Reconceptualizing Center Politics in Post

Chapter 10
Reconceptualizing Center Politics in
Post-1980 Turkey: Transformation or
Continuity?
Aylin Özman and Simten Coşar
This chapter aims at analyzing the evolution of center politics in post-1980
Turkey. This period is important since it witnessed the reconstruction of the
founding elements of center politics both at the international and domestic
levels. The period represents a thoroughgoing re-structuration in Turkish
political life by the launch of the 1980 coup d'etat and the fol1owing interim
regime, which set the rules for the conduct of politics in the coming years. In
this respect, stability and consensus appeared as the basic requisites of the new
political seııing. Stability concerned the continuity of the regime, which
necessitated the exclusion of "extreme" ideologies and political formations.
Consensus concerned accepting this requisite, and coming to terms with the
basics of the new economic seııing broadly determined by the neo-liberal
framework, and reflected in the Turkish context by the 24 January (1980)
decisions. This, in fact, was a sign of the emergence of a new center identity,
whose roots should not be searched solely in domestic dynamics. In this respect,
the dominance of the neo-liberal framework at the international level signified
the replacement of the post-war consensus by a new consensus, Le. on
neo-liberal policy preferences, on the eve of 1980s. This, in turn, led to the
blurring of the Iines between left and right wing politics.
Thus understanding Turkish politics in the post-1980 period requires a
critical scrutiny of center politics since it has emerged as the most decisive plane
for political action. In the chapter we argue that there has recently been a
transformation in center politics. This is manifested first by the exclusion of the
main center right and center left political parties of the previous decades from
the parliament, with the exception of Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet
Halk Partisi, CHP), in the November 2000 general election and second by the
coming to power of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,
AKP) as original1y a pro-Islamist political party. However, in order to
comprehend the nature of this transformation it is indispensable to explore the
essential (dis)continuities between current representatives of center politics with
the previous ones. In order to do so the characteristic features of center right and
center left politics shal1 be elaborated.
The chapter consists of four main parts. In the first part we delineate
alternative conceptualizations of center politics at large, and present the
methodological scheme that we employ in the study. In the seeond part, we
explore the political and economic space on which center politics was built in
post-1980 Turkey. In the third part, we provide an historical analysis of post1980 center right and center left political parties on the basis of the key
analytical tools that we specify in the first section. In this respect, we select the
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) and the True Path Party (Doğru
Yol Partisi, DYP) as pivotal representatives of center right politics and, the
CHp· and the Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti, DSP) as key
carriers of center left identity during the period in question. We deliberately
exclude other political parties, which can also be categorized under the rubric of
center politics, since their electoral base in the post-I 980 era has not given these
political parties a sufficiently strong hand to have decisive effeets in the political
sphere. In the fourth part of the chapter, in order to answer the question whether
center politics has displayed a decisive transformation in the past two and a half
decades we focus on the AKP as the prominent representative of center right
politics. This is not only because the party emerged with the majority of the
votes in the 3 November 2002 general election but also because the main
representatives of center right politics in the previous decades, within the ANAP
and the DYP, were excluded from parliament. On the other hand the center left
also displayed a poor electoral performance since only the CHP could pass the
ten percent threshold. Besides, the party's record since 2002 was proved to be
deteriorating in terms of presenting a viable opposition and alternative to center
right politics. In the fifth and the concluding part we aim at arriving at a
tentatiye argument on the evolution of center politics in post- i980 Turkey.
Conceptualizing center politics requires taking into consideration the function of
center right and center left political formations in the overal1 political structure.
In this respeet, the classical distinction between the right and the left is
determining. Brietly, in the mainstream institutionalist and behavioralist
literature the function of center political parties is assumed to be the formation
and maintenance of consensus-based politics? This conviction is context-based,
since it is fed by the post-war consensus dynamics and the accompanying "end
of ideology" assumption. In this respect, during the i960s and early 1970s
research conducted on center parties mainly focused on case studies, which were
based on a taken for granted conceptualization of "center" as the mid-point
between the left and the right. As Hans Keman notes, by the Iate 1970s this
approach was subjected to criticism, on the basis of the "unidimensional," and
thus reductionist, method employed in assessing center politics. In other words,
in this framework the center is conceptualized as an ambiguous space in a
certain predefined left-right spectrum, and variations among countries are not
laken into consideration as explanatory, which in the final analysis leads to
insuffıcient cross-country comparison.3
Starting with the Iate 1970s alternative analytical tools were off~red for
extending the scope of analysis on center politics. For the purposes of thıs study
four interconnected approaches are relevant to understanding dif~e~entprop?~als
for conceptualizing center politics. To start with, after provıdıng a crıtıcal
account of previous studies on center parties Hans DaaIder argues for a
definition of center "based on the mechanistic assumption of the presence or
absence of one or more parties which can affectively tip the balance to one
government combination rather than another.',4 Second, Timot~~ Scul1y, in h~s
analysis of Chilean political experience, approaches c,enter POlıtICS.
on the basıs
of the distinction between positional and programmatıc center partıes, based on
the extent of the party's commitment to specific policy pref~renc~s an~
outcomes. In other words, while positional parties are rather tlexıble ın theır
proclaimed priorities programmatic cent~r partie~ ar~ conc~~v~d.to .be less
flexible. Scully's main contribution for thıs study ıs hıs .term crıtıcal J~~ctu~e
framework " which he uses for understanding the evolutıon of party polıtıcs ın
the Chilea~ context.5 For Scully "critical juncture" refers to that historical
moment when "the norm of politics changes, resulting in a shift in the basic
party attachments ofthe voting citizens.,,6
.
