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Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies
- EDAM
THE TURKISH MODEL FOR TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR ENERGY - II
Editor : Sinan Ülgen, EDAM
Researchers:
Sinan Ülgen, EDAM
Prof. Dr. Hasan Saygın, Istanbul Aydın University
Doç. Dr. Gürkan Kumbaroğlu, Boğaziçi University
Doç. Dr. İzak Atiyas, Sabancı Üniversitesi
Aaron Stein, EDAM
Deniz Sanin, Sabanci University
Contributions by :
Nazife Al, EDAM
Translation :
Tri-A Dil Hizmetleri, Danışmanlık ve Reklamcılık
Can Selçuki, CEPS
This research has been funded through a grant
obtained by the “The William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation”
© EDAM, 2012
Seheryıldızı sokak 23/5
34337 Etiler- Istanbul
Tel : 0212-352 1854
Email : [email protected]
www.edam.org.tr
1. Edition, Istanbul, December 2012
ISBN : 978-9944-0133-5-2
Design: Güngör Genç
Publishing: Tor Ofset Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd Şti
Akçaburgaz Mahallesi, 116. Sokak No 2 Esenyurt - İstanbul
Tel : 0212- 886 3474
The Turkish Model
for Transition to
Nuclear Energy - II
The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Energy - II
About EDAM
The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM) is an independent
think tank based in Istanbul. EDAM’s focus is on economics and Turkish foreign
policy. EDAM’s main objective is to contribute to the public debate in Turkey and
abroad on:
- Turkish foreign and security policy,
- Turkey- EU relations.
- the impact and management of globalisation,
- energy and climate change policies,
EDAM undertakes research in these areas and holds regular roundtables and
conferences. EDAM also cooperates with its partner institutions in EU Member
States on joint research and publication activities.
Institutional And Legal Structure
EDAM brings together a network of members from multiple sectors of Turkish
society including academia, civil society, media and business. This diversified
representation enables EDAM to create a productive and effective platform through
which different visions and perspectives can interact.
The administrative and internal operations of EDAM are carried out by an
Executive Board comprised of 14 members. An Advisory Board including both
Turkish and European opinion leaders supports the activities and projects of the
Centre. EDAM also employs a number of permanent professional staff.
EDAM accepts project-based funding, matching grants and institutional donations
in order to carry out its projects. Additionally, EDAM undertakes joint projects and
research with various civil society and international organizations on the basis of
the principle of shared funding.
About the Authors
Sinan Ülgen
Sinan Ülgen graduated in 1987 from the University of Virginia with a double major in
computer sciences and economics. He undertook graduate studies at the College of
Europe in Brugge, Belgium where he received, in 1990, a masters degree in European
economic integration. He then joined the Turkish Foreign Service as a career diplomat.
In 1992, he was posted to the Turkish Permanent Delegation to the European Union
in Brussels where he became part of the team that negotiated the Turkey-EU customs
union.
Ulgen is the founder and managing partner of Istanbul Economics. The consultancy
specializes in market entry strategies for international companies, political and economic
risk analysis related to Turkey and regulatory affairs.
Ulgen is the chairman of the Istanbul based think tank, Center for Economics and Foreign
Policy Studies (EDAM). His research and opinion pieces have been published by the
Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, Center for European Reform
(CER) in London, the Atlantic Council in Washington DC and the World Economic
Forum as well as newspapers such as Le Figaro, the Financial Times, Wall Street Journal,
European Voice and the International Herald Tribune. He is also the co-author of a book
on Turkey-EU relations with Kemal Dervis. Ulgen is also a visiting scholar at Carnegie
Europe in Brussels.
Prof. Dr. Hasan Saygin
He graduated from Yıldız Technical University as a mathematical engineer, then
completed his Master’s degree at the Nuclear Energy Institute of Istanbul Technical
University as a Nuclear Energy Engineer. He received his PhD degree from the École
Polytechnique de Montréal. At Istanbul Technical University , he became an Assistant
Professor in 1994, an Associate Professor in 1996, and a full Professor in 2002. He
was Vice Chair at Istanbul Technical University, Nuclear Energy Institute in 1994–
1999 and Chair and Head of Nuclear Sciences Department in 2002–2003. During this
time, he was an Institute Board Member and Institute Council Member at Nuclear
Energy Institute . He worked at the Turkish Atomic Energy Agency as a Commission
Member and Advisory Board Member in 2003–2007. He became the Dean at Faculty
of Architecture and Engineering in 2009-2010 and Vice Rector of Istanbul Aydın
University and Honorary Chairman of Energy Politics and Markets Research Center
(EPPAM) at Istanbul Aydin University in 2010–2011. In 2011, he was briefly the Acting
Rector at Istanbul Aydın University . He has 144 publications most of them published
in international peer reviewed journals and submitted in international peer reviewed
conferences and these publications were cited 340 times and 254 of them are international.
He is the member of Canadian Nuclear Society (CNS) and World Association of Soil and
Water Conservation (WASWC).
Assoc. Prof. Izak Atiyas
Izak Atiyas graduated from the economics department of the University of Bogazici
in 1982. He received his Phd from economics at NYU. He worked at the private sector
development directorate of the World Bank in 1988-1995. He became a guest member
of the faculty at Bilkent University in Ankara in 1995-1998. He has been a member of
faculty of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Sabanci University in Istanbul since 1998.
His research areas are industrial economics, competition law and economics, regulation,
productivity and political economy.
Assoc. Prof. Gürkan Kumbaroğlu
Born in 1969 in Trabzon, Turkey. He received his BSc, MS and PhD degrees in industrial
engineering from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. He carried out
postgraduate research at the Zurich Technical University and at the National Energy
Research Center at the University of California, Berkeley. In 2003 he became a faculty
member of the Bogazici University. In 2010-2011, he was a guest professor at the RWTH
Aachen University. He also participated in research projects at the Energy Research
Center of the same university. He has led many academic and technical research projects
and has many international publications and book chapters. He is currently an associate
professor at the Industrial Engineering department of Bogazici University. He is also the
chairman of the Energy Economists Association of Turkey and the vice chairman of the
International Association of Energy Economics.
Aaron Stein
Aaron Stein received a bachelor’s degree in political science from the University of San
Fransisco and a graduate degree in 2010 from the Monterey Institute of International
Studies. His area of expertise is non-proliferation policies. Aaron also regularly
contributes to EDAM’s ongoing work on security, arms control and non-proliferation
studies. Aaron is also a reporter for the web based Southeast European Times
international news agency.
Deniz Sanin
Deniz Sanin is a senior at the Economics department of the Sabnaci University. She is
due to receive a double major from economics and mathematics in 2013. She has been
working as a research assistant since 2010 on different topics. Her current research
focuses on development economics and public policies.
Table of Contents
SECTION 1 - Nuclear Energy and Turkey: A Demand Analysis
1.Introduction
........................................................................................................................6
2. Electricity generation and need in Turkey.................................................................................6
2.1.Electricity supply and demand forecasts............................................................................6
2.1.1. Official Demand Forecasts.......................................................................................6
2.1.2. Generation capacity under construction.....................................................................8
2.1.3. The Need for Additional Capacity..........................................................................10
2.2.Technological Foresight................................................................................................11
2.2.1. Energy Strategy and Technological Preferences........................................................11
2.2.2. Renewable Energy Potential....................................................................................11
2.3.Generation Costs.........................................................................................................12
2.3.1. Energy Generation Costs.......................................................................................12
2.4.The Need for Reliable Generation.................................................................................17
2.5.Evolution of electricity prices.........................................................................................18
2.6.Renewable Energy Subsidies.........................................................................................19
2.7.The Need for Cheap Generation...................................................................................20
2.8.Import dependency......................................................................................................21
2.8.1. Import of primary energy supply.............................................................................21
2.8.2. Cost of imported energy........................................................................................21
2.8.3. The need for reducing import dependency...............................................................22
3. A new technology with possible side benefits for high technology industrial development.
The example of South Korea.................................................................................................23
4. Conclusions......................................................................................................................24
SECTION 2 - Nuclear Power in Turkey’s Climate Change Strategy
1.Introduction
......................................................................................................................32
2. Turkey’s Climate Change Strategy.........................................................................................34
2.1.Historical Developments................................................................................................34
2.2.Future Expectations......................................................................................................36
3. Turkey’s Contribution to Climate Change...............................................................................36
3.1.Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Power Generation.........................................................36
3.2.Turkey’s Emission Factor for Electricity Generation...........................................................38
3.2.1. The Operating Margin Emission Factor....................................................................38
3.2.2. The Build Margin (BM) Emission Factor....................................................................40
3.2.3. The Combined Margin Emission Factor...................................................................42
4. The Effect of Nuclear Power on Greenhouse Gas Emissions.....................................................43
5. Conclusions......................................................................................................................46
SECTION 3 - Efforts to Control the Atom and the Transfer of Nuclear Technology:
An Evaluation from Turkey’s Perspective
1.Introduction
......................................................................................................................53
2. The Commercialization of Atomic Power and the Evolution of the Nonproliferation Regime: From the Manhattan Project to the NPT......................................................................................................54
2.1.Proliferation Shocks: Suppliers Tightening Export Controls and the Residual Effects for Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.................................................................................57
2.2.Coming to a Consensus on Controlling the Spread of Enrichment and Reprocessing Facilities.59
3. Balancing Nuclear Exports and Export Controls: Supplier States Interpretation of NSG Guidelines.62
3.1.The United States.........................................................................................................62
3.2.Russia ......................................................................................................................65
3.3.Canada......................................................................................................................66
3.4.Germany....................................................................................................................67
3.5.France......................................................................................................................68
3.6.China ......................................................................................................................69
4. Turkey and Nuclear Negotiations.........................................................................................71
4.1.NSG Guidelines..........................................................................................................71
4.2.Turkey Gets into the Nuclear Business............................................................................71
4.3.Nuclear Legislation and Chronology of Nuclear Negotiations...........................................72
4.3.1. Turkey and Canada’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreement............................................73
4.3.2. Canada and Turkey’s Nuclear Negotiations............................................................75
4.3.3. Turkey and Argentina’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreement..........................................76
4.3.4. Turkey and Argentina’s Nuclear Reactor Negotiations..............................................77
4.3.5. Turkey and South Korea’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.......................................78
4.3.6. Turkey and South Korea’s Nuclear Reactor Negotiations...........................................78
4.3.7. Turkey and France’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreement...............................................79
4.3.8. Turkey and France’s Nuclear Negotiations..............................................................80
4.3.9. Turkey and the United States’ Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.................................81
4.3.10. Turkey and the United States’ Nuclear Reactor Negotiations....................................82
4.3.11. Turkey and Russia’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.............................................84
4.3.12. Turkey and Russia’s Nuclear Negotiations.............................................................85
5. Export Control Guidelines and Turkey’s Nuclear Future: Recommendations for the Future.............86
SECTION 4 - Turkey’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Strategy
1.Introduction
......................................................................................................................92
2. Major Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options........................................................................................93
2.1.Nuclear Fuel Cycle......................................................................................................93
2.1.1. Stages of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle............................................................................93
2.1.2. Current Nuclear Fuel Cycle Types...........................................................................95
2.1.3. Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle Concepts..................................................................96
2.2.Situation in the World Regarding Critical Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technologies: Reprocessing and .
Uranium Enrichment.................................................................................................99
2.2.1. Reprocessing Strategies.......................................................................................100
2.2.2. Uranium Enrichment Strategies.............................................................................105
2.2.3. Spent Fuel Management Strategies.......................................................................106
3. Options for Turkey and a General Decision Analysis.............................................................111
3.1.Choice of the Fuel Cycle.............................................................................................111
3.2.Decision Analysis on the Establishment of the Country’s Own Enrichment/Facilities............114
4. Concluding Remarks..........................................................................................................118
SECTION 5 - A Regulatory Authority for Nuclear Energy: Country Experiences and
Proposals for Turkey
1. Introduction and some key principles...................................................................................125
2. International norms............................................................................................................128
2.1.Rules of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) ....................................................................................................................128
2.2.EU Nuclear Safety Directive........................................................................................131
3. Country examples.............................................................................................................132
3.1.United States of America............................................................................................133
3.2.France....................................................................................................................134
3.3.Korea ....................................................................................................................135
3.4.China ....................................................................................................................137
3.5.India ....................................................................................................................140
3.6.United Arab Emirates.................................................................................................145
4. The Situation in Turkey.......................................................................................................146
5. Conclusion and Recommendations......................................................................................151
Tables & Figures
Section 1
Figure 1 Peak Load Projections..................................................................................................7
Figure 2 Demand Projections....................................................................................................7
Figure 3 Additional Capacity Projections....................................................................................9
Figure 4 Additional Generation Projections.................................................................................9
Figure 5 Suppply and demand – Slow growth...........................................................................10
Figure 6. Suppply and demand – Fast growth...........................................................................10
Figure 7 The impact of interest rate assumption on cost calculations.............................................13
Figure 8 Electricity generation costs under 5% interest rate assumption........................................13
Figure 9 Electricity generation costs under 10% interest rate assumption.......................................14
Figure 10 Cost of electricity generation technologies in the US between 2008 and 2012...............15
Figure 11 Variable operational costs of electricity generation technologies in the U.S.
between 2008 and 2012.......................................................................................................16
Figure 12 Fixed operational cost of electricity generation technologies in the U.S..........................16
Figure 13 Cost of electricity generation technologies in the US between 2008 and 2012
under 7% interest rate assumption............................................................................................17
Figure 14 Capacity factors of U.S. plants between 2008 and 2012............................................18
Figure 15 Industrial electricity prices.........................................................................................19
Figure 16 Domestic electricity prices.........................................................................................19
Figure 17 Evolution of Energy Import Dependency.....................................................................21
Figure 18 Turkish import expenditures and export revenues.........................................................22
Table 1 Peak load and demand projections...............................................................................7
Table 2 Yearly additional demand............................................................................................8
Table 3 Distribution of production facilities.................................................................................9
Table 4 The production of public and private plants, both operational and under construction,
as a percentage of total demand.............................................................................................11
Table 5 Total Wind Power Potential of Turkey ..........................................................................12
Table 6 Economic comparison, using IEA cost data, if nuclear power is substituted by
natural gas or coal fired power ($ million)................................................................................15
Table 7 Evolution of average end-user electricity prices in Turkey and OECD (USD/kWh)..............18
Section 2
Figure 1 Composition of Greenhouse Gases in Turkey from 1990 to 2010...................................32
Figure 2 Composition of Greenhouse Gases Resulting from Electricity Generation in Turkey
from 1990 to 2010................................................................................................................33
Figure 3 Sectoral Share of CO2 Emissions Resulting from Energy Usage in 2010...........................34
Figure 4 Sectoral Development of CO2 Emissions Resulting from Energy Use.................................37
Figure 5 CO2 Emissions Resulting from Electricity Generation According to Source 1990-2010.......37
Table 1 Greenhouse Gases, Atmospheric Concentrations and Radiative Forcing Values................33
Table 2 Share of hydroelectric production in Turkey, 2006 – 2010.............................................38
Table 3 IPCC Emission factors................................................................................................39
Table 4 Annual CO2 Emissions from Electricity Production.........................................................39
Table 5 Net Electricity Production from Thermal Sources............................................................40
Table 6 OM Emission Factor for 2008 – 2010.........................................................................40
Table 7 Default Efficiency Factors for power plants....................................................................42
Table 8 Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant Electricity Generation Amounts...........................................43
Table 9 Turkey’s Electricity Generation Composition (%)............................................................44
Table 10 The Amount of CO2 Emission Reduction Featured by the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant......45
Section 4
Figure 1 The front end of the fuel cycle.....................................................................................94
Figure 2 Nuclear fuel cycle options..........................................................................................96
Figure 3 Open and Closed Cycle.............................................................................................96
Figure 4 Various spent fuel management strategies..................................................................101
Figure 5 Spent fuel storage pool and dry storage area.............................................................107
Table 1 National practices relating to the fuel cycle................................................................102
Table 2 Reactors and fuel types............................................................................................103
Table 3 Distribution of reprocessing facilities.........................................................................104
Table 4 Enriched uranium excess from defense programs.........................................................105
Table 5 Enrichment capacity(thousand SWU/yr).....................................................................106
Table 6 Spent Fuel Storage Practices.....................................................................................109
Table 7 Planned nuclear reactors..........................................................................................117
Introduction
Turkey’s expected transition to nuclear power has put on the agenda the necessity
of reviewing more carefully the public policies in an area that closely concerns
the public. A year ago, EDAM had published its first comprehensive study
examining relevant public policies in a country in the process of moving towards
nuclear energy. The previous study reviewed the risks of nuclear energy, analyzed
prominent nuclear accidents worldwide, undertook an economic evaluation of the
electricity purchasing price stipulated in the agreement with Russia is evaluated in
the light of international precedents and the developments in the Turkish electricity
market, examined the investment model foreseen for the construction and
operation of the Akkuyu and finally reviewed nuclear energy and security policies.
The full study can be accessed from EDAM’s web site
http://www.edam.org.tr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=135&
Itemid=208
In this second comprehensive study prepared by EDAM, an economic analysis of
the transition to nuclear power underpinned by a comparative study of the cost
of other primary energy sources is undertaken. In other words, the expected cost
benefits of a transition to nuclear power are investigated under different scenarios.
The relationship between nuclear power and climate change policies is examined,
Turkey’s institutional and regulatory structure for nuclear power is considered,
Turkey’s policies towards one of the most critical elements of the nuclear chain
namely the the fuel cycle are analyzed and finally a review of the potential for
technology transfer in this sensitive field is carried out in the framework of the
bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements concluded by Ankara.
This study has been prepared under the coordination of EDAM Chairman Sinan
Ülgen, with the contributions of Prof. Dr. Hasan Saygın from Istanbul Aydın
University, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Gürkan Kumbaroğlu from Boğaziçi University, Assoc.
Prof. Dr. İzak Atiyas and Deniz Sanin from Sabancı University, Aaron Stein from
EDAM and Deniz Sanin from Sabanci University. EDAM deputy secretary general
Nazife Al has also contributed. This study has been financed by a grant from the
Hewlett Foundation, California, USA.
Section I
Nuclear Energy
and Turkey: A Demand
Analysis
I
Gürkan Kumbaroğlu
2
Nuclear Energy and Turkey: A Demand Analysis
Executive Summary
In Europe, countries like Germany and Switzerland have announced that they will
not build new nuclear energy plants once the current operational ones reach their
economic lifetime. On the other hand, other European countries like France and
Sweden appear to be determined to continue their nuclear programs. Likewise in
Asia, the fast emerging economies of recent years such as China and South Korea
do not seem to be affected by the Fukushima disaster and further their programs
to install new nuclear power plants. In these countries nuclear energy is seen as
a must in order to meet the fast growing energy demand and support economic
growth, through low-cost production of goods and services which increases
competitiveness.
With its emerging economy and rapidly growing electric energy demand, Turkey
resembles more the Asian countries as opposed to European countries where
the demand is matured (saturated). In Turkey, rapidly growing demand which
averages 7-8% per year in the long run, brings the need for new investment and
capacity additions. Per capita consumption needs to be quadrupled in order to
reach the European average. Hence, despite the efforts to increase energy efficiency
as well energy savings and decrease electricity losses, an economically growing
Turkey will expectedly continue to have an increase in demand and additional
capacity requirements in the mid and long term.
Electricity generation and need in Turkey
The generation capacity projection for the period 2011-2020 utilizes the demand
forecast series derived in the modeling exercise done in June 2011 by the Ministry
of Energy and Natural Resources in accordance with macroeconomic targets. Two
scenarios, characterized by high demand series and low demand series, were used
to define the upper and lower boundaries of the evolution of demand. On average,
electricity in the low demand series is forecasted to grow by %6.5 and in the high
demand series by 7.5% annually. Accordingly demand would increase from 227
billion kWh in 2011 to 433.9 billion kWh in 2020. It is estimated that peak power
demand in 2020 cannot be met under the current supply outlook. Furthermore,
demand cannot be met already in 2016 according to figures for reliable power
generation and in 2018 according to project generation figures.
Energy Generation Costs
The envisaged electric energy generation capacity of the Akkuyu nuclear power
plant has been calculated in the Climate Change Strategy section of this report.
Accordingly, annual production will be 8,935,200 MWh in 2019, 17,870,400 MWh in
2020, 26,805,600 MWh in 2021 and 35,740,800 MWh in 2022 onwards. The median
3
value of cost figures in the IEA report under interest rate assumptions of 5% and
10% are given, respectively, as 5.9 and 9.9 cent/kWh for nuclear plants , 8.6 and 9.2
cent/kWh for combined cycle gas plants and 6.2 and 9.0 cent/kWh for coal plants.
The comparison of nuclear energy generation cost, using the figures above, with
the cost of generating the same amount of electric energy by a natural gas or coal
fired power plant is provided in the following Table.
Table Economic comparison, using IEA cost data, if nuclear power is substituted by natural gas or
coal fired power ($ million)
Nuclear
Natural Gas
Coal
5% Interest
10% Interest
5% Interest
10% Interest
5% Interest
10% Interest
2019
527
885
768
822
554
804
2020
1,054
1,769
1,537
1,644
1,108
1,608
2021
1,582
2,654
2,305
2,466
1,662
2,413
2022 and
onwards
2,109
3,538
3,074
3,288
2,216
3,217
Accordingly when Akkuyu nuclear power plant becomes fully operational with
its full capacity of 4,800 MW, under IEA cost calculations with 5% interest rate
assumption, it annually saves $ 1 billion in comparison to production from a
natural gas fired plant and $ 100 million in comparison to production from a
coal fired plant. On the other hand, when 10% interest rate is assumed, nuclear is
found to be more expensive than both natural gas and coal by $ 250 million and
$ 300 million, respectively. These calculations do not include externality costs, i.e.
damage costs arising from fossil fuel based plants’ greenhouse gas emissions and
for nuclear plants cost from radioactive wastes and associated risks. The analysis
of associated risks is done in a previous study by EDAM and the contribution of
nuclear power plants to climate change has been analyzed in another section of this
report.
The Need for Cheap Generation
Since electrical energy is a main input in the production of goods and services
across all sectors, it constitutes a major cost item in production. Therefore, high
electricity prices are reflected in the prices of goods and services as a reflection of
increased production cost, which in return hampers competitiveness. Particularly
within the context of international trade, exporting firms of countries with low
electricity prices enjoy a competitive advantage. Steering investment through
financial instruments such as subsidies and taxes is vitally important for a
developing country, such as Turkey, with rapidly increasing electricity demand
and investment needs. If greenhouse emissions are restricted, then an electricity
generation system based on fossil fuels risks incurring new costs due to the need
for investing in new and expensive technologies which would increase overall
4
costs and damage the economy at large. In short, the importance of generating
cheap electricity that is ecologically and economically sustainable is abundantly
clear and necessary measures should be taken to ensure sustainability. There needs
to be more public debate on whether nuclear energy generation is as cheap as the
IEA figures and also on issues such as waste storage, plant dismantling costs and
accident risks.
Import dependency
Turkey’s import dependency in energy supply increased over time to reach 80%
(see Figure 17). Almost half of (46% in 2010) electricity generation depends on
natural gas, which exacerbate import dependency given that 98% of natural gas
comes from abroad. The high level of energy import dependency feeds concern
over supply security and price stability, hence increasing the importance of a wider
utilization of domestic resources.
Energy imports play an important role as they hold the major share in Turkey’s
foreign trade deficit. The energy import bill of $ 54 billion makes up almost
half of the foreign trade deficit. In order for the economy to remain healthy and
sustainable, the foreign trade deficit must be decreased by increasing exports and
reducing import dependency. Nuclear energy generation will create some level
of foreign dependency due to the need for technology and the need for enriched
uranium as a fuel. However, the small shares of fuel costs in total generation costs
and the ability to acquire the long-term fuel requirements early on, reduce foreign
dependency.
Conclusion
Nuclear energy generation is a relatively cheap source with a high capacity factor
making it a desirable energy source for many developed countries. However,
on the other hand, the radioactive waste, threat of leaks and accidents make it a
questionable energy alternative. The economics, technology and risks of nuclear
power generation were evaluated with particular reference to the Akkuyu
plant in a pioneering study (EDAM, 2011). This study complements the EDAM
2011 findings by elaborating nuclear energy within the context of increasing
energy demand in Turkey from different perspectives including supply-demand
projections, renewable energy potential, electricity prices, import dependency and
international comparisons.
The utilization of renewable energy sources, which constitutes the largest
indigenous source, should clearly be increased. However, meeting demand only
by renewable energy does not seem possible because of technical and economic
challenges as well as potential restrictions.
It is not realistic to expect that renewable energy can fully substitute thermal plants
as long as there is not a technological revolution that will drive generation costs
significantly down and render distribution networks sufficient, and as long as
5
there no additional external financing mechanisms get available. It is important to
ensure not only the technical and environmental but also economic sustainability
of investments that will prevent supply shortage which may occur by 2016
according to official projections.
A further increase in electricity prices, which are already fair above the OECD
average, will create a threat for international competitiveness of goods and
services produced in Turkey. On the other hand, the energy import dependency of
80% threatens price stability and the fossil fuel import bill exceeding $ 50 billion
threatens the balance of payments. Therefore, policy-makers aim to lower the
share of imported natural gas in electricity production, which currently amounts
to nearly 50% of total power generation. As an alternative to natural gas, coal
and nuclear power appear as economically viable options that provide reliable
production.
6
1-Introduction
In Europe, countries like Germany and Switzerland have announced that they will
not build new nuclear energy plants once the current operational ones reach their
economic lifetime. On the other hand, other European countries like France and
Sweden appear to be determined to continue their nuclear programs. Likewise in
Asia, the fast emerging economies of recent years such as China and South Korea
do not seem to be affected by the Fukushima disaster and further their programs
to install new nuclear power plants. In these countries nuclear energy is seen as
a must in order to meet the fast growing energy demand and support economic
growth, through low-cost production of goods and services which increases
competitiveness.
With its emerging economy and rapidly growing electric energy demand, Turkey
resembles more the Asian countries as opposed to European countries where
the demand is matured (saturated). In Turkey, rapidly growing demand which
averages 7-8% per year in the long run, brings the need for new investment and
capacity additions. Per capita consumption needs to be quadrupled in order to
reach the European average. Hence, despite the efforts to increase energy efficiency
as well energy savings and decrease electricity losses, an economically growing
Turkey will expectedly continue to have an increase in demand and additional
capacity requirements in the mid and long term.
This study examines the role of nuclear energy within the context of increased
demand for electricity in Turkey. The remaining sections include demand and
supply projections, analysis of the renewable energy potential, cost comparison
between different generation technologies, evolution of electricity prices in
comparison to OECD countries, analysis of export dependency in energy and
finally, an evaluation of the nuclear power experience of South Korea.
2-Electricity generation and
need in Turkey
2.1. Electricity supply and demand forecasts
2.1.1. Official demand forecasts
The Turkish Electric Transmission Company TEİAŞ annually publishes 10-year
forecasts of production amount and capacity. The most recent study, published in
November 2011, covers the period 2011-2020. This study investigates how electric
energy demand will be met by taking into consideration the capacity of existing
plants, facilities that are under construction and the ones, for which licenses have
7
been granted and which are expected to be operational in the foreseeable future.
In addition the analysis considers reliable capacity by taking into consideration
operating reserves and reports projected and reliable production capacity of the
above mentioned facilities.
The generation capacity projection for the period 2011-2020 utilizes the demand
forecast series derived in the modeling exercise done in June 2011 by the Ministry
of Energy and Natural Resources in accordance with macroeconomic targets. Two
scenarios, characterized by high demand series and low demand series, were
used to define the upper and lower boundaries of the evolution of demand. On
average, electricity in the low demand series is forecasted to grow by %6.5 and in
the high demand series by 7.5% annually. Demand forecasts are reported in gross
terms excluding the inefficiencies and losses in the transmission network as well
as internal usage of the facilities. In addition, peak load series are derived under
the assumption that the load curve will not change its characteristics during the
planning period. Peak load and annual demand projections for both scenarios are
presented in Table 1. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the evolution of the peak load and
demand intervals.
Table 1. Peak load and demand projections
Source: TEİAŞ (2011)
Low Demand Scenario
High Demand Scenario
Peak Load
MW
Change
(%)
Demand
GWh
Change
(%)
Demand
GWh
Change
(%)
2011
36,000
7.8
227,000
7.9
36,000
7.8
227,000
7.9
2012
38,000
5.6
241,130
6.2
38,400
6.7
243,430
7.2
2013
40,130
5.6
257,060
6.6
41,000
6.8
262,010
7.6
2014
42,360
5.6
273,900
6.6
43,800
6.8
281,850
7.6
2015
44,955
6.1
291,790
6.5
46,800
6.8
303,140
7.6
2016
47,870
6.5
310,730
6.5
50,210
7.3
325,920
7.5
2017
50,965
6.5
330,800
6.5
53,965
7.5
350,300
7.5
2018
54,230
6.4
352,010
6.4
57,980
7.4
376,350
7.4
2019
57,685
6.4
374,430
6.4
62,265
7.4
404,160
7.4
2020
61,340
6.3
398,160
6.3
66,845
7.4
433,900
7.4
Figure 1: Peak Load Projections
Peak Load Change
MW
(%)
Figure 2 : Demand Projections
Low
High
Low
High
8
Additional demand, in accordance with TEİAŞ projections, given by the difference
between demands of two consecutive years until 2020 is shown in Table 2 below.
Table 2. Yearly additional
demand
Low Demand
High Demand
GWh
GWh
2012
14,130
16,430
2013
15,930
18,580
2014
16,840
19,840
2015
17,890
21,290
2016
18,940
22,780
2017
20,070
24,380
2018
21,210
26,050
2019
22,420
27,810
2020
23,730
29,740
2.1.2. Generation capacity under construction
In the TEİAŞ study, generation capacity projections are established by taking
into account various types of facilities in the Turkish Electrical System including
existing plants, facilities that are under construction and the ones that are
expected to be operational in the foreseeable future for which licenses have been
granted. The study contains detailed information on the facilities that are under
construction. Installed capacity levels, project and reliable generation amounts of
the facilities under construction that are granted licenses by the end of 2010 and
private production facilities which will be operational in the planning horizon,
are calculated by taking into consideration the year in which these facilities will
become operational and under two different scenarios based on the assumptions
noted below as put forward by the Energy Market Regulatory Authority.
Under scenario 1, the operationality date was deemed uncertain for those projects
with a progress rate below 10% and for those where information on progress is
undisclosed. Projects with a progress rate 70% or above were assumed to become
operational in 2011. In addition, for projects with a progress rate between 35%- 70%
the following assumptions, contingent on the capacity of the facility, were applied
for date of operationality:
- Below 100 MW year 2012,
- Between 100 MW – 1000 MW year 2013,
- Above 1000 MW year 2014
Finally, for projects with a progress rate between 10% and 35%, one year was
added to the foreseen completion date.
9
Scenario 2 follows the same methodology as scenario 1 with the replacement of
10%, 15% and 35% thresholds with 40%, 70% and 80% respectively.
The amount of electric energy that will be produced by each facility is calculated,
within two scenarios (projec and reliable generation levels) by evaluating for
each year the periodic maintenance, down time, hydrologic and rehabilitation
conditions of the plants. Table 3 shows the additional installed capacity, under both
scenarios, that is expected to be available once facilities under construction become
operational.
Table 3. Distribution of production facilities
Slow
Progress Scenario
Fast
Progress Scenario
Installed
Capacity
MW
Project
Generation
GWh
Reliable
Generation
GWh
Installed
Capacity
MW
Project
Generation
GWh
Reliable
Generation
GWh
2011
3,372
7,641
6,180
3,811
8,532
6,709
2012
1,991
11,333
8,426
2,287
12,841
9,584
2013
5,006
19,013
15,400
7,058
25,216
21,058
2014
3,801
20,226
17,241
2,827
24,096
20,812
2015
1,200
13,787
11,587
1,200
12,070
10,130
As seen in Figure 3, additional capacity that will be operational in 2014 and
2015 is higher under the slow paced construction scenario in comparison to the
scenario with fast paced construction. This is due to the fact that facilities with fast
progressing constructions become operational in previous years.
Figure 3. Additional Capacity Projections
Slow
Figure 4. Additional Generation Projections
Slow-Reliable
Slow-Project
Fast-Reliable
Fast-Project
Fast
Source TEİAŞ (2011)
10
2.1.3. The Need for Additional Capacity
The TEİAŞ study reports on how a demand increase from 227 billion kWh in
2011 to 433.9 billion kWh in 2020 (in accordance with the high demand series
determined in the modeling exercise of the Ministry of Energy and National
Resources) would be met given the supply outlook given in the previous section
and presents implications for supply-demand balance. It is found that peak power
demand in 2020 cannot be met under the current supply outlook. Furthermore,
demand cannot be met already in 2016 according to figures for reliable power
generation and in 2018 according to project generation figures.
The demand projections and additional generation forecasts reported previously
are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. As can be seen in Figure 5, if the progress of
plants under construction continues in slow pace, the reliable production figures
of these plants will not be enough to meet additional demand. On the other hand,
while projected productions are sufficient to meet low demand scenarios in 2014
and 2015, they fall short of high demand projections. Figure 6 shows that if the
progress of plants under construction continues in fast pace, then additional
demand in 2014 and 2015 could be met; however, still there is unmet additional
demand in preceeding and succeeding periods.
Figure 5: Suppply and demand – Slow growth
High Demand
Low Demand
Project Production
Reliable Production
Figure 6. Suppply and demand – Fast growth
High Demand
Low Demand
Project Production
Reliable Production
Table 4 shows the production of public and private plants, both operational and
under construction, as a percentage of total demand. As illustrated, the reserve
production nearing 30% at times plunges to negative values between 2016-2019
depending on the scenario, making evident the need for additional production
facilities beginning 2016. A similar situation is observed for installed capacity
backup to meet peak power demand.
11
Table 4 .The production of public and private plants, both operational and under construction, as a
percentage of total demand
Low Demand
Project Generation
High Demand
Reliable Generation
Project Generation
Reliable Generation
Fast
Progress
Slow
Progress
Fast
Progress
Slow
Progress
Fast
Progress
Slow
Progress
Fast
Progress
Slow
Progress
2011
30,3
29,9
11,8
11,6
30,3
29,9
11,8
11,6
2012
28,1
27,1
10,6
9,9
26,9
25,9
9,6
8,9
2013
29,8
26,4
13,0
10,2
27,3
24,1
10,9
8,1
2014
30,0
25,5
14,2
10,2
26,4
21,9
10,9
7,1
2015
26,5
22,8
11,3
8,1
21,7
18,2
7,2
4,0
2016
19,3
15,9
4,9
1,9
13,8
10,5
0,0
-2,9
2017
11,7
8,5
-1,6
-4,5
5,5
2,5
-7,1
-9,8
2018
5,2
2,2
-7,5
-10,2
-1,6
-4,4
-13,5
-16,0
2019
-1,1
-4,0
-13,0
-15,5
-8,4
-11,1
-19,4
-21,8
2020
-7,0
-9,7
-18,2
-20,6
-14,7
-17,2
-24,9
-27,1
2.2. Technological Foresight
2.2.1. Energy Strategy and Technological Preferences
According to the “Electric Energy Market and Supply Security Strategy Paper” in
force since 2009, the goals for year 2023 are set as follows: the share of renewable
sources in electricity generation is targeted to be at least 30% whereas it is aimed
that the share of natural gas gets reduced to less than 30% of total generation;
the share of nuclear energy is planned to be 5%. Furthermore, it is envisaged that
the installed capacity of wind power will increase to 20,000 MW and all 600 MW
of geothermal potential as well as all of hydroelectric power potential will be
operational by 2023. Finally, the strategy paper targets widening the use of solar
power in the generation of electricity in order to fully benefit from its potential.
The increased share of renewables in electricity generation will decrease the share
of fossil fuels, and particularly of imported energy sources. It is also mentioned
that proven lignite and hardcoal reserves will be depleted until 2023 and plants
dependent on imported coal will be operational.
2.2.2. Renewable Energy Potential
The Wind Power Potential Map of Turkey (REPA) along with the Solar Energy
Potential Map (GEPA) are published on the website of the General Directorate
for Renewable Energy under the auspices of the Ministry of Energy and Natural
Resources. The regional wind speed and capacity factors as well as solar radiation
levels are reported in both maps. Figures prove Turkey to be in a vantage point
with respect to majority of European countries in both sources of energy. “The
12
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources and Affiliates’ Targets and Activities”
report of 2011, also known as the “Blue Book”, quantifies the REPA figures of
installed capacity. Accordingly, the potential of wind power is given to be 47,849
MW (see Table 5). But in view of the conversion efficiency of wind power, this
capacity corresponds to an electricity generation potential of approximately 33
billion kWh. In addition according to TEIAS at present only 33 billion kWh of
wind power can be connected the transmission network. Whereas compared to the
reference year of 2011, the increase in yearly demand is estimated to be between
170 and 207 billion kWh.
Table 5. Total Wind Power Potential of Turkey
Wind Speed
(m/s)
Wind Power
(W/m2)
Total Area
(km2)
Source: Blue Book (2011)
Percentage
of Land With
Wind
Total Installed
Capacity
(MW)
7.5- 8
400-500
5.851,87
0.8
29.259,36
8-8.5
500-600
2.598,86
0.4
12.994,32
8.5-9
600-800
1.079,98
0.1
5.399,92
>9
>800
39,17
0
195,84
9.569,89
1,3
47.849,44
According to the State Hydraulic Works (DSI), Turkey’s theoretical hydropower
potential amounts to 433 billion kWh whereas the recoverable technical potential
is computed as 216 billion kWh. DSI data indicates that Turkey’s hydropower
potential utilization rate is quite low when compared to developed countries and
there is a potential of 20,000 MW capacity whose construction has not started.
It is evident in GEPA that Turkey is located on a solar belt and has a significant
solar energy potential . Whilst some of this potential is used in hot water
generation, its use for electricity generation is virtually non-existent. Due to the
fact that electricity generation from solar energy is more expensive with respect
to other renewable sources such as wind and hydro, no quantified data in terms
of installed capacity is available for solar power. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to
note that Germany with a solar potential less than the worst performing region
of Turkey, the Black Sea region, has more than 20,000 MW installed solar power
capacity.
2.3. Generation Costs
2.3.1. Energy Generation Costs
The study “Projected Costs of Generating Electricity” published by the
International Energy Agency (IEA) in 2010 presents production costs of various
technologies. It reports from 21 countries capturing data from a total of 190 plants
of which 48 are coal (34 with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology and
13 without CCS), 27 are natural gas, 20 are nuclear, 26 are wind (18 on land and
8 on water), 17 are solar, 14 are hydroelectric, 20 are co-generation and 18 are
other types. The evaluation of data from these plants is done under a common
13
methodology and assumptions, providing for a chance to compare. The calculated
figures represent the net production cost excluding transmission and distribution
costs. The cost forecasts of the study include an endogenized cost of 30 USD/ton
CO2. According to the IEA study, nuclear, coal and natural gas plants are relatively
cheaper alternatives in Europe. While the assumptions of the study are presented
in the report, it is underlined that cost calculations are particularly sensitive to the
interest rate. As seen in Figure 7 below, the cost of nuclear power technology is
significantly affected by the interest rate assumption.
Figure 7. The impact
of interest rate
assumption on cost
calculations
(Source: IEA, 2010)
Figures 8 and 9 show regional costs under two different interest rate scenarios
Figure 8. Electricity generation costs under 5% interest rate assumption
(Source: IEA, 2010)
14
Figure 9. Electricity generation costs under 10% interest rate assumption
(Source: IEA, 2010)
The IEA regional cost figures presented above take into consideration only
onshore wind power from among the renewable power generation technologies.
