CR-Romania - Growing Inequalities` Impacts

Transkript

GROWING INEQUALITIES AND THEIR IMPACTS IN ROMANIA
Iuliana Precupetu
Marius Precupetu
Country Report for Romania
GINI Country Report Romania
Table of contents
Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 1
Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 7
2. The Nature of Inequality and its Development over Time ................................................................ 13
2.1 Has inequality grown? .................................................................................................................13
2.1.1 Household income inequality............................................................................................... 13
2.1.2 Wealth & debt inequality ..................................................................................................... 23
2.1.3 Labour market inequality ..................................................................................................... 23
2.1.4 Educational inequality .......................................................................................................... 31
Conclusions............................................................................................................................................ 38
3. The Social Impacts of Inequality ........................................................................................................ 47
3.1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................................47
3.2. Material deprivation ..................................................................................................................47
3.3 Cumulative disadvantage and multidimensional measures of poverty and social exclusion .....53
3.5 Social cohesion and social capital ...............................................................................................57
3.6. Family formation and breakdown, lone parenthood and fertility .............................................60
3.6 Health inequalities ......................................................................................................................65
3.8. Housing tenure ...........................................................................................................................69
3.9 Crime and punishment ................................................................................................................73
3.10 Subjective measures of well-being............................................................................................76
3.11 Intergenerational mobility ........................................................................................................83
Conclusions .......................................................................................................................................84
4. Political and Cultural Impacts ............................................................................................................ 89
4.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................89
4.2 Political and civic participation....................................................................................................89
4.3 Trust in others and in institutions ...............................................................................................92
4.4 Political values and legitimacy ....................................................................................................97
4.5 Values about social policy and welfare state ............................................................................104
Conclusions .....................................................................................................................................107
5. Effectiveness of Policies in Combating Inequality ........................................................................... 109
5.1 Introduction...............................................................................................................................109
5. 2 Minimum wages and collective labour agreements ................................................................109
5.3 Taxation .....................................................................................................................................111
5.4 Social expenditure .....................................................................................................................114
5.4.1 Unemployment benefits .................................................................................................... 118
5.4.2 Social assistance ................................................................................................................. 119
5.4.3 Disability benefits ............................................................................................................... 119
5.4.4 Old age and survivors pensions .......................................................................................... 120
5.4.5 Health care ......................................................................................................................... 126
5.4.6 Family benefits ................................................................................................................... 128
5.5 Education...................................................................................................................................130
Conclusions .....................................................................................................................................134
References ........................................................................................................................................... 137
Annex................................................................................................................................................... 146
List of Figures
Figure 2.1 Distribution of per capita household net income: Gini coefficient, 1990-2009......................... 14
Figure 2.2 Gini coefficient including and excluding own consumption ...................................................... 15
Figure 2.3 Absolute poverty rates 1990-2010 ............................................................................................. 17
Figure 2.4 Absolute poverty by residence ................................................................................................... 20
Figure 2.5 Absolute poverty rates by development region ........................................................................ 21
Figure 2.6 Gini Index - Consumption per Equivalent Adult ......................................................................... 22
Figure 2.7 Employment rates by gender ..................................................................................................... 24
Figure 2.8 Employment rates by age ........................................................................................................... 24
Figure 2.9 Employment rates by education ................................................................................................ 25
Figure 2.10 Indices of real wages ................................................................................................................ 29
Figure 2.11 Higher educational attainment by age ..................................................................................... 32
Figure 2.12 Early leavers ............................................................................................................................. 34
Figure 3.1 Material deprivation rate and severe material deprivation rate ............................................... 49
Figure 3.2 Severe material deprivation rate by age .................................................................................... 50
Figure 3.3 Severe deprivation rate by income quintile ............................................................................... 52
Figure 3.4 Severe deprivation rate by education ........................................................................................ 52
Figure 3.5 Arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase) by income threshold ......................... 54
Figure 3.6 Inability to make ends meet by income threshold..................................................................... 55
Figure 3.7 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by income quintile ............................................... 56
Figure 3.8 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by education ........................................................ 57
Figure 3.9 Frequency of contacts with friends and relatives ...................................................................... 59
Figure 3.10 Total fertility rate ..................................................................................................................... 61
Figure 3.11 Fertility rates by age ................................................................................................................. 62
Figure 3.12 Crude marriage rate ................................................................................................................. 63
Figure 3.13 Crude divorce rate .................................................................................................................... 64
Figure 3.14 Household composition, 2010 ................................................................................................. 64
Figure 3.15 Life expectancy by gender ........................................................................................................ 66
Figure 3.16 Access to utilities by area of residence, 2010 (%) .................................................................... 72
Figure 3.17 Housing cost overburden rate by income threshold................................................................ 73
Figure 3.18 Registered total crime rate (per 100,000 population) ............................................................. 74
Figure 3.19 Prison population ..................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 3.20 Perceptions of insecurity due to crime .................................................................................... 76
Figure 3.21 Life satisfaction......................................................................................................................... 78
Figure 3.22 Happiness/unhappiness ........................................................................................................... 81
Figure 3.23 Worries ..................................................................................................................................... 82
Figure 4.1 Percentage of self-declared members in civic organizations ..................................................... 92
Figure 4.2 Trust in political institutions (2004 – 2012)................................................................................ 93
Figure 4.3 Trust in political institutions (1996 – 2004)................................................................................ 94
Figure 4.4 Levels of trust in local and regional authorities ......................................................................... 95
Figure 4.5 Trust in justice / the legal system ............................................................................................... 96
Figure 4.6 Trust in people............................................................................................................................ 96
Figure 4.7 Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Romania ........................................................... 98
Figure 4.8 Self placement on left-right wing scale, 2010 (percentage) ...................................................... 99
Figure 4.9 Image of the European Union (“very positive” and “fairly positive” image) ........................... 100
Figure 4.10 EU membership approval (“EU membership – a good thing”) .............................................. 101
Figure 4.11 EU membership perceived benefits (“own country benefitted from EU membership”) ...... 102
Figure 4.12 Factors considered important to get ahead in life, 2010 ....................................................... 103
Figure 4.13 Attitudes towards inequality and redistribution .................................................................... 105
Figure 4.14 Welfare responsibility strategies............................................................................................ 106
Figure 4.15 Tensions between social groups ............................................................................................ 107
Figure 5.1 Monthly minimum wages......................................................................................................... 109
Figure 5.2 Monthly minimum wage as a proportion of the mean value of average monthly earnings ... 110
Figure 5.3 Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP........................................................................................ 112
Figure 5.4 Tax revenue by origin as % of GDP ........................................................................................... 112
Figure 5.5 Total social protection expenditure as % of GDP ..................................................................... 115
Figure 5.6 Social protection expenditure by function as % of GDP .......................................................... 116
Figure 5.7 Social expenditure by cash/in kind benefits as % of GDP ........................................................ 116
Figure 5.8 Social expenditure by means/non means tested as % of GDP................................................. 117
Figure 5.9 Labour market policy expenditure as % of GDP ....................................................................... 118
Figure 5.10 Pensions replacement rate (ratio between the average pensions and average net salary) . 123
Figure 5.11 Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP, for all levels of education combined .. 130
Figure 5.12 Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP by levels of education .......................... 131
A1. Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income, 2000-2011 .......................................................... 146
A2. GDP and real wages, 1990=100 .......................................................................................................... 146
A3. Gini 2010 ............................................................................................................................................. 147
A4. Employment rates in EU 2011............................................................................................................. 148
A5. Life satisfaction 2001-2011 ................................................................................................................. 148
List of Tables
Table 1.1 Basic socio‐economic background statistics.................................................................................. 9
Table 2.1 Relative poverty 2000-2010: at risk of poverty rate.................................................................... 16
Table 2.2 At risk of poverty rate by age ...................................................................................................... 18
Table 2.3 At risk of poverty rate by household type ................................................................................... 18
Table 2.4 At risk of poverty rate by most frequent activity status.............................................................. 19
Table 2.5 At risk of poverty rate by highest level of education achieved ................................................... 19
Table 2.6 Employment rates by region ....................................................................................................... 26
Table 2.7 Change in employment according to occupational categories (ISCO) (thousands) .................... 26
Table 2.8 Unemployment rate by age, education, gender and residence .................................................. 28
Table 2.9 Distribution of active population (15-64) by educational attainment and residence................. 33
Table 2.11 Returns to schooling in urban Romania .................................................................................... 37
Table 2.12 Monthly earnings (EUR), 2002 ................................................................................................... 38
Table 3.1 Material deprivation rate ............................................................................................................ 49
Table 3.2 Severe material deprivation rate by household type .................................................................. 51
Table 3. 3 At risk of poverty or social exclusion (EU 2020 target)............................................................... 56
Table 3.4 Self rating of health status by socio-demographic variables (mean values) ............................... 67
Table 3.5 Access to health care by income and residence (% reporting very difficult access) ................... 68
Table 3.6 Tenure status (%) ......................................................................................................................... 71
Table 3.7 Recorded crimes by type (absolute numbers) ............................................................................ 74
Table 3.8 Satisfaction with life domains, means ......................................................................................... 80
Table 3.9 Percentage sons achieving their father’s occupation.................................................................. 84
Table 4.1 Turnout in elections (%)............................................................................................................... 91
Table A1. Public expenditure .................................................................................................................... 149
Table A2. Level and structure of incomes by head of household activity status and residence, 4th
trimester 2011 ......................................................................................................................... 149
Table A3. Structure of incomes by decile .................................................................................................. 150
Table A4. Data Logs ................................................................................................................................... 151
Executive summary
In Romania, inequalities have been driven by a complex of historical, economic and social factors.
The communist past has left enduring marks on the country’s development, while transition shaped
long lasting inequalities. During the process of post-communist transformation, Romania has been
through a severe economic decline accompanied by an important rise in poverty and inequality.
Related to inequality, privatisation of large state assets created important opportunities for the
concentration of resources in the hands of a small elite and has been one of the major factors leading
to the formation of large private wealth. Corruption and its particular form, state capture, created
unjustified privileges for some categories, and produced misbalanced outputs in society.
While privatisation of agriculture has generally had a distributional favourable impact, it contributed
to the emergence of a large, unproductive, fragmented agricultural sector dominated by a
subsistence type of farming. Even though it served as a safety net for numerous households, both for
the rural population and for those coming from urban areas who lost their jobs during the industrial
restructuring process, it is still a low productive sector that hasn’t realised its potential yet.
Informal economy grew to a high extent and, while absorbing a large mass of the restructured work
force, it turned into a driver of inequality, as in the informal sector, the rich tended to increase their
gains, while for the poor it was a mere survival strategy. Emigration, and especially its more recent
form, emigration for work produced heavy imbalances in the Romanian workforce. Although
generally contributing to increasing living standards, emigration also exacerbated the existing
inequalities. Social policy compensated for the negative effects of transition only partly. In difficult
times, people relied more on kinship networks and the subsequent interfamily transfers, on
subsistence agriculture or immersion in the informal economy.
Roma population have been impacted by the transition to a great extent. The low opportunities on
the labour market for a lower educated and qualified labour force, the traditional outdated
occupations, the cultural models and the discrimination they are subject to, all contributed to a trend
of social marginalization of Roma. Transition created new opportunities for some categories while
considerably lowered prospects for others. A certain stratification of life chances by age, education,
employment status has emerged and widen in time.
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Income inequality and poverty
In 2010, Romania ranked fifth highest in EU in regard to income inequality. While in 1990 the value of
the Gini coefficient placed this country at the level of Sweden, by 2007 Romania had become the
most unequal country in Europe according to this measure.
Own consumption played an important role in reducing poverty and lessening inequality, especially
throughout the time of economic recession. Subsistence agriculture represented an important means
that contributed to households budgets and helped to maintaining some households barely above
the poverty line and, furthermore, was a factor in decreasing income inequality.
Real wages suffered a dramatic reduction during transition as in 1996 they reached 56.2% of their
1990 level. It took 17 years into transition to recover to their value in the first year of transition.
Moreover, wages in Romania are among the most unequal in EU: in 2006 the P90/P10 wage ratio
was 5.5 in Romania while in other countries of the EU the ratio was as low as 2.1 in Sweden and 2.3
in Finland.
Employment rates are low in Romania and well below the EU27 average. Economic restructuring and
early retirement schemes have led to declining employment rates. Employment rates generally vary
by gender, education, age and region. The most difficult situation appears to be that of Roma, for
which the employment rate is much lower than the national average, while inequalities are related
to gender, education, age and basic abilities (reading and writing).
Poverty continues to remain one the crucial problems of the country 1. In 2010, Romania ranked the
second highest in the EU in regard to relative poverty rate, after Lithuania. Having one of the lowest
relative poverty thresholds in the EU, Romania had in 2010 a risk of poverty rate of 17.2%. Absolute
poverty affected in 2010 a number of 1.110.000 people. Most exposed to poverty risks are children,
youth, households with dependent children (especially those with three or more children), single
persons and single persons with dependent children, the unemployed, the self-employed in
agriculture and low educated people. Inequalities are marked in Romania, apart from individual and
households characteristics, also by rural/urban, and development region. In 2010 the gap between
rural and urban was important as the absolute poverty was four times higher in rural than in urban.
Important disparities appear also between regions. The poorest region (North-East) has poverty rates
fivefold higher in comparison to the richest one (Bucharest – Ilfov). The ratio is even bigger
(eightfold) according to absolute poverty rates.
1
At risk of poverty rates come from Eurostat, EU SILC data, absolute poverty rates come from MLFSP, 2010,
HBS data
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Roma represent a deep pocket of poverty as in 2010 their absolute poverty rate was 31.4% in
comparison to that of the Romanian population of 4.4%. The gap between Roma and the Romanian
gradually increased in time as in 2003 the Roma poverty risk was 3 times higher than the Romanian
poverty risk, whereas in 2010 it was more than 7 times higher.
Social impacts
In regard to social capital, in Romania, social relationships have been shaped by the communist
heritage characterised by high distrust in others outside primary groups, in social institutions and by
the subsequent social isolation. Generalised trust, the frequency and membership of associations are
at a low level in Romania which can be explained by a series of factors, among which poor structural
opportunities for participation, weak tradition of non-governmental organizations in Romania as well
as poor individual resources.
Romania is characterised by low fertility, a marriage rate at the average level of EU and low divorce
rates. Family has been throughout the transition the main safety net for most of the people.
Multigenerational households, help within the extended family and strong kinship networks acted as
buffers against the hardships of transformation.
In Romania, populations’ health is rather poor and aggregate indicators (life expectancy, infant
mortality, mortality etc.) show that there is big gap that separates Romania from the developed
countries in the EU in regard to health status. Furthermore, a series of inequalities characterize
health in Romania, coming from socio-economic positions as well as from the general development
of the country and the specific setup of the health system (between rural and urban, between
development regions or various size localities).
In regard to housing, tenure status is heavily influenced by the communist heritage and the
privatisation of the housing stock in early ‘90s. Homeownership is overwhelmingly widespread in this
country and the highest in the EU. Most of the houses are owned outright, while mortgage or loans
are not significant in the total tenure status. Romania has the lowest share of owners with mortgage
or loans in the EU. The proportion of tenants is also low as renting is not an institution yet in
Romania.
Inequalities appeared between older generations, who benefited from a generous communist
welfare package, and younger generations, who saw their access to housing severely limited. Also, a
series of inequalities characterise quality of housing in Romania. A major line of division in regard to
housing is between urban and rural. Other disparities that characterise housing conditions are
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between small cities and big cities, neighbourhoods with individual homes and those with blocks of
apartments. Housing conditions are also structured by individual characteristics: most exposed to
precarious housing are those with a low level of education, those with a low level of income and
Roma households.
Life satisfaction generally displays low levels in Romania. Satisfaction with standard of living is
constantly the lowest among satisfaction with life domains, proving that this is the most problematic
aspect of people’s lives. At the other end of the scale, satisfaction with family shows constantly
highest levels among life domains.
In the first part of the communist regime, educational mobility consisted of a high level structural
mobility, while in the second part of the regime (starting with the mid ‘70s) largely social
reproduction dominated mobility processes. However, as a general pattern, during communist
regime in Romania upward mobility was by and large based on education. During transition, upward
mobility became increasingly dependent on social origin.
Political impacts
People’s estrangement from political life in Romania is indicated both by the low level of trust in
political institutions (government, parliament, political parties, presidency) and by their preference
for institutions that are highly personalized and visible (like the presidency, government, and local
authorities) to the detriment of more abstract and less tangible institutions (parliament, political
parties). So, granting trust to institutions appears to be dependent on how people feel having more
or less control on them, and how they perceive the outcomes of these institutions (more or less
direct / tangible, more or less relevant for their own lives).
Even if people evaluate poorly the functioning of the democratic regime, their attachment to the
values and principles of democracy have the meaning of a citizenry that care about the fate of their
democracy and are interested in improving its performance. In Romania, the rather low specific
support for democracy was not opposed to the democratic regime, but driven inside the democratic
system through a vote in favour of the political opposition. As a result, change in power took place in
the last five general elections. The absence of extremist parties in Romania is another characteristic
of the political life that favours the persistence and consolidation of democracy.
Proven by objective indicators, the unequal society of Romania is perceived as such by the majority
of the people in their subjective assessments. A very large majority consider that there are huge
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disparities between incomes and that the fairness of redistribution should be ensured by the
government.
Effectiveness of policy in combating inequality
In Romania, after 1990 and up to 2000, social policy has been through various stages: in the
beginning of transition, social policy knew a so called “reparative phase”, where the goal was to
compensate for the deprivation during the communist regime. The phase of “strategy conception”
followed, where the legislative and institutional framework have been designed, while during the
“actual policy phase” a more articulate welfare regime was outlined. 2
Romania has the second lowest minimum wage in the EU after Bulgaria. Between 1999 and 2012,
the level of minimum wages varied between 21% and 33% of the average monthly gross earnings in
industry and services.
The flat tax system introduced in 2005 with the goal of increasing the tax base by reducing tax
avoidance and evasion has had some mixed effects: its beneficial effect consisted of increased
employment and lower unemployment but it did not contribute to lowering inequality. As a general
model, the higher the incomes, the bigger the benefits of the flat tax and the larger the household,
the smaller the gains were.
Social security contributions are very high in Romania (31.3%) and they might have offset the array of
possible positive effects of the flat tax system. Social expenditure maintained during transition at low
levels and in 2009, Romania had the third lowest social protection expenditure in the EU as a
percentage of GDP.
The Romanian pension faces a series of challenges posed by the ageing of the population, low
fertility rate, a low employment rate, a large underground economy, a large pool of emigrated
workers and a low economic output. The dependency ratio, contributor-pensioner went down from
3.5 in 1989 to around 1 in 2011. From 1990 to 2006 the value of pensions in real terms significantly
deteriorated and they came to represent only 33% of the average salary in 2006 in comparison to
51% in 1990. Starting with 2007 pensions started to increase in real terms but they reached and
surmounted their 1990 level only for a brief moment, in 2010, to fall again in 2011.
2
According to Zamfir, 2000
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Romania has a relatively generous system of family benefits which increased and diversified
especially after 2004. Family benefits represent the third largest expenditure of GDP after old age
and health care.
In 2009 Romania allocated for education 4.2% of GDP, representing the second lowest share
allocated to education in the EU. During the past few years, expenditure on higher education and
secondary education increased, while for primary level of education expenditure decreased. For the
past, 22 years, Romania’s education system has been under perpetual reforms, either deep-seated or
less significant, depending on the objectives of the various governments and political moments.
These reforms have put a high pressure on all the actors involved in the educational process: policy
makers, teachers, parents and students.
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Introduction
Within the framework of GINI research programme, this report aims to create an overall image of
inequality in Romania by looking at income inequality and highlighting the social, political and
cultural dimensions of inequality in this country. The report concentrates on examining patterns and
trends of inequality mainly over the two decades that followed the fall of communism in Romania.
While the main focus is on Romania, where possible, the country is situated in a European
comparative perspective by employing comparisons across the various indicators.
The report follows the common structure of the country GINI reports: first, it describes the macro
context of Romania starting with 1990. Second, it treats the nature of inequality and its development
over time. Following, it examines the social, political and cultural impacts of inequality while in the
end it considers the various policies that might have a bearing in combating inequality.
Romania: macro context
In the recent history of Romania GDP growth generally described an up and down pattern. Economic
recession started in mid ‘80s and prolonged itself and further aggravated during the first years of
transition. The year 1991 registered a record low of 12% contraction of the economic output. The
economy slowly started to recover in 1993 and a relative stabilisation was noticeable only for four
years. The output expansion was reversed by renewed economic turmoil in 1997 and 1998. Since
2000 a new period of economic growth began, which seemed at the time a more robust and
sustainable path: in 2008 GDP registered a record high of 9.6% growth. However, the positive trend
abruptly ended up in the economic crisis, as GDP contracted in 2009 with 8.4%. The following years
brought about certain stagnation. By and large, consumption, which is generally low in Romania,
followed the same pattern as GDP, recording the most dramatic decline in 1991 (15% in comparison
to the previous year) and twenty years later, when in 2011 recorded a contraction of 11.2%, much
more important than that of GDP.
Real wages remained low for the entire transition period. They declined dramatically in the early
‘90s, and despite a small positive trend during 1994-1996, they largely remained under the GDP
evolution and recovered to their 1990 level only in 2007.
The government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP) has been on the increase, from 6.6% of GDP in
1995 to 33.3% in 2011, currently still being one of the lowest in the EU.
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Employment decreased significantly in the 1990s due to the economic restructuring, the slow
process of job creation and early retirement schemes. The number of employees in the economy fell
from 8.1 million in 1990 to 5.9 million in 1996 and furthermore to 4.4 million in 2010 (NIS data).
The dismantling of socialist agriculture and the consequent land restitution conducted to the
formation of a sizeable subsistence agriculture in which a large part of the former industrial labour
force has immersed. However, agriculture conceals a large group of unemployed population.
Informal employment is very high, estimated at between 1 and 2 million people. 3
In relation to education composition, 29.4% of Romania active population have attained levels 0-2
and 57.6% levels 3-4. Although tertiary education expanded a lot during transition, the proportion of
graduates in the active population is still the lowest in EU (13%) (Eurostat data).
Romania has been through a demographic decline that started during the early ‘90s. In the past, the
pro-natalist policy introduced in the mid ‘60s by the communist regime, lead to a demographic
expansion that reached its peak in 1990 when the population was 23.2 million. The last census of
2012 recorded a total population of 20.254.866 (NIS, census provisional data 2012). The sharp
decline is due to a decrease in the fertility rate owing to the unfavourable economic and social
circumstances of transition. Emigration, currently estimated at 3 million (OECD, 2012), with its more
recent form emigration for work, also contributed to the population decrease. Composition of
population by nationality shows that 88.6% is represented by Romanians, 6.5% by Hungarian
population, 3.2% by Roma while the remaining 1.4% is represented by other ethnic groups 4 (NIS,
census provisional data 2012).
Ageing affects Romania along with the other European countries: between 1990 and 2011 the
proportion of the population over 65 years old increased from 10.4% to 15%, whereas the proportion
of those aged 0-14 decreased from 23.6% to 15.1%.
3
4
MLFSP, Strategic national report regarding social protection and social inclusion, 2008-2010
The remaining 0.3% is represented by those who do not declare their ethnicity.
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Table 1.1 Basic socio‐economic background statistics
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2011
Population
Ages 0-14 (% of total)
23.6
20.5
18.4
15.6
15.2
15.2
Ages 15-64 (% of total)
66.0
67.5
68.1
69.6
69.9
69.8
Ages 65 and above (% of
total)
10.4
12.0
13.4
14.8
14.9
15.0
Population, total
23201835
22684270
22442971
21634371
21438001
21390000
GDP
GDP per capita
(constant 2000 US$)
1896
1741
1651
2260
2637
2633
GDP per capita growth
(%1990)
100
91.8
87.1
119.2
139.1
138.9
Consumption
Household final
consumption
expenditure per capita
(constant 2000 US$)
1315
1245
1304
1981
2660
2362
Household final
consumption
expenditure per capita
growth (%1990)
100
94.7
99.1
150.7
202.4
179.7
15.8
30.5
33.3
89.5
123.6
5.9
7
7.7
Debt
Government
consolidated gross debt
(% of GDP)
6.6
22.5
Real wages
Index of real wages
(%1990)
100
66.5
59.4
Unemployment
Unemployment rate
9.5
10.5
Education composition of active population (ISCED)
Levels 0-2
33.3
30.3
29.4
Levels 3-4
57.6
57.8
57.6
Levels 5-6
9.1
11.9
13
Sources:
GDP, Population: WDI
Real wages: NIS, Statistical Yearbook
Unemployment rate: NIS, Statistical Yearbooks
Government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)
Education: Eurostat
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Data constraints and issues
Available data on Romania posed a series of constraints in the writing of this report. In case of
Romania, a former communist country, available data for the ‘80s include only macro-economic and
structural data, some of them not entirely reliable. Moreover, during the communist regime no social
surveys have been carried out in Romania. Early ‘90s are partly covered with data as statistics system
made efforts to harmonize with European and international statistics systems while social surveys
only started to be carried out in Romania. Continuous time data series are rarely available. For
example, Labour Force Survey started only in 1992 in Romania and changed methodology on the
way. Up to 1996, the survey was annual and covered persons aged 14 years old and over. Beginning
with the first quarter of 1999, the underemployment concept complies with the provisions of the
16th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (1998). Beginning with the first quarter of 2002,
the employment, unemployment and main activity status concepts comply with the provisions
agreed by the European Commission.
EU-SILC was implemented only in 2007 in Romania. Also, no wealth data was ever gathered for
Romania and the only (incomplete) source of data for characterizing wealth inequality remain
Eurostat financial balance sheets. Some international surveys have not been carried out in Romania,
e.g. ISSP or they were only done once, like ESS. Romania is not an OECD country, so it doesn’t have
access to the wealth of data available for the OECD countries.
Other problems relate to specific indicators which have not been used for Romania. Some indicators
are calculated by Eurostat only for EU15 like is the case with at-risk-of-poverty rate anchored at a
fixed moment in time.
There are also some differences between national and international data sources like is the case of
unemployment rate, distribution of population by education levels or social expenditure. The report
tried to overcome the difficulties by:
-
using data series that allow breakdown by socio-demographic variables. This is the case with
distribution of population by educational attainment which differs between national source
and Eurostat. We used national source to highlight disparities between urban and rural and
Eurostat for characterising the macro background of Romania. When the case, the
differences were acknowledged.
-
covering periods as long as possible with data, sometimes complementing sources.
Given the asymmetry in availability of data between the various decades which were the focus of the
GINI report, the Romanian report covers as completely as possible the ‘90s and 2000s.
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Note: throughout the report, where possible, Gini coefficient is given in graphs along with impact
indicators. The right axis to Gini coefficient and the left axis refer to variables. Gini coefficient is given
using as data source Transmonee, the most complete continuous data series (1990-2009). To be
noted though that putting together impact indicators along with Gini does not imply a relationship
between Gini and the diverse variables as the relationships have not been statistically tested. The
same applies to data “logs”.
Page 11
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2. The Nature of Inequality and its Development over Time
2.1 Has inequality grown?
This chapter is dedicated to inequality in income, labour market and education in Romania. First, it
looks at income inequality in an attempt to understand the pattern of growing inequalities in time.
Second, the chapter concentrates on poverty and poverty profiles by employing two measures of
poverty, relative and absolute, with the aims of understanding the trends in the evolution of poverty
and of highlighting the most exposed groups to poverty. Labour market inequality is treated in the
next section which focuses on three main dimensions: employment, unemployment and wages,
while also highlighting inequalities. The final section is dedicated to educational inequality.
The chapter relies on NIS national data, as well as on Eurostat data. National data 5 come from the
Romanian households’ budget surveys which, in time, have been through several changes: 19901994 Family Budget Surveys, 1995-2000 Integrated Household Survey, 2000-2010 Household Budget
Survey 6. Eurostat data comes from either EU-SILC which was implemented in Romania starting with
2007, or LFS, starting with 1997. Even though these data describe a rather short period of time, it
allows us to understand variations by socio-demographic variables and to make comparisons to other
countries in the EU.
2.1.1 Household income inequality
In 2010 Romania had a median equivalised income of 2037Euro, which was the smallest in EU and
around ten times smaller than that of some developed western countries like the Netherlands
(20.292 Euro), Austria (20.618Euro) or France (20.046Euro), and less than half of the NMS12 average
(4.431Euro) (Eurostat).
In 2010 Romania ranked fifth in the EU in regard to income inequality. With a Gini coefficient of 33.3,
Romania was placed among the most unequal countries in EU, having a level of income inequality
lower only than Lithuania (36.9), Latvia (36.1), Spain (33.9) and Portugal (33.7) and significantly
higher than the EU27 average (30.5) (Eurostat).
5
6
Data series for income shares (top 1%, 5% and bottom shares) are not available for Romania.
In the text, we mention only “NIS data”.
