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Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP The Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been in power in Turkey since 2002. This is the first book-length analysis to chart the rise and development of the party from its Islamist origins through to government, analyzing in particular its internal organization and dynamics. Since its foundation in 2001, the AKP seems to have been more successful than any other party with an Islamic background in the history of the Turkish Republic. Drawing on interviews and analyses of quantitative data from primary and secondary sources, the author examines the party’s character as an organization, its internal power structure, electoral roots, strategy, and leadership in the context of its organizational environment – including its constitution and major veto players, as well as its international actors. Going beyond a mere analysis of Turkish politics and parties, this book applies classical theories and models of political parties to the Turkish case. Focusing on the notion of “institutionalization” and its two main dimensions – autonomy and “systemness” – it makes an original contribution to the empirical study of the AKP, contemporary Turkish politics, and the general discussion on theories of party organization. Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı teaches politics at the University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. His main research focuses primarily on the theories of government, party organizations and party systems; and domestic politics of Turkey with an emphasis on protest element in voting behavior and role of Islamic ideologies. Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics Algeria in Transition Reforms and development prospects Ahmed Aghrout with Redha M. Bougherira Palestinian Refugee Repatriation Global perspectives Edited by Michael Dumper The International Politics of the Persian Gulf A cultural genealogy Arshin Adib-Moghaddam Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada Political opportunities, framing processes and contentious politics Eitan Y. Alimi Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP Dilemmas of institutionalization and leadership strategy Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı Turkish Politics and the Rise of the AKP Dilemmas of institutionalization and leadership strategy Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı First published 2009 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2009 Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Kumbaracıbaşı, Arda Can. Turkish politics and the rise of the AKP : dilemmas of institutionalization and leadership strategy / Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı. p. cm. — (Routledge studies in Middle Eastern politics ; 5) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. AK Parti (Turkey)—History. 2. Turkey—Politics and government— 1980– I. Title. JQ1809.A8A45 2009 324.2561′04—dc22 2008052122 ISBN 0-203-87629-6 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 10: 0–415–49160–6 (hbk) ISBN 10: 0–203–87629–6 (ebk) ISBN 13: 978–0–415–49160–0 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978–0–203–87629–9 (ebk) To my mom and dad anneme ve babama Contents List of illustrations Acknowledgments List of abbreviations ix xi xiii 1 Introduction 1 2 Towards a theoretical framework 6 3 Review of the literature 32 4 The laws on political parties (SPK) and elections 38 5 Veto players 55 6 Electoral environment 78 7 Party organization and “systemness” 124 8 Party ideology 155 9 Conclusions 189 Appendix Notes Bibliography Index 194 195 208 229 Illustrations Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 6.1 6.2 Model of party institutionalization Institutionalization of political parties Extensions of the curvilinear disparity law Mass-bureaucratic and electoral-professional parties Turkish election laws and type of government Percentage of votes won by each party in parliamentary elections (1950–2002) 6.3 Changes in the political spectrum (between 1983 and 2002 elections) 6.4 Vote percentage and representation of Islamist parties 6.5 Comparison of the vote percentage for parties in the 1999 and 2002 election results 6.6 Local assembly and administration election results (2004) 6.7 Distribution of assembly memberships (among the first eight parties) 6.8 Vote share of parties in local assembly elections (1999–2004) 6.9 Comparison of the 2002 general and the 2004 local assembly elections 6.10 OLS regression of the AKP result of 2002 on selected district-level variables 6.11 Multinomial-logit estimation results of the vote intention function 6.12 Party identification and identity among Turkish voters (2006) 7.1 The AKP organization 7.2 AKP income at party HQ (2004 and 2006, YTL) 7.3 AKP expenditure at party HQ (2004 and 2006, YTL) 7.4 Distribution of seats in the TGNA (2002 and 2004) 7.5 Distribution of seats in the TGNA (2005 and 2006) 12 17 24 26 84 88 90 92 97 102 102 103 104 114 117 119 127 135 135 152 152 x Tables and figures Figures 2.1 2.2 2.