Among these, only some wind power plants in the USA are able to compete with
nuclear power plants in terms of generation cost. A more comprehensive and
up to date cost analysis is available at the U.S. National Renewable Energy Lab
(NREL) database. Figures 10 through 13 show the cost range based on the data
from various plants between 2008 and 2012. Accordingly, due to relatively higher
investment costs and relatively lower production costs, total costs remain low
for nuclear power plants. However, unlike the IEA results, NREL results provide
similar production costs for nuclear power and wind power. This outcome stems
from the fact that, under suitable weather conditions, wind power can compete
with nuclear power in terms of cost. It must be noted, however, that discontinuity
of suitable wind conditions limit wind power plants’ ability to meet the demand
throughout a year and the issue of reliability, further discussed in the following
section, becomes relevant.
The envisaged electric energy generation capacity of the Akkuyu nuclear power
plant has been calculated in the Climate Change Strategy section of this report.
Accordingly, annual production will be 8,935,200 MWh in 2019, 17,870,400 MWh in
2020, 26,805,600 MWh in 2021 and 35,740,800 MWh in 2022 onwards. The median
value of cost figures in the IEA report under interest rate assumptions of 5% and
10% are given, respectively, as 5.9 and 9.9 cent/kWh for nuclear plants, 8.6 and
9.2 cent/kWh for combined cycle gas plants and 6.2 and 9.0 cent/kWh for coal
plants. The comparison of nuclear energy generation cost, using the figures above,
with the cost of generating the same amount of electric energy by a natural gas or
15
coal fired power plant is provided in Table 6. Table 6 shows that when Akkuyu
nuclear power plant becomes fully operational, envisaged to be 4,800 MW, under
IEA cost calculations with 5% interest rate assumption, it annually saves $ 1 billion
in comparison to production from a natural gas fired plant and $ 100 million in
comparison to production from a coal fired plant. On the other hand, when 10%
interest rate is assumed, nuclear is found to be more expensive than both natural
gas and coal by $ 250 million and $ 300 million, respectively. These calculations do
not include externality costs, i.e. damage costs arising from fossil fuel based plants’
greenhouse gas emissions and for nuclear plants cost from radioactive wastes
and associated risks. The analysis of associated risks is done in a previous study
(EDAM, 2011) and the contribution of nuclear power plants to climate change has
been analyzed in the following section of this report.
Table 6. Economic comparison, using IEA cost data, if nuclear power is substituted by natural gas or
coal fired power ($ million)
Nuclear
Natural Gas
Coal
5% Interest
10% Interest
5% Interest
10% Interest
5% Interest
10% Interest
2019
527
885
768
822
554
804
2020
1,054
1,769
1,537
1,644
1,108
1,608
2021
1,582
2,654
2,305
2,466
1,662
2,413
3,538
3,074
3,288
2,216
3,217
2022 and
onwards
2,109
Figure 10. Cost of
electricity generation
technologies in the
US between 2008 and
2012
(Source: NREL, 2012)
16
Figure 11. Variable operational costs of electricity generation technologies in the U.S.
between 2008 and 2012
Figure 12. Fixed operational cost of electricity generation technologies in the U.S.
17
Figure 13. Cost of electricity generation technologies in the US between 2008 and 2012
under 7% interest rate assumption
2.4. The Need for Reliable Generation
Two main pillars of ensuring reliable supply are reduction of export dependency
and diversification. According to the long term targets provided in the “Electricity
Energy Market and Supply Security Strategy Paper”, the use of domestic coal,
hydraulic, wind and geothermal energy potentials in electricity generation
will be increased until 2023 while nuclear energy will account for 5% of total
electricity generation. The first target of the strategic theme “Energy Supply
Security” of the 2010-2014 Strategic Plan published by the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources is defined as “Prioritization of Domestic Supply and Supply
Diversification”. In order to reach this target, it is envisaged that nuclear energy
plant construction will commence before 2014.
The study of Kumbaroğlu et al. (2008a) provides a comparative analysis of various
production technologies’ capacity factors and availabilities. While the capacity
factor of a nuclear energy plant is above 90%, it is between 60% and 80% for
plants using fossil fuels. In the renewable energy category, the capacity factor for
geothermal and biomass is 90%, while for others it is 50%. Nuclear energy and
geothermal energy become viable options for supply in regard of security; their
capacity factor over 90% plays an important role in the uninterrupted supply for
baseload generation. Capacity factors of U.S. plants between 2008 and 2012 are
given in Figure 14. These results are similar to those provided in Kumbaroğlu et al.
(2008a).
18
Figure 14.
Capacity factors
of U.S. plants
between 2008 and
2012
(Source:
NREL, 2012)
2.5. Evolution of electricity prices
According to the IEA data, both domestic and industrial electricity prices in Turkey
are fair above the OECD average. Data of the last 15 years reveals that historically
prices in Turkey have been well above (twice or even more at times) the OECD (see
Table 7).
Table 7. Evolution of average enduser electricity prices in Turkey and
OECD (USD/kWh)
Industry
Domestic
Turkey
OECD
Turkey
OECD
1997
0.154
0.064
0.159
0.106
1998
0.150
0.063
0.157
0.105
1999
0.165
0.060
0.173
0.105
2000
0.177
0.063
0.187
0.105
2001
0.228
0.069
0.240
0.109
2002
0.232
0.069
0.245
0.110
2003
0.193
0.073
0.205
0.112
2004
0.176
0.074
0.195
0.115
2005
0.172
0.080
0.191
0.121
2006
0.168
0.089
0.187
0.132
2007
0.164
0.093
0.183
0.136
2008
0.202
0.106
0.239
0.147
2009
0.229
0.107
0.274
0.151
2010
0.229
0.107
0.279
0.150
19
As seen in Figures 15 & 16, average electricity prices of OECD countries exhibit a
smooth slowly increasing trend whereas there are sharp fluctuations around the
increasing trend in Turkey. The main reason for the high volatility of prices is due
to the changes observed in natural gas prices and currency, which is an outcome of
the country’s high energy import dependency.
Figure 15. Industrial electricity prices
Figure 16. Domestic electricity prices
Data Source: International Energy Agency (IEA)
2.6. Renewable Energy Subsidies
According to the subsidy programme introduced by law number 5346 of 10 May
2005 on The Usage of Renewable Energy Sources for Electric Energy Generation
and law number 6094 of 29 December 2010, licensed suppliers with a “Renewable
Energy Supply Document”, are guaranteed the following prices per kWh for a 10year period:
–Hydroelectric generation facility:$ 7.3 cents
–Wind energy generation facility: $ 7.3 cents
–Geothermal energy generation facility: $ 10.5 cents
–Biomass generation facility (including landfill gas): $ 13.3 cents
–Solar energy generation facility: $ 13.3 cents
Kumbaroğlu et al.’s (2008a) modeling study revealed that the law of 2005 would
not be enough for proliferation of renewable energy technologies and that there
needs to be higher incentive that is specific to different technologies. It is believed
that the new incentive figures announced at the end of 2010 as presented above,
albeit being low in comparison to European countries, in addition with subsidies
for domestic generation technologies can help the development of renewable
20
energy technologies in regions where there is high potential. Furthermore, more
investors might be drawn to these technologies by carbon tax or emission caps.
However, the fact that renewable sources are not continuous requires high
planning in the production system to ensure supply security. This planning
includes on the one hand meeting the increasing back-up capacity needs and on
the other hand more investment on improvement of distribution networks to
make them sufficient. However, as shown in the previous section, any investment
that will increase the above OECD average electricity prices should be avoided
unless outside financing options arise. Within the context of Turkey’s sustainable
development move, there is an increased demand particularly due to the energy
sector. Directing all investment needed to meet this energy demand to renewable
sources of energy emerges as an expensive option. However, Turkey has a greater
renewable energy potential, which is under-utilized when compared to most
European countries. The need for increased use of renewable energy technologies
in Turkey is beyond any doubt. At the same time, however, there is need for cheap
and reliable supply to meet the rapidly increasing demand.
2.7. The Need for Cheap Generation
Since electrical energy is a main input in the production of goods and services
across all sectors, it constitutes a major cost item in production. Therefore, high
electricity prices are reflected in the prices of goods and services as a reflection of
increased production cost, which in return hampers competitiveness. Particularly
within the context of international trade, exporting firms of countries with low
electricity prices enjoy a competitive advantage. There are numerous scientific
studies that investigate the relation between energy prices and macroeconomic
indicators (e.g. Akkemik 2011, Kumbaroğlu et al., 2008). Therefore, cheap electrical
energy is important for the macroeconomy. Steering investment through financial
instruments such as subsidies and taxes is vitally important for a developing
country, such as Turkey, with rapidly increasing electricity demand and investment
needs. If greenhouse emissions are restricted, then an electricity generation system
based on fossil fuels risks incurring new costs due to the need for investing in new
and expensive technologies which would increase overall costs and damage the
economy at large. Technology renewal does not necessarily imply foregoing fossil
fuels, since as mentioned earlier, under the IEA scenarios with endogenized carbon
tax, natural gas and coal preserve their relative low cost levels. However, there is a
possibility of cleaner and more efficient technology renewal. For example, carbon
capture and storage (CCS) and gasification are widely used technologies in coal
fired power plants. In short, the importance of generating cheap electricity that
is ecologically and economically sustainable is abundantly clear and necessary
measures should be taken to ensure sustainability. There needs to be more public
debate on whether nuclear energy generation is as cheap as the IEA figures and
also on issues such as waste storage, plant dismantling costs and accident risks.
With regard to these issues, the first comprehensive and, still, the only independent
and scientific study was published by EDAM in 2011 on the Akkuyu nuclear power
and its comparison with other plants in the world.
21
2.8. Import dependency
2.8.1. Import of primary energy supply
Turkey’s import dependency in energy supply increased over time to reach 80%
(see Figure 17). Almost half of (46% in 2010) electricity generation depends on
natural gas, which exacerbate import dependency given that 98% of natural gas
comes from abroad. The high level of energy import dependency feeds concern
over supply security and price stability, hence increasing the importance of a wider
utilization of domestic resources.
Figure 17. Evolution of Energy Import Dependency
%
(Data Source: World Energy Council Turkish National Committee)
2.8.2. Cost of imported energy
Turkey’s import of mineral oil and fuels in 2009 was $ 38.5 billion and $ 54.1
billion in 2011. Although import statistics with respect to items is not available
(probably due to confidentiality clauses of international agreements), it is known
that oil and natural gas imports constituted the main cost items. The sectoral
distribution of statistics reveals that imports of coke coal and refined oil products
were $10.4 billion in 2009, $13.8 billion in 2010 and $18.3 billion in 2011. In the
mining and quarrying sector, the value of imports listed as “confidential” was
$18.3 billion in 2009, $23.5 billion in 2010 and $34.4 billion in 2011. Therefore, the
sum of confidential data imports and imports of coal and oil products make up
98% of imports of oil and fuels and quantify the total energy source imports. It
corresponds to approximately 21% of Turkey’s total imports. In short, it is evident
22
that the $ 54 billion worth energy imports as of 2011 constitute a major burden on
the Turkish economy.
2.8.3. The need for reducing import dependency
Short term and long-medium term foreign debt stock of Turkey was, respectively, $
78.2 billion and $ 211.8 billion in 2010. Foreign currency inflow is needed in order
to pay the debt back. However, as illustrated in Figure 18, Turkey’s imports surpass
the exports causing a current accounts deficit and preventing net foreign currency
inflow. The energy import bill of $ 54 billion makes up almost half of the foreign
trade deficit. In order for the economy to remain healthy and sustainable, the
foreign trade deficit must be decreased by increasing exports and reducing import
dependency. Energy imports play an important role as they hold the major share in
Turkey’s foreign trade deficit.
Nuclear energy generation will create some level of foreign dependency due to
the need for technology and the need for enriched uranium as a fuel. However,
the small shares of fuel costs in total generation costs and the ability to acquire the
long-term fuel requirements early on, reduce foreign dependency.
Figure 18. Turkish
import expenditures
and export revenues
import
export
(Source: Main
Economic Indicators
2012, Ministry of
Development)
23
3-A new technology with
possible side benefits for
high technology industrial
development. The example of
South Korea.
The inception of South Korea’s nuclear program can be traced back to 1956 when
the South Korean Ministry of Education and Science Technology established the
Atomic Energy Department. Their first research reactor began operating in 1962.
Today, the total electrical generation capacity of the nuclear power plants in South
Korea amounts to 20.5 GW from 23 reactors. This corresponds to nearly 30% of
South Korea’s total installed capacity and about 45% of total generation. Eleven
more nuclear reactors are scheduled for construction until 2021, adding 13.8 GW
capacity in total.
A study (Valentine/Sovacool, 2010) analyzing the socio-cultural, political and
economic conditions prevalent during the inception of nuclear power programs in
Japan and South Korea identifies six common factors as having a clear influence on
supporting nuclear power development: (1) strong state involvement in guiding
economic development; (2) centralization of national energy policymaking and
planning; (3) campaigns to link technological progress with national revitalization;
(4) influence of technocratic ideology on policy decisions; (5) subordination of
challenges to political authority, and (6) low levels of civic activism.
Transparency and public acceptance is key to the success of the South Korean
nuclear program as argued by Kim/Chang (2012a). The South Korean Ministry of
Education and Science Technology has established the CNEPP (Comprehensive
Nuclear Energy Promotion Plan) to systematically implement the national nuclear
energy policy in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act. All five years revisited,
the 4th CNEPP has been developing a concrete implementation plan for the 20122017 period. Six promotion areas were set in the 4th CNEPP as nuclear utilization,
sustainability, export/growth force, radiation, safety/public acceptance, and
infra/international cooperation. It will be discussed by various social, economic,
political, cultural, and technical professionals to harmonize with the national vision
for the future, short- and long-term plans. By doing this, it will help to improve the
nuclear safety, transparency, and effectiveness in the promotion of national nuclear
technology.
Kim/Chang (2012b) argue that Korea has to transform to a carbon-neutral
economy and that it is compulsory to rely more on alternative energy sources.
24
However, as the economies of scale for renewable energy are highly dependent on
location-specific conditions (natural resources, societal perceptions, etc.) beyond
market and policy, their research results suggest that nuclear should serve as the
main substitute for fossil fuels in Korea.
South Korea will host the top two global energy events in 2013: the 22nd World
Energy Congress and the 36th IAEE International Conference, both in Daegu. These
organizations provide an excellent opportunity for energy executives, researchers,
policy-makers and experts from Turkey to discuss these issues with their Korean
counterparts in particular and other international participants in general.
4-Conclusions
Nuclear energy generation is a relatively cheap source with a high capacity factor
making it a desirable energy source for many developed countries. However,
on the other hand, the radioactive waste, threat of leaks and accidents make it a
questionable energy alternative. The economics, technology and risks of nuclear
power generation were evaluated with particular reference to the Akkuyu
plant in a pioneering study (EDAM, 2011). This study complements the EDAM
2011 findings by elaborating nuclear energy within the context of increasing
energy demand in Turkey from different perspectives including supply-demand
projections, renewable energy potential, electricity prices, import dependency and
international comparisons.
The utilization of renewable energy sources, which constitutes the largest
indigenous source, should clearly be increased. However, meeting demand only
by renewable energy does not seem possible because of technical and economic
challenges as well as potential restrictions.
It is not realistic to expect that renewable energy can fully substitute thermal plants
as long as there is not a technological revolution that will drive generation costs
significantly down and render distribution networks sufficient, and as long as
there no additional external financing mechanisms get available. It is important to
ensure not only the technical and environmental but also economic sustainability
of investments that will prevent supply shortage which may occur by 2016
according to official projections.
A further increase in electricity prices, which are already fair above the OECD
average, will create a threat for international competitiveness of goods and
services produced in Turkey. On the other hand, the energy import dependency of
80% threatens price stability and the fossil fuel import bill exceeding $50 billion
threatens the balance of payments. Therefore, policy-makers aim to lower the
share of imported natural gas in electricity production, which currently amounts
to nearly 50% of total power generation. As an alternative to natural gas, coal
25
and nuclear power appear as economically viable options that provide reliable
production.
In Europe, an example for a country which makes extensive use of both coal and
nuclear power is Germany: as of 2011, coal has the lion’s share of 43% in electricity
generation and nuclear is on the third rank with a share of 18%. Following the
Fukishima incident Germany decided to shut down the nuclear plants that were
constructed before 1980 (despite deciding, shortly before Fukishima to prolong
their lifetimes). In addition, it was decided that once the operational ones complete
their lifetimes, they will be shut down and will not be substituted by new nuclear
plants. This decision was influenced by the strong public opposition to nuclear
energy, which gained momentum after the Fukishima accident. However, criticism
was also voiced in the press (Financial Times Deutschland, 2011) criticizing the
decision to phase out nuclear as not being sustainable and as posing a threat
to the German economy. Besides coal and nuclear power Germany makes also
exyensive use of renewable energy technologies (much more extensive than Turkey
despite a much lower potential). As of 2011, renewable energy sources account
for the second largest share in total electricity generation in Germany with 20%
and it is aimed to increase this share to substitute for the decrease that will be
caused by phasing out nuclear power. The developments in Germany show the
impact of public opinion on energy policy and the dilemma between the economic
advantages of nuclear energy and its risks. As such a dilemma is valid for any
country in general, what differentiates Germany from Turkey is that in Germany
the demand for electricity has reached saturation and is not increasing.
With a rapidly increasing demand for electricity, Asian countries like China and
South Korea exhibit a similar trend to Turkey. Attempts to increase use of nuclear
energy in China continue with a target of 40 GW installed capacity by 2020
while opinions are voiced claiming that nuclear energy is the only ‘sustainable’
alternative for the country (China Daily, 2012). Similarly, studies to increase the
use of nuclear power are well underway in South Korea where construction of two
new reactors began in 2012. The South Korean Prime Minister was quoted saying
that nuclear energy is not a choice but it is a must for the country and the only
alternative to fossil fuels (The Korea Herald, 2012). A transparent process along
with a healthy institutional system enabled public trust and support to nuclear
energy generation growing rapidly after the construction of the first nuclear power
plant in 1962. The fact that construction of two new reactors started in the eve of
the elections of December 2012, which indicates that the positive public perception
continues.
After shutting down all its nuclear plants for inspection following Fukishima,
Japan re-opened its first nuclear plant in July, 2012. The Japanese prime minister
stated that the living standards of the people could not be sustained without
nuclear energy (The Independent, 2012). A worldwide opposition to nuclear energy
has been on the rise particularly in the aftermath of Fukushima. However, the
need for nuclear energy in developing countries is voiced ever louder in several
countries. Opposing opinions and considerations are being discussed by experts
in independent international platforms, e.g. set up by the World Energy Council
and the International Association for Energy Economics. It would contribute to
establish a productive discussion environment and broaden the perspective of
26
interested people from Turkey, where a phase-in program for nuclear energy has
been announced, if they participate in such platforms and listen to the views and
evaluations of international experts.
Following the decision to phase-in nuclear energy, the related debate in Turkey so
far remains shallow, mostly based on ideological differences, and void of scientific
studies. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the current study presents a
framework to feature accurate analysis to be made when considering the need for
nuclear energy in Turkey for which this section provides the necessary backroung
to evaluatie supply-demand projections, renewable energy potential, electricity
generation costs, electricity prices and import dependency.
27
References
Ali Akkemiki, 2011. “Potential impacts of electricity price changes on price
formation in the economy: a social accounting matrix price modeling analysis for
Turkey.” Energy Policy, Volume 39, Issue 2, February 2011, Sayfa 854-864
Kumbaroğlu and others
- 2008a. “A real options evaluation model for the diffusion prospects of new
renewable power generation technologies.” Energy Economics, Volume 30, Issue
4, July 2008, Sayfa 1882-1908
- 2008b. “CO2, GDP and RET: An aggregate economic equilibrium analysis for
Turkey.” Energy Policy, Volume 36, Issue 7, July 2008, Pages 2694-2708
EDAM, 2011. The Turkish Model for transition to nuclear power. www.edam.org.tr/
EDAMNukleer/edamreport.pdf
Scott Victor Valentine& Benjamin K. Sovacool, 2010. “The socio-political economy
of nuclear power development in Japan and South Korea.” Energy Policy, Volume
38, Issue 12, December 2010, Pages 7971-7979
Yong-Min Kim& Sunyoung Chang
- 2012a. “The comprehensive nuclear promotion plan of the Republic of Korea.”
Progress in Nuclear Energy, Volume 58, July 2012, Pages 58-63
- 2012b. “Experience curve analysis on South Korean nuclear technology and
comparative analysis with South Korean renewable technologies.” Energy Policy,
Volume 40, January 2012
Dimitrios A. Georgakellos, 2012. “Climate change external cost appraisal
of electricity generation systems from a life cycle perspective: the case of
Greece.”Journal of Cleaner Production, Volume 32, September 2012, Pages 124-140
Financial Times Deutschland, 2011, Pressestimmen “Merkels Atomwende
beschleunigt ihren politischen Abstieg”, 10 Haziran 2011.
http://www.ftd.de/politik/deutschland/:pressestimmen-merkels-atomwendebeschleunigt-ihren-politischen-abstieg/60063638.html
The Independent, 2012, Japan powered by nuclear energy again, blamed anew , 5
Temmuz 2012.
http://www.theindependent.com/news/world/st-japan-reactor-goes-onlinesince-nuclear-crisis/article_2d56aeb9-b395-5e47-9ce8-53dbff308ff4.html
China Daily, 2012, Only viable option for future, 16 Temmuz 2012.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-07/16/content_15583220.htm
The Korea Herald, 2012. New nuclear plants, 6 Mayis 2012.
http://view.koreaherald.com/kh/view.php?ud=20120506000047
NREL, 2012. Transparent Cost Database, National Reneweable Energy Laboratory,
http://en.openei.org/apps/TCDB/
Section II
Nuclear Power in
Turkey’s Climate
Change Strategy
II
Gürkan Kumbaroğlu
30
Nuclear Power in Turkey’s Climate Change Strategy
Executive Summary
In May 2010, Turkey released its National Climate Change Strategy Document,
and, in July of the same year, adopted – by passing law number 6007 - an
agreement regarding the establisment and operation of a nuclear power plant in
Akkuyu. Although these two developments took place two months apart and
independently of each other, there is an indirect interplay in place: as it is known,
nuclear power plants do not release greenhouse gases during operation, and, for
this reason, reducing green house gas emissions becomes possible to the extent
the nuclear generation replaces electricity generated from fossil fuels.. In order
to determine how effective a nuclear power plant would be in reducing gree
house gas emissions in Turkey, firstly, the national emission factor (the amount of
emission per unit electricity generation) caused by electricity generation needs to
be calculated in compliance with the international methodology.
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Power Generation
CO2 emissions resulting from fossil fuel use for electricity generation have caused
this sector to have the fastest emission growth rate, which was 252.3 per cent in the
period 1990-2010. While the accelerated growth of CO2 emissions resulting from
electricity generation is in correlation with the increase in supply created to meet
the increasing electricity demands, the actual determining factor is the composition
of the production of the supply: meaning, the high carbon intensity of electricity
generation. While CO2 emissions in electricity generation result from thermal
plants, there is no CO2 emission during generating electricity from renewable
energy sources such as wind and hydropower. Hence, changes in the technological
composition of electricity supply have great impact on emissions. Between
the years 1990-2010, while the share of hydroelectric energy in total electricity
generation decreased from 40 percent to 25 percent, the share of the thermal plants
rised from 60 to 74 percent; and wind power obtained a 1 percent share. Although
the share of hydropower decreased, its installed capacity level increased by 2.3
times and rised to 15,831 MW from 6,764 MW in 20 years. However, the installed
capacity level of thermal power plants during the same period also increased by
3.4 times, rising from 9,536 MW to 32,279 MW. These developments were effective
on CO2 emission growth resulting from electricity generation.
The Effect of Nuclear Power on Greenhouse Gas Emissions
The Akkuyu nuclear power plant is expected to be a four-unit plant with a total
installed capacity of 4,800 MW. It is observed that the assumption of a capacity
factor of 85 per cent, which was put forth in the economics of nuclear energy
section of a previous study (EDAM, 2011), in which the nuclear power adoption
model of Turkey was examined, can be accepted as a realistic estimate. With that
assumption, the total electricity power that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is
expected to generate in a year is calculated as 35,740,800 MWh/year.
31
The reduction of emissions, which is calculated by multiplying the emission factor
calculated as 0.5459 tCO2/MWh and the generation value of the nuclear plants.
Table The Amount of CO2 Emission Reduction Enabled by the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant
Year
CO2 Emission Reduction Amount
2019
8,935,200 MWh x 0.5459 tCO /MWh
= 4,877,726 tCO
2020
17,870,400 MWh x 0.5459 tCO /MWh
= 9,755,451 tCO
2021
26,805,600 MWh x 0.5459 tCO /MWh
= 14,633,177 tCO
2022
35,740,800 MWh x 0.5459 tCO /MWh
=19,510,903 tCO
2
2
2
2
2023 and onward
2
2
2
2
19,510,903 tCO / year
2
The Akkuyu nuclear power plant will enable nearly 6.6-7.5 percent reduction in
emissions resulting from electricity generation by the year 2023. In case of an
establishment of two other plants with equal power to Akkuyu plant, these ratios
will triple; and, assuming that the carbon intensity in electricity generation remains
constant, there will be a nearly 20 per cent reduction in emissions resulting from
electricity generation.
Conclusion
It has been determined that once the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is in operation
with all of its units, it will enable a nearly 19.5 Mton ton savings in CO2 emissions.
And, it is calculated that this value will equal to nearly seven pe cent of the
emissions resulting from electricity generation. As it has been presented in this
study, considering that the ratio of emissions resulting from electricity generation
stands as the sector with the highest share, which is 40 percent of Turkey’s total
emissions volume, it is understood that the savings from emissions that will be
possible corresponds to a significant amount.
Although emission reductions that are enabled through the usage of nuclear
energy are not taken into account under the Kyoto Protocol Flexibility Mechanisms,
it nevertheless will be effective in limiting the increase of emissions in Turkey by
reducing the carbon intensity of electricity generation.
32
1. Introduction
In May 2010, Turkey released its National Climate Change Strategy Document,
and, in July of the same year, adopted – by passing law number 6007 - an
agreement regarding the establisment and operation of a nuclear power plant in
Akkuyu. Although these two developments took place two months apart and
independently of each other, there is an indirect interplay in place: as it is known,
nuclear power plants do not release greenhouse gases during operation, and, for
this reason, reducing green house gas emissions becomes possible to the extent
the nuclear generation replaces electricity generated from fossil fuels.. In order
to determine how effective a nuclear power plant would be in reducing gree
house gas emissions in Turkey, firstly, the national emission factor (the amount of
emission per unit electricity generation) caused by electricity generation needs to
be calculated in compliance with the international methodology. Since the level of
greenhouse gas emissions other than carbon dioxide (CO2), such as CH4 and N2O,
is negligibly small, computations are focused on CO2 emission reduction.
The composition of Turkish greenhouse gas emissions is presented in Figure 1
together with the historical development. In 2010, CO2 emissions had the lion’s
share of 81.4 percent, followed by CH4 emissions with 14.3 percent These are
followed by N2O emissions, with 3.2 percent, and F-gas emissions with 1.0 percent.
In recent years, emissions of CO2 have followed a trend of increase from 75.6
percent in 1990, which is taken as reference in national submissions under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
Figure 1. Composition of Greenhouse Gases in Turkey from 1990 to 2010
90%
N2O
75%
CH4
3.2%
F Gases
2010
1.0%
14.3%
60%
45%
30%
15%
CO2
0%
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
2010
81.4%
(Data Source: National Greenhouse Gas Inventory Report, 2012)
On the other hand, as can be seen in Figure 2, among the gases emitted during
electricity generation, the percentage of CO2 is 99.2 percent in year 2010 and has
remained about the same since 1990, while all other greenhouse gasses had a share
of less than one percent.
33
Figure 2. Composition of Greenhouse Gases Resulting from Electricity Generation in Turkey from
1990 to 2010
2010
While CO2 stands out with its highest share among all greenhouse gases, as can
be is seen in Table 1, it also has, by far, the greatest atmospheric concentration and
radiative forcing level. Due to its longevity and high level of concentration in the
athmosphere, the CO2 gas’ radiative forcing value is by far the highest among all
other greenhouse gases. For this reason, in efforts to confront climate change, the
reduction of emissions of CO2 gas is especially focused on.
Table 1. Greenhouse Gases, Atmospheric Concentrations and Radiative Forcing Values
Concentration
(One in a million)
Increase during
1998-2005
Radiative Forcing
(W/m2)
Change during
1998-2005 (%)
CO2
379 ± 0.65
(One in a million)
+ 13
(One in a million)
1.66
+%13
CH4
1774 ± 1.8
(One in a billion)
+11
(One in a billion)
0.48
-
N2O
319 ± 0. 12
(One in a billion)
+5
(One in a billion)
0.16
+%11
(Data Source: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2007:
The Physical Science Basis, 2007)
The main source of emission of CO2 is the usage of fossil fuels: according to the
latest data (2010), in Turkey, 85 per cent of CO2 emissions results from energy usage
and 39.3 per cent of this share results from electricity generation. As it is observable
in Figure 3, in sectoral ratios of CO2 emissions, electricity generation has the highest
share of increase throughout years.
34
Figure 3. Sectoral Share of CO2 Emissions Resulting from Energy Usage in 2010
Electricity
Industry
Transport
Other
Electricity
Industry
Transport
Other
Since electrification (such as, increase in usage of electrical vehicles in
transportation, and spread of automation and informatics technologies in
industrial and services sectors, etc.) is expected to rise in all sectors, it could be
predicted that the importance and share of the electricity sector in national climate
change strategy will rise. In this regard, determining the scope of the contribution
of nuclear energy, as an electricity generation technology without CO2 emissions, to
the national climate change strategy through lowering the emissions and emission
intensity from electricity generation becomes significant.
The Climate Change Strategy of Turkey, with its historical development and
expectations for the future, are covered in the next section. In the subsequent
section, CO2 emissions in Turkey resulting from electricity generation are examined
and the emission factor is calculated according to the international methodology.
Afterwards, the impact of energy production from nuclear power plants on
lowering CO2 emissions, based on the calculated emission factor, is shown.
2.Turkey’s Climate Change
Strategy
2.1. Historical Developments
Turkey, as a member of OECD, was placed in the developed country annexes
(Annex I and Annex II) of the UNFCCC; and, with the reasoning that it would not
be possible to meet the obligations this would bring along, it did not ratify the
convention when it was approved on 21 March 1994. According to the agreement,
while the countries listed under Annex I were expected to take preventive
35
measures to limit greenhouse gas emissions, countries in Annex II were anticipated
to also provide developing countries with financial assistance. While Turkey was
making attempts to withdraw from these annexes, in 1997, parties to the UNFCCC
agreed upon the Kyoto Protocol, which set forth committments on Annex I
countries to reduce emissions to specific levels. The Protocol was entered into force
eight years later, on 16 February 2005, when Russia’s ratification set the emission
volume of Annex I parties to the required threshold level of 55 percent. Meanwhile,
the status of Turkey as a developed country under the UNFCCC had changed
in 2001: according to decision 26/CP.7 taken at the 7th UNFCCC Conference of
Parties (COP7), Turkey was moved out from Annex II; it was agreed on with
consensus that Turkey’s circumstances were different than the other countries in
Annex I and parties to the convention were called upon to recognize Turkey’s
special position. Decision 26/CP.7 came into effect on 28 June 2008. As Turkey was
removed from the list in Annex II, its obligations to provide developing countries
with new and additional financial support in accordance with article 4.3, to adjust
to climate change in accordance with article 4.4, and to transfer technology in
accordance with article 4.5 of the UNFCCC were also removed and Turkey a
became party to the UNFCCC on 24 May 2004 and also to the Kyoto Protocol, as
a non-Annex B country (not having an obligation of emission reduction), on 26
August 2009.
Following Turkey’s joining the UNFCCC in 2004, a Coordination Board on Climate
Change was established the same year. The Coordination Board, under the
authority of the Minister of Environment and Forestry, is composed of
- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement
- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Transport
- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry and Trade
- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
- Undersecretary of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry
- Undersecretary of the State Planning Office
- The President of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey.
The Board carries activities on ‘Reduction,’ ‘Conformity,’ ‘Technology Transfer,’
and ‘Finance,’ which were designated as building blocks at the COP13 Conference
of Parties held in the Bali island of Indonesia in 2007 and given the name ‘Bali
Road Map’.
On the other hand, it was agreed during the Board Meeting 2009/2, which
took place on 28 July 2009, that there would be an effort to realize an 11 percent
reduction of the greenhouse gas emissions projected for 2020, which was stated
in the 1st National Communication sent to the UNFCCC in 2007. According to the
projections stated in the 1st National Communication, CO2 emissions in Turkey
would increase from 240.7 million tons in 2005 to 604.6 million tons in 2020; and,
in this regard, according to the adopted emission reduction goal, the emission rise
in Turkey between 2005 and 2020 is anticipated to remain at 124 percent instead of
151 percent.
36
With the start of a series of workshops under the coordination of the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry on 28 February 2009 in Abant, Bolu, relevant institutions
and organizations discussed rational strategies to be included in the ‘National
Climate Change Strategy Document’, which was proposed to the Prime Ministry
High Planning Council after having been discussed on the Board, and was released
on May 2010. In the Turkey’s National Climate Change Strategy Document for
2010-2020, prodding of nuclear energy as a zero emission technology is placed
among the mid-term activities to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Additionally,
the prodding of nuclear energy is also included in Turkey’s Climate Change
National Action Plan for 2011-2023, which was released in July 2011.
2.2. Future Expectations
The 17th Conference of the Parties to UNFCCC (COP17) held on December 2011
in Durban, South Africa and the 7th Meeting of the Parties of the Kyoto Protocol
(COP/MOP7) shed a little light into the future. The main output of these meetings
is the decision on determining the second liability term as the years 2013-2017.
In addition to this, establishment of a new working group, named the Durban
Platform, and preparation of an official text by this group for a new agreement
were agreed upon. It is expected of this group, which will start its initial meetings
on May 2012, to complete the preparations of a new agreement at the latest by
2015.
Although there is a bit of uncertainty about the future due to the situation Turkey
is in, because of its EU candidacy on the one hand and its incomplete conditions
as a designated country (26/CP.7 and 1/CP.16 decisions) and ongoing capacity
building on the other, along with the changing dynamics of the negotiations on
a new agreement, it could still be anticipated that Turkey will be in a sustainable
development process in which the concentration of emissions would decrease in
accordance with the National Climate Change Strategy Document and National
Action Plan. It is aimed by decision-makers that the usage of nuclear energy, in
accordance with the National Strategy Document, in electricity generation would
be effective in lowering greenhouse gas emission intensities.
3- Turkey’s Contribution to
Climate Change
3.1. Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Power Generation
CO2 emissions resulting from fossil fuel use for electricity generation have caused
this sector to have the fastest emission growth rate, which was 252.3 per cent in the
period 1990-2010 (See Figure 4).
37
Figure 4. Sectoral Development of CO2 Emissions Resulting from Energy Use
CO2 Index
1990=100
Electricity
Industry
Electricity
Industry
Transport
Other
Transport
Other
1990-2010
% Change
While the accelerated growth of CO2 emissions resulting from electricity
generation is in correlation with the increase in supply created to meet the
increasing electricity demands, the actual determining factor is the composition
of the production of the supply: meaning, the high carbon intensity of electricity
generation. While CO2 emissions in electricity generation result from thermal
plants, there is no CO2 emission during generating electricity from renewable
energy sources such as wind and hydropower. Hence, changes in the technological
composition of electricity supply have great impact on emissions. Between
the years 1990-2010, while the share of hydroelectric energy in total electricity
generation decreased from 40 percent to 25 percent, the share of the thermal plants
rised from 60 to 74 percent; and wind power obtained a 1 percent share. Although
the share of hydropower decreased, its installed capacity level increased by 2.3
times and rised to 15,831 MW from 6,764 MW in 20 years. However, the installed
capacity level of thermal power plants during the same period also increased by
3.4 times, rising from 9,536 MW to 32,279 MW. These developments were effective
on CO2 emission growth resulting from electricity generation.
Figure 5. CO2 Emissions Resulting from Electricity Generation According to Source 1990-2010
Natural gas
Liquid fuels
Coal
Natural gas
Coal
Liquid fuels
1990-2010
% Change
38
3.2. Turkey’s Emission Factor for Electricity Generation
Turkey’s emission factor for electricity generation has been calculated on the basis
of the UNFCCC’s latest methodological tool “Tool to Calculate the Emission Factor
for an Electricity System” (UNFCCC, 2011). The Turkish transmission system
is interconnected, which defines the relevant electricity system to determinde
Turkey’s emission factor for electricity generation. Hence, the estimation of OM
(Operating Margin) and BM (Built Margin) emission factors are based on the
definition of the Turkish electricity network as one single interconnected system
and grid power plants serving the system.
3.2.1.The Operating Margin Emission Factor
According to the “Tool to calculate the emission factor for an electricity system”,
four alternative methods are available to calculate the OM emission factor:
(a) Simple OM; Basit or
(b) Simple adjusted OM; or
(c) Dispatch data analysis OM; or
(d) Average OM.
In choosing the right method for the calculation of OM, “Simple adjusted OM”,
“Dispatch data analysis OM” and “Average OM” methods can be eliminated as
all of these methods require plant-specific information of power plants which are
connected to the grid, but there is no plant-specific data publicly available.
Accordingly, the “Simple OM” method is adopted in the calculations, based on the
total net electricity generation of all power plants serving the system. This method
is applicable when low cost and/or must run resources constitute, as an average of
the five most recent years, less than 50 percent of the total generation for the grid.
Nevertheless, the only major low operating cost and must run resource in Turkey is
hydropower because the share of all other renewable resources is negligibly small.
As can be seen in Table 2, the share of low-cost/must run sources does not exceed
50% for the most recent 5 years.
Table 2. Share of hydroelectric production in Turkey, 2006 – 2010
2006
Turkey’s Gross Electricity Production (GWh)
Electricity Production from Hydro (GWh)
Total Share of Hydro (%)
2007
2008
2009
2010
176,300 191,558 198,418 194,813 211,208
44,244
35,851
33,270
35,958
51,796
25%
19%
17%
18%
25%
The Simple Operating Margin Emission Factor is calculated as the generationweighted average CO2 emissions per unit net electricity generation (tCO2 /MWh)
of all generating power plants serving the system, not including low-cost/must
run power plants/units.
According to the “Tool to calculate the emission factor for an electricity system”,
the formula given below is applied for computing EFgrid, OMsimple, y.
39
=
where
EFgrid,OMsimple,y
=
Simple operating margin CO2 emission factor in year y (t CO2/MWh)
FCi,y
=
Amount of fossil fuel type i consumed in the project electricity system in year y
(mass or volume unit)
NCVi,y
=
Net calorific value (energy content) of fossil fuel type i in year y (GJ / mass or
volume unit)
EFCO2,i,y
=
CO2 emission factor of fossil fuel type i in year y (tCO2/GJ)
EGy
=
Net electricity generated and delivered to the grid by all power sources
serving the system, not including low-cost / must-run power plants / units, in
year y (MWh)
i
=
All fossil fuel types combusted in power sources in the project electricity
system in year y
y
=
Either the three most recent years for which data is available at the time of
submission of the CDM-PDD to the DOE for validation (ex ante option) or the
applicable year during monitoring (ex post option), following the guidance on
data vintage in step 2
In order to calculate fuel-specific emissions, the IPCC emission factors shown in
Table 3 were used..
