The Economic Climate of the `Young Turk Revolution` in

The Economic Climate of the `Young Turk Revolution' in 1908
Author(s): Donald Quataert
Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 51, No. 3, On Demand Supplement (Sep., 1979),
pp. D1147-D1161
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1878813 .
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The Economic Climate
of the 'Young Turk Revolution'
in 1908*
Donald Quataert
University
of Houston
did not come from below, from debased city
This revolution
but from above, from all that
mobs or ignorant pIasantry,
(1909)
is best in Turkey.
It is a sign of the times that, whereas it has been impossible in the past to bring the Turkish masses into line
against the throne, because to them it represented an inthey have
semi-political,
tangible Idol, semi-religious,
been awakened by their sufferings into a nation of solidarity, the underlying element of which is a ne~-born spirit
(September
of criticism
in regard to the Sultan-Caliph.
1908)
On a dit partout-et
tout le monde l'a cru--que le ble
absolument gefaut en Turquie et que la famnine
faisait
(January 1908)
etait d nos portes.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
A profound disequilibrium,
arising from the industrialfoodstuffs
of Europe and its quest for raw materials,
ization
and markets, confounded the world in the early 20th century.
the Russian Revolutions of 1905 and
From a global perspective
of a
1917, as well as World War I, are European indicators
systems
and political
among social
more widespread inability
states to absorb the onrush of economic
of the underdeveloped
the Ottoman
In China, Persia,
change.
and technological
varying in intensity
outbreaks of violence,
Empire and Mexico
of the strains acand outcome, proclaimed the universality
of
companying the deepening European economic penetration
the world.
*My thanks to Leo Grebler, Andreas Tietze and the colloquium group of the University of Houston History Departversions of this
ment for their comments on earlier
I also am grateful to the staffs of the Deutsche
paper.
Staatsarchiv
Bank Archives (Frankfurt/M), Zentrales
(Potsdam arLd Merseburg), and the Bas Bakanl3k Arsivi
A
and cooperation.
for their assistance
(Istanbul)
version of this paper was presented to the 1978 Annual
Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association
A History
E. F. Knight, The Awakening of Turkey.
114.
(Philadelph
a, 1909)
the Turkish Revolution
of
"The Turkish Revolution,"
A. Rustem Bey de Bilinski,
The Nineteenth Century and After, LXIV, September, 1908,
354.
mensuel de la
3Revue commerciale du Levant, bulletin
(herede Constantinople
chambre de commerce franeaise
192.
after Revue), Nr. 250, ll//1908,
D1147
Copyright1979 by TnieUniversityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.Requests to reprintin whole or in partmustbe submitted
to The Universityof Chicago Press.
JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY. Vol. 51 No. 3, September1979. OrderNo. IJ-00049.
D1148
earlier
The Ottoman Empire confronted these challenges
Massive imports of machine-made European
than most areas.
goods began in the late 1830s, undermining the Ottoman handicraft system and gradually weakening the guilds while the
inexorably transagriculture
development of export-oriented
relations
with the world outside the vilformed cultivator
in the
intensified
lage.
The pitch of European penetration
probed deep into
Railroads
two decades before World War I.
the interior of Ottoman provinces and more tightly bound the
The spread
expanding agrarian economy to world market needs.
of European corporative
enterprises
in the empire, for its
part, brought along an unfamiliar work day and discipline.
corroded Ottoman
These cumulative innovations
and intrusions
relationships
and the assumptions upon
values,
traditional
Ottoman
with its subjects.
which the government interacted
economic, ideological,
"institutions
at all levels--social,
political--were
attacked and destroyed or drastically
modified."4
tensions finally exploded in a phenomenon
These secular
Whether or not this
called
the Young Turk Revolution of 1908.
we do
is uncertain:5
a "real" revolution
outbreak constituted
assessnot yet have enough information to make a conclusive
even the
ment. Little
is known about the Ottoman actors,
and officers.
In the case of the Young
famed intellectuals
denotes developments which began in
Turks, the term revolution
their hopes
July of 1908.
Military officers sought to realize
for a strong state and successfully
demanded the immediate
introduction
of parliamentary government, free speech, press
and association--restoration
of the 1876 Ottoman constitution.
But when the unleashed internal forces threatened to move
social
achievements and upset existing
beyond those political
the Young Turks reversed themand economic relationships,
labor organizations
restricting
selves by outlawing strikes,
political
freedom. A key to
and, ultimately,
curtailing
understanding this interplay of government and subject and
even the transformation of post-World War I Turkey involves
of the social
at the time
and economic conditions
an analysis
of the initial
Our knowledge is
sequence of events in 1908.
On the social
side, we are dimly aware
critically
scanty.
that a new professional
bureaucracy,
an often-rich but polita group of cash crop cultiically
impotent merchant class.
labor force and an
vators, a small but growing European-style
studies
artisan group in disarray had emerged, but detailed
4Andrew C. Hess, "Consensus or Conflict:
The Dilemma of
Islamic Historians,"
The American Historical
Review,
Vol. 81 (October, 1976), 796 .
5For important insights into the place of the 1908 events
in the typology of revolution,
see Serif A. Mardin,
"Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,"
International
Journal of Middle East Studies,
Vol. 2
(July, 1971), 197-211.
More generally,
see, for
example, the still
useful Chalmers Johnson, Revolution
and the Social
Structure (Stanford,
1964).
D114?
concerning the economic milieu is
Scholarship
are lacking.
of post-July 1908
Before the constellation
sparse.
similarly
events can be understood, these lacunae in our knowledge need
effort to make the
This essay is apreliminary
to be filled.
of the period more
and relationships
occurrences
political
examining the economic climate in which the
intelligible--by
took place in 1908.
of the constitution
reinstitution
differs from most studies of the
The present article
foci.
Young Turk Revolution in both its geographic and topical
has stressed events in the EuroFirst, previous scholarship
erupted, but
those from which the revolution
pean provinces,
and the
capital
has ignored conditions both in the Istanbul
and manpower heartland of the empire--the Anatolian
financial
and Anatolia.
This study focuses on Istanbul
provinces.
surrounding
the economic conditions
Second, it investigates
and
rather than the leadership
the outbreak of the revolution
demonstrates that the early Summer of 1908 was a period of
The intent here is not to detract
severe economic crisis.
officers
from the notable achievements of the revolutionary
Nor is it to estab(or their historians).
and intellectuals
and
causal link between economic crisis
lish a cast-iron
Such an effort would require a
mobilization.
political
one carrying the story forward at least
broader investigation,
officers
of power by the revolutionary
'seizure'
to the actual
in 1913 and backward to similar economic crises in 1898/1899
Yet to sketch the economic climate within
or even 1873-1875.
events occurred clearly should open
political
which crucial
this period of Ottoman history to new inquiry, insightful
and possiblY new relationships.
questions,
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
During the eighteen months preceding the July 1908 revoconfronted a series of domestic
the Ottoman population
lution,
The crises began with a
economic crises.
and international
severe winter in early 1907 which raised the price of practiof the laboring
cally every comestible and made "the existence
By March, 1907, the Istanbul price of
class very difficult."6
such as legumes were double normal levels.
meat and staples
Firewood was up 250 per cent over normal and charcoal had as
much as tripled in price.
countenance,
Poverty, horrible poverty of a sinister
of this city and it reigns as
has taken possession
for us to dislodge it.7
it appears impossible
mistress;
A prolonged Spring drought then sharply reduced the grain harArab areas
and apparently,
vest in many European, Anatolian,
threatened to
of the empire and according to some observers,
were estimating
By August, pessimists
bring famine.
6Revue, Nr. 240,
the author's.
3/31/1907,
530-532.
Translations
are
Omer Sami Cosar,
7lbid. and Nr. 238, 1/31/1907, 236.
I (Istanbul,
1973,
Atatiurk Ansiklopedisi,
hazirlayan,
hereafter Atati2rk Ans. ), 386, for reports based on
Sabah, 3/2911907.
D1150
Anatolign wheat and barley harvests 50 and 40 per cent below
normal.
The government responded and, between August and
October 1907, forbade grain exports from six Anatolian regions
and from all the European provinces.
It also suspended the
duty on foreign wheat imports to Istanbul while reducing the
foreign flour duty by nearly half.9
The brief but severe
American financial
crisis
then added to the prevailing
uncertainty by causing Istanbul and Anatolian bankers and
merchants to tighten their credit.10
Food provisioning
prospects in early 1908 appeared promising and the year started with optimistic
assessments of the
next harvest.
Gradually, however, area after area, in a pattern repeated throughout much of the empire, abandoned those
rosy predictions
and replaced them with harsher, if more accurate, prophecies.
On the edge of Asia along the Dardanelles,
continuing drought into late June produced numerou lreligious
processions
to seek the intervention
of Providence.
Further
afield in Anatolia,
similar conditions prevailed.
The town of
Merzifon reported the crop of 1907 as 50 per cent below normal
and the situation
by April, 1908 was critical.
Every bag of flour, every bite of bread, has cost
local consumer just about double the usual pricls,
that makes a very hard condition for the poor.1
the
and
The new governor of nearby Kastamonu province on the Black Sea
reduced bread prices in a number of urban centers during April
and May; rains in late June reportedly saved the population
from disaster
and local bread prices were expected to remain
stable until the harvest. 1
The Aegean municipality
of Izmir
Le journal de la chambre
8Revue, Nr. 244, 8/31/1907, 152.
de commerce de Constantinople
(hereafter JCCC), 10/12/
0TO7, 473, placed the'wheat decline at 20 per cent for
Anatolia and 33 per cent for the European provinces.
9Hariciye Arsivi (Foreign Office Archives, Istanbul)
Dosya 191 also records a 19 September 1908 prohibition
on cereal exports from certain Arab areas.
Also see
Revue, Nr. 247, 10/31/1907, 608; Nr. 246, 9/30/1907,
393-395; and Nr. 253, 4/30/1908, 588.
10For example, Revue, Nr. 248, 11/30/1907, 197-198;
250, 1/3111908
I'49; and Stamboul, 7/15/1908.
11Levant Herald (hereafter
trom Edirne and Selanik
reflect the increasing
see LH, 1/13, 1; 2/17,
6/1972 and 6/23/1908,
7/4; 7/9/1908.
LH,
4/1/1908,
Nr.
For reports
LH), 6/24/1908, 2.
in7the European provinces which
drought, suffering and pessimism,
2-3; 4/27, 2; 5/21, 3; 6/2, 3;
3.
Stamboul, 6/2; 6/4; 6/26;
1.
3LH, 5/7, 3; 5/25,
772/1908.
3; 5/26,
1; 5/30/1908,
3.
Stamboul,
D1151
in late May, 1908 by making "small"
responded to its own crisis
depending on
or "'notable" reductions in bread and meat prices,
In mid-June, reports of diswhich observer is to be believed.
drought, began emanating
content, stemming from the persistent
Inland,
from the usually rich hinterland of the port city.14
town
June and July rains lowered wheat prices at the railroad
in the week of the revolution,
of Eskisehir;
however, their
Normal
levels remained double those of the previous year.
wheat exporters such as this area and the Adapazar region
further up the line were importing wheat for their own needs.15
generally had
Harvest reports from Konya, also on the railroad,
But in late June, despite recent and abundant rains,
been good.
residents were said to "fear the droug>p and also famine," and
the governor prohibited grain exports.-LO
Elsewhere, in the central Anatolian town of Sivas, wheat
of 165
prices in January, 1908, stood at 257 piasters/kile
years.
After dropping
okkes, the highest level in thirty-five
biytwelve per cent in late February, they rebounded to new
formed
heights in the first week of June while inhabitants
A
to mosques and churches and prayed for rain.
processions
crept upwards, to
week later, rains did come but prices still
On the morning
a level 24 per cent higher than in January.17
came into the town,
of June 23, women from neighboring villages
protested the price and quality of flour and demanded bread.
By noon, some 500 townspeople joined the women at the governThe
ment house, stoned the building and smashed its windows.
crowd then ransacked the grain warehouses and confronted a
Towards evening some
military unit unwilling to open fire.
60 persons with wheat in their homes were arrested and the
riot apparently subsided.18
At Kayseri, the 1907 crop had been about one-third below
of 17
Flour which had sold for 3-4 piasters/batman
normal.
lbs. av. in mid-1907 had tripled in price by November; then,
to 7-8 piasters.
with better weather in December it declined,
Although good rains fell in mid-May 1908, tne drought resumed
were "suffering enormously ...
and on June 12, the inhabitants
While 12,000
high price of floi.''l9
from the extraordinarily
14LH 5/25, 2 and Sabah, 5/24/1908, 1; LH; 5/26, 1 and
See Atatark Ans., I, e.g. 297. 396-397,
6717/1908, 2.
unrest around
for accounts of military and civilian
Izmir dating back to 1902.
15Stamboul,
7/10;
7/23/1908.
2-3 and Stamboul,
5/29/1908.
6/16;
5/21;
16LH, 6/25/1908,
7/6;
17LH, 1/22, 2-3; 2/5, 2; 3/5, 2; 611, 3; 6/17, 3; and
unit, nominally oneU724/1908, 2; piaster--monetary
of measure;
hundredth of a Turkish pound; kile--unit
okke--unit of weight, 2.8 lbs. av..
18Atatiurk Ans.,
consul.
19Stamboul,
1908 .
I,
404-405
6/23/1908.
after
Also,
reports
LH, 1/24,
of the French
1; 5/20,
3; 6/27/
D1152
persons gathered to pray for rain, the local government intervened and sold subsidized
flour, but at the level of 13
piasters.
On June 15, a correspondent reported on affairs in
the town. "Seldom have I seen such a constant watching of the
rain."
By then,
sky, such a deep longing for the 'latter'
flour prices were about quadruple those of the previous year.20
Near the east-central
Anatolian town of Erzurum, authorities were aiding some villagers
with exemptions from the
usual duties on imported grain.21
There, the people had been
A taxpayers'
revolt
in varying stages of unrest since 1906.
in 1906-1907 had resulted in the destruction
of the government
of several officials,
thewounding of the
building,
the killing
to suppress the
governor, and the refusal of some officers
rising.
Erzurum again exploded in September, 1907 when bread
of
prices "suddenly" doubled.
A crowd stormed the properties
flour merchants, lynched one and badly wounded two others.
The central
Again some military personnel refused to act.
government took the initiative
in October, imprisoning or exofficers.22
ecuting rebel ringleaders
while exiling disobedient
The sources then fall silent on events in Erzurum but, from
September 1907 until the following May, bread prices remained
more than double their earlier,
normal, levels.23
A distinct
pattern emerges from this survey of events in
the Anatolian provinces.
TWheat/flour/bread prices shot up
after mid-1907, then slipped very modestly at the end of the
of the future harvest.
Prices,
however,
year in expectation
and then rose to new
never fell from the late 1907 plateaus
Many
heights as widespread drought again became evident.
areas, with the increasing
certainty of a second consecutive
crop failure,
possessed
only the thinnest of margins against
the growing possibility
of famine.
For the regimte, the continuing deterioration
mocked its subsidy programs and made the
hazardous.
policy of arrest and exile increasingly
Conditions in the imperial and favored city of Istanbul
of
reflected
those in the provinces and affected all classes
the population.
As 1908 began most commodity prices still
prices remained
were well above normal.
Fruit and vegetable
25 per cent, firewood 58 per cent and charcoal 250 per cent
above the levels prevailing
at the beginning of the 1906-1907
20 _,
6/27/1908;
also
sources
cited
in n. 19 above.
Not far away,
21Sabah, 2/20/1908, 1 and LH, 2/20/1908, 2.
at Harput, "Prices of almost all articles
of food are
double the prices of ordinary years."
LH, 6/25/1908, 1.
22Atattirk Ans., I, 358-360, 380-383 and Mehmet Nusret,
Erzurum (Istanbul,
1328), 57-71 which forms
Tarihge-i
the source of the encyclopedia
account.
23LH, 4/10, 3; 4/22, 2; 5/7/1908 and AtatCirk Ans., I, 382.
Also flour prices cited in the above newspapers as well
as in LH, 5/28, 3 and 6/24/1908, 3.
For bread riots in the Arab provincial
centers of Aleppo
and Beirut in November, 1907, see Atattirk Ans., I, 384,
after reports of the French consuls.
Dl1 153
In addition,
the city suffered a meat shortwinter crisis.24
In
age during the Winter of 1907-1908 and the Spring of 1908.
January, 1908, the price of mutton, consumed mainly by the midwas at least 50 per cent above normal.
dle and upper classes,
By March, the price of meat had reached "unbelievable
figto a variety of factors
ures."25
The shortage was attributed
conversion of
including the export of animals, the increasing
and a combination of
pasture to cropland, high fodder prices,
in both European
heavy snows, prolonged drought and epizoots
Turkey and Anatolia.26
in January, began setting
The municipal administration,
meat prices on a weekly basis as the imperial government
ordered the provinces to ship their herds to the capital.27
Through March and April 1908, Istanbul newspapers lavished
extensive coverage on the shipment of animals to the city, for
By midenumerating the arriving animals.
example, precisely
April, thanks in part to the rgceipt of sheep from Syria, the
Reports now focused on the
crisis
apparently had passed.
in
Still,
of epizoot from the various areas.29
disappearance
early May, one newspaper could report that the "rise in meat
as does that of
the general preoccupation
prices constitutes
all other objects of alimentation."30
Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau
24United States,
of Manufactures, Monthly Consular and Trade Reports
January 1908, 202-203
(hereafter U. S. Monthy Reports),
and Revue Nr. 2407 [73719U07737T0-532.
For meat
LH, 3/18/1908, 2; Revue cited in n. 24 above.
Sabah, 3/7, 2; 3/27, 1;
prices during March-June see:
2; and LH, 3/18,
4/5,1; 4/6, 1; 4/17, 2; and 6/14/198,
2; 3/27, 2; 4/8, 1; and 4/27/1908, 1.
26Sabah, 2/12, 2; 3/18, 2; 3/27/1908, 1-2 and LH, 4/8/1908,
Potsdam, Auswart'loes Amt
2. 7entrales
Staatsarchiv,
See Sabah, 2/27,
ZStA,AA), Nr. 6722, Bl. 70.
(hereafter
1-2; 2/28, 2; 3/7, 2; 3/12, 1; 3/15, 2; 3/187 2;and
3/26/1908, 1 for government counter measures.
27LH, 1/28, 3; 2/18, 2; and 3/28/1908, 1-2.
21_3/26, 1; 4/5, 1; and 4/8/1908, 1.
Sabah,
3/11,
28Several meat purveyors to the army contracted for the
a
shipment of 30,000 sheep from Syria to the capital,
measure winning them the gratitude of the press, later
contracts and, probably, considerable
provisioning
See, for example, Sabah, 3/25, 1; 4/2, 1-2;
profits.