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7 7.1 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 A descriptive model of party organization Models of party institutionalization The curvilinear disparity model Fragmentation and volatility in Turkish general elections (1950–2002) First-ranked parties – provincial (2002) Provinces below and above average income Percentage of the vote in relation to income First-ranked parties – provincial (2004 assembly elections) Scattergrams and regression lines (protest) Scattergrams and regression lines (ideology) AKP organizational domains/regions Distribution of voters in the ideological spectrum Economic and religious dimensions Economic and EU dimensions Economic and national dimensions Economic and socio-cultural dimensions Economic and deregulation dimensions Economic and decentralization dimensions Spatial map of German parties on social liberal policy dimension Privatization implementation by years 15 18 21 87 99 100 101 105 110 113 132 156 169 170 171 172 173 173 178 179 Acknowledgments Looking back at the development of this study over the last four years, I would say that the outcome is invaluable. It has been a great journey, with highs and lows, in a constant pursuit of knowledge. I am left fascinated by the extent of the power of thought, the delicate process of its maturing and the final stage of enlightenment. I was taught that there is always an answer to every troubling question, and the secret has been research, endeavor, and devotion. Nevertheless, there are also a number of people who contributed to making this book a reality (which evolved from a thesis completed in November 2007), and whom I would like to thank. First of all, I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Thomas Saalfeld, for warmly accepting me for my postgraduate studies, for his valuable guidance and sharing of expertise over these past years, and for offering continuous support and encouragement. Not to forget his friendly advice in moments of trouble. For all I am very grateful. His teachings will always accompany me in life. Further, I would like to thank current and past members of the Department of Politics at the University of Kent, including Professor Richard Sakwa, Professor Hugh Miall, Dr Iain MacKenzie, Dr Ben Seyd, Ali Erbilgiç, Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, Jenny Eschweiler, Rosalind Holbrook, Elpida Katsavara, Claire Tanner, Jean Hudson, Nicola Huxtable, and Alison Chapman for their friendly conversations and support. Moreover, I would especially like to thank Dr Stefan Rossbach, Dr Ersun Kurtuluş and, from the University of Manchester, Dr Tim Jacoby, without whose guidance this study would never have been completed. I would also like to mention Chris Taylor, who has always been an inspiration for me to pursue politics. Deepest thanks to Süleyman Demirel (9th President of Turkey, 1993–2000), Mehmet Dülger and Cemal Yılmazdemir for accepting my interviews and providing valuable information; and Professor Erdoǧan Soral, Professor Gencay Şaylan, Erol Tuncer and Yas.ar Yakıs. for their helpful conversations on the subject. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr Elina Kaplani deeply, for her understanding and neverending encouragement, and for adding colour to my everyday life. · I also owe thanks to people who never witheld their support from me: Iffet Akyüz, Semra Akyüz, Mualla Kumbaracıbaşı, Professor Can Kumbaracıbaşı, Şükran xii Acknowledgements · Kumbaracıbaşı, Ibrahim Onur Kumbaracıbaşı, Ötüken Hürmüzlü, Kürşad · Hürmüzlü, Murat Kayaalp, Vasileios Chatzigeorgiou, Inanç Arıbal, Cem Güneş Sel, Meral Dülger, Fatma Hasçalık, Emek Can Ecevit, Levent and Eser Bayraktar, Bartu Soral, Ali Erbilgiç, and a special thanks to Maja Elin Kristina Fjällström for being there for me. Last, but certainly not least, I would like to express my dearest thanks and gratitude to my parents, Professor Onur Kumbaracıbaşı and Fatoş Kumbaracıbaşı, to whom I owe what I have achieved, for all they have offered me during this ongoing quest for knowledge, for supporting me in every possible way, believing in me, teaching me, and introducing me to the world of insight. I would further like to thank them for helpful suggestions they have provided through valuable conversations and for sharing their knowledge. I will always be grateful – kalpten ve derinden size minnettarım. Arda Can Kumbaracıbaşı Canterbury, February 2008 Abbreviations AKP ANAP AP ATP BBP BP BTP CAC CDU CEC CGP CHP CKMP CMP CNU CPA DBP DEHAP DEP · DISK DkP DMC DP DSP DTP DYP ECHR ECtHR EMEP EU FP GDP GNP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Anavatan Partisi Adalet Partisi Aydınlık Türkiye Partisi Büyük Birlik Partisi Birlik Partisi Baǧımsız Türkye Partisi Central Administrative Committee Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Central Executive Committee Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi Cumhuriyetçi Millet Partisi Committee of National Unity Certified Public Accountant Demokrasi ve Barış Partisi Demokratik Halk Partisi Demokratik Parti · Devrimci Işçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Demokratik Kitle Partisi Deputy Monitoring Committees Demokrat Parti Demokratik Sol Parti Demokrat Türkiye Partisi Doǧru Yol Partisi European Convention on Human Rights European Court of Human Rights Emeǧin Partisi European Union Fazilet Partisi Gross Domestic