belirtti.
Sonuç olarak, Özal mühendis-tüccar fakat molla olmayan son Osmanlı sultanı
olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bu değerlendirme ÖzaTm politika oluşturmada bir
mühendis gibi optimum riskleri hesap eden ve bir tüccar gibi en karlı olanı
araştıran çizgisinden kaynaklanmaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk Siyaseti, Turgut Özal, Din, İslam
IV
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
First of all, I must express my deep obligation to Prof. Dr. Metin Heper for
his patience and encouragement throughout the whole process.
I would like to express my special gratitude to Jeremy Salt, Ergun
Özbudun, Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, Burak Arikan, Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Ayşe
Kadıoğlu and Evren Esen who have either read or provided their comments and
recommendations.
I am grateful to my parents who encouraged me in my studies.
I would like to thank my friends, especially to Ahmet Ali Temurd for
their valuable ideas.
To My Grandmothers,
Illiterate But Wise Women...
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT...................................................................................................
iii
ÖZET.............................................................................................................
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.........................................................................
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.............................................................................
vi
INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................
1
CHAPTER 1: POLITICS AND RELIGION................................................
5
1.
1 Politics....................................................................................
6
1. 1.1. Politicsin Islam...................................................................
9
1. 2. Religion...................................................................................
13
1. 3. Secularism............................................................................
19
CHAPTER 2: ISLAM IN OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKISH STATE..
25
2. 1. The Role of Islam in the Ottoman Period..............................
27
2. 1.1. Classical Age.......................................................................
27
2. 1. 2. The Tanzimat Vexiod........................................................
32
2. 2. The Republican Period..........................................................
38
2. 2. 2. Military Intervention of 12 September 1980.......................
45
CHAPTER 3: ÖZAL ON THE VERGE OF ISLAMIC POLITICS?............
50
3.1. ÖzaTs Biography......................................................................
53
3.2. Özal and Domestic Politics.....................................................
57
3. 2.1. Özal and the Southeast Problem.......................................
72
3.3. Özal and International Politics..............................................
75
3.4. Özal and Economy...............................................................
78
3.5. Özal and Religion................................................................
81
VI
CHAPTER 4: THE LAST OTTOMAN SULTAN,
AN ENGINEER-MERCHANT ONE NOT A MULLAH...
93
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY.
109
VII
INTRODUCTION
Religion is one of the most important phenomena of Turkish politics. The
role of religion has changed a great deal within the Republican period, following
the inclusion of the principle of secularism into the Constitution in 1937.
Essentially, the roots of secularism can be traced back to the Tanzim at (Reform)
period. This is so because in the following period one of the aims of the
Tanzimat, was to establish a central bureaucracy, secular in character; from that
point onwards, rationalism became the measuring rod for the formulation of the
national interest rather than religion. Because the political conception as the basis
of the Tanzim at ^Qxxoài is closely linked to the rationalist tradition of the eighteen
century Western Europe.'
Until this period in the history of the Ottoman Empire, the state seemed to
be subservient to religion, according to the state philosophy of the Sunni
interpretation of Islam. But the state kept its autonomous character vis-à-vis
religion with the help of the religious bureaucracy loyal to the state in the
persona of the Sultan. Moreover, the Adab tradition and the O rf-i Sultani
provided the basis for this autonomy.
' Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery Relations in the Ottoman Empire; With Special Reference
to the Nineteenth Century," International Political Science Review, 1, 1 (1980), 91 in Menderes
^mar, "An Evaluation of the Recent Debates on Restructuring of the Turkish Government:
Federalism and Unitary State Arguments," Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent
University, 1993), 26-27.
^ The formation of m ezheps (sects) is mainly due to the political confrontation and the different
conceptualizations of fate. The dichotomy between Sunni and Shia has been shaped on the basis
of conceptualization of state.
However, the Kanuimames (secular directives of the Sultan) had to be
compatible with the provisions of the Sharia (Islamic Canon Law).^ The new
formations of the Tanzim at reforms marked the beginning of unending debates
between the religious and the secularized new strata of bureaucracy until the
abolition of the religious bureaucracy in the Republican period. The Tanzimat
reforms pronounced loyalty to the Sharia on the one hand, but on the other, the
promulgation of some new laws decreased the significance of the religious
bureaucracy and its network.
Since the 1980s, religion has gained an increasingly important place on the
agenda of the society and the state in Turkey. For instance, at the present writing,
the mass media has been full of news and comments about the İfta ^ given by the
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan.® The leaders of the prominent tarikats
(religious brotherhoods) and cemaats (religious communities)^ were invited to
the Official Residence of the Prime Ministry on his occasion. The triaP of Ms.
Fadime Şahin who claimed to have been cheated by a quasi tarikat leader, Ali
Kalkancı, also hit the headlines. The latter event is very interesting because it
followed a police operation directed against Müslüm Gündüz -the leader of the
^ Burhanettin Duran, "Kenan Evren's and Turgut Özal's Conceptualization of Secularism A
Comparative Perspective." Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara; Bilkent University, 1994), 7.
^İftar means the dinner to end the fastening of Muslims.
^Necmettin Erbakan is the leader of the Prosperity Party (PP) which is pro-Islamic in attitudes as
could as possible within the secular laws and the PP is the last chain of the tradition of the
National Order Party (NOP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) which were established
again under his leadership.
^ The concept of tarikat carries mysticism in essence; cemaat, however, does not connote such a
meaning.
A czim endi tarikat-^ Gündüz was accused of having established a gang to
destroy the secular character of the state. Şahin was found with him. Another
important event is a list of the names linking Fethullah Gülen, a famous figure in
the 1990s as a leader of a cemaat"^ which is one of the branches of the Nurcus^^, to
the Mafia. Despite, the discussions about religion and its repercussions taking the
first seat in popular daily debates, the secular character of the state is strictly
underlined by the state elites.
In order to understand today's Turkey within the framework of the
relations between politics and religion, we need to go back to the Özalian era.
During 1983-1993, when Özal was on the stage either as Prime Minister or
President, religion became an important factor in the life of the society and the
style of the relations between politics and religion changed a great deal.
^ In fact there are several trials suited by her against Ali Kalkancı, Müslüm Gündüz and the
Ministry of Interior. For further information see M illiyet and other Istanbul daily newspapers of
11 January 1997.
®This tarikat is a newly established one which is keen on the execution of Surma (the life and
practices) of the Prophet Muhammad in many ways, most visibly in their dressing.
^ Fethullah Gülen is a retired preacher who is shown as a tarikat leader in the mass media as a
misinformation. In fact. Gülen, or Fethullah Hoca, as he is popularly known, is in debt to Hikmet
Çetinkaya, a columnist in Cumhuriyet, Istanbul daily, whom Gülen sued more than one thousand
times, winning each of these trials. Cumhuriyet is known for its harsh attitudes towards the
Islamic circles in the country.
The Nurcu ecole was established by Bediüzzaman Saidi Nursi by pamphlets he had written to
prevent the formation of atheism due to the positivist education. A/br means light in Arabic and
Nurcu is intended to mean the disseminator of the light generating from the Qu'ran to society.
Following the death of Saidi Nursi, the ecole was divided into different branches and groups by
his first generation of the pupils and 'others' who followed the methods and discourses. It is
interesting that the cemaat under the leadership of Fethullah Gülen and the tarikat under the
leadership of Müslüm Gündüz take the pamphlets of Saidi Nursi as source. Moreover both Gülen
and Gündüz are not from the first generation of the pupils. But they can be included within
'others' as they are far from the orthodoxy of the Nurcus represented by the first generation of
the pupils and their followers. However, the deviation in the examples of Gülen and Gündüz is
so much apparent even though they are on the different sides of the hill. Because the first
generation of the pupils of Saidi Nursi and their followers try to be remote from media, tarikat
activities and prevent to get the attentions of people on themselves.
In the first chapter, the issues of religion and politics will be addressed
through an etymological analysis. Moreover, special references to the history of
the Islamic and Christian culture will be made.
The second chapter will focus on the development of the interaction
between state and religion within the context of the Turkish political history both
in the Ottoman period and the Republican era.
In the third chapter, I study OzaTs approach to politics and religion
within his conceptualizations. I mainly deal with his policies about domestic and
international politics, the Southeast problem, economy and religion.
In the final, fourth, chapter, I briefly assess Ozal as the last Ottoman sultan
who is an engineer-merchant one not a mullah. This evaluation generates from
his style in approaching the matters as an engineer calculating the optimum risks
and as a merchant searching for the most profitable one.
CHAPTER I
POLITICS AND RELIGION
Islam is mainly observed as a total religion rather than a mere
composition of theological beliefs and worship rituals. It is also a means of
guiding political, social and economic aspects of life for the M uslim s, its true
believers.
In the
Western understanding,
religion is conceptualized
as a
compartment of life to be reserved for certain ritualistic matters, so it is separated
from other spheres of life such as economy. This is in contrast with the Islamic
understanding of religion. It is also contrary to the inauguration of the prophets
not just Muhammad but Jesus too. All the prophets are expected to invite people
to obey the rules of revelation, namely the regulation of life, and not only the
ritualistic matters. Yet the Bible depicts "Render to God that which is God's and
to Caesar that which is Caesar's"" While, Allah of Islam does not share his
power with anyone else.
Before discussing the issue, it will be useful to dwell on the concepts such
as religion, politics, secularism from the perspectives of Islam and modern
thought. Then, these concepts; politics and siyaset, religion and din·, and
secularism will be explained with their historical background embracing them.
" Mark, 12:13; Matta, 22:15, Luke, 20:25 quoted in Ali Bulaç, İslam ve Demokrasi, TeokrasiTotaliterizm (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1993), 119.
Politics
Politics is such a challenging concept that one can be lost among the
various conceptualizations of different writers and theoreticians. In the field of
the political science there is no common definition of politics to which all
political scientists subscribe. One definition takes politics, the conflicts related to
sovereignty claims that is bound to state. If this definition is accepted, then the
term "politics" will not include conflicts not related to the state. It is possible to
identify politics with power, ruling, distribution of resources, borders and
territories, (nation) states and supra-national organizations. According to
Geoffrey Roberts and Alistair Edwards, "...in modern usage 'politics' has come
to denote the activity in social system, whether the social system of the state or of
other communities or institutions, by which the goals of the system are selected,
ordered in terms of priority (both temporally and in terms of resource
allocation), and implemented."^^
From its etymological origin, politics comes from the Greek word "poli^'
which means the political community of citizens identified within the borders of
a city-state. In the classical conception of Aristotle in The Politics, he dubbed
politics as the master art and suggested that politics necessarily involves a form
of practical knowledge concerning both what is good for the community and
Geoffrey Roberts and Alistair Edwards, A Dictionary o f Political Analysis (London: Edward
Imold Press, 1991), 107.
how to attain that good.^^ His distinction between the activity of politics and the
second order of activity of political theory illuminates a critical disjunction
between freedom, power and tru th .P o litic s mainly involves the ways by which
political authorities come to power and leave it. To be a "political authority"
means having the power and ability to decide goal-oriented matters within the
terms of resource allocation. In modern democratic politics, these are represented
by parties, interest groups, social movements, and behavior of individuals
within the context of participation and their electoral choices and lastly, the
organization of government machinery by which political decisions are
implemented.^^ Politics is based on the existence of conflict-consensus dichotomy
which results in further development of the process of politics.
For the first half of the twentieth century, the institutional definition of
politics
dominated
the
discipline
of
political
science,
orienting
the
conceptualization of politics to involve the activities of the official institutions of
the state. This approach was severely criticized as failing to encompass the full
range of political agents; political parties, political bosses, and pressure groups
operating behind the scenes to influence political o u tc o m es.T o avoid these
limitations of the institutional definition, politics can be defined as the "struggle
for power." This approach is based on the conception of the individual as being
Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, eds.. Encyclopedia o f Government and Politics
(London: Routledge, 1992), 24.
Ibid., 25.
Roberts and Edwards, Dictionary. 107.
Hawkesworth and Kogan, Encyclopedia. 26.
actuated primarily by the libido dominandi, the will to p o w e r.T h e n politics is
said to be a essentially zero-sum game in which competition plays an important
role and domination for the sake of exploitation is the chief objective.
As a third approach, pluralists have a third conception of politics 'the
process of interest accommodation', or of "partisan mutual adjustment."^®
The fourth approach - that of the functionalists - viewed politics as
involving the performance of a number of functions without which society could
not exist, whereby the task of political science is to define these critical hmctions
and how they are performed in divergent cultural and social contexts.
Functionalists developed the system approach, that is, how changes in one part
of the political system affect other parts and how the system as a whole
maintains a homeostatic equilibrium.
A fifth approach in political science, behaviorism, was committed to the
belief that definitions must be value-free, that concepts should be operationalized
in a thoroughly non-prescriptive manner and that research methodologies must
be neutral techniques directed towards the collection and organization of data.
However, post-behaviorism challenged neutralityhy suggesting that all research
is theoretically constituted and value permeated. In recent years, critical theorists
and post modernists have suggested that the notion of critical distance is a myth.
They emphasize that every scientific discourse is productive, that is, such a
discourse generates positive effects within its investigative domain. The postIbid., 27.
‘8 Ibid., 28-29.
modernists' approach has asserted that political science must be seen as a
productive force creating a world in its own image, even employing conceptions
of passivity, neutrality, detachment and objectivity to disguise and conceal its
role.“
Politics in Islam
In the Islamic context, politics is conceptualized as the determination of
the rights and obligations of people and the establishment of order in society.
Muslims are invited to salvation and to enjoy its benefits both in this world and
after their death
In Arabic siyaset means politics, which is etymologically from
the same root as siyasa (to groom or to train horse)
Islamic politics aims at the
happiness of people in this world and the next, and orients people to this end
metaphorically. This conceptualization of politics is related to the phenomenon
of the Day of Judgment which is absent in Western political thought. If we trace
back the roots of Western thought to Machiavelli, his advice to the Prince was
based on the realpolitik. The Prince is advised to employ oppressive methods if
necessary.“ Consequently, IslampolitiI<^^ is different from realpolitik as it is
ideal, while realpolitik is based on conjectural premises. According to Islamic
Ibid., 32.
“ Ibid., 34-35.
Ibn-i Abidin, Reddii'l Muhtar (Istanbul: ?, 1983) Cilt (vol.) 8, 186 in D evlet ve Siyaset, Yusuf
Kerimoğlu (Ankara: Misak Yayınları, 1995), 45.
Bernard Lewis, The Political language o f Islam (Chicago: the University of Chicago press, 1989),
11.
It is not implied that Machiavelli advised the Prince to oppress people all the time but even his
ideal way of politics advocated violence when needed, but in the case of ideal way of Islamic
politics the ways through oppression are closed.
political thought, secular politics is zalim (oppressive) politics because it paves
the way to the destruction of the world and the nature of human by performing
his unbounded ambitions.“ The duty of the ideal Muslim is to establish politics
according to the wishes of Allah“ rather than himself which will be the adil (just)
politics. Again ac/a/ef (justice) is intended to mean the execution of the Sharia?^
Although the ideal way of politics in Islamic context was practiced during
the life of the Prophet Muhammad and in the period of H ulefa-i Ra§idin (Rightly
Guided Caliphates) following the death of the Prophet, in the later periods
Islam politik became the victim of realpolitik. In the history of Islam within the
political context, deviations paved the way to the formation of hostile groups
within the same religion.
Generally, the history of Islam is divided as 1. The Period of Muhammad,
2. The Period of H ulefa-i Ra§idin and 3. The Period of Saltanat (Sultanate).
Within the period of Saltanat, we encounter both the monarchies and the empires
established by Muslim conquers and statesmen as in the examples of Umayyads,
Abbasids, Fatim ids and later on Ottomans. I would like to suggest that the
period of Mu'awiya, as it is suigeneris, should be placed between the second and
third ones as Mu'awiya's grasping of power was not a Monarchical type but by
Islampolitik as a concept will be used to denote the ideal ways of politics according to the basic
tenets of Islam versus realpolitik which paves the way to think issues within secular character
according to just worldly benefits.
Imam Fahruddin-i Razi, Mefatihü'l Gayb (Tefsir-i Kebir), (Ankara: ?, 1988), Cilt 5, 13 in D evlet
ve Siyaset, Kerimoğlu, 46.
In English, God is not equivalent of Allah but just İlah, that is why we used this term.
Yusuf Kerimoğlu, Islami Hareketin M ahiyeti (Ankara: Misak Yaymlan, 1988), 26. Yusuf
Kerimoğlu is the pen name of Hüsnü Aktaş who is a prominent figure in the Islamic arena. He
10
sword meaning bloodshed. Following Mu'awiya, the monarchical succession
started as his son, Yezid, taking over the office of the Caliphate, not because of
his competence but kinship to the Caliph. Of course, nepotism is contrary to the
essential spirit of Islam
Mu'awiya set a pattern, dynastic succession, which
others followed, often accompanied by bloodshed.
Within this context, because of the absence of the notion of "two swords",
the historical experience of Islam in the arena of politics did not lead to
secularism but instead to the merger of religion and the state. Then, in the
monarchical period of Islamic history, religion was employed to legitimize the
state in the eyes of its Muslim citizens.
In the state philosophy of Islam, theoretically there is no separation
between the religion and the state as they are fused to each other. The exercise of
a public office is one of the most important duties of religion, and, public office is
essential to the very existence of religion.
In the light of the above, one can ask why did not the religious authorities
take responsibility for state administration? Why did the ulema (scholars of
Islamic sciences) stratum/class give overt consent to the monarchical character of
the so-called Muslim empires and kingdoms? The answer proposed by this
author are twofold. Firstly, in the monarchical history of Islamic politics we
writes in Akit, a pro-Islamic Istanbul daily. He uses his original name when writing about world
issues, but he uses his pen name while writing on Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence).
For further information see Mustafa İslamoğlu, İmamlar ve Sultanlar (İstanbul: Denge
Yaymlan, 1990) and Abu ala Mawdudi, Hilafet ve Saltanat, 3’^'* ed. (trans. Ali Genceli) (İstanbul:
Hilal Yaynlan, ?)
B. Lewis, C. H. Dellot and J. Schacht, eds.. Encyclopedia o f Islam, Vol. 2 (Leiden: F. J. Brill,
1983), 195.
11
encounter the absence of the autonomous organization of religion as in the West;
only the state could preserve its autonomous character vis-à-vis the other groups
and organizations. Consequently, the state became a sacred en tity which was
immune from sin, and the sultans, who were at the apex of this sacred entity
became in the eyes of people zillullah, the shadow of Allah on the earth.
Secondly, the Sunni ulema behaved in a pragmatic and modest manner to the
extent that it was possible within the boundaries of Islam. This was formulated in
the famous statement of Islamic State philosophy that: "One night without a
Sultan (ruler) is worse than the sixty years with an oppressive one."^° In fact,
Sunni ulema remained loyal to the state as state kept the main five security
principles intact. These were composed of can (life), m al (property), akıl
(intellectual), nesil (generation) and din (religion). Also, they did not want to
wage war against the state because they feared the results of the bloodshed
which would be very severe that they could not afford its cost on the Day of
Judgment. Moreover, they refrained from entering into politics, because it is
stated in the
in Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad that 'the
duty for
administration is not wanted but executed when it is offered'.
Religion
The root of the word "religion" is uncertain as it may be derived from the
Latin relegere (to go over again), religari (to bind oneself), or re-eligere (to choose
30 //
Bir gecelik sultansızlık altmış yıllık zalim sultan idaresinden daha kötüdür.
12
again)
In terms of usage, it is usually defined as having dealings with the
sacred and, in its stricter meaning, it denotes the worship of God that arises out
of this concern and reflection. Religion also takes on a social dimension. This is
related to the concrete expression of man's infinite transcendence, and the
absolute worth of his hopes, his genuine needs and his limitless desires.
According to Thomas Aquinas, the task of the religion is to sustain man's
orientation towards God, the label "religious" applying to everyone concerned
with the basis and the purpose of the world what we call God.^^ This particular
understanding of religion within the Christian concept paved the way to its
being accused by the proponents of the Enlightenment of being hostile to science,
and constituting
an obstacle in the way of emancipation and the growth of
democracy, because it leads to false consciousness and subjectivism.^^
In this context, it will be useful to dwell on the approach of Christianity
towards the concept of the 'state'. From the immediate perspective of Western
liberal society, it is obvious that contemporary Christianity seeks to distance
itself from political p o w e rH o w e v e r, in Rome, the Church is and always has
been caught up in the process of political power. The Protestant churches also
play a critical role especially on such social questions as abortion, environment,
nuclear arms and etc. Also, the Protestant churches appeal to the individual
conscience, with exhortations to scrutinize public policy from the outside and to
Karl Rahner, Dictionary o f Theology, 2"^* ed. (New York: Herbert Vorgrimler, 1981), 437.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
13
instruct the public about the moral dimensions of political and social issues. That
is why the Victorian Dissenters managed to combine their laissez faire in religion
with an insistence that the government should enforce Christian personal
morality with use of the state power
In the old "Christendom" model of the Church-State relations during the
Middle Ages, organized society was seen as a unit to be divided into
spiritualities and temporalities based on the manner they functioned. That up to
a point, it was the Church claiming the precedence which was acknowledged by
the temporal power. The two areas of responsibility, for the souls and for the
bodies of humans were regarded as equally Christian and interdependent. As
Edward Norman put it, "The strength of the arrangement was based on the
regard that social organization unavoidably embodies ideological preferences
which simply imposed Christian beliefs and practices rather than countenance
the supremacy of others."^
In Christian thinking, the concrete form of government in a state is not
part of a permanent Divine institution but subject to historical change. In the
Middle Age, it was the 'divine right' of kings to establish states as responsible
only to God. So the state must be servant of the common good and not its master.
