Untitled - Merel van Beeren

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The Daily Battles of the Turkish Journalist
By MEREL VAN BEEREN
April 2012
Table of Contents
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Introduction
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History: Weighed Down by the Past
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Economy: Money Over Meaning
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Law: Controversy is Contagious
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Self-censorship: Fighting Your Instincts
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Government: Pro or Against
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Bibliography
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Acknowledgments
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The Daily Battles of the Turkish Journalist
By MEREL VAN BEEREN
The Turkish government has made significant enough strides in democratizing the state
over the past decade for Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to be able to position his
country as a role model for the Middle East. With visits to Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt
since the Arab Spring of 2011, he has placarded Turkey’s democratic advancement—
attained largely in preparation for possible European Union membership—while taking
a firm and public stance against oppression in neighboring countries. “A future cannot
be built on the blood of oppressed people,” he said in remarks about Syria before the
Turkish parliament last [2011] November. “Those who are cursed for cruelty and
oppression will the pay the price sooner or later.”
But is Turkey really the example to follow? In the nine decades since the founding of the
republic, its record on freedom of speech and press has been questionable at best. And
although the 2002 election of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development party at first seemed
to herald an age of unprecedented progress towards a more democratic nation generally
and increased freedom of expression specifically, the government’s behavior toward the
media has become increasingly harsh. In fact, in this, its third and most recent term, the
annual Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders shows Turkey, a
country that officially abolished censorship under the Ottomans in 1908, moving
precipitously toward the bottom. From an already low ranking of 103rd among the 178
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countries surveyed in 2008, Turkey fell to 138th in 2010 and then dropped another 10
places to the 148th spot in 2011.
Historically and more recently, the blocks to the country’s ambivalent aspirations for a
free press have been three: a long succession of repressive regimes, a challenging
economy and an ambiguous penal code, meaning, a dearth of jobs for journalists and a
prevalence of legal actions against them. For the journalists themselves, it’s little wonder
that the abiding fear for personal safety and the need for economic security often take
precedence over any desire to agitate for the adoption of more democratic journalistic
ideals—creating a fourth block: self-censorship.
Since January [2012] alone, Erdoğan sued Ahmet Altan, editor-in-chief of the
newspaper Taraf, after Altan heavily criticized the prime minister in one of his columns.
Then in March, the journalists' union president, Ercan İpekçi, went on a week-long
hunger strike to protest the pressure being put on journalists by the Turkish state news
agency to resign from the union of Turkish journalists. A few days later, a court, citing
legal technicalities, released journalists Ahmet Şık and Nedim Şener from their yearlong pretrial detention, but the charges against them for alleged membership in a
terrorist organization still stand. Their next trial date was scheduled for June.
At the end of March, police raided the printing company of the Kurdish newspaper
Özgür Gündem, confiscated that Sunday’s edition and then banned the newspaper from
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publishing for a month on orders of an Istanbul court, acting on accusations the
newspaper was “making propaganda for an illegal organization.” The government
viewed Gündem’s coverage of Kurdish New Year celebrations in the Qandil mountains
as propaganda for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)1, which it sees as a threat to
national stability. Turkey, the United States and the European Union all have classified
the PKK as a terrorist organization.
At least 100 journalists2 are currently being held in Turkish prisons, some on mediarelated charges but most because of alleged involvement in terrorist organizations.
Government and various journalists’ rights organizations disagree on the reasons for
these arrests—the government contends the journalists are being held because of
criminal, not journalistic actions while the journalists’ rights group say these allegations
are merely a convenient way to silence critics. Meanwhile, thousands more mediarelated court cases are pending, often for months without leading to a conviction.
The trial of Merdan Yanardağ, a long-time journalist and author, started in October
2008, when he was taken from his home in the early morning the day he was supposed
to leave for Germany to attend a conference, detained, and questioned for three days. He
1 The organization is looking to establish an independent state in what Kurds see as the historic region of
Kurdistan, the majority of which can be found within the boundaries of contemporary Turkey. The
conflict dates back to before the founding of the republic, but has especially affected the Turkish state
since the 1980s.
2 A list of journalists currently imprisoned, with the details and dates of their cases, maintained by
bloggers (who identify themselves as ‘journalist friends of Ahmet Şık, Nedim Şener, and more than a
hundred arrested journalists in Turkey’) at ‘Turkey Press Freedom – Reveals state oppression against
journalists in Turkey’ can be found here.
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had just published a book on the connection between the AKP, the acronym for Adalet
ve Kalkınma Partisi—or Justice and Development Party, and the Fethullah Gülen
movement—a religious organization thought to have significant influence on the current
regime.3 “They detained me to prevent me from going to this conference,” he said,
through an interpreter. He has not been allowed to leave the country since. “I haven’t
travelled after 2008.”
History: Weighed Down by the Past
A WALK THROUGH ISTANBUL is a walk through Turkish history. The face of Atatürk
adorns buildings and walls, bearing witness to the stamp that the republic has left on the
city, a reminder to its citizens to be proud of their nation, and they are, despite a fraught
political history that started in 1923 with an authoritarian one-party system. Between
3 The movement is based on the thoughts and work of Fethullah Gülen, a Muslim preacher who focuses
on interfaith and intercultural dialogue. His followers—amounting to almost 10 million in Turkey—are
part of a network that has no clear structure or hierarchy, but is said to be part of all aspects of Turkish
life, and beyond. Gülen schools can be found in 130 different countries, including the United States, and
the movement also includes newspapers, think tanks, and other organizations worldwide. Gülen’s
intentions have been questioned for a long time, and many people in Turkey are convinced that beyond a
friendly relationship (which the government and the movement confirm) the AKP and Gülen movement
are strongly connected. In a video in 1999, Gülen seemed to, as the BBC’s Edward Stouton reported in
May 2011, encourage his followers to “infiltrate mainstream organizations.” He said: "You must move
within the arteries of the system, without anyone noticing your existence, until you reach all the power
centres. You must wait until such time as you have got all the state power, until you have brought to your
side all the power of the constitutional institution in Turkey." In the last months, the AKP and Gülen
movement—who most likely teamed up because of their mutual opponent, the military—seemed to have
found some cracks in the foundation of their alliance. Foreign Policy’s Justin Vela reports that “with that
job [trying to demolish the old Kemalist regime] nearing completion, the relationship appears to be
fraying.” There were public disagreements over “the response to military air strikes that killed 35 Kurdish
civilians,” Vela writes, and “the two sides also clashed over a soccer match-fixing scandal involving top
business interests within the country.” As Erdogan cannot serve another term as prime minister, he is
looking for a possible presidency—and in rewriting the constitution, that presidency could very well start
to have a more powerful position. Where the Gülen movement previously served as a welcome partner, it
might now be an unwelcome factor in Erdoğan’s future.