Product Gross National Product xiv Abbreviations GP HADEP HaP HP HQ HYP ICO IDP IMF · IP LDP MÇP MDP MHP MiP MNP MP MSP MTTB · MÜSIAD NATO NCO NGO NSC ÖDP ÖSS ÖTP OYAK RP RTÜK SDP SHP · SIP SODEP SP SPK SPO SPSS TBP TESEV TGNA · TIP · TISK TKP TL Genç Parti Halkın Demokrasi Partisi Halkçı Parti Halk Partisi Headquarters Halkın Yükselişi Partisi Islamic Conference Organization Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi International Monetary Fund · Işçi Partisi Liberal Demokrat Parti Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Millet Partisi Milli Nizam Partisi Member of Parliament Milli Selamet Partisi Milli Türk Talebe Birliǧi · Müstakil Sanayici ve Işadamları Derneǧi North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Commissioned Officer Non-Governmental Organization National Security Council Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi Öǧrenci Seçme Sınavı Özgür Toplum Partisi Ordu Yardımlaşma Kurumu Refah Partisi Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu Sosyalist Demokrasi Partisi Sosyal-Demokrat Halkçı Parti · Sosyalist Iktidar Partisi Sosyal Demokrat Parti Saadet Partisi Siyasi Partiler Kanunu State Planning Organization Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Türkiye Birlik Partisi Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı Turkish Grand National Assembly · Türkiye Işçi Partisi · Türkiye Işveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Türkiye Komünist Partisi Türk Lirası Abbreviations xv TOBB TRT · TÜBITAK · · TÜIK/DIE · TÜSIAD UK UN US USSR YAŞ YDP YÖK YSK YTL YTP Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliǧi Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu Türkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Araştırma Kurumu · · Türkiye Istatistik Kurumu/Devlet Istatistik Kurumu · Türkiye Sanayici ve Işadamları Derneǧi United Kingdom United Nations United States Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Yüksek Askeri Şura Yeniden Doǧuş Partisi Yüksek Öǧretim Kurulu Yüksek Seçim Kurulu Yeni Türk Lirası Yeni Türkiye Partisi 1 Introduction In representative democracies, political parties are simultaneously guarantors of stability and agents of change. On the one hand, they aggregate political demands (Almond and Powell 1966), structure electoral choice for the voters, and provide necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for stability in parliamentary decisionmaking (Aldrich 1995, Cox 1987, Müller 2000). At a more empirical level, the predominant patterns of party conflict in most advanced industrial and postindustrial societies have remained remarkably stable over the past century. The adaptability of political parties has contributed to this stabilization of political choice (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Dalton 2006, Dalton and Wattenberg 2000a, Mair 1997). On the other hand, however, parties are organizations that do respond to economic, social, and political change in their environment. Some adapt to changing circumstances; others fail to do so and disappear; new parties emerge and sometimes rise to government status. In that sense, parties reflect change and are agents of political change at the same time (McDonald, Budge and Pennings 2004). The emergence and organizational stabilization of new political parties – and particularly their rise to governmental office – has typically had serious repercussions for their leaders, members, and traditional electoral clienteles. Such changes usually require internal adjustments, which may be painful for the relevant party as an organization. The history of social democratic and socialist parties – developing from social movements to political parties in opposition (opposing the government and in some cases the political and economic system, too) and, later, to government parties (usually within the existing political system) – demonstrates the scope for internal conflicts that may result from such changes and adaptations (Sassoon 1996, Strøm and Müller 1999c, Strøm 2000, Müller 2000, May 1973, Kitschelt 1989b, Gunther, Montero and Linz 2002). The recent rise of the Turkish Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party – AKP) as a center-right party with a religious ideological background is an example of such a transformation in a different context. The socioeconomic transition that Turkey has undergone since the 1980s has altered the conditions for party competition and shifted ideological formations (Sayarı and Esmer 2002). The 2002 elections brought a new phase to the party-political structure of the country. The young AKP – it was formed only in 20011 – won a landslide victory, the parliamentary consequences of which were exaggerated by an electoral 2 Introduction system that enabled its leaders to form the first single-party government since 1987, controlling nearly two-thirds of the seats in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi – TGNA). The party was able to consolidate its position of power in the local elections of 2004, although these elections had the character of a “mid-term” test in which voters often express their dissatisfaction with a government party. The 2007 election, as most pre-electoral surveys had predicted (Keneş 2007), led to a strengthening