The separation of the Church and the State is explained as its issue preserves the
Christian from regarding the state as "sacred" and "numinous" as Christianity
Edward Norman, "Power and the State," in Companion Encyclopedia o f Theology, ed. Peter
Byrne and Leslie Houlben (London: Routledge, 1995), 778.
“ Ibid.
Ibid., 779.
14
"demythologized the notion of the s t a t e . S o in the life of a Christian, only God
is the sacred entity. Consequently, in today's world Christian thinking is
ambiguous towards the conceptualization of state as Christians no longer regard
it as providing a suitable structure for the cultivation and propagation of
religious idea(l)s.^® The state is too internally divided by moral pluralism or
cultural values to be able to prescribe life-styles and ultimate beliefs for its
citizens. 39
In Islam, as did^ came to mean primarily the style of life, then the state, as
an aspect of life would be shaped according to Islam, and would be the
embodiment of religion, because din denotes all the laws promulgated by Allah
to guide man to his final end. Then, the submission to these laws means the
submission to Allah and the implementation of these laws is conceptualized as
worshipping.^^ As Mawdudi puts it, the term of din in Arabic is more inclusive
than religion in English as it embraces all aspects of life both for the individual
and the society, because din denotes both the faith and the life style established
Rahner, Theology. 487.
Norman, "Power," 792.
Ibid., 787.
"...din signifies obligation, direction, submission, retribution. Whether referring to the HebrewAramaic sense or the ancient Arabic root, there will remain the ideas of debt to be discharged
(hence obligation) and of direction imposed or to be followed with a submissive heart...c/in must
be translated 'religion' in its most general and frequent sense. There is no doubt about this
translation. But the concept indicated by din does not exactly coincide with the ordinary concept
of 'religion' because of the semantic connexions of the words. Religio evokes primarily that which
binds man to God; and din the obligations which God imposes on His 'reasoning creatures'...Now
the first obligation is to submit and surrender one's self to him (s)ince the etymological sense of
Islam is 'surrender of self (to God)' in The Encyclopedia o f Islam, Vol. 2, eds. B. Lewis, C. H.
Dellot and J. Schact (Leiden: F. J. Brill, 1983), 293.
·" Ibid., 295.
15
over this faith
Lewis notes that, within the historical context, we cannot
encounter any separation based on the dichotomy of religious and secular,
layman and preachers. According to Islam, every Muslim is responsible for the
practices of the religion, not just the preachers. And within the framework of
these practices, invitation of others to Islam is also included which shows the
absence of a special missionary clergy class responsible for this function.
The Islamic world did not have an institutionalization of the mosque
analogous to that of the church. One may perhaps remember here the case of the
m edrese system, but medreses were employed as one of the state ideological
apparatuses. As Şerif Mardin had indicated, in the Ottoman Empire the religious
bureaucracy acted as the agent of the state and the members of the religious
bureaucracy ensured the state's control of social life through a network of
education, judiciary and administration.^^ But in the era following the Tanzimat,
the medresesi prestige waned as they had been dismantled from the decision
making process and they had been dominated by the secularized military and
civil parts of the bureaucracy. So medreses were actually supplanted by the new
schools.
The Ottoman Empire followed the historical tradition of the merger of
Islam and the state as in the expression of the din-u devleti'^ Following the
Abu ala Mawdudi, Tefhimu'I Kur'an, Kur'an'm Anlam ve Tefsiri, cilt (vol.) 1, (İstanbul: İnsan
Yayınlan, 1986), 101,102.
Mardin, Türk M odernleşmesi, Makaleler (Lsiaribul: İletişim, 1991), 94.
^ Niyazi Berkes, The D evelopm ent o f Secularism in Turire/(Montreal: McGill University Press,
1964), 9-10, Mardin, Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset, Ma/ra/e/er (İstanbul: İletişim, 1992), 117, Binnaz
Toprak İslam and Political D evelopm ent in Turkey (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1981), 26.
16
conquest of the Egypt in the time of Yavuz Sultan Selim, the office of the
Caliphate passed to the Ottoman sultans which meant that, from then on, the
Ottoman sultan represented the highest spiritual as well as temporal authority.
The Ottomans carried not only the banner and the sword of Islam but were
responsible for the political integrity of the Umma (Islamic community). In
enforcing the provisions of the Sharia, the Sultan was assisted by the Sheikh-ulIslam who held the highest office of the religious bureaucracy until the onset of
the secularization process in the Empire in the nineteenth century. Theoretically,
the position of the Sheik-ul-Islam preceded that of the Caliph.
With the M illet system adopted by the Ottoman Empire, as in the
preceding Muslim empires and kingdoms, two types of citizenship developed;
the M illet-i H akim e (governing nation) and the M illet-i M ahkum e (governed
nation)^^. It must be noted that the meaning of m illet does not correspond to the
meaning of nation as it was used in the post-French Revolution period. The
usage of m illet by the Ottomans did not denote ethnicity but religion and its
laws. M illet, etymologically comes to mean a "w ord" in dictionary usage; it
connoted a group of people who accepted a word, meaning a H oly Book^^ In the
dictionaries, m illet was interpreted as religion , Sharia, way, tarikat The basis of
the m illet system in the Ottoman Empire was established by Mehmed the
Conqueror, but the system goes back to the earlier
Muslim monarchical
Bilal Eryilmaz, "Birlikte Yaşama Düzeni: Osmanh M illet Sistemi." Bilgi ve Hikmet, Kış 1994,
sayı:5, 91-97 and for further information see Ali Bulaç, "Ulus-Devletin Suistimal Ettiği
lenm :M illet." Nehir, sayı:2, Temmuz-Ağustos 1993, 38-43 and Bilal Eryılmaz, Osmanh
D evletinde M illet Sistem i (İstanbul: Ağaç Yaymcıhk-Altematif Üniversite, 1992)
17
p e r i o d s . M illet-i Hakime, in practice meant the superiority of the Muslim
population in the Empire compared to the m illet-i m ahkum e, citizens from other
religions.
The M illet system was abandoned following the Tanzimat Period. All
citizens of the Ottoman Empire were declared to have the same rights, without
taking their ethnicity and religion into consideration, in order to gain a new
image in the eyes of the West, as one of the reasons. Later on, in the Abdiilhamid
period, Islam came to the stage not as a star but with a small role, mostly being
"a toy in the hands of the Sultan"^® to unite the Empire once again around Islam.
That is why Pan-Islamism was adopted, while other ideologies were also
discussed fervently for the same end of saving the Ottoman Empire. But none of
them was useful and the Ottoman Empire came to an end. In the days of the War
of Independence, Islam became the main means of legitimization for both the
Kuvay-i M illiye, the Nationalist Forces, led by the Ankara Government and the
remnant of the Empire, Istanbul Government. The photographs taken at the
opening ceremony of the Grand National Assembly reflect the importance of
Islam, as the prominent figures of the forthcoming secular republic open their
hands for praying between the crowds of religious people.
^ Bernard Lewis, İslam'ın S iyasiZ2f7y(trans. Fatih Taşar) (Kayseri: Rey Yayıncılık, 1992), 62.
Kadir Canatan, "Toplum Tasarımları ve 'Birlikte Yaşama Felsefesi." Bilgi ve Hikmet, Kış 1994
sayı:5,105.
Duran, A Comparative Perspective. 13.
18
Secularism
Secularism is one of the most debated issues in Turkey within the context
of politics. That the approach to secularism has significantly changed since the
Ottoman period that is still one of the most important issues in Turkish politics.
The secularization process in the Ottoman period aimed at the bifurcation
of religion and the state. Following the establishment of the Republic, the
founding fathers started to execute their own secularization because they
evaluated institutional religion as an obstacle to progress. For Mustafa Kemal
and his cadre Islam was not thought to function as a 'civil religion' for the
modern Turkish polity
Turkish secularism has been mainly the interference of
state elites directed towards the removal of Islam from state affairs arising from
rationalist and positivist attitudes of Enlightened Despotism toward life. Also, it
can be conceptualized as a legal institutional separation that gave fruit following
the Turkish modernization process.
Secularism etymologically derived from the Latin term saeculum which
meant 'era', 'tim e', 'generation' and 'a g é ^ Secularism emerged as a counter
phenomenon to the theological explanations of religion in the West. That is why
Doğu Ergil defines secularism as the revolt against theological and metaphysical
absolutes and universals both in social and political institutions.^^ At its base,
secularism aims to substitute reason for such supernatural and transcendental
^’ Ibid.,1.
Ibid., 4.
Doğu Ergil, Secularism in Turkey (Ankara:?, ?), 1 quoted in A Comparative Perspective, Duran,
4.
19
approaches as Divine Law. Secularism was expected to pave the way to the
formation of a new ethical system composed of principles referring to human
conscience. At the last instance, this foresaw the abolition of religion with its
repercussions on all aspects of life related to the Divine premises.
Laicism as a concept related to secularism etymologically is derived from
the Greek term /aos meaning 'people' and 'laikos'm eaning 'la y . It emerged from
the constitutional practice of France in the nineteenth century. Laicism connoted
the necessity that the state refrain from supporting any religious group at the
expense of other religions. It is well to remember the approach of Christianity
which is based on the dichotomy of the stratum/class of clergy versus laymen.
This dichotomy kept the clergy powerful until the Reformation. On the other
hand, until this period in Europe, there had been confrontation between
monarchs and the Church. This confrontation had not been continuous since the
'Holy Roman Emperor' was a title granted on submission of the ruler to the
Church. The popes were capable of using their power to humiliate monarchs. But
after a certain point, as the national state emerged, the monarchs refused to
accept the superiority of the 'spiritual sword' held by the Pope and established,
eventually, their own Protestant churches. However, the Church remained the
only organized and powerful institution in Europe following the fall of the
Roman Empire in the Middle Ages until the establishment of national states.
Although both secularism and laicism refer to the separation of church
and state with repercussions of duality and separation, Niyazi Berkes indicates a
20
difference. According to Berkes, secularism emphasizes "the idea of worldliness"
and laicism refers to the 'distinction between the laity and clergy'.“
Historically, the process of secularization cannot be distinguished from
the general modernization process that we encounter both in Ottoman and
Republican history. Secularism
emerged as the sine qua non of the
modernization process.
It will also be useful to dwell on the concept of Byzantinism , referring to
the domination of religion by the state. Byzantinism, in this sense, is just the
opposite of theocracy in which religion governs state activities. In this context,
Ali Bulaç, a prominent Muslim intellectual in Turkey, rejects the claim that Islam
allows a type of government to be conceptualized as theocracy.“ As the concepts
secularism, laicism and Byzantinism are related to the historical experience of
Christianity, so theocracy should be conceptualized within this context and, he
reminds us Christianity and Islam are different.^ As the institution of the Church
does not have an institutional counterpart in the Islamic context, then it will be
useless to search for the meaning of theocracy within the boundaries of Islam.
The secularization process within the legal proceedings in the Tanzimat
period included codification, or the adaptation of secular legal codes, and the
opening of secular courts. This brought a clash within the judiciary system until
the abolition of the religious courts following the foundation of the Republic. The
clash was due to the absence of judges trained in the secular tradition.
Berkes, D evelopm ent o f Secularism. 5.
“ Bulac, İslam ve Demokrasi. 75.
21
The Ottoman State could not dismantle its religious identity so easily,
Berkes has remarked that secularization throughout the
Tanzimat and
M eşrutiyet periods was not the separation of religion and the state into two
different spheres but rather was a process of bifurcating through a series of
changes in one sector of life while another sector of life remained static.®^ In the
Constitution of 1876, the Kanun-i Esasi, even constitutionalized form of the
Tanzimat reforms could not develop into secularism as Islam was declared as
the official religion of the state (article 2) and the Sultan-Caliph remained both
the head of the state and religion (article 4).^ Briefly, Islam preserved its status
within the state; however, it soon lost its ability to shape the policies and goals of
the state as in its heyday.
During the reign of Abdülhamid II, there emerged a paradoxical approach
to secularization. Abdülhamid wanted to benefit from Islam to deal with the
following issue: how could the Ottoman Empire could be saved and revert to its
golden days? Abdülhamid was undoubtedly a devout Muslim, devoted to
modernize the state, but this 'ideological' use of Islam was directed towards
strengthening the state outside the heartland- in relations with Arabs, and,
establishing the possibility of Muslim unity as a threat to the western powers.
But Duran has noted that the strength of the state in Abdülhamid's period was
such that Islam became 'an ideological tool in the hands of the Caliph, rather
^ Ibid., 133.
Berkes, D evelopm ent o f Secularism. 480.
56
AH Fuat Başgil, Din ve Laiklik
Yağmur Yaymlan, 1982), 183.
22
than an end in itself^^, because Abdiilhamid supported the modernization and
secularization process of the state by promoting the secular education, as noted
before. In the Young Turks Era nationalism was favored rather than religion
meaning the radicalization of the secularization process within the Ottoman
State. Essentially, the reforms of Young Turks were the basis of the forthcoming
Turkish Revolution.'’®
Religion played a very important role during the War of Independence.
However this role was rather paradoxical as the m üftis of both Ankara and
Istanbul governments were issuing counter fetwas (legal proclamations) each
pointing the finger at the other as traitors to Islam. Later in the war, Islam was
used as a successful rallying call to defend the nation against the attacks of the
infidels. Eighting in the war against the attackers had its attraction: one would
become a şehit (martyr) and go to heaven after dying for the fatherland or one
would become the gazi (war veteran) and a savior of the country. The Ankara
government used the religious symbols liberally and, at the beginning of the war
even declared its aim as being that of saving the offices of the Sultanate and
Caliphate. This aim was confirmed at the congresses of Erzurum and Sivas and at
the inauguration of the National Assembly in Ankara
However, following the
Burhanettin EHiran, p. 13.
Murat (êmrek, "The Historical Background of the Reforms in the Ottoman-Turkish Tradition.'
Unpublished Manuscpript, 23.
Binnaz Toprak, Islam and Political Development. 64.
23
victory in the Independence War, contrary policies were adopted. The Caliphate
as well as the Sultanate were abolished
The abolition of the Caliphate opened a new chapter in Turkish politics,
as an office which represented the unity of Muslims all over the world no longer
existed. At the end of World War I, the Middle East witnessed the emergence of
nation-states accelerating the exclusion of Islam from the political arena both at
the theoretical and practical levels. Subsequently, Islam kept its low profile
except for the activities of such movements as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt.
Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran under the leadership
of Ayatullah Khomenei, Islam was regarded as a third major ideology after
liberalism and communism. But the development of the modern international
system forced every country, including Iran, to behave according to the secular
norms of the system. This brought confusion between Islam politik
and
realpolitik.
“ The abolition of the Sultanate paved the way for contemporary Muslim theorists to rethink the
relation of Islam and monarchy and conceptualize it as a historical experience of Islam due to the
conditions. New Islamic state models have been suggested other than the Sultanate. One
example, here, is Ali Bulaç's Medina Document Project, see Ali Bulac, M odem Ulus D evlet
(İstanbul: İz Yaymcilik, 1995) and the type of a state existing in Iran, and Sudan.
24
CHAPTER II
ISLAM IN OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND TURKISH STATE
The Iranian Revolution in 1979^ opened a new chapter in world politics,
as Ayatullah Khomeini returned to Iran as a glorious commander and declared
the establishment of the Islamic stated Speculation that the message might elicit a
similar response elsewhere in the Islamic world^ brought the question mark into
minds of people about Turkey, because Turkey carried great potential as a
neighbor of Iran's and as a country that was the seat of the Caliphate for a long
time. These factors, it was thought by some, made Turkey a possible candidate
for the same process. Moreover, the chaotic political climate of the country
bolstered this anticipation.
The question behind the thesis was whether the Islamic revival in Turkey
would pose a threat to the survival of the modern Turkish state and undermine
Turkey's relations with Europe.·* The 'Save Jerusalem' rally on 6 September 1980
in Konya, organized by the pro-Islam National Salvation Part)^ (NSP), was the
catalyst for military intervention on 12 September 1980.
' For further information about the Iranian revolution see Asaf Hüseyin, İslam Dünyasma Siyasi
Bakışlar (trans. Murat Çiftkaya) (İstanbul: İz Yaymcılık, 1991), 255-260 and John L. Esposito ed.,
The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact
Florida International University Press, 1990)
^Barry M. Rubin, M odem Dictators: Third World Coup Makers, Strongmen, and Populist Tyrants
(London: H. W. Men, 1987), 232.
^ İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, "Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey," Government and
Opposition, 18 (1983), 421.
Richard Tapper, "Introduction" in Islam in M odem Turkey; Religion, Politics and Literature in
A Secular State, ed. Richard Tapper (London: LB. Tauris, 1993), 1.
^ Burhanettin Duran, "Kenan Evren's and Turgut Özal's Conceptualizations of Secularism: A
ComparaHve Perspective." Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent university, 1994), 37.
25
The predicted scenario did not eventuate: as İlkay Sunar and Binnaz
Toprak had predicted, "Islamic politics (of the National Salvation Party and the
street politics of radical Islamic groups) was strong enough to figure in the
equation of democratic breakdown, but far too weak to detonate an Islamic
revolution."* Nevertheless, Turkey faced a military intervention which was
partially directed against the politics of the NSP. The rally in Konya was an
important reason for the military intervention. Kenan Evren, head of the junta,
said: "...The events in Konya indicated the extent of (religious) reaction. The
events in Konya showed us the imminent danger and its nature."^ At the rally,
the demonstrators marched in long robes and fez and carried green flags. They
shouted slogans calling for the restoration of the Sharia. Moreover, some of the
participants refused to stand up during the playing of the national anthem. In
this context, the result was harsher than the NSP anticipated, because they lost
control.®
Military intervention was the beginning of a new chapter in Turkish
politics as the military brought the breakdown o f democracy for the sake o f the
^Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 421.
^ Kenan Evren, D evlet Başkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri 1980-1981 (Ankara: TBMM
Basımevi, 1981), 17 and Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren'in Anıları, vol. 1 (İstanbul; Milliyet, 1990), 220
quoted in A Comparative Perspective, Eharan, 37.
®Mehmet Keçeciler was the mayor of Konya at that time. Following the military intervention, like
all mayors, he lost his office. Later on, he would become one of the founders of the Motherland
Party (MP) and kept his post as the Senior Vice Chairman of the party. This post was created for
him specifically, and he was regarded as the leader of the conservatives in the party. He kept his
office in the party until the assassination attempt on Özal. Ironically, he was one of the closest
men to Özal but Özal prevented his ministership, indicating that Evren did not want to see him in
that post. Later on. Keçeciler found out in conversation with Evren that his name was not even
included in any tentative list of the ministers given to Evren.
26
democracy until they returned to their barracks, a characteristic of military
interventions in Turkey.
The Role of Islam in the Ottoman Period
ClassicaLAge
Islam was the core factor of the Ottoman state, motivating to the
formation of the Empire. The founder of the Ottoman state, Osman Bey became
the leader of the Ottoman tribe following the death of his father Ertugrul Bey.
The tribe maintained the gazi tradition, meaning that they were executing attacks
against the castles of the Byzantine.^ The motive behind these attacks was the
notion of jihad (holy war), against the infidels. Osman Bey was the son-in-law of
Sheikh Edebali who is accepted the spiritual father of the Ottoman state because
of his prominence in Islamic sciences. As could be observed in the founding of
the state, religion was one of the most important components of the state
formation.
Later on, following the conquest of Istanbul by Mehmed II the Conquer,
FatiH^- the state would need to expand its territorial reach in order to be termed
an Empire. Again, behind the conquest, the aim was the same: the N izam -i Alem ,
(Order of the World) according to Islam.
While Islam kept its prominent role in the state, it figured in the imperialpatrimonial structure of the Empire at two basic levels. First at the center, Islam
’ Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 425.
Fatih in Arabic means the 'one who opens' and this conquest is commemorated as the opening
of a new era.