To be on the conservative side, the minimum values are used in the OM
calculations. Based on these values, CO2 emissions from electricity generation in
Turkey are computed as shown in Table 4.
Table 3. IPCC Emission factors
kg CO2/GJ
min
mid
max
Default Carbon
Oxidation Factor
Hard coal
92,8
96,1
100,0
1,0 Lignite
90,9
101,0
115,0
1,0 Fuel oil
75,5
77,4
78,8
1,0 Diesel oil
72,6
74,1
74,8
1,0 Natural gas
54,3
56,1
58,3
1,0 LPG
61,6
63,1
65,6
1,0 Naphta
69,3
73,3
76,3
1,0 (Data Source: 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories)
Table 4. Annual CO2 Emissions from Electricity Production
CO2 Emissions from Electricity
Production (tons)
2008
2009
2010
104,062,368
98,532,497
99,128,859
40
The calculation of net electricity production is demonstrated in Table 5. As the
efficiency factor from gross to net electricity for thermal resources is not known, the
overall relation between overall gross and net electricity production is assumed to
be the same for thermal production.
Table 5. Net Electricity Production from Thermal Sources
2008
2009
2010
Gross Electricity Production [GWh] (a)
198,418
194,813
211,208
Net Electricity Production [GWh] (b)
189,762
186,619
203,046
0.956
0.958
0.961
163,919
156,583
155,370
156,768
149,998
149,366
Net/Gross (c=a/b)
Gross Electricity Production
Thermal Sources [GWh] (d)
from
Net Electricity Production from Thermal
Sources [GWh] (cxd)
Using the same relation for both overall electricity production and thermal
production is an approximation based on a rough assumption. Yet, obviously,
such an assumption results in a conservative estimation because the efficiency
of thermal plants is typically much lower than other plants. The OM emission
factors are calculated by dividing total emissions by net electricity production from
thermal sources as shown in Table 6.
Table 6. OM Emission Factor for 2008 – 2010
EFGrid, OM, simple [tCO2/MWh]
2008
2009
2010
0.6638
0.6569
0.6637
As the generation-weighted average of the figures between 2008 and 2010,
Turkey’s OM emission factor is computed as 0.6603 tCO2 / MWh.
3.2.2.The Build Margin (BM) Emission Factor
Computing the BM is based on the sample of plants, in either of two proposed
ways:
(a)The set of five power units that have been built most recently, or
(b)The set of power capacity additions in the electricity system that comprise 20%
of the system generation (in MWh) and that have been built most recently.
Among these two options, the sample group that comprises the larger annual
generation should be used. The data for recently built power plants is available in
TEİAŞ’s capacity projection reports documenting capacity, type of utility, fuel type
and date of commissioning. According to the data:
41
- The total annual generation of the five plants that have been built most recently
is 5,271 GWh. This represents approximately 2.7% of the overall electricity
generation capacity in Turkey. Obviously, it is far below the 20 percent threshold
proposed by the methodology.
- The most recent capacity additions that comprise the 20% of the total system
generation corresponds to 42.1 TWh.
According to the methodology, the Build Margin (BM) Emission Factor EFBM is
calculated as the generation-weighted average emission factor of a sample of
power plants m for a specific year, as follows:
where:
EFgrid, BM, y
Build margin CO2 emission factor in year y (
Net quantity of electricity generated and delivered to the grid by
power unit m in year y (MWh)
EG
m,y
CO2 emission factor of power unit m in year y (tCO2/MWh) m
EF
m
);
EL,m,y
Power units included in the build margin
y
Most recent historical year for which power generation data is
available
As electricity production figures of some small facilities were not available, annual
electricity productions of these plants have been calculated as
EGm,y= Full Load Working Hours × Installed Capacity
values are computed by using the
In the calculation of EF grid, BM, y, first EF
EL,m,y
formula
where
EFEL, m, y
EF
CO ,m,i,y
m,y
2
CO2 emission factor of power unit m in year y (
);
Average net energy conversion efficiency of power unit m in year y
(
)
Average net energy conversion efficiency of power unit m in year y
(ratio)
m
All power units serving the grid in year y except low-cost/must-run
power units
y
The relevant year as per the data vintage chosen
For this computation, the default efficiency values shown in Table 7 were used.
42
Table 7. Default Efficiency Factors for power plants
Grid power plants
Generation Technology Old units (before and in 2000)
Coal
New units (after 2000)
-
-
37%
39%
Supercritical
-
45%
Ultra-supercritical
-
50%
IGCC
-
50%
FBS
35.5 %
-
CFBS
36.5 %
40%
PFBS
-
41.5 %
-
-
37.5 %
39%
Open cycle
30%
39.5%
Combined cycle
46%
46%
-
-
37.5 %
37.5 %
Open cycle
30%
39.5 %
Combined cycle
46%
60%
Subcritical
Oil
Steam turbine
Natural gas
Steam turbine
Source: “Tool to calculate the emission factor for an electricity system” (UNFCCC, 2011)
Accordingly, the Build Margin emission factor is calculated as 0.4315 tCO2/MWh.
3.2.3. The Combined Margin Emission Factor
The combined margin emissions factor is calculated as follows:
EFgrid, CM, y = EFgrid, OM, y × wOM+ EFgrid, BM, y × wBM
where
EF
=
Build margin CO emission factor in year y (tCO /MWh)
EF
=
Operating margin CO emission factor in year y (tCO /MWh)
=
Weighting of operating margin emissions factor (%)
=
Weighting of build margin emissions factor (%)
grid,BM,y
w
grid,OM,y
OM
w
BM
2
2
2
2
The methodological tool “Tool to calculate the emission factor for an electricity
system” recommends equal weighting for electricity generation projects other than
wind and solar power. Hence, equal weighting is used implying
EFgrid, CM, y = 0.6603 × 0.5 + 0.4315 × 0.5
The resulting : EF
grid,CM,y
is 0.5459 tCO /MWh
2
43
4- The Effect of Nuclear Power
on Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Following the agreement between the government of the Russian Federation
and the government of the Republic of Turkey on cooperation in relation to the
construction and operation of a nuclear power plant at the Akkuyu site in the
Republic of Turkey, Turkey has started a serious of negotiations with China, South
Korea, Japan, and Canada for a second nuclear power plant to be built in Sinop.
According to the statements made by the officials of the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources, for energy diversification and security of supply, operation of
three nuclear plants with a total capacity of 15,000 MW is aimed to be realized until
2023. However, since the only project on which there has been a signed agreement
so far is the plant in Akkuyu, the effect of the plant to be built in Akkuyu on
greenhouse gas emissions has been made the focus of this working paper.
The Akkuyu nuclear power plant is expected to be a four-unit plant with a total
installed capacity of 4,800 MW. It is observed that the assumption of a capacity
factor of 85 per cent, which was put forth in the economics of nuclear energy
section of a previous study (EDAM, 2011), in which the nuclear power adoption
model of Turkey was examined, can be accepted as a realistic estimate. With that
assumption, the total electricity power that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is
expected to generate in a year is calculated as shown below.
The amount of generation that will take place when the four-unit Akkuyu nuclear
power plant will be in operation is calculated as:
= 4,800 MW × 8,760 hours/year × 0.85 = 35,740,800 MWh/year
It is expected that the first of the four units, which will each have a power
capacity of 1,200 MW, will start generation in 2019, and the other three will
enter commercial operation every other following year. The anticipated value of
generation expected to be obtained from the Akkuyu plant in accordance with this
plan is shown in Table 8.
1
Table 8. Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant Electricity Generation Amounts
Year
Generation Amount
2019
1200 MW x 8760 hour x 0.85 = 8,935,200 MWh
2020
2400 MW x 8760 hour x 0.85 = 17,870,400 MWh
2021
3600 MW x 8760 hour x 0.85 = 26,805,600 MWh
2022
4800 MW x 8760 hour x 0.85 = 35,740,800 MWh
2023 and onwards
35,740,800 MWh/year
1_ According to the agreement between Turkey and Russian Federation, signed on 12
May 2010, regarding cooperation on the establishment and operation of a nuclear power
plant in Akkuyu, once all of the necessary documents, permissions, licenses, and approvals
are ready for starting the building of the plant, the first unit shall be entered into commercial
operation within the next seven years, and the other three units every other following year.
44
The emission reduction values of today which correspond to the generation values
shown in Table 8 can be calculated by using Turkey’s average electricity generation
emission factor calculated in the previous section. However, in this calculation
of emission amounts, the technological composition of electricity generation is
assumed to remain unchanged. Nevertheless, when the long-term projections
such as the Electricity Market and Supply Security Strategy Paper, which was
approved in May 2009, are taken into consideration, it is expected that the use of
renewable energy resources will be on the rise. Accordingly, until year 2023, it is
aimed that the domestic coal and hydroelectric potential will be used up entirely;
the wind power capacity will be increased to 20,000 MW and geothermal power
to 600 MW; and the share of natural gas in production will be reduced to under 30
percent. According to the report ‘Turkey’s 10 Year Electricity Generation Capacity
Projections (2011-2020)’ published by TEİAŞ in November 2011 (TEİAŞ, 2011),
under the assumptions that change based on projects and the level of reliable
generation of power plants, the composition of generation is expected to be, by
2020, in ranges shown below. It is observed that the composition in year 2010 also
falls under these ranges.2 In light of this comparison shown in Table 9, and by
assuming that the projections of TEİAŞ are reliable and also taking into account
the fact that hydroelectric power plants, like other renewable ones, do not release
greenhouse gas during electricity generation, it is concluded that the average
emission factor calculated for the year 2010 can also be applied to 2020.
Table 9. Turkey’s Electricity Generation Composition (%)
2010
2020 Projections (TEİAŞ)
Thermal Power Plants
% 74
%73 - %80
Hydroelectric Power Plants
% 24
%16 - %23
%2
%4
Other Renewables
In the TEİAŞ report, which includes capacity projections until 2020 for each
technology, the operation of a nuclear power plant is also considered to start. In
this report, the demand ranges calculated by the Ministry of Energy and Natural
Resources are used; and, accordingly, the demand in 2020, presented in two
different scenarios of low and high range, is anticipated to be 398,160 GWh –
433,900 GWh. According to these demand values, the amount of generation that
the two units of the Akkuyu nuclear plant, which is expected to be operating by
that time, will meet nearly four percent of Turkey’s total demand in that year. With
the other two units also starting to operate, this ratio would double and reach eight
percent.
2_
It should be noted that the public plants under construction and those private plants
that had received licenses and are expected to operate on determined dates are taken into
account while no predictions have been made on license applications that would be made
in the following years; therefore, TEİAŞ projections do not match with the Supply Security
Strategy Document. For example, while the projections regarding wind power in the report
of TEİAŞ is stated as 3.3 GW installed capacity for the year 2020, in the Supply Security
Strategy Document, it is aimed to be 20 GW by the year 2023.
45
The reduction of emissions, which is calculated by multiplying the emission factor
calculated in the previous section and the generation value of the nuclear plants, is
as shown in Table 10.
Table 10. The Amount of CO2 Emission Reduction Enabled by the Akkuyu Nuclear
Power Plant
Year
CO2 Emission Reduction Amount
2019
8,935,200 MWh x 0.5459 tCO /MWh
= 4,877,726 tCO
2020
17,870,400 MWh x 0.5459 tCO /MWh
= 9,755,451 tCO
2021
26,805,600 MWh x 0.5459 tCO /MWh
= 14,633,177 tCO
2022
35,740,800 MWh x 0.5459 tCO /MWh
=19,510,903 tCO
2
2
2
2
2023 and onward
2
2
2
2
19,510,903 tCO /yıl
2
Since the estimation of the range of demand for the year 2020 is 398,160 GWh –
433,900 GWh and the emission factor of 0.5459 tCO /MWh is used on that range,
2
the interval of total CO2 emissions due to electricity generation is calculated to
be 217,355,544 – 236,866,010 tCO2/year. In the demand estimation study by the
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the growth rate of low demand in
recent years has been accepted as 6.3 percent per year, while the high demand
growth rate appears as 7.4 percent. When these projections for the year 2020 are
expanded to 2023 by using the mentioned growth rates, the estimated demand is
computed as 478,253 GWh – 537,529 GWh. The total CO2 emissions resulting from
electricity generation, calculated according to that range, account to 261,078,313 –
293,437,081 tCO2/year for the year 2023. When evaluated in terms of ratio, it is seen
that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant will enable nearly 6.6-7.5 percent reduction
in emissions resulting from electricity generation by the year 2023. 3In case of an
establishment of two other plants with equal power to Akkuyu plant, these ratios
will triple; and, assuming that the carbon intensity in electricity generation remains
constant, there will be a nearly 20 per cent reduction in emissions resulting from
electricity generation.
3_
The amount of emission percentage reduction and the share of nuclear energy within
total electric energy are the same because both the total electricity generation amount used in
calculating the emission volume and the nuclear energy generation amount are multiplied by
the same emission factor.
46
5-Conclusions
In this study, Turkey’s electricity generation emission factor has been calculated
in accordance with the methodology published by the UNFCCC to provide a
guideline for the evaluation of projects aiming to reduce CO2 emissions from
electricity generation and trading emission certificates within the framework of
the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms. The calculated emission factor is
multiplied by the amount of electrical energy that the Akkuyu nuclear power plant
will produce, and hence the implied emission reduction is determined. It should be
noted here that the emission reduction due to nuclear power generation cannot be
certified and traded under the Kyoto Protocol Flexibility Mechanisms. It is stated
in decision 17/CP7, which was taken at the 17th Meeting of the Parties in 2001 in
Marakkesh where the implementation rules on the mechanisms were determined,
that the emission reductions from nuclear power generation cannot be certified
and traded in order to be used in reaching the emission reduction goals of the
Annex-1 countries. Aside from this, it is seen that there is neither any positive nor
negative evaluation within the frameworks of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
regarding nuclear power; rather, an objective approach is preferred.
It has been determined that once the Akkuyu nuclear power plant is in operation
with all of its units, it will enable a nearly 19.5 Mton ton savings in CO2 emissions.
And, it is calculated that this value will equal to nearly seven pe cent of the
emissions resulting from electricity generation. As it has been presented in this
study, considering that the ratio of emissions resulting from electricity generation
stands as the sector with the highest share, which is 40 percent of Turkey’s total
emissions volume, it is understood that the savings from emissions that will be
possible corresponds to a significant amount.
Although emission reductions that are enabled through the usage of nuclear
energy are not taken into account under the Kyoto Protocol Flexibility Mechanisms,
it nevertheless will be effective in limiting the increase of emissions in Turkey by
reducing the carbon intensity of electricity generation.
47
Section III
Efforts to Control
the Atom and the
Transfer of Nuclear
Technology:
An Evaluation from
Turkey’s Perspective
III
Sinan Ülgen – Aaron Stein
50
Efforts to Control the Atom and the Transfer of Nuclear Technology: An Evaluation from Turkey’s Perspective
Executive Summary
Intent on overcoming its dependency on imported energy, Turkey has been
pursuing nuclear reactors for decades. Initially lured by the promise nuclear
power as a panacea for its chronic energy problems, Ankara began to put in place
the necessary legislative infrastructure to accommodate the sale of nuclear power
reactors in the late 1950s. In tandem, successive governments have solicited
bids for the construction of reactors on the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts.
Ankara’s prolonged interest in developing a nuclear energy program has drawn
the interest of numerous foreign suppliers, but progress to date has been slowed by
a combination of internal problems and disagreements about financing.
Beginning in the 1980s, Turkey’s nuclear energy acquisition efforts accelerated.
Ankara ratified the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
concluded a full scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and began to aggressively solicit bids for the construction of
nuclear reactors. As the negotiations progressed, Turkey and potential suppliers
busily began negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements. The agreements are
the legal basis for the transfer of nuclear technology and specify the terms and
conditions for cooperation and technology use. To date, Turkey has signed and
ratified nuclear cooperation agreements with Canada, Argentina, South Korea,
France, the United States, and Russia. Ankara has also concluded agreements with
Germany, Jordan, and China but they have not been ratified.
Turkey’s current government has reiterated the country’s desire to develop nuclear
power through partnerships with foreign suppliers and continued to seek out
foreign suppliers to supply Turkey with reactors. Given the current state of its
nuclear industry, Turkey is likely to remain dependent on foreign suppliers for
the foreseeable future. Thus, Ankara’s future development of nuclear power will
be contingent on technology transfers, which are governed by the multilateral
export control guidelines and framed by the conditions in state-to-state nuclear
cooperation agreements. To better gauge the possibilities for Turkey’s future
nuclear program, and the facilities likely to be transferred, it is important to
examine the origins of current nonproliferation norms and the emerging supplier
consensus on limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
Turkey and Nuclear Negotiations
Turkey’s numerous nuclear cooperation agreement all share similar provisions
about the scale and scope of peaceful nuclear cooperation. All outline a desire
to cooperate on nuclear power and research reactor maintenance, operation,
decommission and safety, the mining of uranium and thorium, and provide the
legal authority to transfer nuclear reactor technology. All agreements specify using
scientific exchanges and material transfers to help bolster Turkey’s radioisotope
production and research. In all cases, the parties agreed to exchange data and
scientific personnel, hold regular symposiums and meetings, and collaborate on
joint projects. These provisions are emblematic of NPT Article IV and help shed
51
some light on how the suppliers envision their NPT obligations.
The agreements are also written to make extremely difficult the misuse or
diversion of foreign origin fissile material for nuclear weapons production. All
specifically mention that none of the material or technology will be used for nonpeaceful uses. In all but one of the agreements, there are specific provisions against
the enrichment of uranium above 20 percent and the reprocessing of spent fuel.
These provisions are emblematic of NSG guidelines. Notably, in all but one of the
agreements, the suppliers do not specify the extent to which they are willing to
transfer E&R technologies. Instead, vague language referring to elements of the
fuel cycle is used.
The one exception is the Turkish – Argentinian nuclear cooperation agreement. The
agreement was signed before Argentina joined the NSG and reversed many of its
decades old nuclear policies. While little progress was made in implementing the
deal, the agreement specified cooperation on the front end of the fuel cycle, and the
production of small reactors that had questionable value for large-scale electricity
production. Nevertheless, the agreement still had specific provisions relating to the
non-diversion of fissile material, and an explicit clause barring the manufacture of
nuclear weapons. However, the terms of the agreement were not in line with the
NSG and established nonproliferation norms.
In all cases, the IAEA is counted on to ensure that material is not being used for
non-peaceful uses. The agreements specifically reference Turkey’s 1981 full scope
safeguards agreement as the main enforcement mechanism, and have separate
provisions that call for the conclusion of a bilateral safeguards agreement if it is
found that the IAEA cannot perform its duties. In addition, Turkey’s decision to
sign the additional protocol, which allows the IAEA far greater authority and
powers to inspect nuclear and nuclear related facilities, makes even more remote
the idea that Ankara could or would divert material for weapons production.
Conclusion and recommendations
Turkey should expect to continue to receive lots of interest from foreign companies
eager to sell Ankara power reactors. However, it is unlikely that supplier states
will agree to sell Turkey E&R facilities. Therefore, Ankara should seek to find a
middle ground between its position that all countries in good standing with the
IAEA should retain their right to pursue E&R, and the prospect that the supplier
states aren’t likely to break with the established norms of discouraging the sale of
sensitive fuel cycle facilities. If one uses Turkey’s nuclear negotiations with Russia
as a baseline, it appears that Ankara has unofficially been pursuing a policy of
relying on fuel guarantees and take back provisions. While not willing to acquiesce
to UAE style provisions, Turkey could help alleviate some lingering concerns about
its nuclear intentions by clarifying its future fuel cycle intentions. Ankara should
release a comprehensive strategy paper detailing Turkey’s nuclear ambitions, how
it plans to fuel those reactors, the current plans for dealing with waste and spent
fuel, and the conditions in which Turkey would consider pursuing E&R.
Ankara should match these efforts with a more proactive effort to negotiate
bilateral agreements for the exchange of experts and the training of students in
52
nuclear sciences. Ankara should also strive to ensure that future reactor sales are
not “black boxed” so as to ensure that technology transfer will “spill over” and
have residual effects on Turkey’s current nuclear industry.
However, these efforts appear to be complicated by the decision to accept the
BOO arrangement for reactor sales. According to the Turkish-Russian agreement,
the reactor that will be built in Turkey will be owned and operated by Russian
personnel. Even if a Turkish company were to acquire a percentage of the company
operating the reactor, it is unclear whether or not they will receive access to the
design information for reactor technology. Moreover, it is unclear what role the
Turkish students currently being trained in Moscow will have at the reactor site.
While there are certainly some safety reasons for the Turkish decision, a clearer
sense about a gradual transition to Turkish operation would help clarify some of
the benefits that Turkey will receive from the technology transfer. In particular
the uncertainties related to whether in the middle or long run, a Turkish company
will end up taking part in the operation of the Akkuyu power plant clouds the
technology benefits that Turkey could derive from this large investment.
In addition, the government should begin a concerted effort to explain how and
why nuclear energy benefits Turkey as a whole. These efforts should not only be
limited to the benefits of power rectors, but how the technology transferred and
the skills gained from dual operation can help Turkey further develop its nuclear
medicine and agricultural sectors. These initiatives should be coupled with a state
led effort to bring a clearer sense of how Turkey intends to utilize the skills learned
to benefit society.
53
1-Introduction
Intent on overcoming its dependency on imported energy, Turkey has been
pursuing nuclear reactors for decades. Initially lured by the promise nuclear
power as a panacea for its chronic energy problems, Ankara began to put in place
the necessary legislative infrastructure to accommodate the sale of nuclear power
reactors in the late 1950s. In tandem, successive governments have solicited
bids for the construction of reactors on the Mediterranean and Black Sea coasts.
Ankara’s prolonged interest in developing a nuclear energy program has drawn
the interest of numerous foreign suppliers, but progress to date has been slowed by
a combination of internal problems and disagreements about financing.
Beginning in the 1980s, Turkey’s nuclear energy acquisition efforts accelerated.
Ankara ratified the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
concluded a full scope safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), and began to aggressively solicit bids for the construction of
nuclear reactors. As the negotiations progressed, Turkey and potential suppliers
busily began negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements. The agreements are
the legal basis for the transfer of nuclear technology and specify the terms and
conditions for cooperation and technology use. To date, Turkey has signed and
ratified nuclear cooperation agreements with Canada, Argentina, South Korea,
France, the United States, and Russia. Ankara has also concluded agreements with
Germany, Jordan, and China but they have not been ratified.
Turkey’s current government has reiterated the country’s desire to develop nuclear
power through partnerships with foreign suppliers and continued to seek out
foreign suppliers to supply Turkey with reactors. Given the current state of its
nuclear industry, Turkey is likely to remain dependent on foreign suppliers for
the foreseeable future. Thus, Ankara’s future development of nuclear power will
be contingent on technology transfers, which are governed by the multilateral
export control guidelines and framed by the conditions in state-to-state nuclear
cooperation agreements. To better gauge the possibilities for Turkey’s future
nuclear program, and the facilities likely to be transferred, it is important to
examine the origins of current nonproliferation norms and the emerging supplier
consensus on limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.
In order to do so, this report will analyze the evolution of nonproliferation
agreements and multi-lateral export control guidelines in order to get a better
sense of the limits and opportunities for Turkey’s future nuclear development. In
addition on the basis of a review of past nuclear cooperation agreements, a set of
recommendations will be provided to enhance Turkey’s capacity for additional
nuclear technology transfers through bilateral agreements.
54
2.The Commercialization of
Atomic Power and the Evolution
of the Nonproliferation Regime:
From the Manhattan Project
to the NPT
The origins of Turkey’s nuclear program are rooted in the debates taking place
during the 1940s and the 1950s about how best to control the spread of nuclear
technology. The backdrop for these debates was the Cold War and the evolving
super power dynamic. Shortly after the end of World War II, many of the
Manhattan project scientists argued that the destructive power of Atomic bombs
and the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons/energy facilities necessitated
American disarmament and the establishment of an international agency tasked
with ownership of critical nuclear facilities. However, as the early proposals
made their way through the American bureaucracy, the United States eventually
settled on a policy of national ownership of nuclear materials and facilities. The
decision to nationalize nuclear facilities set in motion the current system of national
ownership and state-to-state cooperation, in exchange for international inspections
and declarations of peaceful intent.
Initially, the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom concluded an
Agreed Declaration that supported policies to promote atomic energy for
peaceful purposes.1 President Truman appointed a committee to prepare a report
that looked into how to implement the themes and statements in the Agreed
Declaration. After deliberating for two months, the expert panel produced the
Acheson-Lilienthal report. The author’s made clear that the recommendations
were intended to be the “foundation” for a concrete proposal to control the spread
of atomic energy. The report called for ceding the control and operation of sensitive
fuel cycle activities to an international atomic energy commission.2 Notably, the
plan did not include any provisions for enforcement other than a proposal calling
for the geographical dispersal of the fuel cycle facilities. The report emphasized
that if nuclear facilities remained under national control, “rivalries” would likely
spur interest in nuclear weapons. While unstated, the Acheson-Lilienthal plan
advocated for American nuclear disarmament.
As the final touches were being put on the report, U.S. President Truman appointed
a conservative delegation headed by financier Bernard Baruch to present the report
to the international community. After reading the report, Baruch quickly moved
1_
Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1995), pg. 229.
2_
The Acheson-Lilienthal Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy,
Prepared for the Secretary of State’s Committee on Atomic Energy, 16 March 1946, http://
www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ach46.pdf.
55
to change some of the earlier proposals. Importantly, the Baruch plan dropped
the idea of international ownership, in favor of national facilities, inspections,
and sanctions to punish states that were caught pursuing nuclear weapons.3 The
Baruch plan also insisted that the decision to impose sanctions could not be vetoed
by the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The plan also
advocated for American disarmament, but only after the inspection regime had
been put in place and the international community had acquiesced to the American
plan.4
The American move to nationalize nuclear facilities was codified even before
the Baruch plan was presented to the United Nations. The 1946 Atomic Energy
Act gave the U.S. government the authority to own nuclear materials, imposed
classification and secrecy rules on atomic research, and created the civilian Atomic
Energy Commission to oversee civilian and military research and development.5
The Soviet Union – which had not developed its own nuclear weapons yet –
rejected the U.S. approach and presented a plan calling for universal disarmament
without inspection. The failure of the earlier proposals changed the tone of the
earlier efforts to control the spread of nuclear technology and eventually led to
President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech. Eisenhower’s landmark speech
contained a proposal for the creation of an international agency responsible for
the supply of nuclear fuel and ensuring peaceful use.6 The IAEA was established
in 1957, but the fuel bank proposal never materialized. The Atoms for Peace was a
compromise between those advocating for international control of nuclear facilities
and those that were adamant that the United States should implement policies to
classify nuclear technology.
To facilitate nuclear cooperation, the U.S. Congress amended the 1946 Atomic
Energy Act. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 lessened nuclear secrecy, allowed
for the private ownership of nuclear facilities, and bilateral nuclear cooperation7
in accordance with section 123. Technology transfers were conditioned on the
following conditions:
1. A guarantee by the cooperating party that safeguards will apply to all
transferred material and be in place as long as the facilities and materials are
under the jurisdiction of the recipient state
2. In the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, a requirement that IAEA safeguards
be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials in all peaceful nuclear
activities within the territory of the recipient state
3_
The Baruch Plan, Presented to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, 14
June 1946, http://streitcouncil.org/uploads/PDF/The%20Baruch%20Plan.pdf.
4_
Ibid
5_
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Public Law 585, 79th Congress, Excerpted from
Legislative History of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, http://www.osti.gov/atomicenergyact.
pdf.
6_
Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to
the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly, 8 December 1953, The
International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www.iaea.org/About/history_speech.html.
7_
United States National Security Council, “Cooperation with other nations in the
uses of peaceful of atomic energy,” 13 August 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. White
House Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. NSC Series. Policy Series
Subseries. Box 12. NSC 5431/1
56
3. A guarantee that material and facilities will not be retransferred to third parties
and that recipient state will not use special nuclear material produced for any
nuclear explosive device, or for research on or development of any nuclear
explosive device, or for any other military purpose
4. Except in the case of . . . cooperation with nuclear-weapon states, a stipulation
that the United States shall have the right to require the return of any nuclear
materials and equipment transferred if special nuclear material produced
through the use U.S. origin technologies are used in the detonation of a nuclear
explosive device or terminates or if the recipient state abrogates its IAEA
safeguards agreement
5. A guarantee by the cooperating party that any material or any Restricted Data
transferred pursuant to the agreement for cooperation will not be transferred to
unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating
party without the consent of the United States
6. A guarantee that adequate physical security will be maintained with respect to
any nuclear material transferred pursuant to such agreement and with respect
to any special nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any
material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to such
agreement
7. A guarantee that no material transferred pursuant to the agreement for
cooperation and no material used in or produced through the use of any
material, production facility, or utilization facility transferred pursuant to
the agreement for cooperation will be reprocessed, enriched or (in the case of
plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than twenty percent)
otherwise altered in form or content without the prior approval of the United
States
8. A guarantee that no plutonium, no uranium 233, and no uranium enriched
to greater than twenty percent, transferred pursuant to the agreement for
cooperation, or recovered from any source or special nuclear material so
transferred will be stored in any facility that has not been approved in advance
by the United States
9. A guarantee that any special nuclear material, production facility, or utilization
facility produced or constructed under the jurisdiction of the cooperating party
by or through the use of any sensitive nuclear technology transferred be subject
to all the requirements specified in this subsection.8
After the change in American attitudes, the United States and the Soviet Union
began to sign multiyear nuclear cooperation agreements and to subsidize the
building of research reactors in a number of foreign countries. The competition
to export research reactors was tied to the overall effort by both sides to establish
influence around the world. The Soviet Union’s nuclear export policy was highly
8_
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703) in Nuclear Regulatory Legislation,
Office of the General Counsel, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 111th Congress, 2nd
Session, vol. 1, no. 9, January 2011, pp. 7-231, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/v1/sr0980v1.pdf#page=13.
57
centralized and there was not a similar piece of legislation governing nuclear
exports. Moscow approached nuclear transfers on a case-by-case basis, and
generally exported nuclear material, equipment, and know how to friendly states.
The Soviet leadership, like their peers in the United States, assumed that the
transfer of dual use atomic facilities would engender good will and help establish
political support abroad.
Soviet attitudes began to change after the Sino-Soviet split (see Russia below for a
more detailed explanation) and mutual concerns about the “nth” country problem.
The “nth” country problem referred to a series of intelligence estimates released
by the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency warning that up to ten new
countries could produce first generation nuclear explosives by the late 1960s.9 The
USSR – which had reached similar conclusions - was particularly worried about
West Germany developing a nuclear weapon and the implications that such an act
would have on the Cold War balance of power. These similar concerns eventually
resulted in the two superpowers coming together and negotiating the NPT.
2.1. Proliferation Shocks: Suppliers Tightening Export
Controls and the Residual Effects for Bilateral Nuclear
Cooperation Agreements
Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT are designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
More specifically, the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) agreed not to develop
or receive nuclear weapons, while the official nuclear weapons10 (NWS) states
agreed not to transfer nuclear weapons or know how to the NNWS. Article 3 of the
NPT requires that the non-nuclear weapon states conclude a safeguards agreement
with the IAEA. The task of verifying a state’s nuclear declaration was initially
contained in bi-lateral nuclear cooperation agreements. After the creation of the
IAEA, the tasks for verification and inspection were slowly transferred to the new
international agency. At the time, it was believed that a state could not develop
enrichment or reprocessing technologies clandestinely. Thus, the safeguards system
was based on a country’s declarations and designed to prevent the diversion of
nuclear material for non-peaceful uses.
While the Treaty’s provisions are quite clear about the spread of nuclear weapons,
specifics about how to enforce the Treaty are vague. According to NPT Article 3.2:
9_
“Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences,”
National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-57, Central Intelligence Agency, 18 June 1957.
10_
The NPT defines the official nuclear weapons states as those that tested a nuclear
device before 1 January 1967. The five official nuclear weapons states are: 1) The United
States, 2) Russia, 3) the United Kingdom, 4) France, and 5) China. India, Pakistan, and Israel
are also known to possess nuclear weapons. The three countries are, however, not signatories
to the NPT.
58
Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material,
to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or
special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this
article.
To help clarify ambiguities about how to implement safeguards, the nuclear
suppliers came together in 1971 to discuss requirements and implications for a
common export control list.11 These discussions eventually led to the creation of
the Zangger Committee – an informal group of states committed to adopting a
common list of citems that should be controlled when exported. In September
1974, Australia, Denmark, Canada, Finland, Norway, USSR, the UK, and the
United States established a “trigger list” (exports that would automatically trigger
IAEA safeguards). The specifics were published in IAEA INFCIRC/209.12 The
annexes have since been updated and the list of Zangger Committee members has
increased. While the Parties were negotiating a wide-ranging list, India detonated a
nuclear device using plutonium derived from a Canadian supplied nuclear reactor
that used American supplied heavy water as a moderator.
India’s nuclear test prompted the major nuclear suppliers to come together again
to discuss ways to tighten export control restrictions. Beginning in 1975, a new
supplier group began to meet in London. The group was unofficially dubbed
the “London Group” and later evolved into the official Nuclear Suppliers Group
(NSG). The original seven members - United States, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, France, West Germany, Japan, and Canada – agreed on a first version
of the “Guidelines on Nuclear Transfers” in 1976. The text was then discussed
with eight new members - Belgium, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland – and accepted in 1977.13 The
document was then sent to the IAEA and published in INFCIRC/254.14
The NSG guidelines incorporated the Zangger trigger list, and include provisions
requiring the importing state to make a peaceful use pledge, have IAEA safeguards
(though not full scope safeguards), and a pledge not to re-transfer facilities
11_
Fritz Schmidt, “NPT Export Controls the Zangger Committee,” The Nonproliferation
Review, (Fall/Winter, 2000), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/73schmi.pdf.
12_
International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received from Members
Regarding the Export of Nuclear Material and of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other
Material, Information Circular 209, 3 September 1974, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf209.shtml.
13_
Tadeusz Strulak, “The Nuclear Suppliers Group,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Fall/
Winter, 1993), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/strula11.pdf.
14_
International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received from Certain Member
States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment or Technology,
Information Circular 254, February 1978, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/nsg/text/
inf254.htm.
59
transferred.15 Unlike the Zangger Committee, the NSG is not tied exclusively to the
NPT. Rather it imposes more stringent restrictions on nuclear transfers to every
non-nuclear weapons state. The members agreed to change domestic legislation
to reflect the NSG supplier guidelines. After the submitting the guidelines to
the IAEA, however, the NSG atrophied and the member states did not meet for
another thirteen years.
Despite the guidelines and the Zangger trigger list, some supplier countries took
a more relaxed approach to the transfer of dual use technologies to third parties.
The calculus changed after the end of the Cold War, and the discovery that Iraq
had diverted nuclear material and facilities that it acquired legally for a nuclear
weapons program. Iraq was an NPT member state whose facilities were subject
to IAEA inspections. Baghdad was able to elude detection and came close to
acquiring the amount of HEU needed for a first generation nuclear weapon. The
post-Gulf War revelations led the NSG to adopt more stringent guidelines for the
transfer of sensitive dual-use equipment.16 The updated guidelines require the
recipient state to have am IAEA full scope safeguards agreement and ask that
the supplier state consider whether or not the importing state is likely to use the
transferred equipment for non-peaceful uses.17
2.2. Coming to a Consensus on Controlling the Spread of
Enrichment and Reprocessing Facilities
Since the start of the nuclear weapons age, policymakers have grappled with the
dual use nature of nuclear technology. The same processes for enrichment and
reprocessing (E&R) can be used for power reactors or nuclear weapons. With the
proliferation of the gas centrifuge in the late 1970s, the problem has grown more
acute. In the 1970s, the United States began to lead efforts to significantly limit the
spread of enrichment and reprocessing in states that did not already have facilities.
After the end of the Cold War, a new consensus amongst the supplier states about
significantly limiting the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies
began to emerge. There continues to be, however, disagreements between the
15_
According to the NSG Guidelines: The transfer guidelines “should also apply to
facilities for reprocessing, enrichment, or heavy-water production, utilizing technology directly
transferred by the supplier or derived from transferred facilities, or major critical component
thereof. (b) The transfer of such facilities, or major critical components thereof, or related
technology, should require an undertaking (1) that IAEA safeguards apply to any facilities of
the same type (i.e. if the design, construction or operating processes are based on the same
or similar physical or chemical processes, as defined in the trigger list) constructed during
an agreed period in the recipient country and (2) that there should at all times be in effect a
safeguards agreement permitting the IAEA to apply Agency safeguards with respect to such
facilities identified by the recipient, or by the supplier in consultation with the recipient, as
using transferred technology.
16_
International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received from Certain Member
States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology,
Information Circular 254, July 1992, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/
Others/inf254r1p1.shtml.
17_
Ibid
60
major nuclear suppliers and some in the developing world/non-aligned movement
(NAM) about the placement of onerous conditions on the spread of nuclear
facilities.
NSG guidelines have tried to strike a balance between the right of all NPT
signatories to pursue peaceful nuclear research and practical policies designed to
limit the spread of sensitive dual use facilities. Key differences remain between the
NWS and NNWS about how to balance nonproliferation efforts and NPT Article
IV. During the 2000s, Turkey, and a number of other NSG members, challenged
the American backed proposal to ban the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies to states that are not currently operating plants. To help break the
political stalemate, France put forward a criteria based approach that conditioned
the supply of enrichment and reprocessing facilities on specific criteria like NPT
compliance, adherence to the Additional Protocol, compliance with safeguards
obligations, implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 154018,
agreements with the supplier state that facilities will not be used for nuclear
explosive devices, adherence to international safety commitments, and physical
protection in line with IAEA standards.19 In addition, the suppliers would be asked
to consider the following provisions before transferring facilities/material:
- If the transfer would have a negative impact on the stability of the importing
state (A reference to proliferation chain, and the belief that states choose to
proliferate reactively)
- If the importing state has a legitimate need for enrichment and reprocessing
facilities as part of a civil nuclear program20
The United States, however, did not fully support the objective criteria and
proposed a further set of “subjective” supplier guidelines. They were:
- Enrichment and reprocessing transfers have to be done under conditions that will
not allow for the replication of the technology (so called “black box” criterion)
- If the transfer will spur other regional states to pursue similar technology
- Suppliers will not transfer sensitive facilities to states that have agreed to forego
such activities in the past21
Argentina Brazil, Canada, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, and South
Africa objected to the subjective proposals. Brazil and Argentina objected to the
18_
The binding United Nations Security Council Resolution requires all states to
measures to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile components
to non-state actors. United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540, Adopted on 28
April 2004, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/
N0432843.pdf?OpenElement.
19_
Fred McGoldrick, “Limiting Transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing
Technologies: Issues, Constraints, and Options,” Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs, May 2011, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.
edu/files/MTA-NSG-report-color.pdf.
20_
Ibid
21_
Ibid
61
inclusion of the Additional Protocol, while Canada and the Netherlands argued
against conditioning transfers on whether or not the importing state has a
legitimate need for enrichment and reprocessing facilities as part of a civil nuclear
program. South Korea disagreed with condition preventing the suppliers from
transferring enrichment and reprocessing in the past (As part of the 1992 Joint
Declaration of the South and North Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, South Korea agreed not to pursue enrichment and reprocessing).22
Turkey argued against both the black box criterion and having suppliers take into
account whether or not the supply of enrichment and the provisions asking the
supplier state to consider if reprocessing technologies could spur neighboring
states to pursue similar technologies. Ankara argued that its territorial proximity
to Iran and Syria would forever preclude it from having access to nuclear facilities
and technologies.