.. .
Third, Keman, conducting across-national analysıs of center polıtıcs ın
Western Europe, conceptualizes center parties as "p~enom~na sui ~~neris:' .an~
argues that they do not originate either from left or rıght wıng polıtıcal partıes.
Thus, for Keman for a center party to exist there has to be a "center space"
between the existing left and right wing political parties, and .t~e cente~ party
should have a distinctive programmatic profile from the polıtıcal partıes on
either side of the spectrum. Fourth, Hazan conducts asimilar cross-national
analysis of Western European party systems that aims at understandi?g !he
relation between the existence of center politics and tendency of polarızatıon
and consensus, and considers center parties on the basis of their ideological
disposition. In this respect, Hazan argues for a universal left-right spectrum ~s a
reference point for defining center parties, which are in essence, conceptualızed
as moderate.8
Within the framework drawn above, we analyze center politics on the basis
of those political parties which claim center identity. In doing so, we locate the
rise of center politics in accordance with Scully's "critical juncture framework,"
so as to understand the formation and features of the "center space" in the
Turkish context. We focus on the post-1980 era as a period when a shift in
essential political norms was witnessed. To understand this shift one has to take
into consideration the dominant political and economic preferences that affected
the norms in question. Within this structural framework we also elaborate ~he
identity of center parties with reference to. their . prog~ams .and polı.cy
preferences. We shall also note that in this study ıdeologıcal dı.".'ensıon ~ccup~es
a pivotal-though not exCıusive-part in reading ~e.nter pol,ltlc~. In lıne wıth
Keman we argue that center-right and center-Ieft polıtıcal partıes ın Turkey have
not developed out of the right or the left, but that theyare sui generis, i.e., they
have their distinctive-and
at times rather ambiguous-ideological
and
programmatic commitments.
To specify the dominant political and economic preferences that marked the
period in question we resort to three founding issues, which we think are
iIIuminative for delineating the contours of center space in Turkey, and thus the
identities of center right and center left parties in the post-1980 period. The
issues we are concerned with are important not only with respect to their
salience in terms of the priorities set by the interim regime but also regarding the
dominant political norms that have oriented the yoting pattern during the periods
in question. in this respect, the founding issues are nationalism, laicism, and
neo-liberal capitalism.
The Making of "Center Space" in Post-1980 Turkey: A
Military-Civilian Blend
Taking into consideration the specific political and economic variables in post1980 Turkey requires focusing first on the role of the military in civilian politics.
This is not merely because of the rather frequent military interventions that the
country witnessed in the past four decades, but especially in regard to the
constitutional role assigned to the Armed Forces, which has endowed it with
increasing authority in civilian affairs from the 1960s onward. However, here
we should note a fundamental difference between the post- 1980 period and the
previous decades in relation to the effect of Armed Forces in the shaping of
center politics.
Briefly, the rise of the notion of center in Turkish political life can be traced
back to the mid- 1960s when the dominant party of the early republican era
(1923-1945)-the CHP-started a search for a competent identity in the face of
the already rising tide of right wing politics in the body of Justice Party (Adalet
Partisi, AP)9 and the socialist left, namely Turkish Labor Party (Türkiye ışçi
Partisi, Tİp). The conception of the left of center, offered as a means for the
re--definition of CHP's political stance in 1965, is symbolic in this respect,
which rendered the AP a center right party.1OThus, the political center of the
i960s and the following decade can be read with reference to the classical
left-right continuum. To be more precise the (center) politics of this period was
predominantly shaped along class-based preferences. Both in Iate i960s and
especially throughout the i 970s the basic point of reference on the part of both
center right and center left political parties was the "communist threat." This
basic threat was alsoperceived by the Armed Forces.
Such a positioning of center political parties had aıready been hinted in the
framing of the 1961 Constitution. The Constitution contained the seeds of the
ambivalent connection between civilian politics and military. Briefly, while
guaranteeing extensive civil and political rights and liberties, it also authorized
the National Security Council (NSC) as an autonomous body to "advise" the
civilian governments on issues of high importance for the country. In other
words, on the one hand, the 1961 Constitution provided the means for the
formation of class-based ties between political parties and the society. On the
other hand, it established the NSC as a checking mechanism against the possible
"misconduct of political parties."