27
appeared "as a scripturalist. Sharia-minded, ulema-governed orthodoxy" and at
the periphery "as a primordially embedded heterodoxy permeated by sects,
tarikais, sheikhs, saints with supernatural powers, and as a latitudinarianism
tinged with mysticism, tasawwui."^^ But an alliance between the central and the
peripheral Islam had been struck in which their sharp edges had been rounded
off and a degree of overlap had been achieved. "This imbricative pattern would
serve to minimize conflict, allow for co-existence and to bridge the gap between
the two worlds."'^
The Ottoman state had a large territory and the population was not just
Muslim but included a multiplicity of religious groups ranging from Jews to
Orthodox Christians. In order to deal with these different religious communities,
the M illet (religious community) system was established, as previously noted,
on the dichotomy of m illet-i hakim e (governing millet) and m illet-i m ahkum e
(governed millet). In this system the religious communities were granted
autonomy and could apply their own judiciary systems.’^ The system worked
smoothly during the heyday of the Empire until the nationalist winds started to
blow in the Ottoman territories following the French Revolution in 1789.
In the Ottoman Empire, because of the lack of contact between state and
society, the religious establishment was used as substitutes for linkage.Religion
" Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 422.
Ibid.
Bilal Eryilmaz, "Birlikte Yaşama Düzeni: Osmanli Millet Sistemi." Bilgi ve Hikmet, Kış 1994, no.
5, 91-97 and Kadir Canatan, "Toplum Tasarımlan "Birlikte Yaşama Felsefesi." Bilgi ve Hikmet,
Kış 1994, no. 5,98-108.
Şerif Mardin, "Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution." International Journal o f
M iddle East Studies, 2 (1971), 205.
28
was institutionalized within the bureaucratic structure and religion was effective
in supplying the ideals of political legitimization among the people. Moreover,
religion was quite efficient in the socialization process with its close connections
of politics. According to Şerif Mardin, Islam was the main institution of
controlling culture as a means of establishing a generalized social control which
is also valid in norm formation.^^
The prominent role of Islam did not eclipse the prominence of state which
was superior to everything. The Ottoman state retained its sovereignty vis-à-vis
Islam despite the fact that the aim of the government was to realize the ideals of
Islam in the society. Thus the Sultan had an ambiguous position towards
religious law.’^ The Sultan had autonomy vis-à-vis the religion. The fact that the
members of the religious institution were appointed and could be dismissed by
the Sultan, made religion part of the whole bureaucracy. Considering the
patrimonial character of the Ottoman bureaucracy, it is easy to understand why
Islam could not develop an autonomous structure vis-à-vis the state, since the
religious bureaucracy was expected to be loyal to the Sultan.
However, as noted, there was an ambiguous balance between state affairs
and religion as each depended upon the other.
Members of the religious
bureaucracy had the theoretical right to denounce the acts of the Sultans by
promulgating their contrary opinions by the fetw as of the Sheikh-ul-Islam.'^ But
'5 Ibid., 206.
Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey { Walkington: The Eothen Press, 1985), 27.
Ibid.
29
this did not give them the right to interfere directly in state affairs as they could
promulgate their fetw as ov\y following the enactment of the laws.
The Ottomans, maintained the earlier Turkic-Iranian state traditions,
namely that when necessary for the sake of the common good or the raison d'être
of the state, the ruler could take measures that might be against the law.'® In this
context, it is useful to point out the existence of the concept Orf-i Sultani which
was developed because of this issue. Orf-i Sultani meant the "will or the
command of the Sultan as a secular ruler." This
issue was based on the
codification of the Kanuns (laws) in compilations called Kanunnames, drawing
on Islamic traditions as well as Turkish, Byzantine, and Slavic legal sources.’’
These kanuns were enacted from the fifteenth century onward and, in time,
were modified or abolished according to the time and situation in order to
formulate legislation parallel to the Sharia. The Ottoman Sultans would benefit
from kanuns by promulgating hundreds of them which were concerned with
public law, state finances, taxation, economic life and criminal issues. Even the
Giilhane Rescript (1839) was prepared in the form of a decree.^® On the other
hand, this secular rule was based on the measuring rod of "necessity" and
"reason", and not "the personal whims of the Sultans."^' This paved the way for
the emergence of the adab tradition as a secular and state-oriented philosophy
Heper, "Islam and Democracy in Turkey Toward A Reconciliation?" The M iddle East Journal,
51, no. 1 (Winter 1997), 33.
Ali Kazancigil, "Democracy in Muslim Lands: Turkey in Comparative Perspective."
International Social Science Journal, 128 (1991), 348.
“ Halil İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society (:Turkey)." in Political Modernization in Japan
and Turkey, eds. Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1964), 57.
30
which developed as a consequence of efforts to bring about a state structure with
established values.“
All these were consistent with the Ottoman state philosophy based on the
concept of "justice''. The absolute power of the Ottoman Sultan would be
supported in the "old Oriental m axim that a ruler can have no pow er w ithout
soldiers^ no soldiers w ithout m oney, no m oney w ithout well-being o f his
subjects, and no popular well-being w ithout justice." This saying had been
repeated in Turkish political literature from Kutadgu Bilik, in the eleventh
century, to the Gülhane Prescript of the nineteenth century, and was regarded as
the summation of practical statesmanship.“ The main aim of the state was
articulated as that of preserving justice which meant maintaining the order of
unalterable tradition by reassuring the position of each social stratum according
to its functions and merits.“
However, the heyday of the Empire did not last and the glorious victories
came to an end. The magic had gone and the Ottoman State started to lose its
brightness following the end of the Classical Age. Thus emerged the question of
"H ow can we save the state?"w hich was repeated until the end of the Empire.
Koçu Bey, a seventeenth century official and courtier, in his famous detailed
memorandum in 1630 to Sultan Murad IV, suggested some reforms in order to
return to the golden days of the state. According to him, it was necessary to
Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey, 25.
Ibid.
İnalcık, "The Nature of Traditional Society (Turkey)," 43.
Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey. 26.
31
resurrect the strong sultanate. Thanks to Sultan Murad IV and the grand vizieis
of the Köprülü family, tighter control of the bureaucracy was back once again,
and the state became to some extent s t r o n g e r B u t this was not enough to end
the decline. The incapability of the succeeding Sultans played a significant role
here.''
Because the reforms and their execution were not effective, the state had
to search for further reforms as the Ottoman Empire fell into a weak position
against the West. European expansionism had begun to create a remarkable
awareness in the Ottoman in the eighteenth century, such that Muslims faced
trouble from the infidel world. This new formation oriented them not to look
down on the infidels any longer, but to learn how to beat them at their own
game." This would give birth to a new chapter in Ottoman history with further
repercussions, among which was the Tanzimat
The Tanzimat Period
The Tanzim at starts with the reading of the Giilhane H att-i H üm ayunu
(Imperial Rescript of Gülhane) by Mustafa Reşid Pasha in the reign of
Abdülmecid (even though the main figure of the period is remembered as
Mahmud II) and continues until the Kanun-i Esasi, the first Constitution of the
Ottoman Empire in 1876. The aim was obvious: in order to save the Empire, the
Ottomans had to imitate their enemies, who had gone a long way in the
Ibid., p.35
Heper, "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective." The M iddle East
Journal, 35 (1981), 347.
32
development of the war techniques and artillery in addition to trade and
production. Firstly, the Ottomans were interested in developing the artifacts and
strategies related to war. In the first steps of modernization, it was thought that it
would be enough for the army to be modernized. However, the reformers could
not see the all-embracing character of modernization which would penetrate
every aspect of life and state affairs. But in time they experienced various effects
of the modernization process.
According to İlkay Sunar and Binnaz Toprak, Islam that was related to the
state went through a "mutation"^®. Following the consolidation of the Ottoman
Empire, Islam animated the gazi warriors of the state against the infidel in their
sacred struggle. However, Islam became a factor involved in the imperial power
mechanism and the accommodation with the "incipient secularism of the
Ottoman state"^^ This resulted in further centralization of power and
secularization of the state. And it was understood that modernization in the
military sphere alone, i. e. without it taking place throughout society, would be
fruitless.
The reforms through modernization were designed by the state elites to
strengthen the state and the administration. With this in mind, reforms were
gradually extended to the establishment of a secularized judicial and educational
Carter Vaughn Findley, Ottoman Officialdom, A Social H istory (Vrmceton·. Princeton University
Press, 1989), 20.
Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 424.
Ibid.
33
system and improvements in the status of the non-Muslim minorities.^® These
reforms would give an end to the M illet system by making all citizens of the
Ottoman Empire equal without taking their religion into consideration.
Moreover, due to the modernization process, the meaning of justice changed to
the "promulgation of secular legislation outside the jurisdiction of the Islamic
traditions and autonomous from them;"®^ this type of legislation would allow for
the free functioning of the new bureaucracy based on reason vis-à-vis the
prescriptions of the Sharia. This would pave the way for the eclipse of the ulema.
Accordingly, they started to lose the important educational, judicial and religious
posts which they had earlier gained while they were incorporated into the state
bureaucracy through a giant network of central and provincial offices. Thus the
state began to extricate itself from the holy authority of Islam;®^ the whole issue
can be related to the changing basis of legitimization of the Ottoman state from
Islam to reason and the secular laws of the judiciary system. In sum, the
Tanzim at's secular modernization would cause a serious split within the state
between the ulema, the religious part of the bureaucracy, and the other
secularized parts, the civil and the military bureaucracy.®®
Following the Tanzimat, the Sultan started to distinguish equally between
his office as ruler of all Ottoman citizens and his office as caliph only to the
Kazancigil, "Democracy in Muslim Lands," 350.
Niyazi Berkes, The D evelopm ent o f Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: The Mcgill University
Press, 1964), pp. 94-95 quoted in "Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern
Perspective," Heper, M iddle EastJournal, Vol. 35,1981,349.
Toprak, " The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey," in State, Democracy and the Military:
Turkey in the 1980s, eds. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 121.
34
Muslims in accordance with the Sharia?* There was a simple rationale behind the
Sultan's move towards the secularization of the public institutions. It was that
the demands of non-Muslim minorities for equality, freedom, home rule, reforms
in taxation, and landownership were contributing to the modernization of the
state which would be appreciated by the Western powers in favor of the
Christians in the Empire.®^
Consequently, the result of the Tanzimat would mainly appear as the
weakening of the ulema vis-à-vis other branches of the Ottoman bureaucracy in
the socio-political life of the Empire through the path towards modernization
taken as westernization. Ironically, the reforms to be included within the
Gülhane Prescript, in the form of decree, would change the imperial regime
completely.^^
The path towards modernization starting with the Tanzim atyjas bolstered
by the Islahat Fermanı (Reform Edict) of 1856. The establishment of the secular
schools both for the military and civil bureaucracy further weakened the
religious bureaucracy as the latter lost control over education. All these
developments were the beginning of a clash between the religious and the
secular wings of the civil bureaucracy that would finally end in the abolition of
the Caliphate and Sultanate. The Tanzimat provided the basis for this clash as
Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu, "Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican
Turkey," InternationalJournal o f M iddle Eastern Studies, 28 (1996), 233.
^ inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society (Turkey)," 58.
Ibid.
Ibid.
35
both wings were allowed to remain hostile to each other while each negated its
counterpart.
Following the Tanzimat there were no remarkable changes in the state
policy on modernization so the role of Islam and the religious bureaucracy went
on losing significance in the face of the rising trend, secularization. It can be
concluded that only the actors of the modernization process changed but the
action in essence remained intact. Only during the reign of the Sultan
Abdtilhamid II, the style of the answer of question, "How can we save the
Empire?" changed as Abdiilhamid II wanted to benefit from Islam in uniting the
society and returning it to the golden age once again. While opening the doors
to the technology of the West, he rejected the necessity to adapt Western ideas
which is a paradox. In the same period, going against Abdiilhamid II, Young
Ottomans sought to base an Ottoman constitutional state on Islamic premises,^^
with the argument that Parliament was in the essence of Islam not imported from
Europe.
This did not mean that the modernization and secularization processes
stopped. Despite the emphasis on the Islamic aspect of the Ottoman rule during
Abdiilhamid IPs reign, as noted before, he placed his full support behind "the
establishment of secular administration, secular education and secular courts."^®
Moreover, despite this emphasis on Islam as the unifying ideology of the Empire
the gap between the religious and secular institutions widened in favor of the
Tapper, "Introduction," 5.
Sunar and Toprak, "Islam in Politics," 425.
36
latter. Consequently, Abdülhamid II's political strategy to save the Empire
became futile due to the ineffectiveness of its mobilizing power against the force
of nationalism.^^
In the Young Turks Period (1908-1918), both the notion of constitutional
government and the secularization process were promoted. The Young Turks'
actions were accompanied by endless discussions of Islam's role in the Ottoman
society and state affairs, bringing a strict clash between idealism and
materialism
The Young Turks' policy towards religion was the basis of Mustafa
KemaTs approach towards religion and the continued secularization process.
Consequently, as the question about the salvation of the Empire could not
be answered fully - or the answers were not implemented - the Empire came to
an end following World War I de facto and by the abolition of the offices of
Sultanate and Caliphate de jure. The next period during which the Turkish
Republic was established as a nation-state rather than as an empire, marked the
beginning of a different relationship between state and religion.
TheJlepublican Period
Following the end of World War I, just as the Ottoman State had spent its
last coin, the old Empire fell into crisis, bringing the death of the 'sick man of the
Europe'. The Ottoman state had lost the war and the Sultan Mehmed Vahdeddin
was deprived of authority and the sultanate.·*’ At the same time, Mustafa Kemal
Sakallıoğlu, "Islam-State Interaction," 233.
41
Hüseyin, Islam Dünyasma Siyasi Bakışlar. 133.
37
had been one of the few successful commanders of the defeated army and had
become famous following the defense of the Dardanelles. Moreover, he was a
charismatic leader^^ and good at mobilizing the people and soldiers around him.
His charisma and the conditions of the country gave him the opportunity to
establish Turkey as a "secular-nationalist state"^^ based on secular laws within
nation-state boundaries rather than an Islamic one based on the Sharia. This was
quite consistent with Mustafa KemaTs approach to Islam as he saw it as an
obstacle to the development of the country, or modernization along Western
lives. From then on, science and secular reason were to be the guides for the
nation rather than transcendental motives. Mustafa KemaTs emphasis on
republicanism, nationalism and secularism were the three symbols of the Turkish
Revolution's negation of the Ottoman dynasty, the caliphate and the umma
ideology.^
An ambiguity resulted as there were two governments in the country, the
Istanbul Government or Sultanate and the Ankara Government or the Grand
National Assembly. The latter became successful against the invading forces.
This ambiguity was solved by the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate in the
following years.
D. A. Rustow, "Atatürk as Founder of State," Daedalus, vol. 97, no.3 Summer 1968,p.794 in
Islam Diinyasma Siyasi Bakışlar, Hüseyin, 134.
Hüseyin, Islam Diinyasma Siyasi Bakışlar. 136.
^ Ibid., 137-138.
38
Mustafa Kemal was a nationalist who believed in the supremacy of the
national sovereignty. Mustafa Kemal was in debt to the secular education that he
obtained in military schools for the ideas that he carried out.
As could be observed Mustafa Kemal was not the pioneer of the
secularization process in the country but played a critical role in bringing it to its
"logical conclusion." Mustafa Kemal was not satisfied with separating Islam
from politics, but wanted to eliminate Islam's power basis and subordinate it to
the state. His aim was clear: he wanted to end the ability of the religious elite to
challenge the worldview of the new state
On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal
was aware of the dual role of Islam, both as a system of ethical rules promising
salvation for life and after death, and as a political
ideology providing an
identity as a member of the umma. While approving the first role of religion,
Mustafa Kemal was strictly against the second. That is why he made reforms to
restrict Islam to the private sphere of worship (even without the leadership of
Imarns, Prayer Leaders) and to the ethical side, and outlawed the tarikals^
In this context, it will be useful to remember the significant events that
shaped the course of secularization process at the beginning of the Republican
period. The Sultanate and the Caliphate were abolished in 1922 and
1924
respectively. Between them, the Republic was established, in 1923. In 1924, the
Sharia was abandoned and replaced by the Swiss Civil Code (1926). Again in
1924, the Vaki^ (Religious Endowment Foundations) were closed and the
« Ibid., 6.
39
principle of the Tevhid-i Tedrisat (Unification of Education) was adapted,
leading to the closure of the medrese&. In 1925, the tarikats were abolished,
paving the way for them to survive underground; Western dress was
encouraged, the Hat Law was enacted and the Gregorian calendar adopted.
Islam as an official religion was deleted from the Constitution in 1928 and the
secular character of the state written was into the Constitution in 1937. Again, in
1928 the alphabet was converted from Arabic to Roman letters and in 1931 the
Western metric system adopted. In 1934, we see the introduction of family names
and Western music in schools. In 1935, Sunday was made the weekly holiday
When one keeps this sequence in mind, the gradual movement could be
observed which was planned as the basic stages of Westernization. According to
Burak Arikan, Atatürk initiated a reform, waited for its support in society, and
when he thought that the time was ready, he initiated a new one.^* On the one
hand, this new Turkish state negated the inheritance of its predecessor, the
Ottoman Empire, by eliminating the powerful role of religion within state affairs;
on the other, it preserved the 'high state' character of the Ottoman polity. Islam's
new role or retreat from the stage was the inevitable outcome of the secular
ambitions of the state
However, Islam continued to survive at the social level despite the high
degree of secularization process. Kemalist reforms could not replace the multi
level appeal of Islam and could not provide an alternative identity or organizing
Ibid.
Private conversation on Turkish Revolution with Burak Arikan
40
principles of life. ” During the İnönü period, these reforms were maintained
intact.
In 1945, Turkey made a transition to the multi-party politics. In 1950 the
first genuine free elections paved the way for the changing of party in power.
The Democratic Party (DP) took the place of the Republican People's Party (RPP).
Before this period, there had been experiments in multi-party politics which
were futile due to such unanticipated events for the Kemalist regime as the
Sheikh Said Rebellion and the Menemen Event.
In its last days, the RPP changed its policy towards religion; it at least
gave up strict methods by allowing the opening of religious courses and
restoring the pilgrimage, training for religious officials and the reopening of
shrines.^* However, the Islamic revival was seen as coinciding with the transition
to multi-party politics and the DP was identified with religious conservatism.
Throughout the DP years, the government was accused of adopting policies that
undermined the secular basis of the Republic in an effort to gain votes. Such
revisions as the lifting of the ban on the recital of the ezan (call to prayer), the
increase of the religious Imam-Hatip (Prayer Leader-Preacher) schools which
were established by the RPP for the first time, and the expansion of the
Presidency of the Religious Affairs were criticized by the RPP and the secular
press. The latter viewed these moves as the first steps toward a non-secular.
Ibid.
Ibid., 9.
41
theocratic state.“ In the first years of the DP, it was not the religious basis of its
political ideology, but its tolerant attitude towards religion which brought
popularity to the party among voters.“
In the late 1960s, Islam came into the limelight in its own right rather than
as a part of the periphery. The establishment of the National Order Party (NOP)
in 1969 marked the entry of Islam into party politics and the revival of tarikat
activity.“ The role of the N akşibendi group, under the leadership of Mehmed
Zahid Kotku, in providing support to the founders of the party (such as
Necmettin Erbakan and Korkut Özal) cannot be denied.“ However, the NOP
could not live long; it was closed in 1971 following the ultimatum of the military
towards the government, for the simple reason that an Islamic march had been
played in the İzmir Convention of the Party.“ One year later, in 1972, the
members of the NOP established the party with a new name, the National
Salvation Party (NSP), keeping the same religious motives. The NSP had a proIslamic stance but could not escape from the modernization process; it placed
emphasis on heavy industry. However, according to the Party ideology,
capitalism and socialism/communism were evil brothers, because both were
"materialist and selfish" and "they could not bring happiness to humanity." The
ideology of the NSP was the extension of the Islamists of the Ottoman Empire,
Toprak, "The State, Politics and Religion in Turkey," 123.
liter Turan, " Religion and Political Culture in Turkey" in Islam in M odem Turkey; Religion,
Politics and Literature in A Secular State, ed. Tapper, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 45.
^ Tapper, "Introduction," 9.
Mardin, "The Nakşibendi Order in Turkey," in Islam in M odem Turkey; Religion, Politics and
Literature in A Secular State, ed. Tapper (London: 1. B. Tauris), 134.