LH, 3/26, 1; 3/27,
4/6, 1; 4/17, 2; and 6/14/1908?;
2; and 4/2/1908, 1.
295Sabah, 6/14, 2; 6/17, 2; 6/22, 1; 6/24, 2; 6/29, 1; and
Also LH, 4/23, 2; 4,/24, 2; 5/12, 2; and
772071908, 1-2.
of
For contrary reports or indications
6/3/1908, 2.
see LH, 6/29/1908, 3; Stamboul, 7/7/
epizoot revival,
1908, and Atattirk Ans., I, 404.
For "'buffalo"
30LH, 5/8/1908, 2.
EH, 3/27/1908, 1.
meat sales
in Izmir,
see
D1154
While confronting and apparently resolving
the meat shortage, Istanbul
faced another, most serious,
of food supcrisis
ply.
The upward spiral
in the price of wheat, flour and bread
severely threatened the well-being
of the broad Ottoman masses
for whom bread was the major item of consumption:
the average
Ottoman ate an impressive 2.2-3.0
lbs. av. daily.31
During the several decades preceding the crisis
being
related here, Istanbul wheat prices had fluctuated
according
to a certain pattern.
Usually,
average monthly prices rose or
fell moderately, within a range of T- 10 per cent, with an increase during one month generally being offset by subsequent
seasonal
price declines.
Annual price fluctuations
commonly
were of modest proportions.
In 1907-1908, however, the pattern
was broken; the divergence began in the late Spring of 1907.
As evidence of a poor crop accumulated,
the average April wheat
price of 38.31 paras/okke jumped to 43.00 in June. Nervousness
in the market mounted and when prices reached 50.50 in September, trading temporarily ceased.
At this juncture,
the
government intervened with its measures to assure bread supplies.
When trading resumed, however, prices continued their
upward course and, in the final three months of the year,
averaged 41 per cent above the April price (with a peak of
55.40 paras/okke in November).
During the year, the average
quarterly wheat price had advanced steadily
from 36.77 to
40.74 in the second quarter,
to 46.06 and, in the final
sing
quarter, to 54.19 paras/okke.
The fixed price of bread, determined after negotiations
between the municipality
and the bakers' guild, rose accordingly.
After the first wheat price increase,
the "years old"
fixed retail
price of 40 paras per loaf of standard weight
bread was moved up to 45 in June 1907.
In September it was
allowed to increase again, to 50 paras.33
By the end of 1907,
bread and wheat prices respectively
had increased
25 and 45
per cent in six months.
31For bread consumption patterns see, for example,
Nr. 256, 7/31/1908, 156; ZStA,AA, Nr. 53736, Bi.
U. S. Monthly Reports, January 1909, 71.
Revue,
39 and
32 Prices derived from semi-weekly market reports in JCCC,
1907, and calculated
in constant value monetary and
weight units.
Forty paras equal one piaster.
Prices
are for Ankara Nr. 1 wheat; other grades follow similar
price trends.
A table stating average annual prices for
standard grade wheat in Istanbul,
1876-1908, is available from the author.
Generally,
prices fell during the
late 19th century price depression
and gradually rose
after 1896.
The indexed table shows that if wheat cost
100 in 1906, it had risen to 123 in 1907 and 145 in 1908.
33JCCC, 7/20/1895, 339; Ataturk Ans., I, 386-387.
In reto loaf weights, French language papers in
eFing
Istanbul usually stated kilogram while Ottoman language
sources alternatively
employed kilogram and okke (of
1.28 kgs.).
Ikdam, 8/27/1908, 2 and Revue, Nr. 257,
8/31/1908, 322, make clear that the weight standard is
the kilogram and not the okke.
Pressure on bread prices- already was evident in 1906;
see, e.g.,
Revue, Nr. 227, 2/28/1906, 247-249.
D1155
In early 1908, Istanbul newspapers began publishing
If the
reports on crop prospects inthe provinces.
detailed
the scheme must have backfired:
intent was to reassure readers,
market had
The international
the news was bad.
generally,
however, so that the year
in Istanbul,
sufficiently
stabilized
In its
in wheat prices.
slippage
began with a fractional
eagerness to regain lost revenues, the government reacted perthe export prohihaps too quickly and, in February, repealed
in wheat and flour import
bitions as well as the reductions
ns then lowered the fixed price of bread to
Negotiati
duties.
45 paras per loaf A4
But as another poor season unfolded,
from the year's low of 49.25 paras/okke
Istanbul wheat prices,
upwards through March,
in late February, crept fractionally
During the first six months of
April, May, June, and July.
In
1908, they were 35 per cent higher than the year before.
wheat prices reached 55.00 paras!
the month of the revolution,
The bread price moved correokke, their peak for the year.
spondingly and on May 7, ro e to 50 paras, a level maintained
until after the revolution.15
Bread prices increased much more than the quoted statisIstanbul bakers
In this era of rising prices,
tics indicate.
felt caught in the squeeze between government efforts to keep
bread prices at a minimum, and their own desire to maintain
some bakers produced and
In response,
certain profit margins.
In the first five months of 1908, the
sold shortweight bread.
over 100,000 loaves which it considconfiscated
municipality
On the average, the bread weighed 30 per
ered underweight.
cost
cent less than the officially-set
standard, an additional
The quality of the bread also
borne by the Ottoman consumer.36
was declining.
Normally, when indigenous sources dwindled,
34Sabah, 2/8, 1; 2/16, 2; 2/25, 1; 2/26, 1; 2/27, 1; and
LH, 2/26, 1; 2/27, 1; and 2/28/1908, 1.
U/2871908, 1.
Hariciye Arsivi, Dosya 191, 2/2/1908; Revue, Nr. 251,
R2/1717,
2/29/1908, 255 and Bundesarchiv (Koble
2/26/1908.
35Bread prices in Bas Bakanlik Arsivi (Prime Ministry
hereafter BBA), Bab-i Ali Evrak
Archives, Istanbul,
BEO) 247951; LH, 5/3, 1-2; 5/5, 2;
Odast (hereafter
Stamboul, 5/4/1908, 2;
5/6, 1-2; and 5/7/1908, 1-2.
Sabah, 5/4, 1 and 5/7/1908, 1. Wheat prices for 1908
derived from JCCC weekly market reports according to
procedures sketched in n. 32.
The bread price rose immediately after the revolution,
of changing food
The implications
to 55 paras/loaf.
between the Ottoman masses and the
prices on relations
Young Turk regime are being studied by the author.
36LH, 1/28, 1; 2/19, 1; 3/5, 1-2; 3/19, 4; 4/21, 1;
5718/1908, 1; 6/11/1908, 2; Stamboul, 7/1/1908; Atatturk
256 and Nr
Ans., I, 386.
Revue, Nr. 22172728Jl906,
Osman Nuri, Sehri Eminleri
T56, 7/31/19087-Is6-157.
1927), 198-199, for stronger municipality
(Istanbul,
measures to prevent weight fraud beginning c. early
1906.
D1156
wheat and flour imports helped to maintain low bread prices.
In 1907, however, world wheat production slumped as many other
countries suffered varying degrees of crop failure.
The great
American granary reported a 15 per cent shortfall
in 1907 while
in early 1908 a drought threatened its Spring crop.37
More
immediately important to the Ottomans was production in
Bulgaria and Rumania, countries which normally were significant
suppliers
both in the international
and Istanbul markets.
In
1907, Rumanian output was do 4 63 per cent while Bulgarian
production fell 40 per cent.38
Istanbul millers and bakers
therefore turned elsewhere and, in 1908, procured a record 73
per cent of the flour consumed in Istanbul
from France (Marseilles)
and Italy.
These two sources provided a cheaper but
lower quality flour than the Danubian, Russian or Ottoman
areas. 9 The procurement of this less-expensive
flour, although its price had risen 50 per cent in two years, made it
to keep bread prices within the state-imposed
easier
limits.40
But the widespread use of poorer-grade
flours, coupled with
the practice
of short weights, did place the Ottoman consumer
at a great disadvantage.
Istanbul
residents,
in the several
months before the revolution,
were eating lower-quality
bread
of lesser weight, and paying more f2j their loaves than at any
time in the past twenty-five years.
'"Nos estomacs et nos
bourses protestent.'42
All the while, they received continuing
37 Historical
10/12/19097,
global
Abstracts
473,
of the United States,
indicate
wheat production
an 11 per
cent
511;
decline
between 1906 and 1907.
JCCC,
in
38United States,
Department of Agriculture,
Yearbook of the
United States Department of Agriculture
(Washington,
1909) and ibid.,
1910, 606-607 and 444-445 respectively
also note that world-wide wheat production in 1907 and
1908 was down about 8 per cent compared with the preceding two years.
the
JCCC, 5/2/1908, 145, places
Rumanian decline,
compared with average 1902-1906 levels,
at 50 per cent.
39During the period 1889-1906, Marseilles
and Italy typically provided 2-12 per cent of the flour consumed in
Istanbul--1899
with 28 per cent and 1900 with 52 per cent
are the only exceptions.
In 1907, the two sources
shipped 45 per cent,
Market summaries in LH, 1889-1890,
and JCCC, 1892-1908.
40Market reports in JCCC, 1906-1908.
The procedures explained in n. 32 were employed to obtain flour prices.
41This assertion
is based partially
on the record use of
Marseilles
and Italian
flour and contemporary reports,
Revue, Nr. 256, 7/31/1908, 159.
e.g.,
Also, the table
cited in n. 32 demonstrates that comparably high wheat
prices had not prevailed
in Istanbul
since 1880-1882.
For the direct linkage between wheat, flour, and bread
prices see Ikdam, 8/17/1908, 2.
42Revue,
Nr. 256,
7/31/1908,
159.
D1157
that the situation
was not worsening.43
if unfounded assurances
The uncertainty and high prices in the first half of 1908
The 1908 harvest was perhaps the worst
fully.
were justified
the year ended
famines of the mid-1870s:
since the killing
in
and near-famine conditions
with widespread crop failures
such as the volume of rail
Several indicators
many areas.44
and sea shipments of grain during 1907 and 1908 attest to the
severity of the shortages.
The Anatolian Railway after its completion in 1895 had
anbecome the major Istanbul wheat (but not flour) supplier,
nually shipping up to 94 per cent of that grain received in the
rose from 238,000
Annual average shipments of cereals
capital.
1896-1901, to
tons during its first years of full operations,
With the 1907 crop failure,
310,000 tons between 1902 and 1906.
merchants in the interior drew on existing stocks and shipped
By the Spring of 1908,
240,000 tons, down nearly one-fourth.
stocks were depleted and grain shipments for the year plummeted,
to 93,000 tons.45
if less clearly evident in cereal
are similarly
Declines
centers of Mersin, Izmir and Samsun.
exports from the coastal
During the period 1876-1906, grain shipments from these cities
Annual average
(at least 50 per cent).
had risen considerably
port of Mersin rose dramatgrain exports from the southeastern
ically
between 1876-1880 and 1891-1895, slipped during the
and war but
by crop failures
1898-1899 turnaround occasioned
to perhaps twice the levels of the 1870s and
again increased,
During these five years, the
1880s, in the 1902-1906 period.
43JCCC, the organ of the merchant community, optimistically
Fithroughout the wheat crisis.
manipulated statistics
405, it admitted that
nally, in the 12/26/1908 issue,
The other newsyear.
1908 had been a "most difficult"
also often predicted a
papers, in their news sections,
from
letters
promising harvest but, in the same issues,
the reverse situation.
indicated
correspondents
provincial
derived its magnitude not only from
44The 1907-1908 crisis
internal Ottoman conditions but from the concomitant crop
abroad.
or shortfalls
failures
in 1907-1908 with those of earlier
To compare conditions
du chemin de fer ottoman d'Anatolie,
see:
Societe
periods,
Betriebsj'ahr
uber das...
Bericht des Verwaltungsrathes
for the years 1889-1908
(1. Januar bis 31. December...)
Accounts and
Great Britain,
(hereafter Annual Report(s);
Papers, Parliamentary Papers (hereafter A&P), reports on
the trade and commerce of Smyrna/Izmir, Samsun, Trabzon
and Adana/Mersin, 1876-1908.
bread continued to derive mainly from flour
45Istanbul
the
"Limited Revolution:
milled abroad: see my article,
Impact of the Anatolian Railway on Turkish Transportation
Business
1890-1908,"
of Istanbul,
and the Provisioning
Annual Reports,
History Review, Summer, 1977, 139-160.
shipments fell below thoe of 1908
Ifrea1908.Cereal
in 1898 and 1899
only once, in 1899, after crop failures
new.
was relatively
still
and when the railroad
D1158
annual value of Mersin cereal exports averaged 293,000 British
pounds but in 1907, even with inflated prices,
declined to
193,000 pounds.
Cereal shipments from Izmir had risen steadily
and, in 1906,
were at least double those of three decades
before.
Between 1902 and 1906, they annually averaged 571,000
British pounds but in 1907 and 1908, fell to 328,000 pounds
(again with higher prices).
At the Black Sea port of Samsun,
the value of cereal exports in the late 1880s and early 1890s
was approximately twice that of the preceding ten year period
but then slipped badly between 1902 and 1906, to about the
level of the early 1880s.
In 1908, exports fell further, to
23,000 British pounds, about one-third the annual average level
of the preceding fivg years and one-ninth that of Samsun's best
export half-decade.4
of the Agricultural
Loan statistics
Bank, a government
agency providing low-interest
credit to cultivators,
also reveal the depression
in Ottoman agriculture
during 1907-1908.
While secured bank loans annually averaged 679,000 Turkish
pounds between 1902 and 1906, their value rose to 1,097,000
pounds in 1907 and to 1,143,000 pounds in 1908.
Perhaps a
better indicator
of the crisis
are bank loans to those unable
to furnish real estate as collateral,
a group usually ignored
by the bank and to which it annually lent, between 1902 and
1906, only 40,000 Turkish pounds.
In 1907 and 1908, the annual value of such unsecured loans rose more than six fold.47
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
The available
concrete evidence of unrest triggered by
these grave and deteriorating
economic conditions has been
summarized above.
Although this documentation is relatively
sparse, a reflection,
perhaps, of the lack of research,
contemporary reporting and/or actual passivity,
it does suggest
widespread provincial
discontent and distress.
In Istanbul,
signs of unrest also are visible
among the workers, a group
which had been in a fairly favorable position.
In a possible
46A&P reports on the trade and commerce of Smyrna/Izmir,
Samsun, and Adana/Mersin and Revue, Nr. 253, 4/30/1908,
598.
The 1907 Mersin exports, originally
reported at
157,000 pounds, were revised upwards to 193,000 pounds.
The available
sources suffer from several major deficiencies.
First, exports often are given under the
general rubric "cereals,"
which include wheat, barley,
maize, and oats.
Second, the export statistics
most
often are stated in units of monetary value
and not
weight or measure.
Third, we have annual price data for
Istanbul but not the three ports.
Actual production
figures do exist for the region as well as some provinces but not in a sufficiently
continuous series.
Furthermore, the sources employ terms--Anatolia,
Asia
Minor and Asiatic
Turkey--which are not necessarily
interchangeable.
And finally,
the fundamental accuracy
of both region-wide and provincial
figures is questionable.
47
YusufSaim Atasagun, Tarkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankasi,
1888-1939 (Istanbul,
For
1939), tables on 261 and 345.
loan assistance
to cultivators
at the end of 1908, see
BBA BEO 258442, 259441, and 259832, and ZStA,AA, Nr.
15052, Bl. 55.
Policy changes introduced by the Young
Turk government account for some of the increases.
D1159
response to the worsening economic conditions,
Ottoman railroad workers established
a union on October 30, 1907.48
The
next day, the Oriental Railway Company raised its workers'
daily wages and "accepted"
salary increases
for its officials
while, at the end of the year, the Anatolian Railway Company
created a pension fund for its employees.
Istanbul
dock
workers agitated
in July 1907 and mid-June 1908 and, on the
earlier
date, some apparently lost their jobs after seeking
pay increases.49
During the first half of 1908, office workers
in the capital
sought to organize but, fearing the "great
risks,"
gave up the effort until after the revolution.50
Public health employees there received 10-15 per cent raises
in late February 1908, an action one newspaper lauded as
exemplary if, unfortunately,
unique in the city.51
Another
indication
of discontent is an imperial decree of early June
which ordered the immediate payment of a month's salary to
state employees and officials.52
In the absence of more complete data on the wages of Ottoman urban workers, average family size,
frequency of supplemental income within a family and/or second jobs for household
can only be approxheads, the impact of food price increases
imated.
Before the 1907-1908 downturn, the average common
laborer, if unimarried and supporting only himself, used 10-15
per cent of his income for his own daily bread needs.
Railroad workers at the lower end of their occupation's
pay scale,
as well as some printing house workers, devoted 14-19 per cent
of their wages for bread.
laborers such as bricklayers
Skilled
and carpenters spent only 5-6 per cent.53
If we then assume
that the above workers had a family with wife and two children
48Stefan Velikov, "Sur le mouvement ouvrier et socialiste
en 1908,"
jeune-turque
en Turquie apres la revolution
Growing consciousEtudes Balkaniques,
1964, Nr. 1, 41.
ness among the workers, noted by Velikov and others,
surely played a role as well.
49Atatairk Ans., I, 387, quoting the newspaper Moniteur
BBA BEO
Annual Report, 1907, 8.
11/12/1907.
Oriental,
231817, 250105, and 250219.
8/20/1908 indicates
50Stamboul, 8/22/1908; ibid.,
association
1908 formation of an international
mercial employees in Istanbul.
51 H, 2/25,
1908, 2.
LH,
2; 2/27/1908,
6/10/1908,
1; and Sabah,
2/25,
a March
of com-
1; 2/28/
2.
are for Istanbul workers' wages related
53The percentages
Annual Reports, clipping from
to Istanbul bread prices.
of the
an unspecified
1908 magazine in collection
ZStA,AA (MerseDeutsche Bank, bound after the reports.
burg), Rep. 93, Abt. E, Nr. 396, B1. 107r; A. Gabriel,
des chemins des fer
Les dessous de l'administration
et de Bagdad (Istanbul,
ottomans d'Anatolie
1911), 131;
Tevfik Cavdar, Milll MIicadelenin
Stamboul, 8/12/1908.
1974), 129-130.
ekonomik kOkenleri (Istanbul,
D1160
and provided the whole family income, we can obtain a notion of
what the bread price increases
might have meant to some families.
The common laborer in such a situation
would
initially
have devoted 40-60 per cent of his income to bread needs and,
other things equal, 50-75 per cent by July 1908.
Similarly,
railroad workers and printing house employees would have been
paying 56-76 per cent of their wages for bread before the
crisis
and an implausible
72-100 per cent thereafter.
For
skilled
laborers,
bread now would have drained about 25-30 per
cent of wages.