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1960 and 1997, there have been three separate military coups d’état and a fourth
occasion where the government resigned largely because of military pressure.
Turkey’s journalism history is as short and volatile as the republic’s, characterized by
interdependence rather than independence from government. Despite the lip service
from the top, there has never been much room for a free press, so there is no broad
tradition of independent and critical reporting and analysis for Turkish journalists to
build on—affecting journalism up to the present.
The Turkish republic’s one-party system, which lasted until 1950, relied on the press as
its messenger for the government’s modernization efforts but also kept the press under
tight control. Any expression of dissent was quickly squelched.4 In 1928, the new Latin
alphabet replaced the Ottoman script and delivered a tremendous blow to what little
independent media Turkey had at the time. Printers and printing equipment had to be
replaced, and the ruling party graciously provided the financial assistance to do so, thus
opening the way to government supervision of published ideas.
That stance changed in 1950 with the election of the Democrat Party (DP). At the
beginning, the government showed its goodwill to the press by adopting a liberal press
4 As described in the section on the history of journalism in the TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social
Studies Foundation) report ‘Communicating Democracy – Democratizing Communication. Media in
Turkey: Legislation, Policies, Actors,’ by Esra Elmas and Dilek Kurban (2011), who cite Demirel and
Hepers’ article ‘The Press and the Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey,” Middle Eastern Studies April
1996.
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law and allowing journalists to form associations and improve the benefits and rights of
their profession. A journalists’ union was established in Istanbul and for a time, the
media was strengthened. But it didn't last long. A few years later, the DP reverted to the
press-manipulating ways of its predecessors: legal amendments were introduced
restricting journalists and the number of court cases against them rose. In the following
decades, the regimes instituted after the coups d'état of 1960, 1971, and 1980 all sought
control of the media. The 1980 coup was even announced on public television.
A generation of journalists born after 1980 have been raised to keep their mouths shut,
or at least to work within government boundaries, said Cağil Kasapoğlu. The 28-yearold foreign news editor at newspaper Radikal is convinced that the extreme political
instability and repression of the military regimes in the 1970s and early ‘80s
traumatized her parents' generation into silence and passivity, causing them to restrict
their children from participating in political movements or joining anti-government
associations. In an environment where the education system already was encouraging
students to obey rather than question, the government began prohibiting even the
slightest forms of criticism. “The aim was to create a citizenry which was uncritical, noninterfering and ready to sacrifice their individuality in the name of the ‘nation’,” a 2011
report on democracy and communication of the Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation (TESEV) stated.
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In 1983, the election of the Motherland Party set Turkey on a course of economic
liberalization, which had commensurate impact on the media. Financial interests began
to outweigh political goals, but pressure on journalists continued. With the Kurdish
conflict at its height, and an the government increasingly anxious, journalists often
found themselves in extreme personal jeopardy.
“There was a danger of being killed,” said Salih Memecan, political cartoonist and
president of the newly formed media association Medya Derneği.5 “So many journalists
were killed, and we never knew who killed them and why. Some of us had our cars
armored, some of us had bought guns. Including myself.”
The overall climate paved the way for what Turks call the 'post-modern military coup' of
1997—another military intervention, but different in the sense that it did not lead to
another military regime. The mainstream media had actively contributed to suggesting a
rise of militant Islamism in the Welfare Path coalition government—a cooperation
between the Welfare Party and the True Path Party, conservative and center right,
respectively. It created an atmosphere of anxiety in the country, and led to popular
support for another government ouster.
5 Medya Derneği, or Media Association, is an association created in 2010, to represent newspapers and
other media outlets who felt that they were not being represented by media organizations already in place.
The board of the association is made up by editors-in-chief and powerful figures of media companies that
most would place firmly in the pro-government camp.
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“I think us journalists have some of the blame because some of us were cooperating with
the bad guys who were planning military coups,” said Memecan. “The established
newspapers of Turkey had the habit of cooperating with the strong guys, the generals.”
But, as in most discussions, the two groups in the media—pro- and anti-government—
disagree on which side is really to blame.
THE FRAMEWORK OF TURKISH media and politics was turned upside down in a
matter of years. In the late 1990s, it was clear that the press was no longer just
influenced by the government, but “had also become a tool of manipulation for private
capital groups for their political and economic benefits in their relationship with
government,” as the TESEV report pointed out. In late 2000, Turkey was shaken by an
economic crisis of immense proportions. Journalism got caught in the crossfire: some
media organizations were deeply invested in banks that went under, showing the
difficult nature of cross-ownership in media. In the political arena, where a coalition of
the Democratic Leftist Party, the Motherland Party, and the National Action Party was
elected in 1999, the Welfare Party was dealing with internal turmoil. Soon after, its more
reformist members left the party and launched the conservative democratic Justice and
Development Party (AKP), rooted in political Islam.