After months of negotiations, the NSG members agreed on a clean Text. Fred
McGoldrick published the confidential draft in his report on the transfer of
enrichment and reprocessing technologies. According to the published draft, the
requirements for E&R transfers were:
- Compliance with NPT obligations
- Implementing IAEA safeguards and has the Additional Protocol in force, or an
IAEA approved regional arrangement that mimics the AP’s provisions (The
mention of the regional arrangement was a concession to Argentina and Brazil)
- Has not been found to be in breach of IAEA safeguards
- Implementing export control in line with NSG and UNSC 1540 obligations
- Have concluded a bilateral agreement with assurances that the facilities will only
be used for peaceful purposes, safeguards in perpetuity, and retransfer
- Adequate standards of physical protection
- Accepted international safety conventions
Eventually, the NSG members agreed to the new guidelines in 2011. The new
guidelines are based largely on the 2008 clean text. References to the American
proposed “subjective” criteria are alluded to vaguely in the conditions for exports,
but they are not nearly as explicit as the U.S. originally intended. The guidelines
condition the transfer of E&R technology on full scope safeguards, or a comparable
regional arrangement approved by the IAEA. If a recipient meets the specific
conditions contained in Article 6 (see Annex 1 for a full copy of the latest NSG
guidelines), the suppliers should receive legal assurances from the recipients that
the facilities will not be modified to allow for the enrichment of uranium above
20 percent. In a reference to the earlier “black box” proposals, the new guidelines
state that suppliers should “seek from recipients an appropriate agreement to
accept sensitive enrichment equipment, and enabling technologies, or an operable
enrichment facility under conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the
facilities.”
22_
Joint Declaration of the South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, Joint Declaration Text, Entry into force 19 February 1992, http://cns.miis.
edu/inventory/pdfs/aptkoreanuc.pdf.
62
This evolution of the nonproliferation regime is critical for understanding Turkey’s
efforts to acquire nuclear technology. In all cases, Turkey’s nuclear cooperation
agreements are a direct reflection of language used in the NSG guidelines. Thus,
the evolution of specific export control guidelines has played an important role in
shaping Ankara’s nearly four decades long effort to acquire reactors. In order to
understand how Turkey has been affected, it is necessary to dissect further how the
suppliers have approached nonproliferation historically and followed through on
their NSG commitments.
3-Balancing Nuclear Exports
and Export Controls:
Supplier States Interpretation
of NSG Guidelines
NSG members agreed that the guidelines would be enacted domestically with
national legislation. While the NSG member states, especially after the end of
the Cold War, have taken steps to universalize restrictions on the transfer of
enrichment and reprocessing, during the 1970s and 1980s there were fundamental
differences about how to interpret the guidelines. Generally, the United States has
taken a more hardline approach to export controls, while some European countries
were a bit more relaxed in their implementation of NSG guidelines. These
differences are reflected in Turkey’s nuclear cooperation agreements (the details
will be elaborated on further later in the report). Before analyzing Turkey’s nuclear
cooperation agreements, it is necessary to dissect how some of the supplier states
interpreted the NSG guidelines.
3.1. The United States
The United States, as mentioned earlier, first thought that the spread of nuclear
technology was a critical way to further influence in “friendly” and “potentially
friendly” states during the 1950s and early 1960s. The Atoms for Peace
initiative was an American policy and was pursued with vigor by successive
Administrations. The United States showed little concern for the spread of
weapons grade enriched uranium globally, believing that safeguards and state
pledges for non-diversion were enough to prevent proliferation. The real concern
amongst American nonproliferation advocates was spent fuel reprocessing. At
63
the time, the gas centrifuge was still being developed and officials believed that
gaseous diffusion was far more economical for enrichment.23 Gaseous diffusion
plants are large, conspicuous, and easily identifiable by technical means.
To counter the threat of plutonium separation, the United States “reserved the right
to regain such fissionable material after usage in the reactor.”24 In addition, it was
assumed that the fissionable material created in reactor was “insignificant” and
that the amount of HEU provided was “not of weapons quality.”25 If the recipient
state had wanted to divert fissionable material for non-peaceful uses, the high
rate of contamination requires the fuel rod “to be reprocessed in special facilities
. . . that only the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union” were
thought to possess at the time.26 The United States believed that the spread of
such facilities would not take place for at least 25 years, thus minimizing the
proliferation risk.
However, the thinking began to change as more and more states began to
approach the technical threshold for nuclear weapons development. One of the
many catalysts for a change in policy was American President John F. Kennedy’s
preoccupation with preventing proliferation. Kennedy worried that uncontrolled
spread of nuclear weapons was destabilizing and had the potential to spark a
nuclear exchange. Consequently, the United States and the Soviet Union –which
shared many of the same concerns – began a process to strengthen nonproliferation
norms and to coordinate and tighten export controls. The centerpiece was the
negotiation and passage of the NPT. However, as mentioned earlier, the real work
of negotiating a minimum standard for universal export controls had yet to be
completed.
Domestically, the United States began to work on legislation to govern U.S. origin
fissile material in third countries in the late 1970s. By the mid-1970s, the United
States had provided more than 90 percent of the West’s research reactors and was
the primary supplier of enriched uranium for reactors.27 Intent on overcoming
reliance on U.S. enriched fuel; Britain, the Netherland, and Germany decide to
build the URENCO enrichment facility. (See Germany and France below)
Early drafts of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act (NNPA) contained provisions
barring the reprocessing or further enrichment of U.S. origin fissile material in
third countries and conditioned nuclear exports on the recipient states foregoing
23_
Scott Kemp, “Gas Centrifuge Theory and Development: A Review of U.S.
Programs,” Science and Global Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (2009), http://www.princeton.edu/
sgs/publications/sgs/archive/17-1%20Kemp-Gas-Centrifuge.pdf.
24_
National Security Council, “Cooperation with other nations in the peaceful uses of
atomic energy,” 13 August 1954.
25_
Ibid
26_
Ibid
27_
Sharon Squassoni, “Looking Back: The 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act,” The
Arms Control Association, December 2008, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/
lookingback_NPT.
64
E&R. Eventually, the legislation was passed with provisions mandating NPT
compliance and the conclusion of an IAEA safeguards agreement as conditions
for the receipt of U.S. nuclear exports (The NSG amended its supplier guideline
with the full scope safeguards provision in 1991).28 The United States was trying
to dissuade states from reprocessing in favor of a once through fuel cycle supplied
with American origin reactor fuel. This necessitated states foregoing research
into breeder/burner reactors, the building of geological repositories, and the
establishment of a reliable and guaranteed of reactor fuel. (Notably, the legislation
did not include a take back provision for spent fuel)
In the 1980s, the United States introduced a catch all provision, which allows the
supplying country to regulate nuclear exports that could contribute to proliferation
even if they are not included on control lists. These efforts have become a staple of
the American nonproliferation policy. As noted earlier, proposals to ban enrichment
and reprocessing in recipient countries was part of the American proposals during
negotiations for new NSG guidelines. Moreover, the idea of an international fuel
bank has been around since the Acheson-Lilienthal report. Notably, however, many
of the early provisions called for in the NNPA are still being debated today. Since
1991, there has been a general consensus amongst the major suppliers that the
supply of enrichment and reprocessing facilities should be limited. However, there
continues to be frictions over the supply of nuclear reactors to countries like Iran,
and worries that states can still take advantage of exports to clandestinely acquire
nuclear weapons capability.
A 2005 decision, however, to begin discussions to grant India an NSG trade
exemption did not conform to United States’ decades old approach to
nonproliferation. In 2008, the United States granted non-NPT member India a
waiver that allows for the transfer of E&R facilities.29 The U.S. decision has had
widespread implications for the behavior other NSG states (see Russian Federation
and China below.) The India waiver demonstrates that the supplier states continue
to be tempted to break nonproliferation norms for commercial and political
benefits.
In 2008, the Bush administration signed a memorandum of understanding with the
United Arab Emirates pertaining to nuclear energy. The UAE was one a number of
states that announced new or long dormant plans for the construction of nuclear
reactors in 2006. After the signing of the MOU, the United States and the UAE
began to negotiate terms for a nuclear cooperation agreement. At the time, the
Bush administration was pursuing a no-transfer policy of E&R facilities at the NSG.
The UAE’s announcement raised concerns that Abu Dhabi was hedging against the
threat of a nuclear-armed Iran by taking its first steps towards achieving nuclear
28_
Nuclear Regulatory Legislation, Office of the General Counsel, Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, 111th Congress, 2nd Session, vol. 1, no. 9, January 2011, pp. 1029-1063,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr0980/v1/sr0980v1.
pdf#page=13.
29_
Javier Serrat, “NSG’s India Waiver Highlights Flawed U.S. Approach,” World
Politics Review, 7 July 2011, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/9399/nsgs-indiawaiver-highlights-flawed-u-s-approach.
65
latency. However, the UAE tried to assuage international concerns from the outset.
The Kingdom released a comprehensive white paper stating that the UAE would
sign the additional protocol and forgo enrichment and reprocessing. In 2009, the
Bush Administration signed the nuclear cooperation agreement, but it wasn’t
submitted to Congress for ratification.
According to the original document, the UAE was to rely on a guaranteed fuel
supply and spent fuel was to be sent for reprocessing in France or the United
Kingdom. In return, the UAE was to pledge not to seek to acquire and to establish
domestically E&R facilities.The agreement also included a provision allowing for
the United States to terminate the deal if the UAE violated its E&R pledge. After
Obama was elected, the U.S. strengthened the nuclear cooperation agreement’s
nonproliferation provisions by adding a clause that explicitly forbids the UAE’s
possession of enrichment and reprocessing facilities on its territory.30 The Obama
Administration submitted the cooperation agreement to Congress on 21 May 2009
and it came into force 5 months later. After the UAE agreed to the United States’
E&R conditions, the United States sought to use it as a model for all of its future
nuclear cooperation agreement.
These efforts, however, have been resisted by other states currently negotiating the
terms of cooperation agreements with the United States. Specifically, the United
States has failed to convince Jordan and Vietnam to accept similar provisions and
has abandoned earlier efforts to condition the conclusion of nuclear cooperation
agreements on a non-enrichment or reprocessing pledge.31
3.2. Russia
Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union did not have one single piece of
legislation governing nuclear exports. In the centralized Soviet system, the
Minsredmash - the ministry responsible for the nuclear program – made export
decisions on a case-by-case basis. Beginning in the 1950s, the Soviet Union agreed
to provide ample assistance to China’s early nuclear program. The depth of
cooperation grew, and eventually the USSR transferred nuclear weapons designs
and sensitive nuclear enrichment information to China. However, after the SinoSoviet split, and the eventual designation of Communist China as a nuclear threat,
the USSR cancelled its nuclear cooperation.
The Soviet Union joined the Zangger committed in 1970 and was one of the
original 15 NSG member states. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, however,
the gap between Russian declaratory policy and the enforcement of export
30_
Aaron Stein, “U.S. – UAE Nuclear Cooperation,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 13
August 2009, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/us-uae-nuclear-cooperation/.
31_
Jay Solomon, “U.S. Shifts Policy on Nuclear Pacts,” The Wall Street Journal, 25
January 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203806504577181213
674309478.html.
66
controls widened.32 The financial conditions after the collapse placed enormous
pressures on Russian export controls. Almost overnight, funding for the former
Soviet Union’s massive nuclear, chemical, and missile programs evaporated. Some
scientists sold sensitive information to well paying customers abroad and site
security deteriorated. The threat of Russian brain drain prompted the United States
to implement the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
In 1999, the Russian Duma passed a new export control law that brought Russian
export controls in line with similar Western legislation.33 Notably, the new law
contains a catch all provision. Nevertheless, there continues to be allegations that
private Russian companies – and individuals34 - have circumvented export controls
and shipped controlled dual use items abroad.
Russia has also been criticized for its transfer of nuclear material to India. After the
Bush Administration announced its intention to grant India an NSG waiver, Russia
announced that it would supply fuel for the Tarapur reactors. The NSG had not yet
considered the exemption, so the Russian announcement violated NSG guidelines.
It also confirms that Russia, like the United States, is susceptible to placing
economic and political consideration above their nonproliferation commitments.
3.3. Canada
Canada’s civil nuclear program stems from its participation in the Manhattan
project. Eager to avoid the costly development and construction of national
enrichment centers, Canada opted to pursue the development of large natural
uranium reactors. After the initial development of the CANDU heavy water
reactor, policymakers decided to market reactor technology abroad. During
the 1950s, there were few restrictions governing the sale of reactors abroad.
Consequently, Canada concluded sales agreements for CANDU heavy water
reactors with India, Pakistan, Argentina, and South Korea with minimal
safeguards.35
Canada’s attitude towards safeguards and export controls dramatically changed
after India’s 1974 nuclear test. It was later discovered that plutonium used for
the nuclear test came from a Canadian supplied reactor. Afterwards, Canada
cancelled nuclear cooperation with India and Pakistan and renegotiated it supplier
contracts with Argentina and South Korea. Since the establishment of the NSG,
Canada’s nuclear exports have largely mirrored the supplier guidelines. This
32_
Vladimir Orlov, “Export Controls in Russia: Policies and Practices,” The
Nonproliferation Review, (Fall, 1999), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/orlov64.pdf.
33_
Ibid
34_
Mark Gorwitz, “Vyacheslav Danilenko – Background, Research, and Proliferation
Concerns,” Institute for Science and International Security, 29 November 2011, http://www.
isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Yscheslav_Dainlenko_ISIS_article.pdf.
35_
Duane Bratt, “CANDU or CANDON’T: Competing Values Behind Canada’s
Nuclear Sales,” The Nonproliferation Review, (Spring/Summer 1998), http://cns.miis.edu/
npr/pdfs/bratt53.pdf.
67
included a continued willingness to continue supplying E&R facilities in line with
international obligations.
During the most recent negotiations to update NSG guidelines, Canada opposed
the American backed “black box” criterion because it wanted to keep open the
option of buying centrifuge technology.36 According to Fred McGoldrick, the
United States and Canada agreed on the following language for “black box”
provisions:
Avoid, as far as practicable, the transfer of specialized design, development,
and manufacturing technology associated with such items; and seek from
recipients an agreement to accept enrichment equipment, facilities, and
technology under conditions that, at a minimum, do not permit or enable
replication of the facilities.37
The language that was eventually adopted reflects the U.S. – Canadian
compromise. According to the 2011 NSG guidelines:
Suppliers should avoid, as far as practicable, the transfer of enabling
design and manufacturing technology associated with such items; and seek
from recipients an appropriate agreement to accept sensitive enrichment
equipment, and enabling technologies, or an operable enrichment facility
under conditions that do not permit or enable replication of the facilities.
Notably, Canada overturned its decades old policy of nuclear cooperation with
India. The two countries signed a nuclear cooperation agreement that allowed
for the transfer of Canadian nuclear facilities and materials to safeguarded Indian
nuclear facilities.38 Like the other suppliers, Canada’s actions indicate that it is
willing to reverse decades old proliferation policy if given the chance, and the
prospects are lucrative.
3.4. Germany
Germany and France, in particular, were early advocates for lesser controls on
the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Germany was rumored
to have had nuclear weapons ambitions, and, at the very least, considered
developing dual use capabilities to become nuclear latent. During the NPT
negotiations, Germany, like many other advanced nuclear countries at the time,
worried that stringent inspections would put it at a commercial disadvantage.
36_
Fred McGoldrick, “Limiting Transfer of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technologies:
Issues, Constraints, and Options,” Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs, May 2011, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/MTA-NSGreport-color.pdf.
37_
Ibid
38_
“India, Canada sign nuclear cooperation agreement,” World Nuclear News, 28 June
2010, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/RS-India-Canada_sign_nuclear_cooperation_
agreement-2806107.html.
68
West German officials believed that the lack of inspection in the NWS would grant
them an unfair economic advantage.39 Germany joined the NSG after the Indian
nuclear test, but refused to accept language banning the sale of full fuel cycle
technologies.40 Bonn was only willing to support the NSG’s provision calling for
the suppliers to show “restraint” when transferring sensitive nuclear facilities.
Bonn, however, had a liberal interpretation of “restrain” and began negotiations
with a number of sates for the sale of reactors and fuel cycle facilities. In 1975, West
Germany concluded an agreement with Brazil for the supply of the full nuclear
fuel cycle41 and negotiated similar contracts with Iran and Argentina. The deals
were eventually cancelled after technical challenges slowed the enrichment project
and the United States put pressure on Bonn to scale back its cooperation. During
the 1980s, however, public opposition to nuclear weapons grew and Germany’s
view on export controls began to change. After a series of embarrassing incidents
involving the legal transfer of dual use nuclear and chemical technologies to
Pakistan, Libya, and Iraq domestic pressure for reforms began to grow.
By the time that the UNSCOM inspectors revealed after the first Gulf War that
German companies had supplied a host of equipment for Iraq’s clandestine nuclear
weapons program, Germany had already taken steps to tighten export control
restrictions. In 1990, Germany passed domestic legislation conditioning the supply
of nuclear facilities on the receiving state having in place full scope safeguards and
later updated the legislation with a catch all provision. Shortly thereafter, Germany
pressed the European Union to adopt a universal export control guidelines (The
EU’s dual use export controls mirror those contained in INFCIRC/254 and were
passed in 2000).42 Germany supported the 2008 clean text at the NSG meetings and
did not raise any major concerns after the NSG’s export control guidelines were
updated in 2011.
3.5. France
France, like Germany, resisted early efforts to ban the transfer of enrichment
and reprocessing equipment. Like many of the other suppliers, French nuclear
equipment has been used for the development of nuclear weapons. Specifically,
France supplied Israel with the technology and expertise for the Dimona nuclear
reactor. At the time, few doubted Israel’s intention to use the reactor to create
plutonium for their nascent nuclear weapons program. France, however, remained
willfully ignorant, claiming that it had received a peaceful use pledge from
39_
Harald Muller, “Germany and WMD Proliferation,” Nonproliferation Review
(Summer, 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102mull.pdf.
40_
Ibid
41_
“Brazil and France Plan Nuclear Pact,” New York Times Wire Services, 6 July
1975, http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=37wqAAAAIBAJ&sjid=A2cEAAAAIBAJ&pg=
1358,2269777&dq=germany+brazil+nuclear+cooperation&hl=en.
42_
pdf.
Muller, “Germany and WMD Proliferation,” http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/102mull.
69
the Israeli’s. While French – Israeli nuclear cooperation pre-dates the NPT and
established nonproliferation norms, Paris’ perceived indifference to the spread
of dual use nuclear weapons technology is indicative of early French attitudes to
nonproliferation.43
After the passage of NSG guidelines, France continued to market and sell fuel
cycle facilities abroad. France signed reprocessing contracts with South Korea and
Pakistan, but heavy U.S. pressure eventually forced Paris to cancel the contracts.
French attitudes to nonproliferation began to change after UNSCOM inspectors
uncovered the depth of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program. In 1995,
France changed its domestic legislation and conditioned exports on a full scope
safeguards requirement. France was also the state that stepped in and proposed the
NSG’s clean text. Paris also included a catch all provision in in their update export
control legislation in 2009. At the same time, however, France and India signed a
nuclear cooperation agreement in 2008.44
3.6. China
China’s nuclear program was significantly aided by a massive Soviet effort to
help its former communist ally establish a robust nuclear energy program. After
relations with Moscow soured, Beijing continued its dual use nuclear work and
eventually tested a nuclear weapon on 16 October 1964. During the 1950s and
1960s China believed that the Russian and American efforts to negotiate the NPT
were part of a larger plot to maintain nuclear superiority. Chinese attitudes on
export controls began to change in the 1970s after the country began to liberalize
its economy. According to Jin-Dong Yuan, Phillip Saunders, and Stephanie
Lieggi, in an article for the Nonproliferation Review, “Over the next two decades,
China gradually joined major international, political, economic, and security
organizations and institutions and began to take a more critical attitude toward
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”45
In the early 1980s, China began to cooperate in nuclear areas with Algeria,
Pakistan, and Iran. China’s original intent was to raise money to buy Western
technology for its own nuclear reactor project, but it soon emerged as a provider
of nuclear technology and services.46 During this time period, China is accused of
providing Pakistan with a design for a first generation nuclear weapons design and
assisting with Pakistan’s early nuclear weapons program.47
43_
See Avner Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998)
44_
“France-India nuclear cooperation deal,” World Nuclear News, 30 September
2008, http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/IT_NP_No_nuclear_deal_from_Singhs_Paris_
trip_3009081.html.
45_
Jin-Dong Yuan, Phillip Saunders, and Stephanie Lieggi, “Recent Developments in
China’s Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges,” The Nonproliferation Review,
(Fall/Winter, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/93yuan.pdf.
46_
Ibid
47_
U.S. State Department, “The Pakistani Nuclear Program,” 22 June 1983, Secret,
excised copy, State Department FOIA release, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB114/chipak-11.pdf.
70
Starting in the mid-1980s, China’s export control policy began to change. Beijing
concluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1984 and acceded to the
NPT in 1992. China’s declaratory export control policy during that timeframe
maintained that all Chinese nuclear exports should be used for peaceful purposes,
exports should be conditioned on IAEA safeguards (notably not full scope
safeguards, but the weaker facility safeguards system), and no re-transfer of
nuclear technologies without Chinese approval.
Following revelations in 1995 that Chinese companies sold centrifuge components
to Pakistan, China tightened its export controls even further. Beijing introduced
legislation governing the export of dual use items and announced that it would not
provide assistance for unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.48 The dual use guidelines
borrowed heavily from the NSG’s control list. Following the announcement,
China joined the Zangger Committee in 1997, but continued with its policy of only
requiring limited safeguards for technology transfers.
In 2004, China formally joined the nuclear suppliers group. However, issues still
remain. China quietly lobbied against India’s NSG waiver, but has since taken
advantage of the precedent. China has announced that it intends to sell Pakistan
two nuclear reactors, after rebuffing the Pakistani requests since it joined the NSG.
The sale violates NSG guidelines, but China argues that the sale is legal because its
nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan pre-dates its NSG membership.49
48_
Jin-Dong Yuan, Phillip Saunders, and Stephanie Lieggi, “Recent Developments in
China’s Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges,” The Nonproliferation Review,
(Fall/Winter, 2002), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/93yuan.pdf.
49_
Mark Hibbs, “The Breach,” Foreign Policy.com, 4 June 2010, http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/06/04/the_breach.
71
4-Turkey and Nuclear
Negotiations
4.1. NSG Guidelines
Despite the differing interpretations of the meaning of “restraint”, the fact
remains that the suppliers have not transferred E&R facilities to states that don’t
already possess the technology since the 1970s. Moreover, very few states have
expressed interest in pursuing E&R facilities. Therefore, the disagreements in the
NSG are largely due to differing opinions about the NPT’s peaceful use clause,
and the extent to which the nuclear weapons states are obligated to assist in the
development of peaceful nuclear technology globally. The major suppliers, and the
officials weapons states, have taken the approach that the spread of E&R could be
interpreted as a not being in the spirit of NPT Article’s I and II. Others have argued
that limits encroach on Article IV and are contradictory to the spirit of the NPT.
While it appears as if the overt spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies
is unlikely, the major nuclear suppliers remain intent on marketing and selling
reactors abroad. Turkey has indicated that it hopes to have 3 nuclear plants built by
2023.50 Given the evolution of nonproliferation norms, it is likely that future power
plants in Turkey will rely on nuclear fuel supplied from abroad. Spent fuel is likely
to be returned to the supplier state or transferred to a country currently operating
reprocessing facilities for reprocessing and storage. The language in Turkey’s
current nuclear cooperation agreements reflect NSG supplier guidelines, which
allows for a reasoned analysis of the limits and opportunities Turkey will have in
the nuclear field moving forward.
4.2. Turkey Gets into the Nuclear Business
Ankara first began to seriously consider developing an indigenous nuclear power
program shortly after the Atoms for Peace program was announced. In 1956,
Turkey established the Atomic Energy Commission under the auspices of the
Prime Ministry to coordinate nuclear research and issue licenses for nuclear power
plants.51 Construction began on Turkey’s first nuclear research reactor in 1959 at
the Cekmece Nuclear Research and Education Center (Cekmece Nukleer Arastirma
50_
“Turkey to have 23 nuclear units, minister says,” Hurriyet Daily News, 6 June 2012,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-have-23-nuclear-units-minister-says.aspx?pageID
=238&nID=22486&NewsCatID=348.
51_
Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” The
Nonproliferation Review, (Spring/Summer 1997), http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/kibaro43.pdf.
72
ve Egitim Merkezi, or CNAEM). The firm American Machine and Foundry
(AMF) was chosen to construct a 1-megawatt thermal (MWt) light water pool
type research reactor on a turnkey basis. The reactor first went critical in 1962 and
operated until 1977. It was replaced in 1982 with a 5 MWt TR-2 research reactor.52
Turkey also operates a General Electric built 250 KWt TRIGA Mark II light water
reactor at the Ayazaga campus of Istanbul Technical University. The reactor
went critical in March 1979 and is fueled with American supplied 20 percent
enriched fuel rods. The reactor is used for research, educational purposes, neutron
radiography experiments, non-destructive testing using gammagraphy and
neutron-activation analysis.
The Atomic Energy Commission opened a second nuclear research facility near
Ankara in 1966. The Ankara Nükleer Araştırma ve Eğitim Merkezi (Ankara
Nuclear Research and Training Center - ANRTC) oversaw the first studies for the
construction of a 300 – 400 MWe heavy water natural uranium power plants and
the initial studies into the mining of uranium. The ANTRC was replaced with
Sarayköy Nükleer Araştırma ve Eğitim Merkezi (Sarayköy Nuclear Research and
Training Center - SANAEM) in 2005.
4.3. Nuclear Legislation and Chronology of Nuclear
Negotiations
Between 1972 and 1974, the Turkish Electric Authority carried out and concluded
the site selection and studies for 600 MWe nuclear power plant at Akkuyu Bay on
Turkey’s southern Mediterranean coast.53 Shortly after the commission issued the
site license in 1976, Turkey began negotiating with an international consortium for
the supply of nuclear power reactor. Talks broke down after the 1980 military coup.
The Atomic Energy Commission was replaced in 1982 with the Turkish Atomic
Energy Authority (Turkiye Atom Enejisi Kurumu - TAEK). The TAEK is authorized
to draft and oversee regulations related to nuclear safety and site licensing. In
2002, the Turkish government re-organized the TAEK and expanded its mandate.
The TAEK is now affiliated with the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.
The TAEK’s president is appointed by the Prime Minister and oversees the
implementation of Turkey’s nuclear energy program. Three vice presidents
are chosen to assist the president. Together, they oversee the Atomic Energy
Commission, an advisory council, and an advisory committee on nuclear safety.54
The Atomic Energy Commission is made up of representatives from the Ministries
52_
“Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities: Turkey,” Nuclear
Legislation in OECD Countries, Nuclear Energy Agency, 2008, http://www.oecd-nea.org/
law/legislation/turkey.pdf.
53_
54_
“TAEK Organizational Chart,” Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, 10 February 2012,
http://www.taek.gov.tr/eng/about-us/taek-organization-chart.html.
73
of National Defense, Foreign Affairs, Energy and Natural Resources, and four
faculty members from Turkish universities. The representatives are selected by
the Prime Minister to serve four-year terms.55 The AEC is responsible for drafting
budgets, laws, and an annual report for the Prime Minister. Members of the
advisory council are appointed by the AEC, and then submitted to the Prime
Minster for approval. The advisory council conducts studies assigned to it by the
AEC and reports its findings to the AEC during regularly held meetings.
The TAEK oversees research at CNAEM, ANRTC, and SANAEM. Research at
CNAEM is heavily focused on the research and development of nuclear reactor
and fuel technology.56 ANRTC’s research focuses on nuclear safety and SANAEM’s
research is focused on medical and industrial uses of nuclear technology.57
4.3.1. Turkey and Canada’s Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement
In 1983, Turkey invited seven companies to submit bids for the construction of
nuclear power plants. Eventually, Turkey sent three letters of intent to Atomic
Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL), Kraftwerk Union (KWU) of West Germany, and
General Electric (GE) of the United States.58 Shorty thereafter, talks with KWU and
GE broke down due to differences about the financing arrangements. Negotiations
with Canada continued, and the two sides eventually agreed to terms on a nuclear
cooperation agreement in 1985.59
The Parties agreed to cooperate in the following areas:
- The supply of information that includes, but is not limited to,
- Research and development
- Health, nuclear safety, emergency planning, and environmental protection
- Equipment (including the supply of designs, drawings and specifications)
- Uses of equipment, material, and nuclear material (including manufacturing and
processes and specifications)
- The supply of material, nuclear material, nuclear fuel, and equipment
- The implementation of projects for research and development as well as for
design and application of nuclear energy for use in such fields as agriculture,
industry, medicine, and power generation
55_
“Atomic Energy Commission,” Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, 10 February 2012,
http://www.taek.gov.tr/eng/about-us/aek.html.
56_
“Cekmece Nukleer Arastirma ve Egitim Merkezi,” Turkish Atomic Energy Authority,
10 February 2012, http://www.taek.gov.tr/eng/cnaem.html.
57_
“Sarykoy Nuclear Research and Training Center,” Turkish Atomic Energy Authority,
10 February 2012, http://www.taek.gov.tr/eng/sanaem.html.
58_
59_
The Turkish Parliament ratified the agreement on 29 June 1986. “Agreements,”
Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, 27 February 2012, http://www.taek.gov.tr/eng/
international/agreements.html.
74
- Licensing arrangements and the transfer of patent rights
- Access to and use of equipment
- The rendering of technical assistance and services, including exchange of experts
and specialists
· Visits by scientists
· Technical training
· The exploration for and development of uranium and thorium resources
· Cooperation specific to the various aspects of the advanced nuclear fuel cycle
The Parties agreed to place limits on the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing
technologies. While not specifically prohibited, the agreement specifies that Turkey
would be required to notify Canadian authorities for up to twenty years if Turkish
companies developed or designed indigenous enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities from Canadian supplied technology. The agreement also mandates that
Turkey not enrich uranium above 20 percent or reprocess spent fuel rods.
The agreement’s nonproliferation provisions are built around the technological
traits of the CANDU heavy water moderated reactor. The CANDU reactor
produces larger quantities and higher concentrations of PU-239 than light water
reactors (LWR). While spent fuel from LWRs can also be used for plutonium
production, the quantity and concentration of Pu-239 is much less.60 In a specific
reference to the proliferation dangers of the CANDU reactor, the agreement
states that the sale of a reactor capable of producing significantly more than
100 grams of plutonium every year is legal. One other feature of some heavy
water reactors is that they can be refueled while operating. This feature allows a
potential proliferator to “burn” the fuel rod for less time. The shorter “burn” time
maximizes the concentration of weapons grade PU-239 in the fuel rod.61 In order to
help prevent this, the agreement states that the supply of equipment to re-fuel the
reactor online is not normally made available.
These efforts to prevent proliferation were matched with a series of articles
enumerating Turkey’s right to pursue peaceful nuclear technology and research.
Specifically, the agreement calls for the exchange of data and the training of
scientists. It also specifies that transferred facilities and technologies cannot be retransferred to third parties, and that site security needs to be in accordance with
specific provisions outlined in Annex E of the agreement. The parties agreed that
the IAEA would be responsible for inspecting Turkish nuclear facilities. In the
event that the IAEA could not conduct inspections, the parties agreed to conclude a
separate protocol that mimics the inspections and techniques called for in Turkey’s
1981 full scope safeguards agreement.
60_
Victor Gilinsky, Marvin Miller, and Harmon Hubbard, “A Fresh Examination of
the Proliferation Dangers of Light Water Reactors,” Nonproliferation Education Center, 22
October 2004, http://www.npolicy.org/files/20041022-GilinskyEtAl-LWR.pdf.
61_
“Plutonium Production,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Weapons
Primer, updated 20 June 2000, http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/plutonium.htm.
75
4.3.2. Canada and Turkey’s Nuclear Negotiations
While the two sides were negotiating the specific terms of their nuclear cooperation
agreement, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and the Turkish government
were amid negotiations for the sale of a 600 MW pressurized heavy water reactor.
Progress slowed, however, when Turkey raised the financing requirement for
the three foreign firms competing to build the country’s first power plant. In the
original offer, Canada’s AECL had guaranteed 85 percent of the financing for
construction.62 Turkey then changed the tender terms and asked that AECL provide
100 percent financing and accept a build, operate, and transfer model (BOT).
The BOT model has never been used for nuclear reactor construction. It calls
for the foreign firm to pay for the cost of construction, operate the reactor for a
specific period of time, recoup expenses from guaranteed electricity sales, and then
transfer the reactor to the importing state in exchange for a share of total electricity
sales. At the time, AECL asked that “risk coverage” be written into the contract,
as well as a guarantee that Turkey’s electricity purchase would be in dollars and
sufficient enough to cover the debt of service.63 In order to meet Turkey’s financing
requirements, AECL turned to Canada’s Export Development Corp. to help raise
money for construction.64 Nevertheless, the two sides could not agree and the
tender was eventually cancelled.
In 1996, Turkey once again invited foreign suppliers to submit bids for the
construction of a turnkey nuclear reactor at the Akkuyu site.65 However, the
postmodern coup complicated Turkey’s tender process.66 After seven missed
deadlines, the Turkish government cancelled the tender in 2000. At the time,
Turkey was amid a severe financial crisis and the terms of their International
Monetary Fund economic program precluded the government from making the
necessary financial guarantees.67
In 2008, the current government once again solicited proposals for a nuclear tender.
Despite showing some initial interest, AECL opted to not submit a proposal.
62_
Ann Taboroff, “The Turkish Electrical Authority has Raised the Financing
Requirement,” Nucleonics Week, 3 May 1984.
63_
Ann Taboroff and Ann MacLachlan, “AECL ready to consider Turkish government’s
terms for Akkuyu Project,” Nucleonics Week, 22 November 1984.
64_
“Financing key to reactor sale to Turkey,” The Financial Post, 17 August 1985.
65_
“Turkey’s renewed plans for nuclear plant,” FT Energy Newsletters, 4 October 1996.
66_
Mark Hibbs, “Turkey pulls back on reactor, Europe’s vendors skeptical,” Nucleonics
Week, 23 May 1996.
67_
“Turkey postpones nuclear plant project due to financial hardship,” Agence France
Presse, 21 April 2000.
76
4.3.3. Turkey and Argentina’s Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement
In May 1988, Turkey and Argentina signed a 15-year nuclear cooperation
agreement. At the time of signing, Argentina was not a member of the NSG,
which explains the Agreement’s language. The Parties agreed to cooperate in the
following areas:
· Research, development and technology for nuclear research and power reactors
· Installation, operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle
facilities, including production of fuel elements.
· Industrial production of nuclear material and equipment including services
related to maintenance
· Exploration and exploitation of natural resources (i.e. uranium and thorium)
· Management of radioactive waste
· Production of radioisotopes
· Environmental protection and nuclear licensing
· Radioactive waste management
· Fundamental and applied research in the nuclear energy field, and other
research, development and development of peaceful nuclear applications.
The Parties agreed to facilitate scientific cooperation through an exchange of
experts, assistance and education, stipends and scholarship for research and
study, the setting up of joint working groups, the delivery of equipment, and
the exchange of information relating to the areas of cooperation. The agreement
explicitly states that all material and information transferred is for peaceful
uses only. However, it does not place any limits on enrichment or reprocessing
equipment. There is also no reference to enrichment above twenty percent or the
reprocessing of spent fuel.
The absence of specific limits on enrichment and reprocessing is reflective
of Argentina’s approach to the global efforts to control the spread of nuclear
technology. Beginning in the 1960s, Argentina rebelled against the global effort
to curb proliferation. At the time, Buenos Aires refused to sign the 1963 Partial
Test Ban Treaty, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American, the 1968 NPT, and the 1971
Seabed Treaty.68 Buenos Aires placed a strong preference on self-sufficiency, and
thus sought to purchase natural uranium – i.e. heavy water – reactors from AECL
and Siemens. Officials argued that the pursuit of heavy water reactor technology
would allow Argentina to use it own domestic uranium reserves, rather than
import enriched nuclear fuel from abroad. Given Argentina’s nuclear history, the
agreement’s provisions are not particularly surprising. In the past, Ankara has also
explored the idea of contracting with foreign suppliers for heavy water reactors
that would eventually use Turkey’s own reserves of natural uranium.
68_
Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Cooperation: Identity, Emotions, and
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 141 – 171.
77
The Parties agreed to consult each other about the implementation of safeguards.
At the time, Argentina had not yet concluded a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA and had been steadfast in its opposition to strict limits for technology
transfers. The agreement says, “both Parties shall, when it considered necessary,
conclude with the International Atomic Energy Agency agreements on
safeguards.” At the time Turkey had already concluded a safeguards agreement, so
it can be assumed that Ankara would have invited the IAEA to inspect facilities if
any had been transferred.
4.3.4. Turkey and Argentina’s Nuclear Reactor Negotiations
Turkey and Argentina’s Empresa Nuclear Argentina de Centrales Electricas
(CNEA) began negotiations for the sale of a 380 MWe Argos pressurized heavy
water reactor in 1988.69 Turkey also expressed interest in a 25 MWe CAREM-25
light water reactor developed by Argentina’s state owned Investigaciones
Aplicadas (Invap).70 In October 1990, Turkey and Argentina agreed to form a joint
engineering company to oversee construction of the CAREM-25. According to
Nucleonics Week, Argentina agreed to provide Turkey with the nuclear steam and
supply system (NSSS) and basic and detailed engineering for the balance of plant,
construction management, and regulatory expert.71 In exchange, Turkey agreed to
finance the construction of one prototype in Argentina and a second in Turkey.72
Argentina claimed that the reactor could be built for less than one hundred million
U.S. dollars, and sought to market it as a cost effective alternative for developing
nations intent on exploiting nuclear power. At the time the CAREM-25 had never
been built and industry experts criticized the cost assessments and optimistic
construction timetable.
Through out the negotiations, Argentina’s controversial nuclear history added
to speculation that Turkey was seeking to acquire the full nuclear cycle in order
to have the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Professor Yalcin Sanalan, the
former director of the TAEK, alluded to these proliferation concerns when he said,
“the CAREM-25 was too small for electricity generation and too big for research
or training, however, very suitable for plutonium production.”73 Sanalan worried
that Western concerns about proliferation could stunt Turkey’s nuclear plans.
Ankara eventually concluded that it was in its best interest to cancel deal. To date,
no progress has been made on implementing the deal and Argentina has not been
involved in any of Turkey’s subsequent nuclear tenders.
69_
Eric Kessler, “Argentina says Nuclear Accord with Turkey sets stage for exports,”
Platts Nucleonics Week, 12 May 1988.
70_
Richard Kessler, “Argentina said to be near deal with Turkey for 25-MW LWR,”
Platts Nucleonics Week, 8 May 1988
71_
Richard Kessler, “Argentina and Turkey to form nuclear A/E to build small PWRs,”
Nucleonic Week, 25 October 1990.