The 1980 coup d' etat was generally justified by the "misconduct of political
parties" of the previous decade. The political atmosphere, whose bases were laid
down during i980- 1983 interim regime, was characterized by the aim of
de-Iimiting the political sphere by constitutional means. The constitutional ban
on the political parties of the previous decade and on their leaders was effectiye
in this respect.1 Besides, membership to political parties was bounded to strict
requisites. On the other hand, electoral system was revised so as to exclude
those political parties, which fall below iO percent electoral threshold from the
parliament. Additionally, in i 983 general election, the NSC was authorized to
decide on the eligibility of political parties for participating in general election.
This was in line with the proclaimed rationale of 1980 coup d'etat, namely
to end the turbulent socio-political milieu of the 1970s. The military established
stabilityas the first and foremost policy priority on political agenda. Apart from
the political turmoil of the i970s, 24 January 1980 decisions, which contained
stabilization measures, had also been decisive in the preparation of the
background of post-I 980 political regime in Turkey. The measures represented
the recognition of economic policies that had long been proposed by IMF, Le.
structural adjustment program.
The structural adjustment program to new dynamics of capitalism that was
framed on the basis of neo-liberal models, widely known as Thatcherism and/or
Reaganism, called for a more authoritarian regime. The authoritarian regime in
turn provided the necessary political framework for the transition from import
substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy, which had dominated the economic
programs of the past two decades, to export-oriented economy. The overlap of
economic policymakers' concern for adjustment cum stabilization with
military's preference for stability at all costs drew the framework for the official
understanding of politics that would be dominant in the following two decades.12
In this respect, both the preference for ISI and i96 i Constitution were pointed as
the underlying causes for economic and political impasse that the country had
experienced especially in Iate i970s. Thus, while the 24 January decisions
marked a break with the former, the 1982 Constitution provided the appropriate
institutional mechanism that would allegedly pre-empt the recurrence of the
governmental deadlock.
Export-Ied growth strategy that marked the i 980s also served to the
advantage of the ANAP, since Turgut Özal as the leader of the party was also
the architect and a fervent supporter of this strategy. ANAP gained an additional
leverage-indirectly-by
the substantial weight of NSC in politics, which in the
final analysis excluded all political formations other than ANAP, Populist Party
(Halkçı Parti, HP) and National Democracy Party (Milli Demokrasi Partisi,
MDP) from the political sphere. On the other hand, ANAP had comparatiye
advantage in 1983 general election vis-lı-vis the latter two mainly due to two
factorso First, the party seemingIy had no organic links with the militaryas
compared to the HP and MDP, which were claimed to be tutelary political
parties, essentially representing the "interests" of the military.13 Second, the
party claimed to represent a brand new political identity, which synthesized
different political dispositions from left to right, reconciling at the center. This
was in line with the dominant political preference that prioritized
consensus-based politics for the sake of stability.14
ANAP's initial embodiment of four tendencies, namely, liberalism,
nationalism, conservatism with Islamist overtones and social democracy, gives
hints about the founding features of center space in Turkish politics. As noted
above these founding features can be briefly cited as nationalism, laicism, and
(neo-liberal) capitalism. On the other hand, it is apt not to exclude the factor oJ
the Armed Forces, which has been dominant in the setting of the political values.
of the center. For, especiaIly throughout the i980s it was the Armed Forces that
put its stamp on the running of politics and shaping of the political sphere. In
this respect, it is necessary to point at the post-1980 stance of Armed Forces
with reference to the issue areas, concerned. To begin with, Armed Forces
traditionaIly represented "official" version of nationalism. As explicated by
Tanı i Bora, this official nationalism is based on a homogenizing national
identit~ perception, which in the final analysis is not restricted solely to identity
issues. 5 To be more precise, official nationalism as represented by the Armed.
Forces hints at a Schmittian understanding of the political that reads politics on.
the axis of friend-foe duality. In other words, not only the identity claims bııt
alsa different social and economic policy preferences that diverge fro
officiaIly set standards are perceived as threats to the notion of national seeuri
Second, as far as the issue of religion is concerned it is possible to concem
shift in the stance of the Armed Forces in post- i980 period, compared to th
previous decades. In this respect, the relatively elastic relation of the Arm
Forces with Islam in particular, as attested by the religious tunes by the th
president Kenan Evren in his public speeches,16 the inclusion of religio
courses (soleIyon Islam) in the curriculum, the handling of the issue of religiou~
high schools displayed a more flexible official attitude toward Islam.17 However,
the Armed Forces flirting with Islam was short lasting, and came to an end by 2&
February 1997 decisions. 18 Third, the Armed Forces' economic preferences ha...
never been in contradiction with capitalist economy:9 In this respect, Arme
Forces' role and place in the economic sphere have overtly been in harmon
with world economic conjuncture.