42
namely that science and technology of the West could be imported without their
values. This ideology had come to its peak in the Abdiilhamid II period
In the 1973 elections, the NSP achieved good results for a new party as it
obtained 11.8% of the votes and 48 seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly
(TGNA); in the Senate the result was 12.3% and three senators.^® The symbol of
the party, a key, opened a new place for itself in the Turkish political arena. This
symbolic key was meant to open all good things for the country. Also, the back
of the key was shaped like a heart. Then the whole symbol came to mean that the
NSP was the key to hearts. Later in 1973, the NSP entered into coalition with the
RPP under the leadership of Biilent Ecevit. The coalition parties were on such
opposite sides that sympathizers of the parties wondered at such a coalition, and
even disapproved of it. The coalition was not destined to last long since both the
parties wanted to convert the military success in Cyprus into votes on their
behalf for an election as early as possible. During the coalition period, the MSP
emphasized the role of religion under the veil of the ethical issues both in the
promulgation of laws against pornography and in the campaigns against
alcoholic drinks.
^ For further information see Ruşen Çakır, N e Şeriat N e Demokrasi: Refah Partisini Anlamak,
(İstanbul: Metis,1994)
In 1970s, İsmet Özel criticized this approach saying, one cannot be unaffected by the ideology of
West while importing its technological products. For further information, see İsmet Özel Üç
Mesele; Teknik M edeniyet, Yabancılaşma, (İstanbul: Çıdam Yaymları, 1992) and for further
information about İsmet Özel see Michael E. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the
Republic of Turkey," in Islam In M odem Turkey; Religion, Politics and Literature In A Secular
State, ed. Tapper (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 210-216.
Hüseyin, Islam Dünyasma Siyasi Bakışlar. 251.
43
The conditions of the country led the NSP to be the "key party" - as its
symbol - in the coming coalition calculations. The 1970s was a decade of chaos
due both
to the world economy and instability within the Turkish political
arena. That is why the NSP^^ became an important partner in both the Nationalist
Front Coalitions. In both of these coalitions Necmettin Erbakan as a Deputy
Prime Minister, turned out to be the most important factor in the continuation of
the coalitions even though the ratio of his party's vote fell from 11.8% in the
general elections of 1973 to 8.6% in the general elections of 1977.^°
There was something wrong in the functioning of Turkish democracy as
the crisis situation could not be overcome. The society was beset by issues of
black market, inflation, and terrorism. Even on the basic problems of the country
the leaders of the parties could not find a middle road; reconciliation was an
alien concept to them, when reconciliation was at the core of democracy. More
than that, the military was not happy with the situation. They first delivered a
secret - ultimatum - letter to the government through the President in the last
days of 1979. This letter was handed over to the party leaders in the first days of
the new year, 1980. But the military could not see the anticipated results that they
had hoped for and took power into its own hands, for the third time in twenty
years.
The NSP would return back to Turkish politics as the Prosperity Party (PP) following its closure
by the Military government
60
Toprak, "The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey," 125.
44
Military Intervention of 12 September 1980
As noted, while the development of Islamic politics was not the only
reason, it was a significant one behind the military intervention. There were also
problems in the economic and political spheres.
In the economic sphere, the dollar reserves of the country had become
scarce, basically because of the astronomic rise of oil prices. Turkey, as an oil
importing country, was badly affected by this development. Long queues
resulted if the goods could be found legally; if not, the black market was an
alternative. The austerity measures of 24 December, 1980, prepared in the last
days of the Demirel government, under the leadership of Turgut Ozal (who held
the posts of the Undersecretary and the Deputy Minister), could not bring short
term positive results. Inflation was too high to give the public hope for its
decrease.
Conditions in the political sphere were as discouraging as the economic
ones. Due to the instability of the governments in the 1970s, the country lived in
chaos. There were battles between the political parties rather than a
reconciliation. The people were miserable under the existing conditions because
everyday about twenty or twenty-five people were dying because of terrorism.
Politics was polarized at all levels, which blocked the measures necessary to end
terrorism. This led some see the situation as civil war. The question of the
election of the President turned to be a vicious circle as for six months no one
45
could be elected to this post. As a consequence, the military intervened on 12
September 1980, "in order to prevent further chaos in the country."^’
The National Security Council (NSC), the executors of the intervention,
aimed to strengthen the state and reestablish democracy by preparing a new
constitution which was expected to prevent conflicts and keep the military in the
barracks. The military government closed all political parties, because they could
not find the cooperation that they had expected. Then, all the existing political
parties, including the RPP (founded by Atatürk), were closed down, their assets
were seized and their leaders were banned from the political activity.
In the preamble of the 1982 Constitution, the final version of which was
shaped by the NSC, the reference to "Turkish historical and moral values" was
aimed at decreasing the ideological tensions within the society,“ that is the use of
Islam for such ends. Heper has viewed the issue as follows: "Although absolutely
opposed to the utilization of religion for political purposes, the military proved
itself to be more congenial on the issue of the role of religion in society than the
post-Atatürk bureaucratic intelligentsia had ever been."“
The military wanted to benefit from Islam not in the political sphere“ but
as a cultural entity in their efforts to create a new system of ethics by
The Prime Minister of the period, Süleyman Demirel, criticized the declared reason of the
military intervention after he had returned back to politics, following the referendum in 1987
about the lifting of the political bans on the politicians of the era preceding 1980. Demirel
indicated that the country was also in a bad state in 11 September 1980 and questioned why the
intervention was not performed earlier.
“ Duran, A Comparative Perspective. 38.
“ Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey. 134.
^ Ziya ül-Haq, a contemporary of Evren, who led the military intervention in Pakistan benefited
from Islam in the political arena.
46
emphasizing the unifying trait of religion. The military regime was exposed to
paradox because, on the one hand, they declared their aim as restoring the tenets
of Atatiirkism, and, on the other, as emphasizing the solidarity notion of religion.
Religious education, both at primary and secondary levels, was made as
compulsory, as stipulated by the Article 24 of the new 1982 Constitution.^^ There
was a structural transformation in the military's previous staunch views on
religion and politics, as was evident in the reconciliation of the two of them.
Evren quoted verses from the Qu'ran as a reference point to justify the secular
policies of the government. Moreover, Evren tried to exhibit Atatürk as a pious
Muslim; later this entered into the text-books of the primary and secondary
education.^
All these endeavors aimed to find middle ground between Islam and the
state. This was because Islam's role was considered as an important factor to
unite the nation. Without abandoning the secular character of the state; the
military regime tried to formulate a new approach under the banner of "TurkishIslamic s y n t h e s i s . L a t e r , Turkey under the leadership of the military
government, would seek to develop its relations with Muslim countries and
decrease its ties with Israel. Still, for Evren, religion was not a tool in politics:
"'The Operation Flag' was directed against those bringing religious reactionism
" Education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be conducted under state supervision
and control, instruction in religious culture and moral education will be compulsory in the
curricula of primary and secondary schools."
“ Duran, A Comparative Perspective. 39.
47
and other perverted ideologies; its aim was to protect the secular Republic."^® It
is clear Evren used religion against the arguments of the religious
fundamentalists
Evren criticized the political parties for setting the climate for
the crisis before the military intervention by exploiting religion for their own
political purposes.
Evren's emphasis on the concept of secularism was directly linked to his
conceptualization as the state elite, that is, the role of the military as a preserver
of the principles of Atatürk, one of which is secularism. This brings us the second
issue, that religion should be subservient to the state, so Islam had to be
transferred to the private sphere: the state would protect the religious rights of
its citizens as long as they were kept within this sphere, and Evren continued the
Kemalist tradition of the modernization project by indicating that without
secularism, the modernization process would remain a dream.
In this context. Evren perceived religious fundamentalism as an enemy of
the secular regime as dangerous as communism. In his approach to religious
revivalism. Evren used a highly negative terminology. Duran explains this
attitude
as
the
dichotomy
of ilerici (progress-oriented)
versus gerici
(obscurantist) which was shaped in the mind of Republican elite
Kenan Evren, D evlet Başkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçleri 1980-1981, 17 in A
Comparative Perspective, Duran, 37.
Kenan Evren, Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söyiev ve D em eden 1986-1987, (Ankara:
Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1987), 250 in A Comparative Perspective, Duran, 45.
Duran, A Comparative Perspective, 46.
48
The era that was shaped mainly by the activities of Evren, enable us to
understand the relations between state and religion as they developed in the
Ozal period. Ozal changed the pejorative approach to the Islamic groups,
because he saw these groups as part of the nation's culture and part of civil
society. Ozal can be seen as having offered a counter argument to that of Evren.
This dichotomy was basically related to their origins; Ozal was a part of the
political elite and Evren was the state elite.
The general elections of 1983 marked a return of limited democracy to the
country. In this period, Turgut Ozal, the winner of the elections, became the
Prime Minister as the leader of the Motherland Party (MP), and with a new
vision, he started transformation in the economy as well as other spheres of life.^^
Vision and transformation were the frequently used terms by Ozal.
49
CHAPTER III
OZAL ON THE VERGE OF ISLAMIC POLITICS?
The chaotic political winds blowing over Turkey ended following the
military intervention on 12 September 1980^; the intervention functioned as the
sw ord o f the Alexander the Great Then, a new period started in which
prohibitions on all spheres of political life were felt for a long time. However, the
military kept its promise and new elections were held in 1983 following the
approval of the new Constitution by referendum in 1982.
The military government evaluated the chaotic condition of the country
as having originated from the fact that there were too many political parties; this
is why they allowed only three parties to compete in the 1983 elections. Of
course, the only reason for this was not the number of parties; the other parties
presented themselves as the followers of the pre-1980 parties which was labeled
by Evren as the organizations who made the saucepan d i r t y O n 6 November,
1983, the general elections were held and the Motherland Party ( MP) with its
leader Turgut Ozal became the victorious party. This result surprised everyone,
especially the executors of the military intervention. Then it was the time for the
military to return to their barracks. Pulur evaluates this return as: "Yes, they
‘ The bill of the intervention was so costly from the perspective of democracy and humanist
concerns which would be felt in the following period. See that bill about the intervention in
Fotoğraflarla 12 Eylül Kitabı:! M ayıs 1977-6 Kasım 1983, eds. Mine Söğüt, Tamaşa F. Dural and
Çetin Demirhan (İstanbul: Hürgüç Gazetecilik, 1994), 96.
^ For the parties established following 16 May 1983, see Söğüt, Dural and Demirhan, eds..
Fotoğraflarla 12 Eylül Kitabı. 104.
50
came as soldiers, they gave the promise of soldiers and they went as
soldiers...History will say that for them."^
The other two parties the Nationalist Democracy Party (NDP) and the
Populist Party (PP), were supported by the military and were the parties of the
right and the left, respectively. ITiese parties wanted the people to see themselves
as the only chance
for democracy. But Özal surprised them despite Kenan
Evren's attack on Özal in his radio-television speech two days before the
elections. Following his part's victory Özal kissed Evren on the cheeks in public
in order to show the people that he was the right person to bring about harmony
to society.^
Özal was a strange, multi-faceted^ and charismatic man; everyone liked
something in him. As Yıldırım Akbulut once observed, Özal was sue generis; it
was difficult to label him.^ Moreover, Özal lent credence to this characterization
by indicating that the MP merged in his program the four tendencies; nationalist,
conservative, liberal and social democratic which were the basis of the social
peace needed to integrate society. For Özal, the MP's starting point was the
building of a consensus and moving away from the dichotomy of right and left.^
Özal defined his party in several speeches as a political organization based on
nationalism, conservatism, social justice and free-market economy meaning free
^Hasan Pulur, Hürriyet, İstanbul Daily, 8 December 1983 quoted in Fotoğraflarla 12 Eylül Kitabı,
eds. Söğüt, Dural and Demirhan, 124-126.
^Mehmet Barlas, Turgut Özal'm Anıları, 2"“êd. (İstanbul: Sabah Yaymları, 1994), 54.
Êmin Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor, 34"’ ed. (İstanbul; Tekin Yaymevi, 1989)
^Yavuz Gökmen, ÖzalSendrom u (Ankara: Verso Yaymları, 1992), 247.
’ Turgut Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey, revised English edition (Northern
Cyprus, Nicosia: K. Rustem & Brother, 1991), 305.
51
competition.® In this context, conservatism meant not reactionism but respect for
tradition.^ Turgut Özal indicated that " the MP combined loyalty to Muslim
conservatism with a strong commitment toward economic liberalism, one that
reoriented the Turkish economy to export to world markets."’®According to
Nilüfer Göle, the core ideology of the MP combined engineering pragmatism
with cultural conservatism which she terms "Islamic social engineering".“ Mesut
Yılmaz attributes ÖzaTs success to his tevhidi, unifying vision.’^ Indeed, Özal
always indicated that the MP was not the continuation of the any pre-1980
political parties, the activities of which paved the way to chaos and military
intervention. Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert have defined Özal's
position as being somewhere between the moderate secular vintage of the Justice
Party (fP) and the religious right of the National Salvation Party (NSP).“
According to Özal, the MP was a new (third) way different from the Republican
People's Party (RPP) and the Democratic Party (DP), both of which had their
roots in the Unity and Progress Party (UPP), as its left and right wings.“ Özal's
®Özal, Başbakan Turgut ÖzaTın Konuşma-Mesaj, Beyanat ve Mülakatları, 13.12.1983-12.12.1984
(Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1984), 160-161.
^ Burhanetin Duran, "Kenan Evren's and Turgut ÖzaTs Conceptualizations of Secularism: A
Comparative Perspective." Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1994), 67.
Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey," in Civil
Society in the M iddle East, ed. A. R. Norton (E. J. Brill Leiden, 1996), 30.
" Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics.", 31 and see Nilüfer Göle, "Engineers and
the Emergence of a Technicist Identity," in Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural
Identities, eds. Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1994)
Mesut Yılmaz, "Introduction," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adam ı Turgut Özal, ed. Prof. Dr. İhsan
Sezai (İstanbul: 20 Mayıs Eğitim Kültür ve Sosyal Dayanışma Vakfı- Çetin öfset, 1996), 3.
Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert, " The 1983 General Elections in Turkey: Continuity or
Change in Voting Behaviors " in State, Democracy and the M ilitary in Turkey in 1980s, eds. Metin
Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin: Walter de Gruyer, 1988), 86.
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTm Anıları. 43.
52
main objective was the re-structuring of the country in all spheres, starting from
the economic one.^®
Neither Özal nor the MP appeared pious but they did not act against
Islam as much as possible. This approach rendered Islam as the source of some
policies performed by the MP.
According to Nilüfer Göle, Özal developed "a synthesis between Islamic
identity and the pragmatic rationality of engineering" in which cultural values of
the country and economic necessities were reconciled.’^ Özal indicated that
reform could be possible within the religion. This became one of the points in the
Second Transformation Program of his Presidency.’^ For Özal, as an architecture
of the 1980s and first years of the 1990s, religion was an important factor in the
transformation process both an object and a subject.
0zars„ BİQgraph_y
Turgut Özal was born on October 13, 1927 in Malatya, the eldest child of
the family. His father, Mehmet Siddik Bey, was a small offical in the Ziraat
Bankası^ Agricultural Bank and his mother, Hafize Hamm, was a primary school
teacher. Because of his father's profession, Özal completed his education until
university in different cities and towns of the country. He did his primary
Ibid., 2.
Göle, "Küçük Dünyalar ve Tarih,"\7 April 1993, Nokta, özel ek. For further information about
Göle's approach to engineers, see Nilüfer Göle, Mühendisler ve İdeoloji: Öncü Devrimcilerden
Yenilikçi Seçkinlere (İstanbul: İletişim Yaymları, 1986)
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı (Ankara: Verso Yaymcılık, 1994), 129-130, 150,294 and Gökmen,
"Değişim Rüzgarları Eserken," in Bütün Yönleriyle Özal ve Dönemi 1983-1993, eds. Oya Ayman
Büber and Mine Söğüt (İstanbul: Tempo Kitaplan,1993), 14.
53
education in Söğüt, a town of Bilecik, and in Silifke, a town of Mersin, his
secondary education in Mardin and graduated from high school in Kayseri.
In 1950, he graduated from Istanbul Technical University as an electrical
engineer and in the same year started to work in the Elektrik İşleri Etüd İdaresi
(Agency for Research on Issues Related to Electricity - ARIRE) in Ankara. In his
university years, Ozal was Chairman of the Aid Branch of the Student Society.
During those years, Özal met Necmettin Erbakan, now the Prime Minister, and
Süleyman Demirel, now the President, and continued to be friends with them
more than forty years until his death. In his university years, Özal learned how
to pray.
In 1950, Özal married Ayhan İnal but this marriage lasted only two years.
In 1952, he went to the US to make further studies on electrical engineering. The
US had a special effect on Özal; he took the US as the model in formulating his
policies.^® Following his return to Turkey, Özal became the technical assistant to
the General Manager of the ARIRE. In 1954, he met Semra and married her. In
1958, he was employed as advisor to Süleyman Demirel who was the General
Director of State Hydraulic Affairs. In 1960, Özal started his military service in
the Research-Development Organization of the Ministry of National Defense, the
State Planning Organization (SPO) and as an instructor in the Middle East
Technical University (METU). Following his military service, Özal continued to
be the assistant of the General Manager of the ARIRE. In 1967, he became private
' Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu, 75 and Gökmen, Özal Yaşasaydı, 223-224.
54
technical assistant to the Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, and in 1968 was
made Undersecretary of the SPO. At the same time, Özal carried the titles as the
Administrative Board Member of Ereğli Iron-Steel factories; the Chairman of
Financial Crediting; and the Chairman of the Board of Economic Coordination.
In 1971, Özal left the office of the undersecretaries and worked as an assistant on
the projects about mining and industry and went abroad. In 1973, Özal returned
to Turkey and worked as a director in private companies representing such
different sectors as steel-iron production, automotive, and textile. In these years
Özal worked in the Sabancı Holding as the General Coordinator.
In 1977, Özal became a candidate for the Parliament from the NSP slate.
ÖzaTs brother. Korkut Özal, was a prominent member of the NSP. Özal did not
succeed in the elections but, according to his brother Korkut Özal, he learned
politics and recognized the structure of the NSP.^’ One of the lesser known
stories about Özal was his possible nomination as a senator for the National
Action Party (NAP) in the same years but he missed out at the last minute
In
1977, Özal became a member, and later Chairman, of the M adeni Eşya
Sanayicileri Sendikası (Union of Metallic Goods Industrialists). In 1979, Özal was
once again back in the public bureaucracy. Özal now became the Undersecretary
of the Prime Minister, and the SPO Undersecretary when Demirel became the
Nail Güreli, Gerçek Tanık Korku Ö zal Anlatıyor (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1994) 126,129.
Korkut Özal differentiates between politics and siyaset and defines his elder brother, Turgut Özal
did siyaset which made him a statesman until 1987 general elections. After 1987, Turgut Özal
became a politician and made politics, that is why Korkut Özal warned him. According to Korkut
Özal, politics is not a place to become successful because politics is a dirty job in Turkey. 154-156.
Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor, 83,96.
55
Prime Minister. Ozal led the team that prepared the austerity measures of 1980.
This brought him fame. Ozal had the important duty of conducting the
negotiations with the OECD and the IMF. Following the 1980 military
intervention, Ozal became the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for economic
issues since the generals needed someone well versed in economic issues. Ozal
performed this duty until July 14, 1982. In the same year, the "bankers scandal"
would bring his resignation.
On May 20,1983, Ozal established the Motherland Party (MP) and became
its Chairman^^ at a time when all the traditional parties were banned. The MP did
extremely well in the general elections held on November 6 1983 and gained 211
seats in the 400-strong Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). President
Evren approved the proposed list of the ministers on December 13, 1983“ and
OzaTs first government received its vote of confidence from the TGNA on
December 24,1983.
Ozal was re-elected Chairman of the MP at the first grand congress of the
Party on April 13, 1985. In the general elections of 1987“, the MP gained 292 of
the seats in the now 450-strong TGNA and Ozal once again was appointed the
Prime Minister. OzaTs second government was declared on December 21, 1987.
At the second congress of the MP in June 1988, Ozal was re-elected Chairman of
Oya Ayman Büber and Mine Söğüt, "Siyaset Merdivenleri ve Özal," in Bütün Yönleriyle Ö zal
ve Dönemi, ed. Büber and Söğüt, 51.
Ibid., 53.
Results of 24 November 1987 early general elections: the MP; 36.3 percent of the votes and 292
seats, the SDPP; 24.8 percent of the votes and 99 seats, the TPP; 19.1 percent of the votes and 59
seats, the DLP; 8.5 percent of the votes, the PP; 7.2 percent of the votes, the NWP; 2.9 of the votes.
56
the Party. During this congress, Ozal survived an assassination attempt. Ozal
forgave Kartal Demirag who made the attempt. Following the event, Ozal
displayed his faith by saying that "...only Allah can take the life back that He has
p r o v i d e d . O n October 31, 1989 Ozal was elected as the President of the
Republic. He died following a heart attack on April 17 1993, at the age of 66.
