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1 Peer Review Mission on Freedom of Expression, Istanbul and
Peer Review Mission on Freedom of Expression, Istanbul and Ankara, 12-16 May 2014 EU-Turkey: Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights Findings and Recommendations by Wolfgang Benedek, independent expert Table of Contents Executive Summary 1. Purpose of the Mission 2. General Developments since 2011 3. Developments with Regard to Criminal and Security Legislation 3.1. Turkish Penal Code 3.2. Anti-Terror Law 3.3. Law on Crimes against Atatürk 3.4. Law on Demonstrations 3.5. The New Law Regulating the Intelligence Sector 4. Developments in the Area of Media Law 4.1. Press Law 4.2. Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services 4.3. Internet Law 4.4. Twitter and YouTube Cases 5. New Remedies of Relevance for Freedom of Expression 5.1. Individual Application to the Constitutional Court 5.2. The Ombudsman Office 5.3. The Human Rights Institution 6. Capacity-building Efforts on Freedom of Expression 7. Conclusions and Recommendations 7.1. Conclusions 7.2. Recommendations 1 Executive Summary There have been significant positive developments in the legislative framework since the last peer review in 2011 as well as visible efforts to address the necessary legal reforms by measures taken by the government, in particular the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of EU Affairs. This resulted in several reform packages and the creation of new human rights institutions as well as the elaboration of an Action Plan on Prevention of European Convention of Human Rights Violations. There have also been changes in the practice of the judiciary towards giving freedom of expression more attention in balancing with reasons for limitations. However, also some trends in the opposite direction were observed with regard to the amendments to the Internet Law (IL) in particular and there are some worrying developments in the practice regarding the role of the media in the Gezi Park protests and concerning the removal and transferal of large numbers of prosecutors and judges after investigation into corruption allegations in December 2013. Criticism was expressed by governmental officials of the judiciary, in particular of the Constitutional Court, which could be seen as an interference with the autonomy of the judiciary, in cases related to freedom of expression. Accordingly, the mission found that since the last peer review in 2011 there have been significant developments in the legislative framework towards larger freedom of expression, while important concerns remain to be addressed and new concerns have evolved. A. Improvements: The number of journalists in prison have decreased significantly, sentences were reduced and trials suspended The problems for journalists in certain laws have partly been addressed by three judicial reform packages, i.e. by introducing the benchmark of violence in the legislation The practice has evolved towards avoiding prison sentences in defamation cases The number of indictments under the Article 301, which need the authorization of the MoJ has dropped significantly Special Anti-Terrorism Courts have been abolished The Kurdish language can be more freely used and the issue of an Armenian genocide discussed without legal consequences A new constitutional complaint procedure has been introduced creating an important new remedy New human rights institutions like the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Institution have been set up and started to work An Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations has been elaborated under the leadership of the MoJ Opportunities for education and training activities on FoE have increased 2 B. Concerns remaining to be addressed: Journalists are suffering from insecure working conditions Only about 1 % of journalists make use of their right to association by joining Unions The number of defamation cases brought by politicians is still high, although courts seems to be aware of pertinent jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and to take it into account Oligopolistic media ownership structures are generally not conducive to the public interest/service function of the media, which focus more on entertainment Governmental control of the media has been increasing Many journalists consequently feel intimidated leading to self-censorship The polarization in society is also reflected in the media The law on demonstrations is used to restrict freedom of expression while freedom of expression and freedom of assembly need to be applied together. C. New Concerns: Amendments to the Internet Law increase control of the social media, which have partly taken the role not played by traditional media in public discourse Trials against use of social media in context of freedom of assembly and FoE Indiscriminate Twitter and YouTube bans do violate principles of case law of ECtHR (Yildirim) as confirmed by the Constitutional Court There is an increasing role for the social media and online news portals because of the failure to fulfil their public service function by the traditional media Data retention provisions in the information law are likely not to be in conformity with the European acquis, in particular after the EU Court decision of April 2014 declaring the EU Data Retention Directive invalid Enlargement of powers of secret services and their immunity in the amended Intelligence Law and high fines for journalists reporting on unclearly defined state secrets has a chilling effect in particular on investigative journalism High number of judges and prosecutors moved to other positions in courts and Academy of Justice within short period negatively affects professional performance and can have negative effects on FoE Elaboration of Data Protection Law and reforms of the Press Law regarding online news portals like other legal reforms seem to lack transparency and therefore raise fears among media Main Recommendations: 1. 2. In spite of significant improvements in law and practice towards freedom of expression, some concerns of the past still need to be addressed for which purpose the Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations can be usefully employed. However, the momentum needs to be accelerated again. New challenges need to be addressed like assessing FoE through social media in order not to negate advances by reforms in traditional problem areas. 3 3. 4. Structural problems need to be addressed like media ownership structures or poor working conditions of journalists contributing to a general climate of intimidation and lack of public interest reporting New opportunities of cooperation with the Ombudsman Office and the new human rights institution as well as with traditional partners like the Ministry of Justice, the Justice Academy, the Bar Association, media NGOs and academia should be used for capacity-building and development of expertise in European standards of FoE. Projects in this field need to be continued and enlarged. 