Put more simply, all individuals,
regardless
of income and marital status, were paying 25 per cent more for
their bread in July 1908 than 13 months earlier
and few enjoyed
even partially
compensating wage increases.
Considering other necessities
such as rent and other
minimum food and clothing needs, some of these statistical
calculations
strain credibility.
There is no indication
in the
materials
available
for research on this essay how the spending
pattern of workers as a group changed in response to the extraordinary and sometimes absurd proportion of income needed just
for bread.
There were presumably some consumption substitutions.
Some families had two or three breadwinners while the
statistical
illustrations
assumed only one.
Other workers may
have borrowed from relatives,
from moneylenders, or obtained
retail
store credit.
And some simply may have eaten less.
The wage hikes noted above were the exception;
more generally,
"neither profits nor salaries
have followed the upward
tendency (in prices]...
"54 Most wages remained fixed during
the inflationary
period, a reversal
of what one writer has
described as a rise in real wages during most of the half century before the revolution.55
Ottoman workers were less well
off in July 1908 than thev had been for several decades and
were confronting a sharp, sudden decline in their level of
living.56
One theorist suggests that a long period of relative
54U. S. Monthly Reports,
January 1908,
203.
55Charles Issawi issued a preliminary report on "Wages in
Turkey, 1850-1914,"
to the "First International
Congress
on the Social
and Economic History of Turkey, 1071-1920"
held at Hacettepe University,
Ankara, Jtuly 11-13, 1977.
He noted that at the turn of the century, real wages for
common laborers were almost "twice as high as those of
1850" and those for "skilled
laborers perhaps one and a
half times as high."
Fragmentary information, however,
suggests little
increase
in real wages after the end of
the 1873-1896 price depression.
Compare, for example,
the 1908 wages of common laborers in Izmir noted by Issawi
with those of "day laborers"
in 1896 cited in United
States,
Department of State, Bureau of Statistics,
Special
Consular Reports, "Money and Prices in Foreign
Countries,"
report by Consul Madden of Smyrna/Izmir,
8t26/1896, 209.
56Revue, Nr. 257, 8/31/1908, 233-236, discussed
the outbreak of strikes after the revolution
and said that to
understand the workers' position
several
infactors,
cluding the rising cost of living and unjustifiably
high
prices which made it impossible
to live on some of their
former salaries,
had to be considered.
.D1161
prosperity followed by a "short period of sharp reversal"
and gratifications
which
creates a "gap between expectations
At this juncture,
quickly widens and becomes intolerable."57
prosperity of
Whether the relative
violent action ensues.
predecades and its sudden turnabout in the 1907-1908 crisis
or change candisposed the Ottoman urban workers to violence
not be determined here but the question is posed as a spur to
further research.
of 1907-1908 hardly
For the rural masses, the shortfalls
deprivation,
impoverishment
represented a unique experience:
and the cycle of abundance followed by want were familiar pheand price rises of seemingly
nomena. Also, crop failures
comparable magnitudes had occurred within living memory, most
in 1898-1899, without sparking revolution.
Therefore,
recently,
the economic setbacks in 1907-1908 cannot be viewed as the sole
What seems new in July 1908 is
motive force of the revolution.
that an economic crisis
unfolded in the presence of an orgaFor the first time in
cadre.
nized, widespread revolutionary
decades,
there was a favorable juncture of economic and
political
conditions.
a
In sum, this preliminary investigation
has indicated
days of 1908:
a rapidly
second side to the prerevolution
among workers,
deteriorating
economic environment, restiveness
and an
a suffering and sometimes riotous rural population,
of
The existence
abiding pessimism for the future harvest.
between elements of these various urban and
direct contacts
Alrural groups and the Young Turk officers is uncertain.
climate
though the officers clearly acted in a socio-economic
as to
it remains a matter of conjecture
favorable to success,
whether or not the revolution would have occurred in the abinternational
sence of such a climate.
To summarize the case:
(both
extreme cold, drought, crop failure
financial
crisis,
and epizoot created unstable
domestic and international)
economic conditions
and pushed food prices to unprecedented
Prospects in July 1908,
heights on the eve of the revolution.
before the new harvest and when stocks were low, seemed grim,
with little
hope for improvement. Frustrated urban workers
reason
There was little
faced a declining
standard of living.
for either the urban or rural populace to aid a regime apparently unable to alter conditions.
favoring the Young Turks in July
The economic conditions
1908 also created the backdrop for the subsequent evolution of
of the populace
The acquiescence
relations.
government-subject
of
to the July events carried with it implicit expectations
into action during the
economic benefits which were translated
and strikes
following weeks when new workers' organizations
the expectations
stifled
Government repression
proliferated.
supported
population
the disappointed
and, nine months later,
The present
of the Sultan.
the unsuccessful
counter-revolution
the economic setting of the 1908 revolustudy, by establishing
tion, suggests that the flow of events in Young Turk and early
if the tie between
republican Turkey can be made more sensible
and government
economic conditions,
popular expectations,
action is explored further.
"The J-Curve of Rising and Declining
57James C. Davies,
and
as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions
Satisfactions
Hugh D. Graham and Ted R. Gurr,
a Contained Rebellion,"
(New York,
eds., Violence in America, revised edition
1970), 690-730.
Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History
Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression in the Late Ottoman Empire
Author(s): Carter Vaughn Findley
Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1986), pp. 81-106
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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http://www.jstor.org
Economic Bases of Revolution and
Repression in the Late Ottoman
Empire
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
Ohio State University
Centralto late Ottomanhistory is a series of events that marksa milestone in
the emergence of modem forms of political thoughtand revolutionaryaction
in the Islamic world. The sequence opened with the rise of the Young Ottoman ideologues (1865) and the constitutionalmovement of the 1870s. It
continued with the repression of these forces under Abdiilhamid11 (18761909). It culminated with the resurgence of opposition in the Young Turk
movement of 1889 and later, and especially with the revolution of 1908.
Studiedso far mostly in political and intellectualterms,1 the sequence seems
well understood. The emergence of the Young Ottomans-the pioneers of
political ideology, in any modem sense, in the Middle East-appears to result
from the introductionof Western ideas and from stresses created within the
bureaucracyby the political hegemony of the Tanzimatelite (ca. 1839-71).2
The repressionunderAbdiilhamidfollows from the turmoilof the late 1870s,
the weaknesses of the constitutionof 1876, and the craft of the new sultan in
creatinga palace-dominatedpolice state. The emergence of the Young Turks
shows that terrorultimatelyfostered, ratherthan killed, the opposition. Too,
theireventualrevolutionarysuccess shows how much more effective than the
I Ernest E. Ramsaur, Jr., The Young Turks:Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Princeton,
1957);BernardLewis, The Emergenceof ModernTurkey,2d ed. (London, 1968), 150-74, 194230; Serif Mardin,The Genesis of YoungOttomanThought(Princeton, 1962); idem, Jon Tiirklerin Siyasi Fikirleri [Young Turk political ideas] (Ankara, 1964); idem, "LibertarianMovements in the OttomanEmpire, 1878-1895," Middle East Journal, 16:2 (1962), 169-82; idem,
"Power, Civil Society, and Culturein the OttomanEmpire," ComparativeStudiesin Society and
History, 11:3 (1969), 258-81; Feroz Ahmad, The YoungTurks:The Committeeof Union and
Progress in TurkishPolitics, 1908-1914 (Oxford, 1969); StanfordJ. Shaw and Ezel K. Shaw,
History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge, 1977), II, 263-67, 273ff.;
CarterVaughn Findley, "The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East, PartII," Studia
Islamica, 56 (1982), 147-66; Donald Quataert, "The 1908 Young Turk Revolution: Old and
New Approaches," Middle East Studies Association Bulletin, 13:1 (1979), 22-29.
2 Mardin,Genesis, 121-32; idem, "Power, Civil Society, and Culture," 277; idem, "Super
Westernizationin Urban Life in the Ottoman Empire in the Last Quarterof the Nineteenth
Century," in Turkey:Geographicand Political Perspectives, PeterBenedict et al., eds. (Leiden,
1974), 403-46.
0010-4175/86/1481-2342 $2.50 ? 1986 Society for ComparativeStudy of Society and History
82
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
Young Ottomans they were as political mobilizers.3 Finally, international
political forces played a part, as indicated by the role of refugees from the
RussianEmpirein the developmentof Turkishnationalism,and by the excitement that the Russo-JapaneseWar and the Russianrevolutionof 1905 roused
in the OttomanEmpire, as elsewhere in Asia.4
No doubt, this political-intellectualinterpretationcovers many of the most
importantpoints. Yet, it remains to ask whether analysis of additionallinkages between the sequence-ferment-repression-revolution-and its historical context would not add significantly to understandingof the sequence.
This essay answersthe question positively by showing that the sequence was
linked to economic, as well as intellectual and political, developments.5 In
fact, as 1908 approached,the economic situationevolved into a variationon a
well-known theory that seeks the origins of revolutionin a "sharp reversal"
following a "prolonged period . . . of economic and social development."6
Evidence for the interpretationoffered here emerges from comparisonof
two sets of quantitativedata:the salariesrecordedin the personneldossiers of
the OttomanForeign Ministry, and the commodity prices publishedin Istanbul newspapersof the period 1851-1914. The method of analysis is to produce time series, of salary statistics in the one case, and commodityprices in
the other, and then, by comparingthese series, to arriveat conclusions about
changes over time in the economic position of a key sector of the bureaucratic
intelligentsia.7
3 Since I have treated problems of ideology and political mobilization in another study,
discussionof these topics here will be schematic. Interestedreadersshould see Findley, "Advent
of Ideology, Part II."
4 Nikki Keddie, "Religion and Irreligionin EarlyIranianNationalism," ComparativeStudies
in Society and History, 4:3 (1962), 265; L. S. Stavrianos,Global Rift (New York, 1981), 38890; David Kushner,The Rise of TurkishNationalism (London, 1977), 10-14.
5 A similar argument for the years right around 1908 appears in Donald Quataert, "The
Economic Climate of the 'Young Turk Revolution' in 1908," Journal of ModernHistory, 51:3
(1979), D1147-D 1161 (available from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan, orderno.
IJ-00049). See also idem, "Commercializationof Agriculturein OttomanTurkey, 1800-1914,"
InternationalJournal of TurkishStudies, 1:2 (1980), 52-53.
6 James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," in When Men Revolt-and Why,
James C. Davies, ed. (New York, 1971), 134-47. Some scholars question whether the term
revolution is appropriatefor the Young Turk case of 1908. The view taken here is that it is
meaningfulto speak of revolutionarytransformationof a political system-a fundamental,violent, restructuringof the political game-as distinctfrom more drasticrevolutionsthattransform
socioeconomicrelations,and perhapsculture,as well. Revolutionarytransformationof a polity is
also distinguishablefrom the less drasticcoup d'6tat, an irregularand usually violent change in
the identity of those who wield power, without necessarily any restructuringof the political
process. The view of political revolutiontaken here is congruentwith the ideas of Davies, and
other theorists of revolution. Considering what the Ottoman Empire was like before 1908, a
strongcase can be made that the Ottomanexperience of 1908 was a political revolutionas here
defined.
7 For assistancein this research,I am indebtedto the late WilfordL'Esperance,andto Charles
Issawi, Mehmet Genq, Andreas Tietze, Russell Major, David Landes, Metin Heper, Yilmaz
Esmer, Lars Sandberg, Donald Quataert,,evket Pamuk, Feroz Ahmad, Justin McCarthy,Tom
Whitney, and Jim Wagner.
ECONOMIC
BASES
OF OTTOMAN
REVOLUTION
83
While bureaucraticsalaries, particularlythose of a single agency, may
seem to have little bearingon the subjectindicatedin the title of this essay, the
Foreign Ministry-aside from being the one Ottoman government agency
whose personnel records are available to researchersas a discrete corpus of
manageable size-was particularlyimportantin the rise of the modernist
intelligentsia. This was especially true in the generation of the Young Ottomans, almost all of whose leaderswere associatedwith this ministry.While
less strong in the generationof the Young Turks, whose leaders came from
both militaryand civil services, the link to the civil bureaucracywas a significant fact of thatperiod, too.8 The economic fortunesof less elite segments of
Ottomansociety are now becoming betterknown,9 and we shall make at least
some comparativecomments aboutthem in this discussion. Given limited but
growing political mobilizationin this period, however, the economic fortunes
of the elites surely had more to do with the origins of majorpolitical movements than did those of the masses, however importantthe latter were in
respondingto opposition appeals.
I.
FOREIGN
MINISTRY
SALARIES
In 1877, the Ottomangovernmentbegan to keep official personnel records,
includingregularmentionof salarychanges. Data collected from all recoverable files of career officials of the Foreign Ministry provide the basis for a
study of bureaucraticsalaries throughoutroughly the second half of the nineteenth century. Analysis of the salaries presents problems pertainingto the
representativenessof the data, the monetaryunit of payment, the relationof
the salary figures in the records to the actual receipts of the officials, and
variations over the years in the numbers and seniority of the officials for
whom thereare data. Once the observationsand adjustmentsthatcan be made
in response to these problems, as set forth in the appendix, have been carried
out, we are in position to open discussion of the salarystructureby presenting
series of adjustedmeans and medians. These figures are shown in Table 1,
and are presented graphically in Figure 1. Considerationof the means and
8 Phrasesliked bureaucraticintelligentsiaarejustified in speakingof the Ottomanelites in the
sense that, historically, governmentservice was the predominant,almost the exclusive, way for
intellectuals to earn their livelihoods. One of the best-chartedthemes of nineteenth-century
Ottomanhistory is the link between reformand the creationof a Western-oriented"modernist"
segment within the bureaucraticintelligentsia. In the civil bureaucracy,the Foreign Ministry
played the key role in shapingthe modernistleadershipthatdominatedthe governmentduringthe
Tanzimat. The rise of the Young Ottomans in the 1860s representsthe emergence from the
"modernistintelligentsia" of a movement opposing the leading Tanzimatstatesmen. About the
same time, bureaucraticand literarycareerswere also beginningto differentiate,a process linked
especially to the rise of journalism(Mardin,Genesis, 124-27; idem, Jon Turklerin,94 et passim;
Lewis, Emergence, 88-89, 147-50; CarterVaughn Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton, 1980), 126-40, 209-17; idem, "Ideology, Part II," 151-52).
9 KorkutBoratav, A. G. Okgiin, and S. Pamuk, "Ottoman
Wages and the World Economy,
1839-1913," Review (publishedby the FernandBraudelCenter, State Universityof New York,
Binghamton), forthcoming.
CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY
84
TABLE 1
Monthly Salaries of Ottoman Foreign Ministry Officials Serving in
Istanbul, Adjusted Means and Medians
(gold kurus per month)
Means
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
5,536
4,137
2,691
2,668
1,655
2,674
2,600
2,960
3,386
3,331
Medians
4,550
3,100
1,500
3,050
1,550
3,017
3,025
1,844
1,916
1,991
1,150
1,150
1,044
1,050
1,339
1,035
1,011
1,218
1,174
1,212
1,215
1,216
1,201
2,070
1,231
2,151
1,242
2,148
2,773
2,680
2,216
2,461
1,917
1,887
1,666
1,753
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
Means
Medians
2,024
1,889
1,740
1,668
1,604
1,522
1,511
1,604
1,534
1,599
1,716
1,686
1,256
1,255
1,231
1,213
1,188
1,181
1,144
1,144
1,039
1,153
1,062
1,193
1,201
1,230
1,169
1,723
1,821
1,932
1,910
1,947
1,964
1,960
1,473
1,530
966
1,242
1,218
1,278
1,218
1,315
1,347
1,266
1,414
1,212
1,177
1,169
925
SOURCE:Salary statistics are computed from the salary notations in the personnel files of 366
officials of the OttomanForeign Ministry. The sources and proceduresfor the computationsare
explained more fully in the appendix.
medians leads on to analysis of long-term change in the salary distribution,
and to an initial consideration of what the salaries shown in the table meant in
terms of living standards.
Perhaps the most conspicuous point in these salary statistics is that the
means are almost invariably higher than the medians. The greater the gap, the
stronger the indication that the salary distribution was inegalitarian, with
many low salaries and a few higher ones. The greater the inequality, the
greater the extent to which the median-the midmost salary when all salaries
the mean as an indicator of the fortunes of
are ranked by amount-excels
most members of the group studied. The mean-median gap does narrow over
ECONOMIC
BASES
OF OTTOMAN
REVOLUTION
85
10,000
Medan
C
1,000
t
Median
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
FIGURE
1. Monthly Salariesof OttomanForeignMinistryOfficials Serving in Istanbul,Adjusted
Means and Medians
time, since the means tend to fall, while the mediansremainnearlyon a level.
The exceptionally high values in both curves for the early years may be
anomalies due to computation from small numbers of cases. Or they may
signal that salarieshad been much higherduringthe Tanzimat(ca. 1839-71),
a political period when the civil bureaucracydominatedthe polity as never
again.
The ideal way to learn more about the salary distributionwould be to
compute statistical measures of dispersion, but this is not possible with the
manipulateddata distributionthat emerges from the controls for seniority.
One way to get around this problem, and incidentally to learn more about
salariesin the precedingperiod, is to comparethe salaryof the highest official
of the ministry, the foreign minister, with the lowest salary paid there. Since
Ottoman officials normally began their careers as unpaid apprentices, verificationof the lowest salarypresentsno problem.Therewere always officials
with a salaryof zero. The salariesof the ministers,however, variedover time
in ways that reinforce the implications of the mean-mediangap shown in
Figure 1. Because indications of these salaries appearboth in the personnel
recordsand in other sources, extending back to the 1830s, the available data
on this point cover a much longer span of time than the statistics in Table 1.