Ozal became famous as a technocrat and transferred his experiences to
politics. The period between 1983 and 1993 were the years when the world was
being reshaped. During the decade, Ozal was the chief actor in determining the
national policies. He was the second civilian President after Celal Bayar and he
kept his office about three and half years, not long when compared to other
Presidents
Qzal and Hcmestic Politics
Ozal continued to be one of the prominent actors of the Turkish political
scene from the midst of 1970s until 1993 when he died. Ozal identified politics as
a "subtle and sensible job in democratic and open regimes"^^ and himself as the
man knowing his mission. This provided Ozal to be far away from internal
political benefit calculations meaning that he cared about the national interests
rather than personal and party benefits
Ozal developed his main policies not
Büber and Söğüt, "Siyaset Merdivenleri ve Özal," 58 and Betül Uncular, İşte Böyle Bir Meclis:
1983-1991 2"'^ ed. (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1992), 169.
Mehmed Nuroğlu, ed.. Sevgi Şelalesi Özal: N e Dediler, Sekizinci Reisi Cumhur Turgut Özal'm
Vefatı Sebebiyle Türk Basmmda Çıkan Yazılar (İstanbul: Sebil Yayınevi, 1993), 13-14 and Büber
and Söğüt, eds.. Bütün Yönleriyle Ö zal ve Dönemi, pp.5-11 and Hüseyin Sak, "Özal'la
Demorasimizi EXişünmek," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. İhsan Sezai, 124.
Barlas, Turgut Özal'm Anıları. 124.
2"Ibid., 128.
57
for saving the day but for including Turkey among 15 developed Western
countries.^® For Ozal, consensus in society was the factor to succeed
According
to Sezal, Ozal formulated a game plan based on the reconciliation of the Republic
with the Ottoman and Islam, and of the people and politics. This was OzaTs
mission. 30
Ozal's most noticeable characteristic was his revolt against the state's
official ideology and all kind of taboos®^; one can argue that he was close to the
discourses of the Second Republic, coined by Mehmet Altan.®^ However, OzaTs
grand moves were to some extent restrained largely by Turkey's traditional
bureaucracy and Ozal had to find a middle road.®® His attitude could be observed
in the issue of privatization, which Ozal could not take a long way.
Ozal thought that one should act in a logical way; for him the law and the
requirements of the state were mere obstacles.®^ In his New Vision of
Development,®® prepared in 1979 when he was a bureaucrat, and his Second
Third Economy Congress in İzmir {III. İzm ir İktisat Kongresi) and "Türkiye'de Gerçeklşeşen
Büyük Değişim", "2 Ekim 1992 İstanbul, Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'm İş Dünyası Vakfmdaki
Konuşmaları," in Turgut Özal'm Anılan, Barlas, 253, 259.
Ibid., 140.
İhsan Sezai, "Bir Toplumsal Barış Mimarı: Turgut Özal," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai,
134-135.
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı. 23.
Gökmen, "Değişim Rüzgarları Eserken" in Bütün Yönleriyle Ö zal ve Dönemi, ed. Oya Ayman
Büber and Mine Söğüt, 41 and Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı, 151 and Barlas, Turgut Özal'm Anıları,
333-334.
Ibid., 51-52.
At the Small Congress of the Nationalists {M illiyetçiler Küçük Kurultay!) Özal said that one day
the New View would come to power. Taha Akyol has interpreted Özal's prophecy as the mixture
of the modernist ÖzaTs social determinism and conservative Özal's mystical intuition, in "Özal'a
Saygı," Taha Akyol in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 12.
58
Transformation Program^^ formulated in 1992, when he was President, Özal was
critical of the massive role of the state in the economy and society.
Özal learned the rules of the game while he was close to Demirel as a high
bureaucrat. One of his characters was to be patienP^ and not show his hand. Özal
was aware of the role plotted by the generals for him as a gift of the democracy
to establish a party before the general elections of 1983 but for him the most
important issue was to get into the elections. He knew how to avoid making the
generals angry. Also, the case of the kissing scene is worth of mention: Özal
could melt the iceberg. Evren, with his kind attitude.^® For Demirel, Özal was
opportunist rather than a pragmatist and he did not care as much about the
people as Demirel, who protected him for long years
From the early 1980
onwards, Demirel and Özal did not see eye to eye.
Özal seemed reluctant to enter into politics in 1983, but encouragement
from his wife Semra and such close associates as Hüsnü Doğan, his cousin,
Mehmet Keçeciler and Adnan Kahveci made him change his mind.'“’ According
to Yavuz Gökmen, Semra Özal was the first person who encouraged her husband
to enter politics and to aim at the Prime Ministry.^’ ÖzaTs daughter Zeynep
would say that; "If my mother was not around, my father would not be the
^ Gökmen finds Özal's democratic vision came to the surface with this program and accounts
Özal's speech given on 2 October 1992 in Conrad Hotel as his manifesto. Gökmen, Özal
Yaşasaydı, 39,117,121-124.
Hasan Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi {Ankara·. Bilgi Yaymevi, 1989), 64.
Ibid., 20.
Cemal's interview with Demirel at the beginning of June of 1988 quoted in Özai Hikayesi,
Cemal, 27.
Cemal, Ö zai H ikayesi 39 and Söğüt, Dural and Demirhan, eds., Fotoğrafiaria 12 Eylül Kitabı,
103.
59
Prime Minister. ^ Semra Ozal was influential on his husband“ : Gökmen
characterizes Özal as a successful man who was always supported by two
women, his wife and his mother who also had an effect on Özal.^
Özal met Evren three times before the establishment of the party. In these
visits. Evren wanted Özal to enter the general elections as a candidate from the
NDP but Özal refused these proposals. Özal convinced Evren that a third party
in the elections and in the Parliament with few deputies would provide a more
democratic appearance.“ Then Özal was allowed to establish his party on 20 May
1983 with 30 members as the founding fathers of the MP.
Even following the establishment of the Party, Özal and his friends were
anxious that the generals could close the party.“ Evren did not think that Özal
would be successful in the elections. But when he was informed about the
increasing popularity of the MP, Evren made his famous speech on TV and
radio“ on 4 November 1983 by which he hoped to stop the momentum of ÖzaTs
p a r t y I n this speech Evren indicated that Özal tried to show himself as the
owner of the actions, not the military, approved by the society.
Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu. 65
Gökmen, Özal Sendromu, 213 and Uncular, iste Böyle Bir Meclis, 9. According to Uncular,
Turgut Özal did not think to establish a party but to become a Minister responsible from
economic and financial affairs. Thus, the MP, in fact, was a handiwork of Semra Özal.
“ Güreli, Gerçek Tanık. 165.
^ Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu. 27.
“ Ibid., 80.
Ibid.
At the time, there was only one TV channel.
Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu, 80, Söğüt, Dural and Demirhan, eds., 110 and Cüneyt Arcayürek,
Namı 864Rakımlı Tepe: Çankaya,
ed., (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi,1989), 20.
60
When the results of the elections were declared'*^ Özal's victory was quite
striking. Özal had not anticipated such a victory; he had hoped for about sixty or
seventy seats in the Parliament.^“ He won because he had shown himself as
representing a new force. Despite being favorable towards the ban on some
political parties and politicians, he did not give his blessings which gave him the
image of being a civilian person when compared to Sunalp and Calp. Özal was
also able to reach the sympathizers of the closed political parties through some
connections (to the NSP by Korkut Özal and Mehmet Keçeciler and to the NAP
by Mustafa Taşar, Halil Şıvgın and Veysel Atasoy). Özal also made use of
modern image-making and research methods.^’ He changed his style of dressing,
hair, even his glasses which gave him a smiling Tonton Amca (Darling Uncle)
appearance, beloved by everyone. All these tactics were quite compatible with
ÖzaTs way of thinking as he was making all the necessary calculations befitting
an engineer.
President Evren approved ÖzaTs cabinet on 13 December 1983 and the
government obtained a vote of confidence (213 yes, 115 no and 65 abstaining) on
24 December, 1983.“ Thus, a new period started for Özal during which he
wanted to stay away from conflict on regime issues.“
Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi. 60.
Uncular, işte Böyle Bir Meclis. 11.
Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi 49-52.
“ Ibid., 67.
Ibid., 66: "Kendi (Özal'm) deyimiyle "maraza çıkarmak"tan özenle kaçmmak, Özal'm 6 Kasım
1983 seçimlerini izleyen politikasmm en temel ilkesi olmuştu."
61
Özal appeared as a student who had done his homework well; all the
policies he pursued were in his mind from the very beginning. This was clearly
from the letter he sent to Demirel on 15 June 1973 and the Kalkınmada Yeni
Görüşün Esasları (Principles of New Vision of Development), presented at the
M illiyetçiler K üçük Kurultayı (Nationalists' Small Congress) held in Ankara in
April 1979.^ They were both about the necessary amendments that the country
needed as fast as possible.
Özal wanted to change the state's father character to that of guide. He
attempted to demystify the sacred understanding about the state, urged the
people to question the phenomenon of the strong state^^ and wanted them to
realize that the state was a means rather than an end. Özal wanted to demolish
the father-state image arguing that state was not a master but a servant to the
p e o p l e H e also pointed out that this orientation was necessary in order to make
a transition to the free-market economy
Özal seemed the apostle of democracy. But when democratic demands
were made, he used the card of Çankaya, saying that Evren would disapprove
even if he approved of such kind of democratic developments.^® According to
Yavuz Gökmen, Özal was neither a democrat nor did he understand the essence
of democracy. He did not try to change but instead benefited from the 1982
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaJ'ın Anıları, 169-226, and Özal, Değişim Belgeleri: 1979-1992 (İstanbul:
Kazancı Matbacıhk, 1993), 11-45 and Duran, A Comparative Perspective, 70.
“ Mustafa Erdoğan, "Türk Politikasmda Bir Reformist: Özal," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed.
Sezai, 43.
“ Atilla Yayla, "Özal: Reformcu Lider," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 145.
Gökmen, ÖzalSendromu. 63.
62
Constitution which was an anti-democratic one.^^ On the other hand, according
to Gökmen "Özal opened the paths to democracy and freedoms."^” Özal made
efforts for the gradual development of democracy.^’ The whole atmosphere
provided Özal capability of maneuver by which he underlined the priority of the
economy rather than other issues, such as democratization.^^ Özal underlined the
negative relationship between democracy and inflation, and indicated the
necessity of the decline of the inflation for a stable democracy
On 24 March 1989, two days before the local elections, Özal said that he
would leave politics rather than take his place in opposition if the MP received
less than 30 percent of the votes. He wanted to retain power,^ and hoped that the
political bans established by the interventionist generals would continue because
he knew that his votes would fall when Süleyman Demirel, Bülent Ecevit,
Necmettin Erbakan and Alparslan Türkeş returned to the political scene
Özal was proud of the abrogation of Articles 141,142 and 163 of the Penal
Law which were seen by Özal as obstacles to democratization.^ These laws
banned the propagandation of socialism and Islam. The promulgation of the
Terörle M ücadele Kanunu (Law on Fighting Terror) resulted in articles harsher
Yavuz Donat, Yavuz Donat'm Vitrininden 3: Ozal'li Yıllar 1983-1987{Ankara·. Bilgi Yayınevi,
1987), 339.
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı. 22,39.
“ Gökmen, ÖzalSendromu. 248.
Cemal's interview with Özal in 5 June, 1984 in the Official Residence of the Prime Ministry, in
Özal Hikayesi, Cemal. 69.
“ Ibid., 74.
“ Ibid., 108.
^ Ibid., 279-280.
“ Ibid., 309.
63
than previous provisions of the Penal Law.^’' Another point was the
promulgation of the amendment to the Polis Vazife ve Selahiyet Kanunu (the
Law of the Duties and Rights of Police) which can be accepted as the extension
of the military intervention atmosphere.^® Moreover, Özal supported the YÖK,
(High Board of Education) which was established by the generals and criticized
by most of the s o c i e t y F o r Özal, bread was more important than democracy.
However, Özal took local administration as the basis of democracy.^®
Özal approached the state machinery with a simple pragmatic mind rather
than with bureaucratic clichés. He wanted to overcome the bureaucracy as much
as possible since he regarded it as red-tape, a point made above. According to
Hasan Cemal, Özal considered bureaucracy to be an obstacle to development.^’
Özal tried to change the father character of the state by decreasing bureaucratic
procedures to some extent.^^
Although Özal won the plurality of the votes and became the winner of
the elections, he was doubtful about the power the government could wield and
at the end of 1983, when Özal came to government he could not gain full power
because Evren was the president and stood as the sw ord o f Damocles over his
head. Moreover, institutionalization of the MP was one of Özal's plans, which is
“ Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTm Anıları, 70 and Ergun Özbudun, "Özal ve Demokratikleşme," 108 and
Atilla Yayla, "Özal; Reformcu Lider," 146 in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai and Gökmen,
Özal Yaşasaydı, 25.
“ Cemal, Özal Hikayesi. 315.
Ibid., 317.
Ibid., 317-323.
Ibid., 118.
64
why he regarded the local elections of 1984 as being very important/^ The results
were positive for Ozal: the MP obtained 41.5 percent of the votes, 54 province
mayoralties and 328 subprovince mayoralties; the Social Democratic Populist
Party (SDPP) obtained 22 percent of the votes, 8 province mayoralties and 191
subprovince mayoralties; the True Path Party (TPP) obtained 13.72 percent of the
votes and 61 subprovince mayoralties; the Populist Party (PP) obtained 8.5
percent of the votes and 28 subprovince mayoralties; the Nationalist Democratic
Party (NDP) obtained 7.87 percent of the votes, 3 province mayoralties and 34
subprovince mayoralties; and the Prosperity Party (PP) obtained 4.73 percent of
the votes, 2 province mayoralties and 6 subprovince mayoralties.^^ The results
showed that the political map drawn by the military intervention had been
broken down and the opposition remained outside the Parliament.^^
In the institutionalization of the MP, the result of the by-elections of 28
September 1986 was an important cornerstone; they showed that DemireTs rising
popularity could end in the MP's losing political power. Henceforth, Ozal could
not approach the economy as a technocrat but as a politician, meaning that
austerity measures and the struggle against inflation had to be replaced with
populist policies. According to Cemal, OzaTs "Demirel Complex," "Elder
Brother Complex" or "Demirel P h o b i a m a r k e d the beginning of the end for
Murat Çemrek, "The Basic Rationale of administrative Reforms in the OzaTs Governments: The
Structural Transformation of Turkish Bureaucracy's Role," Unpublished paper, 29.
Cemal, Ozal Hikayesi. 76.
Ibid., 80.
Ibid.
Ibid., 256.
65
the MP: Ozal became less democratic than the generals on the occasion of the
lifting of political bans on pre-1980 politicians/^
On the other hand, the political bans began to be flouted with the lifting of
Martial Law in the autumn of 1985. This encouraged the Istanbul press to talk
about old politicians and their views
The negative attitude of Ozal towards the
political bans was perceived by Demirel as an act without n o v el t y Demi r el
characterized OzaTs mind primordial, anti-democratic and full of enmity.®“
OzaTs attitude would become the reason for the endless disputes between Ozal
and Demirel. Ozal regarded the conflict between old party leaders and himself,
especially Demirel, as being a war between the old and the new and explained
this issue as the reason why he supported the continuation of the political bans
against the pre-1980 politicians.®^ The importance of the dispute could be
understood if we indicate that Ozal sought DemireTs permission when,
following the military intervention, the generals invited Ozal to work with them
on economic issues. Demirel encouraged Ozal to take on this job because,
according to Demirel, the country needed services and there should be no
interruptions in the functions the state provided. Ozal even continued his
telephone conversations with Demirel until the warning of the generals.®^
""Ibid., 202-204.
Ibid., 208.
Ibid., 216.
Ibid., 221.
81
Barlas, Turgut Ozal'm Anılan.
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaJ'm Anıları, 219, Gökmen, Özal Sendromu, 54 and
Demirhan, eds.. Fotoğraflarla 12 Eylül Kitabı, 59-63.
66
üt. Dural and
It is worth talking about Özal's relations with media which changed over
time. Initially, Özal saw the media as being indispensable to democracy, but
eventually believed that it wielded too much power.*^ According to Cemal,
Özal's aim was to make the press subservient.®^ He used various means at the
disposal
of
government
to
suppress
the
press,
including
dropping
advertisements for state economic enterprises, especially the banks, an important
source of revenue for the newspapers. Another method was to increase the price
of newsprint. This method was very effective because the state held the
monopoly on paper production in Turkey and could be imported only with
government permission and funding. Özal used this weapon against the press in
the name of liberalism and a free-market economy.®® Özal also filed several suits
against such newspapers as H ürriyet, Cum huriyet ânà Günaydın, Istanbul daily
newspapers.®® Cemal saw similarities between ÖzaTs and the DP's attitudes
towards the press.®^ Then, the press became very happy with ÖzaTs defeat in the
1989 local elections.®®
Cemal thinks Özal as a typical Oriental politician who knew when to give
in and when not to.®^ Özal was also a stubborn person due to his egocentric
thinking.^“ Thus he could not easily engage in dialogue or reconcile his
differences with others, a general characteristic of Turkish political life, even
“ Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi, 257-258 and Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor, 198.
^ Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi. 259.
Ibid., 266.
“ Ibid., 267.
Ibid., 219.
“ Ibid., 281 and see the headlines of the Istanbul daily newspapers in the footnote.
Ibid., 73.
67
though he underlined the importance of reconciliation and unity within society.’^
Ozal's indication that he would not go into opposition^^ following the 26 March
1989 local elections was a good example of his egocentric thinking. As noted, his
by-pass operation in February 1987 and the assassination attempt of June 1988
bolstered his egocentric approach to politics.’^ Ozal closed his ears to any kind of
critique. He wanted to use power by himself as a politician who believed that he
was a liberator and had c h a r i s maOz al became much happy with the results of
29 November, 1987, early general elections results, that, according to Cemal, his
"megalomania" had risen to its peak.’^ These results bolstered the significance of
the role as a liberator determined by Ozal for himself. Ozal could dream a
government staying in power for at least twenty years, in the example of the
Japan Liberal Party
Ozal worked with his family members and those close to the family. In
fact, the family as an institution kept its prominence in the preparation of policies
by Ozal.^^ The Ozals were referred to as the 'Dynasty'^® first in 1984 and more
frequently from 1987 on w a r d s . I n the same period, allegations about bribery.
^ Ibid., 83-84.
Ibid., 195.
Cemal, ÖzaJ Hikayesi, p.324 and Atilla Yayla, "Özal: Reformcu Lider," in D evlet ve Siyaset
Adamı, ed. Sezai, 148.
Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi, 86.
Ibid., 223
Ibid., 253
Ibid., 254.
’®Bekir Coşkun would make a series of articles about Özal's family under the name of
Hasbahçe'de Sonbahar in Sabah, Istanbul daily. Then following the application of the Prime
Minister and his wife the articles would be stopped. This would mean the censor over the press.
Cemal, Özal Hikayesi, 270 and Uncular, İşte Böyle Bir Meclis, 187.
’’ Cemal, Özal Hikayesi, 135.
68
corruption vis-à-vis the Özals were frequently voiced^*’*^ and contributed to the
MP's defeat in the 1989 local elections.^“^
Özal also knew how to treat the military. His initiative about the Öztorun,
or 'two N ecdet^ Operation for the Office of the General Staff in the summer of
1987 was a case in point. In this event, the chief of the General Staff Necdet Üruğ
was to be replaced by Necdet Öztorun according to a plan determined by the
military hierarchy. This bothered the MP government as being a fa it accompli
which Özal said he would not allow.'“ Ih e case was important for Özal, because
he wanted to show the supremacy of the civil government. Özal blocked
Öztorun's appointment.'“ Then, Necip Torumtay would take the Office of the
General Staff and he would give his resignation on 3 December 1990 during the
heyday of the Gulf Crisis'“ and would be replaced by Doğan Güreş. ÖzaTs
initiative could be evaluated as the civilianization of the regime meaning a
diminished role for the military bureaucracy.'“ On the question of the
Presidency, Özal, according to Cemal, was unsympathetic to the aspirations of
the Harbiye (Military Academy) graduates to become candidates for this office
one day, as a fifth star on their shoulders'“, believing that the President should
Mustafa Erdoğan, "Türk Politikasında Bir Reformist: Özal," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed.
Sezai, 48-49.
Cemal, Özal Hikayesi. 342.
Ibid., 232-236.
Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi 227 and Gökmen, ÖzalSendromu, 182.
Arcayürek, Çankaya. 69,123-124.
Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi 233 and Gökmen, Özal Sendromu, 133.
69
be a civilian. However, Demirel thought Özal only wanted the office for himself
and did not have any democratic concerns.