Elected to government in 2002, the AKP filled many Turkish citizens with hope for a
more democratic future. Turkey had officially become a candidate for membership to
the European Union in 1999, kickstarting a process of democratization through
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constitutional and practical changes. Erdoğan and his government actively courted the
European Union and quickly started work on implementing the required changes for
membership. It seemed like the ultimate challenge to what the establishment of the
secular republic (e.g., the military and the upper echelons of bureaucracy) had always
believed in: a religious party taking over their quest for modernization. The media itself,
torn between its age-old connection to the military establishment and the increasing
demands of the public for an independent media, was in for a rough ride.
After eighty years of republic, Turkey now had a media landscape where publications
abounded, representing every possible political stance, and the EU accession talks that
officially started in 2004 promised more freedom to come. But government continued
its quest to abide by EU demands while at the same time holding on to state ideology,
and keeping a firm grip on the media—finally leading to a stagnation in the road
towards becoming a member. Improvements have halted, too, and even journalists who
had firmly believed in the AKP in its first two terms, are disappointed.
Erkan Saka, a professor of new media at Bilgi University who runs a blog focused on
media issues, became disillusioned after the government started to work on
constitutional amendments and didn’t follow through on promises made.6 “I lost hope
6 The election program of the AKP in 2007 “contains a strong promise for a new constitution which is
described as ‘civilian’ and as a ‘social contract,’” Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya describe in
their 2009 book Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey. “It should protect
fundamental rights and liberties in the most effective way in accordance with the standards of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ECHR, while preserving the unamendable [sic]
characteristics of the republic such as the democratic, secular, and social state based on human rights and
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that they are good natured when it comes to the Kurdish issue and other issues. I feel
betrayed, like many liberals.”
In its current term, Saka thinks the AKP is becoming more and more arrogant. “Rights
violations increase. And, in the mean time, government thinks that they are the model
for many other countries, in a sort of self-delusional way,” he said. “The model looks
more like the Chinese model: big economic development, but not much democratic
advancement.”
The country’s fast-growing economy is something in which the republic takes extreme
pride. In the midst of international economic crises, it has managed to steadily grow by
an average percentage of 8,5 over the last few years and today finds itself at No. 16
among the largest economies of the world.7 Turkey’s status as role model for the region
relies to a large extent on this economic prowess—but that same economy is the source
of many frustrations for journalists.
the rule of law. The manifesto promises to regulate the relations among different branches of government
in line with the parliamentary model and to redefine the powers of the president accordingly. The new
constitution should be based on the broadest possible consensus.” (pages 104-105) Many Turks feel that
the party has not come through on their promises, and has simply strengthened its own position and
network since the latest election. As mentioned in footnote 3, some Turks are also suspicious of the
changes that Erdogan is looking to make with regard to the presidency.
7 Turkey is working to be one of the ten top economies by 2013. However, their steady growth is starting
to slow down, as Daniel Dombey reports for the Financial Times. Furthermore, the Turkish account
deficit—at about 10%—is one of the country’s biggest economic vulnerabilities, and their currency, the
Turkish lira, has taken a beating compared to the dollar over the last year.
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Economy: Money Over Meaning
TODAY'S MEDIA IN TURKEY is inextricably tied up with those economic interests,
much like in the rest of the world. Having gone from family-owned publications to
media conglomerates with interests that far surpass the domain of free speech, Turkish
newspapers are no longer even remotely removed from the woes of the economy. The
majority of Turkish newspapers are owned by large holding companies, which often
control as many as a half a dozen publications. Although the number of Turkish media
outlets is still high, their political stance and backgrounds are becoming increasingly
homogeneous.
Mehmet Sağnak, a journalism professor at Bahçeşehir University, has worked in
journalism since 1987, and has seen the field change. Until some years ago, it was easy
for a journalist to change jobs, move to another station or newspaper when satisfaction
waned. With so many different publications and media owners around, it was easy to
find a good fit. Not anymore though, Sağnak said. “There are only two or three owners
left, and you know who they are.” News of disagreement with a paper’s policies travels
fast, complicating the ability to find a new job. It's why Sağnak gave up his career to
become a teacher five years ago.
The lack of independent media outlets and concentration of ownership looks like an
open invitation to government involvement, if not censorship, through promises of
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economic windfalls or hardship via the back rooms.8 Small newspapers, mostly locally
published, rely on the income they receive from publishing government notices and ads
—something that can easily be taken away by the government when the paper turns out
to be too critical. The income is so important that the publication could very well—and
often does—go under when the notices are pulled. Tax fines could be just as disastrous:
small publications can't recover from fines that they simply can't afford, and have to
close their doors.
Big media groups, like the Doğan Holding, have important interests to defend in other
sectors, like oil, or construction. And that's what the government uses to its advantage.
After having published some unfavorable opinions toward the AKP and its leader
Erdoğan, Doğan found itself facing a heavy tax fine in 2009: the government had
charged the Doğan Holding with $2.5 billion in back taxes.9 Its effects were soon clear:
some of Doğan's newspapers were sold off, others made considerable changes in their
staff, fired difficult columnists, put new directors in place, and became considerably less
8 I have asked government representatives for comments several times, via the Prime Minister’s
Directorate General of Press and Information (www.byegm.gov.tr) as well as the office of the President,
during the summer of 2011, early 2012, and again before finalizing this piece. I have not heard back.
9 The case started out in September 2008, when Erdoğan accused Aydin Doğan, owner of the Doğan
Holding, “of using his newspapers and television channels to defame the government and the ruling AK
Party with reports of alleged corruption,” Reuters writes in a timeline on the case. In February of 2009,
the holding was fined for the first time by tax authorities, amounting to 693 million Turkish lira. In a fight
over the payment of the fine, the holding’s bank accounts were frozen. In September of the same year,
another fine was added after a second tax investigation, for another 3.76 billion lira.
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critical of the government. The tax fine was lowered to a more proportionate amount.