Page 13
In time, income inequality grew to a high extent. In 1990, immediately after the fall of communism,
Romania was characterized by a low level of inequality, being in the group of countries less unequal
in Europe, like Sweden or Hungary. After only a decade of transition, Romania went into the group of
the most unequal countries in EU, like UK or Portugal.
Early ‘90s saw a moderate increase in the Gini coefficient in a time of economic recession (Figure 7
2.1). In the second part of the ‘90s, with the start of modest economic growth, the Gini coefficient
registered another increase, followed by a relatively stable period. The most significant increase in
the Gini coefficient occurred after 2001, when the economy entered a path of more robust growth.
The Gini coefficient maintained a very high level all through the time of economic growth and
reached a peak in 2007 when Romania ranked the highest in the EU in regard to income inequality
(Eurostat data). Only starting with 2008, for the first time after 1990, the Gini coefficient recorded a
significant decrease although the country still remains one of the most unequal in EU.
Figure 2.1 Distribution of per capita household net income: Gini coefficient, 1990-2009
40
35
37,5
35,3 34,9 35,2 35,9 36,1 36,4
34,7 34,5
30
30,6 30,2 30,5 29,8 29,9 31
25
20
25,8 25,9 26,7 26,4
22,7
15
10
5
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
Source: Transmonee, based on NIS data
In Romania, own consumption 8 played an important role in reducing poverty and lessening
inequality, especially throughout the time of economic recession.
7
Here we use Transmonee data as is the most complete series available for Gini coefficient. International
comparisons are based on Eurostat data which start the series in 2000. A graph of Eurostat data is given in the
annex. The Eurostat measure is the Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income using the modified OECD
scale and the Transmonee refer to the distribution of population by per capita household net income.
8
Own consumption refers to consumption of food produced by the household and does not include imputed
rent.
Page 14
In 2000, the value of the Gini coefficient excluding own consumption was 37.8 while the value of the
same coefficient including own consumption was 29.4, the difference between the two being 8.4 Gini
points. In time, up to 2007, the differentiation between the two decreased to 5 Gini points, showing
a diminishing significance of own consumption (Figure 2.2).
Subsistence agriculture carried out by individual farmers on small plots of land represented an
important means that contributed to the households budgets and helped to maintaining some
households barely above the poverty line and furthermore was a factor in decreasing income
inequality (Marginean, 2006). This was especially important for the poorest households, as for
example, the most important income sources for those in the first income decile are agriculture and
social benefits (NIS data).
Figure 2.2 Gini coefficient including and excluding own consumption
39,0
37,8
37,0
35,0
37,5
37,4
36,5
35,0
37,7
36,5
36,3
33,0
36,5
32,6
31,0
30,5
30,0
29,5
29,4
29,0
29,6
32,0
31,5
31,1
30,7
27,0
2008
Gini (disposable income excluding own consumption)
Gini (disposable income including own consumption)
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1997
25,0
Source: Zamfir et al, 2010, NIS data
The income quintile ratio (S80/S20) depicts approximately the same picture of income inequality as
the Gini coefficient. In 2010 the S80/S20 ratio was 6, which ranks Romania fourth in the EU, after the
countries with the most unequal income distribution represented by Spain (6.9), Lithuania (7.3) and
Latvia (6.9), and higher than the EU27 average (5). The highest ratio was registered in 2007, when it
reached 7.8 (Eurostat data).
Page 15
Trends in poverty risks
In 2010, Romania ranked the second highest in the EU in regard to relative poverty rates. According
to Eurostat data 9, the at-risk of poverty rate in Romania was 21.1%, second after Lithuania (21.3%),
higher than the EU27 average (16.4%) and much higher than in countries like the Netherlands
(10.3%) or France (13.5%). It is also worth mentioning that Romania has one of the lowest poverty
thresholds in EU.
Table 2.1 Relative poverty 2000-2010: at risk of poverty rate
At risk of poverty
rate
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
17,1
17
18,1
17,3
17,9
18,2
18,6
18,5
18,2
17,5
17,2
Source: MLFSP 2010, NIS data
Relative poverty, calculated by using a threshold fixed at 60 percent of the national annual median
disposable income, shows little change since 2000. Despite a period of economic growth from 2000
to 2008, which lead to an increase in time in incomes and consumption, the poverty rates remained
rather stable as the median income also changed.
The relative poverty measure does not capture the dynamics of poverty in Romania. For this reason,
another measure of poverty was calculated nationally that is able to reflect the changes in the level
of welfare, against an absolute poverty line anchored in a minimum consumption basket.
The absolute poverty measure is based on a national methodology, developed by NIS, Government
experts, researchers, and the World Bank. This methodology uses a consumption-based welfare
indicator, and an absolute poverty line based on the cost of basic needs method. The consumptionbased welfare indicator includes own consumption. The poverty line is absolute, including a food
component plus an allowance for essential non-foods and services. The food component is
determined as the cost of a food basket preferred by the individuals from the second and third
deciles. The equivalence scale is empirical, taking into account economies of scale and relative cost of
children over adults (each adult = 1, each child = 0.5, economy of scale parameter = 0.9) (Word Bank
2007).
In Romania, absolute poverty rose sharply after 1990, along with the economic recession, until 1995,
when it began to decrease for two consecutive years as the economy seemed to recover to a certain
extent. Once again, with a new economic recession, starting with 1997, absolute poverty rose again
9
The figures for at risk poverty rate slightly differ between Eurostat and NIS data based on HBS. Here, we used
Eurostat for international comparisons and NIS national data for trends in time.
Page 16
abruptly up to 2000, when economic growth re-launched more robustly, and continued to fall until
2010 when the effects of the economic crisis were heavily experienced by population. In 2000, the
number of persons affected by absolute poverty was 8.045.000, while in 2010 the number decreased
to 1.110.000.
Figure 2.3 Absolute poverty rates 1990-2010
40
35
28,2
30
25
30,3 30,8
33,2
40
35,9
30,6
35
28,9
25,4
25
20,1
20
18,8
20
15
10
10,7
30
25,1
15,1
12,8
20
13,8
15
9,8
5,7
5,7
5
4,4 5,2
10
5
0
Absolute poverty rates
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
Gini
Source: MLSFP, 2010, NIS data
The relative poverty measure is well suited for international comparison as well as for understanding
the position that various social groups hold relatively to the national standard of living.
Following, we will detail the various inequalities by social and individual characteristics that are
highlighted by the relative poverty measure and we will complete the picture with absolute poverty
data only when the latter better highlights disparities. Essentially, poverty profiles based on the
relative poverty measure and the absolute poverty measure are very similar.
In regard to age, the highest poverty risk is faced by children and youth. In 2010, the poverty risk of
persons under 18 was almost two times higher (31.3%) than that of persons of 65 years and over
(16.7%). In time, between 2007 and 2010, the poverty risk decreased significantly only for those
between 55 and 64 years old and for those of 65 and older (Table 2.2). Although the elderly were a
rather vulnerable category in the nineties, lately it registered a higher reduction of the poverty risk
probably as a consequence of the increases in farmers’ pensions and in the pensions recorrelation 10
10
A process aiming at eliminating the inequities among pensions in the public system.
Page 17
that was implemented. When looking at absolute poverty, we observe that children and youth
(under 30) are indeed most exposed to poverty while representing almost half of the number of
people in absolute poverty. (MLFSP 2010, NIS data)
Table 2.2 At risk of poverty rate by age
Age
2007
2008
2009
2010
less than 18
32,8
32,9
32,9
31,3
18-24
23,3
22,9
23,2
22,9
25-54
20,8
20,1
20,1
19,4
55-64
20,2
17
15,5
13,9
65 years or over
30,6
26
21
16,7
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data
When looking at household type (Table 2.3), households with dependent children face a significantly
higher risk of poverty than those without children. Most exposed to poverty are the households of
two adults with three or more children. In 2010, in Romania, at risk poverty for households with
three or more dependent children was the second highest in Europe in 2010 (60.4%) after Bulgaria
(65%) and was more than two times higher than the average of EU27 (25.9%). Single persons with
dependent children also have high poverty risks. In time, from 2007 to 2010 poverty risks decreased
for most types of households with the exception of those made up of two adults with dependent
children for which the risks increased.
Table 2.3 At risk of poverty rate by household type
Household type
2007
2008
2009
2010
Households without dependent children
22
18,4
16,5
14,3
single person
36,2
32,9
29,1
26,7
two adults, younger than 65
17
13,8
13,1
13,5
two adults, at least one aged 65 or older
25,8
20
14,5
11,3
three or more adults
16,8
12,7
13,1
10,3
Households with dependent children
26,5
26,3
26,2
25,3
single person with dependent children
42,5
39,9
35,3
31,9
two adults with one dependent child
14,9
14,1
14,9
16,4
two adults with two dependent children
22,4
24
24,3
26,7
two adults with three or more children
54,8
57,3
56,3
60,4
three or more adults with dependent children
26,7
25,7
25,2
22,4
Source: Eurostat, EUSILC data
As expected, in regard to most frequent activity status, unemployed people are most exposed to
poverty (45.4%), facing a risk almost three times higher than the employed (17.2%) and maintaining
Page 18
high and relatively stable risks over time. Other inactive people also face higher poverty risks (Table
2.4).
However, when looking at absolute poverty rates and trying to analyse poverty rates by a more
refined activity status, we can observe that the self-employed in agriculture have the highest poverty
rate (12.9%) representing also the highest share in the number of people in absolute poverty
(22.9%). Self-employed in non-agricultural domain (10.7%) and housewives (10.2) also face higher
risks of poverty, while the unemployed ranked fourth, with a poverty rate of 9.4%. Other categories
are less exposed to poverty: old people and preschool children (8.4%), students (6.5%), retired (2%)
and employed (1%). (MLFSP 2010, NIS data)
Table 2.4 At risk of poverty rate by most frequent activity status
Most frequent activity status
2007
2008
2009
2010
employed
18,3
17,5
17,6
17,2
not employed
27,9
24,7
22,3
20,5
unemployed
46,4
42,7
46,4
45,4
retired
22,9
19
15,7
12,8
other inactive
33,1
31,8
30,7
29,8
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC data
When looking at education (Table 2.5), the data show that highly educated people are well protected
against poverty while the least educated (ISCED 0-2) represent the most vulnerable category in this
respect. In time, from 2007 to 2010 poverty rates decreased significantly for those with low
education.
Table 2.5 At risk of poverty rate by highest level of education achieved
Highest level of
education achieved
2007
2008
2009
2010
ISCED 0-2
40,5
36
35,1
33,2
ISCED 3-4
14,2
13,7
12,1
12,5
ISCED 5-6
1,2
0,7
1,6
1,1
Source: Eurostat, EUSILC data
Inequalities are marked in Romania not only by individual and households characteristics but also by
location. NIS data from HBS highlight further inequalities between urban and rural on the one hand
and various development regions on the other hand.
At risk of poverty rate was in 2010 three times higher in rural (27.1%) than in urban areas (9%). When
looking at absolute poverty, in 2010 the gap between rural and urban areas was even deeper: the
Page 19
absolute poverty gap was four times higher in rural (8.8%) than in urban (2.2%). In Romania pockets
of poverty are concentrated mostly in rural areas as 76.7% of the poor are living in rural and only
23.3% live in urban areas. (MLFSP 2010, NIS data)
In time, absolute poverty rates dropped considerably both in urban and rural areas. However,
poverty reduction was much more important in urban than in rural: between 2000 and 2010,
absolute poverty became 11 times lower in urban and only about 5 times in rural areas. The gap
between the two areas tended to deepen with only small variations in time: in 2000 the absolute
poverty in rural areas was less than 2 times higher than in urban areas, while in 2010 it was 4 times
higher.
Figure 2.4 Absolute poverty by residence
60
50
40
47,8
44,7
42,4
40
30
35
27,3
25,9
18,8
20
30
38
17,6
13,8
11,6
10
25
23,5
20
22,3
15
15,8
8,1
6,8
4,9
9,8
2,3
7,2
2,1
8,8
2,2
0
10
5
Rural
Urban
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
Gini
Source: MLFSP, 2010, NIS data
Looking further at the spatial distribution of poverty, big disparities become evident: the highest
relative poverty rates are to be found in North-East region (26.2%) and South-East region (23.1%)
while the lowest incidence of poverty is in Bucharest – Ilfov region (5.3%). According to absolute
poverty rates, the regional divide is even bigger: the poorest region has poverty rates almost 8 times
higher than the Bucharest region (Figure 2.5). Some of the disparities deepened in time, even in
times of economic growth, when poverty decreased. For example, in the period 2003-2006 the West
region registered a 62% drop in the number of poor, in the South the number of poor was reduced
by more than half, while in the Centre region the decrease was much lower, at only 34%. The
differences in the pace of poverty reduction lead to increasing regional disparities (World Bank
2007).
Page 20
Figure 2.5 Absolute poverty rates by development region
9
7,7
8
6,8
7
6
7
5,4
5
4
3,3
3,9
4,4
3
2
1
1,1
0
Bucharest
West
North-West
South
Muntenia
Centre
South-East South-West North-East
In Romania, there are also important disparities associated with ethnicity. Roma represent a deep
pocket of poverty as in 2010 their absolute poverty rate was 31.4% in comparison to that of the
Romanian population of 4.4% and of the Hungarian population of 2.4%. Roma absolute poverty rate
decreased from 76.8% in 2003 to 31.4% in 2010. However, the gap between Roma and the Romanian
poverty risk, whereas in 2010 was more than 7 times higher. (MLFSP 2010, NIS data)
Consumption inequality
Consumption inequality depicts a relatively different picture than the distribution of per capita
household net income. Consumption inequality shows relatively stable levels of inequality with a
small decrease in time (Figure 2.6).
Page 21
28,4 28,8
28
28,6
28
28,3 27,7
26,9
2006
28
2005
29,6 29,3 28,6
2004
30
2003
31,6 30,8
2001
35
2000
Figure 2.6 Gini Index - Consumption per Equivalent Adult
25,8 25,7
25
20
15
10
5
2010
2009
2008
2007
2002
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
0
In Romania expenditure on food represents a high share of total consumption. Eurostat data show
that, in 1995, food represented 39% of the final consumption expenditure of households while the
average of current EU27 was at the time 15%. Over time, along with economic growth, food share in
total consumption decreased to a certain extent to the benefit of non-food and services. In 2009,
food was 29% of consumption expenditure, still high in comparison to 13% representing the EU27
average. This pattern is in line with theoretical and empirical findings showing that as the level of
income increases, the food share in the households’ consumption expenditure decreases.
Using a different methodology than Eurostat, a World Bank report (2007, NIS data) also showed the
high proportion of food in households’ consumption expenditure and highlighted the various
discrepancies between income quintiles and urban/rural. The report showed there are large
differences between the consumption patterns of rich and poor. While the richest quintile spends
less than 40 percent on food products, the poorest spends more than 70 percent on these items. The
non-food and services consumption of the richest quintiles is two times higher than the one of the
poorest quintile.
In 2006, the share of food in consumption was 44% in urban and 59% in rural areas, lowering from
50% in urban and 68% in rural in 2000. Even though economic growth brought about a certain
change in consumption patterns, the gap between rural and urban remained important given that
the incomes are also smaller in rural areas (World Bank 2007).
Page 22
2.1.2 Wealth & debt inequality
There are no studies on wealth based on survey sources for Romania. The only sources of
information for wealth are Eurostat financial balance sheets (Credit Suisse report, 2010), being thus
an incomplete source of data for characterizing wealth inequality.
The study by Credit Suisse (2010) based on financial balance sheets shows that between 2000 and
2010, in Romania, along with other countries around the world like Australia, China, New Zealand,
Poland, the wealth is estimated to have tripled. Despite the increase in wealth from 2848USD in 2000
to 9661USD per capita, Romania is in the “lower middle income” group of countries with the second
lowest wealth per adult in EU after Latvia.
Debts increased from a remarkable low of 60USD in 2000 per adult to 2397USD per adult. To be
mentioned here that the high increase was possible due to the growing availability of bank loans,
especially after 2003, when the economic recovery and consequently more stable market conditions
encouraged both banks and population to contract credits. Romania has currently the lowest debt
per adult in EU.
2.1.3 Labour market inequality
In 2011 the total employment rate (15-64 years old) in Romania was 58.5%, well below the EU 27
average (64.3%) and much lower the developed western countries like the Netherlands (74.9%),
Sweden (74.1%) or Denmark (73.1%). Employment rates were similar to those in Italy (56.9%) and
Bulgaria (58.5%). From 1997 to 2001, employment rates declined continuously and fell more abruptly
in 2002, to remain rather stable to the present. The declining employment rates in early 2000s were
due to the accelerated reforms and economic restructuring, coupled with early retirement schemes.
Migration also influenced employment to a certain extent. For female labour force the drop in
employment was a bit sharper than for the male labour force (Figure 2.7). In 2011, female
employment rates, although lower than the EU average (58%), were higher than in countries like
Greece (45.1%), Italy (46.5%), Hungary (50.6%) and Malta (41%) (Eurostat, LFS data).
Employment rates declined for all age groups (Figure 2.8) in a similar way from 1997 to 2002, when a
significant drop was registered for older age groups (55-64), while for the younger work force (15-24)
the decline was rather steady. It has been explained (Zaman and Stanculescu 2007) that the early
retirement schemes along with the changing working environment can account for the changes
evident for the older work force. In this case, employees have not been sufficiently able to adapt to
Page 23
new challenges of market economy especially during the time of economic growth in early 2000s. For
younger age groups, increasing enrolment in higher education can explain the drop in activity rates.
Figure 2.7 Employment rates by gender
5
0,0
0
Males
Females
Total
2011
10,0
2010
10
2009
20,0
2008
15
2007
30,0
2006
20
2005
40,0
2004
25
2003
50,0
2002
30
2001
60,0
2000
35
1999
70,0
1998
40
1997
80,0
Gini
Source: Eurostat, LFS data
Figure 2.8 Employment rates by age
90,0
40
80,0
35
70,0
30
60,0
25
50,0
20
40,0
15
30,0
15-24
Page 24
25-54
55-64
Gini
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
0
2001
0,0
2000
5
1999
10,0
1998
10
1997
20,0
The employment rates of individuals with higher education (Figure 2.9) remained rather stable
during the time described by the data and even registered a small increase in 2004. Generally, those
with secondary education also have employment rates characterized by stability. Most important
decrease in employment rates was registered in early 2000s for those with low education. The
economic restructuring at the time seems to have impacted most on the less educated. On the one
hand, opportunities are less important for this category on the market, on the other hand, less
educated individuals are more strongly represented among older cohorts which went into early
retirement at a higher rate than the rest of the population (as also explained by Zaman and
Stanculescu 2007).
Figure 2.9 Employment rates by education
100,0
90,0
80,0
70,0
60,0
50,0
40,0
30,0
20,0
10,0
0,0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
levels 0-2
levels 3 and 4
levels 5 and 6
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
0
Gini
Employment rates also vary by region (Table 2.6), from a low 53.5% in the Centre to a high 64.3% in
Bucuresti-Ilfov region, reflecting disparities in development of the various regions and therefore the
different capacity to absorb the work force.
Page 25
Table 2.6 Employment rates by region
Employment rate
North West
57,7
Centre
53,5
North East
62
South East
55,5
South Muntenia
59,7
Bucuresti Ilfov
64,3
South West Oltenia
59,2
West
57,9
Source: NIS, Annual Statistical Yearbook, 2010
In regard to change in employment according to occupational categories (Table 2.7), several
occupational categories saw their numbers reduced over time: managers, technicians and associate
professionals, skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers, craft and related trades workers and
plant, machine operators and assemblers. Most of these changes are related to economic
restructuring. The occupational categories that saw their numbers increase are professionals, service
and sales workers and elementary occupations. In case of professionals, the expansion of higher
education can account for their rising numbers, while for service and sales workers, the change in
numbers reflects the increasing share in the economy of services.
Table 2.7 Change in employment according to occupational categories (ISCO) (thousands)
1998
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
Total employed persons
10.013,
3
9.538,5
8.723,4
8.592,3
8.637,3
8.764,5
8.675,8
8.960,6
Managers
278,0
232,9
252,6
255,6
241,7
224,6
170,2
195,3
Professionals
654,6
707,3
675,6
776,0
862,6
945,0
1.059,8
1.236,7
Technicians and associate
professionals
946,0
883,3
857,5
832,2
836,7
864,0
818,4
583,0
Clerical support workers
423,3
423,0
394,3
399,7
373,4
448,7
425,2
368,9
Service and sales workers
725,2
751,4
800,4
843,9
934,8
946,1
1.062,5
1.223,3
Skilled agricultural, forestry
and fishery workers
3.157,4
3.088,8
2.369,6
1.986,1
1.913,6
1.675,8
1.728,6
1.841,8
Craft and related trades
workers
2.039,9
1.783,3
1.720,9
1.579,6
1.506,3
1.523,5
1.407,6
1.506,1
Plant and machine
operators, and assemblers
1.061,4
972,1
973,2
1.058,4
985,6
1.056,9
955,4
935,4
Elementary occupations
727,5
696,5
679,4
860,8
907,5
1.003,9
982,9
988,8
Armed forces occupations
:
:
:
:
75,2
75,7
65,1
81,3
Source: Eurostat, LFS
Note: 1998, 2012 data is for trimester II, 2002-2010 data is for trimester IV
Page 26
A specific situation in regard to employment in Romania is represented by the Roma population. A
study undertaken in 2011 on Roma population proved that the Roma employment rate is much
lower than the national average, being situated at only 35.5% 11 (Preoteasa, 2012). The same study
showed that inequalities are related to gender, education, age and basic abilities (reading and
writing) while residence is not important. Employment rate is significantly higher for men (44.3%)
than for women (27.4%), for the higher educated (67%) in comparison to lower educated (33.6%),
and significantly lower for younger age groups (16-24) (28%) in comparison to those between 25 and
54 years old (39.3%).
In time, employment rates declined for this population: in 1992, 22% of the Roma (Zamfir and Zamfir
1993) were employed, whereas in 1998 the share of the employed in the Roma population was only
12.9% (Zamfir and Preda 2002). Currently, only 10% of the Roma (Preoteasa, 2012) declared being
permanently employed over the past two years. A combination of factors contribute to the
particularly difficult situation of Roma: the low level of education, low level of qualification and skills,
the tradition of specific jobs which do not match the current conditions on the labour market and the
discrimination faced from employers who generally offer less qualified jobs to Roma (Preoteasa
2010, Cace et al. 2010).
Unemployment
In 2011, unemployment rates were moderate in Romania (7.7%) and lower than the EU average
(9.7%). Unemployment rate for the youth (Table 2.8) is significantly higher than for other age groups
and economic crisis seems to have impacted heavily on this category (15-24) for which
unemployment rose significantly since 2008 to the present. Young people in Romania have a higher
unemployment rate than the EU average (21.3%), while the other age groups have lower
unemployment rates than the EU average.
In regard to education, higher unemployment rates are registered for the low educated, followed
closely by those with upper secondary and post-secondary education. In time, a significant increase
in unemployment rates is to be observed for the higher educated who show the highest growth
during the time described by data: from 2008 to 2011, their unemployment rates almost doubled.
This category was especially impacted during the time of the economic crisis, as a particular increase
in unemployment rates registered in 2009. This can be explained by the higher graduation rates from
11
Survey data, Soros, 2011
Page 27
tertiary education and the incapacity of the labour market to absorb the more educated labour force
during the crisis.
Higher unemployment rates for males than females probably originate in the economic restructuring
process, which affected to a higher extent the male workforce. In urban, unemployment are
considerably higher than in rural, as agriculture attracted an important segment of the jobless. In
2011, unemployment rate was 8.8 in urban and 5.5 in rural (NIS data). However, it was justified that
in the agricultural sector there is also a substantial hidden unemployment (Zaman and Stanculescu
2007).
Table 2.8 Unemployment rate 12 by age, education, gender and residence
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
6,0
6,2
6,9
7,7
7,3
8,8
7,4
8,1
7,5
7,6
6,8
6,1
7,2
7,6
7,7
15-24
17,4
16,8
17,3
17,8
17,6
22,2
19,5
22,3
20,2
21,4
20,1
18,6
20,8
22,1
23,7
25-54
4,5
4,9
5,8
6,9
6,3
7,3
6,2
6,4
6,4
6,4
5,6
5,0
6,1
6,4
6,4
55-64
0,9
0,5
0,9
1,1
1,7
1,5
1,9
3,3
2,4
2,6
2,3
2,5
3,0
3,3
3,7
levels 0-2
5,0
4,1
4,8
5,3
5,4
7,6
7,1
9,8
8,0
9,0
8,6
8,6
8,9
7,2
8,6
levels 3 and 4
7,6
7,7
8,5
9,5
8,6
10,0
8,2
8,4
8,1
7,9
6,9
6,0
7,3
8,3
8,1
levels 5 and 6
2,3
2,8
2,8
3,6
3,9
4,1
3,4
3,1
3,9
3,8
3,0
2,7
4,4
5,4
5,2
males
5,6
6,3
7,5
8,2
7,7
9,1
7,8
9,4
8,1
8,5
7,6
7,0
8,0
8,2
8,2
females
6,5
6,1
6,2
7,1
6,8
8,3
6,8
6,5
6,8
6,4
5,7
5,0
6,2
6,9
7,1
Total
Age
Education
Gender
Source: Eurostat, LFS data 1997-2010, for 2011 NIS (2011), LFS data
Wages
During the first years of transition, real monthly wages diminished abruptly and in 1993 they reached
58.9% of their 1990 level (Figure 2.10). A new record low was registered in 1996 when they were
only 56.2% of the 1990 level. They picked up slowly but it was only in 2007 that they superseded
their value in the first year of transition.
12
Unemployment rates figures differ between NIS and Eurostat
Page 28
Figure 2.10 Indices of real wages
140
120
112
100
100
80
60
82
71
59 59
67
73
62 64
56 58 57 59
71
78
90
97
130 128
124
40
35
30
25
20
15
40
10
20
5
0
0
Indices of real wages
Gini
Source: NIS, Statistical Yearbook, 2011
In 2006, according to Eurostat data, wages in Romania were among the most unequal in the EU: the
P90/P10 wage ratio in Romania (5.5) was the second highest in EU after Latvia (6). In the developed
countries of EU, the P90/P10 wage ratio was as low as 2.1 in Sweden, 2.3 in Finland and 2.4 in
Denmark.
At household level, wages represent an essential source of income, although their contribution to
total income of households remains low in Romania, at about half of the total income. In 2011,
wages represented 48.4% of the total incomes of households. For households where the head is
employed, wages represented 80.8% of their incomes while for households with the head working in
agriculture, wages constituted only 5.9% of their total incomes. Discrepancies are also evident by
residence: in urban wages are 62.9% of total incomes whereas in rural they represent only 26%. (NIS
2012a)
There are also discrepancies in the way they contribute to household income. In 2007 for the poorest
households (first decile) wages represented only 3.8% of their total income, the most important
income source for this category being incomes from social transfers (25.2%), followed by income
from agriculture (9.2%) and self-employment (5%). The most affluent households (tenth decile) relied
mostly on income from wages as they represented 74.5% of their total income and self-employment.
Income from social transfers constituted 7.3% of total income while non-agricultural selfemployment contributed with 2%.
The average net monthly wage varies by economy sectors. In 2010 (NIS data, Statistical Yearbook,
2011) the financial intermediation and insurance sector had wages far above the national average,
Page 29
more than double the national average and four times higher than the ones in the hotels and
restaurant sector. While education and health sectors have wages close to national average, other
sectors stand out with much higher wages than the average. The energy, mining and
telecommunication sectors have net monthly wages up to two times higher than the average.
A main policy concern has been for a long time the relationship between productivity and wages on
one hand and the disparities in wages between public and private sectors on the other hand. It was
showed (OECD 2000; Zaman and Stanculescu 2007) that many times in the public sectors wages
increased in no relation with productivity, like it was the case prior to election in 2004, and the
following two years, while in the private they generally kept up with productivity. An important wage
differential that maintained for an important part of the transition was that between some of the
former regie autonomes 13 and other public enterprises.
In state-owned companies and most regies autonomes, the lack of hard-budget limits and other
corporate-governance problems contributed to wages becoming out of line with productivity.
Several factors (OECD, 2000) accounted for the “soft” budget limits in these enterprises: political
interference in banks’ decisions, monopolistic pricing and tolerance of payment arrears. As a result,
enterprises could frequently continue to operate irrespective of heavy losses.
Currently, there is still a wage differential between public and private sectors in favour of public. In
2010 the average net wage was 1599RON in public and 1294RON in private sector, while the national
average was 1391RON). The differential lowered in 2010 in comparison to the previous year: the
wages in the public sector declined while those in the private sector increased. The decrease in the
public sector is explained by the 25% cuts in salaries in 2010. Moreover, in the beginning of 2010 the
law of unitary salaries was introduced, aimed at reducing the major discrepancies between the
various public sector categories of employees by introducing wage coefficients ranging on a scale
from 1 to 12. The differences private-public, even though lower in the present, still remain, although
they might be in reality a little lower than shown by the data, as in private sector, especially the small
and medium sized employees may underreport wages paid in order to minimise payroll taxes.