Özal had far-reaching aims as to tie the Office of the General Staff to the
Ministry of National Defense rather than the Prime Ministry, the civilianization
of the Ministry of National Defense with the Undersecretary of the Ministry to be
elected from a person of a civilian background rather than one from the military,
and to civilanize the M illi İstihbarat Teşkilatı (National Intelligence Agency).^”®
However, he was able to achieve none of these policies. Özal was successful only
in the appointment of Hiram Abbas, a civilian, to the Office of the Chief of the
National Intelligence Agency.^*”
Another important point about Özal was his support for a US-style
Presidential system because he wanted to develop the efficiency of the state
administration system."® Özal wanted the President to be elected by people
instead of Parliament, which needed an amendment of the Constitution. Özal
was planning some steps concerning this issue when the Gulf Crisis developed."^
According to Özal, a US-style Presidential system worked better for societies
with a diffuse ethnic basis."^ Özal preferred the one-party government, no
coalition, as a Presidential system in the Turkish version."® Even though Özal
Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi, 238, Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu, 134 and Arcayürek, Çankaya, 134.
Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi 224.
Ibid., 226.
Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi 122-123, Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu, 14, 76 and Gökmen, Özal Yaşasaydı,
25-26, Gökmen, "Değişim Rüzgarları Eserken," in Bütün Yönleriyle Özal ve Dönemi ed. Büber
and Söğüt, 14 and Arcayürek, Çankaya, 163.
Gökmen, Özal Sendromu. 184.
Barlas, Turgut Özal'm Anıları, 141 and Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı, 140.
Barlas, Turgut Özal'm Anıları. 293-295.
70
could not establish a US-style Presidential system at least he tried to imitate the
system in France which would have allowed him to have ample powers in his
hand. Moreover, he could manipulate the intra-party balances better."'*
Ozal played the game of politics as one-man show and always wanted to
be this one-man since he wanted unquestioned consent and he punished any
possible rebellion with his party's r a n k s . H e collected empty papers with the
signatures of his ministers and, when needed, forced ministers to resign from the
government.**^ Ozal could act in this manner until the defeat of the MP in the 29
March 1989 local elections which encouraged the MP deputies to raise the
question of democracy within the Party.**^ Ozal began to stress the importance of
the Parliament*** but still perceived the TGNA as a legality cloak and a device of
democratic image.**^ Thus, Ozal continued to govern the country by decrees
(with the force of law) in order to by-pass the Parliament. This was in line with
his notion of i§bitincilik, "getting things done."*“
As noted, Ozal several times emphasized the mosaic character of the MP
despite the role of the conservative wing within the party. Ozal noted with much
pride that the party was the amalgamation of the four tendencies. Even the salute
invented by Ozal (combining his two hands above his head) was meant to
Gökmen, Özal Yaşasaydı, 28 and Uncular, ifte Böyle Bir Meclis, 128.
Ibid., 128.
Uncular, işte Böyle Bir Meclis. 215-216.
120
Ibid., 217.
71
illustrate this merger.^^^
This discourse of combining the four tendencies
continued until the 29 November 1987 general elections. Özal was aware of the
difficulties in the way of turning the party into a melting pot. To make things
worse, some of the deputies of the Party and some ministers were seen as
affiliates of tarikats, especially the N akşibendi brotherhood. It was even claimed
that Özal, the leader of the MP was one of the affiliates of this sect; according to
some, Özal engaged in taqiyya}^
Özal an d the Southeast Problem
A further issue was ÖzaTs attitudes towards the Southeast problem.
According to Gençkaya, Özal developed two different solutions to that problem.
During the period 1983-1989, Özal identified the problem as small-scale terror
and did not see a need for anything but a military response. After 1989, when
Özal was President, he would try to develop a more democratic solution.
Özal wanted to play the Kurdish card to get some benefits and reverse the
game.’^^ Özal invited the Kurdish opponents of Saddam Hussein to Turkey
during the Gulf Crisis. In fact, the coalition government of the time did not want
to adopt the solution suggested by Özal for the problem because their ears were
Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu. 90.
Taqiyya means to hide one's faith in order to prevent oneself from danger and act or express
views different from these under normal circumstances. Taqiyya is a Shi'i principle entirely as the
Shia population had to hide their sect under the rule of the Sunni Caliphates and Sultanates
which they did not approve as a principle of their Islamic faith. Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi. 19.
Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, "Özal ve Güneydoğu Sorunu: Demokrasi ve Entegrasyon" in D evlet ve
Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai. 56.
Gülistan Gürbey, "Özal Dönemi Dış Politikası," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 84.
72
closed to any proposal offered by
Ozal wanted to demolish Saddam; and
his acts and views can be better understood if this is kept in mind.^^^ Ozal had in
mind the inclusion of Mosul-Kirkuk with its rich oil fields within Turkey's
territories.’^^
For the Southeast problem, Ozal developed the solution as freedom of
speech and dialogue. Moreover, he wanted the problem to be differentiated as
terror on the one hand, and the problems of the Southeast. In the case of terror,
he was a hawk, he supported the projects of the special helicopters and
professional army to be employed in that region.’^®
Ozal was not for federation as a solution but he encouraged discussion of
all the i d e a s . A g a i n , OzaTs approach was basically economy oriented in spirit
as in the example that the good commodity would throw away the bad one from
the market and that would be the same case for the ideas and ideologies, too. By
this, Ozal meant that when there is freedom of speech, then people would be
appealed by the good ideas not the bad ones such as federation.’^” Ozal wanted
investments in the region, devolution of power to the local governments in the
area and permission to use of Kurdish in TV programs.’^’ Ozal did not disclose
Gökmen, "Değişim Rüzgarları Eserken," in Bütün Yönleriyle Ö zal ve Dönemi, ed. Büber and
Söğüt, 21.
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı. 91-95.
Ibid., 101.
Gençkaya, "Özal ve Güneydoğu Sorunu," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 57 and
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı, 131.
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTm Anıları, 147-150,162, 287 and Gökmen, Özal Yaşasaydı, 7 7 , 136.
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTm Anıları. 279
Gençkaya, "Özal ve Güneydoğu Sorunu," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 61-62,
Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu, 206, Gökmen, Özal Yaşasaydı, 76, 290, Büber and Söğüt, "Siyaset
73
his wish that Abdullah Ocalan, Apo, be eliminated. It came as a surprise when
Abdullah Ocalan declared a cease-fire on 17 March, 1993 and indicated that he
wanted to stop the further shedding of blood.
Ozal viewed the notion of Kurdish state as the A chilles' heel of the
Turkish state and was definitely against it. On the other hand, Ozal wanted to
solve the Southeast problem so badly that he even toyed with the idea of meeting
Apo.*^^ Ozal distanced himself from conspiracy theories both in internal and
international politics.'®^ Briefly, Ozal kept his hope and faith for the solution of
the problems of both terror and economy in the Southeast.^^^
Ozal and International Politics
Ozal tried to play a role in world politics, too.*^^ Consequently, he
observed issues related to the internal political realm as secondary matters. Ozal
viewed Turkey as an actor in an interdependent world and arrived at the
conclusion that he should wield power in the international scene.
OzaTs foreign policy was based on peace that would emerge following
common interests based on trade. His approach was different from that of
Atatiirk's "Peace at home, peace in the world"^^ which was taken as a balanced
approach in Turkey's international relations. We observe OzaTs pragmatic
Merdivenleri ve Özal," in Bütün Yönlerüyle Özal ve Dönemi, eds. Büber and Söğüt, 62 and
Özbudun, "Özal ve Demokratikleşme," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 108.
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı, 274 and Büber and Söğüt "Siyaset Merdivenleri ve Özal," in Bütün
Yönleriyle Özal ve Dönemi, eds. Büber and Söğüt, 65.
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTm Anıları. 152.
İbid., 153.
Gökmen, Özal Sendromu. 10.
'^"Ibid., 10-11.
74
approach in the international politics like the one that he developed for the
internal p o l i t i c s . Özal's understanding of foreign policy clashed with the idea
of maintaining the status quo}*° Özal was in favor of the active politics in foreign
affairs which meant taking initiatives provided that the risks involved were the
calculated ones.^^’ This is why Özal criticized the bureaucrats of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs because their policy led to the isolation of Turkey according to
Özal.''*'
Moreover, Özal had a US-centric policy in order not to have problems
with the giant of the w o r l d . Özal's foreign policy derived from the existence of
a uni-polar world dominated by the US.'^^ Özal also paid close attention to
Turkey's relations with Israel because of the influence of the Jewish lobby in the
Özal's takunyalı image, his sympathy to Islamic world and anti-European
market attitudes in 1960s led the Jewish lobbies in US to have some doubts about
Özal. In fact, Özal was close to the doves of the Islamic world, having good
relations with US, rather than the hawks}^^ Then, Özal was criticized because of
Gökmen, ÖzalSendromu. 11-12.
İhsan Durandağı "Özal'm Avrupa Topluluğu Politikası ve İnsan Hakları Sorunu," in D evlet ve
Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 32.
Barlas, Turgut Özal'm Anıları H7: "Dışişileri Bakanlığmm görevi, Türkiye'nin durumunu ve
çıkarlarmı korumak... Türk smırlarmı muhafaza etmek... İnanmışlar ki biz başımızı çıkartırsak,
bizi muhakkak vururlar. Onun için, etliye, sütlüye karışmayalım."
Hüseyin Bağcı, "Bir Devlet Adamı Olarak Özal ve Dış Politika," and Gülistan Gürbey, "Özal
Dönemi Dış Politikası," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. İhsan Sezai, 20, 78-79 Gökmen, Özal
Yaşasaydı, 224 and Büber and Söğüt, "Siyaset Merdivenleri ve Özal," in Bütün Yönleriyle Özal
ve Dönemi, eds. Büber and Söğüt, 69.
Hüseyin Bağcı, "özal ve Dış Politika," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 22 and Gökmen,
Özal Sendromu, 173.
Güneş, İstanbul daily, 23.3.1984 in Ö zal Hikayesi, Cemal, 290.
75
his endeavors to develop friendly relations with Muslim countries. However, he
was looking for new markets for the export products of Turkey and wanted to
show the West that Turkey was the key country for peace in the Middle East.
Concerning Turkey's relations with Greece , Özal was for the softening of
the tensions between Turkey and Greece arising from their conflict on the
Aegean issue and Cyprus. He went to Davos and met with Andreas Papandreou,
Greece's Prime Minister. He wanted to underline Turkey's peaceful intentions.^^^
On the other hand, in the context of the long war between Iran and Iraq, Özal
followed a policy of active neutrality which provided Turkey with room to
maneuver in the international arena. Özal again showed his pragmatic and
economic-oriented policy by seeking to gain from the trade of the both
countries.H ow ever, he would side with the US against Iraq in the Gulf Crisis,
starting on 2 August, 1990,'^’ during which Özal acted like a US-style President
during the C r i s i s . H e wanted the war to scale down the power of Saddam
Hussein.^^^ ÖzaTs initiatives in Barış Suyu, the Peace Water Project, Karadeniz
Ekonom ik İşbirliği Bölgesi, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Region, and the
Economic Cooperation Organization; established by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey,
with the Turkic Republics later joining, are further examples of ÖzaTs active
Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi, 291, Barias, Turgut ÖzaTm Anılan, 131 and Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu,
155.
Barias, Turgut ÖzaTm Anılan, 123, Büber and Söğüt, "Siyaset Merdivenleri ve Özal," in Bütün
Yönleriyle Ö zal ve Dönemi, eds. Oya Ayman Büber and Mine Söğüt, 70 and Hulki Cevizoğlu,
Körfez Savaşı ve Özal Diplomasisi (Ankara: Form Yaymları, 1991), 86-92.
Gökmen, Ö zal Sendromu. 186-187.
76
foreign p o l i c y Özal's goal regarding the Turkic Republics was the formation of
a union that would be completed at the beginning of the twenty first century and
considered the path towards such union as an opportunity that came after four
hundred years.^^^
ÖzaTs aim was to synchronize the Turkish economy with the world
economy; this is why Özal referred to high-tech and globalization when talking
about e c o n o m y A l l these issues led Özal to look at foreign affairs as a
businessman^^^ as in the case of domestic politics and to disperse economic
preferences
accordingly
as
he
manipulated
the
international
Turkish
adjudications as blackmail. Özal favored French firms to prevent French support
for the Armenians.^“ Because of all, Özal dominated the sphere of foreign policy
during the coalition led by Süleyman Demirel and Erdal İnönü until his death
after his trip to the Central Asia which started on 4 April 1993.^^^
O zaLandiconom y
Özal was lucky to some extent as the military government did not intend
to change the economic policies based on the austerity measures of 24 January,
1980.^^® In this context, the main role was played by General Haydar Saltık, the
General Secretary of the National Security Council, who defended the market
Gülistan Gürbey, "Özal Dönemi Dış Politikası," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 80 and
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı, 101-102.
Gülistan Gürbey, "Özal Dönemi Dış Politikası," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 85.
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı, 268-269 and Gökmen, Özal Sendromu, 125.
Gökmen, Ö zal Yaşasaydı. 40-41,275.
Söğüt, F. Dural and Demirhan, eds.. Fotoğraflarla 12 Eylül Kitabı. 21-22,58.
77
economy and, therefore, insisted on the application of the these austerity
measures. That is why the generals needed Özal who was the father of these
austerity measures. In fact they were doubtful about Özal, because of his past as
takunyali’^^ and as a candidate deputy of İzmir from the NSP slate in 1977.’^°
Özal understood his importance to the generals as lying in the continuation of
economic policies related to promises given to some international economic
circles. Özal played his cards well and convinced the generals to put all the
strings in his hand. He became the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of
State responsible for all affairs.
Özal made a big jump in popularity ratings, following the TV program on
the last Saturday of October 1983 before the elections when three of the party
leaders as Özal, Calp and Sunalp came together
Özal was quite noticeable with
his quiet, determined attitude and proved his superiority on the state of
economy as compared to both of his rivals, which made everyone think he was
the right person for the office of the Prime Ministry.^“ As ÖzaTs priority was the
Takunya is the wooden slippers used during ablution. Takunyalı is the person using these
slippers meaning that (s)he is to be praying. This adjective has pejorative connotations such as
obscurantist.
Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi, 28 and Gökmen, Özal Sendromu, 21, 247 and this adjective of takunyalı
would be used firstly for Özal in Devrim, Istanbul daily, on 21 July 1970 and 2 February 1971, and
Akşam, Istanbul daily, on 27 April 1971 and Cumhuriyet Senatosu Tutanak Dergisi, on 14
January 1971 in Turgut'un Serüveni Emin Çölaşan(îstanbul. Tekin Yaymevi, 1990), 112.
Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi 57 and Gökmen, Özal Sendromu, 92. But according to Gökmen both
Özal and Calp did well in this program.
For a long time, the conversation between Özal and Calp, on the subject of selling the bonds of
the Boğaziçi (Bosphorus) Bridge to people for resource creation as suggested by Özal, was
remembered by everyone. Calp became angry and told Özal that they would not let him go ahead
but Özal replied in a soft voice that he was sure that he would become the Prime Minister. When
compared to the two of them, Özal's style provided him prestige meaning more votes in the
general elections.
78
economy, he was aware of the fact that if he could not be successful on economic
issues then he would lose every thing.
Ozal changed the investment policy of the state: the state would make the
investments to provide infrastructure for the private sector rather than compete
in the production process. In particular, the state would invest in the energy and
communication se c t o r s . Oz a l formulated his views on democracy with a view
to the dynamics of economy. According to him, firstly, wealth would be
produced by earning money only then democracy with an appropriate political
culture would grow.**® Moreover, Ozal had this approach in the case of
international politics, too: trade among countries would contribute to peace
because countries would not wage war against others in order not to lose the
benefits of trade.***
The first steps taken by Ozal on the path towards a free market economy
were the transitions to real currency and real interest rates. Ozal wanted the state
to refrain itself from production which would integrate the Turkish economy to
the world economy by setting the imports and prices free.**^ But these policies
brought a rentier class.*** The lowering of salaries was the extension of OzaTs
export-oriented policy.**^ Moreover, he aimed at the privatization and making
Orhan Morgil, "Özal ve Ekonomi Politikaları," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 103-105.
Cemal, Özal Hikayesi, 114 and Ümit Ildan, "Özal's Views on The Relationship Between Politics
and Economy." Unpublished Master Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1991), p.48.
Cemal, Özal H ikayesi 114.
Büber and Söğüt, "Siyaset Merdivenleri ve Özal" in Bütün Yönleriyle Ö zal ve Dönemi eds.
Büber and Söğüt. 53.
Cemal, Ö zal H ikayesi 344.
Ibid., 299.
79
the state smaller vis-à-vis
economic activities. Özal was defeated by the
bureaucracy; he surrendered to the centralist tradition in the country*^® but it
would have to be said that Özal went a long way in this direction despite the
bureaucracy. On the other hand, the state continued to invest more than the
private sector.^^‘ Özal's successful reforms included the fund administrations
such as Mass Housing Fund, the system of yap-işlet-devret (build-managetransfer), the adoption of the value added tax (VAT), and the abolition of the
Türk Parasının K ıym etini Koruma Kanunu (Law for the Protection of Turkish
Lira).'^^ These led Özal to be known as the architect of the new economic model,
because of his success in the marketing of his activities both in the country and
abroad. According to Daknwart Rustow, Mustafa Kemal succeeded the national
revolution; İnönü, democratic revolution; and Özal, liberal revolution.
Özal wanted to develop a free market economy parallel to developments
in democracy and human rights. But he thought, the Turks had to be patient in
trying to follow the same path as the contemporary West: in his view, the
priority belonged to the formation of wealth, then democracy would develop, as
previously noted.
Kemal Görmez, "Özal: Merkezi Bürokrasiye Yenilen Reformist," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı,
ed. Sezai. 66.
Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi. 327
Ergun Özbudun, "Özal ve Demokratikleşme," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai. 107.
Rustow's interview on 21.9.1987 in Cumhuriyet, Istanbul daily in Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi, 300
and Gökmen, Ö zalSendromu, 109.
80
Qzal ancLReligion
Özal indicated that he benefited from the principles of Islam and the
history of the country in the preparation of the Principles of the New Vision of
Development.’^®Özal praised the moral principles of Islam and argued that the
economic problems the country faced had their origin in being estranged from
Islamic ethical system, and that the left part governments were responsible for
this.’^® Özal also criticized the giant and slow-functioning bureaucracy, and
equated it with red-tape. That is why he always talked about the minimization of
the state. This minimization of the state included the transfer of religious issues
from state to cemaais (religious communities). Özal questioned the rationale
behind the Presidency of Religious Affairs, affiliated to the Prime Minister's
office, therefore appointed by the government.”^
Özal was not far away from the Islamic circles. Before 1983, he was the
Chairman of the Islam Science Foundation, based in Saudi Arabia”®he was also
one of the founding members of the İlim Yayma Vakfı (Foundation for the
Dissemination of Science) and the M illi K ültür Vakfı (National Culture
Foundation), later becoming the Chairman of the latter.”^ ÖzaTs relation with
Islam went back to his university years when he started to pray five times a day
Barlas, Turgut Özal'm Anılan, 201.
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTm Anıları, 203 and Özal, Değişim Belgeleri, 13.
Zaman, İstanbul daily, 20 January,1992. The Presidency of Religious Affairs is a big institution
within the state bureaucracy with one hundred thousand staff approximately.
'"8 Ibid., 26-27.
Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor. 83.
81
and learn Islamic thought from some Hocas)^^ Necmettin Erbakan indicated that
he knew Ozal from the mescid, small mosque of the (Istanbul Technical)
university^®' and their paths crossed several times. Following marriage, Ozal
would make his children learn their religion, and he believed that belief in Allah
was one of the conditions of a healthy society.'®^ All these issues made Ozal
believe in Allah and fate strongly; his beliefs were bolstered following his by
pass operation.'®®
In the context of state philosophy, Ozal benefited from the book called
"Advice to Statesmen from His Excellency Ali"’®^ which was the basis of the
establishment of the Social Aid and Solidarity Fund and the participation of
businessmen in OzaTs trips to other countries since there were advices for the
statesmen to care about the poor in the society and to take the traders of the
country with themselves for the development of wealth.'®®
An important difference between Ozal and Evren was the issue of irtica
(reactionism). Once Evren warned Ozal on this issue but Ozal said that the issue
was exaggerated. Then, Evren showed Ozal the reports of the National
Intelligence Agency. In general, Evren had suspicions about Ozal on the issue of
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTın Anıları. 84.
Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor. 34.
182Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTın Anıları. 85.
Ibid., p. 97.
His Excellency Ali is the last Rightly Guided Caliph. {Hulefa-iRaşidin).
82
reactionism.*®^ Özal's candidacy for the NSP in 1977 general elections bolstered
these doubts.*®^
Özal was conservative in his policies and trusted the conservative wing of
his party more than the others while acting in accordance with the dictums of
modernity.*®® In order to keep the balances within the party, Özal would protect
the conservative wing from the others, but when needed, Özal decreased the
power of this wing.