of the party’s electoral base. The result of the election, which was held after this study was completed, confirms the finding of the research presented here, which focuses on the period between 2000 and the end of the AKP’s first term in government, in July 2007. The AKP’s success (and the dynamic changes in Turkey’s party system it reflects) is in itself reason enough to carry out a careful analysis of this party’s organization, members, and voters as well as its leadership’s strategy. To my knowledge (at the time of writing – February 2008), this study offers the first book-length analysis of the organization and institutionalization of this party in the English language. The AKP is a fascinating object of study: its rapid rise from a new party (at least nationally) to the dominant party in the Turkish parliament (receiving 34 percent of the national vote and 66 percent of the seats under a 10 percent national threshold for parliamentary representation in the electoral system) has been spectacular, and can be understood only against the backdrop of a deep crisis among the established Turkish parties. The party’s attempt to portray itself as a “modern,” moderate, center-right party with Islamic roots (AKP Election Manifesto and Party Program) supporting liberal-democratic constitutional values has generated considerable interest. The party is often identified as a potential model for other Islamic movements and parties, and it provides an interesting “test case” for the compatibility of moderate Islam and liberal democracy. Beyond this intrinsic interest, a study of the AKP could contribute to the wider theoretical debate on the ability of political parties to adapt to changing environments; on the institutionalization of political parties; and on the challenges faced by “new” government parties. While a number of theoretical frameworks have been developed to map – and occasionally explain – such changes (see, among others, Mair 1997, Panebianco 1988, Deschouwer 2005, Strøm and Müller 1999c, Strøm 2000, Kitschelt 1994, Müller 2000, Gunther, Montero and Linz 2002), these models were usually developed in (and often for) the study of parties in Europe and North America. On the most general theoretical level, therefore, this study provides some tests for the “applicability and generalizability” of such theories beyond the spatial, historical, cultural, and political contexts of traditional “Western democracies.”2 Empirically, the AKP’s rise is of general interest to comparativists and party theorists who examine party-system change: the AKP has had to cope with rapid electoral and membership growth as well as its sudden rise to the status of government party with an overwhelming parliamentary majority. In some respects it faces problems like those faced by socialist parties of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and, to a lesser extent, green parties during the 1980s and 1990s, or other protest parties that benefited from a sudden surge in voter support (although Introduction 3 the AKP’s success has been exceptional in comparison). Many of these parties failed to adjust to their new role, and were unable to consolidate their electoral support or institutionalize their organization. Their leaders failed to manage the transition from a “policy-seeking” non-governmental party or social movement to being a party in public office that has to balance its original (and often radical) policy goals with the demands and strains of govenment (Panebianco 1988, Strøm and Müller 1999c, Strøm 2000, Müller 2000, Mair 1997). The AKP provides opportunities to study the way party leaders seek to manage this transition. This study is based on the notion of “institutionalization,” as introduced by Angelo Panebianco (1988) in his seminal work on party organization. This concept is of obvious relevance to a new political party seeking to establish itself in its political environment. According to Panebianco, the degree of institutionalization a party attains should be measured in two dimensions: the organization’s degree of “autonomy” vis-à-vis its environment; and its degree of “systemness” – that is, “the degree of interdependence of its different internal sectors” (Panebianco 1988: 55). These concepts will be explained in Chapter 2, where it will be argued that these two dimensions provide crucial insights into the development of political parties. However, Panebianco has been relatively unspecific about the relationship between autonomy and systemness as the two main dimensions of a party’s organizational institutionalization. One of the main and original arguments of this study is that the AKP faces complicated trade-offs between these two dimensions, which present a serious strategic dilemma for the party’s leadership: if the leadership increases systemness, it runs the risk of losing autonomy and vice versa. If it enhances its internal levels of membership involvement and responsiveness to grassroots demands (an important aspect of systemness), for example, it may risk losing autonomy by alienating median and non-religiously oriented voters as well as important veto players in the political system. Therefore, as will be argued later, the leadership has attempted to optimize the level