There is also a wage differential between men and women that tended to deepen a little between
2009 and 2010, which is generally explained by the participation of women in activities with lower
value added. The average net wage in 2010 was 1466RON in case of men and 1308 in case of
women.
13
State-owned enterprises organised as public utilities. At the end of 90s they started to be transformed into
corporations.
Page 30
2.1.4 Educational inequality
Romania went through a process of educational expansion in the 1960s similar to the other
European countries. The most important extension took place between 1960s and 1980s, while in
the last decade of the communist regime, the expansion stabilized. The proportion of population
attending school saw the highest increase between 1960/1961 and 1980/1981 when it grew from
17,2% in to 25%. The total number of schools grew from 23890 in 1960/1961 to 29766 in 1980/1981,
registering an increase of 25%. The proportion in total population of students attending higher
education also grew from 0.4% students in total population in 1960/1961 to 0.9% in 1980/1981
(based on NIS 14 data). However, higher education was very much kept under control by the
communist regime through “numerus clausus” principle. During the first decade of transition, the
population attending school started to contract due to lowering fertility, while the number of schools
also declined by the end of the decade.
After 1990, the most important positive development was the expansion of higher education through
the founding of new private universities and diversification of curricula in existing state universities.
The number of faculties increased 6 times over a decade, from 101 in 1989/1990 to 629 in
2010/2011. Enrolment rates in higher education grew from 27.7% in 2000/2001 to 53.6% in
2007/2008 when they reached their peak and have been on the decrease since 2009, reaching 45%
in 2009/2010 (Ministry of Education, 2008, 2010). The development of higher education was
beneficial for younger generations (Figure 2.11) as well as for the middle age generations who were
not able to get a degree in communist times due to the policy at the time. The higher educational
attainment of the 15-24 age group more than tripled between 2003 to 2011 and doubled for the 2534 group.
In recent years, the average years of education increased from 14.6 years 2000/2001 to 16.3 years in
2009/2010 (Ministry of Education 2010). This recent increase is mainly due to the expansion of
higher education.
14
Own calculations based on NIS data, Statistical Yearbooks
Page 31
Figure 2.11 Higher educational attainment by age
25,0
40
35
20,0
30
25
15,0
20
10,0
15
10
5,0
5
0,0
15-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-74
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
0
Gini
Source: Eurostat
Although higher education underwent an important extension, according to Eurostat data15, in 2011
in Romania the proportion in active population of persons with tertiary education was the lowest in
Europe, at 13%, and much lower than the EU average (23.6%).
15
Eurostat figures slightly differ from national ones. Table 2.8 includes national data that allows breakdown by
residence
Page 32
Table 2.9 Distribution of active population (15-64) by educational attainment and residence
Tertiary
Postsecondary
Upper secondary
Vocational
Lower secondary
Primary
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
total
9,5
10
10,5
10,6
12,1
12,7
13,7
14,6
15,4
16,4
urban
16
16,6
12,8
17,2
19,1
20,1
21,4
22,8
23,8
25,4
rural
2,1
2,3
6,6
2,6
2,8
2,9
3,2
3,5
3,8
4
total
4,7
4,8
4,9
4,5
4,8
4,8
4,8
4,6
4,4
4,2
urban
7,5
7,6
7,5
7
7
7,1
6,9
6,5
6,3
6
rural
1,6
1,7
4
1,6
1,9
1,9
1,9
1,9
1,9
1,6
total
32,8
32,7
32,4
32,5
32,2
32,3
33,3
33,7
33,1
33,9
urban
40,5
40,4
39,8
10
38,4
38,9
39,5
39,9
38,6
39,6
rural
24
23,8
17,5
23,3
24,1
23,6
24,7
25
25,7
26
total
24,3
25
26,1
26,5
26,9
27,1
26,7
26,4
26,1
24,3
urban
25,5
25,4
30,1
26
25,3
24,8
23,6
22,9
23,5
21,2
rural
23
24,5
26,4
27
29,1
30,2
31
31,2
29,9
28,6
total
20,5
20,2
20
20,5
18,5
18,1
17,4
16,8
17,4
18
urban
8,6
8,3
8,4
8,4
8,6
7,8
7,2
6,4
6,5
6,7
rural
34,1
33,8
33,8
35,1
31,6
31,6
31,3
31,2
32,5
33,5
total
8,2
7,3
6,1
8,3
5,5
5
4,1
3,9
3,6
3,3
urban
2
1,7
1,5
1,3
1,7
1,4
1,4
1,5
1,4
1,3
rural
15,3
13,8
11,6
10,4
10,5
9,8
7,9
7,3
6,6
6
Source: Ministry of Education, 2008, 2010, LFS data
Romania has a high proportion of early leavers 16 (Figure 2.12), currently 17,5%, higher than the EU
average (13.5%). In the EU, the proportion of early leavers varied in 2011 between 4.2% in Slovenia
and 26.5% in Spain.
16
Early leaver from education and training generally refers to a person aged 18 to 24 who has finished no more
than a lower secondary education and is not involved in further education or training
Page 33
Figure 2.12 Early leavers
25,0
21,5
20,0
22,9
21,7
40
23,0 22,5 22,4
19,7 19,1
35
19,6
17,9 17,3
18,4
15,9
16,6
17,5
30
25
15,0
20
10,0
15
10
5,0
5
0,0
Early leavers
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
0
Gini
Source: Eurostat
A series of inequalities characterize education in Romania, among which those determined by
income, residence and ethnicity are crucial.
Although public education is tax free, income introduces an important divide in education. A series of
costs are associated with education (transportation, clothing, meals, sometimes textbooks etc.).
These costs introduce a divide between low income families and the rest of the population in what
regards access to schools as the low income households can hardly afford all the mentioned costs.
Income becomes important also when looking at quality of education. Private tutoring is a
widespread model in Romania for those who can afford it. The purpose of private tutoring is to
prepare children for various school contests, supplement low quality education in some schools or
disciplines, prepare the children for evaluations and admissions etc. Consequently, those who cannot
afford private tutoring and rely on the public education system are disadvantaged in comparison to
the others. Moreover, the introduction in lower secondary of tax based school competitions which
count towards the children’s portfolio for high school admission (although it is not yet clear what
their role is) discriminate between children coming from low income families, who cannot afford to
pay the taxes for participation and the others who appear to have better chances in accessing high
schools.
Another important divide is the omnipresent rural/urban disparity that is evident in the various
indicators describing education in the two settings. While schools in urban areas generally have a
Page 34
better infrastructure, higher qualified staff and provide better opportunities for their students, those
in rural areas tend to illustrate the opposite.
The proportion of qualified personnel in urban areas during the last decade is significantly higher
than in urban. In the case of early education, the qualified personnel in 2009/2010 was 97% in urban
in comparison to 93.2% in rural areas while in the case of lower secondary, it was 98.7% in urban in
comparison to 95.6% in rural areas (Ministry of Education, 2010). There was an increasing trend in
time in hiring qualified personnel, while the gaps between the two settings tended to lower,
especially during the past years.
The students per teaching staff ratio also varies by residence: in 2009/2010 the ratio was 16 in urban
and 19 in rural in case of early education, while for primary education the ratio was 15 in rural and 19
in urban whereas for the other levels the differences are not significant.
Participation in education also varies by residence. In 2009/2010, participation rate in early
education in urban areas was 80.7% while in rural areas was 76%. In time, there was an increasing
trend in participation rates from 66.1% in 2000/2001 to 82.1% in 2009/2010, but the gap between
urban and rural areas remained relatively stable. Participation in lower secondary education,
although high (98.3%) in 2009/2010, also displays the same divide between residences: 106.4% 17 in
urban and 91.2% in rural areas. The gap becomes deeper in case of upper secondary education;
participation rate is 110.6% in urban and 81.9% in rural. Dropout rates are also higher in rural in
comparison to urban areas (Ministry of Education 2010).
Participation rates in higher education are more than double in urban (56.3%) than in rural areas
(27.2%). This pattern shows the significantly lower opportunities that rural areas provides to children
in comparison to urban areas all along their educational path. In fact, as showed by a study by Voicu
and Vasile (2010), a series of factors cumulate in rural that influence the decision to enrol in higher
education: values in the network of friends, distance to the university, the demand for higher
education graduates on the labour market and the quality of education at lower secondary level. To
this, we might add the lower standard of living in rural areas which impedes on choosing longer
educational paths by students and their families. The quoted study showed that expansion of higher
education in the ‘90s contributed to higher inequalities, but the years 2000 marked a diminishing of
quantitative access inequalities between residences.
The urban/rural divide is much more obvious when looking at the distribution of population by
educational attainment in rural and urban areas (Table 2.8). In 2009, only 4% of population living in
17
Percentages over one hundred are due to repeaters and children who go back school after temporary leaving
the system.
Page 35
rural had a university degree, while the percentage was 25.4 in urban areas. The divide maintains in
favour of urban for higher levels of education (upper secondary and postsecondary) and reverses for
lower levels of education (vocational, lower secondary and primary). For these lower levels, the
proportion of graduates is much higher in rural than in urban areas.
A study on Roma (Tarnovski 2012) showed that 20% of the children (6-16 years old) were not
enrolled in school. According to the study, illiteracy affects 25% of the Roma aged 16 and older, being
higher in rural, Roma compact communities and among women. Educational attainment, as showed
by the quoted study, is very low among Roma, as almost half either have no formal education or
graduated primary school, around one third graduated lower secondary education while only 15%
have upper secondary education. Those with a university degree are only 1%.
A series of vulnerable groups of children face more important problems in regard to participation in
education. A study dedicated to risks and inequalities (Preda 2009) highlighted several vulnerable
groups: children coming from disadvantaged families, Roma children, HIV infected or children with
special educational needs. A complex array of factors can account for their limited access to
education. In case of poor children and Roma, the characteristics of communities in which they live
impact on their integration in schools: poor development of educational infrastructure or distance to
schools, inadequate transportation facilities, lack of positive models in their community of origin etc.
The quoted report showed in the case of Roma children that school segregation influences school
performance, while further barriers to successful integration are the cultural orientations of Roma, as
well as discrimination on the part of schools and society in general. The low participation in
education of HIV infected children and of those with special educational needs are largely
determined by the culture of the educational organization and teachers, inappropriate facilities for
disabled persons, a low number of places in early education system that doesn’t allow full
participation of children.
Transition to labour market is rather difficult in Romania and is evident in the high unemployment
rate of young population which is 23.5% for the age group 15-24 much higher than the 7.4% rate at
national level (NIS, 2011 data). There is a sort of asymmetry between the education system and the
modern requirements of the labour market, as the education system is not flexibly adapted to the
needs of labour market. Most of the explanations converge towards the idea that the many reforms
of the education system did not achieve their goals and the system continues to follow old ways. To
the mismatch between supply and demand contributes the low participation in adult training in
Romania in comparison to other European countries. In 2011, only 1.6% of 25-64 year olds have
received education or training, compared to a an EU27 average of 8.9%. The skills gap in the labour
Page 36
market is also influenced by the emphasis for a relatively long time on vocational education at the
secondary level and the relatively modest coverage of higher education (World Bank 2008).
Returns to education
Romania is characterized by low returns to education and even though an increasing trend in time is
noticeable, the growth is still modest. A report by the World Bank (2008) showed that average
returns to one year of schooling are less than 6% in Romania in comparison to over 10% worldwide.
Returns to schooling are low for those with less-than-tertiary education, especially for the graduates
of vocational secondary schools who are working in the private sector. The report reveals that poor
children are more likely to be directed into low-return education paths (namely vocational schools),
while wealthy children are more likely to attend general secondary and tertiary education
institutions. This has obvious implications for the reproduction of inequality. For tertiary education,
returns to education are significantly higher (also visible in Table 2.11), earnings being 55% higher
than in case of basic education (Table 2.12), even though they are still significantly lower than in
other countries of the World (World Bank 2008).
Table 2.11 Returns to schooling in urban Romania
Data source: World Bank, 2008, HBS data
Page 37
Note: Robust t-statistics in parantheses ***significant at 1%
Table 2.12 Monthly earnings (EUR), 2002
Pre-primary, primary
and lower secondary
education (levels 0-2)
Upper secondary
education (level 3)
Post-secondary nontertiary education (level
4)
First and second stage of
tertiary education (levels
5 and 6)
125,10
158,77
214,83
349,21
Source: Eurostat, Structure of Earnings Survey 2002
Conclusions
Why has inequality grown? The ‘national story’ of evolving inequality drivers
The context of transition: shaping long lasting inequalities
The communist regime aimed at comprehensive development and at an egalitarian society in
Romania. However, although aiming at social equality, communism only accomplished to generate a
process of “homogeneity in poverty” (Marginean, 2004: 64).
During transition from communism to democracy and capitalism, important drivers of inequality
have been generated. Economic restructuring consisting in a large process of deindustrialisation and
privatisation of agriculture coupled with the fall of former communist markets largely defined the
first decade of economic transition in Romania.
It is largely acknowledged that Romania embarked on a slow and painful path of transformation. The
structural reforms have been gradual and have been accompanied by high social costs. Apart from
the poor communist legacy, the sluggish rhythm of reforms is considered key to economic decline,
rising poverty and inequality.
During the first decade of transition, absolute poverty increased tremendously from 5.7% 18 in 1990
to 35.9% in 2000 when it reached its peak. Income inequality also grew to a high extent and by 2000
it rose by more than 70% above its 1990 level. Romania went from a relatively egalitarian country to
one of the most unequal countries in Europe. Employment decreased due to economic restructuring
and early retirement schemes and the number of employees reduced from 8.1 million in 1990 to 4.6
million in 2000 (NIS data).
As part of the general strenuous reform, privatisation of large state assets was intricate, lingering and
not transparent. In fact, it was characterized at the time as insider privatization, asset stripping and
18
MLFSP, 2010, HBS data
Page 38
nomenklatura privatization (Tanzi, 1998). The transfer of ownership from state to private owners
created important opportunities for the concentration of resources in the hands of a small elite. This
has been one of the major factors leading to the formation of large private wealth.
Corruption plagued the process of privatization and continued to diversify and amplify during
transition in many spheres of society, turning into a factor that contributed to deepening inequality.
State capture (Hellman et al, 2000) created unjustified privileges, and produced misbalanced outputs
in society. Public positions have been used many times to the extent that people occupying these
positions legislated in favour of specific interests or overlooked the legal requirements in order to
fulfil private interests (Precupetu, 2012). Well into transition, legislating in favour of special interests
took many forms like passing special pieces of legislation for special pensions, for creating
advantages in the process of privatization or for awarding contracts or licences.
Privatisation of agriculture has generated a distributionally favourable impact (Cornia 2002).
However, land restitution, usually small parcels of land, has led to the emergence of a large,
unproductive, fragmented agricultural sector dominated by a subsistence type of farming.
Agriculture accounts today for about 30% of total employment 19 (NIS data) while the rural
population is 45%. Nevertheless, subsistence agriculture served as a safety valve for numerous
households, both for the rural population and for those coming from urban areas who lost their jobs
during the restructuring process of the industry. The high agricultural potential of the country has
not been realised yet and the subsistence model perpetuated to today. The role of subsistence
agriculture is to be seen in the high proportion of own consumption in Romania and in the lessening
effect that is has on inequality.
Informal economy grew to a high extent and was estimated for 2001 at 25-28% of the GDP 20 (Albu
2003). Between 1 and 2 million persons were estimated to work in the shadow economy 21 in 2008.
Subsistence agriculture and informal economy constituted at individual and household level
successful surviving strategies for those affected by recession. “Informal cash earnings have
deepened inequality, however; in the informal sector, the rich are becoming richer, while the poor
are only managing to obtain the bare necessities” (Zaman and Stanculescu 2007, 24). In the short and
long term, informal economy means, especially for the poor, less security in what regards their
future earnings at retirement.
19
Involvement in small scale farming might be underreported
Estimations vary a lot according to source and measurement method. Estimations go up to as much as 37.4%
of GDP (Schneider, 2005)
21
Strategic national report regarding social protection and social inclusion, 2008-2010
20
Page 39
Emigration, and especially its more recent form, emigration for work produced heavy imbalances in
the Romanian workforce. Currently, it is estimated that 3 million people work abroad (OECD, 2012).
Emigration is selective in terms of education and regions. Data suggest that the percentage of
university graduates having left Romania for good rose from 6% in 1990 to 23% in 2000 while in
regard to regions migration was concentrated more in western and eastern regions of the country
(UNDP, 2005). Although generally contributing to increasing life standards, emigration also
exacerbated the existing inequalities.
In case of Roma, the transition process affected this population to a greater extent than the majority.
Being less educated and less qualified, they were among the first to lose their jobs in the economic
restructuring. Enrolment in education decreased while the emerging segregation patterns of schools
did not help in their social inclusion. The low opportunities on the labour market, the traditional
outdated occupations, the cultural models and the discrimination they are subject to, all contributed
to a trend of social marginalization of Roma.
Through the difficult times, social policy did not compensate for the negative effects of transition. On
the contrary, over the periods of crisis/recession in the first decade of transformation, the social
expenditure tended to lower and “the public sector seemed the first one to be sacrificed” (Zamfir et
al. 2010, 15).
All these factors either created new inequalities or contributed to the deepening of the existing ones.
Today, a series of inequalities characterize Romania: inequalities between a small elite of very rich
and a large group of poor people, between several large developed cities and the rest of the country,
between rural and urban areas, between big cities and small, former mono-industrial small towns,
between large villages and small, poor, aged, peripheral villages, as well as between various regions
of the country. Moreover, transition created new opportunities for some categories while
considerably lowered prospects for others. A certain stratification of life chances by age, education,
employment status has emerged and widen in time, as showed in detail below.
Currently, inequalities seem to be deeply entrenched and tend to perpetuate
Today, there is no evidence that the existing gaps tend to lower. Currently, Romania has the lowest
median equivalised income in the EU, less than half of the EU12 average and around ten times
smaller than that of some developed western countries like Netherlands or Austria. Even though very
poor, Romania ranks the fifth in the EU in regard to income inequality. While in 1990 the value of the
Gini coefficient was placing this country at the level of Sweden, by 2007 Romania had become the
most unequal country in Europe according to the value of the same coefficient. Although Romania
Page 40
was an egalitarian country under communism, it was characterised by equality at a very low level of
income and the population was generally poor and impoverished. Today, this country displays high
levels of inequality while incomes continue to remain very low.
In Romania, own consumption played, and continues to play, an important role in reducing poverty
and lessening inequality, especially throughout the time of economic recession. Subsistence
agriculture represents an important means that contributes to the households’ budgets and helps to
maintain some households barely above the poverty line and, furthermore, is a factor in decreasing
income inequality.
Poverty continues to remain one the crucial problems of the country 22. In 2010, Romania ranked the
second highest in the EU in regard to relative poverty rates, after Lithuania. Having one of the lowest
relative poverty thresholds in EU, Romania had in 2010 a risk of poverty rate of 17.2%. Absolute
poverty affected in 2010 a number of 1.110.000 people.
Most exposed to poverty risks are children, youth, households with dependent children (especially
those with three or more children), single persons and single persons with dependent children, the
unemployed, the self-employed in agriculture and low educated people. In 2010, the poverty risk of
persons under 18 was almost two times higher than that of persons of 65 years and over. Children
and youth (under 30) represent almost half of the number of people in absolute poverty. Households
with dependent children face a significantly higher risk of poverty than those without children. Most
exposed to poverty are the households of two adults with three or more children and in 2010, in
Romania, at risk poverty for households with three or more dependent children was the second
highest in Europe after Bulgaria and was more than two times higher than the EU27 average.
Unemployed people face a risk of poverty almost three times higher than the employed and maintain
high and relatively stable risks over time. However, the self-employed in agriculture seem to be most
exposed to absolute poverty.
Inequalities are marked in Romania not only by individual and households characteristics but also by
rural/urban and development region. In 2010 the gap between rural and urban areas was important
as the absolute poverty was four times higher in rural than in urban areas. In Romania pockets of
poverty are concentrated mostly in rural areas as 76.7% of the poor are living in rural and only 23.3%
live in urban areas. In time, the gap between the two areas tended to deepen: in 2000 the absolute
poverty in rural areas was less than 2 times higher than in urban areas, while in 2010 it was 4 times
higher. The pattern (Zaman and Stanculescu, 2009) was that, even though the rural population has
22
At risk of poverty rates come from Eurostat, EU SILC data, absolute poverty rates come from MLFSP, 2010,
HBS data
Page 41
been less affected by recession, the urban population has tended to gain to higher extent from
recovery.
Important disparities appear between regions. The poorest region (North-East) has poverty rates
fivefold higher in comparison to the richest one (Bucharest – Ilfov). The ratio is even bigger
(eightfold) according to absolute poverty rates. Some of the disparities have deepened in time, even
in times of economic growth, when poverty decreased. For example, in the period 2003-2006 the
West region registered a 62% drop in the number of poor, in the South the number of poor was
reduced by more than half, while in the Centre region the decrease was much lower, of only 34%.
The differences in the pace of poverty reduction have led to increasing regional disparities (World
Bank 2007).
Roma represent a deep pocket of poverty as in 2010 their absolute poverty rate was 31.4% in
comparison to that of the Romanian population of 4.4%. The gap between Roma and the Romanian
poverty risk, whereas in 2010 was more than 7 times higher.
Employment rates are low in Romania: in 2011 total employment rate (15-64 years old) in Romania
was 58.5%, well below the EU 27 average (64.3%) and much lower than the developed western
countries like the Netherlands (74.9%), Sweden (74.1%) or Denmark (73.1%). From 1997 to 2001,
employment rates declined continuously and fell more abruptly in 2002, to remain rather stable to
the present. The declining employment rates in early 2000s were due to the accelerated reforms and
economic restructuring, coupled with early retirement schemes. Migration also influenced
employment to a certain extent. The older age groups (55-64), the female labour force displayed,
those with low education experienced more important declines in employment rates, while for
younger work force (15-24) the decline was rather steady.
In term of regions, employment rates vary from a low 53.5% in the Centre to a high 64.3% in
Bucuresti-Ilfov region, reflecting once again disparities in development of the various regions and
therefore the different capacity to absorb the work force.
Roma population is picturing again a difficult situation. Roma employment rate is much lower than
the national average, being situated at only 35.5% 23 while inequalities are related to gender,
education, age and basic abilities (reading and writing). The employment rate is significantly higher
for men (44.3%) than for women (27.4%), for the higher educated (67%) in comparison to lower
educated (33.6%), and significantly lower for younger age groups (16-24) (28%) in comparison to
23
Survey data, Soros, 2011
Page 42
those between 25 and 54 years old (39.3%) (Preoteasa, 2012). A combination of factors contribute to
particularly difficult situation of Roma: the low level of education, low level of qualification and skills,
the tradition of specific jobs which do not match the current conditions on the labour market and the
discrimination faced from employers who generally offer less qualified jobs to Roma (Preoteasa
2010, Cace et al. 2010).
High unemployment rates display the youth, the low educated, males in comparison to females,
urban areas in comparison to rural ones. An interesting case is represented by the higher educated
as during the past three years their unemployment rate almost doubled. They seem to have been
impacted more during the time of the economic crisis. This can be explained by the higher
graduation rates from tertiary education and the incapacity of the labour market to absorb the more
educated labour force during the crisis. Higher unemployment rates for males than females probably
originate in the economic restructuring process, which affected to a higher extent the male
workforce. In urban areas, unemployment is considerably higher than in rural areas, as agriculture
accommodated an important segment of the jobless. However, it was justified that in the agricultural
sector there is also substantial hidden unemployment (Zaman and Stanculescu 2007).
Real wages suffered a dramatic reduction during the transition as in 1996 they reached 56.2% of
their 1990 level. It took 17 years into transition to recover to their value in the first year of transition.
Moreover, wages in Romania are among the most unequal in EU: in 2006 the P90/P10 wage ratio
was 5.5 in Romania while in other countries of the EU the ratio was as low as 2.1 in Sweden and 2.3
in Finland.
Wages represent an essential source of income at household level although their contribution to
total income of households remains low in Romania, at about half of the total income. Their
contribution to household income is important for the employed, for those living in urban areas, and
for the most affluent households. Disparities in wages maintain currently between economic sectors,
public and private sectors and by gender.
A series of inequalities characterize education in Romania, among which those determined by
income, residence and ethnicity are crucial.
Income introduces an important divide in education, even though public education is tax free. The
costs associated with education (transportation, clothing, meals, sometimes textbooks etc.)
introduce a divide between low income families and the rest of the population in regard to access to
school. Income becomes important also when looking at the quality of education. Private tutoring, a
widespread model in Romania, supplements low quality education in some schools or disciplines,
prepares the children for evaluations and admissions etc. Consequently, those who cannot afford
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private tutoring and rely on the public education system are disadvantaged in comparison to the
others. Moreover, the introduction in lower secondary of tax based school contests which count
towards the children’s portfolio for high school admission (although it is not yet clear what their role
is) discriminate between children coming from low income families, who cannot afford to pay the
taxes for participation and the others who appear to have better chances in accessing high schools.
Another important divide is the omnipresent rural/urban disparity. While schools in urban areas
generally have a better infrastructure, higher qualified staff and provide better opportunities for
their students, those in rural areas tend to illustrate the opposite. Participation in education is
significantly higher in urban than in rural areas and is especially deep for higher levels of education:
upper secondary and tertiary. Participation rates in higher education are more than double in urban
(56.3%) than in rural areas (27.2%). Rural residence seems to provide lower educational
opportunities to children all along their educational path.
Rural populations also have a generally lower education, which further impedes on its development:
in 2009, only 4% of population living in rural areas had a university degree, while the percentage was
25.4 in urban areas.
Roma children are disadvantaged in comparison to others. In 2011, 20% of the Roma children (6-16
years old) were not enrolled in school. Illiteracy affects 25% of the Roma aged 16 and older, being
higher in rural areas, Roma compact communities and among women. Educational attainment is very
low among Roma, as almost half either have no formal education or graduated from primary school,
around one third graduated from lower secondary education while only 15% have upper secondary
education. Those with a university degree are only 1% (Tarnovski 2012).
Other vulnerable groups of children face important problems in regard to participation in education:
children coming from disadvantaged families, HIV infected or children with special educational needs
(Preda 2009).
Transition to the labour market is rather difficult in Romania and is evident in the high
unemployment rate of the young population which in 2011 was 23.5% for the age group 15-24 much
higher than the 7.4% rate at national level (NIS 2012). There is a sort of asymmetry between the
education system and the modern requirements of the labour market, as the education system is not
flexibly adapted to the needs of the labour market. To this misfit contributes the low participation in
adult training in Romania in comparison to other European countries. The skills gap in the labour
markets comes also from the emphasis for a relatively long time on vocational education at the
secondary level and the relatively modest coverage of higher education (World Bank 2008).
Page 44
Romania is characterized by low returns to education and even though an increasing trend in time is
noticeable, the growth is still modest. Returns to schooling are low for those with less-than-tertiary
education, especially for the graduates of vocational secondary schools who are working in the
private sector. Poor children are more likely to be directed into low-return education paths (namely
vocational schools), while wealthy children are more likely to attend general secondary and tertiary
education institutions. This has obvious implications for the reproduction of inequality. For tertiary
education, returns to education are higher, but they are still significantly lower than in other
countries (World Bank 2008).
Page 45
Page 46
3. The Social Impacts of Inequality
3.1. Introduction
This chapter is dedicated to the potential social impacts of inequalities in Romania. It is an endeavour
to include a large array of social dimensions by describing their current layout and trends over time.
The goal of this section is to scrutinize whether the increasing income inequality during the past two
decades in Romania (as shown in Chapter 2) was accompanied by a rise in negative social impacts as
some scholars proposed (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). This relationship is not tested as such, but we
rather look at trends over time and rely on data and literature to understand the divisions between
social groups that characterize the social set up of Romania in the main social domains. We start with
material deprivation (3.2), cumulative disadvantage and multidimensional measures of poverty and
social exclusion (3.3) patterns and trends in housing (3.7). Following, the chapter treats social
cohesion and social capital (3.4), family formation and breakdown, lone parenthood and fertility
(3.5), health inequalities (3.6), crime and punishment (3.8), subjective well‐being (3.9) and
intergenerational mobility (3.10).
The data used rely on both national and international sources. Eurostat is mainly used to compare
Romania to other countries in Europe and EU averages. Time series are sometimes shorter for
Romania than in other European countries as is the case with EU-SILC that was implemented only in
2007 in the country. National sources of statistical data (NIS) are also employed, while national
surveys provide us with trends in time and specific information on the country. Quality of life
Diagnosis, a national survey, provided us with subjective indicators as a continuous time series for
1990-1999 and then as measurement at every three-four years: 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010.