72_
Ibid
73_
According to Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey’s Quest for Peaceful Nuclear Power,” The
78
4.3.5. Turkey and South Korea’s Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement
In 1999, the national utility Korea Electric Power Corp (KEPCO), in conjunction
with Korea Heavy Industries and Construction, Daewoo Corp and Atomic Energy
of Canada Ltd, submitted a tender for the construction of a 1,400 MWe reactor at
the Akkuyu site in Turkey.74 Shortly thereafter, Turkey and South Korea concluded
a nuclear cooperation agreement. The areas of cooperation are:
· Basic and applied research and development with respect to the peaceful use of
nuclear energy
· Research, design, construction, operation and maintenance of nuclear power
plants and research reactors
· Utilization of research reactors and particle accelerators
· Exploration and ore processing of nuclear material and handling, transportation,
manufacture and supply of nuclear fuel elements to be used in nuclear power
plants and research reactors
· Production and application of radioactive isotopes in industry, agriculture,
medicine, and biotechnology
· Nuclear safety, radiation protection, environment protection, radioactive waste
management
· Nuclear safeguards and physical protection
The Parties agreed to facilitate cooperation through the exchange of scientific
personnel, data, and technical information. South Korea also agreed to provide
consultancy services, and set up joint working groups to carry out studies and
projects in fields of mutual interest.
The agreement states that all transferred materials shall not be used for an
explosive device or other military uses. The Parties agreed that Turkey shall not
enrich above twenty percent or reprocess spent fuel rods, unless the two sides
agree beforehand. Turkey is required to implement specific physical protection
measures in accordance with IAEA INFCIRC/225. The Parties agreed that the
IAEA is responsible for inspecting transferred technology and material and that
none of the material can be retransferred.
4.3.6. Turkey and South Korea’s Nuclear Reactor
Negotiations
In 2008, KEPCO signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with ENKA
– Turkey’s largest construction firm – to help facilitate the sale of nuclear
reactors.75 However, KEPCO quickly announced that it would not submit a bid
74_
“South Korea; Nuclear; KEPCO bids for Turkey Nuclear Project,” Modern Power
Systems, 31 January 1999.
75_
“KEPCO Eyes 1st Atomic Power Plant in Turkey,” Korea Times, 27 January 2008.
79
for construction because Turkey continued to insist on the BOT financing model
and would not grant loan guarantees. In 2009, KEPCO and Turkey discussed the
sale of two APR 1400 light-water reactors at the Sinop site on Turkey’s Black Sea
coast.76 The negotiations eventually resulted in the signing of a MOU on nuclear
cooperation in June 2010.77 Once again, however, disputes relating to Turkey’s BOT
financing terms derailed the deal. This time around, the two sides failed to agree
on the price of guaranteed electricity sales. South Korea is reported to have favored
a higher price per kilowatt-hour, while Turkey sought to keep prices low.78
The information suggests that KEPCO had agreed to a build, own, and operate
(BOO) arrangement, but had sought certain guarantees from the Turkish
government to minimize financial risk. The BOO scheme stipulates that KEPCO
would provide 100 percent financing for construction, recoup its investment
through guaranteed electricity sales, and maintain a majority ownership stake in
the reactor. KEPCO reportedly asked the Turkish government to become the largest
shareholder in the project, in order to reduce the risk and financial burden on
KEPCO.79
In May 2011, the talks appeared to get a boost when South Korea decided to drop
its demands for Turkey to provide treasury loans for construction.80 Nevertheless,
reports to date do not suggest that the two sides have agreed on the guaranteed
price per kilowatt hour of electricity, nor have any details about site licensing at
Sinop been released.
4.3.7. Turkey and France’s Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
France and Turkey signed their nuclear cooperation agreement on 21 September
1999 and its was ratified on 25 February 2011. The Parties agreed to cooperate in
the following areas:
· Basic and applied research
· Agriculture, medicine, and industry uses of nuclear energy
· The use of nuclear energy for electricity generation
· Nuclear safety, radiation protection, and environmental protection
· Nuclear fuel and waste management
· Exploration and exploitation of uranium and thorium reserves
In the event that the parties come to terms for the transfer of material or
technology, France and Turkey have agreed to personnel exchanges and training,
76_
“S.Korea, Turkey in talks on nuclear power deal,” Trend Daily Economic News, 27
December 2009.
77_
2010.
“S. Korea, Turkey sign nuclear power accord,” Agence France Presse, 15 June
78_
Sarah Tzinieris, “Turkish Nuclear Plant Project Falters over Pricing Disagreement
with South Korea,” IHS Global Insight, 17 November 2010.
79_
Ibid.
80_
Umit Enginsoy, “South Korea revisits Turkish nuclear power plant bid,” Hurriyet
Daily News, 26 May 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/south-korea-revisits-turkishnuclear-power-plant-bid.aspx?pageID=238&nID=21620&NewsCatID=348.
80
joint research and development activity, and the co-organization of conferences
and symposia on nuclear technology. The agreement specifies that the details of the
scientific exchanges will be agreed upon separately. To facilitate implementation,
the Parties agreed to establish a Joint Liaison Group, as well as, a Joint Expert
Group to discuss specific issues, and how they can best be delegated.
The agreement has a provision mandating that Turkey not enrich above twenty
percent or reprocess spent fuel rods. The agreement states that the IAEA would be
counted on to carry out inspections to ensure peaceful use. The transfer of nuclear
technology or material to third parties is prohibited, unless the two sides agree
beforehand. The Parties agreed that transferred material be stored in accordance
with the provisions of IAEA INFCIRC/225.
4.3.8. Turkey and France’s Nuclear Negotiations
Despite the agreement, the two sides have never been able to agree on terms for the
sale of French nuclear technology. In 1983, Framatome submitted a proposal for the
construction of a 900 MW reactor at the Akkuyu site.81 However, Turkey quickly
turned to GE, KWU, and AECL and negotiations were abandoned. In 1996, Turkey
invited Framatome, and seven other suppliers, to submit a tender for a reactor at
the Akkuyu site.82 Eventually, Framatome and Siemens formed a joint venture and
submitted a nulcea tender.83 Former Turkish Prime Minister Necmetting Erbakan is
reported to have been more in favor of the Canadian proposal because of his desire
to use Turkey’s domestic uranium reserves to fuel the reactor. Erbakan’s interest in
developing a self-sufficient nuclear program, combined with the terms of the 1996
tender, effectively eliminated the Framatome-Siemens venture from contention.84
As mentioned earlier, the tender was eventually cancelled because of financing
problems in 2000.
In 2007, French nuclear company AREVA cautiously considered submitting a bid
for Ankara’s latest nuclear tender. AREVA and the other major suppliers were
hesitant to get involved in drawn out negotiations unless Turkey reformed its
nuclear laws and put forward a more realistic timetable for construction.85 Despite
having some interest in selling Turkey a 1,600 MWe European Pressurized Reactor
(EPR),86 AREVA eventually decided not to submit a tender.
81_
“Framatome and Alshtom-Atlantique have submitted a technical proposal to Turkey,”
Nucleonics Week, 15 September 1983.
82_
“Ankara invites bids for first reactor at Akkuyu by end-June 1997,” FT Energy
Newsletters – European Energy Report, 30 December 1996.
83_
“Turkey extends tender for nuclear power station,” FT Energy Newsletters – European
Energy Report, 27 January 1997.
84_
Mark Hibbs, “NPI sees little hope, AECL edge Turkish nuclear project,” Nucelonics
Week, 1 May 1997.
85_
Mark Hibbs, “Areva and AECL react cautiously to Turkey’s bid for reactors,” Platts
Nucleonics Week, 8 February 2007.
86_
Ann MacLachlan, “Areva wants to sell EPRs to Turkey, but awaiting invitation to
bid,” Platts Nucleonics Week, 21 February 2008.
81
In January 2011, a team of representatives from AREVA and GDF Suez Energy
held preliminary discussion for the construction of a nuclear reactor at the Sinop
site. At the time, however, Turkey’s December 2010 agreement with Japan’s
Toshiba prevented more detailed discussions for a period of three months.87 After
the agreed upon moratorium expired, no details about negotiations have been
reported.
The nuclear cooperation between Turkey and France has visibly been hindered
by the Turkey sceptic policies of the Sarkozy administration. It was politically
impossible for a French company to partipate in the large nuclear tenders of
Turkey. The change in administration in France is set to change these conditions.
Going forward, AREVA may take part in the future of Turkey’s nuclear program.
4.3.9. Turkey and the United States’ Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement
Despite close relations and long history of nuclear cooperation, Turkey and
the United States struggled to agree on the terms and conditions of a nuclear
cooperation agreement. Negotiations began in 2000, but slowed after the
United States began advocating for its nuclear partners to forgo enrichment and
reprocessing. Turkey - which has not ruled enrichment or reprocessing - refused to
agree to provisions that limited access to nuclear technology.
The negotiations took place against the backdrop of a strong effort by the George
W. Bush Administration to prod members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ban
the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment to states that do not already
have plants in operation.88 Turkey resisted these efforts, saying that there should be
no provision against the transfer of E&R technology as long as the receiving state is
in good standing with the IAEA.89
After six years of negotiations, the Turkish parliament ratified the nuclear
cooperation agreement in 2006. The final document does place some limits on
the enrichment and reprocessing of U.S. origin fissile material, but noticeably
does not contain provisions that ban the practice outright. Instead, the two sides
opted to mimic the provisions in all but one of Turkey’s other nuclear cooperation
agreements. The Parties agreed to cooperate in the following areas:
· Development, design, commissioning, operation, maintenance, and use of
reactors, reactor fuel fabrication, reactor experiments, and decommissioning
· The use of material in physical and biological research, medicine, agriculture, and
industry
87_
“Turkey discussing cooperation with French nuclear companies,” Platts Nucleonics
Week, 13 January 2011.
88_
Fred McGoldrick, “Limiting Transfers of Enrichment and Reprocessing Technology:
Issues, Constraints, Options,” Report for Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, May 2011, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
publication/21010/limiting_transfers_of_enrichment_and_reprocessing_technology.html?brea
dcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F368%2Fmatthew_bunn%3Fpage%3D3.
89_
Ibid
82
· Fuel cycle studies of ways to meet future world wide civil nuclear needs, including
multilateral approaches to guaranteeing nuclear fuel supply and appropriate
techniques for management of nuclear waste
· Safeguards and physical protection of materials, equipment, and components
· Health, safety, and environmental consideration related to nuclear energy
· Assessing the role nuclear power may play in national energy plans
To address the E&R issue, the parties agreed to discuss ways to universalize the
nuclear fuel cycle, so as to guarantee aspiring nuclear states nuclear fuel for future
reactors. The agreement obligates Turkey not to further enrich U.S. origin fissile
material or alter in form or content, except in the case of reactor irradiation, spent
nuclear fuel, unless the parties agree beforehand.
The Parties agreed that all U.S. origin fissile material transferred to Turkey would
be low enriched uranium, except if the parties amend the agreement or if the
HEU is intended to produce medical radioisotopes. If HEU or weapons usable
plutonium is transferred, the amount shall not exceed the needs for research or the
continuous operation of a reactor. However, the transfer of HEU targets or other
special nuclear materials for radiation detectors are not bound by these restrictions.
The agreement, like all of the others, specifically mentions that the material
transferred will not be used for nuclear weapons production. The U.S. agreement
also mentions that none of the transferred material will be used for weapons
research. To ensure compliance, the agreement specifies that the IAEA is
responsible for inspections, in accordance with Turkey’s safeguards agreement.
The parties are also obligated to establish a method of accounting in accordance
with IAEA INFCIRC/153 (corrected), to ensure control and proper accounting and
storage of all material transferred. Moreover, both Parties agreed to apply physical
protection measures in line with IAEA INFCRIC/22.
4.3.10. Turkey and the United States’ Nuclear Reactor
Negotiations
Turkey and U.S. nuclear companies have never been able to reach terms for the
sale of nuclear power reactors. Like other major suppliers, U.S. nuclear companies
General Electric and Westinghouse have been involved in most, if not all, of
Turkey’s nuclear tenders. In 1983, General Electric, AECL and West Germany’s
Kraftwerk Union (KWU) signed a letter of intent for the construction of three
nuclear power reactors at two different sites in Turkey. However, in December
1983, Nucleonics Week reported that the Turkish government had altered the terms
of the original tender. The Turkish government requested that the three suppliers
now compete for the construction of just one power plant at the Akkuyu site. At
the time, General Electric was negotiating for the sale of a reactor at the Sinop site.
The Turkish request voided the original letters of intent and called for another
round of bidding by the three potential suppliers.90
90_
“The Contest for the Sale of a Nuclear Reactor to Turkey is Wide Open,” Nucelonics
Week, 15 December 1983.
83
In October 1984, Westinghouse joined with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd,
and approached Turkey about bidding on the Akkuyu project.91 After months of
negotiations, the Turkish government asked the Westinghouse consortium, AECL
and KWU to pay $1 billion up front in construction costs and another $1 billion in
interest for a reactor at the Akkuyu site. The Turkish government would then pay
back the investment with guaranteed electricity sales for fifteen years. Ankara also
indicated that it would not nationalize the plant for the duration of the contract.
At the time, Turkey was reportedly using Westinghouse for leverage, even though
the Westinghouse – Mitsubishi consortium’s bid was reportedly $200 million less
than both AECL and KWUs.92 Nevertheless, Turkey never sent Westinghouse a
formal letter of intent notifying them of the financing changes. Soon thereafter, the
talks with Westinghouse ended.93
In 1997, Turkey once again invited international suppliers to bid on a nuclear
tender. At the outset, Ankara indicated that it would abandon its insistence on
the BOT financing model in favor of a turnkey reactor project.94 Turkish officials
specified that the reactor be either a pressurized light or heavy water reactor
because they had a long history of use, a proven track record, and had been
licensed in their country of origin.95 The tender insisted that the supplying country
construct one or more reactors with a maximum power output of 1,400 MW.
Turkey also wanted the bidding company to include an option for the construction
of more power stations. Turkey insisted on 100% vendor financing, and once again
pursued bids from AECL, Siemens (which had acquired Kraftwerk Union after
German re-unification), and Westinghouse.
It was reported that the Refahyol government of the former Prime Minister
Necmettin Erbakan had favored Canada’s CANDU reactor, but after the change
in government Westinghouse moved to the top of Turkey’s preferred vendor list.
The new Anasol-D government led by Mesut Yilmaz had for instance extended the
bidding process twice to accommodate Westinghouse over the objections of AECL
and Siemens,.96
Turkey pushed back a final decision on the tender in March 1998 because of delays
with the tender’s technical analysis. A final decision on the project was again
delayed in February 1998. The government eventually cancelled the tender in July
2000.97 All together, seven self-imposed deadlines had passed. At the time, Turkey
91_
1984.
“Westinghouse, Mitsubishi launch joint contract bid,” Nuclear News, October
92_
Ann Taboroff, “Turkish Government Trying to Negotiate Akkuyu Financing by
December,” Nucleonics Week, 18 October 1984.
93_
Ray Silver, “Akkuyu financing guarantees being sought from three nations,” Platts
Nucleonics Week, 19 December 1985.
94_
Mark Hibbs, “World Finance, Regional Gas Market keys to Turkey’s Akkuyu
Project,” 28 August 1997.
95_
Ibid
96_
Mark Hibbs, “Turkey’s pro-U.S. regime extends bidding, which may boost
Westinghouse bid,” Nucleonics Week, 4 September 1997.
97_
Mark Hibbs, Ann MacLachlan, and Ray Silver, “Turkey drops Akkuyu project, citing
IMF Economic Program,” Platts Nucleonics Week, 27 July 2000.
84
was amidst a severe economic downturn, natural gas was a more attractive option,
and the government decided to pass on financing an expensive turnkey nuclear
project.
4.3.11. Turkey and Russia’s Nuclear Cooperation
Agreement
In August 2009, Turkey and Russia concluded negotiations on a nuclear
cooperation agreement. Specifically, the Parties agreed to cooperate in the
following areas:
· Research and development in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy
· Controlled thermonuclear fusion
· Engineering, construction, commissioning, operation, modernization, testing,
maintenance and decommissioning of commercial and research nuclear reactors
· Supply of nuclear materials, particularly, fuel assemblies and equipment for
commercial and research nuclear reactors as well as nuclear fuel cycle services
· Prospecting and mining of uranium deposits; development and production of
components and materials for commercial and research nuclear reactors
· Regulatory activity in the field of nuclear and radiation safety; development of
improved and innovative reactor and nuclear fuel cycle technologies
· Nuclear and radiological safety, environment protection, emergency response,
treatment of radioactive waste
· Recording and control of nuclear and radioactive materials and physical
protection of nuclear and radioactive materials, facilities and sources of radiation
· Production and use of radioisotopes.
The cooperation is to be implemented by the pursuit of mutually agreed upon
projects, the establishment of joint working groups, the exchange of data and
personnel, the organization of conferences, the training of personnel, and
consultation on specific problems. Currently, forty-nine Turkish students are
studying nuclear related disciplines at Mephi University in Moscow. The students
will eventually be part of the first wave of Turkish citizens tasked with assisting
in the operation of the Akkuyu power plant.98 To control and coordinate the
impressive number of activities stipulated to in the agreement, the parties have
agreed to hold consultation on matters of mutual interests, and establish a Joint
Coordination Committee. The procedures for exchange are to decided by the
Committee in accordance with national legislation in Russia and Turkey.
The Parties agreed that Turkey shall not enrich Russian origin fuel above twenty
percent or reprocess spent fuel rods. Transferred dual use technology, including
reproductions, is not to be used by either party for the manufacture of nuclear
explosives. In addition, the agreement states that no material or equipment for
98_
“Turkish students learning nuke know-how in Russia,” Hurriyet Daily News, 26
March 2012, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-students-learning-nuke-know-how-inrussia.aspx?pageID=238&nID=16804&NewsCatID=348.
85
reprocessing or enrichment will be transferred to third parties, unless the Parties
agree beforehand. Russia is obligated to provide Turkey with fuel rods for its
future reactor and take back the spent fuel once it has cooled sufficiently in onsite nuclear fuel ponds. Both sides agreed that the facilities for the chemical
reprocessing, uranium enrichment, heavy water production, as well as, uranium
enriched above twenty percent will not be transferred.
The agreement obligates Turkey provide site security in line with IAEA
INFCIRC/225 and to ensure that any material transferred from Russia is not sent
to third parties. The facilities transferred will be monitored by Turkey’s IAEA
safeguards agreement to ensure compliance. Responsibility for nuclear damage
shall be defined in implementing arrangements by authorized authorities from
both parties.
4.3.12. Turkey and Russia’s Nuclear Negotiations
In May 2010, Turkey and Russia agreed on the terms for the construction of four
nuclear power reactors at the Akkuyu site. The $20 billion dollar agreement is the
first to use the build, operate, and own format. Under the terms of the agreement,
Rosatom will provide 100 percent equity through a Turkish subsidiary set up to
own and operate the plant.99 70 percent of the power produced from two of the
units will be sold to the Turkish market at 12.35 us-cents per kilowatt-hour for 15
years after commissioning.100 30 percent of the power produced from the third and
fourth reactors will be sold to the Turkish market, while the remaining power will
be sold on the international market for competitive prices.
At the end of the 15 year period, Rosatom will give twenty percent of the profits
to the Turkish government. The reactor will majority Russian owned, but a 49 %
local ownership is possible. Rosatom estimates that construction will start by 2014.
The first reactor is scheduled to go critical in 2019. Reactors two, three, and four are
scheduled to go critical in year intervals thereafter.101
99_
“Nuclear Power in Turkey,” World Nuclear Association, April 2012, http://www.
world-nuclear.org/info/inf128-nuclear_power_in_turkey.html.
100_
David O’Byrne, “Akkuyu plant construction to begin in 2011, says Turkish energy
ministry,” Platts Nucleonic Week, 27 May 2010.
101_
Rosatom: Projects, http://www.rosatom.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosatom/
rosatomsite.eng/investmentstrategy/projects/.
86
5-Export Control Guidelines
and Turkey’s Nuclear Future:
Recommendations for the Future
Turkey’s numerous nuclear cooperation agreement all share similar provisions
about the scale and scope of peaceful nuclear cooperation. All outline a desire
to cooperate on nuclear power and research reactor maintenance, operation,
decommission and safety, the mining of uranium and thorium, and provide the
legal authority to transfer nuclear reactor technology. All agreements specify using
scientific exchanges and material transfers to help bolster Turkey’s radioisotope
production and research. In all cases, the parties agreed to exchange data and
scientific personnel, hold regular symposiums and meetings, and collaborate on
joint projects. These provisions are emblematic of NPT Article IV and help shed
some light on how the suppliers envision their NPT obligations.
The agreements are also written to make extremely difficult the misuse or diversion
of foreign origin fissile material for nuclear weapons production. All specifically
mention that none of the material or technology will be used for non-peaceful uses.
In all but one of the agreements, there are specific provisions against the enrichment
of uranium above 20 percent and the reprocessing of spent fuel. These provisions
are emblematic of NSG guidelines. Notably, in all but one of the agreements,
the suppliers do not specify the extent to which they are willing to transfer E&R
technologies. Instead, vague language referring to elements of the fuel cycle is used.
The one exception is the Turkish – Argentinian nuclear cooperation agreement. The
agreement was signed before Argentina joined the NSG and reversed many of its
decades old nuclear policies. While little progress was made in implementing the
deal, the agreement specified cooperation on the front end of the fuel cycle, and the
production of small reactors that had questionable value for large-scale electricity
production. Nevertheless, the agreement still had specific provisions relating to the
non-diversion of fissile material, and an explicit clause barring the manufacture of
nuclear weapons. However, the terms of the agreement were not in line with the
NSG and established nonproliferation norms.
In all cases, the IAEA is counted on to ensure that material is not being used for
non-peaceful uses. The agreements specifically reference Turkey’s 1981 full scope
safeguards agreement as the main enforcement mechanism, and have separate
provisions that call for the conclusion of a bilateral safeguards agreement if it is
found that the IAEA cannot perform its duties. In addition, Turkey’s decision to
sign the additional protocol, which allows the IAEA far greater authority and
powers to inspect nuclear and nuclear related facilities, makes even more remote
the idea that Ankara could or would divert material for weapons production.
Turkey should expect to continue to receive lots of interest from foreign companies
eager to sell Ankara power reactors. However, it is unlikely that supplier states
will agree to sell Turkey E&R facilities. Therefore, Ankara should seek to find a
middle ground between its position that all countries in good standing with the
IAEA should retain their right to pursue E&R, and the prospect that the supplier
states aren’t likely to break with the established norms of discouraging the sale of
87
sensitive fuel cycle facilities. If one uses Turkey’s nuclear negotiations with Russia
as a baseline, it appears that Ankara has unofficially been pursuing a policy of
relying on fuel guarantees and take back provisions. While not willing to acquiesce
to UAE style provisions, Turkey could help alleviate some lingering concerns about
its nuclear intentions by clarifying its future fuel cycle intentions. Ankara should
release a comprehensive strategy paper102 detailing Turkey’s nuclear ambitions,
how it plans to fuel those reactors, the current plans for dealing with waste and
spent fuel, and the conditions in which Turkey would consider pursuing E&R.
Ankara should match these efforts with a more proactive effort to negotiate
bilateral agreements for the exchange of experts and the training of students in
nuclear sciences. Ankara should also strive to ensure that future reactor sales
are not “black boxed” so as to ensure that technology transfer will “spill over”
and have residual effects on Turkey’s current nuclear industry. However, these
efforts appear to be complicated by the decision to accept the BOO arrangement
for reactor sales. According to the Turkish-Russian agreement, the reactor that
will be built in Turkey will be owned and operated by Russian personnel. Even
if a Turkish company were to acquire a percentage of the company operating
the reactor, it is unclear whether or not they will receive access to the design
information for reactor technology. Moreover, it is unclear what role the Turkish
students currently being trained in Moscow will have at the reactor site. While
there are certainly some safety reasons for the Turkish decision, a clearer sense
about a gradual transition to Turkish operation would help clarify some of the
benefits that Turkey will receive from the technology transfer. In particular the
uncertainties related to whether in the middle or long run, a Turkish company
will end up taking part in the operation of the Akkuyu power plant clouds the
technology benefits that Turkey could derive from this large investment.
The issues with the BOO are indicative of a larger problem that has plagued
Turkey’s quest for nuclear power. Ankara’s difficulties are largely a result of its
continued insistence on the BOT and BOO financing model. Suppliers have been
wary of the insistence that the supplier recoup expenses through artificially low
guaranteed electricity sales. While Turkey’s nearly six decade long quest for
nuclear power reactors has recently had some success, the overall pattern suggests
that government will have a difficult time meeting its self imposed goal of building
additional nuclear power plants by 2023 with the same investment model.103 In
order for Turkey to expand its nuclear energy industry, history suggests that
Ankara should alter its approach to the nuclear tender process and consider
following the more traditional turnkey approach.
In addition, the government should begin a concerted effort to explain how and
why nuclear energy benefits Turkey as a whole. These efforts should not only be
limited to the benefits of power rectors, but how the technology transferred and
the skills gained from dual operation can help Turkey further develop its nuclear
medicine and agricultural sectors. These initiatives should be coupled with a state
led effort to bring a clearer sense of how Turkey intends to utilize the skills learned
to benefit society.
102_
issues.
The paper of Hasan Saygın in this compilation deals more extensively with these
103_
“Turkey to have 23 nuclear units, minister says,” Hurriyet Daily News, 6 June 2012,
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-have-23-nuclear-units-minister-says.aspx?pageID
=238&nID=22486&NewsCatID=348.
Section IV
Turkey’s Nuclear
Fuel Cycle
Strategy
IV
Hasan Saygın
90
The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Energy - II Turkey’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Strategy
Executive Summary
The nuclear fuel cycle comprises a series of industrial processes which involve
the production of electricity from uranium fuel in nuclear reactors. It comprises
several stages, extending from uranium mining to the final storage of used fuels
and waste. These stages may vary, depending on design and type of reactor and
whether spent fuels are reprocessed. The most commonly used nuclear fuel cycle
is the “Open Fuel Cycle”, also named the once-through cycle, since it uses each
uranium-based fuel element only once. Spent fuel assembly is then taken out from
the reactor after a certain working period and stored. However, the “Closed Cycle”,
in which spent fuel is reprocessed and recycled, is becoming increasingly used in
some European countries and Japan. This paper examines the potential long term
strategies regarding the front end and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in Turkey
in the light of the international conjuncture. A discussion about the advantages and
disadvantages of reprocessing versus storage is undertaken in order to contribute
to raising awareness among the Turkish public opinion about the different options
for the long term management of waste.
The Nuclear Fuel Cycle
The nuclear fuel cycle starts with uranium exploration and ends with disposal
of the materials used and generated during the cycle. The series of industrial
processes related to the nuclear fuel cycle can be subdivided into three, as the frontend, irradiation or nuclear power reactor operation and the back-end. The frontend of the fuel cycle comprises the stages before irradiation of the fuels whereas
the back-end begins with the discharge of spent fuels from the reactor.
Options for Turkey and a General Decision Analysis
While switching to nuclear power, a country is faced with a number of important
questions such as the types of reactors and fuels to be used, and the methods to be
selected for long term waste storage. The most critical decisions are about:
- The choices of the type of fuel cycle (open, closed or partially closed) and spent
fuel management strategy (the choice of the type of nuclear fuel cycle is vitally
important since it will have major and very long term impact).
- The establishment of its own fuel cycle plants, especially the enrichment and
reprocessing facilities.
Choice of the Fuel Cycle
While switching to nuclear power, making the best suitable technology and fuel
cycle choices is vitally important for a country. Other major decisions are related
to the front end (enrichment) and back end (spent fuel management). For the
91
Turkey’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle Strategy
near and medium term, Open Cycle operating Advanced Light Water Reactors
is recommended, since they are the most economic, safe and appropriate option.
Whereas closed or partially closed fuel cycles including reprocessing and recycling
are not recommended, as they are not expected to become economically viable for
the foreseeable future.
Spent fuel
Moreover, it is seen from past and current operating practices that there is no clear
advantage of the reprocessing option either in terms of waste volume or repository
area. For spent fuel management, the “wait and see” strategy based on long term
temporary (interim) storage is recommended. However, temporary storage should
be considered as an integral part of the reactor installation and relevant physical
and legal infrastructure should be established.
Enrichment
At this stage, establishment of its own enrichment facility does not seem
economically feasible and reasonable for Turkey. Economic justification of
a decision for the establishment of enrichment facilities depends on future
development and realization time period of its nuclear program. But, these aspects
may be strategically important from a security and energy security perspective.
However, due to the association made by the international community, between
the nuclear fuel cycle and the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, the
question of whether “Turkey should establish its own enrichment facility”, will
remain on the agenda in the foreseeable future as a thorny question where the
international political context will play a more decisive role than a purely economic
assessment.
Finally, due to the risks related to environment, proliferation and public health
associated with it, nuclear energy is a subject of interest to a broad spectrum of
people ranging from the local community to people in neighboring countries
as well as the international community. As with all topics related with nuclear
energy, a maximum degree of transparency and, ultimately, an effective public
participation in the decision making process should be sought with regard to
fuel cycle and especially about the disposal mode of spent fuels. First of all, the
Ministry of Energy and the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority should establish
long term strategies and a “White Paper” should be published and shared with the
public opinion . It is vitally important to establish a base for polyphonic debate and
ensure the participation of all the stakeholders and citizens to the decision-making
process, especially related to major nuclear matters. The policies to be implemented
will become ethically justifiable and maintain their sustainability in the long term if
a consensus is achieved between the public opinion and the decision makers.
92
1-Introduction
The nuclear fuel cycle comprises a series of industrial processes which involve
the production of electricity from uranium fuel in nuclear reactors. It comprises
several stages, extending from uranium mining to the final storage of used fuels
and waste. These stages may vary, depending on design and type of reactor and
whether spent fuels are reprocessed. The most commonly used nuclear fuel cycle
is the “Open Fuel Cycle”, also named the once-through cycle, since it uses each
uranium-based fuel element only once. Spent fuel assembly is then taken out from
the reactor after a certain working period and stored. However, the “Closed Cycle”,
in which spent fuel is reprocessed and recycled, is becoming increasingly used in
some European countries and Japan.
There are multiple viable fuel cycles. Yet, it is not possible to fully avoid subjective
criteria when making a selection among these. There are still significant technical,
economic, political, legal and financial uncertainties. Furthermore, different fuel
cycles will cater to different objectives differently. Therefore, making an optimal
choice among current fuel cycle options is not an easy task. For countries newly
switching to nuclear power, the decision about the front end (uranium enrichment)
and the back end (spent fuel management) are still the most critical decisions.
Furthermore, a developing country which intends to establish its own uranium
enrichment or reprocessing facilities to enhance its energy security, may face
heavy international pressure for constraining its nuclear program, even if there
is no objective evidence that it is seeking nuclear weapons. National security and
international stability are now threatened not only by the risk of proliferation
among different states, but also by the potential of organized terrorist groups
obtaining access to weapons-usable materials.
One notable example is the case of Iran’s recent situation. Particularly due to the
recent concerns relating to Iran and North Korea, International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Director, Mohamed El Baradei suggested that enrichment and
reprocessing are limited to facilities under international control and that the
disposal and management of spent nuclear fuels is strictly controlled under
multinational arrangements. In line with these developments, it would not
be realistic to expect Turkey or any developing country to be encouraged for
establishing its own critical fuel cycle facilities.
This paper will address the potential long term strategies regarding the front end
and back end of the nuclear fuel cycle in Turkey in the light of the international
conjuncture. A discussion about the advantages and disadvantages of reprocessing
versus storage will also be undertaken in order to contribute to raising awareness
among the Turkish public opinion about the different options for the long term
management of waste. At this point, it should be underlined that, due to the risk of
proliferation, uranium enrichment and reprocessing constitute a technical as well
as a political problem.
93
The following section briefly describes the major nuclear fuel cycle options and
overviews the global situation. The third section offers an analysis on Turkey’s
situation in order to provide a country perspective for decision makers, while brief
evaluations are presented regarding the conclusion in the final section.
2-Major Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Options
2.1. Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Nuclear fuel cycle involves a series of industrial processes and operations for the
production of electricity from uranium fuels in nuclear reactors, starting with
the mining of Uranium metal, continuing with the storage or reprocessing and
recycling of the fuel spent and ending with the final storage of radioactive waste.
It comprises the intermediary processes related with the use and interim storage of
uranium fuels in the reactors.
2.1.1. Stages of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle
The nuclear fuel cycle starts with uranium exploration and ends with disposal
of the materials used and generated during the cycle. The series of industrial
processes related to the nuclear fuel cycle can be subdivided into three, as the frontend, irradiation or nuclear power reactor operation and the back-end. The frontend of the fuel cycle comprises the stages before irradiation of the fuels whereas
the back-end begins with the discharge of spent fuels from the reactor.
Front-end:
As shown in Figure 1, the front-end of the fuel cycle comprises the following steps :
- Uranium Exploration
- Uranium Mining: It involves the processes related to the underground extraction
of uranium ore.
- Ore Processing Phase: It comprises the chemical processes related to the milling
and refining and purification (including in-situ leaching) of the Uranium ore
extracted so as to obtain Ammonium Uranate, named as Yellow Cake, containing
80-90% U3O8.
- Conversion Process: It involves the activities related to refining and conversion
to the most suitable form for the consequent processes. Yellow cake is converted
into UF6 (Uranium Hexafluoride) gas through a multi-step chemical process.
94
- Enrichment: It involves the processes related to the enhancement of the
isotopic enrichment of the UF6 gas in terms of Uranium, in order to obtain an
appropriately enriched Uranium concentration.
- Fuel Fabrication: It involves processes related to the production of nuclear fuel to
be inserted into the nuclear reactor.
Figure 1. The front end of the fuel cycle
Irradiation/Nuclear Reactor Operation
The fuel elements are placed down in the reactor and energy generation is
achieved by the fission reactions caused upon their exposure to neutron radiation.
Irradiated/spent fuels are then taken out from the reactor after a working period
of 3 to 5 years in Light Water Reactors (LWRs) and of up to 1 year in Gas Cooled
Reactor (GCRs) and Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs).
95
Back-end
Basically, there are two main options for the management of spent fuels:
· Decomposition and recycling of Uranium and Plutonium in the spent fuels and
storage of the remaining waste (Closed Cycle)
· Direct storage of spent fuels (Open Cycle).
It should be noted that, in both cases, the material resulting from the process is
highly radioactive waste. Even if long lasting low level wastes and medium level
radioactive wastes are mostly obtained in case of reprocessing, both types of waste
require geological storage.
All nuclear countries have a certain practice with regard to high level waste. The
two following methods are used for interim storage of spent fuels:
· Wet storage where they are generally stored in the pools at the Reactor site;
· Dry storage: Spent fuels are typically stored in steel casks cooled by a ventilation
system or natural air circulation at the reactor site or in specifically allocated
sites.
The back-end stage of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle involves some of the following steps,
depending on the fuel cycle:
· Processes enabling the temporary storage of spent fuel at-reactor (AR) in (wet
type) spent fuel storage facilities.
· Storage of spent fuel away-from-reactor (AFR), in (wet or dry) fuel storage
facilities outside, upon being moved away from the reactor,
· Processes related to the extraction of useful materials contained within the spent
fuel to enable to be recycled and be re-used in the reactor.
· Disposal of spent fuels: Placement of spent fuel in an appropriate facility without
the intention of retrieval.
2.1.2. Current Nuclear Fuel Cycle Types
There are a few different nuclear fuel cycles categorized according to the
technology of the reactor used and the type of fuel and whether or not the spent
fuel will be processed and recycled. In today’s technology they are divided into
two, as “Open Cycle” and “Closed Cycle”, as indicated schematically in general
terms in Figure 2.
96
Figure 2. Nuclear fuel cycle options
Open and Closed cycles are shown in a flow chart in Figure 3. Spent fuels reaching
the end of their useful life are removed from the reactor core and replaced with
fresh fuels. If spent fuels are not reprocessed, the fuel cycle is called an “Open
Cycle or “Once-Through Cycle”. After being used in the reactor, the fuels are
kept in at-reactor pools until they are sent to the away- from-reactor storage. The
fuels are planned to be placed in the final repository upon reaching conditions
suitable for being transported. Although most nuclear states have adopted this fuel
cycle strategy, no final repositories for spent fuels have yet been established. This
strategy is commonly used for Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR) and
Graphite Moderated Light Water Cooled Reactors (RBMK).
Figure 3. Open and Closed Cycle
97
If spent fuels are reprocessed to extract the remaining Uranium and Plutonium
from the other actinides and fission products after a sufficient cooling period,
the fuel cycle is called a “Closed” or “Twice-Through” Fuel Cycle. The Uranium
and Plutonium obtained upon reprocessing are used for manufacturing new fuel
elements. This reprocessing and recycling strategy has been adopted by some
countries mainly in light water reactors (LWR) in the form of Mixed Oxide (MOX)
fuel. The recycling of nuclear materials in fast reactors is another recycling strategy,
in which reprocessed Uranium and Plutonium are used for production of Fast
Reactor (FR) fuel. Fast Reactors which feed on Transuranics (TRUs) extracted
from fuel spent in Light Water Reactors (LWRs) can significantly reduce the total
radiotoxicity of nuclear waste, dramatically decrease the amount of waste and
are seriously considered as a future technology. However, currently they do not
constitute an economically viable option and their commercial development is
uncertain.
Closed cycle involving chemical reprocessing which separates nuclear weapons
usable Plutonium from spent fuels is of special concern, since it increases the
proliferation risk. Furthermore, not only is it expensive, but it is also a sensitive
topic in terms of environmental protection due to its chemical properties and
radiotoxicity. Therefore, fuel cycles involving reprocessing are not the preferred
option for most of the countries using nuclear energy.
2.1.3. Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycle Concepts
After a few decades, there will probably be a transition from the traditional
fuel cycles to advanced nuclear fuel cycles by using Generation IV Reactors,
with one-half comprising innovative thermal reactor designs and the other
half comprising advanced fast reactors. There are currently several concepts of
advanced nuclear fuel cycles predicted to be implemented within the next 25- 30
years. In the advanced fuel cycles where innovative Light Water Reactors (LWRs)
will be combined with Fast Reactors (FRs), Uranium Oxide (UOX) and (UraniumPlutonium) Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel obtained by reprocessing spent UOX fuels
will be used for generating energy.
It should be emphasized at this point that, in theory, a “Closed Cycle” refers to
all of the fissile material left over from or produced during the operation of the
reactor, which is returned to the reactor for further conversion of energy. Only the
waste with no more potential for energy conversion, in other words the fission
products and any other material that is not fissile, shall be disposed of. Whereas,
in the traditional fuel cycle named “Open” or “Once-through” Cycle, the fuels
are disposed of upon being used only once, regardless of the amount of fissile (or
fertile) material remaining within them. When considered within this context,
the current Closed (Twice-Through) Cycle is in fact just a partially closed cycle.
Therefore, currently there is need for different perspectives that may reflect these
facts relating to nuclear fuel cycles.
Nuclear fuel cycles are categorized as follows on the basis of a new understanding
arising with the activities on nuclear fuel cycle conducted within the scope of the
researches relating to Generation IV Reactors2:
98
(1) Once-Through Nuclear Fuel Cycle: It is used for the production of energy in
the fuel reactor manufactured from Uranium (or potentially from Thorium).
Spent fuels are removed from the reactor after a certain period of use and
stored in the pools at the rector until the decay heat is sufficiently reduced.
Consequently, they are directly disposed of as High Level Waste (HLW).
(2) Partially Closed Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Fissile materials remaining in the spent
fuel are recovered via reprocessing in order to produce additional energy
and are recycled once or several times (generally not exceeding three). The
resulting spent fuel is disposed of as waste. One example is the classical system
of the French nuclear industry: Low enriched Uranium based spent fuels are
reprocessed and recycled as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The spent fuel is used as
waste. Another example will be the proposed DUPIC (Direct Use of Pressurized
Reactor Spent Fuel in CANDU) fuel cycle, currently in design stage, which
converts spent LWR fuels into new CANDU fuels.
