Türkçe Kitap ve Süreli Yayınlar Ayan, Ebubekir. – Temel finans m

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BİLGİYE ERİŞİM MERKEZİ’NE YENİ GELEN YAYINLAR:
Türkçe Kitap ve Süreli Yayınlar
Ayan, Ebubekir. – Temel finans matematiği, finansal hesap makinesi uygulamalı ve
inşaat muhasebesi. – Ankara : Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, 2008
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Resmi Gazete
YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ
BAKANLIĞA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ
— Devlet Bakanı Mehmet ŞİMŞEK’e, Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Nazım EKREN’in Vekâlet Etmesine Dair
Tezkere
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YARGI BÖLÜMÜ
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Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar
The International Journal of Accounting
Volume 41, Issue 3, Pages 209-326 (2006)
The association between management earnings forecasts, earnings management,
and stock market valuation: Evidence from French IPOs
Pages 209-236
Denis Cormier, Isabelle Martinez
Abstract
This study investigates managers' motivations to engage in earnings management
through purposeful interventions in the setting of discretionary accruals, in the context
of initial public offerings (IPOs) in France. Firms issuing forecasts in their prospectuses
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are expected to differ from nonforecasters in the level of earnings management during
the year following the public offering. Within the context of contracting theory, four
research questions are addressed. First, are IPO firms issuing forecasts more inclined to
manage earnings 1 year after an IPO compared to nonforecasting firms? Second, is a
forecasting firm's level of earnings management conditioned by earnings-forecast
deviation? Third, is earnings management by IPO forecasting firms affected by
contractual and governance environments? Fourth, how do investors see through
earnings management following IPO earnings forecasts, i.e., how do stock market
participants value earnings components (i.e., nondiscretionary and discretionary
accruals)? Our findings document that in the year following an IPO, the magnitude of
earnings management is much higher for forecasters than for nonforecasters. Results
also show that a firm's accrual behavior is affected by earnings-forecast deviation, but
the relationship is moderated by contractual and governance constraints. Finally, it
would appear that French investors do not adequately readjust the relationship between
reported earnings and a firm's market value for the year in which earnings are subject to
manipulations.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Institutional environment
3. Earnings forecasts, earnings management and stock market valuation: Development
of hypotheses
3.1. Earnings management: Forecasters/non-forecasters
3.2. Earnings-forecast deviation
3.3. Earnings-forecast deviation—contractual and governance environment
3.3.1. IAS/IFRS compliance
3.3.2. External board
3.3.3. Auditor
3.3.4. Ownership structure
3.4. Control variables (other contractual constraints)
3.4.1. Retained ownership
3.4.2. Size
3.4.3. Leverage
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3.5. Earnings management and stock market valuation
4. Method
4.1. Sample
4.2. Empirical models
4.2.1.Earnings management
5. Independent variables
5.1. Earnings-forecast deviation
5.1.1. IAS/IFRS compliance
5.1.1.1. External board
5.1.1.2. Auditor
5.1.1.3. Concentrated ownership (%)
5.1.1.4. Retained ownership (%)
5.1.1.5. Size
5.1.1.6. Leverage
5.1.1.7. Market listing
5.1.2. Stock market valuation
6. Results
6.1. Earnings management
6.1.1. Univariate analyses
6.1.2. Multivariate analyses
6.2. Selection bias
6.3. Accruals management—additional analyses
6.4. Earnings management and valuation analysis
7. Discussion and conclusion
Acknowledgements
Appendix A. Euronext Paris Stock Exchange—characteristics of different markets
References
The influence of conservatism and secrecy on the interpretation of verbal
probability expressions in the Anglo and Latin cultural areas
Pages 237-261
Timothy S. Doupnik, Edson Luiz Riccio
Abstract
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We use Gray's [Gray, S.J. (1988). Towards a theory of cultural influence on the
development of accounting systems internationally. Abacus, 24 (1), 1–15.] theory of the
influence of culture on accounting to develop hypotheses about the effect the interaction
of the accounting values of conservatism and secrecy and the context in which
probability expressions are used in accounting standards will have on accountants'
interpretations of those expressions. Specifically, we expect accountants in a high
conservatism country to assign a higher (lower) numerical probability to verbal
probability expressions that determine the threshold for the recognition of items that
increase (decrease) income than accountants in a low conservatism country. We expect
accountants in a high secrecy country to assign higher numerical probabilities to verbal
probability expressions that establish the probability threshold for the disclosure of