Though the Doğan papers have not switched camps, they have been quieted.10
“It created a fear in the media sector. They became afraid to fight the government, to
write something against the government,” Ceren Sözeri said. Sözeri and her colleague
Zeynep Güney, both 32, are researchers at Galatasaray University and have published a
report on the political economy of the media for TESEV. Current and potential future
deals with the government makes investors and media owners think twice about what
their publications can publish. This leads to a preference for employees without too
much of an opinion—often fresh out of college.
GÖKMEN KAYA IS PESSIMISTIC about the state of his field in Turkey, and that
includes the attitude of his peers. He is a journalism student at Bahçeşehir University in
Beşiktaş and out of the 20 students in his class, he is the only one on the student
newspaper. Most of his classmates plan to go into advertising, or a more general
communications career. They don't want to go into print journalism, a field that comes
with a low status and even lower salaries.
Despite this attitude, newly graduated journalists are still faced with thousands of
competitors when entering the job market. Not only is the general area of
10 In April [2012], Reuters reported that the Doğan Holding “posted a net loss of 1.2 billion lira for 2011
compared with a loss of 236 million lira the previous year, after paying fines of more than 900 million lira
for failure to pay taxes.” The original amount of imposed taxes was more than 4 billion lira, but was then
brought down to 988 million lira. Despite the steep reduction, the effects of the fine are significant.
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communications popular for a future career, it is also the path chosen by students who
can't get into other programs. Universities in Turkey don't have enough capacity to put
up all students that apply and the country has turned to mandatory entrance exams to
regulate the flow. When students don't have a good enough score to get into their
desired program, they opt for a communications major—just to make sure they'll have a
degree. A big part of those graduates will eventually also look for a job in journalism,
faced with a lack of job opportunities in advertising and public relations.
“There are nearly thirty communications faculties in Turkey, seventeen of them state
faculties, and they are trying to form ten more,” professor Sağnak said. “It is too much.
It must be limited.”
The process has made some employers in media look for more than just a degree. “It's
not enough for us, being a journalism department graduate,” Erhan Başyurt said, editorin-chief of Bugün. They look for graduates of sociology, history, and political science to
get the quality they need.
But overall, Sağnak sees the quality of journalism declining. Publications can take their
pick of new graduates each year, ridding themselves of older, more expensive, and more
critical journalists—leading to a loss of expertise. “You can't take a recent graduate and
easily train them for three or four months to write the story.” But these young
journalists will write what the editor tells them to write.
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“A vast majority of the employees in the media sector have an average seniority of less
than five years,” TESEV's report on the political economy of media stated. Bülent Keneş,
editor-in-chief of English daily Today's Zaman, proudly pointed out the young average
age of his staff, emphasizing the lack of employees who hold on to what he sees as the
old, corrupted style of media practiced under military regimes. But is that truly the
reason, and how much invaluable experience is lost in favor of the new?
THE MINIMAL PRESENCE AND influence of the union is another one of the many
pieces of Turkey's press freedom puzzle. Membership of the journalists' union, Türkiye
Gazeteciler Sendikası (TGS), is at an all-time low since its founding in 1952—a
consequence of both the economy and the very rigid definition of who qualifies as a
journalist.
To become a member of the union, you have to be able to prove that you are a full-time
journalist, and depend on the craft for your livelihood. Not only does this exclude parttime journalists and freelancers, it effectively denies access to anyone working for online
media. To make it all official, the journalist has to fill out forms, have them notarized,
send them to the union, and the union then needs to run the documents by the minister
of labor. An unnecessarily lengthy process that actively involves the state—an apparatus
that journalism worldwide is thought to monitor and report on.
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Even when journalists fit the official profile, they are actively discouraged from joining
unions when applying for jobs. Media bosses promise new hires better salaries and
special benefits if they agree to sign a contract based on the regular Labor Law, instead
of a contract based on the laws that are in effect for journalists. Union membership is
actively discouraged, to the point of termination when membership is discovered, Orhan
Erinç explained, with the help of a translator. He is the head of the Türkiye Gazeteciler
Cemiyeti (TGC), or Turkish Journalists Association.11
Erinç is in his early seventies, and has been a journalist for more than fifty years. When
he was a young reporter, the union had been in an ideal situation, and worked hard for
its members—journalists who could then be open about their affiliation. “Now, if you
want to be a member of the union, your boss will be very angry,” Erinç said. “If they find
out about your membership, they will kick you out.”
Hardly anyone turns down a contract outside of the journalism laws, despite the fact
that these practices lead to a smaller and less influential union, and, in the end, to a
poorer work environment for all journalists. Young journalists grab hold of any job they
can find, and their older colleagues also have their reasons. In a climate where older and
more critical reporters and writers are easily laid off in favor of those younger and
cheaper workers—fresh out of college, with no experience to speak of—journalists give in
11 Journalists are organized in two ways in Turkey: in unions, and in associations. Where the union
works mostly on legal matters and issues pertaining to contracts and collective rights, the Turkish
Journalists Association works in a more advisory manner. It also provides education and practical
assistance to its members, and developed its own ethical code for journalists.
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to their publication's demands, and even resort to self-censorship to maintain job
security.
The TGS was formed as a local union in Istanbul, before teaming up with others in the
1960s and creating a national organization made up of local branches. They were
extremely successful during the '70s when unions made big strides in the improvement
of workers' rights. But "After the 1980 coup d'état, all rights of the workers collapsed,"
said İpekçi. “They closed all the unions in Turkey because of their political involvement,”
Sözeri explained. “After that, the journalists’ union has not been able to reclaim its
force.”
Officially, the union has about 4,000 members, but that's a stretch, even İpekçi admits.
Active members are only in the hundreds, courtesy of the definition of journalism as
well as the deals that media bosses make with their employees. “There are 15,000
journalists working with a contract in Turkey,” İpekçi says. “But according to state
studies there are more than 30,000 workers working legally or illegally, with or without
contract, in this sector.” If the total includes workers in television, radio, and those
working for online publications the number comes closer to a 100,000.