(3) Nuclear Fuel Cycle with Full Fissile Material Recycling: All spent fuels are
processed for the recovery and recycling of all fissile materials (U-235, Pu-233,
U-233). The spent fuels are repeatedly processed in order to fully consume
all the fissile material contained within through multiple usages in a reactor.
Secondary actinides and fission products are separated during the reprocessing
and transferred to the waste stream. One example is the traditional Liquid
Metal Fast Breeder Reactor (LMFBR) Fuel Cycle. However, this cycle has not yet
been implemented at an industrial scale.
(4) Nuclear Fuel Cycle Recycling Actinides and Long Lived Fission Products:
In this fuel cycle all actinides recycled via multiple recovery processes until
all fissionable materials are fully consumed. One (or more) fission product(s)
(e.g. Tc-99 and I-129) may also be recycled. An example of such a fuel cycle
is a combination of Light Water Reactors (LWRs) with Liquid Metal Fast
Reactors (LMRs) and Molten Salt Reactors. In such a system the Light Water
reactors generate power; the Liquid Metal Fast Reactors generate power
and manufacture excess fissile material from Fertile U-238 (or Th-232) to
fuel the LWRs, while Molten Salt Reactors destroy higher actinides that
would otherwise be sent to the final repository. Currently, some countries are
conducting laboratory-scale studies for the development of such kind of a
Nuclear Fuel Cycle.
Many concepts of more advanced reactors, regarded as Generation IV, where one
half consists of fast reactors while the other half consists of innovative thermal
reactors, are promising. The primary design objective of most of these is to reduce
the inventory of Transuranic (TRU) elements.
99
2.2. Situation in the World Regarding Critical Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Technologies: Reprocessing and Uranium
Enrichment
The nuclear fuel cycle strategies have changed considerably due to varying
conditions during nuclear power developmental period across the world.
Commercial Reprocessing Programs originated in the 1960s and 1970s when power
reactor operators worldwide expected that plutonium would be needed to make
start up for fast breeder reactors. In those years the use of nuclear power was
expected to increase so rapidly that the world’s high-grade uranium ores would
quickly be depleted, since uranium was considered a scarce resource, reprocessing
and fast breeder technologies appeared as an important means of utilization of
uranium supplies in a more efficient way by capturing remaining fissile elements
in the spent fuels after it had been discharged from a reactor. However, world
nuclear capacity reached a plateau at one-tenth the level that had been projected
for the year 2000; huge deposits of high-grade uranium ore were discovered in
Australia and Canada and both breeder reactors and reprocessing were found
to be much more costly than expected. The economics of this advanced nuclear
technology became questionable with the decline of fossil fuel prices and increase
of uranium supplies as of the 1980s. Moreover, growing environmental and
proliferation concerns raised strong opposition to the programs or reprocessing
and development of Fast Breeder Reactors. Most national programs were paused.
However, energy security is also a growing concern and depending on strategic
and geopolitical dimensions of energy security, choosing an “Open” or “Closed”
fuel cycle is a also political decision and thus a matter of national policy. Since
there are currently multiple viable nuclear fuel cycles, countries using nuclear
power should make a choice between fuel cycle options by considering their own
conditions and priorities. Good decisions among different proposed systems
require clear, consistent and well-thought-out criteria, based on justifiable system
objectives. A decision analysis for determining an optimal fuel cycle should be
made by considering multiple criteria weighted by their importance or priority,
such as number of planned nuclear power plants, time scale for nuclear energy
planning, required investment for enrichment and/or reprocessing, presence of
neighboring states enrichment or reprocessing facilities, resources availability
and public support. Sufficiently objective quantitative measures for choosing fuel
cycle are not yet available. Moreover, different fuel cycles will meet the different
objectives differently. There are still great uncertainties in terms of economic,
political, social, legal and technologic, while determining the fuel cycle choice.
Thus, making an optimal choice among current fuel cycle options is not an
easy task. It should also be emphasized that, for countries switching to nuclear
power, the decisions about the front end (uranium enrichment) and the back end
(reprocessing) still continue to be the most critical decisions.
100
2.2.1.Reprocessing Strategies
When considered from a global context, it is seen that Nuclear Fuel Cycle strategies
differ significantly from country to country. Moreover, national fuel cycle strategies
have changed considerably during the developmental period of nuclear energy
depending on the changes in the country’s own economic, political, technological
and strategic conditions and priorities. The most commonly used nuclear fuel cycle
is the Open Cycle, which uses Uranium-based fuel. However, it is also observed
that the Closed (twice-through) fuel cycle is becoming increasingly used in some
European Countries and Japan.
France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Japan, the Russian
Federation, China and India have used (mostly partially) a closed nuclear fuel
cycle. After having experienced the “Reprocessing and Recycling” strategy up
until the 1990s, some of them decided to store directly their spent fuels. Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands have stopped the “Reprocessing/Recycling”
practices in 2001 and moved towards an Open Cycle. Almost all of the EU states,
except for the United Kingdom and France, have abandoned reprocessing and the
United Kingdom plans to end it within the next decade. Whereas some countries
like Canada, Finland and Sweden used the open cycle right from the beginning
and preferred to dispose of their spent fuels directly 4.
The United States, being the world’s largest producer of nuclear power, is also the
country which has changed its fuel cycle policy most frequently. The most widely
used and developed reprocessing method, called PUREX (Plutonium and Uranium
Recovery by Extraction), was originally developed in the USA in 1940s for the first
time. After having developed a closed fuel cycle in the early years of its nuclear
power program, the US switched to the Open Cycle strategy at the beginning of
1978 mainly due to proliferation concerns. It stopped its commercial reprocessing
and recycling of spent fuels and corresponding commercial Fast Breeder Reactor
Development Program based on a government decision. The US Government
banned the recycling of separated uranium in commercial reactors. This constraint
significantly affected the development of strategies relating reprocessing. After
spending many years working on it, the US Department of Energy - DOE
submitted a license application for a geological repository for spent fuels and highlevel waste at the Yucca Mountain. The license has yet to be awarded. The US
Government is reconsidering its policy for reprocessing and recycling spent fuels
1,4,5
.
Figure 4 illustrates different options for spent fuel management strategies.
101
Figure 4. Various spent fuel management strategies
Open Fuel Cycle
Wait and See
Closed Cycle
Fuel Irradiation
Fuel Irradiation
Fuel Irradiation
SF Storage
at Reactor
SF Storage
at Reactor
SF Storage
at Reactor
HLW
Disposal
SF Storage
Away from
Reactor
Cooling and
Vitrification
(a)
(b)
…….
SF Storage
Away from
Reactor
SF Storage
Away from
Reactor
SF Conditioning
SF Conditioning
(c)
SF Disposal
Interim and
Long-term
Storage
Recovered
Material
SF
Reprocessing
High-level
Waste (HLW)
Current preferences of nuclear power states and their installed capacities relating
to various stages of the fuel cycle are demonstrated in Table 1. As seen, a significant
number of states mostly availing of a small nuclear power program adopted “a
wait and see” policy with regard to the disposal of the spent fuels.
102
Table 1. National practices relating to the fuel cycle1,4
Country
Nuclear Fuel
Cycle
Mining
and Milling
(t U/a)
Conversion
to UF6
(t U/a)
Enrichment
(103
SWU/a)
Fuel
Fabrication
(t HM/a)
Reprocessing
(tHM/a)
Argentina
No decision
120
62
20
150
-
Armenia
Not applicable
-
-
-
-
-
Australia
No decision
9438
-
-
-
-
Belgium
No decision
-
-
-
435
-
Brazil
No decision
340
40
-
280
-
Bulgaria
No decision
-
-
-
-
-
Canada
Open
14800
12500
-
2700
-
China
Closed
840
1500
1000
400
-
Czech Rep.
Open
650
-
-
-
-
Finland
Open
-
-
-
-
-
France
Closed
-
14350
10800
1585
1700
Gabon
Not Applicable
-
-
-
-
-
Germany
Open &Closed
-
-
-
-
-
Hungary
No decision
-
-
-
-
-
India
Closed
175
-
-
594
Japan
Closed
-
-
1050
1689
120
Not Applicable
5950
-
-
-
-
Open
-
-
-
800
-
Lithuania
No decision
-
-
-
-
-
Mexico
No decision
-
-
-
-
-
Mongolia
-
-
-
-
-
Namibia
4000
-
-
-
-
Closed
-
-
2500
-
-
Not Applicable
3800
-
-
-
-
Pakistan
No decision
30
-
5
20
-
Portugal
Not Applicable
-
-
-
-
-
Romania
Open
300
-
-
110
-
Russia
Closed
4200
30000
15000
2600
400
Slovakia
No decision
-
-
-
-
-
Slovenia
No decision
-
-
-
-
-
South Africa
No decision
1272
-
-
-
-
Spain
No decision
-
-
-
400
-
Open
-
-
-
600
-
Open &Closed
-
-
-
-
-
No decision
1000
-
-
-
-
Open& Closed
-
6000
2300
Open
1150
14000
11300
3450
Not Applicable
2300
-
-
-
Kazakhstan
Korea
Netherlands
Niger
Sweden
Switzerland
Ukraine
UK
USA
Uzbekistan
-
103
Table 2 shows the reactors which are currently in operation across the world and
their fuel types and basic characteristics. The dominant nuclear power reactor type
today is the Light-Water Reactor (LWR) using uranium fuel with Open Cycle. The
most important reason is that they are relatively proliferation-resistant as they
use an open fuel cycle. Their fuels include low-enriched Uranium which cannot
be used to make nuclear weapons without further enrichment. Their spent fuels
contain one percent Plutonium which can directly be used for making nuclear
weapons. However, as it is mixed with other highly radioactive fission products
which makes it inaccessible without being reprocessed7. These features make this
type of reactors resistant to proliferation.
Table 2. Reactors and fuel types1
Reactor Type
PWR/WWER
BWR
PHWR
RBMK
AGR
MAGNOX
FR
Neutron
spectrum
Thermal
Thermal
Thermal
Thermal
Thermal
Thermal
Fast
Moderator
H2O
H2O
D2O
Graphite
Graphite
Graphite
_
Coolant: type
Press. H2O
Boiling
H2O
Pr. D2O
Boil.
H2O
CO2
CO2
Na
Pressure, bar
155
70
110
70
40
19
5
temperature, outlet,
0C
320
286
310
284
630
400
550
Fuel: type
UO2 /MOX
UO2/
MOX
UO2
UO2
UO2
U metal
UO2*
Enrichment
up to 5%
235U
Up to 5%
235U eff.
Nat. U
Up to 3%
235U
2.5-3.8%
235U
Nat. U
17-26%
235U*
Cladding
Zr alloy
Zr alloy
Zr alloy
Zr alloy
SS**
MgO-Al
SS**
Burnup,
GWD/t HM
Up to 60
Up to 55
7
Up to 25
Up to 30
4
Up to
100*
Number of
operating reactors
229
93
39
16
14
8
1
Total power, GWe
240.6
82.6
20
11.4
8.4
2.3
0.6*
Additionally, Plutonium reprocessing and recycling processes are not expected
to become economically viable in the foreseeable future. It is estimated that
worldwide Uranium resources will be sufficient for at least a few more decades.
Uranium supply has become highly diversified, with more uranium mining
across the world. Although Uranium conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication
are concentrated in a handful of countries, major efforts are undertaken for the
establishment of an international fuel bank to reduce the uncertainty in nuclear
fuel supplies. Moreover, it is seen that reprocessing and recycling Plutonium
in LWR spent fuels, as practiced today in France, does not reduce the problem
of radioactive waste. Thus, there seems to be no good economic or wastemanagement reason for the implementation of the reprocessing and recycling
process.7
104
Reprocessing policy preferences of the countries using nuclear power are
summarized in Table 3. Today, five nuclear weapon states (China, France, India,
Russia and the United Kingdom) plus Japan reprocess some of their own spent
fuels. The Netherlands has signed a contract with France to have the spent fuels
from its single reactor reprocessed. Out of the countries with reprocessing facilities,
France, India and Japan currently reprocess most of the spent fuels or plan to
do so. However, the United Kingdom is expected to end reprocessing upon the
termination of its existing contracts with other countries. Russia reprocesses
only the spent fuels from its first-generation VVER-440 LWRs and its BN-600
demonstration Fast-Breeder Reactor. China has built but not yet operated a pilot
reprocessing facility7.
Table 3. Distribution of reprocessing facilities9
Countries that reprocess
(GWe))
China (pilot plant)
Customer Countries that have
quit or are planning to quit (GWe)
Countries that have not
reprocessed (GWe)
8.6
Armenia (in Russia)
0.4
Argentina
0.9
France (80%)
63.3
Belgium (in France)
5.8
Brazil
1.8
India (≈50%)
3.8
Bulgaria (in Russia)
1.9
Canada
12.6
47.6
Czech Republic
(in Russia)
3.6
Lithuania
1.3
Netherlands
(in France)
0.5
Finland (in Russia)
3.0
Mexico
1.4
Russia (15%)
21.7
Germany
(in France/U.K.)
20.5
Pakistan
0.4
U.K. (ending)
10.2
Hungary (in Russia)
1.8
Romania
1.3
Slovak Republic
(in Russia)
2.0
Slovenia
0.7
Spain (in France/U.K.)
7.5
South Africa
1.8
Sweden
(in France/U.K.)
9.0
South Korea
17.5
Switzerland (in France/
U.K.)
3.2
Taiwan,
China
4.9
Ukraine (in Russia)
13.1
U.S.
(since 1972)
100.6
Total
71.8
Total
145.2
Japan
(90% planned)
Total
155.7
Out of the remaining 24 countries with nuclear energy programs, 12 have not
reprocessed their spent fuels. Although the other 12 countries shipped their spent
fuels to France, the United Kingdom or Russia to be reprocessed in the past, those
whose contracts have expired did not renew them. All of these 24 countries have
currently decided to apply interim storage7.
105
2.2.2.Uranium Enrichment Strategies
Uranium enrichment is another critical component of nuclear fuel technologies
for generating civil nuclear power and producing military nuclear weapons.
There are large commercial enrichment plants in operation in France, Germany,
the Netherlands, the UK, the USA and Russia, with smaller plants elsewhere.
Historically, France and the United States dominated the enrichment market with
Gaseous Diffusion. But, firms using the Centrifuge technology, such as the Russian
Rosatom and the British-Dutch-German Urenco, have captured an increasing share
of the market. The U.S. Enrichment Corporation’s (USEC’s) share declined from
39% in 1998 to 17% in 2005, as the diffusion plants of 1940s and 1950s (at Oak Ridge
and Portsmith) were retired. Meanwhile, Urenco is building a new centrifuge plant
in New Mexico and AREVA has announced plans to build another centrifuge plant
in the United States.
Moreover, the enriched Uranium derived from materials excess to defense
programs in the Russian Federation and United States has in effect resulted in
the introduction of an important new energy supply (app. 5.5 Million SWU/a) in
recent years, as seen in Table 4.
Table 4 Enriched uranium excess from defense programs
Quantity (tonnes)
Natural U equivalent (tonnes)
Plutonium from reprocessed fuel
320
60,000
Uranium from reprocessed fuel
45,000
50,000
70
15,000
230
70,000
Ex-military plutonium
Ex-military high-enriched uranium
Source: WNA http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf29.html
Nearly 68,000 tons of Uranium are required annually for the nuclear power plants
worldwide that have a combined capacity of 375 GWe. The factors increasing fuel
demand are offset by a trend for higher burn-up of fuel and other efficiencies, thus
making demand stable. Between 1980-2008, the electricity generated by nuclear
power plants increased 3.6-fold, while Uranium demand increased only 2.5 times.
The distribution of operational and planned enrichment capacity across the world,
according to countries is provided in Table 5.
‘Other’ includes Resende in Brazil, Kahutab in Pakistan, Rattehallib in India and
Natanz in Iran. According to The World Nuclear Association projections, this demand will grow by
33% in the next decade in accordance with a projected increase of 27% in nuclear
reactor capacity. The global nuclear reactor Uranium requirement is projected to
increase to 74 kilo tons-81 kilo tons by the year 2020 and to 82 kilo tons-101 kilo
tons by the year 2025.Demand in North America and Western Europe is expected
106
Table 5. Enrichment capacity(thousand SWU/yr)10
COUNTRY
COMPANY AND PLANT
2010
2015
2020
France
Areva, Georges Besse I & II
8500*
7000
7500
Germany-NetherlandsUK
Urenco: Gronau, Germany; Almelo,
Netherlands; Capenhurst, UK.
12,800 12,800
12,300
Japan
JNFL, Rokkaasho
150
750
1500
USA
USEC, Paducah & Piketon
11,300*
3800
3800
USA
Urenco, New Mexico
200
5800
5900
USA
Areva, Idaho Falls
0
0
3300
USA
Global Laser Enrichment
0
2000
3500
Russia
Tenex: Angarsk, Novouralsk,
Zelenogorsk, Seversk
23,000
33,000
30-35,000
China
CNNC, Hanzhun & Lanzhou
1300
3000
6000-8000
Pakistan, Brazil, Iran
Various
100
300
300
Total SWU approx
57,350 68,000 74-81,000 Requirements
(WNA Reference Scenario)
48,890
56,000
66,535
either to remain fairly constant or decline slightly, whereas in the rest of the world
it is set to increase. These estimations suggest that there is enough Uranium to
fuel Open/Once-Through cycles for at least another 50 years. If a Closed/TwiceThrough Cycle is used, with a more efficient reactor technology such as the Fast
Reactors, the supplies will be sufficient for nuclear energy generation for many
more years. However, although spent fuels can be reprocessed so as to be used
again, it is currently less economical than producing new fuels since Uranium
resources will not be scarce for a long period of time. Thus, it seems that LWRs
(Light Water Reactors) using the Once-Through Fuel Cycle are the preferred option
for most countries for the next upcoming years, and even in the remaining part of
this century. This fact puts forward the challenges related to the direct disposal of
spent fuels. Unless cycles are completely closed, spent fuel and waste management,
used especially for the Open / Once-Through Fuel Cycle as well as the Closed
/ Twice-Through Fuel Cycle, remains to be one of the major issues for countries
using nuclear power.
2.2.3.Spent Fuel Management Strategies
The management of spent fuels from reactors is a major issue that burdens all
countries that have a nuclear power program. The management of the fuels
and waste used both with Open (Once-Through) and Closed (Twice-Through)
cycles without closing the nuclear fuel cycle completely remains one of the most
significant concerns for all nuclear countries. Spent fuel management is currently
considered as an integral part of the nuclear fuel cycle. Fuel management strategy
107
involves a series of technical operations beginning with the discharge of spent fuels
from the core of a power reactor and ending with its transfer to the final storage.
As indicated in the sections above, upon being discharged from the reactor core
and temporarily stored at the reactor, the spent fuels are either sent to reprocessing
facilities or directly to the final storage facilities. It is necessary to store the spent
fuels in the pool regardless of whether the cycle is open or closed. A decision
should be taken from the following options once the initial intense radioactivity
decays:
· They can be sent to a reprocessing facility in order to be reprocessed.
· In principle, they can also be sent to a geological repository for direct final
storage. However, since no such repositories have yet been opened for spent
fuels, Reactor operators do not yet avail of this option in reality.
Currently, long term temporary storage solutions are replaced with final repository
solutions all around the world, depending on the delay in the construction of final
repository plants.
Today, there are two technologies in use for temporary (intermediate) storage:
· Wet Storage: Spent fuels are stored in storage pools where they are cooled via
circulating water.
· Dry storage: Spent fuels are preserved in casks, typically composed of steel
cylinders. The fuel rods inside the casks are surrounded by inert gases and
cooled by ventilation or natural convection. Each cylinder cask is surrounded by
additional steel, concrete and other materials to provide radiation shielding for
workers and members of the public. Figure 5 shows a spent fuel storage pool
and a dry storage area.
Figure 5. Spent fuel storage pool and dry storage area
108
The temporary storage of spent fuels for a longer period of time offers s a safe,
flexible and cost-effective short and medium-term approach towards spent fuel
management. It provides the possibility of implementing a “wait and see” strategy
which is currently adopted by a significant majority of countries, i.e. deferring
the decision between the two options mentioned in the sections above. In some
countries, temporary storage plants have been initially licensed to operate for
a period of up to 50 years. Periods of up to 100 years or longer are also under
consideration.
Historically, the options relating to spent fuels were assessed upon being
categorized into two groups, namely storage at the site of the Nuclear Power Plant
(at reactor storage-AR) and storage in special facilities away from the Power Plant
(away from reactor storage-AFR). At-reactor storage is a more suitable system
for the interim storage of spent fuels. Away-from-reactor storage is generally
developed as a result of the requirements arising from the absence or insufficiency
of such facilities within the reactor. In some countries, like in Germany, it became
official policy of the political administration to force the reactor company to
build long term temporary storage capacity on-site. Wet storage will remain the
preferred approach for interim storage during the first decade after discharge.
Short term wet storage has become a traditional technology that does not need any
elaborate discussion. Long term wet storage is not further discussed here due to
its low future perspectives. According to current trends, the intermediate (interim)
storage of spent fuels for a period of up to 100 years without being transferred to
the final storage areas should be planned as an integral part of fuel cycle designs.
Regardless of the decision on which option - once-through or twice-through- is
preferred for the back-end of the cycle, the problem related with the final storage
of spent fuels and/or radioactive wastes still continues to exist. A general overview
on the storage concepts developed by IAEA member states for high level wastes,
including the direct storage of spent fuels, is provided in Table 6.
109
Table 6. Spent Fuel Storage Practices2
Member
States
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Finland
France
Waste form
HLW, VHLW
SNF
SNF
SNF
VHWL
- EDU (440) 3.237
_x
0.368; ETE(1000)
4.720 _x 0.423
1.05_x4.8(BWR) 1.607 _x 0.590
- 1 primary
- 12 BWR FA or waste package
4 PWR (EPR)
or 12 PWR (
WWER-440)
- Carbon steel
Over pack
- Dimension(m)
0.50_x2.68
- Capacity
- 2 canisters
- Material
- Carbon steel
-Life time(as)
>2000
- 1.24x3.9
(one of several
designs)
- 324 used
CANDU fuel
- 7FA (EDU) or 3FA
bundles
(ETE)
- Cu corrosion
barrier with steel
- Carbon steel
İnsert
- 100,000
Repository
- Capacity
- 1150m3
HLW 625m3
- Host rock
- Boom clay
- Depth
- 230 m
- Emplacement
- Horizontal
- 500m
(design will
depend onsite
conditions)
- Vertical in-floor
or horizontal
tunnel
- 1 000–4 000
- 100000
- 5000
3.6 million
3600t
CANDU bundles
(design)
- Crystalline rock
or sedimentary
rock
- Copper
- Granite
Olkiluoto-3,
1980 t.U
Loviisa1-2 ,
1020 t.U
- Crystalline rock
- 500m
- 420 m
- 6300m3
- Clay (argillite)
- 500m
- Microtunnels
- Horizontal/
vertical
- Vertical
SS
SC
Design and
preparation of
application to
be provided in
2014
2020
2025
Current status
R&D
R&D
Operation
2040/2060
for B-waste
2090/2100
for C-waste
2065
2035 (earliest
estimated
inservice
date for financial
planning
purposes)
110
States
Japan
Republic of
Korea
Russian
Federation
Sweden
Switzerland
USA
Waste form
HLw
SNF (PWR,
CANDU)
HLW
SNF
SNF (UO2 and
MOX)/HLW
SNF, HLW
Over pack
- Dimension(m) 0.82_x1.73 (ref.
- Capacity
option)
HLWcorrespond.
- Material
to 8.6 x 10-2
m3/FA(PWR)
-Life time(as)
- Carbon steel
(reference
option)
- 1000 (ref.
option)
Repository
- Capacity
- Host rock
- More than 40
000
Canisters
- SR/HR
- Depth
- Emplacement - More than
300m
- Vertical./
Horizontal
Current status
Siting
Operation
50 year from
around 2035
- 1.02_x4.83
- 4 PWR FA./
297
CANDU
bundles
- 5 x 1.75
- 1-2 BWR
or 4 PWR
FA
- Cast iron
insert + Cu
outer shell
- 1000
- Copper
- 100000
36 000 t
(PWR
20000 t +
CANDU
16000 t)
- Cristalline
rock
1.644_
x5.16
- 21PWR
FA
- Alloy 22
- 10000
9000 t
- HR
- 100 to
1000m
- 500m
- Vertical
R&D
Cylinder,
diameter/length:
0.94/3.25
Volume:
2.26 m3 for
two 180-l-HLW
canisters
Diameter/length:
1.05 /4.92,
Volume: 4.26 m3
for max. 4 PWR
or 9 BWR FA’s
- Capacity see
above
- Carbon steel
-10000 years
- crystalline
rock
(granite)
- 500 m
- Vertical/
R&D
SC
2030
2020
- SNF from 2435
t.U , HLW from
1140 t.U, volume
of packaged
waste (SNF and
HLW):7325 m3.
- Clay rich
sedimentary rock
(OPA)
- 500-900m
- Horizontal
-63 000 t
Sitting
LA
- Tuff
- 300 m
- Drift
2020
HLW - High level waste from reprocessing; CS – Carbon steel; SNF – Spent nuclear fuel; SR – Soft rock; HR – Hard
rock; SR – Sedimentary rock; HR – Hard rock; T or C – Tunnel or cavern disposal;GS – Geological study; SS – Site
screening; SC – Site characterization; VHLW – Vitrified high level waste; LA – Licensing application for construction
permit; can. – Canisters; FA – Fuel assemblies.
111
3-Options for Turkey and a
General Decision Analysis
While switching to nuclear power, a country is faced with a number of important
questions such as the types of reactors and fuels to be used, and the methods to be
selected for long term waste storage. The most critical decisions are about:
· The choices of the type of fuel cycle (open, closed or partially closed) and spent
fuel management strategy (the choice of the type of nuclear fuel cycle is vitally
important since it will have major and very long term impact).
· The establishment of its own fuel cycle plants, especially the enrichment and
reprocessing facilities.
A general decision analysis has been presented here for the purpose of establishing
a country perspective for Turkey.
3.1. Choice of the Fuel Cycle
The dominant Reactor Technology today is the Light Water Reactor Technology
(LWR), comprising 89% of global operating nuclear-power capacity7. The major
reactor vendors have developed advanced or “Generation III+” LWRs. They
are currently licensing and selling these reactors. Although there is an increased
interest in exploring alternatives to the LWR due to apparently renewed interest in
nuclear power, there is no reason to expect the dominance of LWRs to end within
the system in a foreseeable future. Today’s nuclear fuels are derived from natural
uranium. LWRs are fueled with low-enriched uranium and uranium resources are
not expected to face any constraint for a long time. According to an MIT report, the
worldwide supply of uranium ore will be sufficient to fuel the deployment of more
than 1,000 reactors over the next 50 years3. Currently, LWRs are:
· The most economic option providing the lowest cost for nuclear electric
production;
· The safest nuclear power plants and are safe in each phase of the fuel cycle.
· They provide a technology that may maintain its commercial existence and is
mature.
· The market entry of other reactor types will be slow especially due timeconsuming processes such as the testing and licensing of new technologies2;
· When used in open cycle, they provide the best option in terms of nonproliferation compared to other power reactors - particularly GCR and HWR
types – as they are proliferation resistant when operated on an open cycle. They
produce the lowest rate of Plutonium compared to GCRs and HWRs at the same
power9;
112
· They are also suitable for use of MOX fuel.
Closing (partially) the nuclear fuel cycle by means of reprocessing and recycling
in fast reactors can be regarded as a standard strategy for spent fuel management.
Reprocessing is an accessible and proven technology. Spent fuel reprocessing has
evolved significantly since the start of nuclear energy applications. There is a large
body of industrial experience in fuel cycle technologies complemented by research
and development programs in several countries. The selection of a strategy for
spent fuel management is a complex decision with many factors to be taken into
account such as those related with politics, economy, environment and security
as well as public support. Both approaches (open and closed/twice through) have
their respective advantages and disadvantages. Over long-term, “closed” fuel
cycles may provide a more sustainable option over open fuel cycles3; that is to say,
they;
1. Enable the use of all fissile and fertile resources,
2. Minimize fissile fuel flows, including those at reprocessing facilities,
3. They avail of multiple reactor options rather than a single Fast Reactor option,
and,
4. There is a wider choice of nuclear reactor core design, with desirable features
such as removable blankets for extra plutonium production. Some of these
design options may have better economic, nonproliferation, environmental,
safety and security and waste management characteristics.
However, reprocessing is more expensive than producing new fuel under current
conditions. Currently, closed cycle is less economic but also less secure in terms
of the risk of proliferation compared to the open fuel cycle. The reality is that
reprocessing and recycling strategy have been reinforced by energy security
concerns arising in consequence to the oil crisis in the 1970s. This strategy was
based on the assumptions of a rapid growth in nuclear energy and uranium
demand and hence on an expected scarcity of uranium. However, the growth
in nuclear energy since 1970s did not unravel as assumed initially and forward
plans were progressively downsized5. It is seen from past and current operating
experiences that no clear advantage is offered by the reprocessing options either
in terms of waste volume and repository area. Reprocessing of spent fuels does
not completely close the cycle, as is often claimed, since it involves at each stage
the production of significant waste streams. Moreover, the underground storage
volume required for spent MOX fuel and waste can be smaller or larger than that
for direct storage of spent LWR fuel, depending upon assumptions. There are some
radiologic impacts due primarily to annual releases of the low-level but long-lived
radioactive elements such as Krypton-85 (half-life of 11 years), Carbon-14 (halflife of 5,700 years) and Iodine-129 (half-life of 16 million years) to the atmosphere6
. One of the main reasons for the move towards a direct disposal policy was
also the concern over proliferation. Subsequently, various socio-economic
concerns influenced the divergence from the reprocessing and recycling strategies
4
.Consequently, there is an increasing number of countries that have abandoned the
closed fuel cycle, either by turning to the open cycle and adopting direct disposal
of spent fuels or by deferring a final decision on the fate of spent fuels to a future
time and adopting a “wait and see” position. While interim/temporary disposal
113
cannot be considered as a final solution for spent fuel management, it provides
time for enabling the development of new technical options 3.
The recent research and activity activities have focused on the transition to a safer
new generation technology and the reduction of nuclear fuel cycle costs. Therefore,
no investments are expected to be made to radically innovative technologies
in a foreseeable future. It is estimated that focus will be placed on the back end
of nuclear fuel cycle, especially on the solutions relating to the development of
waste management composed of long-term transuranic elements in spent fuels,
in the medium term. It appears that priority will be given in the next decades to
the deployment of open fuel cycle involving cutting edge thermal or fast reactor
technologies, rather than the closed cycle. Thus, Open/ Once-Through Nuclear
Fuel Cycle using Light Water Reactors will likely be the dominant feature of the
nuclear energy system across the world within the next several decades and even
for the rest of this century. It would be unrealistic for a country newly transitioning
to nuclear power to make a marginal individual choice independent from these
realities. Therefore, Open Cycle with Light Water Reactors should be the preferred
option for Turkey in near and medium term investments. Under these uncertain
conditions, those countries with a low waste production due to a small nuclear
program do not yet avail of long term policies for the disposal of spent fuels. Just
like these countries, a wait and see policy based on longer term interim storage will
be a more reasonable approach also for Turkey at this stage.
Choosing an advanced technology that can use both UO2 and MOX fuel, offers
the possibility to convert into Closed (twice-through) cycle when required. In this
context, the technology choice made for Turkey’s first reactor, Russian-based VVER
-1200 491 M, is a suitable option bearing these features at least on paper. It seems
that all the responsibilities related to the management of spent fuels and waste as
well as fuel supply are left to Russia. The nuclear plant will be built, owned and
operated by a Russian subsidiary of Rosatom, a state-owned Russian company.
The project company (to be owned mostly by the Russian side) shall be responsible
for spent fuel and waste management and the decommissioning of the power
plant. The agreement signed between the governments of Turkey and the Russian
Federation also provides the possibility to cooperate in other areas of the fuel cycle,
including the treatment of spent fuel and radioactive waste, decommissioning and
the possible construction of a fuel fabrication plant.
According to Article 12 of the Agreement, the fuels for Akkuyu Nuclear Power
Plant will be sourced from Russia on the basis of long term agreements and spent
fuels may be reprocessed in the Russian Federation. Russia will also be responsible
for the transportation of the spent fuels. According to the Deputy Director of the
Project Company Akkuyu NGS Corporation, Mr. Kasumov, the fuels of the Power
Plant will be brought from Russia and the waste will be sent back to Russia upon
being spent. Mr. Kasumov also stated that spent fuels are valuable as they may be
used again upon being reprocessed and said that the fuels could stay in Turkey
if Turkey decided to purchase them. Furthermore, it is stated that the Akkuyu
Nuclear Power Plant will have a fuel storage capacity of 20 years. However, there
is no clear plan on how the spent fuel and waste generated in the power plant
will be disposed of. In the light of all these, it seems that Turkey has postponed its
decision on spent fuel and waste management.
114
Although this strategy provides short term solutions for the Akkuyu Nuclear
Power Plant, it still contains significant uncertainties. For other power plants to be
built in the longer term and in future, Turkey should remove these uncertainties
and establish well-rounded and comprehensive strategies and policies for its spent
fuel and waste management.
3.2. Decision Analysis on the Establishment of the
Country’s Own Enrichment/Facilities
Another challenging question for a country deciding to switch to nuclear energy,
is whether it should establish its own enrichment/reprocessing facility as part of
its nuclear program. The construction of an enrichment facility is a process that
requires a very high initial capital investment. The construction of an enrichment
facility may cost as much as a few billions of dollars1. A standard uranium
enrichment facility may generate enriched uranium enough to supply the annual
reload requirements of 8-9 large power reactors. In order for the power facility
to amortize its capital cost most rapidly within a reasonable period of time, it
should be operated at full capacity. Therefore, the presence of indigenous uranium
enrichment plants becomes justified for a country only when it possesses at least 10
GW of installed capacity (app. 8-10 Reactors).
Still, independent from economic considerations, a country may want to establish
its own enrichment facility due to energy security concerns against fuel supply
interruptions to be used as a political tool 10. Various decision factors considered by
countries availing of a nuclear energy program have been outlined by Ferguson 8:
· Number of Nuclear Power Plants: The establishment of an uranium enrichment
facility is not economically viable until there are eight or more power reactors.
· Time Scale for Nuclear Energy Plans: Have they focused on the next few years
or on the next decades? Investments delivering fast results are required for the
former and this may prevent the establishment of fuel fabrication plants. With
regard to the latter, a country may be willing to wait several decades for an
investment to pay off. In that case, reprocessing, for example, may be regarded as
a strategic investment to hedge against potential future uranium shortages.
· Investment in Enrichment and/or Reprocessing: If the real or perceived energy
security of a country fits its vision, investment in such type of plants may be
considered. Countries with substantial Uranium resources but with no nuclear
power programs may decide to build enrichment plants in order to enhance the
economic value of their indigenous Uranium sources.
· Adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty, Safeguards Agreements and
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials: How well is the
nonproliferation system and relevant safeguards established and implemented
1_
Estimated cost of a new Standard gaseous diffusion facility is $ 5 billion, whereas
that of a gaseous centrifuge enrichment facility is around $ 6 billion. The annual operation
cost of a gaseous diffusion plant is $ 500 million, while that of a gaseous centrifuge facility is
around $ 100-200 million.
115
by a country? Has that country become part of the Additional Protocol relating to
comprehensive safeguards?
· Security Alliances: Is the country part of a security alliance receiving protection
from at least one or more nuclear-armed allies?
· Nuclear energy cooperation agreements: Do these agreements prohibit or forego
enrichment and reprocessing or do they allow the conduct of such activities?
· Political statements regarding the pursuit of enrichment or reprocessing: Does
the country have a leader making statements against these activities?
· Presence of enrichment or reprocessing facilities in neighboring countries:
Do neighboring countries have such plants; if so, which ones and why are they
pursuing such a policy?
· Availability of resources: Does the country have access to other relatively
abundant indigenous energy resources or reliable supplier states for electricity
generation? Are these resources inexpensive compared to nuclear power?
· Public support for nuclear power: How supportive is the public about nucleargenerated electricity?
· Public support for waste management: Even if the public is generally supportive
of nuclear power, they may largely oppose waste storage. This opposition may
drive decision makers to consider reprocessing or other options that would alter
the perceptions surrounding permanent repositories.
· Degree of government ownership of utilities: What is the share of the public
sector in electricity generation? Can the government push through decisions to
build nuclear power plants or reprocessing facilities?
· Level of enthusiasm among nuclear technology scientists and engineers for
fuel cycle plants: Are technical people against these plants or do they have any
influence and political power on those shaping the political will?
The establishment of its indigenous Uranium enrichment facility enables a country
to ensure sufficient fuel supply for its nuclear power plants. Such an infrastructure
will enhance the energy independence of a country and contribute to its national
energy security. However, as mentioned above, a country may not economically
justify the construction of its own fuel cycle plants, especially enrichment plants,
before establishing eight or more large reactors. Although the Turkish government
has announced its long term plans for establishing eight nuclear power plants,
it seems that there are still great uncertainties related with this program. The
economic cost of establishing an enrichment facility is sizeable for a country with
only one or two reactors. Furthermore, as seen on Figure 8, there are a number of
countries with uranium enrichment plants around the world and also a significant
overcapacity.
On the other hand, nuclear fuel cycle investments generate concerns of
proliferation. Uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities may use the raw
materials – enriched uranium or plutonium – that constitute the basis of nuclear
weapon production. The same technologies that are needed to enrich uranium to
make reactor fuel and to separate plutonium from spent fuel to be used in fresh
reactor fuel can be used to produce the fissile material needed for nuclear weapons.
116
The training of personnel to design, operate and regulate such plants would also
provide the skilled labor necessary to move to the construction of nuclear weapons
11
.
Therefore, the potential expansion of nuclear power plants and fuel cycle plants
in developing countries exploring nuclear energy as a potential option cause a
growing concern in major developing countries about proliferation of nuclear
materials and the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. Thus, international
rules are imposed on the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies starting with
enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Detailed information regarding the
referred rules formulated by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has been assessed
extensively in the analysis within this report by Sinan Ülgen and Aaron Stein on
the transfer of nuclear technology.
Due to the association between the proliferation of nuclear weapons and such
technologies, efforts for internationalization of fuel cycle services have recently
been intensified and a number of proposal have been made with regard to
this topic for the purpose of enabling countries to forego the establishment of
indigenous enrichment capabilities. The aim of internationalization of fuel cycle
efforts to enable countries using nuclear power feel more secure upon assuring
reliable fuel supply for their reactors and thus deter them from building their own
enrichment facility 11.
Turkish decision makers should encourage independent research to analyze
in detail the interplay of these factors. They should then make a decision by
evaluating the different options and associated risks. The following can be stated as
a result of an initial evaluation:
Turkey has announced a new national energy strategy including the initiation
of nuclear energy production. The process for the establishment and licensing of
the first power plant in Akkuyu has been initiated. In addition, statements have
been made, confirming that the nuclear program will continue also after Akkuyu.
In fact, negotiations have begun with Japan, South Korea, China and Canada
for the construction of the country’s second nuclear power point near Sinop on
the Black Sea coast. The planned and proposed power reactors of Turkey have
been presented in Table 7. Although there have been no clear plans announced
regarding fuel cycle capabilities, it is clear that Turkish leaders have not ruled out
this option. While speaking about NPT states’ right for Uranium enrichment in the
context of Iran, Prime Minister Erdogan stated that if needed for its civilian nuclear
program, Turkey would also go ahead with domestic uranium enrichment 12.