1. Purpose of the Mission The main objectives were to review recent legislative reforms related to freedom of expression (FoE), relevant judicial practice as well as practice by other authorities, the ownership structure of the media and the working conditions of journalists in their impact on the media environment and on FoE. For this purpose, the independent experts had meetings with a wide variety of media actors, like journalists and media owners, academics and NGOs, judges and lawyers, human rights institutions and regulatory authorities as well as competent ministries. The Turkish Ministries of EU Affairs and of Justice deserve special thanks for coorganizing the programme and facilitating a constructive dialogue. The last EU Peer Review Visit on freedom of expression has been undertaken in January 2011 by Lord Macdonald of River Gloven QC, who identified a number of legislative and practical shortcomings. He reported the existence of serious obstacles to the full enjoyment of freedom of expression stemming in particular from certain provisions of the Turkish Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law and other laws related to the media and the Internet, but also the practice of prosecutors and judges in opening and pursuing cases related to freedom of expression. Subsequently, in April 2011, also the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg, visited Turkey with a focus on freedom of expression and media freedom and came to similar conclusions emphasizing in particular that not enough had been done to reduce the numerous judgments of the European Court of Human Rights finding Turkey in violation of freedom of expression. He was also concerned with an increasing number of criminal proceedings against and arrests of journalists.1 2. General Developments since 2011 Since 2011, there were three judicial reform packages. The 3rd package by “Law No. 6352 amending some Laws for Effectiveness of Judicial Service and Suspension of Cases and Sentences Regarding the Offences Committed via Press”, amended in particular the Turkish Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law and the Press Law. It also introduced a suspension of cases and convictions for offences committed before 31 December 2011 via the press, publication or other communication ways, so-called crimes committed by 1 See report by Thomas Hammarberg, Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe, following his visit to Turkey from 27 to 29 April 2011, CommDH (2011) 25 of 12 July 2011. 4 opinion and thought published in the media, for which there was a maximum fine of 5 years. Accordingly, all judicial activities on these cases were postponed. If the persons do not commit any offences within three years, the cases will be dropped, otherwise they will be continued. This procedure allowed the Cassation Court to suspend a significant number of cases, but the persons concerned could also have benefitted from reformed laws instead of being under the threat of continued persecution for three years, which has a chilling effect on the freedom of expression of those affected, which obviously was politically intended. The focus of the Fourth Judicial Reform Package, which was adopted in April 2013 was freedom of expression.2 The main purpose of the package was to reduce the number of violations found by the European Court of Human Rights in this field. It contained amendments to eight different laws. Furthermore, the 5th Judicial Reform Package, which came into force in March 20143 brought further changes to the Anti-Terror Law, in particular the abolishment of the Regional Heavy Criminal Courts established under Article 10 of the Anti-Terror Law and the reduction of the pre-trial detention for crimes falling under their former competence from 10 to 5 years. Therefore, the provision in Law No. 6352, which allowed the special courts under Article 250 of the Criminal Procedure Code to continue with already ongoing cases was changed by Law No. 6526 and all cases transferred to ordinary criminal courts. In addition, the Democratization package4 of 2014 needs to be highlighted as it lifts restrictions on the use of different languages and dialects in political campaigns and in education in private schools and also repeals criminal sanctions in the Turkish Penal code regarding the use of letters such as q, x and w. In this context, the Chief Public Prosecutor of Istanbul in a meeting confirmed that the Kurdish language was allowed and that it had become also possible to mention the words “Armenian genocide”. Furthermore, in 2012 two new institutions for the protection of human rights were established, i.e. the Office of the Ombudsman and the Turkish Human Rights Institution, which is supposed to develop into the National Human Rights Institution of Turkey. While the former seems to have had a better start than the latter, it is important that both do receive complaints and thus new remedies have been created, which the Turkish public in general and the media in particular still have to make proper use of.5 Finally, maybe the most positive development has been the decrease of the number of journalists in prison. While the peer review of 2011 reported an increasing number of around 40 and this number indeed increased to about 95 according to OSCE sources, at present it has dropped to less than 30 or according to the Committee for the Protection of Journalists to 16. The Turkish authorities claim that none of them is in prison because of his or her journalistic work. Actually they all seem to have been imprisoned on 2 3 4 5 See Law Amending Certain Laws within the scope of Fundamental Rights and Freedom of Expression of 11 April 2013. See Law No. 6526 Amending the Anti-Terror Law, the Criminal Procedure Code and Various Laws, which came into force on 6 March 2014. See Law No. 6529 on amending certain laws for the enhancement of Fundamental rights and freedoms. See also under 5. 5 charges under the anti-terror law. Immediately before the peer review mission several of them have been released. 3. Developments with Regard to Criminal and Security Legislation This legislation is only of indirect importance for freedom of expression. However, because it has been used rather extensively against journalists in the past, it has been a major area of criticism, which in the meantime has been partly addressed by the judicial reform packages, while major issues remain. 