International surveys like Eurobarometer and European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) 2003 and 2007
were used to provide data for subjective well-being.
The comparisons are made, based on data, with individual countries in the EU mainly those who are
at the extremes, either positive or negative. Comparisons are also made to EU averages, mostly
EU27, EU15 and NMS12.
3.2. Material deprivation
Material deprivation proposes a multidimensional perspective of poverty by going beyond the
limited income measure and capturing the inability of people to participate in their society due to
Page 47
lack of resources. This perspective is especially fruitful when using a comparative perspective and
particularly when aiming at describing living standards across countries which are very diverse in
term of affluence as is the case in the EU (Whelan and Maitre 2012).
Material deprivation comprises the enforced lack of items that are customary in a certain society at a
certain point in time, that people would like to possess (have access to) but cannot afford them.
(Eurostat 2010)
The Eurostat material deprivation rate is calculated on the basis of EU-SILC data and is based on the
following 9 items: 1. to face unexpected expenses; 2. one week annual holiday away from home; 3.
to pay for arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase instalments); 4. a meal with meat,
chicken or fish every second day; 5. to keep home adequately warm; 6. to have a washing machine;
7. to have a colour TV; 8. to have a telephone; 9. to have a personal car. People who are materially
deprived cannot afford at least three items in the list. Material deprivation rate was calculated for
Romania starting with 2007, when EUSILC was implemented in this country.
Table 3.1 presents the levels of material deprivation in Romania in comparison to EU averages.
Romania has the second highest deprivation rate in the EU, after Bulgaria: around half of the
population lacks at least three items. Although between 2007 and 2010 deprivation rate slightly
decreased, Romania still maintains its top ranking in the EU. Material deprivation rate is almost three
times higher than the average of EU27 and around 4 times and a half than that of more advanced
countries like Germany (11.1%) or Austria (10.7%).
This indicator speaks of the low standard of living in Romania as well as the low degree of
modernization in this country: with a high proportion of underdeveloped rural countryside, it is
expected that this setting has a heavy contribution to the high material deprivation rate.
The period described by the data was at the household level a time of accumulation (especially
between 2007 and 2009) for a population that was generally materially deprived in comparison to
the standard of the developed countries. The gap that separates Romania from the developed
countries of EU still remains huge.
Over the time described by the data, 2007-2008 was a period of economic growth, while 2009
marked a significant decrease in the economic output as the crisis reached Romania. At household
level, the crisis started to bear effects in 2010. Income inequality steadily decreased over this period
of time.
Page 48
Table 3.1 Material deprivation rate
2007
2008
2009
2010
Romania
53,3
50,3
49,3
49,2
EU27
17,9
17,3
17,1
17,5
EU15
12,0
12,5
12,5
13,0
NMS12
40,4
35,4
34,5
34,6
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC)
Note: Lack of 3 items or more
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 include severe material deprivation rates. The indicator of severe material
deprivation is defined in terms of households being deprived of any four of the nine items. This
measure has been included, along with the risk of poverty and jobless households, as one of the
Europe 2020 headline targets to indicate progress towards reducing poverty and social exclusion.
Severe material deprivation rate is lowest for the age category between 18 and 64 years old. Over
time, a slight but significant decrease in severe deprivation rates registered for those over 65 years
old.
Figure 3.1 Material deprivation rate and severe material deprivation rate
40
60
35
50
30
40
25
20
30
15
20
10
10
5
0
0
2007
2008
Material deprivation rate
2009
Severe material deprivation rate
2010
GINI
Page 49
Figure 3.2 Severe material deprivation rate by age
60
35
50
30
40
25
30
20
15
20
10
10
5
0
0
2007
less than 18 years
2008
18-64 years
2009
65 years and over
2010
Gini
Source: Eurostat, (EU-SILC)
Severe material deprivation varies to a great extent by household type (Table 3.2), being significantly
higher for single persons, single persons with dependent children and couples with three or more
dependent children. Although the general trend between 2007 and 2010 was a decrease in severe
material deprivation, for couples with at least three children, the trend was reversed as severe
material deprivation registered an increase. The number of children significantly adds to deprivation,
being one the most important factors of poverty in Romania.
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Table 3.2 Severe material deprivation rate by household type
Household type
2007
2008
2009
2010
single person
54.2
43,5
39,6
40,4
two adults, younger than 65
29.4
25,5
23,0
22,7
two adults, at least one aged 65 or
older
49.0
36,2
30,7
30,3
three or more adults
31.6
28,8
27,5
27,3
single person with dependent
children
54.9
53,5
51,4
42,0
two adults with one dependent
child
23.2
21,1
21,4
24,7
two adults with two dependent
children
30.9
27,0
25,8
24,8
two adults with three or more
children
57,6
57,6
60,4
62,8
three or more adults with
dependent children
37.3
35,7
37,1
33,1
Households without dependent
children
Households with dependent
children
The level of severe material deprivation varies by income quintile (Figure 3.3), with the fifth quintile
having deprivation levels similar with the total material deprivation rates of the developed countries
in the EU and the first quintile facing extremely high deprivation levels, reaching over 70% in 2007.
However, for the poorest two quintiles, a small but significant decrease took place between 2007
and 2010, even though deprivation levels remain very high.
Page 51
Figure 3.3 Severe deprivation rate by income quintile
80,0
40
70,0
35
60,0
30
50,0
25
40,0
20
30,0
15
20,0
10
10,0
5
0,0
0
2007
First quintile
Fourth quintile
2008
2009
Second quintile
Fifth quintile
2010
Third quintile
Gini
Notes: Income is equivalised disposable household income
As expected severe deprivation rates are highest among the low educated. In time though, the rates
decreased for this category by 10 percentage points.
Figure 3.4 Severe deprivation rate by education
40
60,0
35
50,0
30
40,0
25
20
30,0
15
20,0
10
10,0
5
0,0
0
2007
2008
ISCED 0-2
Page 52
2009
ISCED 3-4
ISCED 5-6
2010
Gini
3.3 Cumulative disadvantage and multidimensional measures of poverty and social
exclusion
Poverty risk and vulnerability
Relative poverty, calculated by using a threshold fixed at 60% of the national annual median
disposable income was 21.1% in 2010 (Eurostat data) and showed little change since 2000 to the
present. The most vulnerable groups 24 in Romania, in regard to age, are children and youth. When
looking at household type, households with dependent children face a significantly higher risk of
poverty than those without children, while most exposed to poverty are the households of two
adults with three or more children.
When taking into consideration the activity status, the unemployed and other inactive people have
high poverty rates. Absolute poverty figures reveal that the self-employed in agriculture are also a
vulnerable group, representing the highest share of the number of people in absolute poverty.
In this section, we present trends in two indicators of poverty of risk and vulnerability: arrears of
payment and difficulties to make ends meet.
In 2010, Romania had the third highest proportion in the EU of the population in arrears of payment:
29.8%. Similar percentages had Bulgaria (33.8) and Greece (30.9%). At the other end of the scale,
Netherlands and Germany only had 4.9% of their respective population in arrears of payment.
Between 2007 and 2010 (Figure 3.4), in only 4 years, the percentage of population in arrears of
payment increased three times in Romania. While most of the countries in the EU experienced a
relative stability for this indicator, Romania experienced the highest increase in the union. This can
be explained through a significant rise in availability of bank loans for homes and consumer goods
and a consequent growth in the number of mortgages and credits as well as by the consequences at
household level of the economic contraction of 2009-2010. As expected, income differentiates in
arrears of payment between those living in relative poverty and those who are not.
24
Chapter 2 details trends in at poverty risks and also describes in more depth vulnerable groups.
Page 53
Figure 3.5 Arrears (mortgage or rent, utility bills or hire purchase) by income threshold
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
2007
2008
Below 60% of median equivalised income
Total
2009
2010
Above 60% of median equivalised income
Gini
Figure 3.6 presents data for inability to make ends meet. Around one fourth of the population had
great difficulties to make ends meet in 2010 in Romania, which placed the country next to Hungary
(25.3%), Greece (24.2%) and Portugal (20.3%) but well below Germany (2.8%) and Luxembourg
(1.9%). In time, during 2007 and 2010, the gap between Romania and other countries in the EU seem
to narrow a little in regard to inability to make ends meet. As expected, there is a great disparity
between those below 60% of median equivalised income and those that are above.
Page 54
Figure 3.6 Inability to make ends meet by income threshold
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total
Gini
Note: Households making ends meet “with great difficulty”
EU 2020 target
At risk of poverty or social exclusion, according to the definition adopted for the Europe 2020
strategy, is the share of the population in at least one of the following three conditions: 1) at risk of
poverty, meaning below the poverty threshold, 2) in a situation of severe material deprivation
(lacking at least four items covering from the list detailed above), 3) living in a household with a very
low work intensity (people aged 0-59 living in households where the adults work less than 20% of
their total work potential during the past year).
Romania and Bulgaria (41.6%) had in 2010 the highest proportion of population at risk of poverty and
social exclusion in the EU. Romania has a rate of at risk of poverty or social exclusion (Table 3.3)
almost twice as high as the average of EU27. Between 2007 and 2010, the rate steadily decreased to
a certain extent, without making an impact on the gap between this country and the more affluent
countries in the EU.
Page 55
Table 3.3 At risk of poverty or social exclusion (EU 2020 target)
2007
2008
2009
2010
Romania
45.9
44.2
43.1
41.4
EU27
24.4
23.5
23.1
23.4
EU15
21.6
21.4
21.2
21.7
NMS12
35.0
31.2
30.6
30.2
Source: Eurostat (EU-SILC, EU 2020 target).
A very clear social differentiation is evident in data with regard to both incomes and education.
In regard to variation by incomes, Romania shares the model of Latvia, Bulgaria and Greece where all
the people in the first quintile are at risk of poverty or social exclusion. For the category with smallest
incomes, the situation remained stable during the period covered by data. The poorest segment of
population differentiates greatly from the next category, the second quintile, where situation is
better and slightly improved in time (Figure 3.7).
Figure 3.7 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by income quintile
40
120
35
100
30
80
25
60
20
15
40
10
20
5
0
0
2007
First quintile
2008
Second quintile
Third quintile
2009
Fourth quintile
2010
Fifth quintile
Gini
The EU2020 target varies by education level (Figure 3.8), as expected, and the data clearly shows that
the better educated are also better off. A little decline in time is observed for the least educated
category of population.
Page 56
Figure 3.8 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by education
80
40
70
35
60
30
50
25
40
20
30
15
20
10
10
5
0
0
2007
2008
ISCED 0-2
2009
ISCED 3-4
ISCED 5-6
2010
Gini
3.5 Social cohesion and social capital
The concept of social cohesion incorporates two dimensions which are analytically distinct (BergerSchmitt, 2002):
-
the first one concerns the reduction of inequalities, disparities and social exclusion;
-
the second dimension refers to the strengthening of social relations, interactions and ties.
This refers to the components of social capital.
Social cohesion and social capital are closely connected as the social capital of a certain society is
underpinning all efforts aiming at the reduction of inequality and thus is furthering more equal
societies through solidarity among their members.
Social capital includes features of society like relationships and interactions, reciprocal feelings of
trust and commitment based on common norms and values, a consequent sense of belonging and
solidarity that makes the glue of a community or an entire society.
Putnam, who largely founded the current approach of social capital, after the concept had been
earlier given prominence by Bourdieu, defined social capital as ‘’features of social organisation like
networks, norms and trust that facilitate cooperation and coordination for the mutual benefit’’
(Putnam, 1993a: 23). Coleman, another prominent author in the field, used a more extended and
general approach, considering social capital as a variety of different entities that have two elements
in common: “they consist of some aspect of social structure and they facilitate certain actions of
actors - whether personal or corporate - within the structure” (Coleman 1988, 98). The same author
distinguished between social capital within the family and social capital outside the family, while also
Page 57
considering the quality of social capital as a public good. A series of authors (Putnam 1994, Coleman
1988, Narayan 1999, Voicu 2010) pointed out to the relationship between social capital and the wellbeing of a social entity, either community or society. Social capital is considered to contribute to
general improvements in society in various welfare domains like health, education, environment or
reduction of crime.
The main bulk of literature takes into consideration three dimensions of social capital:
-
interpersonal relations among family members, within kinship group, among friends etc.;
-
civic engagement and participation in voluntary organisations;
-
generalised trust in people and trust in institutions.
In regard to social relationships, Romania has been described as a country characterized by
‘’bonding” relations, mainly developed within the family and kinship groups, being thus a rather
traditional country in this respect (Precupetu, 2007). In Romania, ‘’both involvement in networks of
friends and trust in people, minority groups or institutions display lower levels in comparison to
other European societies. Moreover, networks of useful relations are rather scarce’’ (Voicu 2005,
159).
For Romania, a series of authors (Marginean 2006, Voicu 2005, Sandu 1999) showed that social
relationships have been shaped by the communist heritage characterised by high distrust in others
outside primary groups, in social institutions and by the subsequent social isolation. Moreover,
Romania is a country with no historical tradition of civil society that has tried during transition to
build this sector from scratch. “Communist period furthered atomisation processes, cultivated
suspicion and lack of transparency, while social order was based not on trust but on institutional
fear. Socialism acted as a factor of anti-modernization” (Sandu 1999).
In fact, Romania shares the model of the other post-communist countries which also exhibit low
levels of bridging social capital (connecting relationships, outside the primary groups) (Bădescu and
Uslaner 2003, Voicu 2005).
Voicu (2010) tested the influence of communist past on bridging social capital in Eastern European
countries. The author confirmed through his analysis the presence of a certain negative effect of the
communist rule on the frequency of meeting friends and trust in institutions. He discovered that the
residents of the Eastern European countries tend to meet their friends less often than Western
Europeans while they also have a lower level of trust in institutions (Voicu 2010).
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Generalised trust 25 placed Romania in the 2008 EVS study 26 among other countries in EU with low
trust in people: Bulgaria (18%), Hungary (21%), Portugal (20%). In Romania only 18% declared that
most people can be trusted, while in western countries trust in people is more widespread and goes
up to 76% in Denmark and 70% in Sweden. It should be noted though, that trust varies to a great
extent for western countries, while in eastern countries the levels of trust tend to be generally low.
The frequency of social contacts is low, as described by the data (Figure 3.9). Over time, the trend in
the levels of social contact was described by small fluctuations, while in the recent past (from 2003 to
2010), which was a little bit more prosperous economically, significant increase was registered.
Membership in associations is also low in Romania, as shown by Voicu (2010), only 8% of Romanians
were part of at least one association, this being the lowest proportion of participation in Europe 27.
This can be explained by a series of factors, among which poor structural opportunities for
participation, weak tradition of non-governmental organizations in Romania as well as poor
individual resources might explain the low level of participation.
Figure 3.9 Frequency of contacts with friends and relatives
35
29
30
24
24
15
15
20
16
15
15
14
15
15
2003
20
17
1999
20
1998
25
10
5
2010
2006
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
Frequency of contacts
Source: Quality of Life Diagnosis, Research Institute for Quality of Life
Question: How often do you take part in the following: Meetings, parties, visits with friends and relatives? 1.
Not at all, 2. Rarely, 3. Often.
Note: Proportion of people who declare they take part “often” in such meetings.
25
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing
with people? 1. most people can be trusted, 2. can’t be too careful
26
Source: EVS 2008, GESIS
27
EVS/WVS 1999-2002
Page 59
3.6. Family formation and breakdown, lone parenthood and fertility
Fertility rates
Fertility rates are currently low (Figure 3.10), Romania sharing the model of countries like Latvia,
Hungary and Portugal with the lowest fertility rates in Europe.
Overall, economic prosperity has a positive bearing on fertility and usually periods of economic
growth will bring about raising fertility rates, while recession will have the opposite effect (d’Addio
and d’Ercole 2005). In addition to this, demographic and family policies can also contribute to fertility
rates.
For the communist period, demographic and family policies were of key importance in influencing
fertility rates, whereas for the period after 1990 economic recession was crucial in determining
fertility.
The communist regime introduced a pro-natalist policy in Romania, in its attempt of creating a large
and well educated work force. During the 60s, the time of sexual revolution in western countries,
contraception had not been introduced in Romania and all throughout the communist period
contraception methods were not officially available. Abortion was mainly used as a family planning
method. Abortion was legalized in 1957 and was employed at the time on a large scale. As part of the
pro-natalist policy, abortion was banned in 1966 by the communist regime and, as a result, the
number of live births increased two times over the next three years. Until 1989, fertility rates
remained high, being throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s among the highest in Europe.
In the same time, the demographic and family policies of the time included a series of measures
designed at supporting families. Higher-order births were especially encouraged and they were
sensitive to periodic re-enforcements of pro-natalist policies in 1973 and 1984 (Muresan and Haem
2010). Despite the legal coercive measures, abortions were still used illegally by women, with high
risks, as a planning method, until 1989, whereas punitive actions against them have been periodically
enforced or relatively relaxed by the regime.
The pro-natalist policy made possible an important cleavage between family incomes and birth rate.
Those with higher incomes managed to keep control of their family size while the size of poor
families increased. Consequently, a polarization of families depending on income took place while
certain social groups such as Roma communities saw their fertility increasing a lot. Moreover, it led
to sizeable groups of street children and abandoned children (Birzea 2000).
With the fall of communism, a new age began in the field of fertility. Abortion was legalized in 1989
and contraceptive methods were progressively made available to couples. From this point on,
Page 60
fertility abruptly decreased: over a period of five years, from 1989 to 1994 (Figure 3.10), fertility rate
lowered by more than one and half times reaching levels among the lowest in Europe. The family
policies implemented during transition didn’t seem to make up for the economic recession. After
1990 to the present, fertility rates remained relatively stable at a very low level, with a very small
increase from 2007.
Figure 3.10 Total fertility rate
3,0
40
35
2,5
30
2,0
25
1,5
20
15
1,0
10
0,5
5
0
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
0,0
Total fertility rate
Gini
Source: Eurostat
In regard to age (Figure 3.11), since 1990 fertility rates seem to follow a more modern pattern.
Fertility decreased significantly for women between 20 and 24 and increased steadily for women
aged 30 to 34. Greater involvement in higher forms of education might have influenced this model,
along with an incipient general process of modernization characterized by a change in traditional
values.
Page 61
Figure 3.11 Fertility rates by age
0,25
40
35
0,20
30
25
0,15
20
0,10
15
10
0,05
5
0,00
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
0
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
Gini
Source: Eurostat
In regard to education, Muresan and Haem (2010) discovered a negative educational gradient in
recent Romanian fertility: more educated women have lower fertility rates than lower educated
women. This was explained by the authors mainly through the preference of well-educated mothers
for higher educated children, who are better integrated into society and have better levels of human
capital. They argued that, while for well-educated mothers, raising children means diminished wages
and a certain deterioration of skills, more important in their decisions might be their preference for
quality instead of quantity. Moreover, in a country where roles in the household are still very
segregated, with the women performing most of the tasks in the household, including raising
children, it is possible that women have difficulties in balancing their work and family life and make
rational decisions towards limiting their family size.
Page 62
Couple formation and dissolution
The crude marriage rate 28 currently places Romania at an average level in the EU. Although
throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s marriage rates maintained relatively high levels, after 1990 began to fall
gradually, and despite a peak in 2007, marriage rates registered in 2011 a historical low.
Figure 3.12 Crude marriage rate
40
10
35
8
30
6
25
4
15
20
10
2
5
0
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
0
Crude marriage rate
Gini
Source: Eurostat
Crude divorce rates 29 are low in Romania, under the EU average and close to the values registered in
Poland (1.7) and Bulgaria (1.4), countries with the smallest divorce rates in EU. While in the first part
of the 80s (Figure 3.13) divorce rates have been very stable, afterwards they started to oscillate but
still remaining at low levels.
28
The crude marriage rate is the number of marriages occurring among the population of a given geographical
area during a given year, per 1,000 mid-year total population of the given geographical area during the same
year
29
The crude divorce rate is the number of divorces occurring among the population of a given geographical
area during a given year, per 1,000 mid-year total population of the given geographical area during the same
year.
Page 63
Figure 3.13 Crude divorce rate
2,0
1,8
1,6
1,4
1,2
1,0
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
0,0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
0
Crude divorce rate
Gini
Source: Eurostat
Household composition
The average size of a household in Romania is 2.9 (EU-SILC) similar to Bulgaria and Malta and close to
average of the new member states (2.8).
Figure 3.14 Household composition, 2010
30
25,2
25
24,0
21,3
20
15,6
15
12,2
10
5
0
1,7
Two adults with
children
Two adults
Single person
Three or more adults Three or more adults
with dependent
children
Single parent
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC 2010
The most widespread household type is that of couples living with children (Figure 3.14). Also
important shares among household types are couples without children and single persons. Extended
families, multigenerational are quite numerous and over time, in comparison to the early 90s, they
Page 64
grew in number (Popescu 2010). This might be explained by a combination of factors, among which
economic hardships, high price of housing and traditional values might have a crucial importance.
Romania has the smallest proportion of single parents in Europe after Greece (1.3%), much smaller
than countries like Ireland (8.9%) or UK (5.9%) and closer to Spain (2.1%) and Poland (2.1%)
3.6 Health inequalities
Generally speaking, in Romania, the populations’ health is rather poor (Marginean, 2006; Pop, 2010;
Dobos, 2003). Aggregate indicators (life expectancy, infant mortality, mortality etc.) show that there
is big gap that separates Romania from the developed countries in EU in regard to health state.
Moreover, a series of inequalities characterize health in Romania (Marginean 2006).
Life expectancy
In 2010 life expectancy was 73.8 years in Romania, the third lowest value in EU after Latvia (73.7) and
Lithuania (73.5). When compared to western societies, Romania lags far behind countries like
Sweden where people live on average 81.6 years or Ireland where life expectancy is 81 years. Over
time, life expectancy increased slightly, with a more significant rise of 2.6 years from 2000 to 2010
(Figure 3.15). The gap between women and men grew higher over time: in 1980 the difference in life
years between genders was 5.3, in 2010 it grew to 7.5. The gender disparity is a universal feature and
studies have shown that women, even they live longer, they also spend more days in poor health and
they run higher risks of a number of chronic illnesses, whereas men are more exposed to fatal
illnesses like vascular diseases (Alber and Kohler 2004, Annandale and Hunt 2000).
Beside the gender gap, in Romania there are also other inequalities which are evident in life
expectancy data. Life expectancy varies by urban-rural and development region. The indicator is
higher in urban in comparison to rural areas (1.7 years difference), as well as in developed regions in
comparison with less developed ones (differences up to 2.1 years) (Pop 2010, NIS data).
Life expectancy is ten years shorter while infant mortality rates are 40% higher among Roma than
among the general population (Cace and Vladescu 2004).
Page 65
Figure 3.15 Life expectancy by gender
80
78
76
74
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
58
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
0
Total
Males
Females
Gini
Source: Eurostat
In a similar way to life expectancy, infant mortality rates show another important gap that separates
Romania from the western countries. Romania had in 2011 an infant mortality rate of 9.4, the
highest in the EU, whereas in western countries infant mortality rates are as low as 2.4 in Finland and
3.4 in Spain. The country experienced an improvement in this indicator over time as from 1990 to the
present infant mortality rates decreased from 26.9 to 9.4. However, the same inequalities as for life
expectancy are evident between urban and rural and development region for this indicator (Pop
2010).
Indicators describing the incidence of illnesses also depict a rather poor picture of health. Romania
has the highest incidence of circulatory diseases, tuberculosis and infectious diseases in Europe, with
values of tuberculosis up to ten times higher than in the developed countries.
Self-reported health
In regard to self-reported health, Romania displays values close to the EU average: in 2010, 8.5% of
the population rated their health as bad or very bad, while the EU average was 9%. Over time, a
small decrease was registered in the number of those reporting poor health, from 9.6% in 2007 to
8.5% in 2010, this trend being also visible in case of EU averages (Eurostat, EU-SILC data).
The importance of social gradients in health is largely accepted and demonstrated. It was maintained
that health inequalities are deeply embedded in the social stratification system of every society
(Mackenbach, 2008). Health inequality varies by gender, age, education, income. These inequalities
Page 66
are omnipresent in all societies, although in Romania some of them are more pronounced
(Marginean 2006). To these disparities, some other differences need to be added, which do not come
from socio-economic positions but from the general development of the country and the specific
setup of the health system. Such inequalities are between rural and urban areas, between
development regions or various size localities.
Table 3.4 Self rating of health status by socio-demographic variables (mean values)
Mean
total
Gender
Age
Income
Education
Residence
Fem
ale
Ma
le
1824
65
+
Lowest
quartile
Highest
quartile
Low
education
High
education
Rur
al
Urb
an
20
2,6
2,4
2,8
3,4
1,
2,4
2,9
2,1
3,1
2,5
2,8
20
3,5
3,7
3,4
4,2
3
3,3
4
3,1
4,3
3,5
3,6
Question: In general, would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair or poor?
Note: means were calculated using a reversed scale from 1 to 5, where one means poor and 5 means excellent.
The higher the mean the better evaluated the health status.
Source: EQLS 2003, 2007, own calculations
A study using EQLS data 30 (Marginean 2006) showed that self-reported poor health varies by gender,
with inequalities between sexes a bit more pronounced than in the average of EU25 at the time. Age
was proven to introduce another divide, as people in old age report significantly poorer health than
the young, this difference being much deeper in Romania than the average of the EU25. It was
explained that the problematic health situation of old persons reflects, in fact, the health state that
people experience in all stages of their life cycle, resulting thus in an accumulation of difficulties in
old age.
Characteristic for Romania was the difference induced by residence in self-reported health: people in
rural areas report poorer health in comparison to those in urban areas (Table 3.4). Even though
inequalities are not especially high, the study showed that the data might reflect the different quality
of health services that are available to people in the two settings. While comprehensive and
sophisticated health care is mainly concentrated in urban areas, only primary care is usually available
in most rural areas.
The strong relationship between income and health was largely proved, this relationship being
stronger especially for the poorest categories of people and the poorest countries (Alber and Kohler
2004). People in the highest income quartile report better health than those in the lowest quartile.
30
EQLS data 2003, comparisons have been carried with the averages displayed by EU25, Romania and Bulgaria
were not part of the union at the time.
Page 67
Education is also a powerful factor that differentiates between health states. It was explained that
people with higher levels of education are able to protect themselves better against increased health
risks, and/or are able to benefit more from new opportunities for health gains and, despite the
universal link between education and health, this was especially evident in Eastern Europe during
transition (Machenbach et al. 2006).
Between 2003 and 2007, a time of steady economic growth, self-rated health improved but
inequalities by gender, age, income and education generally maintained. Only in case of residence
inequalities seem to have levelled out. Income inequality grew during this period of time.
Access to health care
Significant inequalities were found in terms of access to health care by income and residence in
Romania (Alber and Kohler 2004, Marginean 2006). Table 3.5 illustrates inequalities in accessing
health care by income and residence. Inequalities in access by income are significant in case of all
four items that measure access. However, more pronounced are inequalities in case of costs of
seeing a doctor, which seems to be the most difficult aspect of care for those with low incomes: only
8% of those with high incomes report very difficult access in regard to costs, while 27% of those with
low incomes consider access difficult due to costs. Poor families cannot afford co-payment of medical
services, costs of medication as well as the costs related to transportation to health care facilities,
especially secondary and tertiary. Those with high incomes can afford access to high quality services
in big urban centres, private health care and expensive medication. Inequalities by residence do not
display high levels, but some differences are still significant in regard to distance to medical facilities
and costs of seeing a doctor. People in rural areas find access more difficult mostly to hospitals, as
also showed by Alber and Kohler (2004), whereas costs of seeing a doctor prove to be the most
difficult aspect of access for those in rural in comparison to urban areas.
Table 3.5 Access to health care by income and residence (% reporting very difficult access)
Income
Residence
Lowest
quartile
Highest
quartile
Rural
Urban
Distance to doctor's office/hospital/medical centre
15
6
10
6
Delay in getting appointment
17
4
8
9
Waiting time to see doctor on day of appointment
19
10
12
16
Cost of seeing the doctor
27
8
16
11
Source: EQLS 2007, own calculations
Question: On the last occasion you needed to see a doctor or medical specialist, to what extent did each of the
following factors make it difficult for you to do so?
Page 68
“The low standard of living and the circumstances of health care system conducted during the past
decades to a polarisation of access to health care, this having long term consequences on
population’s health state and contradicting the principles of social equity promoted by health
legislation” (Dobos 2003, 13).
3.8. Housing tenure
Romania has a housing model that was mainly determined by its historical communist pathway. It is
characterised by a high share of home ownership, with a low proportion of homes owned with
mortgage, a low share of renting and an almost insignificant fraction of social housing. By and large,
Romania shares this housing pattern with the other post-communist countries which were essentially
exposed to a similar policy in their communist past.
During the communist regime, the state was the only institutional actor involved in funding and
building houses. As part of the industrialization and urbanization processes, particularly in the 60s,
the state built homes, especially in urban areas and mainly in the form of blocks of flats. Individuals
were also able to build their own houses with some support from the state but mainly in rural areas
and to a smaller extent in urban. Here, state built apartments were distributed to people mostly
through their jobs and the vast majority were owned by the state.
