1 Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi`ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar Cihangir, Mehmet

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Bilgiye Erişim Merkezi’ne Yeni Gelen Yayınlar
Cihangir, Mehmet. – Türkiye’de banka birleşmeleri ve birleşen bankaların
verimlilik ve etkinliğinin ölçülmesi üzerine karşılaştırmalı-uygulamalı bir inceleme
(Doktora Tezi). – Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 2004.
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Resmi Gazete
YÜRÜTME VE İDARE BÖLÜMÜ
CUMHURBAŞKANLIĞINA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ
— Cumhurbaşkanlığına, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Başkanı Köksal TOPTAN'ın Vekalet Etmesine Dair Tezkere
BAKANLIKLARA VEKÂLET ETME İŞLEMİ
— Devlet Bakanı Kürşad TÜZMEN’e, Devlet Bakanı Mehmet AYDIN’ın Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere
— İçişleri Bakanlığına, Milli Savunma Bakanı M. Vecdi GÖNÜL’ün Vekâlet Etmesine Dair Tezkere
YÖNETMELİKLER
— Tarım ve Köyişleri Bakanlığı Döner Sermaye İşletmeleri Uygulama Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
— İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim ve Öğretim Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
— İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Yaz Öğretimi Yönetmeliğinde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Yönetmelik
ANA STATÜ
— Türkiye Motosiklet Federasyonu Ana Statüsünde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Ana Statü
Yabancı Kitap Ve Süreli Yayınlar
Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
Volume 26, Issue 6, Pages 637-750 (November-December 2007)
Information sharing among firms and cyber attacks
Pages 639-688
Kjell Hausken
Abstract
As the Sarbanes-Oxley Act strengthens internal controls, and the government
encourages information sharing, accounting gains significance through secure
representation, storage, and transfer of information, and by laying the foundation for
assessing costs and benefits. Information sharing and security investment for two firms
are inverse U shaped in the aggregate attack, and interlinked through the
interdependence and the firm’s unit cost of security investment. Both increase in the
interdependence (e.g. US telecommunications industry). With given security
investment, social welfare is inverse U shaped in information sharing. Individual
optimization implies free riding. A social planner is introduced controlling information
sharing, security investment, or both, in simultaneous and two period games. Two
period games where the social planner moves first are realistic when the social planner
is highly respected. For the simultaneous game, a social planner controlling information
sharing (security investment) imposes unreasonably high sharing (security investment).
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Firms free ride in the variable they control. The social planner imposes more moderate
levels in the two period games. A social planner controlling both information sharing
and security investment in a two period game where the social planner moves first is the
most beneficial control scenario when the firms’ defense efficiencies are high. If these
are sufficiently high, the attack is deterred altogether.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. The model
3. Analyzing the model: each firm and the agent optimize individually
4. Exogenously given information sharing
5. Exogenously given security investment
6. Social planner controls information sharing
6.1. Two period game
6.2. Simultaneous game
7. Social planner controls security investment: simultaneous game
8. Social planner controls both information sharing and security investment
8.1. Simultaneous game
8.2. Two period game
9. Which games and control scenarios do the agent and social planner prefer
10. Conclusion
Acknowledgements
Appendix 1. Individual firm and agent optimization, cf. Section 3
Appendix 2. A social planner controls information sharing in a two period game, cf.
Section 6.1
Appendix 3. A social planner controls information sharing in a simultaneous game, cf.
Section 6.2
Appendix 4. Social planner controls security investment: Simultaneous game, cf.