3.1. Turkish Penal Code A major point of criticism has been Article 125 TPC, which criminalizes defamation, is broadly drafted and has been used widely against journalists and broadcasters. In spite of international criticism, the article has not been revised, while the practice appears to have changed as prosecutors seem to open fewer cases against the media. This might also be due to the fact that the Court of Cassation has developed a stricter line on defamation cases by putting more emphasis on freedom of expression, which also covers heavy criticism, but does not call for violent action. However, the number of defamation cases is still very high: according to statistics provided by the Court of Cassation, the number of appealed cases in the Penal Departments of the Cassation Court in 2013 was 8961, while the number of appealed cases regarding “compensation for defamation” in the 4th Civil Chamber of the Court was about 1500. Accordingly, defamation has still not been decriminalized as suggested by the previous pear review mission, but the recommendation to take freedom of expression better into account in the balancing process seems to have been accepted. The judiciary is thus mitigating the ongoing practice of politicians and others to use the defamation rules against criticism. However, according to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights public figures must endure a higher amount of criticism, than ordinary citizens and this seems to be increasingly taken into account by the Turkish judiciary. A solution to the problem of the exaggerated use of defamation rules can best be provided by a reform of Art. 125 to take the case law of the European Court of Human Rights into account. With regard to the long-standing recommendation to decriminalize the offences related to freedom of expression, the reported fact that hardly any prison sentences are handed down anymore, which in itself is an important progress, should make it easier to delete this article from the penal law. Amendments were made to Articles 132-134 TPC protecting the right to privacy, with the result that journalistic activities are better protected against prosecution under these articles. With regard to Articles 214-216 and 220 TPC on the protection of public order, there have been also some amendments. For example, Article 215 TPC now requires a “clear and imminent danger to the public order” in line with the criteria of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in order to make “praising the offences and offenders” a criminal offence. However, Article 216 TPC on provoking public hatred and hostility has been used to prosecute public figures for critical remarks on religion like the pianist 6 and composer Fazil Say for insulting religion by a tweet. This Article would also need to be adjusted and the judicial practice to be changed. Also Article 220 para. 8 TPC was amended making the praise of the methods of an organization an offence only if those methods contain violence, force or threat. A new provision in paragraph 6 clarifies that the scope is only applicable to armed organizations. It can be expected that this will reduce the number of cases considerably. No change is reported in Article 226 TPC, which in the past allegedly was used to prevent the description or depiction of homosexuality as falling under the publication or broadcasting of obscene material. Whether this practice has changed, could not be established. Amendments have been made to Article 285 TPC as well as to Article 288 TPC, which prohibits attempts to influence prosecutors, judges, courts or witnesses. In both cases, the lack of at least a public interest provision had been criticized already in the previous peer review report. Now, reporting about investigations and the trial without exceeding the limits of news reporting shall not constitute a crime, but there seems to be a lack of clarity what that means in practice. No changes are also recorded for Article 301 TPC on insulting the Turkish nation, which according to the previous peer reviewer should have been repealed or at least amended to include a clear public interest defense. However, according to the Ministry of Justice, which based on a circular of 2008 needs to give its consent to any prosecutions, the number of authorizations is few,6 which reduces the problem in practice, but does not resolve it, because the practice can be changed any time. Furthermore, there are at least two judgments of the ECtHR regarding Article 301, the implementation of which is pending. Several Kurdish journalists were detained for membership of an armed organization on the basis of Article 314 TPC, which also remained unchanged. Some of these journalists seem to have been recently released, while others remained in detention. 3.2. Anti-Terror Law With regard to the anti-terror law, the reform packages did also bring several changes: Article 6 has been amended in a way that the printing or publishing of materials of terrorist organizations or praising their methods are now punished only if it relates to methods containing coercion, violence or threat or encourage appealing to these methods, which is still a very wide definition. Former paragraph 5 of Article 6 foreseeing a pro-active ban on publications for terrorist organisations has been repeated, which led to a fast reduction of banned publications. Also Article 7 on the prohibition of the funding, managing and membership of terrorist organizations and propaganda on their behalf, which has been used against journalists 6 According to the Information Note of the Ministry on EU Affairs on Freedom of Expression of May 2014, in 2012 out of 277 files submitted in 2012, permission was granted only in 18 cases. According to information received from the Ministry of Justice out of 373 cases in 2013 only about 10 % were allowed to go on, which actually would mean an increase of cases. 7 and broadcasters as observed by the peer report of 2011 has been amended in paragraph 2 so that making propaganda for a terrorist organization is only punishable if related to coercion, violence or threats thereof. Some other obvious problems of the law were also addressed like someone who is not a member of a terrorist organization, but committed crimes in their name under other laws shall no longer be prosecuted for being member of a terrorist organization (Article 7). Regarding Article 318 TPC, which makes discouraging people from military service an offence, the practice under the article seems to have softened, while the article has not been repealed or amended as suggest, but rather been made more clear and concrete, without solving the real problem that the provision as such interferes with the freedom of expression and possibly also the freedom of religion. 3.3. Law on Crimes against Atatürk Also the Atatürk law, which has been misused in the past to restrict political speech, has remained unchanged although the requirement of consent by the Minister of Justice has resulted in only few cases. The restrictive practice can, however, be changed anytime according to the political will. Therefore, the mere existence of such laws do have a chilling effect on political speech. 