Doing something for the love of Allah was very important to Özal. He
said that his purpose in entering politics was to serve the people, whose voice
was the voice of Allah, and therefore he was serving Allah.*®'^ Özal who thought
of the Day of Judgment prayed at least once a day. He also considered his
entrance to politics and being elected as Allah's kindness to the country.*’°
The establishment of private financial institutions was another case
connecting ÖzaTs approach to politics and religion within the framework of
economy. A decree signed by Özal onl6 December, 1983, two days after his
government had received vote of confidence paved the way to the establishment
of finance institutions working in accordance with Islamic principles. The first
two were Al-Baraka Türk Private Finance Institution and Faisal Finance
Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi, 71 and the caricature drawn by Bedri Koraman shows the position of
Özal very interestingly. Karikatür, Altmci Mizah ve Bedri Koraman Onur Gecesi Anısı Ö zel
Sayısı, 14.
'8^ Ibid., 172.
‘“ Gökmen, ÖzalSendromu. 119-120,149-150.
Uncular, işte Böyle Bir Meclis. 172-173.
Arcayürek, Çankaya. 24,93.
83
Institution which were Saudi Arabia o r i e n t e d . I n the case of Al-Baraka, the
dominant figures were Korkut Özal, brother of the Prime Minister, and Hymen
Topbaş, the Chairman of the MP in I s t a n b u l . I t is interesting that Özal was
interested in interest-free credit and expressed his views on this to Sakıp Sabancı
when he was working in the Sabancı Holding^^^ and one of his important projects
was interest-free banking.’^^
The case of türban, headscarve was one of the most important issues of the
Özal era. On 16 March, 1989, demonstrations calling for the freedom of women to
wear the hicab on university campuses marked what the secularists identified as
the revival of reactionism.’^^ This was a case when Özal was considered as
helping reactionism. In November 1988, Özal government passed a law allowing
the freedom of dress for all students and faculty staff but the law was abrogated
by the Constitutional Court upon President Evren's touting the case there.’^^ Özal
regarded the türban issue as a matter of freedom rather than religion. According
to him, Turkey should not have been dealing with such kind of issues on the eve
of the twenty first century. Moreover, according to Gökmen, he wanted to shoot
the Prosperity Party (PP) with its own gun by allowing female students to wear
the türban, which was one of the main themes of the PP.’^^ If Özal approached
Ibid., 177.
Cemal, Ö zal Hikayesi, 178 and Emin Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor, 189.
Emin Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor. 84.
Barlas, Turgut ÖzaTm Anılan. 213-214.
84
the türban matter as a rule of Islam, then he would not let his wife and daughter
be without wearing headscarves.
It is necessary to dwell on Özal's views on social justice. Those views were
rooted in Islam not the West. Özal noted: "The principle of social justice takes its
roots in our beliefs and manner of life." Here Özal cited the H adith of the
Prophet Muhammad: "(S)he, who sleeps while his (her) neighbor is hungry is not
from us ( Mu sl i m s ) . A s noted before, this philosophy was the basis of the
establishment of the Social Aid and Solidarity Fund. Özal perceived Islam as
aiming at a social system based on the principles of justice and equity; he thought
Islam would contribute to social solidarity.
How Özal conducted government only partially derived from Islam
which did not contradict Islam in a fundamental way'^’ As Nilüfer Göle has
noted, Özal developed "a synthesis between Islamic identity and pragmatic
rationality of engineering" through finding a middle way between the nation's
cultural values and the requirements of economic growth which made Özal and
his team "Muslim engineers."™
For Özal, Turkey had to supply three forms of freedom in order to catch
up with the contemporary West concerning civilization. These freedoms were
freedom of thought and speech, freedom of faith (religion) and freedom of
Özal, Başbakan Turgut ÖzaTm Konuşma-Mesaj, Beyan ve Mülakatları, 13.12.1984-12.12.1985
(Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi,!985). 220.
Duran, A Comparative Perspective. 68
Nilüfer Göle, "Küçük Dünyalar ve Tarih" in Nokta, Özel ek, 17 April 1993.
85
enterprise
Ozal accepted these rights as God-given and natural rights which,
according to him, enabled the people to advance themselves and help society
In this context, Ozal took the freedom of religion as the highest symbol of human
love and respect, which should not be suppressed
Ozal perceived the principle of secularism as the guarantee for religion
rather than something contrary to religion. Ozal defined secularism as nobody's
interference on any other one's belief system.^®^ In this context, he indicated that
secularism was a issue for the state and not for the individuals, and identified
himself as a pious Muslim, not a se cul a r i s t Kor kut Ozal, Ozal's brother, said
that Turgut Ozal was a pious man by nature.^*’^ Ethem Ruhi Figlali and M. Sait
Yazicioglu also characterized Ozal as a pious Muslim.^®^
Ozal's approach to Islam was different from the state elites who saw
religion as an obstacle to progress. Ozal pointed to the example of Japan that
made progress while keeping their cultural traditions.^“®
Duran indicates that Ozal's understanding of Islam was the basis for his
attitude to liberalism, in which he emphasized individualism and the
Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey, 311, Özal, Değişim Belgeleri, 98 and Ergun
Özbudun, "Özal ve Demokratikleşme," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 109.
Duran, A Comparative Perspective, 70.
Özal, Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut ÖzaTm Bazı Konuşmaları, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi,
1991), 15.
Kenan Evren, Kenan Evren'in Anıları, vol.VI, (İstanbul: Milliyet Yaymlan, 1990), in A
Comparative Perspective, Duran, 75.
Hürriyet, İstanbul Daily, 3 March 1990 in a Comparative Perspective, Duran, 76 and M. Sait
Yazıcıoğlu in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. İhsan Sezai, 157.
Güreli, Gerçek Tanık 16.
Ruhi Fığlalı, "Değişimci Özal ve Değişim Sürecinde İslam," and M. Sait Yazıcıoğlu, "Manevi
Cephesiyle Turgut Özal,"in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai. 51,154.
^°®Özal, Başbakan Turgut ÖzaTm Konuşma-M esaj Beyanat ve Mülakatları, 13.12.1984-12.12.1985
(Ankara. Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1985). 220.
86
minimization of state, parallel to his famous three freedoms. In this context,
Duran has found Özal's perception of religion similar to the "civil religion" of
American liberalism.“^ When we relate this notion to politics, it is worth noting
the thesis of Göle about Özal, that he had built " a party not emphasizing
'utopian Islamism' but instead capitalizing on the heritage and ideal" with
..."faith".'“
Ozal thought that the underdevelopment of the Muslim countries today
was not because of Islam but because of the false interpretation of Islam. From its
birth in the seventh century to the twelfth century Islam led its true believers to
develop the most advanced civilization of the period. However, the Islamic
world remained static when the West made the industrial revolution.'"
Moreover, Ozal went one step further and said: "The way I read the Qu'ran,
there are several references made to life, way of living, and issues about
individual and society; that is why Islam is at the same time a way of life."'" This
was a definitive deviation from the official understanding of the role attributed
to the religion as a private spiritual matter and not "do"s and "dont"s concerning
social life. The latter conception of Islam was taken as the essence of
secularism.'" However, OzaTs religiosity was compatible with the standards of
Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics," 43.
Barlas, Turgut Özal'm Anıları. 260.
Özal, "Değişim Sürecinde İslam," İslâmî Araştırmalar, Vol. 6, no.4,232.
Osman Ulagay, Özal'ı Aşm ak İçin (İstanbul: Afa, 1988), 125.
87
the secular groups in Turkey because Ozal on the one hand prayed, if not five
times a day, and also drank alcoholic drinks
As noted before, Ozal was for reform in religion over some issues. Ozal
was inclined towards new interpretations of Islam concerning usury.^'^ He
wanted Muslim scholars to develop new interpretations on this point.^^^ Duran
explains OzaTs consideration of reform as being part of his understanding of
religion.^^^ OzaTs approach to this matter also meant that he was for the opening
of the gate of igtihad, legal jurisdiction, accepted by some theologians and
scholars as having been closed since the twelfth century.
Concerning the case of the revival of the religion, Ozal took the issue as
related to democracy letting people voice their concerns
Ozal thought faith in
religion would prevent the state from gaining a divine character: "Religious faith
reduces the role of the state while inculcating a sense of freedom and
responsibility in the ordinary people, because it does not attribute divine powers
to the s t a t e . I n this context, Ozal did not see any problem in girls going to
university with headscarves. He also did not see a relationship between an
Çölaşan, Turgut Nereden Koşuyor, 223-224 and Gökmen, ÖzalSendromu, 120.
Özal, "Değişim Sürecinde İslam," 232.
Riba is the Arabic equivalent of the usury. It means the payment of debt as more in quality
and/or quantity for the current debt not just in monetary terms but also in other terms. For long
years, in the Islamic circles one of the main discussions is about the payment of debt more in the
same rate of the inflation is riba or not. The affirmative group argues that the spirit of lending
debt is to develop the brotherhood and for the sake of Allah. Taking more in any term will kill the
feelings of this brotherhood. In order to prevent the loss of the lender, the process can be done in
gold or any currency not being affected from inflation. The other group argues that, in order to
protect the lender, the inflation rate is added on the main debt. Due to this discussion, I intend to
understand the dichotomy of Özal in this context.
Özal, Turkey in Europe and Europe in Turkey 295.
2'’ Ibid., 296.
88
increase on the number of Îmam-Hatip schools and the development of
reactionism. I find Özal's approach on these matters consistent since his
university years when he learned to pray and sought information about Islam
from some Hocas as noted before.
Özal was aware of the fact that the roots of the religious brotherhoods
were powerful and he did not want to bother them. Moreover, these
brotherhoods gave advice on the ways of becoming a good Muslim which is at
the last instance to be a good human being. But all these must not mean that Özal
supported Islamic fundamentalism; he distinguished Islamic fundamentalism
from Islamic revivalism. In his talks with Clinton, Özal warned him that if the US
and the UN did nothing about the massacre in Bosnia and the people dying in
Iraq due to the embargo following the Gulf Crisis, then Islamic fundamentalism
would gain power and the passage of Muslim countries to liberal democracy
would be a dream
Özal was not afraid of praying, or using the word of "Allah" frequently in
his speeches and fasting.“ ^ Korkut Özal said that his elder brother had been
engaged in tevekkül (leaving everything to Allah after carrying out all the
preconditions)
Özal went to Saudi Arabia for pilgrimage three times, one of
which was in 1988 when he was Prime Minister.
When Özal became President, he gave the following advice to the MP
deputies as: "I have only one wish from you. Do not be divided, do not be
Gökmen, ÖzaJ Yaşasaydı. 235.
Uncular, işte Böyle Bir Meclis, 14,22,32 and Gökmen, Özal Sendromu, 66.
89
fragmented among yourselves, and hold on to Allah's rope in a tight manner.
which refers to a verse from the K o ran .T h ese kind of speeches would not let us
view Özal as a concealed mullah. In the oath-taking ceremony after he became
President, Özal said: "I promised to be neutral but I will take sides. But for what
will I take sides? I will continue to take side of Atatürk's principles and
reforms."^'"
One of the interesting points about Özal is how he changed his will about
where he wanted to be buried when he died. Korkut Özal told the story as
follows:^^^ on 9 or 10 February, 1987 Turgut Özal called Korkut and his mother
and asked them to pray for him before he had his by-pass operation. He also told
them that he wanted to be buried next to Mehmed Zahid Kotku^^^ the Sheikh of
one of the branches of the Nakşibendi brotherhood in Turkey. Kotku was
important for Özal since he took Kotku's approval and permission for entering
politics, as did Korkut, before he becomes a candidate in 1977 general elections
from Izmir.“ ®Özal survived the operation. One year later, ÖzaTs mother died.
She was buried close to Mehmed Zahid Kotku in the garden of the Süleymaniye
mosque in Istanbul, in accordance with a Cabinet decree under the leadership of
Güreli, Gerçek Tanık. 26
Uncular, İşte Böyle Bir Meclis. 203.
“■*Sura ATlmran (The Imrans): "Cling one {hablullah) and all to the faith of God and let nothing
divide you" The Koran With A Parallel Arabic Text (trans. N. J. Dawood) (London: Penguin
Books, 1990), 62. In the verse, the meaning o f hablullah is the rope o f Allah, connoting Islam.
(Italics are mine)
Uncular, İşte Öyle Bir Meclis. 204.
Güreli, Gerçek Tanık. 174-175.
For further information About Mehmed Zahid Kotku, see Şerif Mardin, "The Nakşibendi
Order in Turkish History," in Islam in M odem Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in A
Secular State, Richard Taper, ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 1993), 132-134.
90
Özal?^^ In 1992 April, before Turgut Özal went through a prostate operation.
Korkut asked him if his will was still good. Turgut told his brother that he now
wanted to be buried in the open field opposite the mini-mausoleum^®” of Adnan
Menders and his colleagues who were hanged following the 27 May 1960
military intervention. ÖzaTs explanation for the amendment was that the
coalition government led by Demirel and İnönü might not have promulgated
such a decree. In his last trip to the Turkic Republics in Central Asia, on his visit
to the tomb of Bahaddin Nakşibend, the founder of the Nakşibendi brotherhood,
Özal was questioned if he was a Nakşibendi, answered: "I wish I could have
become a member.
When Özal died, the slogans and banners in his funeral ceremony
signaled that an important Islamic thinker or a man of action had died. The
people shouted such slogans as: "Müslüman Türkiye Laik Olamaz" Muslim
Turkey cannot be secular), "Müslüman Halka, M üslüman Lider" (A Muslim
leader for the Muslim people), "Ya Allah, Bismillah, Allahuekber" (O' Allah, In
the name of Allah, Allah the greatest), "Müslüman Türkiye" {Muslim Turkey)
and "Müslüman Türkiye, Çankayaya M üslüm an"(Muslim Turkey, A Muslim to
Güreli, Gerçek Tanık, 126 and Abdurrahman Pala, "Türkiye'de Politikayı 'Özel Fetvalar' mı
Yönlendiriyor?," in Nokta, 20-26 Ekim 1996, vol. 14, no. 43,19-20.
In Turkey, in order to be buried somewhere else than the graveyards, there is a need for
governmental decree. Mehmed Zahid Kotku could be buried by the decree of the Military
Government in 1980.
““ This monument was built during the government of Özal and the graves of them were
transmitted from the Yassiada island to there.
Gökmen ,Özal Yaşasaydı, 276.
91
Ç a n k a y a ) One of the banners read: "Dindar ve Sivil Cum hurbaşkanı"(K pious
and civilian President)
According to Udo Steinbach, Özal's initiatives to enter the European
Union was pragmatically oriented as the heart and brain of Özal belonged to the
East.^^ In a TV discussion. Mahir Kaynak talked of Turkey as a fat man idly
sitting in front of a television at home. Özal tried to make this fat man start to
move. Özal taught the people to have trust and self-confidence in themselves
Özal wanted the people to get rid of inferior complex. But, while trying to do all
this, the engineer-minded oriental wolf opened the Pandora's box.
Turgut Özal introduced a new identity to Turkey since he defined himself
as both a Muslim and a modem person."^^ That is why, following his death, in
the book put down for the people to write their views, young people in
particular indicated their thanks to Özal for having opened new horizons for
them.^^’’
Mürşit Balaballar, "Tarihe Yolculuk," in Bütün Yönleriyle Özal ve Dönemi,eds. Oya Ayman
Büber and Mine Söğüt, 94.
Büber and Söğüt, Bütün Yönleriyle Özal ve Dönemi, 125 and Yazıcıoğlu, "Manevi Cephesiyle
Turgut Özal," in D evlet ve Siyaset Adamı, ed. Sezai, 160.
İkibine Doğru Dergisi (Magazine, Towards Two Thousand) 21.5.1989, 20 in Özal Hikayesi,
Cemal, 179.
Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics," 32.
Duygularmizla, (Ankara: Arena Yaymlari, 1993)
92
CHAPTER IV
THE LAST OTTOMAN SULTAN, AN ENGINEER-MERCHANT
ONE NOT A MULLAH
To Evren: "Thanks to you, there is ju st one thing that the
blessed Imam Khomeini could n ot become the Prime M inister
o f Turkey." He replied: "By God! I sw ear it is so!, I w ill n ot
hide the truth o f what Allah knows from H is mortals. In fact,
that would have happened too. But, a t the last moment, Özal,
the intelligent, cheated us as disguising him self like
Khomeini.
Hayrettin Oğuz questions why there has been a consensus on the name
of Özal despite there is no such a thing in Turkish society on any other
subject. He answers his question by writing that the people found themselves
in Özal and his family who reflected them. Moreover, it was quite normal for
that society to adopt Özal and his family who were ordinary and
representative of the people.
Oğuz also finds Islamist intellectuals playing a prominent role in the
adoptation of ÖzaTs family by Turkish society. The Islamist intellectuals
adopted and protected Özal as the Kemalists defined him as pro-Sharia and
anti-Kemalist.^ In this context, Özal, who went to Mecca on pilgrimage and
was the first President to pray, could easily be described as having an Islamist
’ "Evren'e; 'Sayenizde, bir rahmetli Humeyni'nin Türkiye'ye Başbakan olmadığı kaldı
demişler.
'Valla' demiş, 'Allah'm bildiğini niye kuldan saklayayım. Asimda o da olacaktı. Ama son
anda Özal uyanığı, Humeyni'nin kılığma girerek bizi aldattı." quoted in Politikabesk:
Fıkralarla Liderler, 4“’ ed.. Can Ozan (Ankara: Bilgi Yaymevi. 1990) 19.
^ Hayrettin Oğuz, "Özal ve İslamcılar: Opportunizmin ve Sıradanlığm Egemenliği." İktibas,
no: 208, April 1996, p. 18. İktibas (Extract) is a radical Islamist magazine whose founder.
93
dimension. Moreover, on Özal's last visit to Central Asia, approximately half
of his program consisted of visiting places where the Islamic pioneers had
lived.
Another point is the demolition of taboos where the Islamists and Özal
intersected. Özal, as a liberal person wanted to transform society according to
the principles of liberalism and thereby challenged the Kemalist culture and
understanding of life. Özal's questioning of the status quo in the name of
liberalism was evaluated as an extension of his Islamic dimension. For
example. Fikri Sağlar when he was General Secretary of the Social Democratic
Populist Party (SDPP) indicated that Özal's target was to orient Turkish
society towards a Turkish-Islamic philosophy by silencing the press
However, according to Hayrettin Oğuz, Özal also tried to demolish an Islamic
understanding which was "resisting, not reconciling and not integrating with
the secular system"^ while underlined the demolotion of taboos. In fact, proÖzal Islamists did not seem capable of understanding his motives. Özal
wanted a society and state that resembled the US. At the same time, to win
votes, he took measures which would appeal to devout Muslims. This created
a confusion, secular elites consequently regarding him as an Islamist, but
according to Oğuz, Özal was acting according to the doctrine of taqiyya - not
to the infidels but to Muslims.^
According to Nilüfer Göle, throughout Republican political history, the
four phobias of Kemalism (Islamism, Kurdish identity, leftist ideology and
Erciimend Özkan planned to open the Sharia Party but he died because of a sudden heart
attack.
^ Tercüman, Istanbul daily, 5 January 1988.
94
liberalism) constituted the ideological basis for the political authoritarianism
that prevailed in Turkey. On the other hand, the autonomization of civil
society proceeded through the process of "the emergence and development of
a market economy, expression of religious values, recognition of ethnic
identities and freedom of ideological opposition." These became cornerstones
of the Turkish democratization process.^ What made Özal remembered was
his success showing that the phobias of Kemalism were not justified. In this
respect, Hikmet Özdemir points that Özal was successful in confronting the
phobias against Islam and the Kurds, which led the pro-status quo elite
regard him as irredentist and pro-Sharia.’'
Özal could develop good relations not only with the Islamic circles but
also with leftist intellectuals. They provided support for him and some would
even become candidate for the Motherland Party (MP).® This is consistent
with the Ktir§at Ba§ar's description of Özal as one of the "major crazies of
Turkish political history" capable of taking risks for change considered by no
one else. Moreover, Özal could overcome the fatalistic and negative approach
of society. This oriented the Özal generation to be more courageous, dynamic
and capable of making decisions appropriate to the twenty-first century.^ It is
noteworthy to indicate that the girls with their türbans were one of the first
Ôğuz, "Özal ve İslamcılar," 20.
Îbid. 21.
^ Nilüfer Göle, "Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey" in C ivil
Society in the M iddle East, ed. A. R. Norton (London: E. J. Brill, 1996), 20.
’ Hikmet Özdemir, "Değişimin Kıyısmda." Nokta Özel ek, 21. The same situation was cited
by Ülkü Güney, ANAP Grup Başkan Vekili, that Özal fell down or was made to fall down in
such a position. Sabah, Istanbul daily, 1 October 1992.