The center space of post- 1980 period was built upon the dynamics delineated i
the preceding part. Since ANAP emerged as the first representative of nouvea
politics of the decade, and the Armed Forces appeared as the initial author of t
institutional framework, it would not be inapt to regard these two actors as th
major manufacturers of center politics in the 1980s. In this context, the ensuin
center right and center left political parties positioned themselves with positiv
and/or negative recourse to the two main actors of the center space.
Nationalistic Considerations on Ethnic Identity20
Nationalism formed one of the defining features of center space, however wit
different tunes among the occupants. To start with ANAP, the nationalis
framework was stated in the first party program and recurrently stressed in th
following ones. ANAP's nationalism is formulated with recourse to
conservative framework in socio-cultural issues. This, in turn, marks
divergence from official nationalism as represented by the Armed Forces.
Briefly, while Armed Forces' nationalism was state-based, ANAP's nationalistic
discourse is coined as to appeal to the conservative sentiments among !he
populace. As a center party ANAP's nationalism is d~corated with Ii~eralısm
and conservatism. These three components of party ıdeologyare claımed to
function as mutual checks and balances. In other words, in ANAP's official
discourse nationalism and liberalism are meant to form a control mechanism
against the threat of "fundamentalism,". while I~b~ralism.and conser~atis~ a~~
intended to play the same role as agaınst fascıstıc versıons of natıonalısm.
This, in the final analysis, amounted to a "liberalized" version of
Turkish-Islamic synthesis: "Our identity, which we cannot sacrifice under any
condition and which we wiIl adopt in 2000s is Muslim-Turkish identity." The
phrase "liberalized" corresponds to the perceplion of state in service to the
nation at large.22
The prioritization of Muslim-Turkish identity also gives hints about
ANAP's rather fluctuating stance regarding the Kurdish issue. On the o~e hand,
under the leadership of Özal the Earty adopted a discourse of tolerance ın terms
.of individual rights and liberties. 3 On the other hand, combined with the rather
uneasy "synthesis" of liberal and nationalist-conservative elements in ANAP's
identity, the dominance of hawkish stance among the military circles toward the
Kurdish issue led to an oscillating discourse on the part of the party. However,
one constant factor that summarized the party's understanding of the issue has
been the preference to use the term "Southeastern Problem" rather than the
Kurdish issue, which signifies ANAP's rejection of considering the issue as part
of identity claims. In this respect, the general position of ANAP has been first
for the military solution in the region in order to "end the terror," and s~cond for
economic development.24 Although the founding chairperson Turgut Özal once
used the term "Kurdish reality" in his term of Presidency and tried to propose
non-military solutions to the problem he nonetheless feIl short of providing any
substantial alternative.25
In comparison to ANAP, DYP can be perceived ~s a m~re outsp.oke?ly
nationalist-conservative political party, except for a brıef perıod of flırtatıon
with liberal democratic values when Süleyman Demirel was the chairperson.
Especially starting from 1991 onward Demirel tried to incorporate welfaris.m,
civilianization, human rights into the party discourse. As for the Kurdısh
question this incorporation connoted a preference for excl~~ing mil~tary
solution. This can be understood as an attempt to extend the tradıtıonal basıs of
ıhe party and to constitute a sphere that is distinct from the ANAP. Howeve~,
during DYP's coalition with the SHP that started in 1991, the emphasıs
especially on democratization proved to be mere rhetoric.26 .,
.
Tansu Çiller, the chairperson of the DYP after Demırel s electıon .to
Presidency in 1993, managed to appropriate the nationalist-conservative identıty
at the expense of ANAP. Her persistent rhetoric, shaped around symbols such as
"eall to prayer" and (Turkish) "flag" is significant in this respecl. it is possible to
argue that while 1990s witnessed the gradual demise of ANAP, DYP
increasingly emerged as the new carrier of center-identity with almost no
difference from the previous decade. In other words, the simultaneous reference
to Ihe "caIl to prayer" and "flag" as the national symbols that define Turkishness
has been reminiscent of ANAP' s penchant for Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the
formulation of Turkish national identity. The reflection of this nationalisı
perspective on Kurdish issue was again similar to ANAP's experience. Although
in her leadership period Çiller seemingIy tried to shift toward non-miIiıary
solutions by proposing to resolve the problem in the National Assembly,27this
proposal proved to have short lived. All in all, DYP in general stood for the
rather hawkish militaristic solutions.28 Thus, Çiller' s support for "education and
publication in Kurdish, reconsideration of citizenship on geographical basis,
rather than on ethnicily••29turned out to be a mere gesture, and not a long-term
policy proposal. This oscillation finally came to an end by the election o
Mehmet Agar to party chairpersonship after the November 2002 generilI
election. With Agar the party assumed a more "consistent" position in terms o
the nationalist-democratic dichotomy that has marked AP-DYP line. Briefly,
Agar's overly nationalistic political preference re-shaped the party's rhetoric
and identi~ so as to distance it from center-right to the right in the politica
spectrum.3
When analyzed critically il is possible to argue that on the scale o