Examiningnotationsof the amountsof foreign ministers' salaries, we find
that, of eight mentions for 1838-76, seven were in the range of 60,000 to
75,000 kuru?per month; and the one anomaly, in 1872, was 50,000-still
86
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
more than forty times the median for that year, shown in Table 1.10 Recent
studies indicate that an Ottomanlaborer would have been fortunateto earn
250 kurus per month in the early 1870s; thus the dimensions of Ottoman
bureaucraticelitism emerge clearly from these figures."I The military and
fiscal crises of the late 1870s lowered the minister's salaryto around40,000
kurusper month.12For 1880-84, it fell again, by half, to an all-time low of
20,000 kuru. 13In 1885-95, the figure was again 30,000 per month.14 From
1896 throughthe Young Turk revolution, the salary wavered in the range of
36-46,000 kuru?.In the purges and salary cuts that followed the revolution,
the minister's salary fell to 25,000.15 That was still about twenty times the
adjustedmedian Foreign Ministry salary shown in Table 1, while the successor of the lucky laborerwho earned 250 kuru?per month in 1872 would
perhapshave earned 350 by that date.16 World War I broughta cut of 50
percentto all bureaucraticsalaries. By 1916, inflation forced a restorationof
the amountcut and even the additionof cost-of-living supplements,although
these proved inadequate.17
Since the highest salary indicates the range of salaries, the lowest salary
10 Salaries mentionedfor 1838-76 (and data sources) are: 75,000 kurus
per month (Haus-,
Hof-, and Staatsarchiv,Vienna, Turkei VI/67, 18 April 1838); 65,000 (BasbakanlikArchives,
Istanbul(cited as BBA), Maliyeden Miidevver (cited as MM) 11738, p. 11, entry of 17 Safer
1256/20 April 1840); 75,000 (BBA, Dahiliye sicill-i ahval defterleri(cited as DSA) II, 218, entry
of 1273/1856-57); 61,455 (BBA, MM 10531, p. 20, entry of 27 Mart 1277/8 April 1861);
75,000 (BBA, MM 10529, pp. 11, 22, entries of 26-27 Mart and 10 Nisan 1279/7-8 and 22
April 1863); 50,000 (BBA, DSA II, 416, entryof 2 Cemaziyilahir 1289/7 August 1872); 75,000
(BBA, DSA XXII, 37, entry of I Rebiyulahir1291/18 May 1874); 75,000 (BBA, DSA II, 416,
entry of 8 Zilhicce 1291/16 January1875, incumbentin office until May 1876).
1 To compute this wage estimate, I have multipliedthe highest daily wage estimates in the
appendixof Boratavet al., "OttomanWages," by twenty-six, the averagenumberof workdays
per month assuming a six-day workweek and full employment. See also Charles Issawi, The
Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1980), 37-43.
12 Salaries for 1876-79 (and data sources): 39,000 kurus (BBA, DSA II, 416, entry of 25
Cemaziyulevvel 1293/18 June 1876); 40,000 (ibid., entry of 16 Safer 1295/19 February1878);
39,000 (ibid., entryof 9 ?aban 1296/29 July 1879). In all notes mentioningministerialsalariesof
1876 and later, consistency with the procedureoutlined in the appendixwould requiremultiplying the salaries by 0.975 to convert them into gold kurus. Since the highest salaries may have
been paid in gold (Findley, BureaucraticReform, 237)-one more inequity of the salary system-I have not done this here.
13 BBA, DSA IV, 114, entries of 5evval 1297/September 1880, 14 Muharrem 1300/25
November 1882, 19 Cemaziyulahir 1301/16 April 1884; BBA, DSA I, 576-77, entry of 20
Cemaziyulahir1299/9 May 1882.
14 BBA, DSA I, 576-77, entry of 15 Zilhicce 1302/25 September 1885, incumbentin office
through 1895.
15 Mentionsof salaries for 1896-1908 begin with 45,000 kurus(BBA, DSA I, 576-77, entry
of 15 Receb 1313/1 January1896). The following are from HariciyeArchives, Istanbul(cited as
Har.), Sicill-i Ahval collection (cited as SA) 429: 40,000 (entry of 18 Cemaziyulevvel 1313/6
November 1895); 36,000 (9 Sevval 1314/24 March 1896); 46,000 (4 Receb 1318/28 October,
1900); 25,000 (17 ?aban 1326/14 September 1908).
16 Boratavet al., "Ottoman Wages," appendix.
17 Ahmed Emin [Yalman], Turkeyin the World War (New Haven, 1930), 151-53; Zafer
Toprak, Turkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 1908-1918 [Economic nationalism in Turkey] (Ankara,
1982), 334-35.
ECONOMIC
BASES
OF OTTOMAN
REVOLUTION
87
being zero, it is clear that the scope of inequality within the ministry was
fantasticallywide. The elitism of this ministryand probablyothers, especially
that of the top officials, was also of grotesqueproportionswhen comparedto
the statusof humble folk. The rangeof ForeignMinistrysalariesdid fall over
time, however, especially with the government bankruptcy in the late
1870s,18the revolutionin 1908, and WorldWar I. Whatfinally destroyedthe
economic elitism of the ruling class was the dilemma, from 1914 on, of the
person on fixed income faced with runawayinflation.
This inflationarycatastropheraises a question so far neglected for earlier
dates: what the officials' salaries shown in Table I meant in terms of their
living standards.This question is difficult to deal with, but there are indications of what Ottomanofficials regardedas a living wage. For the end of the
period, there are also two systematic, but contradictory,calculationsof living
costs. From these sources, some inferences emerge.
Analysis of the bureaucrats'estimates of a living wage confronts several
problems. Some of the estimates rangequite high, telling perhapsmore about
what bureaucratswanted than about what they needed to supporttheir families. 19Only infrequently,moreover, do specifics aboutthe size of the family
to be supportedaccompany the estimates. On the other hand, the difference
between nominal entitlements and net receipts (discussed in the appendix)
ceases to be a concern in analysis of these estimates, for the officials obviously knew that their salaries would not be paid regularly and must have
made allowance for this disparity.
Fortunately,there are some estimates of the 1890s that yield a consistent
and seemingly realistic indication of what officials then thought it took to
supporta family. For example, one bureaucraticmemoirist recorded some
calculations, aroundthe turnof this century, abouthow much he would need
to retire. He wrote that since he had a small family, he could get by on 5 liras
a month, or about 540 kuru?in silver.20Such a sum would not have sufficed,
then, for a man with full family responsibilities.As if to supportthis point, a
petitionerasserted in 1897 that he could not accept a post at a salary of 600
kuru?because he could not supporthis family on that.21For officials with
large families, or with bad habits such as alcoholism, the definition of an
inadequatesalary could be much higher.22
18 A. Du Velay, Essai sur l'histoirefinanciere de la Turquie(Paris, 1903), 316-461; Donald
Blaisdell, EuropeanFinancial Controlin the OttomanEmpire(New York, 1929), 74-107; Shaw
and Shaw, History, II, 221-27; Issawi, An EconomicHistoryof the MiddleEast and NorthAfrica
(New York, 1982), 64-65.
19 E.g., Levant Herald, 4 August 1875, p. 276, circular from grand vezir to provincial
governors, implying a figure of 3,000 kurus.
20
Asqidede Halil Ibrahim,Hatiralar [Memoirs], R. E. Koqu, ed. (Istanbul, 1960), 114-15.
21
BBA, Bab-i Ali Evrak Odasi 6641, Hasan Tahsin to Grand Vezir, 20 Kanun-i Sani
1312/1897.
22 Har., SA 531,
entry of Cemaziyulahir 1314/1896: unable to manage on 920 kuru?per
month because of size of family and alcoholism; Har., SA 270, entry of 17 Nisan 1327/1911:
2,000 kurus per month inadequatefor large family at Aleppo.
88
CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY
Still, it appearsthat an official of the mid-1890s would have considereda
salaryof 1,000 kuru?per monthadequateto supporta family. Saying that she
had only a very small pension, and that her son's salary was only 250 kuru?
per month, an official's widow petitioned in 1892 for the son's salary to be
raised to 1,000 kuru?.23Also referringto the 1890s, when he, too, was an
official, the writer H. Z. Usakligil discussed the significance that a raise to
1,000 kuru?had for him on accountof an "importantdeath" in the family.24
On this basis, the adjustedForeign Ministry medians for the 1890s appear
comfortable,althoughby definition half the officials made no more than the
median, and some of those with lower salaries must have had large families.
By the Young Turkperiod, the most nearlycomparablesalaryestimatesare
fifty to one hundredpercenthigher. In a reporton a proposedreorganization
of 1912, the director of the Foreign Press Office, a part of the Foreign
Ministry, said that salaries of 1,500-2,000 per month would be necessary to
attractproperlyqualifiedofficials. The directorgeneralof anotherdepartment
reportedthat his staff should be reorganizedin classes receiving 800-1,000,
1,000-1,200, 1,200-1,500, and 1,500-2,000 kuru? per month.25 It is a
matterof judgment to estimate at what age, on average, such an individual
would become the chief providerfor his family, presumablyan extendedone.
The assumptionthatthis occurredat aboutage thirty-fivewould again probably suggest a needed salary of 1,500. The latest medians shown in Table 1
offer little confidence that most bureaucratsmade that much in 1912.
Systematic estimates of living costs computed from prices of a typical
shoppinglist of goods, with the prices weighted by likely amountsconsumed,
are available only for the eve of World War I. Even then, there are wide
disparitiesin the estimates. One places the budgetof a "mid-level" official in
1914 at the low figure of 235.25 kuru?.26The budgetis incomplete, however,
since it omits such predictableexpendituresas tobacco, transportation,andmost important-housing. There is a more complete estimate for 1914 that
sets the budgetfor a family of middle standing(orta halli), as reckonedby the
Istanbul Chamberof Commerce, at 945 kuru?.27Of this, 150 is for rent;
tobacco and transportationagain do not appear. In the present state of research, it is not clear how the difference between these estimates should be
explained. The fact that the lower one comes from the European-controlled
Public Debt Administration,which paid its Ottomanemployees regularlyand
23 Har., Terciime Kalemi Evraki 1406, no. 226, petition of Enise Hanim, 20 Agustos
1308/1892.
24 Halid Ziya U?akligil, Kirk Yil [Memoirs] (Istanbul, 1969), 358.
25 Har., Mutenevvi 249, both
reportsenclosed in dossier on reorganizationof ForeignMinistry, ca. 1912.
26 Toprak, Turkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 332-33.
27 Vedat Eldem, OsmanliImparatorlugununIktisadi5artlari Hakknda bir Tetkik[Economic
conditions in the OttomanEmpire] (Ankara, 1970), 214-15.
ECONOMIC
BASES
TABLE
OF OTTOMAN
REVOLUTION
89
2
Percentage Relatives, Ottoman Foreign Ministry Salaries (Istanbul),
Adjusted Means and Medians
(base period 1880-82)
Means
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
SOURCE:
note 30.
Medians
Means
Medians
316
1887
236
153
152
94
152
375
256
124
1888
1889
1890
1891
115
108
99
95
91
104
104
102
100
98
252
1892
87
128
249
250
95
95
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
86
91
97
94
148
169
193
190
122
158
153
126
140
109
108
95
100
105
109
114
118
123
86
87
110
85
83
100
97
100
100
100
99
102
102
87
91
98
96
98
104
110
109
111
112
112
84
87
55
81
67
94
86
95
88
98
99
101
96
102
100
105
100
108
111
104
100
96
76
These statistics were computed from those in Table 1, using the procedureoutlined in
so was able to get good service at modest rates, may have depressed the
figure.28 Since, to judge from workers' wages, it must have been possible for
a family to subsist on the lower budget, the difference may stem from variant
concepts of what was appropriate for the ill-defined mid-levels of Ottoman
society. Given the medians in Table 1, however, the larger budget seems
more realistic. An official of 1914 with a nominal salary of 1,500 kurus might
perhaps have taken home 945 a month on average. Because extrapolation
from the latest medians in Table 1 suggests that most officials of 1914 did not
have a nominal salary of 1,500 kurus-yet did have one several times the
28 Robert G. Landen, The
Emergence of the Modern Middle East (New York, 1970), 173.
90
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
lower of the two budgets-to accept the higher estimate fits the assertionof
one qualified observerthat official salaries before World War I amountedto
"scarcely . . . a living wage."29
These figures from 1914 take us as far as it is possible to go with currently
available cost-of-living estimates. We can, however, preparefor a different
approachto the salary-pricecomparison by converting the adjusted salary
statistics shown in Table 1 into percentage relatives, which we shall later
compare with a grain price average expressed in the same terms.30Table 2
presents the salary relatives, analysis of which follows in the last section of
this study.
II.
ISTANBUL
COMMODITY
PRICES
To date, no scholar has computed-or even found the sources for-a time
series based on a comprehensivemarket-basketcalculation of Istanbulconsumerprices for the late nineteenthcentury.31Except for 1914, when we have
the two contradictorycost-of-living figures, determinationof living costs for
thatperiodthereforedependson some proxy for a systematiccalculation.One
recent study uses Britishconsumerprices as a "crude indicator"of Ottoman
prices.32Growing integrationof the Ottomaneconomy into the world market
argues for this approach.Yet, a look at the goods used to compute the 1914
cost-of-living estimatesdiscussed in the previous section suggests that 60-75
percent of either budget went for local goods whose prices must have responded to local factors: perishable foodstuffs, from fruit to fish; firewood
and charcoal; housing.33 Persons with discretional income, businesses, or
29 Ahmed Emin [Yalman], Turkey, 151.
30 The point of recomputingtime series as percentagerelatives is to convert values expressed
in other terms into percentages, with the value for an arbitrarilyselected base period set equal to
100. This techniquenot only facilitates analysis of change over time in a single statisticalseries,
but also-if the base period used for all series is the same-permits the comparisonof different
series. For computationof percentagerelatives on a common base period turnsdisparatevalues
and measures(salary per month, price per unit) into comparablevalues expressed on a common
scale. To convertthe salariesstatedin kuru?in Table 1 into percentagerelatives, we use 1880-82
as the base period. For the means, the divisor used to computethe relativesis the arithmeticmean
of the three annual means falling in the base period. Since medians are not mathematically
manipulable,I have taken as the divisor the middle value of the three salarymediansfor the base
period. To computethe relatives, the values in kuru?for each year are divided by the appropriate
divisor, and the result is expressed as a percentage. By this procedure, as Table 2 shows, the
averageof the means for the base period (1880-82) equals 100. In the case of the medians, it is
the middlevalue-here appearing(becauseof roundingin calculation)as a pairedvalue-for the
same years that equals 100.
31 Boratavet al., "OttomanWages," second section;cf. Issawi, EconomicHistoryof Turkey,
44-50, 332-36; Safi Yorulmaz, "IstanbuldaToptan E?ya Fiyatlari (1884-1911 Yillannda)"
[Wholesale commodity prices], Konjonktur(1946), 45-55; and Donald Quataert, "Ottoman
Reformand Agriculturein Anatolia" (Ph.D. diss., Universityof California,Los Angeles, 1973),
21-23, 366-70, which uses the same sources analyzed here.
32 Boratavet al., "Ottoman Wages," second section.
33 Toprak, Tiirkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 333; Eldem, OsmanlhImparatorlugununIktisadi
5artlarl, 214-15. In computingthe percentagefor the estimate in Toprak,I added 100 kuru?for
ECONOMIC
BASES
OF OTTOMAN
REVOLUTION
9I
governmentagencies may well have spent more on imports. As a guide to the
fortunesof the average Ottoman, however, British prices are not necessarily
preferableto even a narrowlybased indicatorfrom the local market.
In this study, we shall use a composite average of Istanbulgrain prices. It
can be objected that grain prices give a better idea about the living standards
of the poor than about those of relatively affluent officials, that most grains
tradedin Istanbulwere imported,at least until the mid-1890s, or thatthe price
of grain fell faster than that of other items duringthe price decline extending
into the same decade.34 Yet, movements in grain prices help us locate times
of economic distress that, as other sources show, did have an effect on the
official class. The figures will show, too, that Istanbulgrainprices responded
to local forces as well as to ones from far afield; and allowances can be made
in discussion for the exceptional extent of the price decline.
The prices analyzed here come from commodity quotations of the years
1851-1914.35 To reduce distortion from seasonal price fluctuations, these
have been averagedon a quarterlybasis, with all prices stated in gold kuru?
per okka, a unit of weight equal to 2.828 pounds (1.283 kilograms).36Initial
rent (cf. 150 in the larger Eldem estimate). On integrationinto the world economy, see ?evket
Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisi ve Diinya Kapitalizmi(1820-1913) [Ottomaneconomy and world
capitalism] (Ankara, 1984), chs. 2, 7.
34 On provenanceof grains tradedin Istanbul, see note 36. With the extension of the railroad
into Anatolia, Ottoman-growngrains began to assume an important-in some years, preponderant-place in the Istanbul market, but starting only in the 1890s (Quataert, "Economic
Climate," Dl 157; idem, "Limited Revolution:The Impactof the AnatolianRailway on Turkish
Transportationand the Provisioning of Istanbul, 1890-1908," Business History Review, 51:2
(1977), 151, 154-58). Boratavet al., "OttomanWages," emphasize the exceptionaldecline in
grain prices after 1873.
35 I collected quotations from newspaperspublished on, or soon after, I March, 1 June, 1
September, and 1 December of each year. The publications (followed by abbreviations),with
quartersand years for which they served, are:Journalde Constantinople,1851-2d qtr. of 1865 (I
found no quotationsfor 1850); LevantHerald (LH), 3d 1865-2d 1875; La Turquie,3d 1875-3d
1880; ConstantinopleMessenger (CM), 4th 1880-2d 1881; LH, 3d 1881-1st 1882; Eastern
Express (EE), 2d 1882-1884; Journal de la Chambrede Commercede Constantinople(JCCC),
lst-3d 1885;EE, 4th 1885; LevantHerald and EasternExpress(LHEE), lst-2d 1886;JCCC, 3d
1886-1887; LHEE, 1888-1891; JCCC, 1892-2d 1914; Moniteuroriental, I August 1914. ConstantinopleMessenger, Eastern Express, and Levant Herald and Eastern Express are alternate
names, inspired by the censor, for Levant Herald.
36 I converted newspaperquotationsinto gold kurus per okka by relying, whereverpossible,
on notations,publishedwith the prices, on the value of the monetaryunits and measuresin which
the quotationswere given. In other cases, the best guidance came from "Poids et mesures en
Turquie,"JCCC, no. 456, 23 September1893, pp. 446-67; no. 460, 21 October 1893, pp. 49596; no. 466, 2 November 1893, pp. 567-68. Since, for every commodity, several varieties or
provenanceswere quoted, I computedcommodity averagesas averagesof varietalsubseries. The
procedurewas to select for each variety all years in which there were quotationsfor at least three
quarters.From each subseries, all other years were excluded as offering insufficient control for
seasonal fluctuations. Averaging the quotations for the selected years produced varietal price
series, which were then averagedto producethe commodityaveragesin Table 3. To minimizethe
impactof price differences amongcommoditieson the composite grainprice average, I computed
it as an average of percentage relatives (Table 4). The computationof percentagerelatives is
explainedin note 30. Again 1880-82-an intervalintermediate,in termsof both time and price-
92
CARTER VAUGHN FINDLEY
efforts to take accountof a largerrangeof commoditiesfounderedon the fact
that many of the items quoted were not consumergoods, or not directly so,
while varieties and quality grades of some consumergoods, such as tea and
sugar, varied so widely over time as to be unintelligible.