3.4. Law on Demonstrations According to Bianet reports received 17 persons were sentenced to a total of 31 years for shouting slogans against Prime Minister Erdogan, on the basis of the law on demonstrations (No. 2911) combined with other laws, for insulting the prime minister. Therefore, this application of the law also interferes with the freedom of expression. Freedom of expression and the right to assembly are closely related. Accordingly, the frequent limitations of these freedoms by the Turkish Police can constitute a violation of the freedom of expression. In conclusion, there have been several amendments as part of the third, fourth and fifth judicial package, which, however, did not cover all the problematic provisions and, in some cases, did not go far enough. Accordingly, there is a need for a continuation of the reform efforts. This is recognized also by the Action Plan on Prevention of European Convention on Human Rights Violations, prepared by the Directorate General for International Law and Foreign Relations, Human Rights Department, and adopted by the Turkish Government in March 2014,7 when it identifies the revision of Articles 125, 299 and 301 of the Turkish Penal Code for bringing it into conformity with the standards of ECHR-case law. Unfortunately, this is planned only as a long-term goal, while other reforms are to be reached in the medium term. The action plan also foresees impact assessments of the reformed Articles 215, 220, 277, 285, 288 and 318 to be undertaken in the short and medium term, which provides an opportunity to see whether the amendments are working in practice and to reform those provisions further. 7 See Directorate General for International Law and Foreign Relations, Human Rights Department, Action Plan on Prevention of European Convention on Human Rights Violations, published in official Gazette on 1 March 2014. 8 3.5. The New Law Regulating the Intelligence Sector While in the other fields of penal and security laws there have been some – limited – developments towards larger conformity with the European standards as contained in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the new Intelligence Agency (MIT) Law8 points in a different direction: The law provides wide powers to MIT to obtain all kind of information from public institutions and private organizations and to wiretap communications, which creates major interferences with the right to data protection and privacy. With regard to the freedom of expression its Article 8 foresees imprisonment of 4 to 10 years for any person, who takes possession, without authorization, of information and documentation concerning the activities of MIT. In case of publication via radio, television, internet, social media, newspapers … and all other media tools …, the media owner, content provider, correspondent, editor, publisher and printer face prison sentences of 3 to 12 years. No doubt that this law will have a strong chilling effect on the publication of news on activities of MIT, which would be in the public interest. However, no public interest exceptions exist to the draconic fines foreseen. 4. Developments in the Area of Media Law This area is regulated mainly by the press law of 2004, the new broadcasting law of 2011 and the internet law of 2007. The main focus will be on the amendments of the internet law of 2014 and the subsequent practice as those raise basic issues of conformity with European standards. 4.1. Press Law The peer review of 2011 of the Press Law No. 5187 recommended amendments to the press law including a strong public interest clause protecting journalists and publishers to report on and publish matters of legitimate public interest. The third judicial reform package did indeed bring amendments to Articles 19 and 26 of the Press Law with regard to compromising the judicial process and the time limit for a law suit by legal amendment of July 2012. Article 19, which had foreseen high fines for publishing material about proceedings of an inquiry or comments about the judge before the case is concluded has been abolished.9 However, the fourth and fifth judicial packages on freedom of expression did not touch on the press law at all. According to statistics provided by the Bureau for Investigation of Press Crimes in the offices of the Chief Public Prosecutor of Istanbul, there were 604 investigations until 9 May for 2014 of which 96 were concluded with an indictment. 23 cases concerned publications revealing the identities of victims of sexual offense or victims below the age of 18, while the other 73 concerned offences such as insult, 8 9 See amending the law on the state intelligent services and national intelligence organizations (Law No. 2937), adopted on 17 April 2014. See Law No. 6352 of 2 July 2012, Art. 105. 9 slander, attempts to influence a fair trial or violation of confidentiality regulated in the Turkish Penal Code. Although this shows that the majority of cases does not lead to indictments, the number of cases brought in four months for Istanbul alone shows that there is still a high number of investigations, which by themselves can already have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. The Committee to Protect Journalists, in April 2014, has addressed an open letter to the Prime Minister to ease the heavy pressure on traditional and online media. While recognizing the release of journalists, it deplored that violations against the Turkish Press have increased in recent months and that the media environment in Turkey became increasingly repressive.10 Accordingly, although there have been some positive developments, in particular in the practice, there appears still to be a need to reform the press law. 4.2. Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services (new Broadcast Law) The previous Law No. 3984 on broadcasting foresaw the possibility of sanctions on broadcasters for a wide range of violations. There have been complaints on its implementation by RTÜK as limiting freedom of expression. The peer review of 2011 also in this case has proposed the inclusion of a strong public interest clause allowing to favor the broadcasting of matters of legitimate public interest also in cases of otherwise questionable material. In March 2011 the new law came into force as a successor to the former broadcasting law.11 In Article 8 it contains a long list of media service principles, which mainly consist of prohibitions, which include human dignity and the principle of privacy, but do not refer to the requirements of freedom of expression. There is also no public interest clause. With regard to the obligation not to act “contrary to the national and moral values of the society, general morality and the principle of family protection (Article 8f)”, statistics were provided according to which in 2013 18 warnings and 14 pecuniary fines were given by the competent board of RTÜK. However, altogether the number of sanctions for the period 1 January 2013 until 31 March 2014 was much higher, which would indicate a close monitoring of other principles and obligations. According to Article 7 of the Law 6112, the Prime Minister or respectively appointed Minister can impose a temporary ban if “evidently required by public security or in situations where it is highly likely that the public order will be seriously disrupted”. Such sweeping powers, although they can be brought to the Council of State for review, raise also issues of the freedom of expression as the existence of such provision may already have a self-censorship effect. It has been criticized that the mainstream media were slow in reporting about the Gezi Park Events, which resulted in a loss of confidence with the public. Accordingly, the Law 6112 should be reviewed with regard to the practice of sanctions and its emergency provision. 