of institutionalization rather than seek to maximize institutionalization in both dimensions. The detailed exploration of this trade-off (using the AKP as a case study) extends Panebianco’s theoretical framework and offers an original contribution to the theoretical literature on party organization. Given the rapid party-system change Turkey has experienced since the 1950s (Chapter 6), the AKP’s survival chances as a major political force in Turkish politics will depend, among other factors, on its ability to maintain its core voter base in the Islamic sections of Turkish society and to convert the less committed protest voters it attracted in 2002 to more loyal supporters with a degree of attachment to the party. This requires a balancing act, which can be analyzed in terms of Panebianco’s dimensions of autonomy and systemness (see Chapter 6). A similar point could be made for the party’s ability to maintain and enhance its systemness as an organization. As will be shown in Chapter 7, Turkish political party organizations have been characterized by populist and centralized leadership resulting in frequent breakaways from these parties and the establishment of new ones. If the AKP is to avoid the fate of its predecessors, it needs to balance its internal systemness and responsiveness to activists with its attempt to gain autonomy in 4 Introduction the political system. While this is true for any party, it is more problematic for Islamist and radical parties with religiously or ideologically highly committed supporters. Balancing the AKP’s roots in Islamic parties and movements against its claims to be a moderate party far from radicalism and fundamentalism is a permanent organizational challenge, forcing the leadership constantly to seek and maintain a precarious equilibrium. The study will investigate this balancing act in the following steps. Chapter 2 will be devoted to the development of a theoretical and analytical framework that will contribute to the understanding of the strategic dilemmas faced by the AKP faces, the trade-offs involved in the process of its institutionalization, and the options available to its leaders for managing these dilemmas. It will be argued that Panebianco’s notion of institutionalization provides an appropriate theoretical tool to analyze some of the dilemmas the AKP faces as a party. Also, the use of “heresthetic” is important in understanding how parties and leaders seek to mitigate the potential damage arising from these trade-offs. Following Riker (1984) and McLean (2001), the notion of heresthetic refers to strategic political leaders’ attempts to overcome disadvantageous situations by manipulating the political agenda and moving the political conflict to policy areas in which they can win without necessarily changing people’s underlying preferences. The final part of the chapter will briefly lay out the methodology and the primary sources used in the study. Chapter 3 will review the literature on the AKP, identifying lacunae in our understanding of the party and some shortcomings in previous theoretical accounts of party and party-system change in relation to the study of Turkish party politics. Having set out the background to the study, key elements of the organizational context constraining the AKP will be illuminated in two descriptive chapters, which are necessary to contextualize the party’s development. The first of these, Chapter 4, describes the constitutional and legal environment affecting the party’s institutionalization and room for maneuver in government, stressing the general constitutional constraints within which the party operates. In particular, it will deal with the impact of the “Law on Political Parties” (Siyasi Partiler Kanunu – SPK) in shaping intra-party politics, communication, and organization; and the role of certain courts in constraining Turkish party politics. It also shows the problematic aspects of the SPK and electoral laws. Chapter 5 looks at the major political actors who possess (and exert) political power and influence in the Turkish political system: the President, the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the TGNA, political parties, local administrations, interest groups, universities, the NSC (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu – National Security Council) and the armed forces, labor unions, corporations, and mass media. These background chapters will be followed by the main empirical part of the study. Chapter 6 starts by analyzing the development of the party’s electoral environment since the 1950s. The first part of this chapter provides background information on important aspects of the electoral history and geography, focusing on party identification and voting behavior, the AKP’s and its predecessors’ electoral strength in its regional variations, and the impact of different electoral Introduction 5 systems adopted in the history of the Turkish Republic. This will help to illustrate a number of secondary theoretical notions, aiding understanding of the AKP’s institutionalization in its electoral environment. These theoretical notions refer to the center–periphery cleavage in Turkish party politics, the importance of protest voting, and certain cyclical dynamics in