While concentrationon grains was more a matterof necessity than choice,
grain products were and are extremely importantin the Turkish diet. The
prime example of this is bread, of which the average Ottomanat the turn of
this centuryreportedlyconsumed a kilogramor more a day.37As a Levantine
womanof Istanbulonce explainedto an Englishman, "vous etes carnivore,je
suis carnipain."38The price of breadwas officially controlledin Istanbul,so
thatthe effects of shifts in wholesale wheat and flourprices were passed on to
the consumeronly intermittently.This does not, however, deprive wheat and
flour prices of value as indicatorsof movements in the economy. Too, Ottoman bakershad ways, at times, of "disadjusting"the official breadprice,
for example, by decreasingloaf size.39 And Ottomansconsumedother baked
goods, various types of noodles, cracked wheat (bulgur), and other grain
products.
With this introduction, we may now examine the price tables. Table 3
presents annualaverage prices for four cereal items-hard and soft wheats,
barley, and flour. The table states the kuru?prices in decimals; in fact, the
subdivisionof the kurus was the para, at forty to the kuru?.40
Of the four commodities, hard wheat was normally used for making
levels, between the highest and lowest prices recorded-served as the base period. For want of
indicationsof consumptionvolumes, the composite grain average is necessarily an unweighted
one. This limits its value from an economic point of view, and could be takento indicateuse of a
single commodityseries for comparisonwith salaries. Here, the unweightedaverage is preferred
as having fewer gaps.
Varietalsubseriesfor each commodity, with the dates for which each is quoted, follow. Hard
Wheat: Azov-Taganrog, 1850-90; Ismail-Bessarabia, 1850-90; Galatz-Danube-Constantza,
1851-90; Rumelian (Balqik, Burgaz), 1850-96; Edime, Rodosto, 1862-1903; Anatolia-Bandirma, 1896-1906; AnatolianFirst, 1905-14; Anatolian Second, 1907-14. Soft Wheat:Rumanian (Galatz, Galatz-Braila,Danube, Braila), 1850-88, 1893-96, 1906-13; Rumelian(BurgazVarna-Balqik,Varna-Balqik), 1850-96; Burgaz-Plovdiv, Plovdiv-Zagora, Zagora, 1880-96;
Konya First, 1904-15; Konya Second, 1904-14; AnkaraFirst, 1904-12; AnkaraSecond, 190412. Barley: Braila, Danubian, 1851-1913; Rumelian, 1858-1908; Black Sea, Odessa, 18881900; Mersin, 1899-1914; Anatolian First, 1903-14; Anatolian Second, 1903-14. Flour:
Odessa 2d, 000, 1, and successor grades, 1869-1914; Odessa 3d, 00, and successor grades,
1868-1914; Danube 2d, Braila 3d, and successor middling grades, 1870-80, 1882-85, 1888,
1890-1908, 1911-14; Danube 3d, Braila00, 4th, and successor lower grades, 1868-76, 187879, 1890-97, 1899-1902, 1907-08, 1911-14; Local, local Braila, local kirma, 1868-1914.
37 Quataert, "Economic Climate," Dl1154.
38 Bulletin mensuel de la Chambre de commercefrancaise de Constantinople,no. 256 (31
July 1908), 156.
39 Quataert, "Economic Climate," D1155, events of 1908.
40 Gaps in the price series have two possible explanations.Some signify insufficientnumbers
of quarterlyquotations.Others, especially longer gaps like that of 1896-1903 for soft wheat, or
shortgaps across all series, signify that no quotationswere being published. The reason is never
stated, but sometimes (i.e., 1855, 1915-18) it was obviously war.
TABLE 3
Annual Averages of Istanbul Grain Prices
(in gold kurus per okka)
Hard
Soft
Wheat Wheat Barley Flour
1851
1852
1853
1854
0.79
0.87
1.16
2.05
0.63
0.76
0.95
1.89
0.45
0.49
0.57
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1.81
1.51
1.20
1.29
1.43
1.33
1.35
1.05
0.98
1.03
1.19
1.17
0.84
0.60
0.68
0.66
0.70
0.68
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1.00
0.97
1.27
1.59
1.51
1.17
1.27
1.33
1.23
1.54
1.47
1.22
1.14
1.27
1.29
1.46
1.52
1.36
0.91
0.88
1.13
1.41
1.43
1.03
1.14
1.18
1.09
1.47
1.27
1.15
1.09
1.28
1.28
1.31
1.47
1.32
0.50
0.49
0.63
0.89
0.93
0.64
0.71
0.75
0.63
0.75
0.84
0.78
0.63
0.65
0.77
0.78
0.90
0.74
1.75
1.84
1.83
1.82
1.86
2.15
2.08
1882
1.26
1.12
0.72
1.84
2.11
1.77
1.87
2.05
1.79
Hard
Soft
Wheat Wheat Barley Flour
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1.12
0.96
0.95
1.04
0.99
0.93
0.89
1.02
1.34
1.01
0.90
0.69
0.76
0.79
0.70
0.59
1.37
1.17
1.13
1.15
0.94
0.96
0.95
1.10
1.27
1.26
1.13
1.03
1.19
0.56
0.53
0.52
0.63
0.74
0.62
0.56
0.41
0.47
0.51
0.51
0.62
0.67
0.65
0.55
0.60
0.61
0.58
0.63
0.70
0.87
0.85
0.89
0.78
0.80
0.97
1.72
1.45
1.49
1.76
1.63
1.39
1.60
1.60
1.87
1.57
1.32
1.02
1.04
1.13
1.50
1.59
1.42
1.33
1.33
1.26
1.31
1.36
1.38
1.37
1.64
1.82
1.72
1.51
1.54
1.65
1.22
1.14
1.21
1.13
0.93
0.78
1.67
1.60
0.91
0.94
1.01
1.01
0.98
0.97
0.96
1.30
0.98
0.89
0.59
0.61
0.69
0.90
1.07
0.98
0.87
0.81
0.80
0.88
0.90
0.94
0.98
1.14
SOURCES:Price statistics are computedfrom commodity price quotationspublishedin contempo-
raryIstanbulnewspapers.The sources and proceduresfor the computationsare explained in notes
35 and 36.
TABLE4
Percentage Relatives, Annual Averages of Istanbul G
(base period 1880-82)
Composite
Grain
Price
Average
Hard
Wheat
Soft
Wheat
1851
1852
1853
1854
57
63
84
149
49
59
73
145
57
62
72
54
61
77
147
1856
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
131
109
87
94
104
96
104
81
75
79
92
90
106
76
86
84
89
86
114
89
83
85
95
91
Barley
Flour
Hard
Wheat
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
66
68
73
73
71
70
70
94
71
65
43
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
SOURCE:
73
70
92
115
109
85
92
96
89
112
107
88
83
92
94
106
110
99
91
70
68
87
109
110
79
88
91
84
113
98
89
84
99
99
101
113
102
86
63
62
80
113
118
81
90
95
80
95
106
99
80
82
98
99
114
94
91
105
88
93
102
89
87
91
91
90
92
106
103
91
69
67
86
112
110
83
91
96
85
107
104
91
84
91
95
99
111
99
90
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
44
50
65
78
71
63
59
58
64
65
68
71
83
99
85
82
83
88
83
outlinedin note30.
Thesestatisticsarecomputedfromthosein Table3, usingthe procedure
96
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
200
Grain Price Average
50 -
i
3020-
10
1850
i
I
1860
1870
i
1880
i
i
1890
1900
1910
FIGURE
2. Grain Price Average, Istanbul
(in percentagerelatives, base period 1880-82)
noodles. Soft wheat was chiefly used for makingbread.Barley, while the second most widely cultivated grain in Turkey after wheat in the 1920s and the
preferredgrain for breadmakingin some provinces at that time,41 was not a
majorconstituentof the diet of Istanbuldwellers. In Istanbul,most barleywas
consumedby horses, a fact that affected living costs to the extent that people
used horses for transportation.Barley was also a raw materialfor the brewing
industry,which dates back to the late nineteenthcenturyat least, and whose
productswere surely not unknownto the official class. The mainjustification
for including barley in the average is that its record is the longest and most
nearly uninterruptedof the commodity series. Includingboth flour and soft
wheat in the average will have the effect, in years when prices for both are
available, of reinforcingthe representationof the commodities most directly
related to breadmaking.
Since the main interestof this study is in the composite cereal price average, we may proceed, without further comment on Table 3, to the price
relatives, which provide the basis for computationof this average. These
statistics are listed in Table 4 and presentedin graphic form in Figure 2.
The composite grain average will serve for comparisonwith the adjusted
salary means and medians. Before looking at this comparison, it will be
helpful to examine the fluctuationsin the composite average and to compare
them with otherinformationabouteconomic conditionsin Istanbulduringthis
period.
41 G. Stratil-Sauer,"Cereal Productionin Turkey," Economic Geography, 9:4 (1933), 324,
327-39; Quataert, "Limited Revolution," 149.
ECONOMIC
BASES
OF OTTOMAN
REVOLUTION
97
The most importantfeatureof the composite grain average is no doubt the
extent to which it parallelswell-known fluctuationsin other majormarketsof
the period. In the midst of a downward price trend for grains and other
commodities that spanned almost the entire nineteeth century, we find a
cyclical rise into the 1870s, followed by a decline to depressionlevels in the
1890s, and then an upturnthat lasted, on the world market, until 1920.42
Superimposedon this pattern, however, are short-termpeaks, usually attributableto local or regional crises. The first and sharpestpeak in 1854-56
coincides with the CrimeanWar. That of 1867-68 coincides not only with a
price peak in the internationalgrain markets,43but also with the Cretancrisis
of 1866-69.44 Occurringat a time when the financialposition of the Ottoman
governmentwas steadily worsening, the crisis caused economic strain,which
the Young Ottomanideologues did not fail to exploit.45In 1868, distresswas
so great in Istanbul that the wives of officials serving in the provinces besieged the Ministryof Financein screamingmobs, demandingtheirhusbands'
salaries. The finance minister had to be assigned a special guard. Public
security virtually ceased to exist on the outskirts of the city and declined
within it.46
The 1870s brought graver troubles. The Anatolian famine of the early
1870s had limited effect on the Istanbulmarketbecause little Anatolianproduce could reachthe capital as yet. Even so, prices went up, for 1873 marked
a cyclical high on the world grainmarket.The first half of the 1870s was also
a time of troubles for the civil bureaucracy,in the sense that instability of
political leadershipheighteneduncertaintyof tenurein office, the probability
of nonpaymentof salaries, and even inefficiency in tax collection.47 The
second half of the 1870s was one of the lowest points of the entire nineteenth
century for the Ottomans, a fact evidenced especially in the government
bankruptcyand the Russo-TurkishWar, which broughtthe Russian army to
the outskirtsof Istanbul,flooded the city with refugees, and left the Ottoman
government saddled with a huge indemnity. One result was the reissue of
42 Brian K. Mitchell, with collaboration of Phyllis Deane, Abstract of British Historical
Statistics (Cambridge, 1962), 488-89; United States Departmentof Agriculture(USDA), Yearbook 1921 (Washington, 1922), 146; Quataert, "OttomanReform and Agriculture," 188, 38990; Issawi, Economic History of Middle East, 10; Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisi, 131-36.
43 Mitchell, Abstract, 488-89; USDA, Yearbook1921, 146.
44 Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 151-52.
45 Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi (Ankara, 1977), VII, 37; Du Velay, Essai, 279.
46 Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes (Bonn), Abt. A (856/3), 868, I.A.B.q 95,
Brassiervon Saint-Simonto Bismarck, 13 February1868; Uebel to Bismarck,9 July 1868 (T139,
mf. roll 354, in the microfilmholdings of the U.S. NationalArchives, Washington,D.C., where
I consulted the Germandiplomatic correspondence).
47 Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 156; Du Velay, Essai, 316-461; RodericH. Davison, Reform
in the OttomanEmpire, 1856-1876 (Princeton, 1963), 301-10; Archives des Affaires 6trangeres
(Paris),Turquie390, 24 October 1871, Vogiiu to Remusat;Turquie391, 9 January1872, idemto
idem; Turquie391, 27 March 1872, idem to idem; Turquie404, 17 May 1876, from Bourgoing.
98
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
papermoney from 1876 to 1883-the only time, otherthan 1863, duringthe
period for which we have salary statistics when papermoney was in circulation. The paper money soon sank as low as 1,300 kuru?to the gold lira.48
Thereafter,in the 1880s, we see that the downwardtrend in prices reappears, through1894. Duringthis interval,thereis only the price peak of 1891,
which was due to a crop failure in Russia and a consequentsurge in Ottoman
exports. European and American grain prices showed small rises at the
time.49
After 1894, when prices turnedup again, the price high of the late 1890s
coincided with crop failure in Anatolia, the Greco-TurkishWar of 1897, and
the Armeniancrisis of the same period.50 Thereafter,the high of 1907-9
signaled an unusualcombinationof woes-international financial crisis, domestic and internationalcrop failure, exceptionallywidespreaddistress-that
providedthe economic backdropfor the Young Turkrevolutionof 1908.51 It
is significantthat similar problems, includingprolongeddrought(1905-10),
foreshadowedthe Mexican revolutionof 1910. There, the internationalfinancial crisis of 1907, which began in the United States, is recognizedas a major
economic factor.52 That crisis should probably be ranked with the RussoJapaneseWar and the Russian revolutionof 1905 as an element in inducing
the wave of revolutions and disturbancesthat swept Asia and the colonial
world in the years precedingWorld War I.53 Finally, the war-inducedinflation raisedthe cost of living by a factorof morethantwentybetween 1914 and
1920.54
To see what these price fluctuationsmeantin the lives of officials, we must
now comparethe composite grain price average with the salary statistics.
48 Shaw and Shaw, History, II, 182ff., 221ff.; Du Velay, Essai, 354-57; Issawi, Economic
History of Turkey,326-29, 361-65.
49 Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 21-23, 211-12; cf. Mitchell, Abstract,
489; USDA, Yearbook1921, 146.
50 Robert Melson, "A Theoretical Inquiry into the Armenian Massacres of 1894-1896,"
ComparativeStudies in Society and History, 24:3 (July 1982), 481-509. Qualified observers
noted at the time how the turmoil in eastern Anatolia affected the grain trade. See "Handelsberichtfur das Jahr1897," Deutsches Handelsarchiv(1898), 511-16 (unfortunately,I have to
cite this source from memory, as I can no longer find my photocopy;I have verified the citation
from other records).
51 Quataert, "Economic Climate," D1157, D1161; Pamuk, Osmanli Ekonomisi, 135-36.
52 Ram6nRuiz, The Great Rebellion: Mexico, 1905-24 (New York, 1980), 120-35. On the
crisis of 1907 in the United States, see Milton Friedmanand Anna Schwartz,A MonetaryHistory
of the UnitedStates, 1867-1960 (Princeton, 1963), 156-68. I have not found a good discussion
of the worldwideeconomic effects of the crisis; see comments in William C. Schluter,The PreWarBusiness Cycle, 1907 to 1914 (New York, 1923), 13-34.
53 Keddie, "Religion and Irreligion," 265; Stavrianos, Global Rift, 367-427. Detailed researchinto the economic historyof othercountriesthatexperiencedrevolutionjust before World
WarI-for example, Iran(1905-11) and China (1911)-might well disclose common factorsin
additionto financial crisis, such as the droughtor crop failure that appearsin both the Ottoman
and Mexican cases.
54 Ahmed Emin [Yalman], Turkey, 151; Toprak, Tiirkiye'de "Milli Iktisat," 331.
III.
CONCLUSION:
OF POLITICAL
ECONOMIC
BASES
OF OTTOMAN
LIVING
STANDARDS
AND
REVOLUTION
SHIFTING
99
LEVELS
ACTIVISM
Fromthe salary-pricecomparisonemerge the conclusions of this essay. Since
there is no sign in Ottoman sources that salaries varied systematically with
prices priorto World War I,55 the best way to comparethe two is to assume
no statisticaldependenceof one series on the other. We shall simply compute
two sets of ratios by dividing each year's relatives for the adjusted salary
means and medians (Table 2) by the same year's relative for the composite
grainprice average (Table 4). In the few years for which the grain average is
missing, it will not be possible to compute these ratios. In any year when the
relative for the salary statistic is greaterthan that for the grain average, the
value for the ratio will be greaterthan one. When the opposite relationship
occurs, the ratio will be less than one. The lower the value of the ratio, the
greaterthe economic distress it implies. Table 5 presents these ratios.
The salary-priceratios show that the economic situationof Foreign Ministry officials varied widely over time. The late 1860s and the 1870s witnessed
a marked erosion of living standards. Qualitative evidence confirms this
point. In the previoussection, we noted riots by the wives of officials in 1868,
followed in the 1870s by problems stemming from administrativeirregularities, governmentbankruptcy,and the Russo-TurkishWar.
After 1880, an improvementin official living standardsappears to have
begun, as evidenced in the doubling of both of the Table 5 ratios by 1894.
Even if the fall in grain prices exceeded that in other goods, there was still
room for ratios computedon a broader-basedprice indicatorto show marked
improvementduringthis interval. While the Ottomaneconomy was predominantly agricultural,and agriculturalprices were falling between 1880 and
1894, an improvementin the living standardsof officials, or of other social
groups, is not implausible.The late nineteenthcenturywitnessed an important
railroad-relatedexpansion in Ottoman agriculture, the effects of which in
some ways outweighed those of the price declines. Expansionin agricultural
outputand exportvalues did not translatedirectly into increasein government
revenues or, by extension, into funds available to the governmentfor salary
payments, as a growing number of Ottoman taxes passed under control of
foreign creditors in these years.56 The significance of this fact for official
salary payments is not clear, given the limited informationnow available
about how salary payments were actually made. In any case, the qualitative
evidence for 1880-94 tacitly reinforces the evidence of Table 5 throughthe
55 Toprak, Tiirkiye'de 'Milli Iktisat," 334,
cost-of-living adjustmentof 1916.
56 Quataert, "Ottoman Reform and Agriculture," 15-17, 189-91, 352-54; idem, "Limited
Revolution," 143, 159-60; idem, "AgriculturalTrends and Government Policy in Ottoman
Anatolia, 1800-1914," Asian and AfricanStudies, 15:1 (1981), 83; Issawi, EconomicHistory of
Turkey,353-55; idem, Economic History of Middle East, 105.
IOO
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
TABLE 5
Ratios of Percentage Relatives: Adjusted Salaries to Grain Price Averages
Ratio
for
Means
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
3.4
2.3
1.8
0.8
1.4
1.8
1.9
2.0
2.2
1.1
1.5
1.7
1.5
1.5
1.1
1.1
0.9
1.0
1.2
1.2
1.5
1.6
1.5
1.5
Ratio
for
Medians
1888
5.6
3.0
1.1
2.3
1.5
2.7
2.6
1.1
0.9
0.8
1.0
1.3
0.9
0.9
1.0
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.1
1.3
1.4
1.3
1.4
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
Ratio
for
Means
Ratio
for
Medians
1.6
1.4
1.2
0.9
1.1
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.0
1.3
1.4
1.9
1.6
1.3
1.8
1.6
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.3
1.5
1.7
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.5
1.1
1.0
0.6
0.8
0.8
1.7
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.5
1.5
1.4
1.4
1.2
1.1
1.0
1.1
0.9
SOURCE: These statistics were computed by dividing the salary relatives in Table 2 by the
composite grain price averages in Table 4.
absence of reports of distress like that of the 1860s or 1870s, though there was
suffering from irregularity in salary payments.