In the early 90s, the privatisation of the public stock of housing facilities took place and apartments
were sold to people at very low costs. This policy highly increased the number of home owners.
However, the transfer of ownership was ambivalent: it brought about a number of advantages, but
also a series of issues related to the difficulties of new owners responsibility for proper maintenance
of their purchased property (Marginean 2006). Even to today, the overall quality of this type of
housing remains rather low, particularly when speaking about the basic infrastructure (heating,
sewerage, water etc.) and maintenance of common spaces.
Transition up to year 2000 was characterised by an abrupt decrease in the number of new dwellings
built from public funds due the economic recession and lack of policy in regard to housing. Private
houses were also constructed with private funds, but the overall pace of house building, in the
absence of serious credit facilities, was very slow. This created important inequalities between older
generations who had obtained their homes through a generous communist welfare package and the
young generations who were not able to find adequate housing on the market. In the same time,
renting institutions did not have any tradition and were almost insignificant. This led to inflated
prices on the market for the houses built up to 1990 , while the land prices also went up to a high
Page 69
extent, making access to housing very difficult, especially for the young generations. A certain
differentiation in this respect was between small cities, where the industry was dismantled and the
housing stock was in excess of demand and the more developed big cities where the demand on the
market was very high.
With the growth of the economy after 2000, credit facilities started to develop (from 2003), making
possible the involvement of private actors in house building, the expansion of individual construction
of homes by individuals, whereas the state also started some housing programmes for the young. In
the same time, buying from the “old” housing stock was relatively easier in this period. However, on
a market under the pressure of demand and with still a very low offer, the prices of the houses were
very high. Until the end of 2010, a certain housing stock was available on the market as between
2006 and 2010 the number of finished dwellings almost doubled, from 39,638 to 62,520 (NIS 2010),
around 90% of these finished homes being built with private funds. Nevertheless, the prices of the
newly built homes largely made them prohibitive for a generally poor population.
In regards to subsidies, after 1989, after the broad withdrawal of the state from housing sector
and the privatization of the housing stock, several subsidy programs have been put into place.
They generally represented measures taken by various governments, without being integrated
into a coherent housing policy designed for the long term. State interventions into the housing
market included state support for the completion of partially completed building leftover from
prior to 1989, a programme for providing a limited number of relatively low-rate housing loans
through the state savings bank for people under 35 years old, the National Housing Agency
Ownership Scheme which was a subsidy programme focused on building new housing and,
finally, a subsidy scheme for owner-occupied housing through contract-savings banks for
housing. Currently, the state guarantees the bank loans for first time owners in a programme
called “first house”. In 2010, the housing expenditure in Romania was 0.02% of GDP.
Tenure status
Table 3.6 presents tenure status in Romania. Homeownership is overwhelmingly widespread in this
country and the highest in the EU. Similar shares of owners are to be found in Hungary, Lithuania and
Bulgaria. Most of the houses are owned outright, while mortgage or loans are not significant in the
total tenure status. Romania has the lowest share of owners with mortgage or loans in the EU. This
can be attributed to the low opportunities in regard to bank loans which became available on the
market only from around 2003 on, the high price of the housing and the limited buying power of the
population. The proportion of tenants is also low as renting is not an institution yet in Romania.
Page 70
Moreover, many of the tenants do not pay rents at market prices, but rather reduced prices or even
stay free, frequently in houses belonging to relatives, friends etc. Romania scores lowest in the EU in
regard to share of tenants. Over time, no major changes occurred in housing tenure, and the status
tenure is still heavily shaped by the communist heritage.
Table 3.6 Tenure status (%)
2007
2008
2009
2010
Owner
96,1
96,5
96,5
97,5
Owner with mortgage or loan
0,5
1,0
1,2
0,6
Owner, no outstanding mortgage or housing loan
95,6
95,5
95,3
96,9
Tenant
3,9
3,5
3,5
2,5
Tenant rent at market price
1,0
0,9
0,8
1,1
Tenant, rent at reduced price or free
2,9
2,6
2,7
1,4
Source: Eurostat (EUSILC)
In regard to income, there are no significant differences between those below the poverty line and
those that are above when looking at the share of homeowners. As explained above, homes
privatised in the 90s were passed on to the population regardless of individuals’ incomes.
Nevertheless, a significant difference is to be observed when looking at the proportion of mortgages
or loans by income. Today, the main mechanism of acquiring a home from the market would be for
the majority of population through mortgages or housing loans. However, the access to credit
facilities is very low or even impossible for those having an income below the 60% median
equivalised income. This is to be seen in data, as among those living in poverty only 0.1 and up to
0.3% own their home with mortgage or loan while for those above the poverty line, the percentage
varies from 0.7 to 1.4 during 2007 and 2010 (Eurostat, EUSILC data).
While in regard to homeownership no important inequalities are to be found, a series of inequalities
characterise quality of housing in Romania. A major line of division in regard to housing is between
urban and rural areas. Generally, urban areas provide a relatively modern infrastructure with good
access to utilities, whereas rural areas provide people with a much lower quality of housing. Here
houses are frequently built with low endurance materials and there is limited or no access to utilities.
Other disparities that characterise housing conditions are between small cities and big cities,
neighbourhoods with individual homes and those with blocks of apartments.
Page 71
Standard of accommodation
Quality of accommodation is generally low in Romania and it was demonstrated that, in Romania,
similarly with Bulgaria, the quality of accommodation is the lowest in EU (Marginean 2006).
Access to utilities is an important indicator for housing conditions as it reveals information on the
basic comfort that households have, according to the standards that are generally accepted in the
modern society. In Romania, access to utilities is very differentiated by urban and rural residence.
Except for the indicator “separate kitchen”, all the others show significant differences between urban
and rural areas (Figure 3.16). Moreover, access to utilities varies also by size of locality and its
development (Voicu 2006).
Figure 3.16 Access to utilities by area of residence, 2010 (%)
96
95
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
91
91
86
80
70
54
35
27
24
14
Separate kitchen Running water
Bathroom or
shower
Urban
Hot running
water
Heating system Flushing toilet
Rural
Source: Quality of life Diagnosis, 2010, Research Institute for Quality of Life
Housing conditions are also structured by individual characteristics as shown by Voicu (2006).
Education clearly differentiates between housing conditions: most exposed to precarious housing are
those with a low level of education. Ethnicity also introduces differences in housing conditions: roma
households have poor quality of accommodation and “are excluded from modern housing as they
have inferior conditions by all indicators” (Voicu 2006, 83). Other studies have shown that quality of
accommodation is also clearly structured by the level of income (Marginean 2006).
Page 72
Housing costs
Figure 3.17 illustrates the housing cost overburden rate 31 by income threshold in Romania. In 2010,
15% of the Romanian population lived in households that spent 40% or more of their equivalised
disposable income on housing. Romania has one the highest housing cost overburden rates in EU,
close to Denmark (21.9%), Greece (18.1%) and UK (16.5%). In the country under scrutiny here, the
high housing costs come mainly from the costs for services (water, electricity, gas or other fuels,
heating etc.).
Incomes (figure) clearly structure these cost rates, as households below 60% of median income
display a much higher rate than those that are above.
Figure 3.17 Housing cost overburden rate by income threshold
45
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
25
20
20
15
15
10
10
5
5
0
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total
Gini
3.9 Crime and punishment
Crime rates grew between 1990 and 1998 in Romania more than four times (Figure 3.18). A general
weakening of social control during the first decade of transition, as well as the economic recession
with its social consequences can generally account for this upsurge of more than 4 times in
criminality rates. Another important increase, although of a much smaller magnitude was recorded
between 2005 and 2009, when the rise was 1.4 times.
31
The housing cost overburden rate is the percentage of the population living in households where the total
housing costs ('net' of housing allowances) represent more than 40% of disposable income ('net' of housing
allowances).
Page 73
Figure 3.18 Registered total crime rate (per 100,000 population)
2.000
1.800
1.600
1.400
1.200
1.000
800
600
400
200
0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Crime rate
Gini
Source: Transmonee 1989-2009, NIS 2010
Table 3.7 Recorded crimes by type (absolute numbers)
Homicide
Violent crime
Robbery
Domestic
burglary
Motor
vehicle theft
Drug
trafficking
1993
722
9.515
4.647
15.411
2.078
:
1994
749
8.930
4.161
17.842
2.362
:
1995
758
9.212
4.154
31.163
2.687
368
1996
722
8.720
3.866
29.024
1.800
597
1997
693
8.966
4.010
31.311
2.110
803
1998
559
7.846
3.548
29.404
2.284
620
1999
566
7.840
3.336
21.287
2.331
653
2000
581
7.703
3.280
19.024
2.149
561
2001
597
7.943
3.467
17.551
1.952
658
2002
563
7.130
3.025
12.001
1.297
1.074
2003
551
6.281
2.782
10.063
1.127
1.131
2004
516
6.388
3.087
10.002
1.120
1.775
2005
453
6.469
3.326
9.135
1.082
2.441
2006
438
7.240
4.078
9.165
1.266
3.079
2007
416
7.044
2.496
10.829
1.817
2.796
2008
493
6.842
2.464
10.285
2.355
3.621
2009
421
6.781
2.541
11.574
2.967
3.228
Source: Eurostat
The trends in homicide and total violent crime are descending in time. Robbery and domestic
burglary and motor vehicle theft display rather sinuous trends but overall, they are also descending.
A longer lasting rising trend is in drug trafficking which grew between 1995 and 2009 almost 9 times.
Page 74
Prison population registered a peak in 1998 and decreased steadily until 2009 (Figure 3.19). In the
first years of transition, prison population increased from 29 000 in 1989 to 44 000 in 1992 (Roth,
2006). Among the explanations for the rising prison population given by the quoted author are the
rise in crime that accompanied the transition to a market economy, increasing the length of
confinement for maximum sentences and the lack of noncustodial alternatives. From 1994 to 1997,
as the crime rate increased significantly, due to the limited range of sentences and to the sentence
patterns, the custodial rate was one of the highest in Europe with the immediate consequence of an
overcrowded prison system (Durnescu, 2008). As a result, starting with 2002, Romania implemented
the organisation and functioning of the services for social reintegration and supervision of offenders
(probation services) which might have had an effect on the prison population.
Figure 3.19 Prison population
40
60.000
35
50.000
30
40.000
25
30.000
20
15
20.000
10
10.000
5
0
Prison population
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
0
Gini
Source: Eurostat
Feelings of insecurity
The proportion of people fearing lack of personal security due to criminality was 28% in 2010. During
transition, the percentage of population feeling unsafe varied between a maximum of 50% in 1991
and a low of 21% in 2006. The high numbers of people having criminality fears in 1991 can be
explained partly through the rise in criminality rates after 1990 but mostly through a general feeling
of insecurity that people experienced in the first years of transition when, after a lifetime of stability
and security, they were exposed for the first time to a large array of risks, threatening both their
well-being and personal safety.
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Figure 3.20 Perceptions of insecurity due to crime
60
50
50
40
34
36
38
35
28
30
29
39
27
26
28
21
20
10
2010
2006
2003
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
0
Perceptions of insecurity due to crime
Source: Quality of Life Diagnosis, Research Institute for Quality of Life
Question: During next period of time, do you worry about each of the following for you and your family? lack of
personal security due to crime. 1 a lot, 2 a little, 3 not at all. Percentage of those declaring they worry ‘’a lot”.
When looking at feelings of insecurity that people have in their neighbourhood, studies have shown
that they vary by gender, age and residence (Marginean and Precupetu 2010). Women tend to feel
more insecure in comparison to men, as well as people in old age in comparison to those who are
young. Also, those living in urban areas have higher feelings of insecurity when compared to those
living in rural areas. It was explained that not only are criminality rates higher in urban areas, but
people feel more insecure there due to certain characteristics of the Romanian urban setting. Usually
in urban areas and especially in big cities, people live in communities where housing is mainly blocks
of flats (majority from communist times), in which people, despite living very close to each other,
they are socially very differentiated. Consequently, social capital is low, with insignificant
relationships, cooperation and trust. In fact, a common paradox of urban living was amplified by the
specific circumstances of post-communist societies where people tend to live more in the private
sphere and less in the larger society (Marginean 2006).
3.10 Subjective measures of well-being
Subjective well-being refers to the subjective manner in which people experience their lives and
includes a cognitive dimension (life satisfaction and satisfaction with various domains), and an
affective one involving both pleasant affects (happiness) and unpleasant affects (depression, anxiety,
or alienation) (Diener and Suh 1997, Bohnke, 2005). Following, we will describe subjective well-being
Page 76
in Romania, based on national as well as international data, trying to cover the period after 1990 to
the present.
Life satisfaction
Low levels of life satisfaction are generally recorded in Romania. According to Eurobarometer32 data
in 2011, Romania ranked the second lowest in Europe in regard to life satisfaction, after Bulgaria.
Only 40% of the population declared themselves either very satisfied or fairly satisfied with life, in
comparison to the high levels of satisfaction that are present in developed countries like the
Netherlands and Finland (both 96%) or UK (92%). Romania ranks close to Bulgaria (37%), traditionally
the most dissatisfied country in the EU, and Greece (46%) also ranking constantly low in satisfaction.
Life satisfaction is a subjective evaluation of a person’s life that has the capacity to indicate the
degree to which people’s needs are met (Delhey 2004). The low levels of life satisfaction in Romania
indicate that basic needs are satisfied in Romania only for a small proportion of population. Life
satisfaction depends also on structural circumstances and opportunities that are provided to people
in their societies in order for them to fulfil their goals and live according to their values and
aspirations. There is an important amount of research evidence proving the relationship between
material living conditions and subjective well-being, both at macro and micro levels (Delhey 2004,
Bohnke 2008). Generally, wealthy countries, characterised by political stability, important systems of
social protection, high quality education and health systems provide their citizens with good
conditions and opportunities for living a good life and are usually rich in subjective well-being, while
poor countries are deprived in satisfaction. Moreover, it was shown that (Delhey 2004) social
inequalities in life satisfaction by social position, income or educational level are more marked in the
new member states in the EU in comparison to older members of the EU. To these, it adds a
particularly strong generation gap in the post-communist countries, where older people are usually
less satisfied than the younger age groups.
32
Standard Eurobarometer 2011, spring wave
Page 77
Figure 3.21 Life satisfaction
45
39
40
30
26
30
29
26
26
1998
30
35
34
32
1997
35
32
25
24
17
20
15
10
5
2010
2006
2003
1999
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
0
% "very satisfied" and "satisfied"
Source: Quality of life Diagnosis, 1990-1999, 2003, 2006, 2010, Research Institute for Quality of Life
Question: Taking all things into consideration, how satisfied would you say you are with your life? 1. Very
satisfied, 2. Satisfied, 3. Nor satisfied, not dissatisfied, 4. Dissatisfied, 5. Very dissatisfied.
National level data shows significant variations over time in life satisfaction (Figure 3.21). The lowest
level was registered in 1991 when the economy experienced the most dramatic contraction during
transition, as GDP fell by 12.1% in comparison to the preceding year. Life satisfaction also fell
significantly in relation to 1990. In 1990, in the very beginning of transition, some reparatory
measures were taken aimed at increasing the very low standard of living imposed during
communism. However, the second year of transition with its abrupt economic contraction was the
turning point in which it became evident that the social costs of transformation born by the
population would be very high. This explains the very low satisfaction registered in 1991.
In the following years, life satisfaction extended to about one third of the population. At macro level,
the process of economic decline continued and brought about further deterioration in living
conditions. Moreover, the newly built social protection system was not broad enough and did not
create safety nets for the people affected by the new social realities, among which economic
restructuring and increasing unemployment made a powerful mark on peoples’ lives. However, a
certain adaptation process (Headey and Wearing, 1992) is visible in life satisfaction data and the
period 1992-1996 can be considered as one of “survival and adaptation” (Precupetu 2010) as people
began to learn how to shape their lives and adjust to the grim social realities of early 90s.
The following years saw a steadily decrease in levels of satisfaction until a new low in 1999,
associated with more economic decline, political instability and culminating with the social conflicts
of 1999.
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The period after 2000 was characterised by a ten years economic recovery and, for the first time
during transition this had visible consequences in living conditions and was accompanied by a
significant increase in levels of life satisfaction. However, the economic growth abruptly ended in
2010 and in 2011 a significant decrease in life satisfaction was revealed by Eurobarometer data 33
(2011, spring wave), life satisfaction decreased from 46% in 2010 to 40% in 2011.
Satisfaction with life domains
Specific satisfaction with life domains (Table 3.8) provides information on objective conditions in the
various fields of life and allows us to ascertain the more positive or negative realms in quality of life.
Previous research (Marginean and Precupetu, 2010) showed that satisfaction with life domains
describes certain patterns that are consistent across various data sources. In Romania, satisfaction
with standard of living is constantly the lowest among satisfaction with life domains, proving that this
is the most problematic aspect of people’s lives. Satisfaction with standard of living decreased over
time, the most significant decline being in 2010.
At the other end of the scale, satisfaction with family shows constantly highest levels among life
domains. This was explained in the literature (Marginean 2004b, Böhnke 2005, Saraceno and
Olagnero 2004) by showing that family acted in post-communist countries as a buffer against the
difficulties of transition and helped people coping with the many issues of the period. It provided
various types of support to people during the strenuous years of transition, when safety nets were
not available in society. Currently, it still remains the most satisfying life domains and the central
value in people’s lives. Even though family stays the most powerful source of satisfaction in people’s
lives, satisfaction with family life also decreased slightly in time.
Satisfaction with job and satisfaction with health follow the same pattern and decreased during the
period described by data.
33
Eurobarometer uses a different scale for life satisfaction (4 point scale) than Quality of life Diagnosis (5 point
scale).
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Table 3.8 Satisfaction with life domains, means
2003
2007
2009
2010
Satisfaction with job
7,4
7,1
6,9
6,5
Satisfaction with standard of
living
6,1
6,4
5,9
5,4
Satisfaction with family life
8,1
7,8
7,5
7,1
Satisfaction with health
7,3
7,2
7
6,9
Source: EQLS 2003, 2007, Special EB 321, 355
Question 41: Could you please tell me on a scale of one to 10 how satisfied you are with each of the following
items, where one means you are very dissatisfied and 10 means you are very satisfied? a. your education; b.
your present job; c. your present standard of living; d. your accommodation; e. your family life; f. your health;
g. your social life.
Happiness
Happiness, defined as “how much one likes the life one lives, or the degree to which one evaluates
one’s life-as-a-whole positively” (Veenhoven 2006), is able to capture the positive feelings that
people experience in their lives and is closer to the private sphere in comparison to life satisfaction,
which is more sensitive to the social context (Precupetu, 2010). Continuous data series are not
available for happiness. However, the available data from EQLS can reveal the levels in these
indicators and the rank that Romania has in regard to happiness in the EU.
According to EQLS data, in Romania happiness registered a mean value of 7 in 2003 and 7.1 in 2007
on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means very unhappy and 10 very happy. This ranked Romania in
2007 among countries like Portugal (6.9), Italy (7) and Greece (7.3) and lower than the happiest
countries in EU like Sweden (8.3) and Denmark (8.5).
National data can reveal general trends in happiness over time (Figure 3.22). The happiness indicator
displays great stability over time and the proportion of those declaring themselves happy is very low.
However, the lowest proportion of happy people was registered in 1998-1999, maybe the most
difficult years of transition, while the highest proportion of happy people was registered in 2010, the
year in which many positive effects of economic growth accumulated, while the crisis was not yet
completely felt in the private sphere of the individual.
Page 80
Figure 3.22 Happiness/unhappiness
70
66
65
64
64
61
60
61
65
61
60
60
62
50
40
30
20
18 17
16
19
19 17
22
21
15
17
21
17
24
21
13
23
15
17
20 20
18
21
10
0
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
Unhappy
1997
1998
Mixed feelings
1999
2003
2006
2010
Happy
Source: Quality of life diagnosis, 1992-1999, 2003, 2006, 2010, Research Institute for Quality of Life
Question: In people’s life there are better times and worse times. How would you describe your feelings during
the last days: 1. I was unhappy, even desperate, 2. I had pretty big worries, 3. I’ve got the feeling that
something is not right (working), 4. I generally feel fine, although I do have some problems, 5. I feel fine, no
problems, 6. I am completely happy.
Negative feelings
Negative feelings refer to unpleasant moods and emotions, like stress, worries, various concerns that
people might have and they complete the picture of subjective well-being, adding to the positive
feelings of satisfaction and happiness. National data reveal the most important concerns that people
have (Figure 3.23).
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Figure 3.23 Worries
100
82
76
80
60
40
90
89
86
80
76
75
89
88
76
34 34
27
20
36
29
20
42
35
21
34
28
20
35
29
19
88
82
78
71
9087
8481
66
50
38
37
91
86
90
87
36
27
18
40 38
26
44
39
33
42
26
18
42
25
21
28
27
10
0
1991
1992
Unemployment
1993
1994
Social conflicts
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Lack of personal security due to crime
2003
2006
Increasing prices
2010
Taxes
Source: Quality of life diagnosis, 1992-1999, 2003, 2006, 2010, Research Institute for Quality of Life
Question: During next period of time, do you worry about each of the following for you and your family?
Unemployment, social conflicts, lack of personal security due to crime, increasing prices, taxes. 1 a lot, 2 a little,
3 not at all. Note: Percentage of those declaring they fear ‘’a lot”.
The major concerns that dominated peoples’ well-being were those directly affecting their standard
of living: increasing prices and taxes. An overwhelming majority of the population constantly
declared they fear “a lot” both increasing prices and taxes, these indicators displaying a remarkable
steadiness over time.
Instability in consumer prices heavily and constantly influenced subjective well-being over time as
this can have a major impact on the most problematic aspect of quality of life in Romania, standard
of living. Fear of social conflicts varied, as expected, according to the presence of social conflicts in
society, maintaining higher levels in early 90s and again in 1998-1999. After a calm and stable period
during 2000, the fears of social conflicts got a bit higher in 2010 along with other fears which
increased as a result of the incoming crisis at the time.
The fear of unemployment is less important in comparison to the other worries that people have.
However, the trends in this subjective indicator reflect the objective situation, as years like 1994 and
1999 when unemployment rate was highest in Romania (10,9%, and 11,8%, respectively) also show
high levels of fears in regard to unemployment.
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3.11 Intergenerational mobility
Educational mobility
The communist regime gave rise to an important expansion of education, increased availability of
higher qualifications and better educational opportunities. The structural changes in the education
system, especially in the first two decades, conducted to an increasing upward educational and
occupational mobility (Marginean 2004).
Access to education widen in the first two decades of the communist regime to a great extent for
primary levels and up to 8th grade levels. Moreover, the extension of mandatory school years to 10 in
1980s created opportunities for all social classes to be represented in the upper secondary levels of
education and increased chances for those coming from low educational backgrounds to access
higher education (Larionescu et al. 2006). However, this mobility was limited, with sons going
upward only one educational level in comparison to their fathers (Cartana 2000). This was
interpreted as a phenomenon of selection (Larionescu et al. 2006) in which inequality in access only
transferred to higher levels of education, without levelling out.
Secondary education has been through a great expansion with consequences for upward social
mobility. While during the first part of the regime, the social value of the high school diploma was
very high, mostly guaranteeing upward mobility, in the second part (starting with the 80s), along with
the economic recession, high school certificates did not anymore assure a good social position, but
were rather a mechanism for maintaining the parents’ position in the social structure. By and large,
upward mobility decreased and socio-economic positions started to become increasingly dependent
on social origin. One study showed that for the last period of communism, up to the end of the first
decade of transition (1988-2000), the relationship between the socioeconomic status of father and
that of the sons became considerably stronger (Tomescu-Dubrow 2006).
An important mechanism for upward mobility during communism was higher education. However,
access to this form of education was restricted through a tough control (particularly staring with the
80s) of the number, type and profile of higher education institutions and through a rigorous selection
of students (Larionescu et al. 2006).
Educational mobility consisted in the first part of the communist regime of a high level structural
reproduction dominated mobility processes. However, as a general pattern, during the communist
regime in Romania upward mobility was by and large based on education.
During transition, the situation changed severely in regard to education. While the general structure
of education remained for a considerable period largely the same, higher education went through
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the most important changes. Higher education institutionally increased, while access to higher
education also grew to a high extent.
Upward mobility became increasingly dependent on social origin. “The effect of the diminishing of
inequality in access to education that was achieved during communism was cancelled by the increase
in social inequality, to the extent that the chances of an individual with a modest social origin to
accede to an intermediary or high social position are very low” (Larionescu et al. 2006, 217).
The relationship between educational qualifications and class destinations continued to remain
clear during transition.
Table 3.9 Percentage sons achieving their father’s occupation
farmer
manual worker
clerical
professional and
management
1993
20
36
23
40
1996
33
34
24
41
1999
52
31
24
32
2003
45
31
9
33
2006
48
30
13
43
2010
46
30
7
51
Source: Quality of life Diagnosis, Research Institute for Quality of Life
The relationship between father and sons occupations is most clear for professional and
management class and for farmers, especially towards the end of transition. The increase in the
number of farmers having the same origin can be explained by the economic restructuring processes
that lead to the lowering of manual occupations and the returning to farmer occupations of many
workers (usually vocational or high school graduates). For manual workers data show a significant
stability in the level of immobility.
Conclusions
Even though it is pretty difficult to assess the impacts that inequality has had in the social realm, as
this relationship cannot be tested directly in this report, we can still observe the various disparities
that characterize Romania in a range of social dimensions. However, while social dimensions
generally describe a poor situation in Romania, they did not worsen during the time described by the
data as income inequality rose. It is clear though that inequalities are accompanied by social features
which are long lasting: “low social trust, corruption, decline of state authority are here to stay and
most probably will not disappear during the life time of current generations” (Zamfir et al. 2010, 11).
Page 84
Romania has the second highest deprivation rate in the EU, after Bulgaria: around half of the
population lacks at least three of the items that are customary in a modern society and that people
would like to possess but cannot afford them. Couples with three or more dependent children, single
persons and single persons with dependent children are most exposed to severe material
deprivation. Couples with three or more dependent children seem the most vulnerable and, even
though severe deprivation rates generally decreased over time from 2007 to 2010, for this category,
the rates increased. Even the most affluent households (fifth quintile) face high deprivation levels
and they barely situate themselves at the level of the total material deprivation rates of the
developed countries in the EU. As expected, the poorest households (first quintile) face extremely
high deprivation levels, reaching 60% in 2010. Also, in 2010, Romania had the third highest
proportion in the EU of population in arrears of payment: 29.8%.
Social cohesion and social capital are closely connected as the social capital of a certain society is
underpinning all efforts aiming at the reduction of inequality and thus is furthering more equal
societies through solidarity among their members.
In Romania, social relationships have been shaped by the communist heritage characterised by high
distrust in others outside primary groups, in social institutions and by the subsequent social isolation.
Generalised trust placed Romania in the 2008 EVS study 34 among other countries in the EU with low
trust in people: Bulgaria (18%), Hungary (21%) and Portugal (20%). The frequency of social contacts is
also low with a significant increase only in the recent past (from 2003 to 2010), which was a little bit
more prosperous economically. Membership in associations is also low in Romania, as shown by
Voicu (2010), only 8% of Romanians were part of at least one association, this being the lowest
proportion of participation in Europe 35. This can be explained by a series of factors, among which
poor structural opportunities for participation, weak tradition of non-governmental organizations in
Romania as well as poor individual resources.
Romania is characterised by low fertility, a marriage rate at the average level of EU and low divorce
rates. Family has been throughout the transition the main safety net for most of the people.
Multigenerational households, help within the extended family and strong kinship networks acted as
buffers against the hardships of transformation.
In Romania, population health is rather poor and aggregate indicators (life expectancy, infant
mortality, mortality etc.) show that there is big gap that separates Romania from the developed
34
35
Source: EVS 2008, GESIS
EVS/WVS 1999-2002
Page 85
countries in the EU in regard to health status. Furthermore, a series of inequalities characterize
health in Romania.
In 2010 life expectancy was 73.8 years in Romania, the third lowest value in the EU. Life expectancy is
higher in urban in comparison to rural (1.7 years difference), as well as in developed regions in
comparison with less developed ones (differences up to 2.1 years). Life expectancy is ten years
shorter while infant mortality rates are 40% higher among Roma than among the general population.
Disparities in self-reported health and in access to health services come from socio-economic
positions as well as from the general development of the country and the specific setup of the health
system (between rural and urban, between development regions or various size localities). Access to
health care is significantly stratified by income and inequalities in access are pronounced in case of
costs of seeing a doctor, which seems the most difficult aspect of care for those with low incomes.
People in rural areas find access more difficult, mostly to hospitals, whereas costs of seeing a doctor
prove to be the most difficult aspect of access for those in rural in comparison to urban areas.