nationalism and the Kurdish issue center right and center left politicaJ partie
have more common points than differences. To start with DSP, proclaiming a
social democratic identity,3! the party was one of the forerunning center len
political parties in the i990s. However, this social democratic identity is
delimited with national borders, and hence nationalistic concerns, which has led
to the identification of the party with "national left.,,32The incumbent partye
chairperson Bülent Ecevit explicated what he meant by "national len" as
"guarding the integrity of Turkish nation and the Turkish Republican state.••33In
parallel, in its 1999 election declaration the party confirmed the necessity of
going beyond the left-right cleavage for the sake of "national unity." In thW
respect, a statist framework has in essence shaped the party's approach to
nationalism. This statist nationalism is symbolized in DSP's approach to tb!:
Kurdish issue. First, and however ironically, in line with ANAP and DYP, t
DSP reads the issue not as "a problem of Turkishness-Kurdishness" but
"Southeast and East Anatolian problem," and connects it with the "exploitati
and oppression that arises from the semi feudal structure of the region,',34whic
according to Ecevit has eased the penetration of foreign forces into the region LI
the expense of national security.35In this respect, DSP's solution to the Kurdis
issue lies first in "the cutting off of the foreign dimension," which turns out to
a foreign policyand
security issue, and second in "the socio-economi
develo~ment of the region [that would transform] the feudal structure ... by the
state .••· 6 Here it can be noted. that although Ecevit claims that the DSP offers II
"completely new policy as against [such] political solution[s as] autonomy, II
federation or dividing Turkey," the party only differs from the center right
stance by holding the state responsible for investing in the region due to
contention that "... the private sector would not go to the Southeasl. ••37
CHP, on the other hand, adheres to its organic ties with the founding CH
i.e., the party discourse is imbued with Kemalist nationalism. In this respee
national identity is presented as transcending any particular cultural andlo
ethnic identity. This representation assumes that Turkishness is not amatter o
,r ethnicity but an outcome of the "u~ity of ideal amo~g••diff~rent people who
participated equally in the constructıon of the Republtc. Thıs has meant that
national identity is based on "citizenship and political sphere," rather than on
38
, ethnic or cultural ties, which in the final analysis is located in the state sphere.
( Literally, CHP approaches the Kurdish issue, as either "Southeastern problem"
. or "the Kurdish problem." In parallel to ANAP, DYP a~d DSP, t~e party
proposes first the resolution of the "security" con:erns ın the regıon,. and
thenceforth socio-economic development of the regıon by means of prıvate
,':'investmenl.39
On the other hand, regarding the cultural rights of Kurds. as another
dimension of the Kurdish problem CHP relegates the issue to the prıvat~•.sphe~e.
Here, the critical point for the party is the detachm~nt of the state from" ıdentıt~
and ethnic differences .••4o Briefly, the party perceıves the state as a servant
state, Le. the state "shall perceive the people only as citiz.ens [without
considering their ethnic identities] and shall teach them the [officıal] language,
r shall provide education ... social security ... health service.,,41 Besides, for
, CHP, the preservation of differences and thus cultural plurality" can .0?,ly be
accomplished where identity issues are exCıuded from the publtc -the
state-sphere. In this respect, for example, on the use of ~other ~anguag.e,the
dominant argument is that the state should not be .a.~a~ty ın th~ ~nstruc~ıonof
ethnic languages;42otherwise this might lead to polttıcızıng ethnıcıty, whıch for
. o f the natıon
. at iarge. 43
CHP means the segregatıon
Laicism-As aLeverage Among Competitors and Opponents in the
Center
Laicism has formed the other hot issue that has analytical use in trying to
understand the ideological composition and dynamics of c~nter po.li~ics.. As in
the case of nationalism, variation in center on the interpretatlOn of laıcı~m ıs also
restricted with the margins drawn by the Armed Forces. Here, ıt should
, immediately be noted that the debates on laicism in the Turkish context ~~ve
ii almost exclusively revolved around the relation bet~een Islam and, polttıcs,
, while the concern for religion-state relations was perıpheral. ANAP s stance
regarding the issue of laicism .can be under~too~ wit? refer~.nce to !he
conceptualization of "progressıve conservatısm.
B~leflY., progressıve
conservatism,',44 has been explained along two axes. Fırst, ıt connoted th~
commitment of the party to the preservation of natio~al va~ues. Second, ıt
r,' prioritized economic and technological pro~ress••as a n.atıonal ıssue that. would
enhance "integration between state and socıety .. In .thıs resp~ct, and wıth .due
regard to appealing to its electoral base, the majorıty of whı~h are Mu~hms,
ANAP has had to develop a balancing strategy between ıts emphasıs on
religious tolerance and its will to survival in the face of strictly laicist sta~ce of
, the military. Thus, while trying to appeal to the electorate by resortıng to
Muslim sentiment, the party has separated "re~ct!onary" and~or
"fundamentalist" Islam from Islam as a tradilional characterıstıc of the Turkısh
nation.45However, on the issue of laicism, too, ANAP has in the final analysis
tended to take sides with the official standing in the implementation of strictly
laicist policies.46
?ne can observe almost the same perception of Islam in DYP with ANAP's
readıng of Islam as part and parcel of Turkish national and traditional heritage.