Section 7
Appendix 5. Social planner controls both information sharing and security investment:
simultaneous game, cf. Section 8.1
Appendix 6. Social planner controls both information sharing and security investment:
two period game, cf. Section 8.2
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References
Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates and tax reform:
Evidence from Australia
Pages 689-704
Grant Richardson, Roman Lanis
Abstract
This study examines the determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates
in Australia spanning the Ralph Review of Business Taxation reform. Our results
indicate that corporate effective tax rates are associated with several major firm-specific
characteristics, including firm size, capital structure (leverage) and asset mix (capital
intensity, inventory intensity and R&D intensity). While the Ralph Review tax reform
had a significant impact on many of these associations, corporate effective tax rates
continue to be associated with firm size, capital structure and asset mix after the tax
reform.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Determinants of ETRs and hypotheses
2.1. ETRs and firm size
2.2. ETRs and firms’ financing and investment decisions
2.3. ETRs and tax reform
3. Research design
3.1. Sample and data
3.2. Dependent variable
3.3. Independent variables
3.3.1. Firm-specific variables
3.3.2. Control variables
3.3.3. Tax reform variables
3.4. Regression model
4. Results and analyses
4.1. Descriptive statistics
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4.2. Regression results
4.3. Robustness checks
5. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
References
Auditor specialization, perceived audit quality, and audit fees in the local
government audit market
Pages 705-732
Suzanne Lowensohn, Laurence E. Johnson, Randal J. Elder, Stephen P. Davies
Abstract
Prior governmental research implies a positive relation between auditor specialization
and audit quality, but the effect of specialization on audit fees is mixed. However, no
single governmental study investigates the effect of auditor specialization on both audit
quality and audit fees. Also, prior studies focus on either large- or small audit firms and
often employ indirect proxies for audit quality. We study the effects of auditor
specialization on perceived audit quality and audit fees. Our data represent both Big 5
and smaller audit firms and include three market-based measures of specialization. We
survey 241 Florida local government finance directors and find that specialization is
positively associated with perceived audit quality but not with audit fees. We also find
that Big 5 auditors, often used as a proxy for higher audit quality in prior research, are
not uniformly associated with increased perceived audit quality but consistently charge
higher audit fees. Our results confirm a relation between measures of audit firm
specialization and audit quality and raise questions regarding audit firm size and audit
quality in the municipal sector. Our findings suggest that engaging specialized auditors
may be good policy for many local governments.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Literature review and theoretical considerations
2.1. The audit environment of interest
2.2. Operationalizing audit quality
2.3. Auditor specialization and audit quality
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2.4. Auditor specialization and audit fees
2.5. Audit firm size and audit quality
3. Model development
3.1. The dependent variable
3.2. Research variables
4. Control variables
4.1. The audit fee model
4.2. Relation between audit quality and audit fees
5. Research method
6. Data collection
6.1. Data analysis
7. Results and discussion
7.1. Analysis of audit fees
7.2. Additional analysis of audit firm size and specialization
7.3. Discussion of findings
7.4. Conclusion
Appendix. Local government audit survey
Please complete this survey regarding the audit of your government’s financial
statements for the fiscal year ending (FYE) 9-30-02
References
US oil companies’ earnings management in response to hurricanes Katrina and
Rita
Pages 733-748
Donal Byard, Mahmud Hossain, Santanu Mitra
Abstract
This study examines earnings management by US-based oil companies in the period
immediately after the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We show that large
petroleum refining firms – but not the smaller crude oil and natural gas production
companies – recorded significant abnormal income-decreasing accruals in the fiscal
quarter immediately after the impact of hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Q4 of 2005). In
addition, we show that these results are driven by abnormal current accruals. Prior
studies show that some firms respond to periods of heightened political scrutiny by
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recording abnormal income-decreasing accruals (e.g. [Cahan, S., 1992. The effect of
antitrust investigation on discretionary accruals: a refined test of the political cost
hypothesis. The Accounting Review 67 (1), 77–96; Han, J., Wang, S., 1998. Political
costs and earnings management of oil companies during the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis.
The Accounting Review 73 (1), 103–118]). Our results add to this stream of research by
examining a political cost-increasing event that occurred after the passage of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. The results suggest that in the post-SOX period
managers continue to engage in income-decreasing earnings management during
periods of heightened political cost sensitivity, at least in the case of large petroleum
refining firms.
Article Outline
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Sample selection and research method
3.1. Sample selection
3.2. Research method
4. Results
5. Concluding comments
Acknowledgements
References
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