İpekçi, who makes a living as an editor for Anadolu Agency, recently went on a hunger
strike to protest the pressure on Anadolu employees to resign from the union. İpekçi in
particular was pressured, “singled out by management as a target in a campaign of
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intimidation to undermine support for the union,” the European Federation of
Journalists wrote. İpekçi has been at the forefront of those who support imprisoned
journalists, and believes that he was targeted because of his activism. A week into the
strike, he ended his efforts after his fellow union members urged him to stop.
Without any collective to speak of, there is little else that the union can do than
continuously try to speak up for journalists everywhere, engage domestic and global
authorities in a debate and hope that somewhere down the line, their words will have
effect and contribute to an economic environment that will be more conducive to
independent journalism, helped along by wide-scale reforms in the law.
Law: Controversy Is Contagious
IN TURKEY, THE DISTINCTION between reporting on and participating in politics is
hard to make. Most journalists are actively involved in politics, and have strong opinions
on the state of their country. Journalists are more political than elsewhere, 37-year-old
journalist Semra Pelek says. “Being a member of a political ideology is a necessity for
us,” she said, through an interpreter. “Because in Turkey, human rights were never part
of state politics.” Pelek is currently without a job, while a court case against her is
pending for her previous work as an editor at Akşam magazine.12
12 The case was opened against Mustafa Dolu, the general director of Akşam, and Pelek, the editor, for
running an article (“Questions to Fırtına from Aydın Doğan, Rahmi Koç and Akçakoca” on January 5th,
2010) and specifically quoting General İbrahim Fırtına who testified in the trials looking into the coup
attempt by alleged terrorist organization Ergenekon. Akşam took the quote from the website of NTV,
because their own reporters had been unable to hear the quote themselves. Pelek believes that only
Akşam was accused, not the original publisher of the quote, NTV. In its annual report on press freedom,
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Turkish authorities often accuse journalists who work outside the boundaries of what
the government thinks are appropriate discourses of being involved in the issues they
report on. Writing and participating are often seen as the same thing—even by law, a law
that is based on a constitution created under military rule, immediately after the last
coup d'état. Despite a multitude of amendments over the last few years, nothing
significant has changed in the penal code when it comes to freedom of speech. The state
remains a strong presence in the media, and journalists are expected to stick to the
status quo. There is a similar lack of distinction between two other categories: that of
criticism on the one hand, and slander and libel on the other hand.
“There is a long, long problem of failure to see that saying insulting, shocking,
disturbing, and critical things is free speech,” Emma Sinclair-Webb, the Human Rights
Watch representative in Turkey, said. Court cases against journalists, editors, and critics
in general have been opened thousands of times—some even have several dozens of
cases against them at the same time. Almost every Turkish journalist has been accused
of something, Turks often say, and some journalists flaunt their trials like a badges of
honor. For most, however, potential court cases are what leads them to watch their
words and avoid criticism.
Bianet reported in March [2012] that Dolu and Pelek continue to stand trial. They “are faced with 1,5 to 6
years in prison for ‘violating the secrecy of the investigation’ (TCK [Turkish Criminal Code] 285) and 6
months to 2 years in prison for ‘attempting to influence a fair trial’ (TCK 288).”
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Historically, critics of the regime were mainly subject to the provisions of Article 301 of
the Turkish Penal Code. The Article prohibited 'insulting Turkishness,' and famously
accused novelist Orhan Pamuk and writer Perihan Mağden, who spoke about the
Armenian genocide and conscientious objection to military service, respectively. The law
has since been revised to state 'insulting the Turkish nation,' but remains no less
ambiguous or widely applicable.13
Hrant Dink, editor-in-chief of the Armenian newspaper Agos, was brought to court
under the banner of 301 several times. “For comments which in no way should have
been subject to any criminal action whatsoever,” said Sinclair-Webb. Five years ago,
Dink was assassinated in front of the Agos offices. The charges against him had “made
him a target, brought him to public attention and that notoriety brought him to the
attention of his killers,” Sinclair-Webb continued. The Dink case came to a conclusion
last January, putting his murderers behind bars, but neglecting to convict members of
state that many thought to be the instigators. The outcome caused an uproar in Turkey,
and far beyond.14
13 The article states, as of 2008: “1 - A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the
Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and
three years. 2 - A person who publicly denigrates Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial
institutions of the State, the military or security organizations shall be punishable by imprisonment of
between six months and two years. 3 - In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a
Turkish citizen in another country the punishment shall be increased by one third. 4 - Expression of
thought intended to criticize shall not constitute crime.” Source: World Law Direct.
14 A crowd of 10,000 protested in Istanbul, in front of the Agos offices, Today’s Zaman reported. The
Economist wrote that “Even Turkey’s allies worry about its legal system. In a report citing Mr Dink’s case,
Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe’s human-rights commissioner, rebuked Turkish judges and
prosecutors for ‘giving precedence to the protection of the state over the protection of human rights.’”
News outlets and human rights organizations worldwide joined the protesters.
22
NOW, CRITICS MOSTLY FEAR the Turkish anti-terrorism laws. The majority of
journalists in jail today are accused in some way of being connected to organizations
hostile to the state. As part of extensive reforms under AKP leadership, an investigation
was launched into suspected attempts to overthrow the government yet again at the
beginning of this century, by a group under the name of Ergenekon. The alleged
terrorist organization is said to be connected to what the Turks call 'deep state,'
influential people in the government, military, and judiciary, that together are against
the development of a democratic Turkey and do whatever it takes to make sure Turkey
remains in military hands.