117
Table 7. Planned nuclear reactors
Reactor type
Mwe gross
Start construction
Start operation
Akkuyu 1
VVER-1200
1200 2013
2018
Akkuyu 2
VVER-1200
1200 2019
Akkuyu 3
VVER-1200
1200 2020
Akkuyu 4
VVER-1200
1200 2021
Sinop 1
APWR?
1550
2019
Sinop 2
APWR?
1550
2020
Sinop 3
APWR?
1550
?
Sinop 4
APWR?
1550
118
4-Concluding Remarks
While switching to nuclear power, making the best suitable technology and fuel
cycle choices is vitally important for a country. Other major decisions are related
to the front end (enrichment) and back end (spent fuel management). For the
near and medium term, Open Cycle operating Advanced Light Water Reactors
is recommended, since they are the most economic, safe and appropriate option.
Whereas closed or partially closed fuel cycles including reprocessing and recycling
are not recommended, as they are not expected to become economically viable
for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it is seen from past and current operating
practices that there is no clear advantage of the reprocessing option either in terms
of waste volume or repository area. For spent fuel management, the “wait and
see” strategy based on long term temporary (interim) storage is recommended.
However, temporary storage should be considered as an integral part of the reactor
installation and relevant physical and legal infrastructure should be established. At
this stage, establishment of its own enrichment facility does not seem economically
feasible and reasonable for Turkey. Economic justification of a decision for
the establishment of enrichment facilities depends on future development
and realization time period of its nuclear program. But, these aspects may be
strategically important from a security and energy security perspective. However,
due to the association made by the international community, between the nuclear
fuel cycle and the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons, the question of
whether “Turkey should establish its own enrichment facility”, will remain on
the agenda in the foreseeable future as a thorny question where the international
political context will play a more decisive role than a purely economic assessment.
Finally, due to the risks related to environment, proliferation and public health
associated with it, nuclear energy is a subject of interest to a broad spectrum of
people ranging from the local community to people in neighboring countries
as well as the international community. As with all topics related with nuclear
energy, a maximum degree of transparency and, ultimately, an effective public
participation in the decision making process should be sought with regard to
fuel cycle and especially about the disposal mode of spent fuels. First of all, the
Ministry of Energy and the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority should establish
long term strategies and a “White Paper” should be published and shared with the
public opinion2. It is vitally important to establish a base for polyphonic debate and
ensure the participation of all the stakeholders and citizens to the decision-making
process, especially related to major nuclear matters. The policies to be implemented
will become ethically justifiable and maintain their sustainability in the long term if
a consensus is achieved between the public opinion and the decision makers.
2_
The White Paper published in 2008 by the United Arab Emirates on their nuclear
strategy and long term goals can be accessed at http://www.uaeembassy.org/sites/default/
files/UAE_Policy_Peaceful_Nuclear_Energy_English.pdf
119
Endnotes
1. IAEA 2009a. “Nuclear Fuel Cycle Information System, A Directory of Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Facilities” IAEA-TECDOC-1613, April 2009.
2. IEAE 2009b.”Status and Trends of Nuclear Technologies, Report of the
International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles” (INPRO),
IAEA-TECDOC-1622, September 2009.
3. MIT 2009. “The Future of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle”, MIT Report.
4. IAEA 2005. “Country Nuclear Fuel Cycle Profiles”. IAEA, Technical Report
Series No: 425, 2.Edition, Vienna.
5. IAEA 2005. “Status and trends in spent fuel reprocessing”. IAEA-TECDOC-1467.
6. World Nuclear Association. “Processing of Used Nuclear Fuel”
7. Steve Fetter and Frank N. von Hippel. “ Is U.S. Reprocessing Worth The Risk?”,
Arms Control Today, September 2005
8. WNA Market Report 2009; WNA Fuel Cycle: Enrichment plenary session.
9. Shahriman Lockman, 2012. Nuclear power’s limited usefulness and limited
proliferation risk.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ,28 March 2012.
10. Report of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel
Cycles (INPRO), September, 2009.
11. Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board , 2009. “Internationalization of the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges”
12. EDAM, 2011. “The Turkish Model for Transition to Nuclear Power”. www.
edam.org.tr/EDAMNukleer/edamreport.pdf
13. Dave Martin,”The Threat of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation from Turkey”,
Nuclear Awareness “Project , http://www.cnp.ca/issues/turkey-nuclearbackground.html#2.
2
Section V
A Regulatory
Authority for
Nuclear Energy:
Country
Experiences and
Proposals for Turkey
3
V
İzak Atiyas & Deniz Sanin
122
A Regulatory Authority for Nuclear Energy: Country Experiences and Proposals for Turkey
Executive Summary
The regulatory framework in the field of nuclear energy is actually composed
of two key components. The first consists of the norms, standards, rules and
recommendations established by international agreements and international
organizations. The second consists of the elements of the regulatory framework
prepared individually for each country. As it may be observed below, the most
important of these elements is the establishment of a regulatory authority. The
degree of independence of this authority, its powers, the extent of transparency
in the activities to be conducted; in short the organizational and managerial
characteristics of the regulatory authority are among the most important factors
determining the quality of the regulatory framework.
Among these characteristics, emphasis should be placed on the independence of
the authority. Nuclear energy generation comprises many financial and safety
risks. These financial and safety risks are not independent from each other.
Regulations aiming to maintain the safety risks at a reasonable and acceptable level
generally increase, at the same time, the costs of activities such as construction,
operation and management of spent fuel and waste. Moreover, the implementation
of these regulations may sometimes give rise to interruptions in electricity
generation at times of risk. Therefore, the priorities of the power plant operator and
even of the Ministry responsible for electricity supply may not always be in line
with the principles and regulations relating to safety and may even be in conflict
with each other in many cases. In that case, it is highly critical, in ensuring nuclear
safety, to adopt the regulatory decisions regarding safety independently from
the power plant operator or the relevant ministry, sometimes even in opposition
to their interests. So, administrative independence is regarded as one of the key
prerequisites for ensuring an independent decision making process.
Yet, although the compatibility of regulations with internationals standards
is often necessary for the high quality of regulations, this is not sufficient. The
quality of regulations will also depend on the nature of enforcement . Here,
again the independence of the regulatory authority will be one of the key
determinants of the quality of enforcement. In literature a distinction is made
between de-jure independence and de-facto independence. While many regulatory
authorities in many countries appear to be independent in the legal sense, that is
internationally accepted conditions for independence are fulfilled , there may not
be any independence in the factual sense. This leads to the following outcome:
the fulfillment of legal conditions for independence may not be sufficient for the
fulfillment of factual independence.
Another factor impacting the quality of regulation is transparency and
accountability. The scope of the transparency principle referred to here is
considerably wide. The openness of the decisions to the public, for example
their publication on the official gazette and most importantly on the website of
relevant authorities is one the most basic conditions of transparency. However,
transparency also requires that the justifications of these decisions are presented to
123
the public. Likewise, the public accessibility of the decision making processes is a
characteristic enhancing transparency. In countries where the level of transparency
is high, also the processes for preparing rules and regulations are accessible by the
public, ensuring that public consultations are always carried out in a systematic
manner.
Another factor impacting regulatory quality is technical capacity and, more
generally, the quality of human capital. Many decisions of regulatory authorities
require expertise in technical subjects. The presence or absence of this expertise
depends on the education system in the country, on the characteristics of the
personnel regime of the regulatory authority as well as on the degree of prevalence
and strength of the merit system. Certainly, in a field like nuclear energy, the
presence of technical capacity will depend on the presence of nuclear engineering
and similar university programs in the country. In case the efforts aimed at
developing nuclear energy comprise plans and programs focused on remedying
the limitations, technical capacity will become a less important limitation in time.
In a way, it would be more appropriate to consider that technical capacity “is a
limitation that may be remedied”, that is to think that it is also a result of quality
as much as being a factor impacting the regulatory capacity. A regulatory authority
that would like to produce high quality work may create adequate technical
capacity.
Abovementioned principles (compliance of regulations with international
standards, independence of the regulatory authority, transparency and technical
capacity) will certainly have a critical importance also in the field of nuclear energy.
Safety is one of the most important goals in nuclear energy regulations. Weakness
in regulatory and supervisory framework in the field of safety will increase the
possibility of accidents and the public cost of an accident is significantly high. On
the other hand, deficiencies in the regulatory and supervisory framework have
played a major role in nuclear accidents. The lessons drawn from the Fukushima
nuclear accident are highly striking in this area.
The situation in Turkey
Currently, the regulatory authority in the field of nuclear energy production is
TAEK. There seems to be a consensus in Turkey on the view that TAEK does
not bear the characteristics of an independent regulatory authority according to
international norms. However, it appears like this consensus is formed because
TAEK performs development activities and operates the reactor in addition
to regulating and inspecting. So, according to this perception, the sole or the
most important obstacle standing in front of the independence of TAEK is the
development activities performed by TAEK. It would be beneficial to review the
institutional characteristics of TAEK to show that this is not the case. In summary,
TAEK is not independent not only because it performs development activities
in the field of nuclear energy or because it operates the reactor; it also does not
avail of other key legal and institutional characteristics of independence. The new
authority to be established should avail of these characteristics of independence.
On the other hand, the presence of these legal characteristics in a regulatory
authority does not guarantee actual or de-facto independence. These characteristics
124
are required but are not sufficient. To give a very simple example: there is a
considerable weight of the political authority in the process of appointing
managers of any authority. In case the closeness to the political authority precludes
the principle of merit in the management of the authority during the appointments,
independence would de-facto receive a severe harm. According to the institutional
characteristics of the country, various methods may be used by the political
authority or the establishment under inspection for influencing the decisions of the
regulatory authority.
Another measure aimed at ensuring the accountability of the regulatory authority,
and thus the high regulatory quality, is transparency. Transparency may also play
a role in ensuring de-facto independence. There are no provisions on transparency
in the TAEK Law. The topic of transparency should be extensively tackled in the
establishment law of the regulatory authority and measures should be adopted for
ensuring that the agency conducts its regulatory activities in a transparent manner.
In addition to the institutional elements discussed above, it is known that there
are major deficiencies in terms of legislations and regulations in the legal and
regulatory framework with regard to nuclear energy in Turkey. For instance,
there are major deficiencies in the legal and regulatory framework in Turkey about
spent fuel and decommissioning of power plants.
Finally, another important factor impacting the quality of the regulatory
framework relating to nuclear energy is the presence of adequate human capital.
Therefore, relevant planning should certainly be made, a pool with an adequate
number of experts should be created and a human resources plan should be made
for the relevant training of experts for this important element of the regulatory
framework. In Turkey there are universities providing graduate and undergraduate
education in the field of nuclear engineering. In case the right planning is made via
this infrastructure, no major limitation should be expected with regard to human
resources.
Actually, these deficiencies reflect the presence of a larger and more fundamental
problem. Turkey does not yet have an integrated policy with regard to nuclear
energy. First of all, the political authority has not yet presented a serious study
comprising a critical analysis on whether the country need a nuclear power
plant and discussing the benefits and costs of nuclear energy compared to its
alternatives. The process of creating such a study should be in the form of a
process where the views of the public are received and responses to these views
are provided. After this stage, there is the need for a policy document indicating
how the nuclear policy will be developed, how the relevant legal and regulatory
infrastructure is to be formed, how the safety culture will be created and what
type of steps are to be taken in topics such as spent fuel and decommissioning.
These documents should be prepared in a participatory manner, the public should
be informed, their views should be received and sufficient responses should be
provided to these views.
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1-Introduction and Some
Key Principles
The objective of this study is to discuss the characteristics of the regulatory
framework in the field of nuclear energy in Turkey in light of international
trends and country experiences and examine the qualifications required in an
independent regulatory authority.
The regulatory framework in the field of nuclear energy is actually composed
of two key components. The first consists of the norms, standards, rules and
recommendations established by international agreements and international
organizations. The second consists of the elements of the regulatory framework
prepared individually for each country. As it may be observed below, the most
important of these elements is the establishment of a regulatory authority. The
degree of independence of this authority, its powers, the extent of transparency
in the activities to be conducted; in short the organizational and managerial
characteristics of the regulatory authority are among the most important factors
determining the quality of the regulatory framework.
Among these characteristics, emphasis should be placed on the independence of
the authority. Nuclear energy generation comprises many financial and safety
risks. These financial and safety risks are not independent from each other.
Regulations aiming to maintain the safety risks at a reasonable and acceptable level
generally increase, at the same time, the costs of activities such as construction,
operation and management of spent fuel and waste. Moreover, the implementation
of these regulations may sometimes give rise to interruptions in electricity
generation at times of risk. Therefore, the priorities of the power plant operator and
even of the Ministry responsible for electricity supply may not always be in line
with the principles and regulations relating to safety and may even be in conflict
with each other in many cases. In that case, it is highly critical, in ensuring nuclear
safety, to adopt the regulatory decisions regarding safety independently from
the power plant operator or the relevant ministry, sometimes even in opposition
to their interests. So, administrative independence is regarded as one of the key
prerequisites for ensuring an independent decision making process.
The subject of independent administrative authorities is not new for Turkey. The
Capital Markets Board of Turkey was established in 1982, while the Competition
Authority was founded in 1997. Independent administrative authorities were
established in the fields of banking, electronic communication, energy and public
procurement at the end of 1990s and during 2000s. International regulations
and especially those formulated in the European Union played a guiding role in
most of these fields have constituted the backbone of the regulations drafted at
the national level in many fields. For instance, the regulations and notifications
prepared in Turkey in the fields of energy and electronic communication were –
mostly - prepared in line with the EU directives. In the field of competition law,
the decisions of the European Commission and the European Court of Justice
126
constitute an example for the decisions of the Competition Authority. Likewise, the
main regulations of the Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency are in line
with the recommendations of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and the
EU directives.
Yet, although the compatibility of regulations with internationals standards
is often necessary for the high quality of regulations, this is not sufficient. The
quality of regulations will also depend on the nature of enforcement . Here,
again the independence of the regulatory authority will be one of the key
determinants of the quality of enforcement. In literature a distinction is made
between de-jure independence and de-facto independence. While many regulatory
authorities in many countries appear to be independent in the legal sense, that is
internationally accepted conditions for independence are fulfilled , there may not
be any independence in the factual sense. This leads to the following outcome:
the fulfillment of legal conditions for independence may not be sufficient for the
fulfillment of factual independence. To give an extreme example, if the decisions
of a Chairman holding a managerial position in an authority or a Board fulfilling
the legal independence conditions are exposed to the pressure of the establishment
inspected or regulated by the relevant Minister or authority and if this impacts the
decisions adopted, then it would be hard to talk about a real independence.
Another factor impacting the quality of regulation is transparency and
accountability. The scope of the transparency principle referred to here is
considerably wide. The openness of the decisions to the public, for example
their publication on the official gazette and most importantly on the website of
relevant authorities is one the most basic conditions of transparency. However,
transparency also requires that the justifications of these decisions are presented to
the public. Likewise, the public accessibility of the decision making processes is a
characteristic enhancing transparency. In countries where the level of transparency
is high, also the processes for preparing rules and regulations are accessible by the
public, ensuring that public consultations are always carried out in a systematic
manner. The publication of comments received during consultations on the website
of the relevant authority is another element enhancing transparency. For instance,
it has become a standard activity in Turkey to publish the regulations before they
are finalized by independent authorities. However, comments provided on drafts
are published very rarely.Why is transparency important and how does it impact
regulatory quality? In environments where there is high transparency, newspapers,
televisions, NGOs, trade unions, universities, academicians, specialist and
advisory organizations in the private sector and lawyers may follow up regulatory
decisions, criticize these decisions and propose alternatives; and, most importantly,
may take legal action against decisions which they believe are unlawful. This type
of monitoring, criticism and evaluation activities and the possibility of taking legal
action may force the authority to take the decision making process seriously right
from the beginning, which would enhance the quality of regulatory decisions. For
instance, the fact that the Turkish Competition Authority was obliged to publish
justifications for its decisions most probably had a major impact on the quality of
the Board’s decisions.
Another factor impacting regulatory quality is technical capacity and, more
generally, the quality of human capital. Many decisions of regulatory authorities
require expertise in technical subjects. The presence or absence of this expertise
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depends on the education system in the country, on the characteristics of the
personnel regime of the regulatory authority as well as on the degree of prevalence
and strength of the merit system. Certainly, in a field like nuclear energy, the
presence of technical capacity will depend on the presence of nuclear engineering
and similar university programs in the country. In case the efforts aimed at
developing nuclear energy comprise plans and programs focused on remedying
the limitations, technical capacity will become a less important limitation in time.
In a way, it would be more appropriate to consider that technical capacity “is a
limitation that may be remedied”, that is to think that it is also a result of quality
as much as being a factor impacting the regulatory capacity. A regulatory authority
that would like to produce high quality work may create adequate technical
capacity.
Abovementioned principles (compliance of regulations with international
standards, independence of the regulatory authority, transparency and technical
capacity) will certainly have a critical importance also in the field of nuclear energy.
Safety is one of the most important goals in nuclear energy regulations. Weakness
in regulatory and supervisory framework in the field of safety will increase the
possibility of accidents and the public cost of an accident is significantly high.1 On
the other hand, deficiencies in the regulatory and supervisory framework have
played a major role in nuclear accidents. The lessons drawn from the Fukushima
nuclear accident are highly striking in this area. The following was stipulated in the
investigation report2 prepared by the Japanese Parliament pursuant to the accident:
“The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion
between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance
by said parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear
accidents. Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly ‘manmade.’ We
believe that the root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that
supported faulty rationales for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating
to the competency of any specific individual.”3 Indeed the report demonstrates
that the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), which was the regulatory
authority during that period, and TEPCO were aware of some safety gaps, but
that NISA did not prepare the relevant regulations or did not force TEPCO to
adopt relevant measures. NISA was reporting to the Ministry of Economy, Trade
and Industry, responsible for developing nuclear technology. Pursuant to the
Fukushima report, regulatory and supervisory role was assigned to the Nuclear
Regulation Authority established under the Ministry of Environment. Hence, the
1_
EDAM “Nükleer Enerjye Geçişte Türkiye Modeli” (Turkish Model for Transition to
Nuclear Energy), 2011. See particularly Section 1 entitled “Türkiye’de Nükleer Enerjiye
Geçişin Emniyet ve Güvenlik Yönlerine İlişkin Değerlendirme” (Study on the Security and
Safety Aspects of Switching to Nuclear Power in Turkey) and Section 2 entitled “Büyük
Nükleer Kazalar ve Nükleer Enerji Teknolojinin Evriminde Doğurdukları Sonuçlar” (Major
Nuclear Accidents and Their Implications for the Evolution of Nuclear Power).
2_
The National Diet of Japan, The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission, http://naiic.go.jp/en/
3_
“The TEPCO Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident was the result of collusion
between the government, the regulators and TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said
parties. They effectively betrayed the nation’s right to be safe from nuclear accidents.
Therefore, we conclude that the accident was clearly “manmade.” We believe that the
root causes were the organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales
for decisions and actions, rather than issues relating to the competency of any specific
individual.”
128
goal of separating the function of developing nuclear energy and the regulatory
and supervisory function, which is one of the first rules of independence in the
field of nuclear energy in international literature, was achieved only in 2012 in
Japan.
This study is organized as follows. In the next section some key international
and EU norms will be reviewed with regard to the topic of nuclear safety and
regulations. Some country experiences will be discussed in the third section. The
regulatory framework will be assessed in light of these discussions and futureoriented proposals will be presented in the fourth and final section.
2-International Norms
2.1. Rules of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Particularly after the Chernobyl accident which occurred in 1986, efforts aimed at
harmonizing the standards relating to safety in nuclear energy at an international
level and establishing them on joint common principles have accelerated. A series
of international agreements resulted from these efforts. Maybe the most important
of these joint efforts was the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS)4, adopted in
Vienna in 1994 and enforced in 1996. The purpose of CNS was to ensure that
the signatory parties, that have established international standards, commit to
establish a high level of safety. Generally, the liabilities of the parties are based on
IAEA standards. Among the liabilities emphasized in the convention, there is the
establishment of a regulatory authority for implementing the legal and regulatory
framework in the field of nuclear safety, furnishing it with relevant powers, and
the efficient separation of the agency with regulatory functions from the agencies
developing and using nuclear energy (Article 8).
However, the Convention does not have any power of sanction. No supervisory
mechanism is established over signatory countries. The Convention foresees
that the parties submit reports showing to what extent they have fulfilled their
liabilities and that these reports are exposed to a peer review in the meetings held
regularly once every 3 years. The main sanction mechanism is composed of these
peer reviews. The parties may express their views regarding each other’s report in
these meetings and are expected to consider these views (Stanic, 2010).
The most important agency establishing international standards in the field of
nuclear safety is IAEA. One of the main duties of IAEA is to prepare international
standards, rules and guidelines for the purpose of enhancing the nuclear safety
regime. The revision of process of these standards began in mid 1990s. In 2006,
IAEA adopted the “Fundamental Safety Principles”.5 There are 10 fundamental
4_
Another critical agreement on nuclear safety is the “Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of radioactive Waste Management”. OECD
(2006) provides detailed information about international law in the field of nuclear energy.
For a recent evaluation, see Kuş (2011).
129
principles identified regarding nuclear energy in this document. These 10
fundamental principles may be summarized as follows:
1. The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organization
responsible for facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks.
2. An effective legal and governmental framework for safety, including an
independent regulatory body, must be established and sustained.
3. Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and
sustained in organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give
rise to, radiation risks.
4. Facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks must yield an overall
benefit.
5. Protection must be optimized to provide the highest level of safety that can
reasonably be achieved.
6. Measures for controlling radiation risks must ensure that no individual bears an
unacceptable risk of harm.
7. People and the environment, present and future, must be protected against
radiation risks.
8. All practical efforts must be made to prevent and mitigate nuclear or radiation
accidents.
9. Arrangements must be made for emergency preparedness and response for
nuclear or radiation incidents.
10.Protective actions to reduce existing or unregulated radiation risks must be
justified and optimized.
These principles are not binding; in other words, IAEA does not have any power
of sanction over member countries within the framework of these principles. These
principles are regarded as recommendations for member countries.6
IAEA’s rules and principles regarding safety are undergoing a restructuring
process. In addition to these Fundamental Safety Principles that apply for all
nuclear facilities and activities, also 7 “General Safety Requirements”, which also
apply for all facilities and activities, have been identified:
1. Legal and regulatory framework for safety
2. Leadership and management for safety
3. Radiation protection and safety of radiation sources
4. Safety assessment for facilities and activities
5_
Fundamental Safety Principles, Safety Standards Series No SF-1, www-pub.iaea.
org/MTCD/publications/PDF/ Pub1273_web.pdf. For a summary, see Stanic (2010).
6_
The legal status of these principles may be compared with the safeguards also
implemented by IAEA. The main goal of the safeguards system is to prevent the proliferation
of nuclear weapons and abuse of nuclear technology. The nuclear safeguards system is
composed of a series of detailed measurements used by IAEA for inspecting the accuracy of
the reports of the countries with regard to nuclear activities and materials. Countries that have
signed the safeguards agreement with IAEA thus also accept this inspection.
130
5. Predisposal management of radioactive waste
6. Decommissioning and termination of practices
7. Preparedness for emergency and intervention
IAEA has also published the General Safety Guides on these requirements.
IAEA developed a key approach on what needs to be done by countries that decide
to develop nuclear energy. This fundamental approach is called “Milestones in
the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power” (IAEA 2007).
This study aims to reveal in a systematic manner the steps that are required to
be taken by the countries that plan to establish a nuclear power plant. The study
is based on the acknowledgement that entering the field of nuclear energy is an
extremely complicated process. The referred infrastructure encompasses a number
of elements ranging from the choice of location, physical facilities and equipment
to the relevant legal and regulatory framework. The study is focused especially
on planning, tender preparation, construction and commissioning phases.
However, also the operation, radioactive waste management and decommissioning
phases have been considered as much as required in the initial plan. According
to the study, also issues relating to phases such as operation, spent fuel and
waste management and decommissioning should be considered at the phase of
participation in the tender and the planning process should be initiated regarding
these topics. As it will be discussed below, it is stated that the United Arabic
Emirates is trying to structure its nuclear energy generation process in line with the
recommendations of this study.
Finally, it would be beneficial to summarize what IAEA understands from the
independence of the regulatory authority. One can look at the booklet entitled
“Independence Regulatory Decision Making” of the International Nuclear Safety
Advisory Group (INSAG), dated 2003, regarding this topic.7 In this document
the following are presented among the measures highlighted for ensuring
independence in the regulatory decision making:
1) An effective separation of the regulatory functions and the nuclear energy
development or utilization functions
2) Adoption of adequate legal measures for enabling regulatory decisions to be
independent from external factors
3) Existence of a legal appeal option
4) Presence of a sufficient budget for the regulatory authority and its nonsubjection to the approval of organizations developing and utilizing nuclear
energy
5) Ensuring that regulatory decisions are open to public scrutiny
6) Assessment of regulatory performance
Moreover, some other measures, which aim to ensure independence in international
literature with regard to regulatory authorities, are also highlighted. The first of
7_
www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1172_web.pdf
131
these is the fact that the decisions of the independent authority are not subjected
to any approval or inspection at a political level and are open only to legal appeal.
The second is the fact that persons appointed to the management of the regulatory
authority are appointed for a given period of time and that their employment may
be terminated before the end of their term in case of misconduct or crime.
2.2. EU Nuclear Safety Directive
The European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom) was established
in 1957 for coordinating the researches of member states focused on the peaceful
use of nuclear energy. However, the topic of nuclear safety was not covered by a
regulation at the EU level until recently. But, with the increase in nuclear power
plant investments on one side and considering nuclear energy as an instrument for
ensuring security of supply at the EU level prior to the Fukushima accident on the
other side, as well as the concerns with regard to the safety of nuclear power plants
in some of the new member states that joined the EU in 2004 led to efforts for the
establishment of a legal framework on the safety of nuclear energy at the EU level.
As a result of these efforts, the Council of the European Union adopted a directive
forming the “community framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations”
(“the EU Directive”) in 2009. 8
The basis of the referred directive contains certain standards of CNS and IAEA. As
all EU member states and Euratom members of CNS anyhow, the directive refers to
principles which are already engaged by member states. However, the important
aspect of the directive is the fact that it comprises binding rule and measures.
Member states that do not comply with the rules and measures may be confronted
with sanctions.
With regard to the content of the Directive: the scope of the Directive has been kept
wider than the scope of NCS. NCS only comprises nuclear power plants and the
radioactive substance storage and processing facilities located in their place while
the Directive encompasses also nuclear fuel generation, enrichment, reprocessing,
waste storage and nuclear research reactors in addition to nuclear power plants.
Stanic (2012) emphasizes that the Directive aims a minimum safety level regarding
safety instead of presenting a specific legal and regulatory framework.
According to Article 4 of the Directive, each member state is obliged to establish
a national legal, regulatory and organization framework with regard to nuclear
safety. This framework should identify the responsibilities in the following fields:
· Identification of national nuclear safety requirements
· Licensing regime
· Inspection of nuclear safety
8_
Council Directive 2009/71/EURATOM of 25 June 2009 establishing a Community
framework for the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. This was followed by the directive
on spent and radioactive waste adopted in 2011 (Council Directive 2011/70/Euratom of 19
July 2011 establishing a Community framework for the responsible and safe management of
spent fuel and radioactive waste).
132
· Sanctions including amendment of the license and its annulment
As in CNS, the operator holds first degree responsibility with regard to nuclear
safety. Article 5 of the Directive is about the qualifications of the regulatory
authority. Here, the need for the authority “to be effectively independent” was
highlighted. In other words, the Directive emphasized that the authority should be
not only de-jure independent, but also de-facto independent.
Member states are obliged to submit a report analyzing the degree of enforcement
of the Directive until 2014. Consequently, they will be obliged to submit a report
once every three years. Differently from CNS, in case of failure to submit the report,
a sanction at the EU level may be applied. Furthermore, member states are obliged
to conduct a self-assessment subjected to a peer review once every 10 years.
According to Stanic (2012), there are two main deficiencies in the Directive. Firstly,
the Directive does not give green light to the inspection of nuclear power plants by
the Commission directly or maybe by surprise inspections. Independent inspection
will continue to be conducted not by the affiliate organizations of the Commission
but by the regulatory authorities of countries. Secondly, it is not mandatory to
make the reports public.
3-Country Examples
It may be stated that the corporate alternatives relating to the regulatory
framework in the field of nuclear energy are shaped around two main models. In
the first of these models there is no clear cut separation between the development/
promotional function of nuclear energy and the dimensions of safety and
inspection. For instance, both functions may be organized as different offices
under the umbrella of a specific ministry. Although the functions are transferred to
different bodies in time, it would not be possible to talk about a clear independence
between the two functions. Probably, it is implicitly acknowledged at the basis
of this model that there is a no clear conflict of interests between the functions
of promotion and inspection. It may be stated that especially in countries where
nuclear energy investments are performed by the public and particularly until
recently this was the prevalent model. Until 2006, the nuclear energy programs
appear to be shaped around this model although at different degrees in countries
such as France, China, Korea and India. The other model is the independent
administrative authority model. We may say that this model is applied since 1970s
in the US where the private sector plays a major role in the investments right from
the beginning. Individual country examples may certainly comprise the elements
of both of these models. However, in recent years and especially pursuant to the
Fukushima accident there seems to be a predisposition towards the model of
an independent regulatory authority at the international level and a significant
emphasis on transparency. In fact, the changes that have occurred recently in
France, Korea and Japan appear to be examples of the predisposition towards the
independent regulatory authority model.
133
3.1. United States of America
In the US, the main law regarding nuclear energy is the Atomic Energy Law dated
1954. This law has removed the monopoly of the federal government over the
activities relating to the generation and use of radioactive materials and paved the
way for the participation of the private sector in these activities in addition to the
field of defense. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was established with the
same law. AEC was abolished with a law issued in 1974, the duties of licensing
and inspection were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
established with the said law and currently continues to perform the duty of
regulatory authority in the field of nuclear energy in the US. There are 5 members
appointed by the President in the Commission. The members serve for a period of
5 years. The President may dismiss a commission member only in case of neglect
of duty, lack of efficacy or abuse of position. Such a decision would also require the
approval of the Senate.
The main duty of NRC is to ensure that the use of nuclear materials and facilities
is in line with the goals of public health, defense of the US and protection of the
environment. It avails of tools such as establishing standards, imposing rules,
issuing licenses, technical reviews and inspection in order to fulfill this duty. NRC
also avails of powers such as suspending the operation and imposing a penalty.
Moreover, non-compliance to some regulations of the NRC may constitute a crime
(OECD 2008).
There are offices working in affiliation with the Commission or the Chairman
of the Commission. Among these, the Office of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(NRR) is responsible for ensuring public health by licensing and supervision/
inspection. This is the largest office within NRC. Another important office is the
Office of New Reactors, NRO. The duty of this office, which was established in
2006, is to approve the safety of the reactors to be established for the first time in
the US prior to the application for a license. The first stop of the approval process
relating to new reactors is the “design certification approval”. In order to receive
this approval, the applicant company submits detailed information relating to the
safety characteristics of the reactor. So, in a way, the approval of a new design is
not only a political decision but also a technical decision. The interesting point is
that this process advances in a transparent manner. For instance, currently, NRC
continues to apply the approval process for the design certification approval of the
application of the Evolutionary Power Reactor, EPR9 of the French company Areva.
The documents relating to the application as well as the assessments of NRC may
be downloaded from the NRC website.10
The following may be mentioned among the implementations of NRC with regard
to transparency. Most of the meetings are open to the public and the meeting dates
are announced in advance. Meeting minutes are posted on the website within two
days. NRC decisions, voties and dossiers may be found on the NRC website.
9_
The same as the model known as the European Pressurized Reactor.
10_
See http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/epr/overview.html
. Gopalakrishnan (2011) draws attention to the contrast between the level of transparency
and institutionalization of the NRC process and the degree arbitrariness of the decision of the
Indian Prime Minister for purchasing 6 EPR reactors. Certainly, there is also a striking contrast
between the NRC level and the process finalized with the Akkuyu agreement.
134
3.2. France
Nuclear energy has been a long-term strategic goal for France. The first nuclear
power plant was established in 1962 in this country where there are currently
58 power plants. These power plants constitute approximately 75 percent of
the electricity production in France. The first regulatory authority in the field
of nuclear energy in France was established as a department of the Ministry
of Industry in 1973. The Directorate General on Nuclear Safety and Radiation
Protection was established in 2002. This directorate general is responsible towards
the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Environment. The current regulatory
framework in France was prepared with the nuclear transparency and safety
(TSN law) adopted in 2006. Also the Nuclear Safety Authority (ASN) which is an
independent authority in the field of nuclear safety was established with this law.
The decision making body of ASN is composed of a committee of 5 members.
Three members of this committee, including the chairman, are appointed by the
President, while one member is appointed by the President of the Parliament and
the other member is appointed by the President of the Senate. The term of duty of
the committee members is 6 years. Committee members may retire only when they
no longer can execute their duties, upon resignation or when they are dismissed by
the President in case of misconduct.
Nearly half of the 450 employees of ASN are located in different regions and 235 of
the employees are inspectors. 11 ASN receives support especially from the Institute
for Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté
Nucléaire, IRSN) for the conduct of relevant technical assessments. IRSN is a public
entity providing support not only to ASN, but also to some other public agencies
and especially to the energy companies EDF and AREVA. A document of agreement
was signed between ASN and IRSN in order to prevent potential conflicts of interest
and, furthermore, the IRSN experts working for ASN were prevented from working
in the projects of operations that had a license affiliation with ASN.
One of the most important characteristics of the regulatory framework is the
importance placed on transparency. Section 3 of the TSN law regulates the right
of access to information about nuclear safety and radiation protection.12 In this
section, it is stipulated that the government is responsible for informing the public
about the procedures and results on nuclear safety. Furthermore, it is also stated
that any person is entitled to obtain information from a licensed operator about
the risk of radiation and the measures adopted for preventing this risk and that
any disputes arising regarding this topic will be brought before the administrative
court. The way in which the referred liability for providing information is
to be fulfilled is explained extensively. For instance, Article 22 foresees the
establishment of a local information committee at each power plant and the
participation of representatives of municipal councils, local administrations,
environmental, health related organizations and trade unions. This committee
may receive consulting services, and commission for emission analyses and
11_
http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/index.php/English-version/About-ASN
12_
http://www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/index.php/content/
download/22273/123572/file/loiTSN-uk.pdf
135
measurements; the cost of these analyses are to be covered by the government
or local administrations. Moreover, a High Committee for Transparency and
Information on Nuclear Security is established. This committee is composed of
parliamentarians, local information committees, scientific academies, scientists to
be appointed by the Parliamentary Office for science and technology and persons
of similar qualifications. It is indicated that the referred committee is a debate and
information forum about the activities and their impact on the environment and
personal health, and that, from that respect, the committee may express its opinion
regarding these topics, that it is obliged to make its views public, and that it may
commission the conduct of researches and collect relevant information.
3.3. Korea
In Korea, technology transfer and localization played a key role in the development
of nuclear energy. The construction of the first nuclear power plant in Korea began
in 1971. A turn-key system was used in the construction of this power plant; in
other words, the power plant was constructed by foreigners and handed over.
The first three power plants were constructed through turn-key projects. The first
three power plants, where the turn-key method was utilized, the participation
of local companies was limited to areas where security was not important. As of
the fourth power plant, contract types where the main contractor was composed
of foreign companies and local companies played a role as sub-contractors
were used. Choi et. al. (2009) named this period as “on the job training” and
“on the job participation” period. Public design, engineering and construction
companies were established in time. It was mandatory for foreign companies to
work with local companies. Whereas at the end of 1980s the electricity company
KEPCO became the main contractor and foreign companies became subcontractors. The decision for local production was taken in 1989. In 1995 order
was placed for OPR1000 Korean Standard Nuclear Power Plant, which was the
first local production. As of 2012, there are 20 nuclear power plants in Korea, and
approximately 30 percent of electricity production is obtained from nuclear power
plants.
One of the main characteristics of the Korean experience was the leadership
displayed by the government for reducing financial risks. Choi et. al. (2009)
highlights that after the Three Mile Island (TMI) and Chernobyl accidents, the
construction of nuclear power plants was significantly reduced across the world
while Korea continued to construct power plants and improve the measures for
increasing safety. In Korea, nuclear energy is regarded as an essential component
of the national development strategy as in sectors such as petro-chemistry and
shipping and different governments maintained their commitment for the
construction of nuclear power plants.
One of the most important issues confronted in the construction of power plants
has to do with financial risks. With regard to Korea specifically, these financial
risks were undertaken by the public electricity company and implicitly by the
government at the beginning of the nuclear program. KEPCO was recognized as
an effectively operating company and did not encounter major difficulties in terms
of borrowing in international markets. In fact, the first nuclear power plant was
financed by the Eximbank loan obtained by KEPCO.
136
Another important aspect of Korea’s strategy was composed of the strategic
measures adopted for the development of an adequate technical capacity and
human capital. Korea sent 310 people abroad for education between 1955-1969
and only 204 of these came back. So, at the beginning of the program, Korea was
faced with a brain drain problem (Choi et. al, 2009, p. 5501). Furthermore, foreign
personnel were employed in order to compensate for the deficiency in specialized
personnel, including in the operation of the first nuclear power plant.
According to the study of Choi et.al. (2009), another characteristic of the
development of the nuclear program in Korea was that a significant benefit had
been obtained from the practices of opinion seeking and reviewing with the
participation of foreign experts right from the beginning of the program. The
views from local experts, IAEA and an international consultancy company were
consulted for the 20-year plan which began to be prepared in 1962. The preparation
of the plan itself lasted almost 6 years. The number of international conferences
either organized or participated in between 1957-1968 was 47. Furthermore, 81
foreign technical experts were invited and 16 international scientific projects were
conducted with IAEA.
However, the development of the regulatory framework and the establishment of
a regulatory authority took a long period of time. The first nuclear law of Korea
(the Atomic Energy Act, AEA) was adopted in 1958. In the same year, the Atomic
Energy Department (AED) was established under the Ministry of Education. The
Korea Atomic Research Institute (KAERI) was established also in 1958 for the
purpose of training nuclear engineers. The nuclear energy development plan was
finalized in 1968, as a result of an 8-year work. The Nuclear Safety Center began
operating under KAERI in 1981. This unit was separated from KAERI in 1990,
becoming a unit with regulatory functions under the name of Korea Institute of
Nuclear Safety, KINS) (Choi et. al. 2009). KINS, operated in affiliation with the
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology.
Until 2011, the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) assumed
a nuclear energy developing role, via KINS, both as a regulator and also through
its research and development activities. The Ministry of Knowledge Economy
was responsible for the construction of nuclear power plants.13 The fact that KINS
assumed the role of a regulator as well as a developer gave rise to discussions and
led to efforts for the establishment of an independent regulatory authority. The
Fukushima accident accelerated these efforts. Finally, the Nuclear Safety & Security
Commission, NSCC was established via a law adopted in 2011. The function of
MEST was restricted to nuclear research and development upon the establishment
of NSCC. KINS became affiliated to NSCC.
Some measures were adopted for the independence of NSSC:14 NSCC’s
independence was stipulated by law. NSSC was exempted from the law in Korea
empowering the Prime Minister to annul ministerial decisions that regarded as
unlawful or unfair. Commission members are appointed for a term of 3 years and
they may not be removed from office except for limited cases.
13_
Nuclear Engineering International, South Korea’s Regulatory Changes, http://www.
neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2062223; OECD (2009).