° This became the cover subject of Nokta on 26 September 1986 and 11 October 1987.
’ Kürşat Başar, Tempo, Nisan 1993, 1. This generation would become the cover subject of
Nokta on 29 May 1988.
95
visitors to the emergency unit of the Hacettepe University Hospital where
Özal had been brought shortly before his death.
Özal symbolized the transformation of Turkey. This is a reality which
could not be denied even by those who sought to preserve the status quo.
Özal wondered if it was possible to decrease the gap between Turkey and the
contemporary world by climbing the ladder more than one step at a time.“
Özal participated in the discussions on the nature of the Second Republic,
questioning the positive and negative aspects of the official ideology. He
chaired a conference on 'Politics in the Changing Turkey' in February of 1993.
Ali Bayramoglu observes that the secret of Özal's political miracle lay in
ÖzaTs ability to destroy all balances while knowing what he was doing.“ In
fact, Özal was establishing new balances while demolishing the old ones. Özal
was successful in this process because of his effective communication with
society.
According to Nilüfer Göle, Özal formed his electorate by the
establishment of a network with new values and establishing a successful
symbiotic relationship with society.“ This made Özal a "giant"“, a reforming
legend among his constituents, a man of determined vision capable of
discussing and overcoming. Hüsnü Doğan, a close associate of ÖzaTs,
underlined the same point.“ This is why Ali Bayramoglu evaluates Özal as
being in a chain of reformers in the tradition of Kanuni, Abdülhamid and
Cem İlhan, "Özal'm Rüyası,'Wo/r/a Özel ek, 16.
" Yıldırım Aktürk, "Bürokrasisiz Ekonomi." N oktaÖ zelek, 54.
Ali Bayramoğlu, Tempo, Nisan 1993,16.
Göle, "Küçük Dünyalar ve Tarih.", Nokta Özel ek, 30.
Bayramoğlu, Tempo, Nisan 1993,16.
Hüsnü Doğan, "Özal ve Siyaset", Nokta Özel ek, 58.
96
Mustafa Kemal. Despite Özal's main character remained as reformist, but he
supported the slogan of "liberal economy and Greco-Roman politics"
meaning that Özal was for the free market economy as an extension of his
reformist character but he did not do anything to change the style of politics
in Turkey since he continued the traditional way of politics.H ow ever, Özal
was successful in creating a European state despite the voices that he would
change Turkey into Iran. He also eliminated the unquestioned principles of
the s t a t e . I n this context. Reha Mağden and Canan Gedik defined Özal as the
husband of the woman without headscarve who included Allah as a
parameter to his implementation.*®
Özal was an engineer-merchant who was aware of the positive
proportion between risk and revenue: this is why he was criticized for
wanting to change the state into a business area which was degrading for
some people. However, while Özal wanted a smaller state, he was not
successful on the subject of privatization, which became the policy even of
leftist parties. While he was taking risks, he was taking the fate into
consideration as a m ütevekkil merchant after making the necessary
calculations as an engineer.
Özal wanted to evaluate the chaotic position of the new structuring of
the world in a proper way and to become rentier from the geopolitical
situation of Turkey. However, he would be left alone by the elite and
intelligentsia of the country who did not want to take any risks. During the
Yavuz Gökmen, "Özal ve Dinde Reform", Tempo, Haziran 1993,152.
Gökmen, "In Memorial." Tempo, Nisan 1993,18.
97
Gulf Crisis, Ôzal
became an international politician rather than a local
political leader: he evaluated the international situation well and made
Turkey an actor rather than a figurine.
Ôzal was aware of the realities around him. He indicated that the
politician had two shirts, one for the festival and the other one for being
hanged.^*’ All these attitudes made Ôzal open to reconciliation. He applied
this as an action plan but remained a radical with his sentences for the old
politicians that "they cannot even catch our dreams" and "they have
remained in a time tunnel."^*
ÔzaTs dreams were not just economic but included a view of the
twenty-first century as the Turkish century. This could be achieved by taking
the necessary risks and tackling the dangerous issues. Cengiz Çandar
evaluates this discourse not as heroic but the "product of a engineermathematician foreign policy master
On the other hand, ÔzaTs attitudes towards the Kurds led Abdullah
Ôcalan to differentiate Ôzal from other politicians. Ôzal wanted the paths
opened for full discussion of the Kurdish question, raising the possibility even
of federation, and TV programs in Kurdish. Ôzal recognized the reality of
Kurds before everyone. For decades, Turkey had officially considered them as
"mountain Turks", not as a separate linguistic and national group, and had
rigorously suppressed Kurdish revolts as well as any evidence of Kurdish
Reha Mağden and Canan Gedik, "Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut ÖzaTm Ardmdan: Tam O'na
Yetişiyorduk ki... " Aktüel, 22-28 Nisan 1993,28.
Soli Özel, "Zirveye Çıkış." Nokta Özel ek, 24.
“ İlhan, "ÖzaTm Rüyası." 16.
Mağden and Gedik, Aktüel, "ÖzaTm Ardmdan," 34 and Ilhan, "ÖzaTm Rüyası," 16.
Cengiz Çandar, "Dış Politikada Özal." Nokta, Özel ek, 35.
98
identity.^ Özal could not keep his promise to solve the Kurdish problem
before his death
However, Özal would refuse the demand of SDPP deputies
for a Kurdish translator for the prison in Diyarbakır as the official language is
Turkish.“
The PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) under the leadership of Abdullah
Öcalan would declare a unilateral cease-fire on 4 April 1993 which would be
approved by Özal. Following his death. Mehdi Zana, ex-May or of Diyarbakır
and an important figure in Kurdish nationalist circles, said that the Kurds
had lost one of their best friends.“ ÖzaTs approach would pave the way for
him to be depicted as "irredentist" and to be isolated by pro-status quo elites.
In this respect. Cengiz Çandar indicates that Özal approached politics
as a series of mathematical equations but kept his warm personality when he
was evaluated according to these equations.“ Cengiz Çandar indicates the
most lovely aspect of Özal for him was that he was a man of faith who walked
in the demonstration for Bosnia with the feelings of Emir el-M iiminin with his
mystic aspect while having the heart and spirit of a dervish. This is why Özal
tried to draw on Turkish and Ottoman Islam, underlining justice and
tolerance not only in Turkey but also in the whole Turkic world.“ Moreover,
for Cengiz Çandar, Özal was not only a dervish but also guide to formulate a
Turkish and Islamic Renaissance in both action and theory. This would place
Özal opposite the official ideology: his liberal attitudes, including the official
Malcolm B. Russel, The World Today Series, The M iddle East and South Asia 1993, 27^'
Anm/a/M eeting (Washington D. C.: Stryker-Post Publications, 1993), 205.
Lamia Torunlu, "Özal ve Kürtler." Nokta Özel ek, 42.
Tercüman, İstanbul daily, 18 February 1988.
Lamia Torunlu, "Özal ve Kürtler." 38.
Çandar, "Turgut Özal, Derviş ve Kılavuz..." Aktüel, 37.
99
recognition
of Islamic
cemaats. in Turkey,
understanding of secularism
challenged
the
official
His approach was partially based on his
understanding of secularism as being for the state and not for the individuals:
he identified himself as a good Muslim
The Kemalist elite, located secularism within binary dichotomies such
as progressive versus conservative, modern versus traditional, progress
versus backwardness which excluded and marginalized an Islamic identity
On the other hand, the MP strove to construct a new identity "whose
performative acts are no longer bound up with radical secularism".^^ But such
an approach would be evaluated by the Panorama magazine as resulting in
contemporary secular Turkey, falling into the lap of a pro-Khomeini trend
and OzaTs government was accused of failing to take the necessary
precautions against the anti-secular activities?^
Ozal stressed that while Turkey was a secular state, Islam kept society
together; about irredentism, he wanted people to hold on to the rope of Allah
and not to be divided.^ This new cultural orientation emphasized the
significance of Islam as a unifying element in society which made Ozal seem
to have looked to Islam as a unifying identity over ethnic differences which
were not accepted among secular Turks?^
Ibid.
Nokta, Özel Ek, "Turgut Özal (1927-1993) 17 Nisan 1993." p. 10.
^ Hürriyet, İstanbul daily, 3 March 1990.
E. Fuat Keyman, "On the Relation Between the Global Modernity and Nationalism: The
Crisis of Hegemony and the Rise of (Islamic) Identity in Turkey." N ew Perspectives on
Turkey, Fall 1995,13, pp. 105-106.
Ibid., 112.
33 M illiyet, Istanbul daily, 14 May 1989.
3^ Milliyet, Istanbul daily, 24 January 1989.
33 Kevin Robins, "Interrupting Identities: Turkey/Europe in Questions of Cultural Identity.",
73-75.
100
Özal's approach could also be related to the basis of the NSC^^ which
ruled Turkey following the military takeover for three years when the
influence of Islam in Turkish politics increased dramatically and religion was
mobilized as a means to staunch ideological confrontation and division
However, Özal and Evren would fall into different poles over the issue of
türban wearing. The law bringing freedom to the wearing of the türban
would be promulgated by the votes of the MP and True Path Party (TPP) in
Parliament on 30 November 1988 but the issue would be brought before the
Constitution Court by Evren and the Court would cancel the law on 9 March
1988. This led to demonstrations and strikes that rocked
university
campuses.^® Özal wanted to overcome the division in society over the issue
but the military and courts hesitated to allow a public symbol of loyalty to a
religious view within a Kemalist tradition.^^ Özal believed that Turkey would
not go forward or backward because a few girls were wearing the türban but
he underlined that his government supported the free expression of views
and identity.^“ However, Özal identified the türban in La Turquie En Europe
(p.ll3) as a Byzantine inheritance rather than Islamic, a view which was
harshly criticized by Mehmet Bayraktar.^41
"Disgusted with continuous political wrangling and nationwide violence, military leaders
seized power ...A five-member National Security Council was set up to direct affairs of state;
its leader. General Kenan Evren was appointed Chief of State to replace the Acting
President." in The World Today Series, The M iddle East and South Asia 1993, 27th Annual
Meeting, Malcom B. Russel (Washington D. C.: Stryker-Post Publications: 1993), 204.
Kevin Robins, "Interrupting Identities," 71.
Kenan Evren, "Zorlu Yıllarım", vol. II (Istanbul: MilliyetYayvnlan, 1994), 460-475.
Tercüman, Istanbul daily, 2 November 1988 and Malcolm B. Russel, The M iddle East and
South Asia 1993.206.
Milliyet, Istanbul daily, 10 March 1989.
Mehmet Bayraktar, "Avrupa'da Türkiye": Özal'm Günah Galerisi), 5"’ ed. (Ankara: Rehber
Yaymlan, 1990), 71.
101
Cem İlhan observed that Özal dreamed of Turkey as a country which
could discover itself under the light of faith {iman), freedom and science to
the fullest extent/^ This was quite consistent with Özal's nature, which was a
successful synthesis of West and East, in Hikmet Özdemir's view.^^
According to Nilüfer Göle, if Atatürk was the leader of the etatist
modernization period, then Özal was the leader of the civil modernization
period as he encouraged entrepreneurship and dealt with modernism as a
social matter when the question of Muslim identity was discussed.^ During
his Presidency, he would be condemned for his Muslim identity: Deniz
Baykal, when he was the General Secretary of the SDPP said that the
mentality of
membership had occupied Çankaya and must be ended
Our thesis, that the engineer-merchant Özal was the last Ottoman
Sultan is shared by Cengiz Çandar. He regards ÖzaTs foreign policy approach
as being based on the notion that Turkey is an inheritor of the Ottoman
Empire, and that any event happening in the former territories of the empire
becomes the main axis of Turkish foreign politics. Developing an effective
foreign policy needs the foundation of a powerful, dynamic and healthy
economy, also the need of Turkey. However, this Ottoman style did not
mean conquering new lands, unnecessary and meaningless in an epoch when
borders were losing their meaning. In sum, Özal was not a adventurer but a
man of calculation.^*
İlhan, "Özal'm Rüyası." 16.
Hikmet Özdemir, "Değişimin Kıyısmda." 21.
^ Göle, "Küçük Dünyalar ve Tarih." 30.
Cumhuriyet, 24 January 1990.
^ Çandar, "Dış Politikada Özal." 32 and Hikmet Özdemir, "Değişimin Kıyısmda." 21.
102
Moreover, Özal supported any step towards peace as shown in the
Davos meetings between himself and Papaandreou. This issue brought them
the chance for being nominated as candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize.
According to the reform understanding of Özal in religion, Islamic
countries would draw closer to the West and would be able to prove its
supremacy over West. Then Islam could spread out and progress more,
Yavuz Gökmen argues
Özal wanted to change the approach of the society
towards religion which is perceived with fear as the notion of religion was
shaped under the authoritarian application of secularism.
To
describe
Özal
simply
as
"religious",
let alone
"pious,"
"fundamentalist" or "pro-Sharia" would be unjust. Özal stood for two things
in particular, freedom and economic reconstruction, with the latter taking the
precedence. In many ways ÖzaTs economic policy began before Özal became
Prime Minister and "revolutionized the Turkish economy" by lifting the
heavy hand of the bureaucracy from business for the first time in centuries by
reducing tariffs, eliminating exchange controls, and encouraging private
initiative
Özal was the teacher for Turks on economic matters, and made them
define themselves as hom o economicus and behave according to the
principles of profit-maximization. Özal knew that to make society compatible
with the international capitalist market, the common view based on the
Hürriyet, Istanbul daily, 9 March 1988.
Gökmen, "Özal ve Dinde Reform." Tempo, Haziran 1993,152.
Russel, The M iddle East and South Asia 1993. 207.
103
acceptance of the supremacy of the state had to be revised. Ozal taught people
that they could do something without the state, even despite the state.
For Ozal the meaning of freedom was a framework in which society
could develop on the basis of individual freedom and not the morals of the
state. This changed the notion of the state in the minds of people: This was
OzaTs main aim because he thought that this would lead Turks to trust in
themselves.
Briefly, Ozal undertook a pioneering role by questioning the notion of
the state. The state would no longer supply everything: if people had to find
other ways to live, they would start questioning the legitimacy of the state. In
this context, a Pandora's box would be opened and phobias of the official
ideology would come into the light after being imprisoned for a long time.
Islam, among these phobias, was the luckiest: it was needed by the
state, not just a spiritual matter but as a means of uniting society. More than
that, Islam had been the spiritual basis of the conquest of Anatolia and
reigned as the official religion on this territory for about one thousand years.
The secular way of politics was young when compared to the historical
advantage of Islam.
With the freedom in the Ozalian period, the Islamic institutions became
more potent in society. From an economic perspective, Ozal needed to
transform the potential energy of the economic circles into a kinetic force. He
sought to do this through Islamic financing institutions. Ozal would sign the
approval of these institutions within a few days of winning government, even
before securing a Parliamentary vote of confidence. He was aware of the
104
money owned by the conservative people, traditionally kept under their
pillow; they resisted usury, forbidden by Islam; they were also suspicious of
the Turkish banks, more so because the banks did not pay interest rates
higher than the inflation rate.
Islamic banking was conceived as a means of loosening up this capital
that Özal took further steps towards this end. He directed society towards
other sources of investment, such as bu)'îng bonds for the Bosphorus Bridge.
Özal also encouraged consumerism so that eventually everything could be
found in Turkey, surprising the public very much.^“
Özal was guided above everything by realpolitik. He was an engineer
who calculated all possible results and preferred the best one among them. As
Özal was also a merchant, for him the best was always the most profitable
one. In these circumstances, it would be interesting to evaluate ÖzaTs policies
according to whether he complied with Islam before the profit principle. We
could reach the same results when we apply our thesis both in the national
and international political arenas. ÖzaTs attitudes in the Gulf crisis were not
compatible with Islam when allowing US air planes to take off from İncirlik, a
NATO airbase, and hit the civil targets where innocent children and women
died. However supporting UN sanctions and losing the revenue from the
twin pipelines carrying Iraqi crude oil to the sea as well as trade with Iraq and
Turkey's visible support for the coalition®^ could be explained as the result of
ÖzaTs cost-and-benefit analysis which necessitated being with the US at the
I remember as a child, at the first years of the Ozal government when I could taste the
Holland cheese.
Russel, The M iddle East and South Asia 1993. 206.
105
expense of Iraq. As an example for the national politics, we cannot find Ozal's
attitude towards Kurdish problem related that "the miserable living
conditions of the society should be overcome by the governor" which is a rule
from the period of the Caliphate. In sum, Özal calculated the balances every
time but in a dynamic mode.
The Muslim intellectuals would remember Özal as an important
cornerstone in the re-Islamization of society. If ÖzaTs name would be cited in
the conversation many people would pray for his salvation as calling him
"rahm etli (blessed) Özal". His funeral ceremony was really remarkable both
in Ankara and Istanbul. Many people shouted Islamic slogans which would
be depicted as irtica (reaction).
In the case of irtica, Özal believed that when freedom is provided for
the whole society in all aspects of life then Turkey would never be exposed to
such a danger. But Özal argued that oppression over pious people was not
secularism, and in fact constituted reaction in the society. Özal was pro
economy and pro-freedom but not pro-Sharia while he was not ashamed to
call himself a Muslim.
Özal was also a sultan. His family was portrayed as a dynasty and
charges of corruption filled the press. His brother Yusuf was a minister as was
his cousin Hüsnü Doğan, while his son and wife played important roles in the
appointments of high bureaucrats, especially princes, even ministers, Özal's
other brother Korkut was effective on the conservative wing of the MP. This
appearance of corruption and nepotism would be the main reason by which
the MP lost most of the mayoralties in 1989 local elections.
106
In the last British general election held on 1 May, 1997 the Labor Party
under the leadership of Tony Blair came to power following the reign of the
Conservative Party for 18 years. However, because of the resemblance of
Blair's political vision to that of Margaret Thatcher, known as the Iron Lady,
Stryker Mcguire evaluated the elections as "Tory vs. Tory" before the
elections were held.^^ Moreover, according to Daniel Pedersen the election
would pass between the two faces of Thatcher and then asks ; "How can
Thatcherism lose?"’’^ The same case was for Özal and Demirel since following
Özal's Presidency, despite his previous threats to force Özal from office,
Demirel "swallowed the rivalry with his former aide" and promised to
achieve many of ÖzaTs goals including the privatization of state-owned
factories and better human rights.^
After Özal, Demirel replaced him as the President and Tansu Çiller
became both the leader of the True Path Party and the Prime Minister, the
first time in Turkish political history that a woman had captured these posts.
She followed the same path of Özal. At present writing, the current coalition
government led by Necmettin Erbakan and Tansu Çiller, is proud of carrying
out the biggest privatization of the last decade. Both partners of the coalition
talk about the enlargement of democracy, freedoms and human rights as in
the style of Özal. Moreover, with the orientations of the young prominent
figures in the Prosperity Party (PP), it seems that the party politics would look
like that of Özal if somewhat more green. Thus, Özal's policies are still living
Stryker Mcguire, "Tory vs. Tory" in Newsweek, April 28,1997, vol. CXXIX, no. 17,10.
Danel Pedersen, "Maggie Rules", in Newsweek, April 28,1997, vol. CXXIX, no. 17,12.
Russel, The M iddle East and South Asial993. 206.
107
in Turkey even though he is not with us and this means that he put Turkey to
a position from which there is no return.
Özal tried to transform the country and to some extent he was
successful. But he left a generation after him that deserved to be called as "the
children of Özal", remote from political struggles but close to profitmaximization. According to my conceptualization, there are two strands in
the Turkish modernization. The first wing is represented by Mahmud II and
Atatürk and the second wing is Abdülhamid II, Menderes and Özal. The
second wing continued the modernization process without bothering the
religious feelings of the society and even supported them when possible.
Özal had a large vision which provided him great successes and great
defeats. In his will, Özal wanted to be buried according to Islamic principles
as with tekbirs, not the funeral ceremony march.®^
Özal died but he left a political tradition. This tradition resembles an
Ottoman sultan in the form of an engineer-merchant one but not a mullah.
Because of that, especially the women in chador tried to silence the official band playing the
funeral ceremony march while Ozal was brought to his monument.
108
ifâf^âsoT iu İiâveî'ndLe -y ılla r c a - t i r konu
ç e v r e s in d e d ön e n ^ a rrı/y â rıın s a y f a .tu y ü k lû g ü n d e
Jiâyâ^â. dâir r e n k l i ç i^ g i- a n lâ ia la r yayırtılada.
T a b u s a y ı l a n b ir ç o k k o n u y u
a ld ı
ve
neê
ı^ ığ ı a lım d a
ele
bu ç a lı-ş m a la r ı o k u r la r d a t i r y a k i l i k
oluşturdu...
irtica
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