After 1894, things changed again, mainly thanks to the rise in prices (Table
4). For this period, both series of salary-price ratios indicate worsening conditions, especially just before 1908. Our narrowly based price indicator may
again misrepresent the magnitude of the change. But the witness of other
sources, noted in the previous section, becomes eloquent as we approach the
1908 revolution. The international financial crisis of 1907, together with other
factors, reminds us that this was a time of economic and political disturbance
around the world. After 1908, the situation of Ottoman workers improved,57
57 Boratavet al., "OttomanWages."
ECONOMIC BASES OF OTTOMAN REVOLUTION
IOI
but the ratios of Table 5 show nothing of the sort for officials. Literary
sources, already noted, indicate a drastic worsening of their plight during
World War I.
What is most interesting is the correspondencebetween these economic
fluctuationsand the political and intellectual history of the period. Here we
find a parallelism clear enough to suggest a causal link between economic
distressand political agitation. A statisticalargument,like that centralto this
article, cannot in itself prove the existence of such a link; but some of the
evidence here considered, and some that emerges from other scholarship,
does indicate a causal connection, which we must emphasize as our final
point.58
58 One
way to appreciatethe strengthof the causal argumentin this case is to obey the dictates
of a strict concern for method and consider the null hypothesis that there was no connection
between economic distress and political behavior. Aside from some contraryevidence already
presented,one of the best ways to assess this hypothesis is to examine how von Wangenheim,
thenGermanchargeat Istanbul-he was ambassadortherein 1914-dealt with the same idea in a
dispatchof 1901 (Politisches Archiv des AuswartigenAmtes (Bonn), Tiirkei 134, Bd. 18, to von
Bulow, 26 August 1901, correspondingto T 139, roll 392, in the microfilm collection of the
UnitedStates NationalArchives). Commentingon press reportsthatOttomanofficials in Istanbul
and Salonicahad petitionedthe sultanto have theirback salariespaid, on the groundthatthey and
their families would starve otherwise, Wangenheimarguedthat it would be wrong to conclude
from this that there was any danger of revolution. One of his argumentswas that officials and
militaryofficers blamed their problems, not on the sultan, but on their superiors,with the result
that complaints like these served the sultan's efforts to maintainhis own political dominance.
Anotherargumentconcernedthe likelihood of starvation.The ability of poor Turksto get by on
very little excelled even what he had seen in Spain, wrote Wangenheim.To back up the point, he
describedhow elderly Turkswould fish on the landing in frontof the embassy summerresidence
at Tarabyaon the Bosphorus. Too, poor Turks carried the sharing of goods "to the socialdemocratic ideal," and shopkeepers also would take mercy on the poor, so that the shocking
indigence observable in other European capitals was unseen. Turks in office had the added
advantageof enjoying influence, which enabled them to extractbribesfrom the public. Knowing
that they did so enabled the sultan to accustom his officials to irregularsalary payments. Salary
paymentshad thus reachedthe point of being "a special act of grace by the ruler, announcedin
the newspapers,and celebratedalmost like a nationalholiday," not only by the officials, but also
by the tradesmenwho supplied them on credit between paydays. Only Christiansand foreigners
in Ottomanservice suffered, Wangenheimargued,as they lackedaccess to the Muslims' business
arrangementsand love for their fellows. Wangenheim'scomments on the sultan's manipulation
of salary payments are probablyworth taking seriously. Yet it is quite unclear why a Christian
Ottomanofficial could find no supportamong his coreligionists, at any rate. Even more perplexing is the ingenious way Wangenheim'sargumentchanneledthe grievancesof Ottomanofficials
into a limbo where they had neithersevere humancosts for the officials nor political costs for the
regime. Perhapsin gratificationat this conclusion, a pencil note below Wangenheim'ssignature,
probablyby von Billow, states: "very well writtenandcorrectlyobserved." In fact, the argument
is a piece of orientalismin the sense of EdwardSaid. Why shouldthe behaviorof poor old Turks,
fishing on a landing, have providedany betterguide to the political behaviorof Ottomanofficials
and militaryofficers than that of peasantsdigging potatoes in Prussiawould have providedto the
behavior of Germandiplomats like Wangenheim?Apart from having discussed these old men
with his Montenegrindoorman,as he says, how well did Wangenheimunderstandthem?It is not
worthwhileto belabor such questions, since the kind of argumentWangenheimsought to make
could be updatedand strengthened.Yet the fact remains that revolutioncame only seven years
after he wrote this dispatch and that Salonica and Istanbul, the sources of the news reportson
which he commented, were its most importantcenters.
102
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
To sum up the evidence for this causal link, we may start from the point
that both periods of political and ideological ferment, those of the Young
Ottomansand the Young Turks, were times of economic distress. In both
periods the distress extended well beyond the official milieu from which the
salary statistics derive.59 And in both periods the ideologues and activists
displayed at least some responsiveness to economic problems. Among the
Young Ottomanleadership, almost all of whom came from extremely privileged backgrounds,the response may not have gone much beyond denunciation of generalgrievances, such as foreigncommercialprivilegesor the public
debt.60 Given the massive long-term problems of the Ottomaneconomy, it
was perhapsnaturalfor the earliest ideologues to respondmore to them than
to specific short-termproblems. Later, the Young Turksappearto have coupled discussion of general issues with exploitation of specific crisis conditions. No doubt, the extent to which the scope of political mobilizationhad
broadenedby then contributedto this result. Those who joined or responded
to the Young Turk movement included not only civil bureaucratsand large
elements of the military,but also nonbureaucraticelites, membersof the nonMuslim communities, sometimes even workers. The connections between
Young Turk activists and these various groups are not all well established.
The roots of the movement in the civil bureaucraticand militaryelites are, of
course, best known.61In the case of the workers, to cite a less-known example that is particularlysignificant where political mobilizationis concerned,
Young Turk activists had forged alliances with aggrieved worker groups
before revolution broke out in 1908, and had apparentlyled at least one
Ludditedisturbance,which resulted in good part from the currenteconomic
crisis. Consideringhow little researchhas been done in Ottomanlaborhistory, it is highly likely that more such examples of economically motivated
political activism await discovery.62
59 With particularreferenceto agrariandifficulties of 1873-75 and 1907-8, Quataert,"Commercializationof Agriculture," 52-53, makes much the same point by speaking of social and
political "dislocations" that arose out of crises in agriculture.
60 Mardin, Genesis, 166-68, 321-23, 354, 388. As noted in the precedingsection, there is
evidence that the Young Ottomansdid seize upon the economic problems that surroundedthe
Cretancrisis (1866-69), at least.
61 Among the many sources that could be cited on this point, Shaw and Shaw, History, II,
263-66; Mardin,Jon Tiirklerin, 11, 22-27, 32-33, 39-41, 225-26, et passim.
62 Donald Quataert,Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the OttomanEmpire,
1881-1908 (New York, 1983), chs. 4, 5; idem, "Ottoman Luddites and the Changing Carpet
Industryin Usak, Anatolia, 1860-1914" (Paperpresentedat the ThirdInternationalCongresson
the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Princeton, 24-26 August 1983); idem, personal
communications,November-December 1983. Furtheron the workingclass and on the beginning
of socialist influence, especially among non-Muslims, see Paul Dumont, "Une organisation
socialiste ottomane:La Federationouvrierede Salonique," Etudes balkaniques, 11:1 (1975), 78;
idem, "Sources in6dites pour l'histoire du mouvementouvrier et des courantssocialistes dans
l'empire ottoman au debut du XXe siecle," in Social and Economic History of Turkey(10711920), OsmanOkyarand Halil Inalcik, eds. (Ankara, 1980), 383; idem, "A proposde la 'classe
ECONOMIC
BASES
OF OTTOMAN
REVOLUTION
103
In considering the correspondence between economic and politicalintellectualhistory, the interval in the 1870s and 1880s between the Young
Ottomanand Young Turkperiods is also significant. Economically, it was a
time of relief for the bureaucraticintelligentsia,and probablyfor othersectors
of society, too. Politically, it was the period when Abdtilhamidquashedthe
oppositionand consolidatedhis palace regime. Makingdue allowance for his
intelligenceand the authorityof his office, it seems-unless we supposethese
economic and political facts to be unrelated-that the last great flourish of
Ottomansultanismwas made possible in some degree by a detente, if it was
no more than that, in the general economic decline of the empire. When the
benefits of this detente began to dwindle, political opposition re-emerged,
sultan or no sultan. After the economic situation took a sharp downturnin
1907, revolution broke out. Here we have another example of James C.
Davies's "J-curve" theory of revolution, with the variationthat the period of
improvement(in this case not so prolonged:ca. 1880-94) yielded to a period
of gradualeconomic erosion (ca. 1894-1907), priorto the "sharp reversal"
of 1907, which precipitatedthe crisis.63
In the case of the bureaucraticintelligentsia and, at key moments, other
sectors of Ottomansociety, economic patternsthus varied over time in ways
that display a clearly intelligible relationshipto the rise and fall of political
activism. Extensive documentationof the causal connection will requirefurther researchof a kind different from the statistical analysis presentedhere.
Yet, it is clear that the familiar political and intellectual explanationsof the
sequence of events that ran from Young Ottomanferment, throughHamidian
repression, to Young Turk revolution must, as comparative or theoretical
analysis suggests, expand to include the economic dimension.
COMPUTATION
APPENDIX
OF SALARY
STATISTICS
Sources and Methods
The mainsourcefor calculationof the salarystatisticsis the collectionof personnel
records(Sicilli-i Ahval, cited in the notes as SA) in the archivesof the Ottoman
ForeignMinistryin Istanbul(Hariciye,cited as Har.).This collectionincludes771
on one official. In addition,recordsof
envelopes,each containingdocumentation
somehigh-ranking
individuals
associatedwiththeForeignMinistryappearonlyin the
PrimeMinisters'Archives(BasbakanllkArsivi, cited as BBA), Istanbul,in the
Dahiliye sicill-i ahval defterleri (cited as DSA), consisting of 196 large registers;see
Attila Cetin, Ba?bakanlikArtivi Kilavuzu [Guide to BBA] (Istanbul, 1979), 46; and
CarterVaughn Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the OttomanEmpire: The Sublime
ouvriere' ottomane a la veille de la revolution jeune-turque," Turcica, 9:1 (1977), 229-52;
Georges Haupt and Paul Dumont, Osmanli ImparatorlugundaSosyalist Hareketler [Socialist
movements in the Ottomanempire] (Istanbul, 1977; not seen).
63 Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," 136.
104
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton, 1980), 267. Many of the files in the Foreign Ministry
personnelrecordsshow only brief careerrecords, since young men often acceptedone
or two appointments,but did not continue (cf. Findley, BureaucraticReform, 23439). To distinguish careeristsfrom noncareerists,I collected only files with service
recordsspanningfifteen solar years. The result was a groupof 366 individuals,not all
in service at once. In the analysis, I recordedthe salaryof each official, as of 1 Juneof
the Gregoriancalendar,for every year of service. Since the price datacome only from
the Istanbulmarket, only salaries of officials serving in that city have been used in
computingthe statistics presented here. As the programfor executing the computer
analysis of both salaries and prices, I used the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences. See NormanH. Nie et al., SPSS:StatisticalPackagefor the Social Sciences,
2d ed. (New York, 1975).
Problems of Analysis
Correctinterpretationof the salary data containedin these sources depends on understanding-and, wherepossible, eliminatingdistortionsthatresultfrom-certain problems of either the documentationor the data collection method. These problems, and
the proceduresor assumptionsthat I have used in coping with them, are as follows.
Representativenessof the Data. Two questions of this type arise. Was the Foreign
Ministryof elite status in relation to the rest of the civil bureaucracy?Was the civil
bureaucracyof elite status in relationto the rest of the populace?The only answer for
the first question is the impressionisticone that while the Foreign Ministrymay have
been exceptionally privileged during the Tanzimat, it was no longer so under Abdulhamid(Findley, BureaucraticReform, 135-37, 153-55, 242-43, 255-57). On the
elitism of the civil bureaucracyin relationto the populace, the text presentsevidence
of an income gap that was wide, but narrowedwith time.
Monetary Units. Because the Ottoman monetary system was complex, and the
personnelrecordsare not specific as to money of payment, care is needed to convert
the salaries statedin the recordsinto units of constantvalue. The Ottomancoinage of
this period was officially bimetallic. The gold lira, nominallyconsisting of 100 kurus,
stood throughoutthe period at essentially 1.11 to the pound sterling. The silver
coinage was minted in units nominally worth 20 kuru?(the silver mecidiye) and less,
the gold-silver ratiohaving been set in 1844 at 1:15.0909. There were also small coins
of base metal. Finally, paper money was in circulation, usually much depreciated,
duringthe intervals 1839-63, 1876-83, and 1914-22. See CharlesIssawi, The Economic History of Turkey, 1800-1914 (Chicago, 1980), 326-31; idem, An Economic
History of the Middle East and North Africa (New York, 1982), 186; George Young,
Corps de droit ottoman (Oxford, 1905-6), V, 1; Carl Anton Schaefer, "Geldwesen
und Staatsbankfragein der Tiirkei," in Das TurkischeReich, Josef Hellauer, ed.
(Berlin, 1918), 33; Roderic H. Davison, "Ka'ime," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2d ed.,
IV, 460-61; I have also computedmoney marketstatisticsfrom the same newspapers
used to compute commodity prices (see note 35).
Since gold was mostly hoarded, and paper money circulatedfor only a few of the
years for which statisticsappearin the tables in the text, the silver mecidiyemust have
been the primaryunit for salarypayment. Convertingsalaries assumed to be stated in
silver into units of constantvalue becomes a problemafterthe value of silver began to
decline in the 1870s. By the early 1880s, it took 108 kurusin silver to buy a gold lira
(equal to 100 kurus in gold). On the world market,the value of silver declined much
furtherthereafter.In Istanbul,however, the Ottomansilver coinage held steadyaround
108 kurus to the gold lira through 1914, according to the money rates published in
local newspapers. For an explanation of this stabilization, see Salgur Kanqal, "La
dualisationde l'espace monetaireottoman" (Paperpresentedat the ThirdInternational
ECONOMIC
BASES
OF OTTOMAN
REVOLUTION
105
Congress on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, Princeton, 24-26 August
1983).
The Ottomangovernmentrespondedto the decline in silver by decreeing in 1879
thatthe silver mecidiye was worth 19 kurusin gold, ratherthan 20, and proceedingto
use this rate in government transactions. The capitalist commercial sector did not
accept this rate. In fact, there was an error in it, for if it took 108 kuru?in silver to
equal 100 kuru?in gold, 100 kurusin silver were worth92.59 in gold. At one fifth of
that, the value of the silver mecidiye should have been reduced, not to 19 kurus,but to
18.52. The new official rate for the mecidiye representedan errorof 2.6 percent of
18.52, or 2.5 percent of 19. The governmentdid not rectify this erroruntil August
1909, when it reset the rate for the gold lira at 102.6 kurusin silver while holding the
mecidiye at 19 (Schaefer, "Geldwesen," 30). For the years when governmentpolicy
was based on this error, I have interpretedthe personnel-recordsalaryfigures to mean
payment in mecidiyes assumed by the payer to be worth 19 kurus in gold. To state
salariesin gold kurus, I have compensatedfor the errorof 2.5 percentby multiplying
all salariesfor the appropriateyears by 0.975. Since the adjustmentof the official rate
was a tardyresponse to the decline in silver, I have made this adjustmentfrom 1876
on, that being the first year when the money rates in Istanbulnewspapersindicate an
appreciabledecline in silver.
Disparity betweenNominal Salary Entitlementsand ActualReceipts. Ottomanofficials did not get paid regularlyor fully. The salaryfigures in the personnelrecordsthus
signify gross nominal entitlements by way of salary, ratherthan net receipts. The
differenceconsisted partlyof deductionsfor things like retirementfunds. By 1913, the
deductionsamountedto 9 percent (Har., Mutenevvi 156, TurhanPasa to Said Halim
Pasa, 9 10bre [sic] 1913). A largerpartof the gross-netdifference consisted of delays
of payment, some of which were never made up. Indeterminablylarge gross-net
differencesraise questions about the value of the personnel-recordsalarydata;yet, for
a varietyof reasons, they remain worthy of study. There are, for example, no known
sources from which to verify the actual receipts of substantialnumbersof civil officials. Similarly, despite some efforts (Findley, BureaucraticReform, 277-78, 33132), the Ottomansnever produced any comprehensivegrading of officials and their
salaries. Thus, there is no convenient source, like the barem (Frenchbareme)adopted
underthe republic,from which to verify salariesof officials of differenttypes. Further,
while the problemsof the salarysystem are sometimestakento mean thatsalarieswere
unimportantto officials, there is evidence, too voluminous to presenthere, that officials were keenly concerned about their salaries, precisely because they were not
regularlypaid (Findley, BureaucraticReform, 236-39; I plan to discuss this evidence
more fully in a book on the "Social History of OttomanCivil Officialdom"). Reflection shows, too, that the salary data in the personnel records do tell several things.
They indicatethe prioritiesof those with discretionto assign salaries.They indicatethe
upperlimit of what officials legitimatelyreceived by way of salary. If we can assume
that the gap between nominal and actual salaries did not vary materially over long
periods, the nominal salaries yield good relative indicatorsof long-term changes in
bureaucraticfortunes. It is essentially as relative indicatorsthat the salaries are used
here.
Variationover Time in the Number of Officialsfor WhomSalary Data are Available. I calculatedsalarystatisticsfor the period 1850-1914, but found thatthe number
of cases droppedoff, and the statisticsbecame erratic,at both ends of that period. For
the earlieryears, the cause of the troubleis thatthe personnelrecordswere not created
until 1877. The records cover the individual's lifespan from birthforward. Thus, the
oldest files containdatafor years long before 1877; yet, the furtherback one looks, the
fewer the cases. The problemin the lateryears arises from the purgesthatfollowed the
io6
CARTER
VAUGHN
FINDLEY
Young Turkrevolutionof 1908 (Findley, BureaucraticReform, 296-98). Since I had
decided to collect records only of officials with at least fifteen years of recorded
service, the decline in the numberof cases on which I have data begins, not in 1908,
but some fifteen years earlier. The result is a data distributionin which the numberof
officials serving in Istanbulwith known salaries begins at 21 in 1850, rises to 203 in
1891, then startsto fall, plunges from 125 to 53 between 1908 and 1909, and standsat
8 for 1914. To cope with this, I have adoptedan arbitrarycutoff point, and show no
statistics for years with fewer than fifty cases.