Turkey’s electoral history. These theoretical notions will then be used to analyze continuity and change in electoral alignments and Turkey’s relatively high levels of electoral volatility; the geography of voting patterns in Turkey, and its implications for the AKP’s electoral and campaign strategy. By using these theoretical notions, it is possible to shed light on the AKP’s strengths and historical roots in electoral terms. It will be demonstrated that the AKP connected to the traditional support base for Islamic parties, but also managed to extend its electoral appeal beyond traditional Islamic core voters. After locating the AKP’s electoral success in 2002 in the longer-term developments of Turkey’s electoral “landscape,” Chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of the 2002 national and 2004 local elections, using aggregate as well as individual-level data. In Chapter 7, the AKP’s organizational evolution and adaptation are analyzed in some depth. Different levels of party organization are analyzed with an emphasis on party finance, heterogeneity (differentiating groups and factions within the organizational structure), and relations with collateral organizations. But most importantly, this chapter focuses on the organizational adaptations the party made in the face of the dilemma sketched above, including its centralization and the problems of intra-party democracy curtailing the scope for democratic forms of systemness. This problem is not peculiar to the AKP. General surveys conducted among some major Turkish parties on intra-party democracy will be used to demonstrate the extent of dissatisfaction with such problems within the internal structure of parties. Chapter 8 focuses on party ideology. Using programmatic texts and election manifestos, it will demonstrate how the party leadership used heresthetic in Riker’s (1984) sense to occupy a significant niche in Turkey’s electoral “market” and manage some of the dilemmas of institutionalization: that is, balancing autonomy and systemness. The data used allow the party’s location to be established in relation to other parties in the Turkish political system with a relatively high degree of precision. Furthermore, an exploration will be made into whether the AKP has adopted an ideological strategy similar to those of the Christian democratic parties of Europe, combining moderate center-right policies in the realm of economic and international policy with conservative positions on social values, religion, and law and order. In the concluding chapter (Chapter 9), the main findings of the study will be summarized and discussed in light of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. 2 Towards a theoretical framework Background In this chapter a theoretical framework will be developed based on theories of party organization and political leadership.1 At the heart of this framework will be Panebianco’s (1988) notion of party “institutionalization.” Nevertheless, the framework developed here is not merely an application of Panebianco’s theory. Rather, it points to a problem that has not been fully addressed by Panebianco and those applying his theoretical work: the main dimensions of party institutionalization, “autonomy” and “systemness,” as he calls them, may not always be related to each other in a positive correlation; they may, in fact, require political leaders to trade off one dimension against the other and lead to difficult strategic choices (see below). In theoretical terms, this dilemma is the main focus of this study. Moreover, Panebianco’s relatively general framework will have to be extended in order to understand the precise interactions within the party and in the Turkish party system. In addition, individual chapters will often refer to further theoretical work that may be better suited to conceptualize or explain the detail of developments below the level of the “bigger picture” of the dilemma of institutionalization. The development of studies on political parties as organizations has followed a complicated pattern, starting with the influential work of Moisei Ostrogorski (1964 [1902]) and Robert Michels (1962 [1911]). Ostrogorski diagnosed a crisis of democracy caused by the excessive power of party organizations and leaderships, which he believed robbed formal democracy of the liberty it needs to flourish. The results of his comprehensive and critical analysis of the unequal power within political parties was reinforced by Robert Michels, whose classical study of party organizations was empirically based on a sociological analysis of the structure of the German Social Democratic Party. The theoretical insights and empirical generalizations of this study provide the foundation for numerous studies of political parties to the present day. Michels’ contribution was acknowledged by Maurice Duverger (1954) when he attempted to examine the state of theory on political parties four decades later and found that no other general theory beyond Michels had emerged during those forty years (Shapiro 1989). Duverger successfully sketched a general theory of party organizations, analyzing the development from nineteenth-century “cadre parties” to the “mass parties” that have dominated since Towards a theoretical