Ho~ever, the ~:P has been more prone to the severe reaction of the militaryon
the ıssue of laıcısm than ANAP. This can be attributed to two reasons. First the
DP-AP heritage signified the weight of conservative nationalism in p'arty
. 47 ~n ANAP's case however, religious sensitivity was initially more
i'dent~ty.
~unctıo~al ın t~~ party's altempt to forge a combination of heterogeneous
ıdeologıcal posıtıons. Second, as also c1aimed by the incumbent chairperson of
ANAP, Yılmaz, DYP's preference to form coalition not with its competitor,
~A~, .but ~ith the pro-Islamic RP had significant implications for party's
dısposItıon wıth respect to Islam. This had detrimental effects for the image of
the party in the eyes of the Armed Forces.48
Th~ transfer of p~ty leadership from Demirel to Çiller, and lastly in 2002
f~om Çıller t~ Ağar,.d!d n?t chan~e the official description of laicism in party's
dıscourse. Brıefly laıcısm iS perceıved on the axis of freedom of conscience and
religion, and considered to be a personal matter, which should be coordinated by
the state and civii society organizations.49 However, it can be argued that the last
transf~rmation in leadership has signified the start of a new period so as to
eonsolıdate the party in the nationalist right, which in the words of Ağar, meant
f?r representing. th~ "natio~al center" in Turkey.50 This is especially important
sınce the term iS ımbued ın a totalistic mentality, connoting the state-nation
identifica~i~~which would be represented by the party ofthe "national center."
Sen~ıtıvlty to the offici?1 definition of laicism, as an indispensable factor for
the survıval of the republıcan state is a defining criteria for the center left
political disposition. In DSP's discourse laicism is defined on the axis of
freedom of conscience and religion, and in line with the ANAP's and DYP's
approaches at the outset, politicization of religion is refused. However the DSP
distinguishes its approach by appealing to what it terms as "indigeno~s leftist"
stanee. !his identi~eation serves as a means to separate the party both from its
competıtors and ıts opponents. The notion, "indigenous lefi" refers to a
combination of "national left, national unity and laicism that res~ects beliefs."sı
For I?SP the left in general did not pay its tributes to the religious beliefs of the
Turkısh peo~le at large. In this respect, for example on the issue of religious
orders, ~cevlt. ~as sounded elastic, putıing the reservation that they should not
engage ın pohtıcs. Apart from that in such specific examples as the issue of
~e~ring 5~eadscarf in un~ve~sitiest a~d. as in the case of Merve Kavakçı
ıncıdent, the DSP acted ın hne wıth laıcıst premises. Such a combination was
justified again in Ecevit's words as follows: "Our atıitude concerning
a~ti~secula~ mo~en:ıents is different and th.e~ifference is important. We support
~aıcısm whıle wınnıng the hearts of ... rehglOus but not extremist people."S4All
ın ~I~'the effort on the par~of.~SP t~ achieve a synıhesis between appealing to
rehgıous masses and maıntaınıng ıts adherence to Kemalist conception of
laicism results in "the reco~c~ptualization of laicism in a populist style.,,"55
.
On ~h~part.ofCHP, laıcısm turns out to be the substantial point ofreferenee
ın party s ıde~tlty. In other words, CHP has constructed its political discourse
almost exclusıvely on the ideal of maintaining laicism in Kemalist terms. In
party discourse: "The state does not have a religion. Democratic state stands at
equal distance to each and every belief ... in our country, the ultimate aim of
laicism, which forms the guarantee for social harmony is the transfer of the
world of belief to civil society when the time is ripe.,,56On the other hand, when
CHP's atıitudes are observed on such specific cases as the 28 February
decisions, and the headscarf issue it is possible to conclude that for the party
"the time is not ripe" yel. Contra to the oscillating nature of DSP's approach to
the issue of laicism, CHP presents a more consistent and hawkish stance by its
repeated emphasis on the division of the society and politics along secularnon-secular dichotomy, and by proCıaiming to be the only alternative to a
fundamentalist overhaul. In this respect, CHP almost boils down politics into a
power game between "secular" and "non-secular" forces. This has been most
manifest in the last two general elections when the party positioned itself as the
sole competitor and opponent to Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) and AKP,
respectiveıy.s7
As for the economic dimension of center politics it is possible to argue at the
outset that neo-liberalism is a shared framework within which all of the
opposing and competitive political parties maneuver. This has been manifested
in the different discourses that center parties, except for ANAP, have employed
when theyare in opposition and when theyare in power, respectively. Briefly,
when in opposition the political parties almost invariably adopted a critical
stance vis-a-vis the (neo-liberal) economic policies. However, the same
opposing parties have not refrained from implementing almost the same
policies, proposed in IMF-sponsored restructuring programs, when in power.