ApparentIncrease over Time in the Seniorityof the Officialsfor WhomSalary Data
are Available. The factors that caused the numberof cases to rise and fall also created
a misleadingappearanceof a long-termincreasein seniority. If the oldest recordsdate
from 1877, statistics for earlier years will reflect a populationthat is more and more
junior, the furtherback the dates of the statistics. After 1893, my rule excluding
officials with fewer thanfifteen years of service, and the decline in maintenanceof the
recordsin 1908, will create the appearanceof a populationthat becomes more senior
with the passage of time. In the interveningperiod, 1877-93, the seniority distribution, thoughheavy with junior officials, was not changing. The increasein the degree
of seniority is thus an artificial product of the data collection procedure and the
propertiesof the records, not an attributeof the populationstudied. Given the likelihood of a positive association between seniority and salary, this increase must be
broughtundercontrol statistically before the salary statistics can be regardedas reliable indicators.
For the means, standardizationprovidesthe needed adjustment.See R. G. D. Allen,
Statisticsfor Economists (London, 1968), 111-14. I have standardizedacross time,
dividing the salariesquoted for each year into three bracketsdefined accordingto the
seniorityof each official at the time, and recomputingthe salarymean for each year as
a weighted average of the means for each seniority bracket. The three seniority
bracketswere defined as including officials whose recordedcareerscomprised spans
of 0-14, 15-29, and 30 or more years. The weights used to recomputethe average
representthe proportionsamong the average numberof cases falling into the three
seniority bracketsduring the years 1880-82, which I selected to serve as the base
periodfor the standardization.The base period falls in the interval 1877-93, when the
senioritydistributionapparentin the recordswas not distortedby the factorsdiscussed
above. (For a different reason, I shall also use the same base period in computing
percentagerelatives of salaries and commodity prices). During the base period, on
average60 percentof the officials in service were in the 0-14 year seniority bracket,
30 percent were in the 15-29 year bracket, and 10 percent were in the 30-or-more
bracket.I thereforeused 0.6, 0.3, and 0.1 as weighting factorsto recomputethe mean
for each year as a weighted average of the means for the three brackets. No statistics
are shown for years when there were no cases in one or more of the senioritybrackets.
For the median, as a positional statistic, there is no counterpartof standardization.
Because the distortions of the seniority distributionlie mostly in the lack of senior
officials in the earlier years, and of junior officials after 1893, the best alternative
seemed to be to compute medians for only the middle seniority bracket,comprising
officials with 15-29 years of service as of each year of computation.Of course, this
methodfurtherreduces the numberof cases used in calculation. Since the maximum
numberof cases in the 15-29 year bracketin any year is 84, I shall show no statistics
for any year without at least 21 cases. Because of differences in the adjustment
techniquesfor means and medians, the years for which these statistics appearin the
tables differ slightly.
ikinci meşrutiyet’i hazırlayan koşullar
OSMANLI TARİHİ
rumeli’de vergi tahsilatı
ve jandarma
nadir özbek
Yakın tarihimizin önemli bir evresini oluşturan İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi,
Jön Türk devrimini hazırlayan koşullar ve İttihad Terakki rejimi akademik
tarihçilerin olduğu kadar Türkiye’nin güncel siyasal gerçekliğini anlama kaygısı
taşıyan daha genel bir kitlenin de ilgisini hep çekmiştir. Bu yazıda, söz konusu
yeniden değerlendirme çabalarına Rumeli vilayetlerinde İkinci Meşrutiyet’i
hazırlayan toplumsal koşullara ve özel olarak da vergi tahsilatı sırasında yaşanan
baskılara değinilerek mütevazı bir katkıda bulunmak amaçlanmıştır.
çülük, İslamcılık, halkçılık, solidarizm
gibi düşünce akımlarının evrimine
ilişkin çalışmalar başlangıç noktası
olarak bu dönem üzerinde yoğunlaşmıştır. Oysa Meşrutiyet’e giden sürecin geniş halk katmanlarının yaşam
koşulları itibariyle değerlendirilmesi
veya İkinci Meşrutiyet’in sosyal tarihi diyebileceğimiz çerçevede tarihyazımı hayli sınırlı kalmıştır.
1875 yılında
vergilerden
şikâyet ederek
başkaldıran
Hersekli
köylüler
Osmanlı
yetkililerine
itaatlerini
bildiriyor.
Sacit Kutlu arşivinden
alınmıştır.
46
Meşrutiyet’in 1908 yılındaki ilanının
üzerinden 100 yıl geçti. 2008 yılında
bu vesileyle ulusal ve uluslararası
düzeyde birçok bilimsel toplantı düzenlendi, tarih dergileri özel sayılar
hazırladı. Böylece İkinci Meşrutiyet, Jön Türk hareketi ve İttihad ve
Terakki yönetimi enine boyuna bir
kez daha tartışmaya açılmış oldu.
İkinci Meşrutiyet’e doğru giden toplumsal ve siyasal süreç ve ardından
gelen Meşrutiyet dönemi Osmanlı
Devleti’nin dağılmasıyla sonuçlanmıştı. Modern Türkiye’nin temelleri, bu son derece karmaşık yerel ve
uluslararası siyasal ortam içinde şekillenmiştir.
Türkiye tarihçiliğinde İkinci Meşrutiyet dönemi ağırlıklı olarak yüksek
siyaset düzlemi ve düşünce akımları
bağlamında ele alınmıştır. Tarık Zafer Tunaya’nın işaret etmiş olduğu
doğrultuda, Meşrutiyet döneminin
cumhuriyet Türkiye’si için bir siyasal laboratuvar olduğu tespiti tarih
çalışmalarının ana eksenini oluşturmuştur. Tarihçiler ağırlıklı olarak
parlamenter sistemin ve çokpartili
siyasal hayatın gelişimi üzerinde
durmuşlardır. Türk tarihçiliğinin bir
diğer ağırlık noktasını da cumhuriyet Türkiye’sine yön veren siyasal
düşünce akımlarının kökenlerinin bu
dönemde aranması olmuştur. Türk-
Osmanlı vergi sisteminin adaletsizliği ve her milletten köylü yığınları
üzerinde oluşturduğu ağır yük genellikle teslim edilmiş olmakla birlikte,
bu faktörün İkinci Meşrutiyet’e giden süreçte geniş halk kesimlerinin
Abdülhamid rejiminden uzaklaşarak
Makedonya ve Anadolu’nun birçok
bölgesinde muhalif siyasal hareketlere yönelmesini kolaylaştırmış olduğu
üzerinde fazla durulmamıştır. Bu konuda Zafer Kars, Kudret Emiroğlu ve
Aykut Kansu’nun çalışmaları bir istisna oluşturmaktadır.1 Donald Quataert, Carter Findley ve Feroz Ahmad
devrimin ekonomik ve sosyal arka
planlarına değinen tarihçiler arasında yer almıştır.2 Emiroğlu daha çok
yerli matbuata dayanarak, 1908 devrimi öncesinde Anadolu’nun birçok
vilayetinde halk kesimlerinin rejime
yönelik hoşnutsuzluklarının ve isya-
Yukarıda kısaca değindiğimiz eserlerin ortak noktasını Jön Türk devriminin bir toplumsal arka planı
olduğu veya en azından ülkenin
içinde bulunduğu ekonomik ve
sosyal ortamın devrimi hazırlayan
koşullar arasında değerlendirilmesi
gerektiği fikri oluşturmuştur. Ancak
bu tespitin imparatorluğun birbirinden çok farklı özellikler taşıyan
bölgelerinin her biri için ayrı ayrı
araştırılması gerekmektedir. 19. yüzyılın sonu itibariyle imparatorluğu
Rumeli veya Makedonya, Anadolu,
Doğu Vilayetleri, yani vilayat-ı sitte
ve Arap vilayetleri şeklinde dört ana
grupta değerlendirmek mümkündür.
İttihad Terakki hareketinin gelişimi bakımından önemli bir coğrafya
olması itibariyle Makedonya’yı konu
alan çalışmaların görece daha fazla
olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Bu yazının
da konusu olan Rumeli vilayetlerine
ilişkin çalışmalarda vergi adaletsizliğinin ve vergi tahsil yöntemlerindeki gaddarlığın Rumeli köylüsünün Osmanlı rejiminden kopuşunu
hazırlayan faktörlerden en önemlisi
olduğu, Halil İnalcık’ın 1943 tarihli
Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi başlıklı eserinden bu yana önemsenen
bir tespit olmuştur.5 Fikret Adanır’ın
Türkçeye 1996 yılında çevrilen, ancak
1979 tarihli Makedonya Sorunu
başlıklı çalışmasında da bu yaklaşımın izlerini görmek mümkündür.6
Ermeni nüfusun belli bir ağırlığa
sahip olduğu Doğu Anadolu vilayetlerinde İkinci Abdülhamid döneminde yaşanan huzursuzlukların
vergi ve gelir adaletsizliği eksenli
bir boyutunun olabileceği, devletin
nizami ve gayri nizami unsurlarının ahali üzerinde şiddetli bir baskı
uyguluyor olduğu gerçeği genellikle üzerinde durulmayan konular
arasında yer almıştır. Dolayısıyla
Ermeni sorunu olarak isimlendirilen mesele Abdülhamid rejiminin
Ermeni düşmanlığı ve kimlik siyaseti kavramlarının dar sınırlarına
hapsedilmiş, konunun yerel servet
paylaşımı ve iktidar mücadelesi,
vergi rejimi gibi toplumsal siyasal
boyutları genellikle göz ardı edilmiştir. Aşağıda, geniş halk kesimlerinin
Osmanlı rejimine yabancılaşmasına
yol açan en önemli faktörlerden
olan vergi tahsilatı meselesi Rumeli
vilayetleri örneği üzerinden kısaca
değerlendirilecektir.
Osmanlı 19. yüzyılında vergi tahsili
meselesi, devletle bireyin birbirleriyle çok yakından temas kurmalarına vesile olan iktisadi siyasi (idari)
meselelerden birini oluşturmaktadır.
İkinci Mahmut döneminden imparatorluğun sonuna kadar uzanan evrede Osmanlı yöneticilerini uğraştıran
en önemli meselelerden birisini,
vergi tahsili usulünün ıslahı meselesi oluşturmuştur. Öncelikle iltizam
sisteminin kaldırılması ve verginin
aracılara başvurmadan doğrudan
devlet görevlileri eliyle toplanması
hedeflenmiştir. İltizam sisteminin
kaldırılması 1840 ve 1879-1885 tarihleri arasındaki denemeler dışında
mümkün olamamıştır. Ancak aşar
vergisi dışında 1839 yılında gündeme
gelen vergi, emlak ve akar vergisi
gibi yeni vergiler iltizam kapsamı
dışında bırakılmış ve bunlar doğrudan devlet görevlileri aracılığıyla
toplanmıştır. Yine de asıl sorunu,
bu devlet görevlilerinin kim olduğu
oluşturmaktadır. 1869 tarihli Asâkir-i
Zabtiye Nizamnamesi’nde de açıkça
ifade edildiği üzere, tahsil-i emval işi
zaptiyenin görevleri arasında sayılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, 1864 tarihli
Vilayet Nizamnamesi sonrasında,
daha önceki dönemde tamamı zaptiyenin görevleri arasında bulunan
vergi tahsili ve iç güvenlik ve polis
işlevlerinin idari ve kurumsal olarak ayrıştırılması yönünde bir niyet
oluşmuştur. Tahsilat işlemlerini ve
TOPLUMSAL TAR‹H 183 MART 2009
na yaklaşan kalkışmalarının bir dökümünü çıkarmıştır.3 Kansu ise vergi
konusuna daha doğrudan yönelmiş
ve ağırlıklı olarak yabancı gazeteleri
kullanarak, vergi isyanları şeklinde
ortaya çıkan siyasal hareketler üzerinde durmuştur.4 Kansu’nun, İkinci
Meşrutiyet’in dar anlamda bir siyasal
devrim olmayıp İttihad Terakki’nin
yerel şubelerinin gayretleriyle organize edilmiş geniş tabanlı bir toplumsal devrim olduğu şeklindeki yorumu
tartışmaya açıksa da, vergi nedeniyle yaşanan hoşnutsuzlukları devrimi
hazırlayan koşullar arasında değerlendirmiş olması önemlidir.
teşkilatını düzenlemek üzere başlıca
1871, 1875, 1879, 1886, 1894, 1902
tarihlerinde olmak üzere çok sayıda
tahsil-i emval nizamnamesi çıkartılmış ve bu nizamnamelerle zaptiyeden ayrı bir vergi tahsildarlığı teşkilatı oluşturulması yönünde çaba
sarf edilmiştir. Ancak bütün çabalara
rağmen başarı sağlanabildiğini söylemek zordur.
İkinci Abdülhamid dönemi itibariyle
vergi tahsilatının nasıl icra edildiğini,
1897 yılında henüz 19 yaşında genç
bir Mülkiye mezunu iken Pürsıçan
nahiyesi müdürlüğüne atanan Tahsin
Uzer’in kaleminden aktaralım:
BOA, DH.TMIK.S,
33/104,
2,1318.12.05.
28 Şubat 1901
tarihli Maliye
Nezareti
tezkeresinin
sureti.
Manastır’a
bağlı Debre’de
bulunan 10
tahsildardan
bir fayda
görülmediğini
ve tahsilat
işlerini zabıtalar
yaptığından
tahsildar
memurluğunun
lağv edilmesini
bildiren yazı.
“Halktan istenen vergiler, o zaman
zaptiyeler, yani jandarmalar aracılığıyla toplanır ve muhtarlar da,
düzenledikleri tutanaklarla parayı,
hazineye teslim ederlerdi…
Mülkiye amirleri, maliye, alay ve
tabur, bölük ağaları; halktan vergi
toplama usulünü tespit için, baş başa
verip uzun uzun konuşurlar, sonra
aldıkları karar üzerine; kaza ve nahiyelere, kol kol jandarma müfrezeleri
çıkarıldığı gibi, muhtarlara kocabaşılara ve hatta eşraf, seçkin kişilere
yazılı emirler gönderilir. Jandarma
komutanları, aldıkları emirleri yerine getirmek için bölgelerinde gerekli
tedbirleri alırlar.
Kazalardan 150.000, nahiyelerden
70.000-80.000, köylerden ise dere-
47
cesine göre 10.000 den 50.000 kuruşa kadar defterler hazırlanır.
OSMANLI TARİHİ
Gidecek müfreze komutanlarına yani
zulümle para toplayacak bu kişilere bu
defterler verilir. (Bu tahsilatı yapamaz
veya eksik getirirseniz kafanızı keserim diye sert emirler tebliğ edilir.)
Müfrezeler çıkar; Kara Osman Çavuş Ova mıntıkasına, Kürt Ali Çiç’e,
Cellad Mustafa Onbaşı Dağ koluna,
Gırgır Mehmet Çavuş Ulak ve çevresine, Mülazım Osman Ağa Pürsıçan’a,
Kuzey
Arnavutluk’ta,
Mirdita
bölgesinde bir
dağ köyü.
Sacit Kutlu arşivinden
alınmıştır.
48
işte bunlara benzeyen; şanlı şöhretli
‘Çakırcalılar’ birer tarafa giderler.
Gittikleri yerlerde ileri gelenleri ve
muhtarları çağırırlar, telaşlı ve kızgın
bir tavırla, defterdeki paranın üç katını isterler.
Zavallı köylü, harman mevsimi
ise ve tütünleri de satılmamış ise,
imkânsızlıktan dem vurarak, istenilen parayı veremeyeceklerini söyleyince, derhal işkence ve baskı başlar.
Kazaya ve livaya borcun bir süre ertelenmesi için başvuranları da, tabur
ağaları ve mülkiye amirleri kovarlar.
Hatta tahkir ve tehdit ederler. Köyde
ağnam (küçük baş hayvan) ve mekâre
(katır, at, eşek ve benzeri hayvanlar)
varsa köyün uygun bir yerinde toplar
ve sahiplerini de bunların arasında
tevkif ederler. Zavallıların aileleri de
kıymetli eşyalarını veya tütününü yok
bahasına rehin etmek için, dört tarafa
başvururlar. Toplanan hayvanlar düşük fiyatlarla elden çıkarılır veyahut
ileride bunlardan alacağı, yağ veya
yapağıya karşılık, korkunç bir faizle
para bulmak zorunda kalırlar.
Süvari jandarmalar; köylerde yer,
içer, arpa, buğday ellerine ne geçerse hayvanlarına yedirirler. Hatta,
Hıristiyan köylerinde, rakısına şarabına ve karısına kadar ileri giderler.
Nihayet o köyden, istedikleri parayı
alıp defolurlar.”7
Aslında asâkir-i zabtiyenin özellikle
vergi tahsili sırasında ahali üzerinde
tahammülfersa bir baskı oluşturduğu
gerçeğinin Osmanlı yöneticileri de
farkındaydı. Bu konu, 1878 tarihli Berlin Antlaşması’nın Rumeli vilayetleri
için öngördüğü ıslahat programının
gündeminde de yer almıştı. Antlaşmanın 23. maddesi de Makedonya’da
Avrupa devletlerinin denetiminde
idari reformlar yapılmasını öngörmekteydi. Makedonya’da gündeme
gelen reformların en önemli başlığını, asâkir-i zabtiyenin, yani iç güvenlik teşkilatının ahali üzerindeki
baskılarını önlemek üzere Avrupa
devletlerinin doğrudan gözetimi altında olan bir jandarma reformunun
gerçekleştirilmesi oluşturuyordu. Bu
konu kuşkusuz vergi tahsilatı meselesiyle doğrudan ilişkiliydi ve Osmanlı
hükümetinin 1879 yılında çıkarmış
olduğu Tahsil-i Emval Nizamnamesi
ve daha sonra, 1896 yılında jandarma bünyesinde bulunan tahsildaran
fırkasını lağvederek yerine yeni bir
tahsildarlar heyeti oluşturma kararı hiç şüphesiz Avrupa devletlerinin
müdahale çabasını geçersiz kılma yönünde bir kaygının da ifadesiydi. Ancak 1902 ve 1903 yıllarında Rumeli’de
gerçekleşen Cuma-i Bâlâ ve İlinden
ayaklanmalarının ardından Avrupa
devletlerinin müdahalesi engellenememiş ve jandarma reformu Umum
Müfettiş Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa’nın denetiminde olmak kaydıyla uygulamaya konmuştur.8 1879 tarihinden söz
konusu ayaklanmaların gerçekleştiği
yıllara kadar uzanan evrede vergi
tahsilatı alanında planlanan reformların istenildiği ölçüde gerçekleştirilememiş olması kuşkusuz geniş halk
kitlelerinin hoşnutsuzluğunu daha
da artırmış ve isyanlar için zemin
hazırlamıştır. Aşağıda, 1896 tarihli
vergi tahsilatı işine jandarmanın kesinlikle karıştırılmaması ve tahsilatın
yeni oluşturulan tahsildarlık teşkilatı
aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmesi yö-
nündeki talimatı takip eden süreçte
Rumeli’nin belli başlı vilayetlerinde
vergi tahsildarlığı ıslahatının nasıl
gerçekleştirildiği, daha doğrusu gerçekleştirilemediği kısaca incelenecektir.