framework 7 the early twentieth century. This framework was extended in the 1950s and 1960s by Otto Kirchheimer (e.g., 1966), who believed that some mass parties had transformed themselves organizationally into what he called “catch-all parties.” The most recent literature on party organizations also builds on Duverger’s typology (see, for example, Katz and Mair 1995, which extends Duverger’s analysis to include the ideal type of “cartel party”). Following the development of scholarship on party organizations from Ostrogorski and Michels to Kirchheimer, research began to focus on voting behavior and party systems in the mid-1970s. Giovanni Sartori (1976), for example, published a classic volume on parties and party systems which brought a fresh reappraisal of existing theories. Yet, significantly, Sartori’s work was more innovative with regard to the dynamics of inter-party competition in different party systems than in relation to party organization. This is illustrated by the fact that a second volume on party structure, which Sartori had planned to publish, never materialized. Angelo Panebianco’s Political Parties: Organization and Power (1988) provided a fresh look at the development of party organizations and became one of the most influential texts in this field. In contrast to Sartori, Panebianco analyzes political parties as organizations rather than as constituent units of party systems. Summarizing research on party organizations since Duverger in a review of Panebianco’s work, Yonathan Shapiro (1989: 316) observes that sociologists and political scientists had moved away from the study of parties as organizations and concentrated instead on the relations between parties and the electorate. He argues that Panebianco’s achievement is to have reconnected research on political parties to the classics by Michels and Duverger; to have enriched this literature by linking it to research in the sociology of organizations (e.g., studies on the interaction of organizations and their environment); and to have introduced a wealth of new concepts and hypotheses, such as the notion of party “institutionalization” (see below). Although some of these notions had not been fully developed in Panebianco’s work and remained vague, they were likely, Shapiro argues, to stimulate future, theory-driven research on party organizations. Apart from Katz and Mair’s (1995) extension of Duverger’s framework to include the notion of “cartel party,” Panebianco’s study may be considered the most influential work on party organizations from a sociological perspective: that is, outside the rationalchoice framework. In fact, his model of the “electoral-professional” party may be seen as the first serious attempt to capture the evolution of party organizations theoretically since Kirchheimer’s catch-all party. In stressing the importance of organization, Panebianco revived the original concerns of the classical scholars – Ostrogorski, Michels, Weber, and Duverger. To change the direction of the study of parties, Panebianco took it upon himself to build a new model, an ideal type of party organization, drawing on the theoretical advances of the past thirty years in the sociology of complex organizations – bringing the work and theories of Michels and Duverger up to date (Shapiro 1989). In the tradition of Michels and Kirchheimer, the organizational approach expands into two branches that were neglected by many scholars until that time. It dealt first with the formative period of an organization’s history and how that affects 8 Towards a theoretical framework the party structure (Panebianco 1988: 55). The second important area that had been overlooked concerned the effects of changes in the larger society – social, economic, and political – on the organizational structure of parties (Shapiro 1989: 316), relating to their formation, development, institutionalization, and maturation (Panebianco 1988: 55–56).2 Furthermore, deriving from Michels’ classical study, Panebianco expanded on the importance of the role of party leaders. Michels claimed that an important source of the leaders’ strength stems from their many years of experience in the party organization. From a bureaucratic perspective, Panebianco claims power in bureaucracies is attained by those who control areas in the organization with the help of their expert knowledge and information which they do not share with others in the organization. This provides certain advantages to leaders in controlling differentiating factions and establishing a dominant coalition. The professionalism and expertise of leadership within complex bureaucratic structures also relates to entrepreneurial approaches and the model of electoral-professional parties, coined by Panebianco. According to Panebianco, in contrast to Michels, the group of leaders in control of the party is not an oligarchy, as Michels thought, but a dominant coalition of leaders who are able to control strategic zones within the party (Panebianco 1988; see also Shapiro 1989). Another important elaboration is about the degree of a party’s bureaucratization being attributed to the size of the party organization. Panebianco stresses that there are more complex factors rather than sheer size. These are, for