14_
Nuclear Engineering International, South Korea’s Regulatory Changes, http://www.
neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2062223
137
One of the major lessons to be drawn from the Korean experience relates to its
radioactive waste policy. During the years when the nuclear program was initiated
and the first power stations were constructed, priority was placed on the topics
of cost, quality and completing the power plant in time. However, not enough
importance was placed on creating a public opinion and waste management.
According to Choi et. al., it has become even more difficult to find a place for the
wastes with the increase in the income level of the country. The fact that Korea
still does not avail of a clear waste management policy is regarded as one of the
weakest aspects of the nuclear program in international assessments (IEA, 2006).
The policy regarding radioactive wastes was finally established with a law adopted
in 2009 (Şirin, 2010). However, the problem of nuclear wastes is not yet solved.
The Korean government began seeking for a place to store low and medium level
wastes in mid 1980s, but the first location was found only in 2005 as a result of the
objections of local inhabitants. The construction of a waste plant built in the region
named Gyeongju was accepted by the locals via a referendum and the municipality
received US$ 300 million from the government in return for accepting the waste
plant. 15 Whereas high level wastes are still stored at nuclear power plants and the
storage capacity of these plants are almost saturated. 16
Korea attained certain achievements with regard to the exportation of nuclear
power plants. For instance, the nuclear power plant construction projection of
the United Arabic Emirates was won by Korea. There seems to be a rather high
level of consensus in the country regarding the development of nuclear energy.
However, there is also news appearing on the press, indicating that this consensus
is beginning to weaken especially pursuant to the Fukushima accident. The failures
occurring in nuclear power plants in recent years give rise to the development of a
suspicion against nuclear energy. 17
3.4. China
In 2010, nuclear energy based electricity production constituted approximately 2
percent (70 TWh) of the overall electricity production in China.18 China’s nuclear
capacity amounts to nearly 12.5 GW. Although this constitutes a very small part
of the overall electricity production capacity, China has become of the countries
where nuclear energy production has been increased very rapidly since mid
2000s. One of the most important reasons for tending towards nuclear energy is
the rapidly increasing energy demand and the concerns relating to environmental
15_
http://thediplomat.com/2012/02/18/south-korea-nuclear-challenge
16_
“Nuclear waste disposal issue to make it hard to add nuclear reactors” Korea
Economic Daily, September 18, 2012, http://english.hankyung.com/news/apps/news.
view?c1=06&nkey=201209181808101
17_
For instance, due to a failure in the power plant named Kori 1 in February 2012,
the plant was closed down for 12 minutes the manager of the power plant had not reported
to NSSC for a period of one month. NSCC initiated an investigation upon the surfacing of
this case and the manager of the company Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP), that
operated nuclear power plant resigned in April 2012 (http://www.world-nuclear-news.
org/C_Kim_resigns_over_Kori_1704121.html). Due to the failures in October 2012, 2 more
power plants were closed down (http://www.nuclearpowerdaily.com/reports/S_Korea_
shuts_down_two_nuclear_reactors_999.html).
18_
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=CH
138
pollution. The goal of the government is to reach a nuclear power plant capacity
of nearly 70 GW by the year 2020. There are 15 nuclear power plants in China
as of 2012. The overall capacity of 30 power plants currently under construction
amounts to nearly 33 GW; this means nearly half of the overall new capacity
currently under construction across the world.
After the Fukushima accident which occurred in March 2011, the Chinese
government began revising safety regulations and suspended the permission for
new constructions until these revisions are completed. The revision process was
completed at the end of 2011. The State Council adopted in May 2012 its safety plan
to be applied in all power plants. Hence, the construction of new power plants is
expected to be resumed.19
China does not have a long history in terms of interest for nuclear energy. The
Chinese government approved the first project on nuclear energy in 1972. But,
nuclear energy was not regarded a serious alternative even in those years. The
main reason for this lack of interest was related with the large coal reserves in the
country. The China National Nuclear Corporation, CNNC began the construction
of the first local power plant in 1985 in Qinshan. This power plant began to operate
in 1994 (Xu, 2008). As a result of the severe power cuts in the southern regions of
China, two power plants were constructed with the French company Framatome
in the region of Daya Bay and they began also began to operate in 1994. No other
power plants were opened until 2002. In the meantime, China became a member
of IAEA in 1984. Two years after, IAEA opened two centers in order to raise
nuclear energy experts in China. China signed agreements with countries such
as Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Norway for nuclear technology sharing and
education. A total of 11 power plants began to operate in 6 regions until 2007.
The importance placed for nuclear energy increased significantly in 2000s.
According to Xu (2008), this was due to 4 main reasons. Firstly, a highly significant
increase occurred in energy consumption in 2000s. This led to severe supply
deficits in many regions of China. Secondly, China’s own energy resources began
to be insufficient. In fact, China became a net oil importer in 1993 and a net coal
importer since 2003. Thirdly, it is stated that coal reserves may be depleted within
25 years (Xu, p. 1199). Maybe, most importantly, coal-based electricity production
led to very severe environmental problems. It is indicated that environmental
pollution gives rise to very significant economic losses and that according to the
World Bank data these losses reach 8 percent of the national income. Especially
environmental pollution issues and increasing energy demand made nuclear
energy be regarded as a serious alternative.
In fact, in the Medium and Long Term Nuclear Energy Development Plan adopted
by the State Council in 2006, it was proposed to transform the role assigned for
nuclear energy in economic development from “medium” to “active”. In 2008, the
nuclear energy development was raised from “active development” to aggressive
development” (Zhou et. al., p. 772). Power plant constructions gained momentum
as of mid 2000s. Eight out of 12 power plants that began to operate between
1990 and the first half of 2000s were based on foreign designs, while the share of
Chinese power plants among those currently under construction is rising.
19_
Ibid.
139
The energy policy in China has a fragmented structure (Zhou et. al). There is a
major impact of energy companies on the policy making process. For instance, the
Ministry of Electric Power was abolished in 1996 and the State Power Corporation
was established for the purpose of continuing the production of electricity.
Administrative and regulatory functions were transferred to much smaller
administrative units in time. Similar developments took place also in the field of
nuclear energy. In 1980s, the Second Ministry of Machine Building which had made
the first nuclear bomb in China was converted to the Ministry of Nuclear Energy.
In 1999, China National Nuclear Company was established and affiliated with
CNNC. China Atomic Energy Authority, CAEA, was established in the same year
to function in affiliation with the Science Technology and Industry Commission for
National Defense (first CSTIND, and consequently SASTIND20). As the importance
of nuclear energy increased, the nuclear unit operating under SATINFD was
moved to the newly established Nuclear Energy Office (NEB), operating under the
National Development Reform Commission (NDRC). NDRC operates in affiliation
with the State Council21 and is the most competent body for Chinese economy.
The State Council is the highest policy unit in China. All policies, 5-year plans,
as well as the rules relating to the implementation of nuclear energy projects are
under the responsibility of the State Council. NDRC reports to the State Council.
Five-year plans are prepared by NDRC. The choice of projects in the field of
nuclear energy is made by NDRC. NEB prepares the nuclear development plans
and manages the restructuring in the energy sector where necessary. It is indicated
that CAEA manages especially the researches relating to nuclear technology and
identifies the policies and arrangements relating to nuclear technology (Zhou
et al. p. 774). CAEA also conducts the international cooperation on nuclear
energy in China. The National Nuclear Safety Administration, NNSA) is the
agency responsible for issuing licenses to nuclear power plants and regulating
and supervising nuclear power plant operations and reports to the Ministry of
Environmental Protection.
There are three public companies working in the field of nuclear energy: CNNC,
China Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (CGNPC) and China Power
Investment Corporation (CPIC). Among these, the most critical player is CNNC,
because this company is also the owner of all nuclear construction companies. It
is stated that these three companies are in a fierce competition in order to grab
market share and cooperate very rarely in areas such as technology, strategy,
management and similar topics (Zhou et. al. 774).
NDRC is placed at the center of the decision making process with regard to nuclear
energy. When formulating its policies regarding nuclear energy, NDRC mostly
bases itself on research centers, universities and establishments such as CNNC that
are within the nuclear industry. NDRC submits to the State Council the policies
formulated in this manner with regard to nuclear energy so that the Council may
take its final decision.
During the decision process, local administrations play a major role especially in
the selection of location. The central government decides on the selection of some
projects, but local administrations have been competing for attracting new projects
20_
SASTIND- State Administration of Science Technology and Industry for National Defense.
21_
The State Planning Commission, with its previous name.
140
in recent years. In fact, three nuclear operators generally begin to prepare power
plant projects together with local governments. In order to a project to receive a
license, the establishment should obtain three different permits from NSAA. The
first of these is regarding the selection of location. In order to receive this permit,
the establishment submits to NSAA a safety report about the choice of location and
an environmental impact report. A pre-feasibility report is also presented to NDRC.
Upon the acceptance of the project by the State Council and the receipt of the first
permit for the choice of location, a permit should be obtained for construction.
In order to obtain this, the establishment submits an environmental impact
assessment report relating to the construction process, a quality control report and
a safety report. The third permit is issued at least 12 months before the refueling.
The operation permit is issued 12 months after the first refueling.
Observers underline the fact that the Chinese government has been placing a major
importance to the safety issue especially pursuant to the Chernobyl accident of
1986 (Zhou et. al., Kadak 2006). It is stated that no major safety issue has been faced
so far. The inspection of safety is performed by CAEA and NNSA and the general
opinion is that this inspection is in line with international standards. However, there
are still major deficiencies in the legal and regulatory framework relating to nuclear
energy. First of all there is not a fundamental framework law on nuclear energy. The
State Council has issued three regulations regarding the management and safety
implementations of civil nuclear establishments, the control of nuclear materials
and emergency measures in case of accidents. The existing secondary regulation
and standards are compliant with the standards determined by IAEA and the
French and American authorities. Yet, NNSA, which is the main regulatory and
supervisory authority, is not an independent organization. In bureaucratic hierarchy,
when nuclear energy companies are directly under the State Council, NNSA reports
to the Ministry of Environmental Protection. In other words, under bureaucratic
hierarchy, NNSA is at a weaker position compared to the companies they inspect.
NNSA does not have its own research and development unit. Therefore, for
instance, it does not have a standard development capacity in cases not covered by
the existing safety rules. More importantly, the number of experts working in NNSA
is very limited. In this case, nuclear energy program develops very rapidly and the
capacity of NNSA to conduct the relevant inspection when new power plants are
established will remain highly limited. Furthermore, according to the assessment in
the study by Zhou et. al., the decision making process relating to nuclear energy is
not a transparent process. The criteria on which the decisions are made are not clear.
Conflicts of interest may occur during the decision making processes.22
3.5. India
India has a history of half a century in nuclear energy. The construction of nuclear
power plants started in 1964 and the first two power plants began in 1969.23
As of 2010, there are twenty nuclear reactors in the country and five reactors
are currently under construction. Nuclear energy is regarded as an important
component of the national development strategy. One year after gaining
22_
For instance, the persons involved in the Project preparation phase may also be
included into the assessment process (Zhou et. al. p. 780)
23_
IAEA Country Profiles: India http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/
CNPP2011_CD/countryprofiles/India/India2011.htm
141
independence in 1947, the Atomic Energy Commission, AEC was established
for the development of atomic energy in the country. The Department of Atomic
Energy, responsible for nuclear technology and researches in the country and
reporting directly to the Prime Ministry, was established in 1954.
The Atomic Energy Act, which was India’s first law on atomic energy, was adopted
in 1962. The Department of Atomic Energy Safety Review Committee, DAE-SRC
was established for the safety reviews of the decommissioning and operating
activities of the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) and Unit-1 of the Rajasthan
Atomic Power Station. In 1981, this committee proposed the establishment of the
Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, AERB in its report entitled “Re-organization
of the Inspection and Safety Functions” and AERB was established consequently
(Comptroller and Auditor General of India CAGI 2012)
AERB has 10 main functions: the Board develops safety policies in the field of
nuclear, radiological and industrial safety. Moreover, it also develops the safety
codes, guides and positioning, construction, commissioning, operation and
decommissioning standards of various types of nuclear and radiation plants.
The board also grants approvals for positioning, construction, commissioning,
operation and decommissioning of nuclear plants and ensures the fulfillment
of inspection conditions. AERB should identify the accepted radiation exposure
limits of workers and citizens and approve the release of radioactive materials at
the accepted limit into the environment. AERB is also responsible for revising the
emergency preparedness plans of nuclear and radiation facilities. The board should
revise all educational programs relating to nuclear energy and prepare an academic
program for the nuclear safety education of relevant personnel. Finally, AERB
should ensure the development of researches on nuclear energy and continuously
inform the public about radiological safety (CAGI, 2012).
The Board of Directors of AERB is composed of a chairman, four members and
a secretary. The secretary is an employee of AERB, whereas the Board members
are individuals who are government officials or persons providing service to
academic institutions or national laboratories or persons who have retired from
such institutions. The board is responsible to the Atomic Energy Commission, AEC
and is supported by the Safety Review Committee for Operating Plants (SARCOP)
and Safety Review Committee for Application of Radiation (SARCAR). SARCOP
supervises and conducts the safety inspection of the nuclear power plants and
other radiation facilities identified by the central government. SARCAR is the
monitoring and advisory committee, reviewing the safety of the implementation of
all radiation resources in AERB (CAGI, 2012).
AERB was recently inspected by the Comptroller and Auditor General of
India, CAGI. The goal of the inspection was to assess whether AERB fulfills its
responsibilities as a regulatory body and whether its legal status, authority and
independence were in line with the standards of IAEA (CAGI, 2012).
According to the inspection report, an independent supervisory body should
first of all be established by law and hold the power of making the final decisions
within its sphere of influence. It should identify the standards within the sector
where there is a regulatory body and establish the rules itself. It should be able to
impose sanctions where the standards and rules it has established are not complied
with.
142
The CAGI report placed a high importance to the independence of the regulatory
authority. In the report reference was made to the report prepared by the
independent research commission pursuant to the Fukushima accident and it was
reminded that essentially the reason of accident was the fact that the regulatory
authority in Japan was not independent and that there was collusion between the
government, the regulatory authority and the operator.
The inspection report reached the conclusion that AERB, which is the regulatory
and supervisory body with regard to nuclear energy in India, did not avail of the
qualities of an independent regulatory body. CAGI reached this judgment due
to the following reasons: First of all, AERB was established under the Atomic
Energy Act. As it was established under this act, no special law was issued for
the establishment of AERB. Thus, in the eyes of CAGI, AERB is regarded as an
institution affiliated with the central government. The French and American
examples were provided in the report in order to support this judgment: in France,
the regulatory institution responsible for nuclear topics was established in 2006
under a special law, thus one of the abovementioned qualities of an independent
inspection body was fulfilled. This is no different in the United States of America.
In 1974, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which is the supervisory body in the
country, was established with the Energy Organization Act. So, according to the
report, the fact that AERB was not established with a special act as was the case of
the supervisory bodies in France and the US prevents it from being independent.
Moreover, according to the report, no rule regarding nuclear energy was
formulated by AERB in India. All of the rules were shaped by the Department
of Atomic Energy. In fact, the opinion of DAE was consulted during the CAGI
inspection: According to the explanation reflected in the DAE report, the power to
establish the rules to maintain the purposes of the Atomic Act (1962) was anyhow
assigned to the central government. As a result, AERB does not avail of the power
to establish and shape the rules regarding nuclear and radiation safety. According
to CAGI, it would be impossible to call independent a regulatory body that cannot
establish its own rules. In addition to its inability to establish its own rules, AERB
reports regularly to the Atomic Energy Commission which is a body affiliated with
the central government. The Atomic Energy Commission is an agency with the
responsibility to report to the Prime Minister.
AERB cannot be regarded as an independent institution also from the economic
sense, because also the budget of AERB is shaped by the central government. AERB
does not have a special budget. As a result, AERB is a supervisory organization
which is position under the central government and cannot be independent
because of these characteristics.
In addition of the issue of non-independence of the regulatory authority, the CAGI
report also drew attention to other inadequacies. For instance, the IAEA safety
standards require each country to establish a nuclear safety policy. According to
the report, AERB did not establish such a policy although this task was assigned
to it. In more concrete terms, as of 2012, AERB has not yet prepared 27 of the
168 codes and guidelines which it had committed to develop. Another example
relates to the decommissioning of nuclear power plants. According to the report,
in addition to the absence of a legal framework on decommissioning in India,
143
AERB does not have any power besides for the preparation of advisory codes and
guidelines. Although it has been 13 years since the publication of the guidelines
about this topic by AERB, none of the nuclear power plants in the country have a
decommissioning plan. Furthermore, the Atomic Energy Act does not include a
specific provision regarding the establishment of a fund for the decommissioning
of power plants. Therefore, no legal framework has been established in India with
regard to decommissioning.
India’s nuclear energy program seems to be inadequate in terms of transparency.
According to Subarrao (2012), the public is not sufficiently informed about the
nuclear energy program conducted in the country and many nuclear accidents
were not disclosed to the public. For instance, a serious accident occurred in the
Narora Atomic Power Station, NAPS on March 31, 1993. The accident was reported
by a committee of AERB and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited,
NPCIL, but the report was never presented to the public (Subbarao, 2012). The
collapse of the dome of the Kaiga Atomic Power Plant under construction in 1993
was one of the rare cases across the world. This accident, which could have led
to a disaster if it had happened during the operation of the nuclear reactor, was
investigated by AERB and NPCIL. The research results were not disclosed. Major
damages occurred in the fire that broke out in the Kakrapar Atomic Power Station,
KAPS, in 1991. The power plant was significantly damaged due to the flood of
1994. The public was never informed about the details of the safety problems in the
power plant (Subbarao, 2012, pp. 11-18).
The absence of transparency on nuclear energy in India led to a lack of confidence
for the public. The public displays a negative approach with regard to nuclear
energy. Recently, during the construction of the Kudankulam Power Plant (2012),
the inhabitants of this town and neighboring villages protested the power plant
(Kudankulam Power Plant, 2012)24 The inhabitants of the town expressed their
concern about any accident that may occur and defended that as the power plant
was located on the coast of the sea, this would have a negative impact on the
fishing activities in the sea. A lawsuit was filed at the Supreme Court in order to
prevent the operation of the power plant in 2012. The lawsuit petition referred to
the unlawful deeds during the construction process of the Kudankulam power
plant, mentioned that only 6 out of 17 additional measures proposed by AERB
after Fukushima were implemented and included the claims about AERB’s
granting refueling approval despite this.25 The history of the Kudankulam power
plant is attracts attention also due to the fact that it displays the deficiencies of
the inspection process in India. For instance, according to the agreement made
with Russia in 1988, Russia was going to establish a power plant composed of
two VVERS units with a power of 1000 MW, and the wastes were going to be
transported to Russia. The environmental and location licenses of the project
were obtained on the basis of this platform. Consequently, with an amendment
made in 1989, it was decided to keep the wastes in India. Thereupon, while it was
necessary to renew the environmental license in order to initiate the project, this
24_
Taken from the link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_India;
September 20, 2012.
25_
http://www.dianuke.org/koodankulam-documents-prashant-bhushans-note-in-thesupreme-court/
144
was not done, and the new environmental license was obtained after the initiation
of the construction. Furthermore, still no decision is made about where the wastes
will be stored. Moreover, no environmental approval was obtained for the major
modifications in the project (e.g., renouncing the use of river water as cooling
water and using desalinated sea water).
In addition to all these problems, it is also stated that the human resources in the
country about nuclear energy is inadequate. The Nuclear Power Corporation
Limited (NPCIL) trains the technicians, engineers and scientists that will be
work in this sector in India. These trainings are provided in the nuclear training
centers of NPCIL or in the DAE/BARC Training School (Jain, 2012). Although
there are special schools and training centers in the country, some resources claim
that the workforce in the country is not sufficiently qualified and that not even
one expert works in same reactors (Subbarao, 2012, p.23). More importantly, the
number of experts in AERB is limited and assistance is received from institutions
such as DAE/BARC and DAE. It is highlighted that the experts working in these
institutions will actually be loyal to DAE and not to AERB, which may overshadow
independence.26
The CAGI report led to major repercussions in India. In the meantime, the Indian
government took a series of steps for amending the regulatory framework. In
the IAEA meeting held in September 2012, the Indian government declared that
they would invite IAEA to assess the nuclear regulatory process in India.27 The
Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) provided by IAEA, comprises the
assessment of a regulatory framework in a country on the basis of the IAEA
standards and international agreements. Furthermore, the Nuclear Safety
Regulatory Authority, NSRA Draft Law, aiming to establish a regulatory authority
in the nuclear field, was presented to the parliament in September 2011. One
of the most important criticisms regarding the draft law was the fact that the
independence of the regulatory authority to be established was not ensured in
line with international standards and insufficient importance was placed on
transparency.28
26_
A. Gopalakrishnan “the nuclear safety question” http://www.countercurrents.org/
gopalakrishnan201211.htm December 20, 2011, accessed on October 8, 2012.
27_
India to ask IAEA for review of its nuclear regulatory process, http://zeenews.india.
com/news/nation/india-to-ask-iaea-for-review-of-its-nuclear-regulatory-process_800611.html,
September 19, 2012; accessed on October 8, 2012. 28_
For instance: Gopalakrishnan “Transparency in nuclear safety regulation”, February
2, 2012, http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/comment_transparency-in-nuclear-safetyregulation_1644896 Accessed on: October 8, 2012 and Gopalakrishnan “Breaking the
stranglehold on the N-Safety regulator” http://www.dnaindia.com/analysis/comment_
breaking-the-stranglehold-on-the-n-safety-regulator_1644897 Accessed on: October 8, 2012.
145
3.6. United Arab Emirates29
The interest of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for nuclear energy is based on a
study prepared by the Executive Affairs Authority of the country, analyzing the
future of the country’s energy supply. In this study the need to develop supply
diversity, including nuclear energy, was highlighted. This study was followed
by the study on the Policy of the United Arab Emirates on the Evaluation and
Potential Development of Peaceful Nuclear Energy, named as the “White Book”.
The views of IAEA as well those of the US, France, Korea, Germany and Japan
were consulted in the preparation of this study. The White Book published in 2008
highlights the following principles:
1) Commitment for operational transparency
2) Commitment for the prevention of proliferation
3) Commitment for the highest safety and security standards
4) Commitment for cooperating with IAEA for the implementation of a peaceful
nuclear energy program and complying with IAEA’s standards
The study also proposed concrete steps for the preparation of the relevant legal
framework, international commitments and financial regulations. These steps
also include the establishment of an independent regulatory authority and the
formation of the legal infrastructure required for financial responsibility, spent fuel
management and decommissioning. At the basis of the general approach lies the
development of the nuclear energy program in line with the “Milestones” proposed
by IAEA (2007) and the establishment of a Nuclear Energy Program Implementation
Organization (NEPIO) to provide leadership to its implementation.
The White Book also determined certain points with regard to technology and the
financing model. Thus, the technology preferred is the third generation light-water
reactor, LWR technology. The financing model is the Build-Own-Operate (BOO)
model and partnerships between the government and international investors are
envisaged.
The White Book was followed with the study entitled “Roadmap for Success”,
prepared in line with the IAEA (2007) “milestones” approach, determining the
details about the steps of the development of nuclear energy program. This study
presented 4 options which were potentially acceptable in terms of technology.
These were the Areva EPR, Westinghouse AP1000 models, Korea’s KHNC
APR1400 model and GE-Hitachi ABWR model.
One of the characteristics required by AEB in the project was the presentation of
the quote as a whole under the responsibility of a single company, and not in the
form of a consortium committing to undertake different aspects of the project. As
a result of the negotiations made with construction companies, Korean KEPCO
provided the most suitable quote for the demands of UAE. Hence, an agreement
was signed between KEPCO and the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation in
November 2010.
29_
The study of Ebinger et. al. (2011) was used in the preparation of this section.
146
Meanwhile, the Federal Authority of Nuclear Regulation, FANR, was established
with a federal law issued in 2009 (Federal Law No. 6 of 2009 Regarding the Peaceful
Uses of Nuclear Energy, hereafter referred to as the “UAE nuclear energy law”).
FANR was established as an independent legal entity with an independent financial
statement in the UAE nuclear energy law. In the law it was highlighted that FANR
has full powers and administrative independence in its field of activity. FANR
comprises a Board of 9 persons working a part-time basis. This board is appointed
for a term of 3 years upon the decision of the Council of Ministers; this term may
be renewed. The board selects a general manager. The general manager manages
the two main departments of FANR, namely the Administrative Department and
the Operational Department. In case of “mismanagement” by one of the Board
members, he may be replaced by someone appointed in his place (Art. 13). The
General Manager may be changed where this suitable for “public interest”. Here,
it may be underlined that the term “public interest” remains rather vague. The
budget of FANR is composed of the resources provided by the government, the
revenue obtained from the jobs performed and the “gifts, loans and donations” to
be accepted by the Board, which “do not contradict the purposes of the authority”.
In 2008, the White Board also envisaged the establishment of the nuclear energy
company of UAE, named the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation, ENEC. ENEC
was established in 2008. Its main responsibility was to undertake the ownership
and operation of the power plants to be established in Abu Dhabi and to cooperate
with foreign investors in the field of nuclear energy as the investment company of
the Abu Dhabi government both in the domestic and foreign markets.
Based on the statements summarized above with regard to the management
method of FANR, it may be said that the decision making process of FANR is
independent, but independence is not achieved in terms of the administration
and the budget. The noticeable aspect in the approach of UAE to nuclear energy
is the preliminary preparation made the transition to nuclear energy production,
rather than the characteristics related with the independence of FANR. A policy
was developed before the any actual attempt, consequently the main steps relating
to the development of the program were formulated, potential alternatives were
presented and the negotiations with potential suppliers were initiated pursuant to
this preliminary preparation phase.
4-The Situation in Turkey
The reason that the safety issue stands out within the regulatory framework with
regard to nuclear energy is certainly the potential danger posed for the society by
nuclear power plant activities. In case of an accident, not only the owners of the
power plant, but also the surrounding community would incur a serious damage.
In other words, a failure in the activities related to the production of nuclear
energy has the potential of generating negative externality and serious damages
for the society. This externality is not something that may be handled with market
mechanism and the safety issue arises because of this reason. Actually, from this
respect, the nuclear sector is principally not different from other sectors or activities
subjected to market malfunctions. The real difference lies at the dimension of
potential damage.
147
In many areas where market mechanism does not function properly, state
intervention is generally organized through administrative authorities. In fact,
the regulatory and supervisory activities in areas such the implementation of
the competition policy, banking, energy, electronic communication and market
economy are performed by relatively independent administrative authorities in
Turkey. The independence here is certainly not absolute. First of all, the activities of
such type of authorities are restricted by the main laws of the relevant institution
or of the sector which they are inspecting. There is an overall consensus that the
responsibility and power of establishing sectoral policies do not belong to the
regulatory authority; policy formation is the responsibility of the political authority,
such as the relevant ministry. However, the quality of the regulatory framework
within these limits is closely associated with how independently the regulatory
authority may take decisions. In the decisions it takes, the regulatory authority
is expected to be independent from the political authority and the companies
or operators it is assigned to inspect. In order for the regulatory authority to be
independent in its decisions, a series of institutional measures have been envisaged
in international literature, including the folllowing:
1) The political authority cannot intervene directly in the decisions of the
regulatory authority; for instance, it should not have the power to annul or
amend the decisions
2) The chairman and/or board members of the regulatory authority, in other
words persons with the power to take a regulatory decision, should be
appointed for fixed term and cannot be removed from office except for under
extraordinary circumstances such as disease or misuse of authority
3) The budget of the authority should not be directly under the control of the
political authority and should have its own sources of income (such as special
taxes)
Certainly, being independent does not mean not being inspected or not being
accountable. One of the measures ensuring accountability is to subject the decisions
of the regulatory authority to judicial review (appeal). In Turkey this function
is generally fulfilled by the Council of State. The second measure is to subject
the budget and performance of the regulatory authority to audit. For instance,
the regulatory authority may be accountable to the Parliament or the relevant
parliamentary commission each year and its budget may be inspected by the
Council of State on behalf of the Parliament.
Another institutional measure required for ensuring accountability is transparency.
As specified at the beginning of this study, transparency requires the decisions,
the decision making process and the decision making logic to be transparent. This
requires the justifications of the decisions and the technical details playing a role in
decision making to be open to the public.
We would like to remind the fact that the regulations and inspections to be
implemented with regard to the issue of nuclear safety will mostly contradict
the interests of the political authority and the establishment being regulated
and inspected. Naturally, the risk perception of the regulatory authority will
be different from that of the political authority and/or the establishment.
The regulatory authority should not take into account the reflection of safety
related interventions on other areas. For instance, the delays to arise during the
148
construction of the power plant due to safety inspection may directly increase
the costs or lead to setbacks in the supply of electricity. Both contradict the short
term interests of both the political authority and the establishment. Likewise,
intervening inthe failures that may occur when the power plant begins to operate
and to stop electricity production for example due to this reason may damage the
interests of the political authority and/or the establishment. It is for this reason
that as demonstrated by international experience, one of the most important
threats standing in front of ensuring safety in nuclear energy is the weakness of the
regulatory and supervisory authority, and even worse, when it is in collusion with
the nuclear power plant operator. It is lessons drawn from this experience that lie
behind the prominence of the measures aimed at ensuring the independence and
transparency of the regulatory authority in the field of nuclear energy.
The following picture comes out when one considers Turkey’s situation in light
of these data: According to Provisional Article 1 of Law No. 5710, “TAEK shall
continue to fulfill this function in line with the Turkish Atomic Energy Agency
Law dated 9/7/1982, with no. 2690, until a new agency is established for fulfilling
the duty of regulating and inspecting nuclear activities.” Therefore, currently,
the regulatory authority in the field of nuclear energy production is TAEK. There
seems to be a consensus in Turkey on the view that TAEK does not bear the
characteristics of an independent regulatory authority according to international
norms. However, it appears like this consensus is formed because TAEK performs
development activities and operates the reactor in addition to regulating and
inspecting. So, according to this perception, the sole or the most important
obstacle standing in front of the independence of TAEK is the development
activities performed by TAEK. It would be beneficial to review the institutional
characteristics of TAEK to show that this is not the case.
The institutional characteristics of TAEK were identified by Law No. 2690 issued
in 1982. TAEK reports to the Prime Ministry. TAEK’s Chairman is “selected by
the Prime Minister and jointly appointed by decree” (Article 5). As indicated
above, one of the internationally accepted prerequisites of enabling the regulatory
authority to act independently is the inability of the political authority to remove
from office the persons who fulfill the duty of chairman. Generally, this institution
is clearly stated in the relevant law. In fact, in Article 24 of the Law on the
Protection of Competition, it is stipulated that “The Chairman and members of the
Board shall not be removed from office due to any reasons prior to the completion
of their term”. However, as there is no such provision in the TAEK Law, TAEK’s
management is directly under the control of the Prime Minister.
Another element of regulatory independence relates to the distribution of the
power of regulation and decision making. Autonomy requires that the decisions
and the regulations of the administrative authority are made in an independent
manner, and that especially the political authority should not be directly involved
in this process. Yet, this is not the case for TAEK. For instance, many critical
decisions, including the adoption of TAEK’s regulations (TAEK Law, Art. 6/b/2),
are taken by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). AEC is also the critical
buyer in the licensing and inspection/license cancellation process. AEC, “under
the Chairmanship of the President of TAEK, consists of the Vice Presidents, one
member each from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Energy and Natural
Resources and of four faculty members in the field of nuclear energy.” (TAEK
149
Law, Art. 6/a). According to the referred article, the Prime Minister presides to the
meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission where deemed necessary. All members
are appointed by the Prime Ministry and, as in the case with the Chairman, there
are no provisions to prevent the arbitrary removal from office of the members. In a
way, the Commission functions as a sub-branch of the Prime Ministry. In this case,
it is not in line with the principles of independence. 30
Another dimension of regulatory autonomy relates with the financial resources of
the authority. The main point here is the presence of mechanisms to prevent the
full financial dependence of the agency to the political authority. For instance, the
main income source of the Competition Authority “is composed of payments to
be made at a ratio of four out of ten-thousand of the capital of all partnerships at
the status of an incorporation or limited company to be newly established, and of
the remaining part in case of capital increase (Law No. 4054, Art. 39/c). Thus, the
Competition Authority holds a budget that is independent from the budget of the
Ministry to which it reports. Yet, the budget of TAEK is fully dependent on the
budget of the Prime Ministry and its real income is composed of the allowance to
be allocated for TAEK in the budget of the Prime Ministry.
Another dimension of the regulatory independence relates with the inspection of
the agency. It is preferred that the inspection of the agency is not conducted by an
institution directly reporting to the political authority. For instance, the financial
inspection of the Competition Authority is performed by the Audit Office. The
Audit Office conducts its inspections on behalf of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly. Yet, TAEK is under the inspection of the High Inspection Board (HIB)
of the Prime Ministry in administrative and financial topics.” (TAEK Law Art. 16).
Moreover, TAEK may be inspected also by the inspectors of the treasury, upon the
request of HIB and the approval of the Prime Minister. In other words, TAEK is
dependent on the political authority also in the field of inspection.
In summary, TAEK is not independent not only because it performs development
activities in the field of nuclear energy or because it operates the reactor; it also does
not avail of other key legal and institutional characteristics of independence. The
new authority to be established should avail of these characteristics of independence.
On the other hand, the presence of these legal characteristics in a regulatory
authority does not guarantee actual or de-facto independence. These characteristics
are required but are not sufficient. To give a very simple example: there is a
considerable weight of the political authority in the process of appointing
managers of any authority. In case the closeness to the political authority precludes
the principle of merit in the management of the authority during the appointments,
independence would de-facto receive a severe harm. According to the institutional
characteristics of the country, various methods may be used by the political
authority or the establishment under inspection for influencing the decisions of the
regulatory authority.
Another measure aimed at ensuring the accountability of the regulatory authority,
and thus the high regulatory quality, is transparency. Transparency may also play
a role in ensuring de-facto independence. There are no provisions on transparency
30_
Ebinger et. al. (2011, s. 34) pinpoints to another potential conflict of interest:
The duty of chairmanship of AEC, which is the duty of approving the regulations of TAEK is
fulfilled by the Chairman of TAEK.
150
in the TAEK Law. The topic of transparency should be extensively tackled in the
establishment law of the regulatory authority and measures should be adopted
for ensuring that the agency conducts its regulatory activities in a transparent
manner. First of all, transparency requires the publication of all documents
relating to regulatory work on the website of the agency, but this is not sufficient.
Decision making processes should also be transparent and the public should be
enlightened about the justifications of the decisions adopted. The background
research and technical reports used in the decisions should be open to the public.
The right of the public to obtain information should be clearly defined and the
regulatory authority should be required to provide this information (in a manner
so as to prevent confidential information from being disclosed). Moreover, local
information committees should be established by law as in France and it should be
possible for these committees to obtain relevant information about safety.
In addition to the institutional elements discussed above, it is known that there are
major deficiencies in terms of legislations and regulations in the legal and regulatory
framework with regard to nuclear energy in Turkey. 31 For instance, there are major
deficiencies in the legal and regulatory framework in Turkey about spent fuel and
decommissioning of power plants. With regard to Akkuyu specifically, as the whole
responsibility about these topics is assigned to the contractor company the problem
appears to be solved at least in principle in the power plant, but the deficiencies in
the legal framework still continue. The problem of nuclear waste is one of the most
delicate topics in the development of nuclear energy. One of the important lessons to
be drawn especially from the Korean experience is that governments are unwilling to
take steps to solve this problem, that they display a tendency to delay the solution of
the problem over a period of time while the solution of this problem in a competent
nuclear energy policy should be taken up at the beginning. Likewise, there are
serious ambiguities about financial liabilities and insurance.
Actually, these deficiencies reflect the presence of a larger and more fundamental
problem. Turkey does not yet have an integrated policy with regard to nuclear
energy.32 First of all, the political authority has not yet presented a serious study
comprising a critical analysis on whether the country need a nuclear power plant
and discussing the benefits and costs of nuclear energy compared to its alternatives.
The process of creating such a study should be in the form of a process where the
views of the public are received and responses to these views are provided. After this
stage, there is the need for a policy document indicating how the nuclear policy will
be developed, how the relevant legal and regulatory infrastructure is to be formed,
how the safety culture will be created and what type of steps are to be taken in topics
such as spent fuel and decommissioning. These documents should be prepared in a
participatory manner, the public should be informed, their views should be received
and sufficient responses should be provided to these views.
Finally, another important factor impacting the quality of the regulatory framework
relating to nuclear energy is the presence of adequate human capital.33 Therefore,
relevant planning should certainly be made, a pool with an adequate number of
experts should be created and a human resources plan should be made for the
31_
For instance see Şirin (2010)
32_
There is a document entitled “Information on Nuclear Power Plants and the Nuclear
Power Plant to Be Established in Our Country” on the website of the Ministry of Energy and
Natural Resources. This document is far from being a “policy book”.
33_
See Ebinger (2011) with regard to the education in the nuclear field.
151
relevant training of experts for this important element of the regulatory framework. In
Turkey there are universities providing graduate and undergraduate education in the
field of nuclear engineering. In case the right planning is made via this infrastructure,
no major limitation should be expected with regard to human resources.
5-Conclusion and
Recommendations
In this study, some characteristics that a regulatory authority to operate in the field
of nuclear energy in Turkey should have were highlighted in light of international
trends and country experiences. One of the most important purposes of the
regulatory and supervisory work in the field of nuclear energy is to ensure that the
activities related with the production of nuclear energy are conducted in line with
internationally accepted safety standards. The standards in this field are determined
by international agreements and the work of IAEA. Also the European Union began
to produce its own directives with regard to nuclear safety. The whole set of these
international rules constitutes one of the main elements of the laws and regulatory
framework of nuclear energy.
The second main component of the legal and regulatory framework relating to
nuclear energy is the regulatory framework established by each country. The
establishment of an independent regulatory authority in the light of international
experience has become one of the most important components of the country wide
regulatory framework. The quality of the regulatory framework mostly depends
on the degree of independence of this authority, their powers and the degree at
which they conduct their activities; in short on the institutional and governance
characteristics of the regulatory authority. International experience emphasizes
specifically that the authority should be independent from the establishment under
regulation and inspection during the decision making process. Another critical
characteristic which is emphasized is the protection of transparency and the right of
the general public to obtain information.
It is generally accepted that TAEK, which still functions as the regulatory authority
in Turkey, is not yet an independent authority. The fact that TAEK is involved in
nuclear energy development activities and operates a reactor is just one of the
obstacles standing in front of its independence. In order to achieve independence,
at least the decision making process of the regulatory authority should be protected
from political impact, those serving in the decision bodies should not removed
from office except for extraordinary cases and the control of the political authority
over the budget of the regulatory authority should be reduced. In addition to such
type of measures related to independence, it should be ensured that the work of the
regulatory authority is transparent and observable. The topic of transparency should
be included with detailed provisions in the law on the establishment of the regulatory
authority and measures should be adopted for ensuring that the agency fulfills the
regulatory activities in a transparent manner.
152
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The Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies
(EDAM) is an independent think tank based in Istanbul.
EDAM’s focus is on economics and Turkish foreign
policy. EDAM’s main objective is to contribute to the
public debate in Turkey and abroad on:
•Turkish foreign and security policy,
•Turkey- EU relations,
•the impact and management of globalisation,
•energy and climate change policies,
EDAM undertakes research in these areas and holds
regular roundtables and conferences. EDAM also
cooperates with its partner institutions in EU Member
States on joint research and publication activities.
THE TURKISH MODEL FOR TRANSITION TO NUCLEAR ENERGY - II
ISBN : 978-9944-0133-5-2
Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies
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