Ergiri, Preveze, Berat ve Yanya
merkez olmak üzere dört sancak ve
toplam 2378 köyden oluşan Yanya
vilayeti Rumeli’nin görece büyük
vilayetlerinden birisini oluşturmaktadır. Diğer vilayetler için söz konusu olduğu gibi, Yanya vilayetine de
yeni tahsildarlık teşkilatının oluşturulması yönündeki talimat Aralık
1896 tarihiyle gönderilmiş ve vilayet
tarafından bu doğrultuda icraata
başlanmıştır.9 Vilayetlerden gelen,
vergi tahsildarlarının artırılması
yönündeki ısrarlı taleplere rağmen
hükümet 1897 yılında nahiye meclisleri ve nahiye müdürlerinin tahsilatla ilgili görevleri bulunduğunu
hatırlatarak tahsildar sayısında bir
azaltmaya gidilmesi yönünde bir
talimat göndermiştir. Yanya valiliğinin bu emre tepkisi, beklenileceği
üzere hayli sert olmuştur. Vali, Dahiliye Nezareti’ne yazdığı 3 Kasım
1897 tarihli yazıda, “Maliye Nezaret-i
Celilesi’ne takdim edilen defterde muharrer tahsildaran adedi ve
mahsusatının hiçbir suretle tenkihat
icrası kabil olamayacağı gibi işbu
tertibatın bile yeterli olamayacağı
ve ilerde jandarma muavenetine
muhtaç olunacağını” çok açık bir şekilde ifade etmiştir.10 Yanya vilayetinin Dahiliye Nezareti’ne gönderdiği
14 Mayıs 1899 tarihli telgrafta ise,
yeni oluşturulan tahsildarlar teşkilatını “köylünün henüz işitmediği ve
binaenaleyh bunlara karşı emir ve
nüfuzu tamamen cereyan etmemekte olup şu sebeple emr-i mühim-i
tahsilatın pek geri kaldığı anlaşıldığından ahali tahsildarlara alıştırılıncaya kadar muavenet için yanlarına
muvakkaten birer nefer zaptiyenin
terfikinin zaruri olduğu” ifade edilmiştir. Maliye Nezareti’nden Dahiliye Nezareti’ne gönderilen 26 Kasım
1900 tarihli tahriratta ise, vilayetin
bazı bölgelerinde tahsilat işlemlerinde “jandarmadan başka asâkir-i
şahane müfrezelerinin bile istihdamına lüzum gösteren mahallerinin
Bütün bu yazışmalar Yanya vilayetinde vergi isyanlarının hayli yaygın olduğunu, idarenin zora ve askeri güce
başvurmadan vergi tahsil etmekte
zorlandığını ortaya koymaktadır.
Aynı sıkıntıların Düyun-ı Umumiye
tahsildar ve kolcuları tarafından da
yaşanıyor olması şaşırtıcı değildir.
Yanya valisinin 24 Eylül 1905 tarihli
telgrafında ifade edildiğine göre, son
terhislerden sonra vilayet jandarma
alayının mevcudu hayli azalmış ve
karakollarda yeteri kadar jandarma
bulundurmak zorlaşmıştır. Bu durumda Düyun-ı Umumiye tahsildarlarına
refakat etmek üzere jandarmaların
görevlendirilmesinin mümkün olmadığı ifade edilmiştir. İfade edildiğine
göre, Düyun-ı Umumiye tahsildarlarına refakat eden kolcuların silah
taşıma izni bulunmadığından müşkilat iyice artmaktadır. İdare ise kendilerine en azından birkaç tüfek verilmesini talep etmektedir. Dahiliye
Nezareti’nin 2 Kasım 1905 tarihiyle
Yanya vilayetine gönderdiği yazıda
kolculara silah verilmesinin kesinlikle uygun olmadığı bildirilmiştir.12
Manastır vilayetinde de durum farklı
görünmemektedir. Vilayet, 28 Mart
1898 tarihli telgrafla nahiye meclislerinin tahsilatta görevlendirilmeleri
durumunda bile idare-i maslahatın
mümkün olmadığını belirtmiştir.
Aynı telgrafta, bazı bölgelerde nahiye meclislerinden faydalanmanın
mümkün olduğu, ancak birçok bölgede nahiye meclislerinin henüz oluşturulmadığı ve bu nedenle tahsildar
sayısında bir azaltmaya gidilemeyeceği bildirilmiştir.13 17 Temmuz 1899
tarihli valilik telgrafında ise Serfice
sancağında tahsilatın ancak zabıta
yardımıyla gerçekleştirilebildiği bildirilmektedir. Serfice, 800 civarında
köyü bulunan büyükçe bir sancaktır
bu sancakta bir önceki yıl da vergi
tahsilinde jandarmaya başvurmak
durumunda kalınmıştır. Serfice Mutasarrıflığı tahsildarların yanına, mevkiine göre birer ikişer zaptiye süvarisinin verilmesini gerekli görmektedir.
Dahiliye Nezareti ise 29 Ağustos 1899
tarihli yazısında öncelikle ıslahat kararlarını hatırlatmış ve tahsildarlara
refakat edecek jandarmaların bir
neferle sınırlandırılmasını istemiştir. Söz konusu jandarmanın “asla işe
karıştırılmaması ve bu muamelenin
nihayet-ün-nihaye bir iki aya mahsus
tutularak ondan sonra kuraya yalnız
tahsildarlar gönderilerek eski usulün
katiyen terk olunması lazım geleceği”
de ayrıca belirtilmiştir.14 26 Mart 1901
tarihli Manastır Vilayeti yazısında ise
Debre Sancağı’ndaki tahsildarlardan
hiçbir fayda sağlanamadığı gerekçesiyle tahsildarlığın lağv edilmesi
istenmektedir. İfade edildiğine göre,
sancakta vergi ancak “zabıtadan ve
cihet-i askeriyeden memurlar çıkarılarak” toplanabilmektedir. Maliye
Nezareti ise her ne kadar ıslahat kararlarına aykırı da olsa bu durumun
onaylanması gerektiği yönünde görüş belirtmiştir.15
İstanbul’a yakın olmasına rağmen
Çatalca Mutasarrıflığı’nda da jandarmaya başvurmadan vergi tahsilatının
gerçekleştirilemediğini görüyoruz.
Örneğin Çatalca Mutasarrıfı 17 Nisan 1897 tarihli telgrafında tahsildar
maaşının düşüklüğü ve tahsildarların sayısının azlığı nedeniyle verginin toplanamadığını bildirmiştir.16
Mutasarrıf, 13 Temmuz 1897 tarihli
telgrafında ise 400’er kuruş maaşla 14 süvari ve 250’şer kuruş maaşla
4 piyade tahsildar daha istihdam
edilmediği takdirde vergi tahsilinin
gerçekleştirilemeyeceğini bildirmiştir. Mutasarrıf durumun vahametini
ifade etmek üzere, “geçen sene tah-
TOPLUMSAL TAR‹H 183 MART 2009
bulunduğu” ifade edilmiş ve söz konusu tahsildarlara birer nefer jandarma refakat etmesi yönündeki geçici kararın bir müddet daha devam
ettirilmesi talep edilmiştir. Dahiliye
Nezareti’nden Yanya vilayetine gönderilen 5 Ocak 1901 tarihli telgrafta
da, söz konusu geçici uygulamaya
birkaç ayı geçmemek üzere ve refakatçi jandarmaların “tahsilata asla
karıştırılmamaları” şartıyla izin verildiği belirtilmekte ve geçen süre
zarfında nahiye meclisleri ve nahiye
müdürlerinin tahsilatta görevlendirilmesi yönünde gerekli adımların
neden atılmadığı sorulmaktadır. Ayrıca söz konusu geçici uygulamaya
“nihayet-ün-nihaye kaç mah daha”
ihtiyaç duyulduğunun bildirilmesi
istenmiştir.11
silat işi zabıta marifetiyle icra edildiği halde emval-i umumiyeden yüzde
seksen derecesi tahsil olunup bu
sene ise şimdiki tahsildarlarla ancak
yüzde kırkı tahsil olunacağını” ayrıca
belirtme ihtiyacı duymuştur.17 Çatalca Mutasarrıflığı’nın 11 Eylül 1901
tarihi itibariyle hâlâ tahsildarların
yetersizliğinden şikâyet ettiğini görüyoruz. Mutasarrıf, ya zaptiyelerin
tahsildarlara yardım etmesine izin
verilmesini ya da 6 nefer süvari zaptiyesinin lağvına ve onlardan kalacak mahsusatla 6 nefer süvari tahsil-
darının istihdamına izin verilmesini
talep etmektedir. Bu talep Dahiliye
Nezareti’nin ilgili birimlerinde görüşülmüş ve reddedilmiştir.18
Rumeli’nin diğer vilayetlerinde de
durumun farklı olduğunu söylemek
zordur. Örneğin 1897 tarihi itibariyle
Selanik vilayetinde, benzer şekilde,
tahsilat işlemlerinde zabıta kuvvetine başvurulmaya devam edildiğini
görüyoruz. Selanik valiliği çok açık
bir ifadeyle, “kuvve-i zabıta ile tahsilata alışmış olan ahalinin nahiye
meclislerinin nüfuzuyla tekalifatı
vakti zamanıyla ifa etmeyeceklerini” belirtmiştir.19 Kosova vilayeti ise
kısmen olumlu bir yaklaşım sergile-
BOA, DH.TMIK.S,
26/54,
2,1317.04.21.
17 Temmuz 1899
tarihli Manastır
Valiliği’nin
telgrafı:
Serfiçe’de
mevcut
tahsildarlarla
tahsilat mümkün
olamadığından,
zabıtanın
yardım etmesi
yönünde talep.
49
OSMANLI TARİHİ
miş, bir an önce nahiye meclislerinin
oluşturulması ve tahsildar maaşlarının da uygun bir seviyeye çekilmesi
halinde tahsilat işlemlerinde bir sorun çıkmayacağını belirtmiştir.20
Vergi tahsilatında jandarma ve zaptiye kuvvetine başvurulmaya devam
edilmesi, hazinenin ihtiyaçlarının her
şeyin üzerinde tutularak ne pahasına
olursa olsun bütçe gelir öngörülerinin gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılması
Osmanlı taşrasında emeğiyle geçinen
geniş halk kitleleri üzerinde sürekli
bir baskıya yol açmıştır. Osmanlı idaresi, imparatorluğun bütün sathında
vergi tahsilat teşkilatının askeri görünümünü ortadan kaldırarak sivil bir
niteliğe büründürmek üzere büyük bir
çaba sarf etmiştir. Ancak Osmanlı tarım üreticisi için bu değişikliğin ne ölçüde bir rahatlama sağladığı pek açık
değildir. Aşağıdaki örnek, Rumeli’nin
en büyük vilayeti olan Edirne’de,
askeri unsurlarından arındırılmış da
olsa vergi tahsilatının ahalinin gündelik hayatında önemli bir değişim
getirmediğine işaret etmektedir.
Edirne vilayetinin Dedeağaç sancağına bağlı Mekri karyesinde 1903 yılında cereyan eden vaka, tahsildar Bekir
Efendi’nin tahsilat esnasında ahaliye
kötü davranışıyla ilgilidir. Bekir Efendi, Mekri ahalisinden Yanako’nun 170
kuruşluk vergi borcu için zevcesinin
hanesine girmiş ve yanında jandarma Ömer Çavuş, iki muhtar ve ihtiyar
heyeti mensupları hazır bulunduğu
halde Yanako’nun zevcesinin verdiği
100 kuruşu eksik olduğu gerekçesiyle
almamıştır. Kadını, 70 kuruşu daha
sonra bulup getireceği yönündeki
ricasını da kabul etmeyerek, merdivenden aşağı itelemiştir. Daha sonra
oğlu Petro’yu ve bir başka akrabasını darp ve tahkir etmiştir. Olayın bu
şekilde cereyan ettiği, şahitlerin ifadesi ve Ömer Çavuş’un kendi beyanı
tarafından doğrulanmıştır. Ahalinin
mahkeme-i nizamiyeye şikâyeti üzerine tahsildar Ömer Çavuş hakkında
15 gün hapis cezası verilmiştir.
Olayın yukarıda özetlediğimiz genel
çerçevesi olağandışı bir nitelik taşımamaktadır. Ancak bu vakıa vesilesiyle Maliye, Dahiliye ve Adliye
nezaretleri arasında cereyan eden
yazışmalar, Osmanlı mali idaresinin,
verginin ne koşulla olursa olsun toplanması şeklindeki zihniyetine ışık
tutar niteliktedir. Maliye Nezareti,
tahsildarların mahkemeye celp,
davet veyahut hapis ve tevkif edilmesi gibi durumların tahsilat işlemlerini sekteye uğratmak gibi ciddi
mahzurları olacağı görüşünden hareketle, “tahsildarların mahkemeye
celbi hususunda memurin-i maliyenin vesaitine müracaat olunmasını”
istemektedir. Dahiliye Nezareti de
bu isteği Adliye Nezareti’ne aktarmıştır. Adliye Nezareti’nin cevabı
ise tahsildarlara kanunda öngörüldüğünden farklı özel bir muamelenin uygulanamayacağı şeklinde
olmuştur. Kuşkusuz bu örnek vergi
tahsili sürecinde yaşanan baskılar
karşısında ahalinin mahkemeler ara-
dipnotlar
1
2
50
Zafer Kars, 1908 Devriminin Halk Dinamiği
(İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1997). Zafer Kars,
Belgelerle 1908 Devrimi Öncesinde Anadolu
(İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1984).
Donald Quataert, “The Economic Climate
of the ‘Young Turk Revolution’ in 1908,”
The Journal of Modern History 51, 3 (1979):
D1147-D61. Donald Quataert, “Rural Unrest in
the Ottoman Empire, 1830-1914,” in Peasants
and Politics in the Modern Middle East, ed.
Farhad Kazemi and John Waterburry (Miami:
Florida International University Press, 1991),
38-49. Donald Quataert, “The Young Turk
Revolution: Old and New Approaches,” in
Workers, Peasants and Economic Change
in the Ottoman Empire, 1730-1914 (İstanbul:
ISIS Press, 1993), 49-62. Carter Vaughn Findley,
“Economic Bases of Revolution and Repression
in the Late Ottoman Empire,” Comparative
Studies in Society and History 28, 1 (1986):
81-106. Feroz Ahmad, “Doğmakta Olan Bir
Burjuvazinin Öncüsü: Genç Türklerin Sosyal
ve Ekonomik Politikası,” in İttihatçılıktan
3
4
5
6
7
8
Kemalizme (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2002),
25-60.
Kudret Emiroğlu, Anadolu’da Devrim Günleri:
II. Meşrutiyet’in İlanı (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi,
1999).
Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, trans. Ayda Erbal
(İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).
Halil İnalcık, Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi
(Doktora Tezinin 50. Yılı) (İstanbul: Eren
Yayınları, 1992).
Fikret Adanır, Makedonya Sorunu (İstanbul:
Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996).
Tahsin Uzer, Makedonya Eşkiyalık Tarihi ve
Son Osmanlı Yönetimi (Ankara: Türk Tarih
Kurumu, 1979), 30-31.
Bu süreç ve jandarma reformunun ayrıntıları için
bkz. Nadir Özbek, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda
İç Güvenlik, Siyaset ve Devlet, 1876-1909,”
Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi, 16 (2004): 5995. Makedonya’daki siyasi gelişmeler ve söz
konusu ayaklanmalar için bkz. Fikret Adanır,
Makedonya Sorunu (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt
Yayınları, 1996), Gül Tokay, Makedonya Sorunu:
cılığıyla hakkını arayabildiğine işaret
etmektedir. Ancak bu tekil örneğin
geneli yansıttığını düşünmek hayli
zor görünmektedir.21
Bu yazıda, Osmanlı Rumeli’sinde İkinci Abdülhamid döneminde vergi tahsilatına ilişkin kısa bir değerlendirme
yapılmıştır. Vergi tahsilatı, 19. yüzyıl
zarfında bireyle devletin karşı karşıya geldiği en önemli anlardan birisini
oluşturmaktadır. İdarenin meşruiyeti ve ahalinin rejime güveninin tesis
edildiği en önemli momentlerden
birisini bu ilişki oluşturmaktadır.
Osmanlı idarecileri bütün çabalarına
rağmen bu ilişkiyi sağlıklı bir zeminde
kuramamışlardır. Vergi tahsili işlemleri bütün çabalara rağmen zaptiye
ve jandarma birlikleri aracılığıyla gerçekleştirilmiş ve bu durum ahalinin
baskı ve şiddete maruz kalmasına yol
açmıştır. Ayrıca her ne kadar son derece sınırlı kalmış da olsa vergi tahsildarlık teşkilatının zaptiyeden ayrıştırılıp sivil bir kurum haline getirilmesi
tek başına bir çözüm olamamış, maliyenin ne pahasına olursa olsun ahaliden zamanında ve devletin ihtiyaçları
ölçüsünde vergi toplama eğilimi geniş
halk yığınlarının rejimden uzaklaşmasını ve muhalif siyasi hareketlerin
etki alanına girmesini kolaylaştırmıştır. Rumeli’de bu dinamik İttihad
ve Terakki’nin Abdülhamid rejimine
karşı yürüttüğü siyasal muhalefet için
kuşkusuz verimli bir sosyal zemin hazırlamıştır.
nadir özbek
boğaziçi üniversitesi atatürk enstitüsü
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Jön Türk İhtilalinin Kökenleri (1903-1908)
(İstanbul: AFA Yayınları, 1995).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 4/41, 1314.07.08 (13 Aralık 1896).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 19/87, 1316.02.28 (18 Temmuz
1898).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 33/23, 1318.09.04 (26 Aralık
1900).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 60/39, 1323.09.04 (2 Kasım
1905).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 19/87, 1316.02.28 (18 Temmuz
1898).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 26/54, 1317.04.21 (29 Ağustos
1899).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 33/104, 1318.12.05 (26 Mart 1901).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 8/59, 1314.11.17 (19 Nisan 1897).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 19/87, 1316.02.28 (18 Temmuz
1898).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 35/42, 1319.06.22 (6 Ekim 1901).
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 19/87, 1316.02.28 (18 Temmuz
1898).
BOA, Ibid.
BOA, DH.TMIK.S, 47/1, 1321.05.04 (29 Temmuz
1903).