example, environmental factors: the more complex the environment, the less stable or the more hostile it is, the more elaborate and complex the party bureaucracy will become (Panebianco 1988: 55–56; see also Shapiro 1989: 317). The environment in which a party functions creates a grand scheme in the study of party organizations and theories, which is addressed in this study as well. According to party analysts (Gladdish 1989, Shapiro 1989, La Palombara 1990), it is Panebianco’s concept of the evolution of the mass-bureaucratic party into what he calls electoral-professional parties that is the most thought-provoking and, perhaps, controversial issue. Strong modifications in the environment – such as changes in the system of social stratification and revolutions in communications systems – are said to represent powerful forces that act upon all political actors, and parties relate to the concept of “autonomy.” Their responses are conditioned by their internal organizational characteristics and by the degree of fragmentation that the party system itself manifests, which represents the concept of “systemness.” One way or another, sooner or later, parties change. In this sense, Panebianco is fully in agreement with Kirchheimer’s formulation of a generation earlier. As the electoral-professional party emerges, the party itself is marginalized, and greater space is accorded interest groups, state bureaucrats, the mass media, promoters of single-issue politics, and other such segments of the population (Shapiro 1989: 317). A key idea in his model, institutionalization, is defined as “the way an organization solidifies.” In a party with strong institutionalization, the leadership enjoys greater autonomy, while in a party with weak institutionalization, its dominant coalition will not be “very cohesive.” In his review of Panebianco’s study, Towards a theoretical framework 9 Shapiro (1989) argues that the concept of institutionalization remains too vague and imprecise, and it undoubtedly requires further elaboration. This study aims to accomplish that. It seems that Panebianco has left little space in his study to address the crucial problem of modern parties: a point raised by Otto Kirchheimer, who, in the mid-1960s, claimed that mass-bureaucratic party organizations were declining, with parties instead becoming electoral agencies. To sum up, it should be stressed that Panebianco’s book is generally considered to be a standard work on party organization in political sociology, extending the work of such early classics as Michels and Ostrogorski. It treats political parties as organizations and offers insights into the interaction between the internal “life” of parties and their organizational environment (constitution, veto players, voters). It focuses on the topic of institutionalization, which is crucial to understanding the problems of the AKP resulting from its rapid rise from a political outsider and breakaway faction of the FP (Fazilet Partisi – Virtue Party) to a government party with a large overall majority in the Turkish parliament. This focus is also present in research on so-called “new parties,” but Panebianco’s work offers the most systematic treatment. It also breaks down institutionalization into two fundamental dimensions, “autonomy” and “systemness.” However, Panebianco fails to problematize the tension between these two dimensions, which is a serious problem with respect to the AKP. This study is therefore also a critique of Panebianco’s influential theory, which is quite unspecific in some areas. That is why I have used further theoretical texts, especially the works of May and Kitschelt (curvilinear disparity law), that focus on the relationship between party leaders, activists, and voters. It occurred to me that Panebianco’s theory could also be extended by incorporating results from a number of other theories (electoral-agency model; the policy–office–votes dilemma of Katz and Mair; Riker and McLean’s theory of heresthetic; Hirschman’s exit–voice–loyalty framework), with which it is largely compatible. Due to its flexibility and the space it left to build upon, Panebianco’s theory was therefore a “natural choice” for a framework. The theory is highly compatible with other possible theoretical approaches, some of which are briefly mentioned in this study: for example, the conflict between center and periphery in Turkish political history (Mardin 1973). Compared to these theories focusing on the particularities of the Turkish case, Panebianco offers better “connectivity” to the research on political parties in other political systems. Another theoretical approach could have related to the studies on social movements and its theory. Much of the material dealt with in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 could be covered by such approaches as the “political opportunity structure approach” (electoral strategies of the AKP), the “resource mobilization approach” (intra-party structures), and the “framing approach” (ideology and leadership). However, classical social movement theories do not capture the governmental aspect of the AKP well. Considering the AKP is a government party pursuing moderate electoral strategies, it seemed better to go forward with the natural choice.