In regard to housing, tenure status is heavily influenced by the communist heritage and the
privatisation of the housing stock in early ‘90s. Homeownership is overwhelmingly widespread in this
country and the highest in the EU. Most of the houses are owned outright, while mortgages or loans
are not significant in the total tenure status. Romania has the lowest share of owners with mortgage
or loans in the EU. This can be attributed to the low opportunities in regard to bank loans which
became available on the market only from around 2003 on, the high price of the housing and the
limited buying power of the population. The proportion of tenants is also low as renting is not an
institution yet in Romania. Moreover, many of the tenants do not pay rents at market prices, but
rather reduced prices or even stay free, frequently in houses belonging to relatives, friends etc.
Romania scores lowest in the EU in regard to share of tenants.
Inequalities appeared between older generations, who benefited from a generous communist
welfare package, and younger generations, who saw their access to housing severely limited. Also, a
series of inequalities characterise quality of housing in Romania. A major line of division in regard to
housing is between urban and rural areas. Other disparities that characterise housing conditions are
between small cities and big cities, neighbourhoods with individual homes and those with blocks of
apartments. Housing conditions are also structured by individual characteristics: most exposed to
precarious housing are those with a low level of education, those with a low level of income and
Roma households.
Life satisfaction generally displays low levels in Romania, revealing at the individual level, that
people’s needs are not fully satisfied, and, at macro level, the low quality of structural circumstances
Page 86
and opportunities that are provided to people in order for them to fulfil their goals and live according
to their values and aspirations. Satisfaction with standard of living is constantly the lowest among
satisfaction with life domains, proving that this is the most problematic aspect of people’s lives. At
the other end of the scale, satisfaction with family constantly shows the highest levels among life
domains. The major concerns that dominated peoples’ well-being during transition were those
directly affecting their standard of living: increasing prices and taxes.
Educational mobility consisted in the first part of the communist regime of a high level structural
reproduction dominated mobility processes. However, as a general pattern, during the communist
regime in Romania upward mobility was by and large based on education. During transition, upward
mobility became increasingly dependent on social origin.
Page 87
Page 88
4. Political and Cultural Impacts
4.1 Introduction
Democracy is a type of political organisation that allows citizens to express their preferences for
contending political parties and candidates in regular, free and fair elections and to freely express
their approval or discontent with the decisions and actions of those in power. One of the most
important features of a developed democratic system is that it offers the citizens opportunities for a
significant input into the political processes. A functional democracy is also congruent with the
prevalence among people of a civic, participatory political culture.
Institutional performance of a democratic regime depends not only on the institutional design, not
only on the manner in which democratic institutions are set, but depends also on the features of the
social environment in which these institutions function, as demonstrated by numerous studies
(Paxton, 2002; Bernhard, Nordstrom and Reenock, 2001; Chambers and Kopstein, 2001). Some
authors (Huber et all, 1997: 324) point out to the more developed forms of democracy that go
beyond the procedural (or formal democracy) to participative or even social type of a democratic
regime. A participative democracy consists not only of free and fair elections, universal suffrage,
government accountability, freedom of speech and association, free press, guaranteeing of human
rights (all considered essential conditions to be satisfied for a political regime to be called a
democratic one), but is also defined by the existence of high levels of citizens’ participation to
political process, without significant differences among social categories (on the grounds of ethnical
origin, gender, or social class).
As an essential component of a democratic regime, the participation of Romanian citizenry to civic
and political affairs, people’s behaviour, values, attitudes and evaluations in relation to politics and
social life will be the focus of current analysis.
4.2 Political and civic participation
Participation in elections
Citizens’ participation in elections has registered relatively high levels in the early `90s - the first years
of restored democracy in Romania after the fall of the communist regime (Table 4.1).
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The first free parliamentary and presidential elections held in the year 1990 witnessed an 86%
participation of the electorate – the highest level in over two decades of post-communist democratic
regime. Since then, the voters’ turnout in general elections has decreased to a minimum of 39%
attendance in the last parliamentary elections of 2008 and to a low of 54% for the last presidential
elections (that of the year 2009), respectively. The separation of parliamentary elections from the
presidential ones after 2004 (when the mandate of the president was extended to 5 years – as
compared to a 4 years mandate for the legislative body) could be accountable for intensifying the
trend of declining participation in parliamentary elections down to a level well under 50% of the total
electorate (39% in 2008). Up to now, the rate of participation in presidential elections, although on a
decreasing path over time, did not go lower than 50% of the total electorate.
As for the local elections, the trend of diminishing participation has characterized the period 19922000 (1992: 65% participation rate in first post-communist local elections; 2000: 51% voters from
total electorate) and was interrupted by the 2004 elections, that saw a 3% increase from the
previous ones. Described by ups and downs in the last 12 years, the voter turnout in local elections
has maintained overall an over 50% level of citizens’ presence in the voting booths, with a low of 51%
participation in the local elections of the years 2000 and 2008 and higher levels in 2004 (54%) and
2012 (56%). Although between 1992 and 2004 the turnout in local elections has registered lower
levels as compared to general elections, in 2008, for the first time, local elections have attracted a
bigger share of voters than the parliamentary elections that took place later in the same year. In the
most recent local elections, the share of people’s participation has increased by 5% from the
preceding one (from 51% in 2008 to 56% in 2012).
The more recent opportunity to elect representatives in the European Parliament proved less
attractive to the Romanian electorate; the only two EP elections that took place up to the present
registered low shares of participation as compared to national and local elections (29% in 2007, 28%
in 2009 respectively).
Page 90
Table 4.1 Turnout in elections (%)
Parliamentary
Elections
Presidential
Elections
Local Elections
1990
86
86
1992
76
76
65
1996
76
76
56
2000
65
65
51
2004
58
58
54
2007
2008
29
39
2009
2012
EP Elections
51
54
42
28
56
Source: Permanent Electoral Authority of Romania, own calculations
Affiliation to trade unions
During the communist regime, in the industrial sector, every employee was compulsorily a trade
union member and the trade union density was 80%–90%. Currently, there is no official record of the
number of workers affiliated to trade unions. The only estimations come from trade union
confederations and their leaders’ statements claiming a density at national level of 50%–60%, and
higher figures of 75%–80% in the public sector (Eironline 2009).
The law regarding the creation of trade unions was enacted in 1991. In communist times, there was
one major trade union structure – the General Trade Union Confederation of Romania (Uniunea
Generala a Sindicatelor din România, UGSR) with around 7.5 million members.
In 1989 the union structure had a considerable wealth consisting in immovable property plus an
estimated 300 million US dollars in accounts. The structure divided over the first four years of
transition, into five new trade union confederations.
Over time, the five confederations have been in a sort of competition with each other over the right
to partake in the substantial assets that the former centralised trade union structure owned during
the communist regime (Eironline 2009).
The leadership of the confederations largely remained the same since their setup. While some of the
prominent leaders went openly into politics, some others have been many times accused of
corruption, of taking part in the process of privatisation on the employers’ side and of becoming
inexplicably rich.
Page 91
Membership in civic organizations
Participation in civic organizations is low in Romania. Badescu (2007) asserted that the involvement
of Romanian citizens in civic associations remained at almost the same level (6% - 8%) over the
period of 15 years analysed (1993 – 2007).
Another study (Voicu 2010) estimated the dimension of participation to associative life in Romania to
be under 13% - 15% of total population, placing Romania among the European countries with very
low levels of civic involvement (see also section on social impacts).
Figure 4.1 Percentage of self-declared members in civic organizations
9,2%
10%
9%
8%
7,5%
7,7%
7,1%
7,2%
2006
2007
7%
6%
5%
3,9%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
1993
1998
1999
2000
Percentage of self-declared members in civic organizations
Source: Badescu 2007, based on WVS (1993) and BOP data
4.3 Trust in others and in institutions
Trust in institutions
Together with networks of civic participation and inter-personal relations based on reciprocity
norms, trust in others and in institutions is a key ingredient of social capital (according to Putnam
1993) – a concept that captures definitory traits of the social environment in which institutions
function. High levels of trust in a society are conducive to the increasing of people’s availability to
engage in associative life, to cooperate with others for the creation of public or private goods.
Furthermore, a social environment with a high density of associative life and an important stock of
trust has a positive effect on government performance (as asserted by Boix and Posner 1998).
From the three political institutions analysed here, the most trusted, in general, in the last 8 years, is
that of Government (having an average trust of 24%), followed closely by the National Parliament
Page 92
(with an average trust of 20%) and political parties (14% average trust). We have to notice, though,
the rather low level of trust; in Romania, we can actually speak of a prevalence of distrust displayed
by people in relation to political institutions. In the last 8 years, the level of trust ranged between
10% and 43% in the case of Government, 9%- 35% for Parliament and 8%-22% for political parties (as
shown in Figure 4.2).
The lowest point of trust for Romanian political institutions (10% for Government, 9% for Parliament
and 8% for political parties) was November, 2011, a time marked by the effects of the global
economic crisis, prolonged social protests and political instability that eventually, in the spring of the
next year, led to a change in power due to the centre-right government losing support in Parliament
in favour of a centre-left coalition. Probably related to this, the more recent data (from the spring of
2012) indicate an increase in trust granted by people to political institutions.
Figure 4.2 Trust in political institutions (2004 – 2012)
40
50%
45%
40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Government
Parliament
Political parties
2012/May
2011/Nov
2011/May
2010/Jun
2009/Nov
2009/Jun
2008/Oct
2008/Apr
2007/Oct
2007/May
2006/Sep
2006/Apr
2005/Oct
2005/Jun
2004/Oct
0
Gini
Source: Eurobarometers
In general, less than 50% expressed trust in political institutions between 1996 and 2004 (Figure 4.3).
The points of departure (1996 and 2000) of the two electoral cycles analysed here are low in terms of
trust granted to institutions. The general model is that of increasing in the first phase of the level of
trust as a result of initial measures employed by governments, prior expectations and hopes that
people employ in relation to this new governments. As time passes, though, trust erodes depending
on government performance and a settlement of people’s expectations towards the new political
authorities.
Page 93
Figure 4.3 Trust in political institutions (1996 – 2004)
70
40,0
60
35,0
30,0
50
25,0
40
20,0
30
15,0
20
10,0
10
5,0
0,0
0
1996
1997
1998
Government
1999
Parliament
2000
2001
Political parties
2002
2003
Presidency
2004
Gini
Source: BOP (Public Opinion Barometers), Foundation for an Open Society Romania
As a general conclusion, based on both 1996-2004 (Public Opinion Barometers) and 2004-2012
(Eurobarometers) data, trust in major political institutions (national Parliament, national
Government, and political parties) is heavily influenced by the logic of electoral cycles. Every
elections and forming of a new government is followed by an increased level of trust. In time, as the
new administration unfolds, trust enters a declining path - until the moment of new elections
approaches. The pattern is that of a relatively high level of trust close to the beginning of each cycle,
during the electoral cycle registering a more or less pronounced erosion of this capital of trust.
Over time, this pattern of trust in political institutions In Romania is strongly correlated with the fact
that, starting with 1996, a change in power took place after each of the last 4 parliamentary elections
(1996, 2000, 2004, 2008); every political party that governed at the moment of elections has entered
opposition thereafter. Even in the 2012 parliamentary elections, the vote of the majority of citizens
confirmed the change in government that took place several months earlier as a result of shifted
parliamentary allegiances.
In Romania, trust in Parliament is persistently under the average trust in national Parliament at the
level of the European Union.
Although in 2004 and 2005 the level of trust in Government in Romania was exceeding the average
trust for national governments registered in the EU taken as a whole, in the following years, up to the
present, trust of Romanians in their successive Governments was placed under the EU average.
Like in most of the European Union, the share of people trusting political parties is a modest one in
Romania (ranging mostly between one tenth and one fifth of the population). As in the case of trust
Page 94
in Government, the share of Romanians trusting political parties was above the EU average in 2004
and 2005, and below that since then.
Figure 4.4 presents data on trust in local and regional authorities. Less than half of Romanians (most
frequently, one third of citizens) tend to trust local and regional authorities. In Romania, authorities
at the local level are constantly less trusted than the average value of trust at the level of the
European Union.
Figure 4.4 Levels of trust in local and regional authorities
60%
50%
50%
50%
40%
30%
39%
47%
45%
43%
41%
32%
33%
33%
2010/Jun
2011/Nov
2012/May
20%
10%
0%
2008/Oct
2009/Nov
Romania
EU
Over time, trust in the legal system is expressed by almost half of the people at the level of the
European Union. In the case of Romania, the share of trust in justice/legal system is 15%-20% lower
than the EU average (Figure 4.5). In the period 2004 – 2010, trust in the legal system ranges between
a minimum of 23% and a maximum of 35% of Romanians.
Page 95
47%
48%
31%
34%
46%
47%
46%
26%
26%
28%
48%
48%
25%
25%
2009/Jun
50%
50%
2008/Oct
45%
2007/Oct
60%
2006/Sep
Figure 4.5 Trust in justice / the legal system
47%
43%
40%
30%
35%
20%
26%
10%
28%
23%
Romania
EU
2010/Nov
2009/Nov
2008/Apr
2006/Apr
2005/Oct
2005/Jun
2004/Oct
0%
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Gini
Trust in others
The share of those trusting other people in Romania is, on average, around 33%, with an interval of
variation between a low of 28% and a maximum of 40% (as indicated by Figure 4.6). With a third of
the population trusting other people, Romania ranks low in Europe, even compared to other EasternEuropean countries. According to EVS 2008 data, again Romania scores low on this item (17.6%) 36,
similar to Bulgaria (18.1%) and Portugal (19.7%).
Figure 4.6 Trust in people
40
35
28
29
31
31
33
29
40
39
38
36
34
32
31
36
37
30
33
25
20
10
5
Gini
Source: BOP (Barometer of Public Opinion), own calculations
The difference between BOP and EVS results could be attributed to different wording of this item
Page 96
2007/Oct
2007/May
2006/Oct
2006/May
2005/May
2004/Oct
2004/May
2003/Oct
2003/May
2002/Oct
2002/May
2001/Oct
2001/May
2000/Nov
2000/May
1999/Oct
0
Trust in people
36
32
15
1999/May
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
In the case of Romania, as in the case of other former communist countries, an explanation for this
low level of trust (in others and in institutions) could reside in the effects exerted by the communist
regime and by the post-communist transition on people’s attitudes and behaviour, as indicated by
Tufis (2008). Communism had the effect of instituting a generalized distrust of people towards others
and towards state institutions, people restraining their trust to family members and close
acquaintances. Furthermore, the low performance (as evaluated by people) of state institutions in
over two decades after communism has the effect of reinforcing people’s distrust.
4.4 Political values and legitimacy
Satisfaction with democracy
More than in the case of other types of political regime, the persistence and consolidation of a
democracy is profoundly dependent on citizens’ support. Support given by the members of the polity
appears as a variable that connects the political system to its broader social environment.
When analyzing the extent to which a democracy is rooted in people’s beliefs, attitudes and
evaluations, becomes important to differentiate between specific and diffuse support for that
political regime (Klingemann 1999, Fuchs and Roller 1998, Dalton 1999, Mishler and Rose 2000). The
notion of diffuse support tapes people’s attachment to democracy (in terms of shared beliefs and
values congruent to the democratic rule of society), while specific support refers to evaluations of
current performance of the democratic system (being closely related to the perceived efficiency of
the governing elite).
In Romania there is a strong acceptance of the democratic values and principles as demonstrated by
numerous studies done on the matter (Precupetu 2006, Precupetu and Precupetu 2004, Marginean
2000, Wessels and Klingemann 1998, Fuchs and Roller 1998, Evans and Whitefield 1995).
In contrast to people’s high commitment to democratic values and to a large acceptance of
democracy as an appropriate form of government, the functioning of democracy is poorly evaluated
by the majority of Romanians (an average of only 24%, over time, of people satisfied with the way
democracy works in their country) (Figure 4.7).
Even though a prolonged low performance of democracy in action could erode the legitimacy base of
the democratic system itself, both people’s positive views on democracy as a value and, in the same
time, their discontent with the way democracy works in their country could be interpreted as a sign
Page 97
that citizens are critically interested in democratic governance and that they aspire to an
improvement of the way democracy functions.
In Romania, people’s negative evaluations on the manner democracy works (low specific support for
democracy) have been directed not against the democratic regime itself, but inside the democratic
system, - by the majority voting for a change in power in the last 4 (out of a total of 6) general
elections.
Figure 4.7 Satisfaction with the way democracy works in Romania
90
80
70
68
74
77
80
79
67
67
78
71
76
78
61
35
30
60
25
50
20
40
30
20
40
15
36
29
10
23
29
21
29
10
27
18
18
20
22
20
0
5
"Very and fairly satisfied"
"Not at all and not very satisfied"
Spring 2012
Autumn 2011
Spring 2010
Autumn 2009
Autumn 2007
Spring 2006
Spring 2005
Autumn 2004
Spring 2004
Autumn 2003
Spring 2003
Autumn 2002
0
Gini
Left – right wing positioning
When asked to place themselves on the political left-right wing scale, almost one third of the
population didn’t know what to answer, by far the highest number in the EU (Figure 4.8). This high
proportion is very significant as it might indicate the low relevance of the question in case of
Romania. When taking into consideration those who refused to answer, we obtain more than two
fifths of population for which the question have not been actual and/or relevant. Clear and strong
opinions hold barely half of the respondents who place themselves symmetrically on the scale.
A similar finding was revealed by Comsa (2006), who showed for a longer period of time (1993 2006) the same pattern. Moreover, he explained the irrelevance in Romanian society of the left Page 98
right political taxonomy through the fact that political discourse did not employ these terms and did
not convey a significant meaning to the citizens.
Benoit and Laver (2005) demonstrated that the notion of left and right have a meaning strongly tied
to country context and to specific political periods within a country.
Rotation in power, initially thought of as an indicator of democratic consolidation, proved to be, in
time, a permanent search of a better solution for the major problems of the country that had little to
do with party ideology. The context of Romania made basic economic and social problems the main
engine of political action.
Tavits and Letki (2009) demonstrated that the classic relationship between left/right orientation and
public spending does not hold in post-Communist countries.
We believe that this applies to the Romanian context as well. Here, the actions of various political
parties have been influenced by the opportunities they had when in power, responding to pressing
problems of the moment and to the interest of their political clientele, and much less by long term
strategy and ideological stances.
Figure 4.8 Self placement on left-right wing scale, 2010 (percentage)
1
17
0
22
20
17
40
Left wing
13
60
Centre
Right wing
31
80
Refusal
100
120
DK
Source: EB 74.1, 2010, own calculations
Currently, no political entity represented in the Romanian Parliament fits the profile of an extremist
party.
A self-declared nationalist party (Greater Romania Party) has been represented in the Parliament
from 1992 up to 2008, when scored poorly in elections (less than the electoral threshold of 5%) and
became an extra parliamentary party. After the 2009 elections for the European Parliament, though,
this party succeeded to send 3 elected representatives (out of a total of 33) to the European
legislative body. The highest performance of this nationalist party was in the year 2000, when its
Page 99
leader entered the second tour of presidential elections and lost the presidential race by 33% to 67%
in favour of his political opponent. This situation is similar to that of France 2002 presidential
elections, when the leader of the French National Front entered the second tour and has been
defeated by Jacques Chirac.
Evaluations of Romania’s membership to the EU
In 2004, three years prior to the admission of their country to the European Union, Romanians had a
very positive image of the EU (shared by more than three quarters - 76% of the people in Romania).
At the time, Romania (76%) and Ireland (75%) were the only two countries among the member and
candidate states with such a big proportion of people holding a positive image of the EU.
Since then, the share of people for whom the EU conveys a positive image has steadily decreased, a
trend reversed for a while in the autumn of 2006 (pre-admission year) and in 2007 (when Romania
became a full member state of the EU). The decreasing trend continued thereafter, in the spring of
2012 Romania registering its lowest percentage of people with a positive view of the EU – 48%,
coming for the third time just under half of the adult population (Figure 4.9).
Constantly, the percentage of Romanians having a positive image of the EU was well above the
average percentage registered at the EU level (with a plus of 15%-20%).
Figure 4.9 Image of the European Union (“very positive” and “fairly positive” image)
80%
76%
70%
35
54%
60%
50%
40%
40
67% 65%
67% 68% 67%
64% 66%
63% 62% 63%
50%
46% 44%
50%
46%
52%
49% 48%
45% 45%
48%
30%
42%
56%
49%
49% 48%
30
25
20
38% 40%
15
31% 31%
20%
10
Romania
Page 100
EU
Gini
2012/May
2011/Nov
2011/May
2010/Nov
2010/Jun
2009/Nov
2009/Jun
2008/Oct
2008/Apr
2007/Oct
2007/May
2006/Sep
2006/Apr
0
2005/Oct
0%
2005/Jun
5
2004/Oct
10%
The majority of Romanians evaluate positively their country’s membership to the European Union.
The proportion of people in Romania considering EU membership a good thing ranges between 55% 75% and has seen a decline from the year of Romania’s admission to the EU (71% in 2007) to the
more recent years (55% – 57%) (Figure 4.10). Overall, membership of Romania to the EU is evaluated
in a positive manner by more than half of the population, a share continuously above the European
average.
Figure 4.10 EU membership approval (“EU membership – a good thing”)
80%
75%
64%
70%
61%
62%
62%
67%
71%
64%
66%
66%
55%
60%
50%
40%
56%
54%
50%
55%
53%
40
64%
57%
58%
52%
53%
53%
53%
57%
35
30
25
49%
30%
47%
20
15
Romania
EU
2011/May
2010/Jun
2009/Nov
2009/Jun
2008/Oct
2008/Apr
2007/Oct
2007/May
0
2006/Sep
0%
2006/Apr
5
2005/Oct
10%
2005/Jun
10
2004/Oct
20%
Gini
In the last eight years, a majority of Romanians see EU membership as beneficial to their country (as
indicated by Figure 4.11). Although the share of those that consider EU membership as an advantage
for Romania has reduced over time (from three quarters to around 55% - 60%), the percentage
registered in Romania in this respect was consistently above the EU average.
Page 101
Figure 4.11 EU membership perceived benefits (“own country benefitted from EU membership”)
80%
76%
70%
70%
65%
69%
69%
69%
67%
65%
69%
40
63%
66%
56%
60%
50%
40%
53%
55%
52%
54%
54%
59%
58%
54%
56%
56%
57%
53%
61%
53%
50%
35
30
52%
25
20
Romania
EU
2011/Nov
2011/May
2010/Jun
2009/Nov
2009/Jun
2008/Oct
2008/Apr
0
2007/Oct
0%
2007/May
5
2006/Sep
10%
2006/Apr
10
2005/Oct
20%
2005/Jun
15
2004/Oct
30%
Gini
Attitudes towards immigration
According to EVS 2008 data, the share of people in Romania agreeing to the statement that there are
too many immigrants in their country is a minority of 17.1%, similar to a group composed of other
former communist countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. Among the
European Union countries, a big share of respondents holding this opinion (over 90%) is specific to
countries like: Cyprus, Greece, and Malta. This data indicate that immigration as a social problem is
not on the current agenda of Romanians.
People’s evaluations of factors of success
Good luck was considered by the majority of the population as very important to get ahead in life
and, according to the scores it received, appears to be the central element among the other possible
drivers of personal accomplishment (Figure 4.12). A personal trait, ambition, also received high
scores. Hard work is considered by half of the population as very important for getting ahead in life.
Less important seem to be background factors like parents with higher education and a wealthy
family.
Placing a major importance on good luck as a factor for getting ahead might be an indication of a
state of alienation at personal level. It was explained that transition affected a basic relationship, that
Page 102
between work and pay, effort and reward (Marginean 2006, Precupetu 2012). The convoluted
circumstances of early transformation characterised by economic recession, unemployment, sharp
reduction in income, rapid social polarisation and escalating corruption caused work partially to lose
its meaning. Moreover, the models posed by the rapid affluence many times obtained in illicit ways
eroded values like work and education. Consequently, people started to feel that factors that are not
under their personal control, like good luck, are crucial in their society for personal success. Romania
shares this pattern of beliefs with other Eastern European countries.
Other studies (based on EQLS 2003 data) proved (Marginean 2006) that one fourth of the Romanian
population believed that “in order to get ahead nowadays you are forced to do things that are not
correct”, in comparison to only 10% in EU25 at the time. By 2007 (EQLS 2007 data, own calculations),
the proportion of those sharing this belief had increased to 43%. Once again, this was interpreted as
a perception of a state of normlessness in society, associated with weakening of social control,
increased crime and corruption and erosion of moral values. At individual level, people feel alienated
and develop an impaired relationship with their society which they consider it encourages
behaviours and strategies that are not correct.
Figure 4.12 Factors considered important to get ahead in life, 2010
parents with higher education
25,5
wealthy family
28,5
connections with politicians
34,1
higher education
38,8
talent
46,4
connections
47,4
hard work
50,6
ambition
57,8
good luck
58,8
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
% very important
Source: Quality of life diagnosis, 2010, Research Institute for Quality of Life
Question: “Please tell us how important for getting ahead in life are the following: a wealthy family, parents
with higher education, higher education, ambition, talent, hard work, connections, connections with
politicians, good luck. Very important, important, neither important nor unimportant, unimportant, not at all
important”.
Page 103
4.5 Values about social policy and welfare state
Attitudes towards inequality and redistribution
According to Eurobarometer data, in 2010 an overwhelming majority of the population, 91%, totally
agreed that income differences between people are far too large in Romania. This seems a largely
shared, consensual perception in society. The percentage situates Romania close to EU27 average
(88%). In the EU, the percentage of those sharing this belief varied between 65% in Denmark and
97% in Latvia and Slovenia. The general agreement in Romania can be explained by the special
circumstances of the country, where large amounts of wealth have been accumulated many times
through non transparent, illicit means. The general rise in inequality during transition as well as the
economic crisis at the time of the survey in 2010 might have added to the largely shared belief.
In 2010, 88% of people in Romania believed that government should ensure that the wealth of the
country is redistributed in a fair way to all citizens, while the EU27 average was 85%. The lowest
share of people sharing this belief was in Czech Republic (67%) while the largest was in Greece (97%).
On the other hand, only 32% of respondents believe income inequalities are necessary for economic
development, below the EU27 average (44%). The lowest support for this idea was in Greece (24%),
while the highest was in Denmark (70%).
During transition in Romania, especially its first decade, the government role in welfare has been
weak and mostly inefficient. Moreover, within the welfare mix, where government, market economy
and civil society should all play their role in ensuring the well-being of population, market economy
failed in its role in this respect. Civil society, underdeveloped at first and with no tradition in
Romania, picked up only later, with much external pressure and help, on gaining a certain stance in
providing social services. Consequently, it is rather easy to understand today the high support that
the population gives to the idea the government should ensure redistribution. Rather than being the
expression of a communist mindset (as also shown by Voicu 2005), it is the result of a process of
social learning during transition, where people saw, on the one hand, rapid affluence by not fair
means being accumulated and, on the other hand, that no efficient mechanisms compensated for
unemployment, poverty and rising inequality.
An important majority of the population (82%) believed in 2010 that people who are well off should
pay higher taxes, placing Romania around the EU27 average (79%). The proportion of the population
sharing this view varies between 67% in Poland and Denmark and 96% in Greece.
Between 2009 and 2010, the support for the idea that income inequalities are necessary for
economic development lowered to a certain extent while the view that the well-off should pay
higher taxes gained a stronger support. This might be explained by the fact that in 2010, at the time
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of the survey, the effects of the economic crisis started to have an important bearing in people’s
lives, through salary cuts in the budgetary sector and the consequent effects in the economy (e.g.
lowered consumption).
Figure 4.13 Attitudes towards inequality and redistribution
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90 100
91
91
Income differences are far too large
Government should ensure that the wealth of the
country is redistributed in a fair way to all citizens
86
88
Income inequalities are necessary for economic
development
32
74
People who are well off should pay higher taxes
2009
39
82
2010
Source: EB 72.1, EB 74.1
When looking at the perceptions towards welfare responsibilities (Figure 4.14) it is evident that a
much more important role is placed at the level of government than at the individual level. Romania
shares this model of beliefs with the majority of Eastern countries, as well as other countries like
Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and former Eastern Germany. Finding the same pattern for the
first decade of transition in Romania, Voicu (2005) concluded that “collective mentality does not
encourage passive expectations towards the state, but rather promotes the idea of welfare based on
workfare, where both individual and the state play an active role” (Voicu 2005, 67). In EU, in 2010,
the countries where the balance of views leaned towards a more important role of the individual in
comparison to the government are Sweden, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and Lithuania.
Page 105
Figure 4.14 Welfare responsibility strategies
2010
64
2009
28
61
0
10
20
30
31
40
50
Government should take more responsibility
60
70
80
90
100
People should take more responsibility
Source: EB 72.1, EB 74.1, own calculations
Agreeing poor are lazy
In a study using public opinion barometers data, Voicu (2003, 93) showed that laziness as cause of
poverty ranks second in peoples’ evaluations (24%), the most mentioned being a cause attributed to
society (“unjust society”: 38% of respondents having an opinion).