10 11 See Committee to Protect Journalists – Open Letter to Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey should revise all anti-press measures and laws, 9 April 2014. Law No. 6112 on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and their Media Services. 10 4.3. Internet Law The application of the law on the regulation of publishing in the internet environment and the combatting of offences, committed through such publication (the internet law) No. 5651 of 2007 has been characterized by the peer review in 2011 as internet censorship, which goes beyond what is necessary or proportionate in a democratic society leading to the conclusion that the law should be abolished or revised. Furthermore, it has been recommended to make higher courts responsible and include a strong public interest clause to better protect journalists, bloggers and other publishers. However, the amendments made to the internet law in February 2014, although modified on the request of the Turkish President go in the opposite direction by enlarging and strengthening the instruments of control. New paragraphs added to Articles 4 and 5 require content and hosting service providers to furnish the Telecoms Communication Presidency (TIB) with any information it may demand and take such measures as directed by TIB. The amendments by a new Article 6A foresee the establishment of a “union of access providers” with obligatory membership of all internet access and service providers. The service providers are further committed to retaining all traffic information concerning their services for at least one year (Article 5, para. 3). Due to an amendment requested by the President as a condition for his signature, requests for this information by the presidency now require to be demanded by courts with regard to criminal proceedings. Compared to the EU data retention obligation, which recently has been found in violation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU because of a lack of principles for limitations and of proportionality, the internet law does not contain any such elements either and therefore does not meet European standards as defined by the Court of the European Union. In partial response to the case Yildirim v. Turkey.12 Article 8, which foresees the possibility of blocking measures for violation of the eight public crimes identified, has been amended to provide that the decision on denial of access may also be issued for a specific time period but only if this serves the intended purpose. Also the sanction of prison sentences has been changed into monetary fines. Article 9 provides a procedure for persons and entities, who assert a violation of their personal rights by a publication on the internet. They can request from the provider to remove the content. The provider has to respond within 24 hours or apply to a criminal court judge, who should give a decision within 24 hours. Again, the amendments take Yildirim hardly into account when the removal of content or denial of access based on complaints for violation of personal rights according to Article 9 shall now be limited to the – part of – the content, which has occasioned the violation and that total denial of access shall not be decided by the judge except if it is convinced that a lesser interference would not be sufficient in which case the reasons need to be specified. A new Article 9A has been added on “confidentiality of private life” allowing persons, who claim that their right to privacy has been violated by any publication on the internet 12 See Ahmed Yildirim v. Turkey, Appl. No. 3111/10, Judgment of 18 December 2012. 11 to apply directly to TIB with a request for denial of access to the content. Access providers are informed by TIB through the “Union” and have to carry out the request within a maximum of four hours. In urgency cases, the President of TIB can give direct instructions through the presidency, which need to be sent for approval to a criminal court judge within 24 hours who has 48 hours to decide. The person demanding the blogging has to seek confirmation within 24 hours from a criminal court judge, who has 48 hours to take its decision and sent it to TIB, which has the right to make objections based on the criminal procedure code. This procedure does not spell out any rights of the persons or providers affected by the decision of denial of access, like the internet or content providers, the Union, or the owners of affected websites. It is left unclear, whether and by which procedure they have the right to challenge the decision of the judge. Article 6A, para. 8 provides only for a possibility of objection of the Union against decisions sent to it without spelling out any procedure. Therefore, not only does the internet law show a preference in the balancing of the right to privacy versus the freedom of expression in favor of the former, it also entrenches this preference in a procedure, which does not provide equal rights for both sides. This, however, raises an issue of the right to fair trial, first, because all decisions are taken within very short deadlines without rights of the defense like a fair hearing according to Article 6 ECHR. No special urgent procedure is foreseen to challenge these decisions and the appeal can be launched only in accordance with the general rules. Therefore, there is a need to bring the procedure in cases of Article 9 and Article 9A into conformity with European standards based on the ECHR. Furthermore, another important finding of the European Court of Human Rights in Yildirim, regarding the legality and foreseeability is not sufficiently met as many details of the internet law are left to further executive regulation. The Court also requests a strict legal framework, which would include a balancing obligation to determine the proportionality of restrictive measures and it saw the powers of TIB already as “extensive”. However, these powers have substantially been further