Thus, it would be apt to pinpoint not the differences among the center parties as
regards the economic policies, applied when in govemment, but the differences
in terms of their preferences when in opposition.
ANAP, whose founding leader was also the architect of 24 January
Decisions introduced the "neo-liberal way" to Turkey with special reference to
Thateherite policies. The key notion in this new way was transformation,
meaning "opening up," by means of export-oriented economic measures and
decreasing the role of state in the economic sphere to the greatest extent
possible. In fact, the party's liberal coloring was mostly owed to its economic
policy preferences. Although the party has adopted the principle of social justice
as one of the elements in its identificatory codes, the principle was coined within
the framework of the liberal-conservative stance.58 In this respect, the party's
understanding of social justice was rather based on a combination of c1assical
liberal emphasis on equality of opportunity and neo-liberal resort to "voluntary
social solidarity, especially [to] the principles of traditional social solidarity and
related institutions, natural social solidarity that stems from love and
compassion within the family system that constitute the foundations of our
society,,,59than on a concem for social democracy. Here, it should be noted that
the emphasis on familyand
tradition forms a direct Iink between the
conservative tone in ANAP's neo-liberalism and Thatcherite neo-liberal
model.60
The neo-liberal model required a major re-structuration in the economy in
tenns of certain policies including privatization, weakening of the bargaining
capacity of trade unions, taking measures for an uncontrolled market
mechanism, and setting the conditions for the rise of finance capitaL.In meeting
these requisites ANAP has managed to endow the executive with exclusive
power in economic policies by means of forming new institutions and linking
the aIready existing ones, which are specifically engaged in economic issues,
directly to the prime ministry,61 and by technocratizing, and thus depoliticizing
the economy. As argued by Nilüfer Göle, "the ANAP has been policy--rather
than politics-oriented; the p~
has defined its identity in terms of pragmatic
rather than ideological values." 2
According to SakaIlıoğlu and Yeldan, the societal costs of economic
neo-liberalization has been countered with recouese to "the politics of a
haemorrhaging public sector; the role of the informal sector and the rise of the ..
. Anatolian Tigers as new patterns of capital accumulation; ... [attempts to
popularize] ... the market; and anti-political politics and reform populism.,,63
Apart from the reformism inherent in populism of the neo-liberal times, not
merely ANAP but the center-right political parties at large introduced
neo-populism as one of their central strategic tools. Briefly, neo-populist
practice required a stronglpersonalist leadership, the curbing down of the power
of trade unions, and constant denunciation of the past politicians and style of
politics, and lastly de-ideological politics.64
Çiller' s words are representative in understanding this style of politics; "I
pursue above politics policy. I took decisions for my nation. I promised not to
engage in politics. And i will do what i know is right i entrusted myself to the
people. i work for them. i do not engage in politics.,,6s This rationale was
accompanied fırst by an appeal to the rural electorate. This was in line with
DYP's claim to be the heir to the DP-AP line and the party's search for a
distinctive stance in the face of ANAP. However, it seems that DYP's aspiration
to mark itself in competition with ANAP at times resulted in a totally
contrasting outcome to the DP-AP heritage. For example, the party resorted
even to social democratic rhetoric, however immediately shifting toward the
"reality" of neo-liberal times. Sakallıoğlu quotes from Demirel's speeches to
substantiate the oscillating rhetoric between the support "for a more egalitarian
distribution of economic resources" and a staunch pro-free market stance.66This
osciIlation was also exemplified in the acquiescence of the party to an alınost
social democratic stance in DYP-SHP coalition protocol on tlıe one hand,67and
in the subsequent application· of 5 April 1994 economic stability measures on the
other hand. These measures signified the complete compliance with ANAP's
neo-liberal program. Thus, in the following period the DYP-SHP coalition's
economic policies were main1y formulated on the griority of privatization and
on a disregard of social rights of the working class. Currently, DYP, under the
leadership of Ağar, seems to have adopted a pro-rural and poverty-focused
economic rhetoric in its opposition to the AKP government. Although the focus
on poverty especiaIly in metropolitan areas at fırst sight points to an apparent
concern for the social rights of the working class, the way that Ağar puts the
issue raises doubts about social rights based nature of such a focus. Although
poverty is noted as a source for security problems, the solution to this specific
issue is formulated on the basis of strengthening and extending the police, rather
than a social-democratic economic recipe.69 For the time being, we may argue
that DYP's rhetoric, imbued with fascistic signs, represents a shift in the
neo-populist character of center-right to further rightist stance.
A similar line of emphasis on the rural site can also be observed in DSP's
economic program. However, DSP represents a different idea of development i.n
which the rural site emerges as a sub-category of the people's sector. In thıs
respect, DSP consistently stands for development in the countryside by means ~f
land reform and cooperative organization. In general, DSP formulates ıts
economic policy on four sectors, namely the people's sector, the state sector, the
private sector and the marginal sector. The relation that the party forms among
these sectors in its economic program indicates the ideal of a mixed economy.