The social profile of those who consider that laziness is a cause of poverty is defined by an average
age (50 years old) greater that the average age of the respondents. At the same time, such a view is
shared mostly by people having a low educational status (primary and secondary school).
Perceptions towards tensions in society
In 2010, 29% of people interviewed declared there is ‘a lot’ of tension between different ethnic and
racial groups in Romania. In the EU, the percentage of people declaring a lot of racial and ethnic
tensions varied between 13% in Bulgaria and Lithuania and 63% in Hungary.
Perception of tensions between young and old people is among the highest in EU and above the
EU27 average (16%). This might come from the different structuring of opportunities for the various
generations during the process of transformation: while for the young generations opportunities
expanded, for the older ones, they narrowed to a considerable extent.
Romanians are much more concerned with vertical tensions i.e. tensions between social classes (rich
and poor; management and workers) than about the horizontal ones (between sexes, between
generations, between ethnic groups) (Marginean 2006). The prominence of vertical tensions might
Page 106
be the result of inequalities accumulated during transition in Romania. Between 2009 and 2010, the
ethnic tensions have lessened while the other tensions tended to increase (as shown in Figure 4.15).
Figure 4.15 Tensions between social groups
22
Different racial and ethnic groups
Old people and young people
19
29
21
Management and workers
41
36
Poor and rich
35
0
5
10
2010
15
20
25
30
35
38
40
45
2009
Source: EB 74.1, EB 72.1
Note: percentage of people declaring “a lot” of tension
Conclusions
Participation in elections is on a decreasing course in Romania. Parliamentary elections saw a sharply
declining turnout after their separation from presidential competition in 2008. The presence of
Romanians in the voting booths in presidential and local elections, although engaged on the same
declining path, remains at levels over 50% of the total electorate. Less than 30% of citizens have
voted so far in the only two elections that took part for the European Parliament.
Lower levels of trust in others and in institutions registered in Romania as compared to other
European countries (even among former communist states) is reflected in the small propensity of
Romanians to associative life. Thus, it is possible that, in time, this deficit of social capital (in terms of
trust and civic engagement) to negatively affect the legitimacy of authorities and of the democratic
regime itself.
People’s estrangement from political life is indicated both by the low level of trust in political
institutions (government, parliament, political parties, presidency) and by their preference for
institutions that are highly personalized and visible (like the presidency, government, and local
authorities) to the detriment of more abstract and less tangible institutions (parliament, political
parties). So, granting trust to institutions appears to be dependent on how people feel having more
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or less control on them, and how they perceive the outcomes of these institutions (more or less
direct / tangible, more or less relevant for their own lives).
Even if people evaluate poorly the functioning of the democratic regime, their attachment to the
values and principles of democracy have the meaning of a citizenry that care about the fate of their
democracy and are interested in improving its performance. In Romania, the rather low specific
support for democracy was not opposed to the democratic regime, but driven inside the democratic
system through a vote in favour of the political opposition. As a result, change in power took place in
the last four general elections. The absence of extremist parties in Romania is another characteristic
of the political life that favours the persistence and consolidation of democracy.
Enthusiasts about the process of the European integration at first, Romanians’ attitudes in relation to
the European construction have become more tempered in more recent years. More than half of
Romanians, though, approve their country’s membership to the European Union and consider it as
beneficial for Romania.
People’s perceptions and evaluations of social life seem to be marked by an estrangement from
society at the individual level and by cynicism in social relations.
Proven by objective indicators, the unequal society of Romania is perceived as such by the majority
of the people in their subjective assessments. A very large majority consider that there are huge
disparities between incomes and that the fairness of redistribution should be ensured by the
government.
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5. Effectiveness of Policies in Combating Inequality
5.1 Introduction
This chapter aims at detailing policies that can influence inequality and an assessment of their
effectiveness. The focus in section 5.2 is on minimum wages and collective labour agreements as
they can have an important bearing on labour income. Section 5.3 is dedicated to taxation and
concentrates on levels and trends in taxation as well as on policy orientation. Section 5.4
concentrates on social expenditure and details unemployment benefits, social assistance, disability
benefits, old age pensions, health care and family benefits. Last section is dedicated to education.
5. 2 Minimum wages and collective labour agreements
In January 2010 the minimum wage in Romania was 161Euro. In EU minimum wages varied from 138
EUR gross per month in Bulgaria to 1801 EUR gross per month in Luxembourg. When expressed in
Euro, minimum wages in Romania are nine times lower than those in Ireland or the Netherlands.
The gap lowers when looking at minimum wages in PPS, as they represent in Romania almost a
fifth of their amount in the Netherlands. However, Romania still has the second lowest minimum
wage in EU after Bulgaria. During the time described by the data (Figure 5.1) minimum wages
registered a significant increase.
Figure 5.1 Monthly minimum wages
300
246
250
215
200
129
150
100
50
57
27
130
83
25
41
50
153
71
159
68
157
79
162
90
271
242
115
40
35
30
183
139
283
149
142
157
162
25
20
15
10
5
0
EUR
PPS
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
0
Gini
Source: Eurostat
Page 109
Note: Minimum wages as valid in January of each year
In Romania, the level of minimum wages varied during the time described by data between 21% and
33% of the average monthly gross earnings in industry and services (Figure 5.2). In EU countries, in
2010 the minimum wages went from the lowest share in Romania to as high as 47% of the average
monthly gross earnings in industry and services in Slovenia.
Figure 5.2 Monthly minimum wage as a proportion of the mean value of average monthly earnings
40
40
35
37
30
31
25
20
15
31
35
34
33
30
26
29
30
33
32
30
25
20
21
15
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
0
2003
0
2002
5
2001
5
2000
10
1999
10
Monthly minimum wage as a proportion of the mean value of average monthly earnings
Gini
Source: Eurostat
In Romania, the minimum wage is subject to a governmental decision after consultation with social
partners. The minimum wage for 2012 was established by government, at the proposal of the
Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Protection, at 700 RON, a 4.5% increase in comparison with the
last year.
Wage bargaining in Romania is mostly decentralised to enterprises and the government does not
intervene in wage setting. The state-owned companies conduct their own wage bargaining within the
limits approved by the law and after the approval of the budgets of the enterprises. Private
companies also conduct their wage bargaining without having set upper limits by law, while at the
lower end, the bargaining outcomes must exceed the minimum wage. Labour agreements have a
validity between 12 and 24 months and can be extended only once for a maximum of 12 months. The
Ministry of Labour and Social Protection and its territorial labour branches check the agreements
reached, taking reference in a regulatory framework designed to promote consistency and
transparency throughout the collective bargaining system (latest law on social dialogue, Law no.
62/2011). Wage amounts were set for the first time in 1999 through a national agreement whose
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role was to lay down an institutional framework was followed in the subsequent sectoral and
enterprise-level bargaining.
Collective bargaining can be done at enterprise level, groups of enterprises and sectoral levels, being
mandatory only at enterprise level. In each enterprise, the agreement determines an enterprisespecific minimum wage, which must not be lower than the minimum wage fixed by law or higherlevel collective agreements.
An OECD report (2000) assessed that by and large, the decentralised bargaining as practised in
Romania has proved suitable in the private sector, leading to wage deals that are broadly compatible
with the economic situation of enterprises and with a tendency towards higher differentiation of
private-sector wages.
5.3 Taxation
In 2010 the overall tax-to-GDP ratio of Romania was 28.1%, much lower than the EU-27 average
(39.6 %). The level of taxation in Romania is higher than that of Latvia (27.5%), Lithuania (27.4 %),
and Bulgaria (27.4 %) and comparable to the level of Slovakia (28.3%) and Ireland (29.8%).
Between 1999 and 2004, the tax-to-GDP ratio declined, then picked up until 2007 as GDP registered
higher growth (Figure 5.3). During the following two years, the tax ratio fell again due mainly to a
decrease in VAT revenue. Even though in 2009 GDP dropped by 6.6 percentage points compared to
2008, the increase in excise duty rates in 2009 and VAT standard rate in 2010 (from 19% to 24%)
ensured higher revenues from indirect taxes, which compensated for the drop in revenues from
direct taxes and social contributions. The following year, 2010 the overall tax-to-GDP ratio increased
by 0.3 percentage points with respect to the year before (Eurostat 2012).
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Figure 5.3 Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
45
41
41
41
42
42
42
41
40
40
40
41
40
41
40
40
40
40
35
35
30
30
25
20
40
28
26
27
29
31
31
29
29
28
28
29
29
30
29
25
28
28
20
15
15
Romania
EU27
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
1999
0
1998
5
1997
5
1996
10
1995
10
Gini
Source: Eurostat
Figure 5.4 Tax revenue by origin as % of GDP
9,0
40
8,0
35
7,0
30
6,0
25
5,0
20
4,0
15
3,0
VAT
Personal income
Corporate income
Employers' social contributions
Employees' social contributions
Gini
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
1999
0,0
1998
5
1997
1,0
1996
10
1995
2,0
Source: Eurostat
In Romania there is a flat rate tax system with the flat tax set at 16%. The system was introduced in
2005 and replaced the previous progressive four-bracket system, with tax rates ranging from 18% to
40%. The rate of 16% applies to income from independent work activity, royalties, income from
movable and immovable property (e.g. rents), but also to short-term capital gains on listed shares.
Interest income is also subject to a final withholding tax of 16%.
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Romanian corporate income tax is a standard flat rate set at 16% (before 2005 it was 25%). The
system is based on taxing the corporate profits at the company level and on taxing distributed profits
again at the level of both corporate and individual shareholders. Dividends received from other
Romanian resident companies are exempt from taxation. Capital gains are generally treated as
ordinary business income and subject to the same rate.
The standard VAT rate is 24% and was introduced in 2010, previously, VAT being 19%. Currently, a
reduced rate of 9% applies to goods such as pharmaceutical products, medical equipment for
disabled persons, books, newspapers, admission to cultural services and hotel accommodation.
Starting with 2009, a 5% reduced rate applies to the supply of social and some private dwellings. VAT
exemptions without right of deduction apply to, among others, medical treatments, some
educational and cultural activities, public postal services, certain banking and financial transactions,
insurance and reinsurance.
In regard to property tax, immovable property is subject to a local building tax which varies between
0.1% for buildings owned by individuals and 0.25% to 1.5% for company-owned buildings. If the
building has not been re-valued during the last three years, the rates for company owned buildings
vary from 5% to 10%. Land inside and outside city limits is subject to local land tax. Local taxes have
increased by approximately 20% in 2010.
There are neither net wealth taxes nor gift or inheritance taxes in Romania.
Social security contributions are payable at a combined rate (31.3%) for the employer and the
employee. The rate, starting with 2009, is levied for employees with normal working conditions at
10.5%. Employers contribute at a rate of 20.8%. Higher rates for employers apply for special working
conditions. Furthermore, both employees and employers contribute to the health insurance fund
and to the national unemployment fund. All social contributions are deductible for income tax
purposes.
The revenue shares received by social security funds account for 31.9 %, two percentage points
above the EU-27 average (29.9 %) (Eurostat 2012).
The latest priorities in fiscal policy were set by an agreement between the country and the EU
following financial assistance in 2009, 2010 and 2011 (as detailed by the Eurostat report on taxation
trends, 2012): a package of fiscal measures such as adoption of a draft pension reform, adoption of a
Fiscal Responsibility Law and implementation of fiscal consolidation measures. In terms of revenue,
there were also agreed some minor measures: a broadening of the personal income tax base to
include lunch vouchers, incomes from capital gains, income from interests on bank deposits and
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severance payments; broadening of the tax base for social security contributions to include
intellectual property rights.
The policy of the flat rate tax was implemented in 2005 in the attempt to increase the tax base by
reducing tax avoidance and evasion. The adoption of the flat 16% corporate profit and income tax
was assessed as not being successful enough in encouraging formal employment expansion, as the
still high social contributions might have offset its positive effect. On the other hand, it was
considered that the flat rate, enhanced flexibility, though limited, of the labour market. The flat rate,
coupled with the revision of the labour code in 2005 (including more emphasis on active labour
market policies and the simplification of company registration) has had beneficial effects and have
resulted in the years to follow in increased employment and lower unemployment (Daianu 2006).
A study by Voinea and Mihaescu (2009) investigated the effects of flat rate tax on inequality by using
the Household Budget Survey data, through comparing the period before and after the introduction
of flat rate tax. Their research showed that the gains from the flat rate tax were unequally
distributed, with 10% of the number of employees gaining 40% of the total returns from the tax. As a
general model, the higher the incomes, the bigger the benefits of the flat tax and the larger the
household, the smaller the gains were.
The benefits from flat rate tax represent 3.3% of the net income of the households in the upper part
of the distribution and 2.4% of the net income of the households in the lower part of the distribution.
Only for the 1% top income households, the returns from flat tax represented 10% of their net
income. Overall, only the richest 20% were the winners of the flat tax (Voinea and Mihaescu 2009).
The authors’ estimation is that the vast majority of gains went into consumption, especially in the
case of rich households and only a small part went into savings.
5.4 Social expenditure
According to Eurostat’s ESSPROS system 37, Social Protection encompasses all interventions from
public or private bodies intended to relieve households and individuals of the burden of a defined set
of risks or needs, provided that there is neither a simultaneous reciprocal nor an individual
arrangement involved. The list of risks or needs that may give rise to social protection is, by
convention, as follows: Sickness/Health care, Disability, Old age, Survivors, Family/children,
Unemployment, Housing and Social exclusion not elsewhere classified.
37
Romania implemented Eurostat’s ESSPROS system in 2000. In the Annex to the report, longer data series are
provided for social expenditure based on national data sources. We chose ESSPROS system as it allows
comparability to other EU countries and contains the indicators required by GINI report.
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In 2009, Romania had the third lowest social protection expenditure in the EU as a percentage of
GDP (17.9%), after Latvia (16.8%) and Bulgaria (17.2%). This means less than two thirds of the EU
average (29.5%) and only about one half of the social protection expenditure of countries like
Denmark (33.4%) and France (33.1%). During the time described by the data, the level of expenditure
remained rather stable (Figure 5.5), with only a small, more marked increase in 2009.
Figure 5.5 Total social protection expenditure as % of GDP
18,0
40
16,0
17,1
14,0
12,0
10,0
13,0
12,8
13,6
13,1
12,8
13,4
12,8
13,6
35
30
14,3
25
20
8,0
15
6,0
Total social protection expenditure as % of GDP
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
0
2004
0,0
2003
5
2002
2,0
2001
10
2000
4,0
Gini
Source: Eurostat, ESSPROS system
Figure 5.6 shows the breakdown of social protection expenditure by function as a percentage of GDP.
The largest function is old age, followed by health care. All of the functions maintained low, stable
levels during the time described by the data, with the exception of old age that grew more markedly
since 2007.
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Figure 5.6 Social protection expenditure by function 38 as % of GDP
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Health care
Disability
Old age
Family benefits
Unemployment
Gini
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
Survivors
In Romania, the share of cash expenditure is larger than that of expenditure in kind (Figure 5.7) and
old age is the most important contributor to cash benefits. The dynamics of cash benefits is therefore
mainly due to this type of driver.
Figure 5.7 Social expenditure by cash/in kind benefits as % of GDP
14
12,3
12
10
8,4
8,2
8,8
8,2
8,5
8,8
8,5
9,0
35
10,0
30
25
8
6
4,3
4,4
4,6
4,5
4,0
4,4
3,9
4,2
4,1
4,6
4
20
15
10
Benefits in kind
Gini
Housing expenditure was null until 2008 and 2009 when they reached 0.02 of GDP.
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2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
0
2002
0
2001
5
2000
2
Cash benefits
38
40
Figure 5.8 Social expenditure by means/non means tested as % of GDP
18,0
40
16,0
35
16,0
14,0
12,0
10,0
11,5
11,8
12,5
11,9
11,6
12,3
11,7
12,3
13,4
25
20
8,0
15
6,0
4,0
2,0
30
10
1,2
0,7
0,8
0,8
1,0
0,9
0,8
0,8
0,7
0,9
0,0
5
Means tested
Non means tested
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
0
Gini
Active labour market policies
Active labour activation measures were launched in late 90s in Romania, although some attempts
started in the early 90s. Today, the share of labour activation measures in the total labour market
policy expenditure is insignificant in Romania: in 2010 was 0.03% of GDP, by far the smallest value in
the EU. By comparison, this type of spending in the EU went up to about 0.86% in Finland and 0.81%
in Sweden. Even though it never represented a major share in the labour market policy, during the
time covered by these data (Figure 5.9) the expenditure for activation measures registered a decline.
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Figure 5.9 Labour market policy expenditure as % of GDP
0,80
0,67
0,70
35
0,63
0,61
0,60
0,54
0,52
0,50
0,49
0,40
0,34
0,39
0,30
0,11
0,10
0,11
0,10
0,10
15
0,23
0,08
0,06
25
20
0,38
0,27
0,28
0,20
0,56
0,46
0,42
30
10
0,17
0,04
5
0,03
0,00
Total LMP measures
LMP activation measures (2-7)
LMP supports (8-9)
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
0
Gini
Source: Eurostat
5.4.1 Unemployment benefits
The unemployment insurance system and stimulation of employment (Law no.76/2002, modified in
2011) guarantees the rights of the unemployed. The recipients of unemployment benefits are at least
16 years of age, are in search of a paid job and fulfil the following conditions:
-
they have no job, no income or receive, from legal activities, an income lower than the value
of reference the social indicator of unemployment insurance and stimulation of employment,
in effect.
-
did not find a job in 60 days after graduating one of the levels of education;
-
they are under the standard retirement age;
-
had a minimum period of social insurance contribution of 12 months in the last 24 months;
-
are registered with one of the territorial National Agencies for Employment.
The unemployment benefit is calculated differently for those who had working contracts which were
ended due to reasons not attributable to them and for those who graduated different levels of
education. For persons who had working contracts, the benefit is 75% of the guaranteed minimum
wage for the persons that contributed less that 1 year, while for those who contributed longer, a
certain amount is given, based on the calculation of the average basic salary earned during the last
12 months of contributions, multiplied with a percentage determined by different periods of
contribution (the longer the period, the higher the percentage, up to 10% for those who contributed
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at least 20 years). These recipients can receive unemployment benefits for a period between 6 and
12 months (plus 3 months), in accordance with different periods of contributions.
For those who graduated different levels of education, the unemployment benefit is 50% of the
guaranteed minimum wage. These recipients are entitled to unemployment benefits for a period of 6
months (plus 3 months).
5.4.2 Social assistance
The law of guaranteed minimum income (Law no. 416/2001) guarantees to families and single
persons (over 18) with low incomes a guaranteed minimum income. This type of income represents a
social support benefit meant to ensure a certain standard of living for those with no other means of
income. The benefit amount varies by the number of persons in the families and is calculated as a
difference between the value of reference social indicator and the monthly net income of the family
or of the single person. The monthly net income of the family/single person includes all members’
incomes (after all tax deductions are applied), all types of family allowances and social benefits.
Social Aid is increased by 15% in case at least one family member is employed.
The recipients of guaranteed minimum income have the obligation (in case of family, at least one
member) to perform a certain number of working hours in the benefit of the municipality.
In the context generated by the economic crisis, in 2011 (HG 50/2011), a series of restrictions were
introduced that limited access to social benefits which were not generous in the first place. A list of
goods that are considered not to represent the basic needs was introduced. Owning goods above the
levels set by the list will lead to withdrawing the social aid.
Lately, the policy debate, especially in the context of cutting public expenditure, was about
strengthening performance management of the social assistance system, improving equity and
administrative efficiency, as well as about reducing error and fraud.
5.4.3 Disability benefits
In 2009, Romania had the second lowest expenditure of GDP (5.8%) on sickness and disability after
Latvia (5.2%) and well below the EU average (10.6%).
Under the social insurance functions the disability pensions. In addition to this, a number of
programs are in place for adults with disabilities. The major policy concern has been the promotion
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of rehabilitation and reintegration of persons with disability into mainstream society. The shift from
residential to private care has been one of the goals of the administration for the past years.
In 2012 there were 627,243 disabled adults, the vast majority taken care of by family (610,071). Of
the disabled persons, 17,172 (2.7%) were institutionalized. There were 327 residential centres for
adults and 57 day care non-residential centres. (MLFSP 2012)
It is worth mentioning that some of the big residential centres perform also a social function, as
many adults are institutionalized for social reasons (they have no family, no home, they have low
incomes).
The general objectives set by the National Strategy regarding the social protection, integration and
inclusion of disabled persons during 2006 – 2013 “Equal opportunities for disabled persons – towards
a society without discrimination”, were: the promotion of social integration for disabled persons as
active citizens able to control their lives, with the following specific objectives: providing support to
families that include disabled persons and improving the degree of employment for disabled persons
in the labour market.
The benefits vary according to the severity of disability. The benefits comprise in their maximal form,
for severe disability, a monthly indemnity, complementary personal budget and an indemnity for
care-taking persons all paid as lump sums to which it adds some in kind benefits such as free travel.
Disabled children also receive benefits depending on the severity of disability. In its maximal form,
the benefit includes a double monthly children allowance, a complementary personal budget and an
indemnity for care takers paid as lump sums. Generally, the same philosophy as in the case of
disabled adults was followed by policies, through dismantling institutionalized care and shifting
resources towards developing community social services for children and families, family care in the
attempt to preventing the separation of the child from his/her family.
5.4.4 Old age and survivors pensions
In Romania, the pension system consists, according to the current legislation, in a three pillars
system, although only the first two are fully functional.
Pillar I, pay-as-you-go, is the public pension system, and is compulsory.
Pillar II comprises privately-managed compulsory pensions and consists in the development of a
system of individual pension funds which are in the portfolios of private companies. The mechanism
for these pensions started in 2008 and consists of reducing the individual contribution rate and
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transferring the amounts resulted to the privately-managed pension funds. The social contributions
are payable by employees under 35. They start first with an amount of 2% and increase gradually
over a period of 8 years until they reach 6%. In the beginning, for employees under age 35 the
contribution was compulsory, for those between 35 and 45, the contribution was optional.
Pillar III is formed of voluntary contributions of the insured to different pension funds or insurance
companies specialized in the field. The provisions regarding the occupational pension schemes came
into effect in 2005 but they are not fully functional.
The public pension system is the one that is part of public social expenditure that was presented
above. In a similar way to the other EU countries, old age and survivors pensions represent the
biggest function of the social expenditure in Romania (8.8% of GDP).
The public pension system gives the right to receive a pension when the retirement age is reached,
following a full contribution period which is stipulated by law. The retirement age has been the
subject of various modifications in time. In 2000, the retirement age was increased from 57 years for
women and 62 for men to 60 for women and 65 for men, to be fully reached in 2014. In 2010, the
retirement age was increased again to 63 for women, to be reached in 2030, while 65 remained the
threshold for men to be fully reached in 2014.
The number of years of contributions, in order to qualify for the minimum pension is 15 years, to be
reached in 2014. The full contribution period is 30 years for women and 35 years for men, both to be
attained in 2014. The contribution period is to be increased at 35 years for both women and men by
2030. The pension for old age is established based on the contributions paid during the whole active
life and includes re-distribution calculation items based on the contribution principle. A scoring
system allows workers to accumulate points for each full year worked. At retirement, the value of
the new retiree’s points is determined according to a formula and a value of the pension point
established by law. The law also has provisions for an early pension or an early partial pension, for a
period of up to 5 years before the official retirement age is reached.
The PAYG system is financed from the social security contributions paid by employers and
employees. The employer’s contributions are established on a rate basis, depending on the severity
of labour. For normal conditions, the total contribution rate in 2010 was 31,3%, out of which 20,8% is
paid by the employer and 10,5% by the employee. For particular working conditions contributions
were 36.3% (25.8% employer and 10.5 employee) and for special conditions (like those in the mining
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industry) contributions were 41,3% (30,8% employer and 5% employee) 39. The global contribution is
at a record high and was raised starting in 2009, after a 2005-2008 period when they had been lower.
The reforms of the public pension system (in 2000 and then further modifications were made in
2004, 2006, 2007 and 2010) aimed at creating an equitable redistribution40 and at improving the
connections between paid contributions and provided benefits, triggering the increase of the general
level of the individual benefits by a harmonisation process, as well as to the improvement of the
long-term sustainability of the system. However, the delay in reforming the pension system was one
of the factors that perpetuated the structural problems of the system. (Marginean 2008)
Challenges faced by the public pension system
Romania, along with other countries in the EU faces the challenges posed by the ageing of the
population, low fertility rate and a low economic output. However, there are also specific problems
posed by the specific set up of the system.
During the first years of transition, due to the economic restructuring, a series of provisions were
introduced mostly for social protection reasons. Early retirement with full pensions was granted to
persons who had contributed longer than thirty years (men) or twenty-five years (women). People,
who would normally go into unemployment, have been absorbed into the pensions system. The
stock of retirees increased from 3.6 million in 1990 to 5.7 million by 1998 (NIS data). The number of
contributors declined from 8.1 million in 1990 to 5.3 million in 1998.
In addition to early retirement, a series of advantages were granted to special interest groups, like
those for members of the military, MPs or magistrates. Moreover, around elections, the various
governments increased pensions as a largely populist measure, even though they were allowed later
to be eroded by inflation.
Figure 5.10 shows pensions replacement rate. From 1990 to 2006 the value of pensions in real terms
significantly deteriorated and they came to represent only 33% of the average salary in 2006 in
comparison to 51% in 1990. Starting with 2007 pensions started to increase in real terms but they
reached and surmounted their 1990 level only for a brief moment, in 2010, to fall again in 2011.
39
40
MLFSP data
According to the Strategic national report regarding social protection and social inclusion, 2008-2010
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Figure 5.10 Pensions 41 replacement rate (ratio between the average pensions and average net
salary)
40
60
35
50
30
40
25
20
30
15
20
10
10
5
0
Pensions replacement rate
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1996
1990
0
Gini
Source: National House of Pensions and Other Social Security Rights
The dependency ratio, contributor-pensioner went down from 3.5 in 1989 to around 1 in 2011. The
number of employees was 5.258.668 in 2011, while the number of pensioners was 5 422 000 42.
Between 1990 and 2002, the number of beneficiaries of the public pension system almost doubled,
as it increased from 3.4 million in 1990 to 6.3 million in 2002, when it peaked. This was due to
economic restructuring (especially during the first years of transition) which sent into unemployment
large numbers of people, while others left the active labour force and most probably went into the
informal economy (Menil 2002). Currently, there is still an important underground economy
(estimated at 1-2 million) (MLFSP, 2008) where no contributions are paid, impeding on the potential
pension of these persons at retirement age. Moreover, early retirement provisions, and the lax
provisions in regard to disability pensions contributed to the enlargement of retirees stock. The
number of disability pensions increased from 208,000 in 1990 to 920,100 in 2009, when it peaked.
Currently the number of disability retirees is 786 900 (NIS data).
The low occupation rate in Romania means a low base of contributions. Moreover, the high
contribution rates tend to induce employers to declare lower wages than those actually paid to their
employees (Zaman and Stanculescu, 2008). Another feature of the Romanian work force is a large
group of emigrated workers (estimated at 2 million people)(MLFSP, 2008). Many will probably
contribute to the social security system in the host country. However, there is also a still significant
41
42
All values for December of each year, with the exception of 1991 (October) and 2011 (November)
Data source: National House of Pensions and Other Social Security Rights
Page 123
group works in the grey economy that does not contribute to the pension systems and which makes
them vulnerable when retired.
The coverage of self-employed is only partial. Although the insurance is compulsory, their inclusion is
rather optional. Especially during 2001 – 2006, the number of insured among the self-employed was
relatively reduced, denoting a lack of attraction of the system and its reduced capacity to monitor
such category of insured (MLFSP, 2008).
There is also an asymmetry between the real retirement age and the legal age. Due to the provisions
for early retirement and disability pensions, overall, the real retirement age is lower than the legal
age. In 2009, the legal age of retirement for most people in the state system was approximately 63.7
years for men and 58.7 years for women, while the real retirement age was much lower, at 56.6 for
men and 55.7 for women (Gheţău, 2010).
Inequalities
Men/women
Women have lower pensions and, consequently, higher poverty risks in comparison to men, the
difference amounting to at least 10% (Preda and Grigoras, 2011) and reflecting the discrepancies in
the occupational degree, the low scoring given to women for the non-contribution times (child care
leaves), and the lower retirement age.
The difference between women and men in retiring age remains a topic of public debate in Romania.
Some argue that, while trying to protect women by allowing them to retire earlier than men, one can
only discriminate against women (Preda and Grigoras, 2011). It was maintained that women usually
exit prematurely from the labour market, at an age when salaries are higher (the last active years)
and the position in the hierarchy is usually higher, thus losing a part of their potential income.