Every journalist is scrutinized—those working for publications that support government
as well as those who take a more critical stance. But while most of those cases are a mere
nuisance to journalists, a roadblock that slows them down on their way to a good story,
others lead to imprisonment and are tried in special courts. Journalists can be arrested
and put into pre-trial detention—without even knowing what exactly they are being
accused of until the official indictment is presented, something that can take months or
even years. “If you are condemned as part of an organized gang, or for a terrorist
offence, you are tried according to special procedures in the criminal procedure code,”
Sinclair-Webb explained. “Then your period of pre-trial detention can be up to ten
years.”15 Even when you are aware of what you are accused of, it is only when the
15 The cases are also tried in different courts than usual, called specially authorized heavy penal courts.
Articles 250, 251, and 252 of the Turkish Criminal Code describe these special courts and the cases that
fall under its jurisdiction. The exact language of these articles can be found at Legislation Online.
23
indictment comes out that the evidence is laid bare, and that the accused knows what
exactly he or she needs to defend themselves for.
The Ergenekon investigation has been heavily criticized on both sides of the political
equation. “The Ergenekon investigation process is not well founded,” said Bülent Keneş of Today’s Zaman. “Certain prosecutors opened many cases against journalists.” And
those journalists were frequently the ones who were covering the Ergenekon
investigation as part of their job as a reporter.
Investigative journalists Nedim Şener and Ahmet Şık were arrested and jailed in March
of 2011, accused of being members of Ergenekon. Both had been vocal opponents of
military coups, and Şık was an integral part of exposing Ergenekon’s existence.
Şener wrote a book on the Hrant Dink case and what he perceived as its neglectful
criminal investigation, while Şık had worked on an at the time unpublished manuscript
on the supposed ties of police to the Gülen movement. Many believe they were tried
because of these manuscripts, and they have since become the face of the Turkish
crackdown on the press.
“Ahmet Şık believed in the Ergenekon case, he thought it was something rightful,”
Merdan Yanardağ said about his colleague. “He’s so disappointed. He thought that the
Gülen movement was a social movement instead of a political movement, but he learned
24
the hard way. And then he shouted, when he was detained, ‘whoever touches them
burns.’”
Deniz Ergürel, secretary general of Medya Derneği, believes the investigations are
important, despite their faults. Because in the end, “Military coups d'état, when they
succeed, they destroy everything. And they start with the press.” His colleagues in other
organizations, more favorable to the opposition, disagree: they doubt that the benefits of
the investigations outweigh the negative consequences of the sweeping language of the
anti-terrorism laws.
BOTH THE TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE and Criminal Procedure Code were revised in
2004 and 2005, Sinclair-Webb said. “They introduced some good measures in both, and
some very problematic. It only became clear how problematic they were, in particular
terrorism offenses and restrictions of free speech, over the years.” Old cases still had to
be concluded under the previous code, and it is only since the first cases under the new
law have been coming to an end that the extent of the problems can be observed.16
The biggest issue with the new laws, Sinclair-Webb said, is their ambiguous language.
William Jones, head of the Turkey Coordination Group at Amnesty International USA,
16 The AKP comprehensively revised the Turkish criminal code, the Turkish penal code, and the criminal
procedures code. Since there was not yet a body of case law, the results of the new laws only became clear
after the first trials and convictions were completed. “The biggest problems are the very vaguely drawn
nature of the [anti-terrorism] laws, which allows people who have not incited violence or weren’t involved
in violent activities in any way, let alone terrorism, to find themselves subject to criminal sanctions of
different kinds [than they should have been, and were before],” Emma Sinclair-Webb says.
25
agreed. “All of this comes down to Turkey's very broadly written anti-terrorism laws.
And they have become the new way of putting people in prison.”
The 2011 TESEV report on communication and democracy in Turkey says that “While
press freedom is protected under the constitution, the judiciary has a tendency to censor
dissent and minority media organs under the pretext of combating terrorism, preserving
territorial unity and protecting the state.”
The lengthy pre-trial detentions are one of Human Rights Watch's main concerns, as
well as for Amnesty. It's also one of the few things that Amnesty can actually protest
about the law: “Amnesty's hands are kind of tied right now,” Jones said. “Because
usually Amnesty doesn't comment until somebody not only has been charged, but
sentenced. Which can take forever.”
While Ergenekon is the best known investigation, and most widely covered, most
journalists are in fact charged with suspected affiliation to or membership of the KCK,
the so-called urban wing of the banned PKK, which Turkey, the EU and the United
States all classify as a terrorist organization. Taking a closer look at the list of
journalists currently jailed shows that the majority of them have some involvement with
the Kurdish issue: they are connected to Gündem, or they have spoken to and reported
about the PKK.
26
“The KCK trials are different. And that's where the bulk of these journalists are, who are
Kurds. There has been a very strong push that anyone you can tie in with either the PKK
or the KCK is automatically a terrorist,” Jones said.
IT'S THE END OF the afternoon in early January, and I am surrounded by half a dozen
Kurdish journalists of all ages. Only one speaks English—a student volunteer from
Boğaziçi University—and tries his very best to translate as fast as his friends can talk.
We're sitting in the cafeteria located on the top floor of Özgür Gündem's offices—
Turkey's main Kurdish newspaper—looking out over the roofs of Istanbul, where people
walk in and out, making food, drinking tea, and, mostly, smoking.
The young and eager faces around me are complemented by the lined and weathered
ones of those who've been over this many times—yes, they've been arrested, and yes,
their jail time was far from torture free.
The 50-year-old political editor Oğuz Ender has spent six years in jail himself, almost
ten years ago, when torture was still prevalent. Under Erdoğan, however, the
government has eschewed the systematic practice of physical torture in favor of subtler
measures, such as technologically driven psychological torture, according to journalists
at Gündem. Members of the Kurdish community suspect that their homes and offices
are being watched and their conversations recorded.
27
Apart from banning Gündem for reporting on the Kurdish New Year last March, the
government viewed the newspaper’s more general coverage of Kurdish events and issues
as propaganda for a terrorist organization. Nothing new, really, the reporters for the
newspaper say. In the two decades of their existence, the paper has been closed time and
time again, and every time it reopened under a new name. They must have had 50
different names by now, Ender believes.