increased although some judicial requirements have been added in the last round of amendments. Accordingly, there is a need to review the powers of TIB as well as the question of the requirement of a strict legal framework, whether they are in conformity with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 4.4. Twitter and YouTube Cases The blocking of Twitter by the Telecoms Communication Agency (TIB) on 21 March, right after the Prime Minister has threatened “to wipe out twitter, regardless of what the international community says” at an electoral rally in Bursa on 20 March, has been the most controversial decision regarding access to the internet in Turkey so far, because the total ban affected millions of people. The explanation given by TIB was that it was acting on several court decisions and it had been technically impossible due to the lack of cooperation from Twitter to block certain incriminated accounts. The measure was heavily criticized in Turkey, starting from the state president and abroad, for example by the OSCE Representative for the Freedom of the Media. A large number of tweets, however, circumvented the ban, which thus was hardly effective. 12 On 2 April, the Constitutional Court, based on three individual applications and by an urgency procedure, unanimously decided a closure of Twitter by TIB to be a violation of the constitutional rights of the applicants and order TIB to eliminate the violation. It also argued that blogging access to a social media sites restricts freedom of expression. Also the effect on democracy in view of the local elections on 30 March were noted. It further referred to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and made reference to the principle of proportionality. TIB complied with the decision, which, however, was criticized by the Minister of Justice for not following all procedures. Although the ban on Twitter was not based on the amendments to the information law, it shows the strong role of TIB and raises doubts as to its autonomy. Also the ban on access to YouTube of 27 March 2014 was based on a court decision, with regard to the law on crimes against Atatürk and Article 8 of the internet law, but implemented by an administrative decision of TIB, allegedly after YouTube refused to take down the incriminated URLs. A later court decision on a partial lifting of the ban seems not to have been followed by TIB, allegedly to keep YouTube under pressure to comply more fully. Again, it was the Constitutional Court, which on 29 May 2014, based on three individual applications, decided that there had been a violation of individual rights and of freedom of expression. Accordingly, the conformity with the right to freedom of expression was re-established in both cases by the Constitutional Court, who has thus demonstrated that it is taking this new mandate of deciding individual applications in line with the ECHR seriously. This should allow the authorities like the TIB, but also TCTA to bring their practice in conformity with the right to freedom of expression as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. They should be aware that much confidence has been lost by the blocking decisions and that the reputation of freedom of expression in Turkey has been damaged on the national and international level. Therefore, it would be necessary to rebuild the trust by reforming the internet law accordingly, bringing it in full conformity with the right to freedom of expression. The use of social media, like Twitter, by demonstrators, has led to a number of cases, known as “Twitter cases” before a court in Izmir, which give reason to concern. It seems that the law on demonstration is being used to restrict the freedom of expression. However, the freedom of assembly and the freedom of expression are closely related and therefore the freedom of expression needs to be taken into account together with the right to assembly. 5. New Remedies of Relevance for Freedom of Expression 5.1. Individual Application to the Constitutional Court The individual application to the Constitutional Court was adopted in 2010 and came into force on 23 September 2013. It has been introduced to serve the role of an effective domestic remedy and thus to reduce the number of violations found by the ECtHR. Anyone, who considers his or her rights under the ECHR and the Turkish constitution violated, can apply. In this context, it is of importance that according to Article 90 of the 13 Turkish constitution as amended in 2004, the provisions of international agreements concerning fundamental rights and freedoms like the ECHR shall prevail. In the Twitter and YouTube cases, the Constitutional Court has indeed found a violation of freedom of expression, which has been accepted, although with criticism, by the concerned governmental agency, the TIB, and the government. This shows that the decisions of the Constitutional Court in these cases have indeed served as an effective domestic remedy. However, somehow similar to the ECHR, the Constitutional Court could become a victim of its success. Since September 2013 it has already received 16,500 cases and although it has reorganized its structure and working methods it is only able to decide around 200 cases per year. This raises the issue whether in the case of delays the ECtHR might consider the individual application as ineffective, because justice delayed is also justice denied. 5.2. The Ombudsman Office The Ombudsman Office has been established in 2012 and started its activities in March 2013. It can receive complaints and reports to a joint committee consisting of members of the Committee of Petitions and the Committee of Human Rights of the Parliament. Until May 2014, it has already received some 10,000 complaints, which are distributed according to 20 topics identified between the five Ombudsman, which support the Chief Ombudsman. So far, there were only few complaints regarding issues of freedom of expression, which could be partly due to a lack of awareness, given the high number of complaints in other fields. In particular, no complaints had been received by journalists or the media. Partly, this could also be due to the limited means of the Office in addressing the complaints. One field of relevance was the rules on Access to Information, which are to improve access to personal information by the administration. Furthermore, the Ombudsman Office is publishing reports on major issues of concern like a comprehensive report on the Gezi Park events with recommendations which was due in the beginning of June 2014 and a May days report on the events in beginning of May 2013. 