However, opposing arguments will maintain that women, even though with a higher life expectancy,
spend more time during their lifetime in illness (as showed by data) and are more exposed to mental
illnesses. To this general model, it adds some specific factors for Romania: the unequal distribution of
housework tasks due to a traditional distribution of roles, which makes women work longer hours
than man, and the involvement in raising grandchildren in a country where children care services are
heavily underdeveloped. It is also worth mentioning the important support in society for the idea of
women having a lower retirement age than men.
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Farmers/social security pensioners
In May 2012, the public pension system counted 5 326 200 pensioners out of which 727 700 retired
farmers 43. Over time, farmers’ pensions went in and out of the Social Security Budget, alternatively
being supported from the state budget. Currently, they are paid from the state budget.
Former farmers had very little incomes and many times they were paid in kind. Their pensions,
calculated at a low level, have been supported either by the social security budget or by the public
budget (as showed above). The amount of their pension was in 2012 less than half (43%) that of
social insurance pensioners. Currently, independent farmers don’t pay any contributions and it is
likely that their situation in old age will be rather difficult.
Social security pensions/special (occupational pensions)
Between 2001 and 2008, about nine different pieces of legislation were passed as modifications to
existing laws to promote special pensions for former employees in the army, secret services,
judiciary, police, parliament, aviation and court of accounts. These entitlements were maintained
until 2010 and 2011, depending on the specific category with the exception of magistrates for which
the special pensions still apply. During the time they were in force, among the special categories, the
pensions varied a lot, the higher amounts being those for former magistrates and aviation employees
going up more than 10 times the average public pension (Dragota and Miricescu, 2010).
In 2010, there were around 200,000 pensioners receiving special pensions. From March 2009 until
June 2010, the number of the special pension’s beneficiaries has increased sharply in all the sectors,
between 3.8% in the case of the Parliament Members and 23.7% in the case of the magistrates, while
the increase in the ordinary system was only of 1.3% (Dragota and Miricescu, 2010).
Survivor pensions
Survivors’ pensions are granted to the children and the surviving spouse of a deceased person if
he/she was a pensioner, or satisfied the conditions for obtaining a pension. Beneficiaries may receive
a pension along with income from a professional activity, if the gross monthly income is not higher
than one quarter of the average gross wage. In May 2012, there were 601 900 survivor pensioners.
Their average pension amounted to half of that of the social security pensioners. The level of this
43
National House of Pensions data
Page 125
type of pension will be established as a percentage of the average annual score achieved by the
deceased, depending on the number of survivors.
The policy debate concentrates on a series of issues that should find solutions in order to insure the
sustainability of the public pensions system. Broadening the total level of coverage, extending the
contribution period, better collection of contributions are main concerns regarding the system.
Encouraging work until full retirement age as opposed to early retirement and better control towards
disability pensions are also main themes of policy. In order to address men/women inequality, policy
discussions converge towards to idea of ensuring equal contribution strategies between men and
women. Addressing the budgetary deficit is of crucial importance while the solutions are not fully
foreseeable. Proposals include issuing government securities and privatisation.
5.4.5 Health care
During transition, Romania undertook a major reform of the health care system. Until the mid 1990s,
the country had a national centralised health care scheme, inherited from its communist past, which
was integrated into the state budget, financed by general taxation, and was highly regulated and
standardized. While the system inherited from the communist period provided universal coverage, it
was also facing a series of challenges that perpetuated for almost the first decade of transition. It was
characterised by a relatively low percentage of the GDP dedicated to health care, a centralized and
unequal allocation of resources (with informal payments that perpetuated as a strong pattern to
today), a vertically integrated system relying mainly on a rigid hierarchical command and control
structure, financial flows independent of outcome, while also having a low responsiveness to local
needs. Moreover, health services were rather of a low quality, “with supply of beds and personnel
not matched by the provision of equipment and drugs, poor-quality primary level services,
inadequate referral and an overemphasis on hospital-based curative services, inequalities in health
care provision between regions and between different social groups, and obsolete, discriminatory
and potentially abusive system for mental health” (Vladescu et al. 2008, 139).
Romania adopted in late ‘90s new schemes of social insurance based on contributions and set up
health insurance funds. Also, private practice was introduced in parallel with the state system, while
the GPs who were previously employed by the state, became independent practitioners, the majority
of them being self-employed.
The system encountered serious difficulties in generating adequate revenues due to the small base
for contribution, just like in the case of pensions. Consequently, the national health system is underfinanced and has serious problems in meeting the needs of the population. The latest provisions
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aiming at enlarging the contribution base and implementing co-payments for medical services, have
not proved yet efficiency in generating substantially more revenue.
Currently, the system is based on mandatory insurance premiums paid by the employee (5.5%) and
the employer (5.2%) as a fixed percentage of income. There is also optional coverage, the insurance
premiums being 10.7%. Pensioners with incomes under the pension’s taxation base are exempt from
contributions. For other categories like people receiving social assistance, the unemployed,
conscripted soldiers, pensioners with incomes above the pension’s taxation base and people in
custody or under arrest, which were previously exempt, contributions are being raised from the
social security budget. Other categories, such as children and young people, and the dependants of
an insured person (wife, husband, parents and grandparents) are covered.
The insured population is entitled to receive a basic benefits package that includes health services,
pharmaceuticals and medical devices. The benefits package and the conditions for service delivery
are provided by the yearly framework contract elaborated by the National Health Insurance Fund,
agreed by the Ministry of Health and approved by the government.
The main goals in regard to health, as reflected in the latest legislative provisions (Health Reform
Law.95/2006) were the effective and equal access of citizens to basic medical care, the increase in
the quality of life by improving the quality and the security of medical services and the improvement
in health and demographic indicators, bringing thus the health status of the population closer to the
EU level. The main concerns of the health care system are related to enlarging the contribution base,
measures to increase utilization of primary, ambulatory and home care services, development of
special home care programmes for the elderly and patients from isolated areas, in order to prevent
their admittance to hospitals for social reasons. Also, decentralization has been a major topic of the
public debate in regard to healthcare, objectives in this realm aiming at creating local level structures
of public health authorities that will better answer local needs.
In time, a series of inequalities were created due to the particular set up of the health care system.
Between 1999 and 2002 the District Health Insurance Funds were responsible for raising social health
insurance contributions locally from employers and employees working in the respective district.
They retained and used 75% of collected funds, 25% being sent to the National Health Insurance
Fund for redistribution. Given the different levels of development in the various regions, the
collection of contributions created more inequality. After 2002, the system of collection changed and
went to the national level so as this type of discrepancy was levelled out.
The setting up of two special health insurance funds (for employees of ministries) created for a time
advantages for their respective insured persons due to the lower risk profiles and the greater
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revenue-raising capacities (Vladescu et al. 2005). Currently, these inequalities are no longer present
as funds are allocated by National Health Insurance Fund at district level based on a formula that
includes the number of insured persons and a mix of population risks.
Medical services are unequally distributed at local level. Urban areas are more advantaged in
comparison to rural, while more developed regions are also more advantaged in comparison to those
less developed. As showed by Vladescu et al. (2008) in urban areas there were 3759 pharmacies
registered while in rural areas the figure was only 1102, while specialized services such as mental
health care are unevenly distributed across the country. Territorial imbalance in health services was
augmented by the latest decisions motivated by the cut in social expenditure to close small
inefficient hospitals, especially those in small cities.
Insufficient coverage for some categories, like Roma, also creates important disparities by ethnicity.
37% of the Roma interviewed in a survey (Ivanov and Zheliazkova 2002) declared they didn’t have
insurance. Although the situation improved lately, it is likely that this population has lower coverage
than the majority. In case of Roma, there is a combination of factors like low economic resources,
lack of identity papers in many cases, lack of information that makes this population less covered,
and thus more exposed to health risks.
Some steps have been taken in order to address the current inequalities in health: offering incentives
for family doctors to locate themselves in isolated rural areas, training Roma representatives as
health mediators to facilitate contact between health personnel and Roma communities, hiring Roma
health mediators at the district level of medical authorities, training community nurses as a link
between primary health care practices and community social services, and programmes offering free
medical services for deprived population groups (Vladescu et al. 2008).
5.4.6 Family benefits
Family benefits represent the third largest function as expenditure of GDP after old age and health
care. In 2009, the expenditure for family benefits in Romania (1.7%) was well below the European
average (2.3%), but still higher than many countries in the EU like Portugal (1.5%), Poland (0.8%),
Spain (1.5%), Malta (1.3%), and the Netherlands (1.3%).
In Romania, there is a large array of benefits designed to support families and children. The
complexity of the system is relatively recent. Until 2004, the most important direct support forms for
families and children were the universal children allowances, maintained at a very low level (less
than 5% of the average salary). After 2004, the financial support for families and children diversified
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by introducing the allowance for children with single parents, increasing the children allowance and
through modification of the eligibility criteria (Popescu 2008).
The monthly state allowance for children is a universal benefit which is received by all registered
children up to 18 years of age. Young persons over 18 can also receive the allowance if they are
attending upper secondary and post-secondary education. The amount is higher for the child up to 2
years old (3 years old in case of disabled children) and then drops for children between 2 and 18
years old. Among the family benefits, the children allowance represents the highest share in GDP,
0.56% in 2010 (own calculations based on NIS data). This was an important form of support during
transition, especially for poor families where this type of benefit frequently represented the only
income (Zamfir 2005).
1. The income maintenance in the event of a child birth is given to insured women (in-work) and to
women who lost their job less than 9 months before. They are entitled to maternity benefits for
a period of 126 days that includes pregnancy leave and postnatal leave. The payments are made
from the health insurance budget. 85% of the average monthly income of the last 6 months from
the last 12 months of the subscription stage, up to 12 minimum gross wages.
2. The indemnity for parental leave is given to one parent who can receive indemnity and parental
leave for 2 years (3 years in case of a disabled child). 85% of average net income of the last 12
months prior to the child birth, but no more than 4000 lei (the equivalent of approx. 870 Euro).
The indemnity amount is raised with 600 Lei (130 Euro) for each twin child.
The current policy encourages parents to take rather long parental leaves. On the one hand, this
is beneficiary for the child due to the quality of care. However, it is worth mentioning that in
Romania child care facilities for children up to 3 years old are heavily underdeveloped, while
there is no support for private care. Therefore, there is no real alternative for small children
other than parents care, this delays reintegration of parents into the labour market.
3. The complementary family allowance is a means tested benefit and is received monthly by the
families whose minimum net income is below a certain level established by law. This type of
allowance is limited up to the fourth child which makes is inefficient as an instrument for
combating poverty. It was argued (Tesliuc et al. 2001, Popescu 2008) that child allowances can
substantially reduce poverty for poor families with children. Limiting the complementary family
allowance up to the fourth child impedes on the inclusion in the benefits system of the poorest
children.
4. The allowance for children with single parent is a means tested benefit, paid for those families for
whom the individual income per person is below a certain level.
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5. There are also some benefits given in case of a new born like birth indemnities and outfits for the
new born as a lump sum.
6. The incentive for child raising is given for all children aged less than 2 years old (less than 3 years
old in case of disabled children).
All the above family benefits amounted in 2010 at about 1.2%GDP (own calculations based in NIS
data). The policy discourse inclined towards the ‘responsible fertility’ idea (Popescu 2008), meaning
that policies should encourage fertility by taking into account the available resources at the family
level. The policy efforts have been also towards reducing poverty for children and their families.
5.5 Education
allocated to education in EU after Slovakia (4.1%). This share of GDP corresponds to less than a half
of what Denmark spends annually (8.7%) and places Romania well below the average of EU countries
(5.4%). Despite some increase since 2005, the expenditure remained at very low levels during the
time described by the data.
Figure 5.11 Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP, for all levels of education combined
6
4,6
5
3,6 3,6
4
3
40
5,4
2,8
3,8
3,6
3,3 3,1 3,4
3,3 3,3
2,9
4,2
3,5
3,3 3,5 3,4 3,3
30
25
20
2,2
15
2
10
1
5
0
Source: Transmonee 1989-2007, Eurostat 2009
Data for 2008 is not reported
Page 130
44
Gini
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
0
Total public expenditure on education (as % of GDP)
44
35
During the past years, expenditure on higher education and secondary education increased, while for
primary level of education expenditure decreased (Figure 5.12).
Figure 5.12 Total public expenditure on education as % of GDP by levels of education
1,8
1,6
1,4
1,2
1,0
0,8
0,6
0,4
0,2
0,0
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
pre-primary level of education (ISCED 0)
primary level of education (ISCED 1)
secondary level of education (ISCED 2-4)
tertiary level of education (ISCED 5-6)
Source: Eurostat
For the past, 22 years, Romania’s education system has been under perpetual reforms, either deepseated or less significant, depending on the objectives of the various governments and political
moments.
The reform of the education system went through various stages, as identified by Birzea (2000):
-
A first stage of deconstruction, immediately after 1990, where the focus was on the removal
of the restrictions imposed by educational policy in communist times: elimination of the
ideological indoctrination from education, the reduction of compulsory education from 12
years (which was in the course of generalization) to 8 years, the reform of polytechnic
education, the diversification of secondary education and of high schools types, the
emergence of private higher education etc.;
-
A second stage of relative stabilization 1991/92, an attempt of consolidation of the system;
-
A phase of restructuring (1993-1997), where a new educational policy was designed based on
a new law of education (1995, modified in 1997 and 1999), law on university accreditation
(1993) and of the Statute of the teaching personnel (1997);
-
The stage of comprehensive or accelerated reform (1998-2000), where objectives have been
more substantial: the curriculum reform (educational planning, programmes, textbooks) and
European adjustment of the national curriculum; the transition from reproductive to
problem solving learning; re-launching of the university scientific research; the creation of a
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relevant connection between all types of schools and the larger economic, administrative
and cultural environment; infrastructure improvement and the introduction of new
technologies in teaching and access to the internet; decentralisation and increase of
educational institutions’ autonomy; the introduction of advanced forms of international cooperation.
To these stages, we might add for the following years two more:
-
A stage of relative stabilization and more gradual reforms (2001-2009). This stage was
marked by the introduction of the Bologna system in higher education. Compulsory
education was extended to 10 years in 2002.
-
The last phase would be that of a final drastic reform (finalized with a new law of education
in 2010) characterized by structural modifications of the education system as well as a
change in the philosophy guiding education. The early education principle has been put into
practice by starting school at 6 years old through a preparatory class, lower secondary school
was extended to 9th grade in an attempt to curtail dropout rates, upper secondary school
was reduced to a duration of 3 years (grades 9th-12th).
makers, teachers, parents and students. Changes have translated into a continuous instability that
affected long term plans for students and their families, as well as career plans for teachers.
Moreover, it was explained (Marginean and Precupetu 2010) that this instability turned at individual
level into a perception that the education system is not accessible for all.
The reforms, starting with the ‘90s aimed at decentralisation of the education system with the aim of
lessening the financial pressure towards central authorities and transferring partially or totally
funding responsibilities towards local levels. However, for a country with an economy affected by
successive crises and with a long tradition of centralization, the process proved to be very difficult.
Moreover, given the disparities between development regions, urban/rural, and even at county level,
decentralisation has the potential to contribute to the deepening of educational inequalities (Neagu
2005).
Currently a series of decentralising measures have been implemented in financing, as costs regarding
the school infrastructure are undertaken by local Councils whereas in co-financing domains schools
got financial autonomy and may use their own extra-budgetary resources for boarding schools or
extracurricular activities. Since 1999, the global financing as a lump sum based on the number of
enrolled students started implementation. The state still retained some responsibilities in granting
Page 132
transport services, meals and hosting, school libraries, clubs, differentiated scholarships, bank credits
for students, the possibility of sponsoring some activities etc. (Birzea et al. 2000).
Education policy aimed at access to education and equal opportunities along the following lines:
1. Especially during the first decade of transition, access to education and equal opportunity
measures concentrated on the protection and education of socially disadvantaged children, the
protection and education of disabled persons, the education of children from ethnic minorities (with
a special emphasis on Roma) and the street children problem.
Among the measures targeting special groups of population, those for Roma have been steady and
integrated, as they mixed social, material and financial support with administrative measures based
on positive discrimination regarding access of Roma children and youth to higher levels of education.
The purpose was to increase school attendance of Roma population and to facilitate their access to
higher levels of education. Moreover, another set of measures included appointment of school
inspectors, at county level, with responsibilities concerning education for Roma population;
allocation of special places to Roma young people in high schools and higher education departments
and the launching of study of Romani language (Ministry of Education, Research and Innovation
2009).
2. A separate package targeted the integration in the ordinary system of education of children in
difficulty: institutionalized children; children in foster families; adopted children; street children;
abandoned children; delinquent children; children partially deprived of family environment. The
policy of integration is currently being developed in Romania. School integration of the children with
special educational needs is accomplished through the following forms of education: separated
special education, partially integrated special education, and full integrated special education.
3. Other programmes concentrated on building or rebuilding infrastructure: school refurbishment,
construction of new schools, school transport for pupils in rural areas, equipping schools with
computers, providing equipment for distance education offices, connecting to the internet. These
were complemented with measures for the organisation of education in disadvantaged areas (rural,
isolated, poor localities) with the aim of reducing educational inequalities. Although these measures
aimed at re-launching rural education in the attempt to answer the drop-out and non-enrolment
problems, as well as at reducing the disparity in education between urban and rural, generally they
did not achieve their initial objectives. In the wake of the recent economic crisis, policy discussion
concentrated on budget cuts and closing schools with small number of children, especially in rural
areas.
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4. Some support programmes were designed for children in primary and secondary education that
influenced enrolment rates for children coming from low income families. The ‘Milk and Breadstick’
programme (for pupils in grades 1-8) and the ‘Fruit’ programme for pupils in grades 1-8 are universal
and funded by local authorities. However, they proved efficient especially for children coming from
disadvantaged families. Romania combines family allowances with study grants: the 200 Euros and
the Money for High-School programmes subsidise families with low incomes during school year. Also,
free textbooks are provided to orphan pupils. There are also scholarships provided to students
having obtained remarkable results as well as discounts for students on local public means of
transport.
5. Another set of programmes focused on the basic education provision, literacy, adult education,
development of the distance education; universities opening towards larger groups of young people
and the development of educational forms for adults.
During the recent financial and economic crisis, in 2010, the effect of the economic downturn and
the pressure on the public finances became very pronounced and Romania applied salary cuts for
public employees in order to restore the budget balance. The reduction consisted in a 25% cut
implemented since July 2010, which impacted heavily on teachers' salaries which already were
generally low.
Conclusions
In Romania, during transition, social policy has been through three different stages: the reparative
phase, where the goal was to compensate for the deprivation during the communist regime, the
strategy conception phase, where the legislative and institutional framework have been designed,
and the actual policy phase, where a more articulate welfare regime was outlined (Zamfir 2000).
Romania has the second lowest minimum wage in the EU after Bulgaria. Between 1999 and 2012,
the level of minimum wages varied between 21% and 33% of the average monthly gross earnings in
industry and services.
In 2010 the overall tax-to-GDP ratio of Romania was 28.1%, much lower than the EU-27 average
(39.6 %). In Romania there is a flat rate tax system with the flat tax set at 16%. The standard VAT rate
is 24% and was introduced in 2010, previously, VAT being 19%. The effects of the flat tax on income
distribution were not in the direction of lowering inequality. As a general model, the higher the
incomes, the bigger the benefits of the flat tax and the larger the household, the smaller the gains
were (Voinea and Mihaescu 2009)
Page 134
Social security contributions are payable at a combined rate (31.3%) for the employer and the
employee. The rate, starting with 2009, is levied for employees with normal working conditions at
10.5%. The revenue shares received by social security funds account for 31.9 %, two percentage
points above the EU-27 average (29.9 %) (Eurostat 2012).
In 2009, Romania had the third lowest social protection expenditure in the EU as a percentage of
GDP. The largest function is old age, followed by health care. All of the functions maintained low,
stable levels between 2000 and 2009, with the exception of old age that grew more markedly since
2007.
The Romanian pension faces the challenges posed by the ageing of the population, low fertility rate,
a low employment rate, a large underground economy, a large pool of emigrated workers and a low
economic output. The dependency ratio, contributor-pensioner went down from 3.5 in 1989 to
around 1 in 2011. The number of employees was 5.258.668 in 2011, while the number of pensioners
was 5 422 000. 45 From 1990 to 2006 the value of pensions in real terms significantly deteriorated and
they came to represent only 33% of the average salary in 2006 in comparison to 51% in 1990.
Starting with 2007 pensions started to increase in real terms but they reached and surmounted their
1990 level only for a brief moment, in 2010, to fall again in 2011.
Inequalities in regard to pensions refer to disparities between men and women reflecting the
discrepancies in the occupational degree, the low scoring given to women for the non-contribution
times (child care leaves) and the lower retirement age, between farmers and social security
pensioners and between social security pensions and special (occupational pensions).
The policy debate concentrates on a series of issues that should find solutions in order to insure the
sustainability of the public pensions system. Broadening the total level of coverage, extending the
contribution period, better collection of contributions are main concerns regarding the system.
Encouraging work until full retirement age as opposed to early retirement and better control towards
disability pensions are also main themes of policy. In order to address men/women inequality, policy
discussions converge towards to idea of ensuring equal contribution strategies between men and
women. Addressing the budgetary deficit is of crucial importance while the solutions are not fully
foreseeable. Proposals include issuing government securities and privatisation.
Family benefits represent the third largest function as expenditure of GDP after old age and health
care. In Romania, there is a large array of benefits designed for supporting families and children with
a complex system which increased and diversified especially after 2004.
45
Data source: National House of Pensions
Page 135
allocated to education in the EU. During the past years, expenditure on higher education and
secondary education increased, while for primary level of education expenditure decreased. For the
past, 22 years, Romania’s education system has been under perpetual reforms, either deep-seated or
less significant, depending on the objectives of the various governments and political moments.
makers, teachers, parents and students. Changes have translated into a continuous instability that
affected long term plans for students and their families, as well as career plans for teachers.
Page 136
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Annex
Figures and tables
2002
2003
33,3
33,2
2011
30
34,9
33
2010
30
31
2005
30
31
2004
29
2001
30
2000
35
36
2009
37,8
40
2008
A1. Gini coefficient of equivalised disposable income, 2000-2011
25
20
15
10
5
2007
2006
0
Source: Eurostat
A2. GDP and real wages, 1990=100
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
GDP%1990
Source: WDI database; NIS data, Statistical Yearbook, 2011
Page 146
real wage%1990
A3. Gini 2010
Lithuania
Latvia
Spain
Portugal
Romania
Ireland
Bulgaria
United Kingdom
Greece
Estonia
Italy
Poland
EU (27 countries)
France
Germany
Cyprus
Malta
Luxembourg
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
Slovakia
Netherlands
Finland
Czech Republic
Sweden
Hungary
Slovenia
33,9
33,7
33,3
33,2
33,2
33
32,9
31,3
31,2
31,1
30,5
29,9
29,3
29,1
28,4
27,9
26,9
26,6
26,1
25,9
25,5
25,4
24,9
24,1
24,1
23,8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
36,9
36,1
40
Source: Eurostat
Page 147
A4. Employment rates in EU 2011
55,6
55,8
56,9
57,6
57,7
58,5
58,5
59,2
59,5
59,7
60,7
61,8
61,9
63,8
64,2
64,3
64,4
64,6
65,1
65,7
68,1
69,0
69,5
72,1
72,5
73,1
74,1
74,9
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Malta
Spain
Romania
Bulgaria
Ireland
Slovakia
Poland
Lithuania
Latvia
Belgium
France
Portugal
European Union (27 countries)
Slovenia
Luxembourg
Estonia
Czech Republic
Cyprus
Finland
United Kingdom
Austria
Germany (including former GDR from 1991)
Denmark
Sweden
Netherlands
0,0
10,0
48
47
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
A5. Life satisfaction 2001-2011
60
47
50
40
40
48
49
47
47
46
40
38
30
20
10
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
% "very satisfied" and "fairly satisfied"
Source: CC-EB 2001-2004, Standard Eurobarometer 2005-2011 (autumn waves, 2001 spring wave)
On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you
lead? 1. Very satisfied, 2. Fairly satisfied, 3. Not very satisfied 4. Not at all satisfied.
Page 148
Table A1. Public expenditure
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Education
2,2
2,8
3,6
3,6
3,3
3,1
3,4
3,6
3,3
3,3
3,4
2,9
3,3
3,5
3,5
3,3
3,5
4,3
5,5
Health
2,5
2,8
3,3
3,1
2,8
2,9
2,6
2,8
2,6
3,5
3,8
3,7
4
4
4,1
3,8
3,7
3,3
4
4,1
0,3
0,7
0,9
1
1
0,7
1,3
1,4
1,5
1,2
0,8
0,7
0,8
0,8
0,5
0,5
0,3
0,3
0,6
5,9
5,9
5,6
5,6
5,8
5,7
5,4
5,8
6,9
6,4
6,5
7,3
7
7,4
5,9
5,4
5,6
6,5
8,2
Unemployment
Old age
5,2
6,5
2008
Source: Zamfir et al 2010, based on national sources
Table A2. Level and structure of incomes by head of household activity status and residence, 4th trimester 2011
% out of total
TOTAL
incomes
(average
monthly
income
in Lei)
Cash
incomes..
out of
which…
Total
884,03
employed
Equivalent of
in kind
incomes…
out of
which….
equivalent of in
kind incomes
from employment
and social
transfers
equivalent
of own
consumption
gross
incomes
incomes from
agriculture
incomes from
independent
nonagricultural
activities
79,7
48,4
3,1
2,3
22,5
20,3
1,7
18,6
1061,9
88,8
80,8
0,5
0,5
4,8
11,2
2
9,2
farmer
703,9
43,1
5,9
21,3
2,6
9
56,9
0,9
56
unemployed
498,42
80,9
37,5
1,6
3,4
20,6
19,1
2,2
16,9
retired
855,54
76,6
19,3
2,2
0,9
52,3
23,4
1,6
21,8
urban
980,54
91,5
62,9
0,5
2
22,6
8,5
2,1
6,4
rural
767,38
61,4
26
6,9
2,8
22,4
38,6
1,2
37,4
incomes from
social
transfers
Source: NIS 2012
Page 149
2009
Table A3. Structure of incomes by decile
Decile 1
Decile 2
Decile 3
Decile 4
Decile 5
Decile 6
Decile 7
Decile 8
Decile 9
Decile 10
Cash income out
of which
46,8
58,1
65,3
72,4
76,2
80,7
84,6
87,1
89,6
93
gross incomes
3,8
15
22,4
31,3
37,3
46,6
53,3
60,9
68,5
74,5
incomes from
agriculture
9,2
6,3
5,5
3,5
2,9
2,4
1,8
1,4
1,4
2,1
incomes from
independent
nonagricultural
activities
5
5,6
4,5
4,3
2,7
2,4
2
2,1
2
2
incomes from
social transfers
25,2
27
28,4
28,7
29,2
26,1
23,9
19,5
14,8
7,3
0,1
0,2
0,1
0,3
0,2
0,2
0,3
incomes from
property
Equivalent of in
kind incomes
from
employment and
social transfers
1,4
1,8
2,2
2,5
2,9
3,4
3,8
3,9
3,8
2,7
Equivalent of
household
production
51,8
40,1
32,5
25,1
20,9
15,9
11,6
9
6,6
4,3
Source: NIS, Statistical Yearbook, 2011
Page 150
Table A4. Data Logs
19901993
19931994
19941995
19951996
19961997
19971998
19982000
20002001
20012002
20022007
20072009
Gini coefficient
+
-
+
-
+
-
+
+
-
+
-
Absolute poverty rates 1990-2010
+
+
-
-
+
+
+
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
+
+
-
-
Gini Index - Consumption per Equivalent
Adult
Indices of real wages
-
=
+
+
-
+
-
+
+
+
-
Total fertility rate
-
-
-
-
+
=
-
-
-
+
+
Crude marriage rate
-
-
=
-
-
-
-
-
=
+
-
Crude divorce rate
+-+
+
-
+
-
+
-
=
+
+-+
=-
Registered total crime rate (per 100,000
population)
+
+
+
+
+
+
-
-
-
-+
+
-
+
-
+
+
-
+
-
-
-+
Prison population
Perceptions of insecurity due to crime
-+
-
-
+
-
+
+
-
-
-+
+
Life satisfaction
-+=
-
+
-
-
=
-+
+
+
+
-
Trust in people
-+
=
+
-+-+
-
Monthly minimum wage as a proportion of
the mean value of average monthly earnings
+
+
+
+-
+
+
-
=
-+
-
-
+
-+
+
+
+
-+
-
Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP
-
+
+
Total social protection expenditure as % of
GDP
Total public expenditure on education as %
of GDP, for all levels of education combined
+=
-
+
+
-
=
+=
Page 151

CR-Romania - Growing Inequalities` Impacts

Transkript

Benzer belgeler

one writing from i̇brahim temo about thermal springs of bursa and

Propaganda Activities and British Political Influence in Romania

Characteristic morphotype distribution predicts

Statement by the Hon. Mehmet Simsek, Governor of the IMF for