A few weeks before our interview, authorities raided the Gündem office, taking editors
and journalists in for questioning and copying their hard-drives. They're used to it by
now and have taken precautions: When prevented from entering their offices, they
publish elsewhere. “If you take us every day, arrest us, new people will always be here
the following day.”
The arrests and seizures don’t diminish support; they encourage it. “It's very easy for
us,” Ender said. “They take our lives, but that's all they can do.” They can't take away the
cause, and that is why, unlike most Turkish journalists in general, Kurdish reporters
continue to stick their necks out by criticizing the government and risking imprisonment
—they are fighting for more than journalists’ rights, they are fighting for their people.
Of the 48 journalists who were taken into custody at the newspaper, authorities
interviewed 13 and released them immediately. “They take you into custody, interview
you, and then either arrest you or don't. If you are arrested, then you stay for six
28
months, and then after that they can still say, sorry, we misunderstood you, we're
releasing you.”
Some changes might be underway, though: the ban on publishing Gündem was lifted six
days after its initial start. And that wasn't all. The Justice Ministry made a statement
that a bill of new regulations aimed at preventing the closure of publications is currently
reviewed and on its way to the General Assembly. It remains to be seen if these promises
will become reality, or will find themselves blocked on their way to becoming law.17
Self-censorship: Fighting Your Instincts
SOME JOURNALISTS ACTIVELY TRY to improve their situation. But not all can. Not
all of them are intellectuals in Istanbul, known public figures with a decent salary. These
columnists, editors-in-chief, and anchormen are relatively free to speak their minds, and
so are some of the figureheads of newspapers. The government is more hesitant to
accuse them than they are of accusing lesser known journalists.
Most are simple reporters, who struggle to get by—journalists at Taraf (the only
mainstream newspaper not owned by a conglomerate) usually get paid once every few
months, while their peers at Gündem merely get their expenses covered and rely on
their families to support them and the Kurdish cause. No one is in it for the money.
17 These changes are part of a larger reform package, that actually leaves the major issues untouched.
Human Rights Watch reports that “the amendment largely fail to address restrictions on freedom of
expression and fair trial issues identified by the Council of Europe and the European Union.”
29
Others are unknown Kurdish activists, unlikely to create an uproar similar to the one Şık
and Şener elicited.
“They also have a home, a wife, a husband. Children. They have to make their living, and
at this point, they have to choose what to do. If they're ready to sacrifice [their lives] or
not,” Professor Sağnak said. So most journalists keep their heads down and censor
themselves to stay out of trouble, others have even chosen to give up their profession
entirely—they no longer consider the struggle worth it.
“Imagine the Turkish press like a chained dog, always trying to escape, full of energy,”
Radikal editor Kasapoğlu said. “If you chain someone for so long, they will stop fighting.
People will get tired and become weak, they will give up.”
Others dream of going away and practicing journalism elsewhere. Ali Abaday, chief web
editor at English-language Hürriyet Daily News would prefer to leave Turkey. “Here,
you’re never thinking, but always repeating,” he said. “Because if you try thinking, you
are a dangerous person in Turkey.” The predicament of journalists in Turkey makes
Kasapoğlu question her own position as well. Should she leave, or stay and fight?
The attitude of individual journalists is understandable, but might ultimately be
blocking real progress when it comes to press freedom. For economic interests,
journalists choose to forego union membership and the possibility to create better work
30
conditions through the collective. By not standing up for their colleagues' rights in
writing, they silently condone the status quo.
“The press itself is not writing critically in solidarity with the rest of the press,” SinclairWebb said. “One of the shocking things is the very muted response to the crackdown on
the Kurdish press.”
Government: Pro or Against
FOUR TURKISH JOURNALISTS SIT down at a slightly raised table in midtown
Manhattan. They have all come for the same purpose: to discuss and explain to those in
attendance the Turkish media landscape and the obstacles journalists face today. The
setting, however, is far from neutral. The panel is hosted by the Turkish Cultural Center,
an organization affiliated to the Fethullah Gülen movement, and thus, according to
some, directly related to the Turkish government. The choice of panel members are an
example of the polarized situation the media in Turkey finds itself in: Salih Memecan
and Deniz Ergürel, both from Medya Derneği, political commentator Ergun Babahan,
and moderator Aydoğan Vatandaş, a correspondent for Cihan News Agency, are all
connected to what most consider to be pro-government publications.
In the last few years, despite the plethora of media outlets, there have really only been
two voices in media: those in favor of government, and those against. An overview of the
newspaper spectrum in Turkey still gives an uninformed outsider the impression of a
31
wide variety of opinions and information, but the public domain—politics as well as
speech in general—has undeniably become increasingly polarized. No political affiliation
matters more than whether you are for or against government, and journalists are
expected to pick a side.
“You're either pro-government, or anti-government. There's nothing in between as far
as professional ethics go,” Sinclair-Webb said. “You'd think that journalistic ethics
would somehow make those political distinctions irrelevant.”
The government and its followers are proud to say that in today's Turkey, everything can
be discussed—there are no remaining taboos. But, union president İpekçi says, these
discussions have to be held in the framework drawn by government. “Everything can be
discussed. But the government is in control.”
Those in favor of AKP leadership tend to emphasize that journalists are prosecuted not
because of their “journalistic activities, but their criminal activities”—a statement that I
have heard in those exact words many times over—but their critics doubt its accuracy.
Ahmet Şık, just two weeks after his release, spoke to the European Parliament and
claimed that journalists were, in fact, prosecuted because of their professional work,
Hürriyet Daily News reported. They were questioned about their journalistic writings
and sources, he said. Keneş of Today's Zaman18 is convinced that improvements in
18 Today’s Zaman is part of the Zaman Media Group, which also owns Zaman—the Turkish language
daily—and Aksiyon magazine, and Cihan News Agency. The group openly supports the Gülen movement,
32
journalism are actively prevented by those who so loudly complain. “Pretending as if
they are afraid is much more influential than anything they would say,” he said. “Their
main argument is that there is now a civilian dictatorship in Turkey, and that people are
afraid of writing their thoughts. I ask, if you compare the Turkey of the 1990s with the
current Turkey, which is much more free?”