5.3. The Human Rights Institution The Human Rights Institution has also been established in 2012 and started operating in 2013. It seems to have had a slow start and to be less operative than the Office on the Ombudsman. It aims at being recognized as the Turkish national human rights institution in the future, according to the Paris principles of the UN. As it is still building up, an application has not yet been made. The Human Rights Institution can also receive applications or complaints and is in a process of awareness raising in this regard. So far the topic of freedom of expression did not play a role as applications are received mainly from prisoners. It also plans to issue a report on Gezi Park events. 14 The Human Rights Institution was involved in the Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR violations and thinks of proposing on “Action Plan on Human Rights”. It is also involved in human rights education and awareness raising. Prosecutors and judges have been identified together with public officials for training activities. The development of this institution remaining to be seen, there is an obvious need of coordination with the Ombudsman Office and to make the public more aware of the potential of the new institution, which could also be relevant for freedom of expression. 6. Capacity-Building Efforts on Freedom of Expression The strengthening of freedom of expression is not only a matter of bringing laws in conformity with the obligations under the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights. Of similar importance is to create awareness and to adjust the practice by application of the Convention in the daily procedures and routines. For this purpose, the EU and the Council of Europe as well as others have engaged in a number of training activities as well as study visits to Strasbourg and other places. On the Turkish side these activities have been mainly undertaken by the Ministry of Justice and the Justice Academy as well as the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors, but also the Bar Association, involving significant number of participants. For example, a project on freedom of expression and media in Turkey was implemented by the Council of Europe between 2012 and 2014, with a number of Round Tables and study visits, which involved 370 and 75 judges and prosecutors as well as academics respectively. It is to prepare also a commentary book to explain the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, but also the domestic law and case law of High Courts. Three other projects focusing on raising awareness about freedom of expression in the judiciary were implemented or are planned by the Justice Academy. Such activities are highly relevant for the development of awareness and proper application of the law in conformity with the right to freedom of expression. In several meetings, judges and prosecutors showed that they had benefited from this experience, which had increased their knowledge and was being taking into account in their practice. An evaluation of the impact of these projects is under way. Some concern is raised by the recent numerous transferals of judges and prosecutors to other positions. This also affected the Justice Academy, which also was restructured. It might well be that this had negative effects on the capacities built by the various projects before. In addition to training programmes there is still a need for well-designed teaching materials. However, there should also be affective coordination of all activities in order not to duplicate work like the translation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights and to better share the work undertaken. As there is a number of actors in the field of freedom of expression, activities should be undertaken for all of them including lawyers, journalists and civil society. It would also be useful to organize training events bringing the different actors together to help overcome the growing polarization. The Bar Association might be able to serve as a platform for such events. 15 Also, with the establishment of new institutions like the Ombudsman Office and the Human Rights institution, they should be involved in such training activities as well. 7. Conclusions and Recommendations Conclusions Since 2011, there have been important positive developments in the legislative framework related to freedom of expression as well as visible efforts by most governmental actors, in particular the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of European Affairs to address the open issues like by the elaboration of an Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations. More attentions to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights regarding freedom of expression can also be observed with the judiciary. New institutions have been established for the protection of human rights and new remedies created like the individual application to the Constitutional Court. Most importantly, the number of journalists in detention has dropped significantly and in defamation cases hardly prison sentence are given anymore. Cases based on Article 301 TPC or the Atatürk Law against journalists have been reduced. Trials were suspended and restrictions on publications lifted. The Kurdish language can be more freely used. Special Anti-Terrorism Courts were abolished. Opportunities for education and training activities on freedom of expression for judges and prosecutors were created and used. However, it appears that since the May 2013 demonstrations and the Gezi Park events as well as the corruption allegations against members of government the dynamics of reform has slowed down if not been reversed. But the positive changes observed will only be a lasting if the reform process is gaining new momentum again. A number of issues identified already in 2011 still wait to be addressed. The speedy implementation of the Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations has to be a first priority, but more reforms are needed than indicated there and on a faster pace, if freedom of expression is to be brought up to European standards. The judicial reform packages have brought important improvements, but they stopped short of attacking the main problems, which need more fundamental reforms. On the same lines the Representative for Freedom of the Media of OSCE in a speech at the Rule of Law Symposium in Istanbul on 9 May 2014 has called for a “long overdue, thorough reform of the laws that govern freedom of expression and media freedom”. She also emphasized the need to clear the law from ambiguous or vague definitions. Indeed, such vagueness reduces the trust into the law as it can always be used in restrictive ways against freedom of expression. For example, the European Court of Human Rights has found that Articles 301 TPC is excessively broad and vague, but no changes have been made so far.13 13 See Altug Taner Akcam v. Turkey, Appl. No. 27520/077, judgment of 25 October 2011, para. 93, where the Court speaks of Article 301 as “a continuing threat to the exercise of freedom of expression”, because of its vagueness. 