information than accountants in a low secrecy country. We survey professional
accountants in Brazil (higher conservatism and higher secrecy) and in the United States
(lower conservatism and lower secrecy) to test our hypotheses. We obtain some support
for the first conservatism hypothesis related to the recognition of income-increasing
items, but no support for the second conservatism hypothesis related to incomedecreasing items. We obtain stronger results in support of our hypothesis related to
secrecy and disclosure. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the
impact of culture on interpretation of verbal probability expressions in the Latin cultural
area and by testing Gray's theory, especially the secrecy hypothesis, at the individualaccountant level.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Review of the theoretical framework and empirical tests of the framework
2.1. Theory of the influence of culture on accounting
2.2. Empirical tests of Gray's framework
3. Research question, hypotheses, and country selection
3.1. Research question and hypotheses
3.2. Country selection
3.3. Influence of Big 4 firm affiliation
4. Methodology
5. Results
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5.1. Responses
5.2. Cultural value scores
5.3. Tests of hypotheses
5.3.1. Tests of conservatism hypotheses — H1 and H2
5.3.2. Test of secrecy hypothesis — H3
5.4. Influence of Big 4 firm affiliation
6. Summary and conclusions
Acknowledgements
Appendix A. IAS excerpts containing verbal probability expressions
References
Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure
Pages 262-289
Eugene C.M. Cheng, Stephen M. Courtenay
Abstract
This study, which examines the association between board monitoring and the level of
voluntary disclosure, finds new evidence that firms with a higher proportion of
independent directors on the board are associated with higher levels of voluntary
disclosure. Although board size and CEO duality are not associated with voluntary
disclosure, boards with a majority of independent directors have significantly higher
levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with balanced boards. Notably, we find that
the presence of an external governance mechanism, the regulatory environment,
enhances the strength of the association between the proportion of independent
directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. This association is some two to three
times greater under a “disclosure-based” regulatory regime than under a “merit-based”
regulatory regime.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Research motivations, prior research and hypothesis development
2.1. Board monitoring
2.2. Corporate governance and disclosure in Singapore
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2.3. Effects of the regulatory regime on board monitoring
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
3.2. Voluntary disclosure index
3.2.1. Validity of the voluntary disclosure index
3.3. Board variables
3.4. Firm characteristics
3.5. Methodology
4. Empirical results and analysis
4.1. Regression results for year 2000
4.2. The endogeneity of board composition
4.3. Analysis of the effect of the regulatory regime on the board monitoring of
disclosure
5. Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
Board composition, regulatory regime, and voluntary disclosure
Pages 290-292
Kevin C.W. Chen
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Contributions
3. Issues in methodology
3.1. Common determinants of board structure and disclosure
3.2. The effect of regulatory regime
4. Conclusions
References
Response to discussion of “board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary
disclosure”
Pages 293-294
Eugene C.M. Cheng, Stephen M. Courtenay
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Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Issues in methodology
2.1. Common determinants of board structure and disclosure
2.2. The effect of regulatory regime
3. Conclusion
Investigating the effect of board independence on performance across different
strategies
Pages 295-314
Lindawati Gani, Johnny Jermias
Abstract
This study investigates the effect of board independence on performance across
different strategies. Using moderated regression analyses, the results confirm our
hypothesis that board independence has a significantly more positive effect on
performance for firms pursuing a strategy of cost efficiency than for those pursuing a
strategy of innovation. The results of this study indicate that consideration of firms'
competitive strategy can provide a better understanding of the relationship between
board independence and firm performance.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Related literature and hypothesis
3. Research method
3.1. Sample selection
3.2. Variable measurements
3.2.1. Competitive strategy (STRA)
3.2.2. Board independence (IND)
3.2.3. Performance (ROE and ROI)
3.2.4. Control variables
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4. Data analysis and result
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlations
4.2. Hypothesis testing
5. Summary and discussion
References
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