Memecan acknowledges that the government's treatment of the press has certainly
changed since ten years ago. And even though those who favor the current government
disagree with the assessment of conditions for journalists in Turkey by Reporters
Without Borders, there is no real sign of improvement. “It's not getting worse,”
Memecan said, “but it should have been much better by now.”
Both supporters and detractors like to point to the other side when it comes to blaming
someone for the state of Turkish journalism and they disagree just as vehemently about
whether the journalists in jail are there for a good reason or not, or fight over who
exactly is behind the oppression of the press. Yet all agree that there are problems with
Turkish press law. Whether they believe Şık and Şener were rightly jailed or not, it's
clear that the legislation currently in place is unclear and prone to misinterpretation.
KEEPING UP WITH THE state of journalism in Turkey can be hard: restrictions expand
and then contract again, changing from month to month, and sometimes even by the
and maintains close relations with the government.
33
hour. Şener and Şık were released a few weeks ago, and are now awaiting their next trial
date in June in freedom. When Özgür Gündem was banned from publishing for a
month, less than a week later the ban was repealed, accompanied by even bigger
changes. The judiciary vowed to outlaw the possibility of banning publications, as part
of a wider package of new laws aimed at accelerating the judiciary process in general.
“I think there was just too much international pressure for banning a daily for a month,”
Erkan Saka wrote, sending his comments via email. “It seems that AKP might actually
be embarrassed of the rising number of jailed journalists.” He believes the pressure
might even lead to revised legislation, but is doubtful about the extent of the changes
and their effectiveness.
At the end of March [2012], the Hrant Dink case was granted a retrial. In January, the
court had ruled that there was not enough evidence to suggest the involvement of an
organization in Dink's murder, but the prosecutor claims that that is exactly the reason
to investigate further—lingering doubts should prompt more research, not dismissal.
The developments can inspire hope, but lead to suspicion as well. How could the appeal
in the Dink case not have been granted, what with the international attention and
protests? Would Şık and Şener have been released, if it hadn't been for an upcoming
European report on the state of the press in Turkey? And what does their release mean?
34
With the two men who gave a face to jailed journalists in Turkey released, will the
world's interest weaken?
To truly become the regional role model it claims to be, Turkey needs to make some
changes itself. Changes that will address all the different barriers that journalists face
and struggle to overcome on a daily basis. Whether reforms across the board are
feasible, especially short-term, remains to be seen. But what’s necessary most of all is for
the government to open space for criticism. Letting those who disagree, those hung up
on past regimes or longing for new ones, and members of minority groups speak. This
will ultimately help solidify a democratic Turkey. Crushing dissent makes it stronger,
letting it be heard will truly put democracy to the test. Small steps taken forward in
changing the domain of journalism will give individual reporters the hope and strength
to fight their personal battle: daring to speak up, by trusting that you're safe in watching
and commenting on the government, instead of the other way around.
35
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Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish issue. London: Routledge, 2011.
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axis: Journalism and freedom of expression in Turkey.” Global Media and
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 Cizre, Ümit (ed.). Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey. The Making of the
Justice and Development Party. London: Routledge, 2008.
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 Kinzer, Stephen. Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds. New York:
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 Pope, Hugh. Sons of the Conquerors. The Rise of the Turkic World. New York:
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+
News and opinion articles from Hürriyet Daily News, Today's Zaman, Bianet,
as well as media outlets in the United States and the Netherlands, on the subject
of press (freedom) in Turkey. Also, documents, reports, and blogs by Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International on the same subject. These documents
have been gathered from April 2011 until April 2012, and span more than ten
years of information. Since they number in the thousands, I am unable to provide
a list of references in this document.
37
Acknowledgments
Starting out as a little seed of a thought in early 2011, the project of understanding the
state of the press in Turkey has led me to research, study, do interviews, and write about
a subject that turned out to be ever fascinating. It has given me a chance to dive into the
complex and endlessly inspiring republic of Turkey during the summer of 2011 and the
winter of 2011/2012, and it will undoubtedly lead me back to the country in the future.
The backbone of this article are the two dozen interviews I conducted with editors-inchief, editors, (aspiring) journalists, critics, human rights activists, and academics. I
could not have come close to understanding the state of the Turkish press in all its facets
without them, and have thoroughly enjoyed the many hours of conversation—from an
academic, journalistic, and personal perspective. I thank everyone of you, and would
here like to include those I could not cite in the article itself: Hidir Geviş, journalist for
A-News; Fréderike Geerdink, Dutch freelance journalist based in Istanbul; Atilla
Yeşilada, political analyst; Zeynep Nuhoğlu and Özgün Özger, foreign news desk editors
at Taraf; Rana Şenol at Medya Derneği; Zana Kaya, editor at Özgür Gündem; and lastly,
Aydoğan Vatandaş, New York correspondent for Cihan News Agency, who graciously
introduced me to all his contacts and provided me with invaluable information and
support in Istanbul and New York. Morgan Brinlee, Alexandra Sprano, Cemil Güler, and
the staff of iEiMedia's Istanbul program were indispensable in navigating Istanbul and
the field of Turkish journalism.
38
Finally, I would like to thank those who supported me from the very beginning to the
end. My two advisers, Brooke Kroeger—professor of journalism and head of the Arthur
L. Carter Journalism Institute—and Sibel Erol—Turkish language and literature
professor in the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies department. They have been
wonderful readers and critics. My family and friends, in the Netherlands, the United
States, and Turkey—I am indebted to you all.
39