16 The evolving practice of the Turkish judiciary as described during the peer review mission gives the impression that the practice in some respects is ahead of the laws, which proves that certain provisions and threats contained in the law are not needed anymore. The downgrading of the press freedom in Turkey by Freedom House from “partly free” to “not free”14 has been very critically commented by the Turkish interlocutors, who on the other side admitted that the media were slow in reporting on the Gezi Park protests in May 2013. Freedom House also explains that pressures to fire journalists or make them resign after reporting on sensitive issues like corruption allegations and the fact that the Turkish Prime Minister himself has intervened with the media where the reasons for such deterioration.15 These facts were not disputed in talks the peer review mission had at the Directorate General of the Prime Minister for the Press and Information, but it was explained that some journalists had resigned on their own will. This might be the case, but seems to have been motivated by the desire to maintain their professional integrity. There is no doubt that Turkey is a democracy. But as free speech is the oxygen of democracy, the quality of the democracy also depends on how freedom of expression is experienced by the citizens in general and the media in particular. In this respect, the Turkish legal environment together with the insecure working conditions of journalists, who are hardly organized in unions, and oligopolistic media ownership structures still gives the impression of a repressive system resulting in intimidation and self-censorship of the media, which is a challenge for the development of the democracy. Media increasingly appear to focus on entertainment and apolitical content instead of putting more emphasis on public interest programmes and news reporting. Investigative journalism is under threat. The general impression is that governmental control of the media is increasing. The situation is aggravated by a large polarization in society which affects also the media. In this situation, the so-called “new media” as in particular the social media have gained in importance and it is a matter of concern that the government is trying to increase its control also of this media. The amendments to the information law and the indiscriminate bans on Twitter and YouTube strengthen this impression as do criminal cases against Twitter users. Also the new data retention obligation goes in this direction. There are fears that the planned amendments to the Press Law to include online news platforms and internet journalism might also be used to strengthen control. There seems also to be a lack of transparency in the elaboration of the data protection law, which could interfere with freedom of expression. The rules on access to information should also be clarified and made better known. The enlargement of the powers of secret services and the strengthening of their immunity together with the high fines for journalists reporting about vaguely defined state secrets must have a chilling effect on any investigative journalism. A chilling effect 14 15 See Freedom House, Press Freedom Report 2013, according to which the score of Turkey deteriorated from 56 to 62 points on a scale of 100. See Karin Deutsch Karlekar, Project Director of „Freedom of the Press“, Why is Turkey’s Media Environment Ranked „Not Free“?, at http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/why-turkey-mediaenvironment-ranked-not-free. 17 on freedom of expression, if not on the administration of justice in general can also be expected from the numerous transferals of judges and prosecutors to other positions. In conclusion, the progress made by the judicial reform and democratization packages and other efforts appear to be at risk in view of recent tendencies to invigorate the control over the media and to extend it also to the new media on the internet. Recommendations In spite of significant improvements in law and practice towards freedom of expression, some concerns of the past still need to be addressed for which purpose the Action Plan on Prevention of ECHR Violations can be usefully employed. However, the momentum needs to be accelerated again. Structural problems need to be addressed like media ownership structures or poor working conditions of journalists contributing to a general climate of intimidation and lack of public interest reporting New legislation should be elaborated in a transparent way and by consulting all relevant actors; the increasing practice of package bills does not allow for a proper legislative process and should therefore be avoided. Autonomous institutions need to be seen as independent and therefore need to act independently from the government. The freedom of the social media and other new media like online information platforms as major instruments of freedom of expression needs to be better protected. The number of possible interferences with freedom of expression and the work of journalists in the existing legislation needs to be reduced. In balancing freedom of expression with other rights the public interest function of the media and the principle of proportionality should always be taken into account. In determining the legitimacy of interferences with the freedom of expression, the principle of necessity in a democratic society corresponding to an urgent social need has to be taken into account. While the suspension of trials is a move in the right direction, care has to be taken that reformed legal provisions benefit those indicted under previous legislation. In order to meet the requirement of clarity and pre-visibility, laws should not contain vague or ambiguous provisions, which therefore need to be made more precise by legal reform. Measures should be undertaken to strengthen the independence of the judiciary; governmental criticism of the judiciary should be avoided and separation of powers respected. The welcome new remedy of an individual application to the Constitutional Court must not lead to undue delays in dealing with complaints regarding the ECHR, which could amount to a denial of justice. Particular support should be given to independent institutions, like the Bar Association Efforts should be made to increase public awareness of the newly created Human Rights Institution and the Ombudsman Institution. There is an obvious need to enhance cooperation between the two institutions, which tasks can overlap. 18 Efforts need to be made to overcome the polarization in the media and in society. Freedom of expression and freedom of assembly are closely related. The law on demonstrations must not be used to restrict freedom of expression. Efforts should continue to offer training and expertise with the work of the ECtHR and relevant institutions in other European countries on freedom of expression. 19