This formula opts for deconcentration of power in both the state and the private
sectors by means of and to the advantage of the people's sector: "The people's
sector will act like a catalyst between the state and the private sector by
partaking in the former's social responsibility and in the lalter's dynam~sm. It
wiJI form a §uarantee for peorıle's power and freedom, for the workıng of
democracy.,,7 DSP's populism i can also be observed in the emphasis on the
"marginals." The party proposes the utilization of the sector of the outcastsgarbage coIlectors, peddlers, homeworkers, shoe polishers-in fueling the
steady working of the free market in return of social benefits.
.
As against the rising tide of privatization DSP proposes the alternatıve of
autonomization of State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). This means detaching the
SEEs from the bureaucracy and ministries and transferring the supervision and
management to the workers. In this respect, the DSP argues for
72
re-nationalization of SEEs, particularly engaged in infrastructural facilities.
The private sector, on the other hand, is perceived as a natural partner t~ t~e
state, and thus is promised incentives so long as its investment plan~ .stay wıthın
the targets of the Plan. However, during DSP-MHP-ANAP coalıtlOn (19992002) DSP had made no altempt to lay the foundations for such an economic
restructuring. On the contrary, the coalition followed the major line of
preferences that characterized the center politics in post-1980 period-namely,
neo-liberal policies devised in IMF packages.
At the economic plane, CHP c1aims to support the principle of hatism,
which has been one of the major tenets of the party's founding ideology,
Kemalism. However, it shall be noted that the current perception, of etatism is
rather different than the original meaning attributed to the term: "Etatism meant
an interventional economic policy involving direct economic activity by the
state through its economic enterprises.,,73 Today, while CHP stili maintains
eıatism as one of its six arrows it has shifted its preferences in favor of a state
that is more neutral and functional in the preservation of market economy. In
other words, while the former understanding and practice of etatism can be
perceived in terms of state capitalism, currently CHP endures a pro-market
capitalistic stance.
However, it is stili difficult to argue that CHP represents a solid and
consistcnt dispositian on the economic plane. On the one hand, the official
documents of the party attest a stance in favor of social security, employment
guarantee, union rights, and an emphasis on the role of the state to balance
private and public interests to the advantage of the latter. On the other hand, in
practice the party gives secondary importance to economic issues. This has been
evineed in post-2002 period, when the party has preferred to represent a more
socio-cultural, rather than socio-economic opposition. This is especially
manifest when the fact that the AKP government has decisively adopted the
May 2000 economic program.74
In this respect, CHP' s silence as regards to this program as the main
opposition party with a social democratic e1aim points at a fine-tuned
neo-liberalism. Apart from the problematic nature of this fine-tuning for social
democratic principles, the most important point for the purposes of this study is
that CHP, in the final analysis, builds its opposition on the marginalization of
economy; on laicism and foreign policy issues;75and more recently on the rising
tide of nationalism, exemplified in the "flag crisis.,,76
AKP's Rise to Power: Transformation and/or Consolidation of
Center Politics?
By 3 November 2002 general election the center parties that we analyzed above,
with the exception of CHP, failed to pass the LO percent electoral threshold,
while AKP, which was formed in August 2001 with a claim to center identity,
got the majority of the votes. This state of affairs was reflected in the
parliamentary composition, and can be read as encompassing the potential for
the transformatian of center politics in the long run. This potential is all the
more convinciııg for two reasons. First, the major center parties that have shaped
the center politics throughout the 1980s and ]990s were left out of the
parliament, and instantly entered into an intra-party redecoration process.
Second, the AKP as a pro-Islamist political formatian effected the strengthening
of one of the constant themes of center politics; that is religion. However, the
eourse of AKP's rule also contained a dialectical process, in that the party itself
has gone through a transformation, which was signified in the attempt by the
ruling cadre of the party to de-politicize religion, at least in rhetoeic.
The politico-historical root of AKP's difference from the previous center
parties has been mainly due to its organic connection with National Outlook
tradition.77 The AKP was formed after the c10sure of the FP by its dissident
"reformist" wing.78 Initially the leading members of the AKP denied that the
party represented a break with the RP-FP line.79 Instead, the only differenee
between the two strands was spelled as one of "political style and discourse."so
Moreover, a centrist tendency was totally rejected.81 However, by the foundation
of two separate parties (AKP and the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), the
"reformist" wing started to emphasize its distinctiveness. Ironically, the main
point of reference in this identity forging turned out to be "centrist" credentials.
iri his public statements the party chairperson R. Tayyip Erdogan has insistently
emphasized the conciliatory stance of the party, and e1aimed that AKP has
aimed at "re-building the fragmented identity of the center-right in Turkey.,,82
The extent to which the party has so far been able to accomplish this aspiration
can be assessed on the basis of the three founding features of center politics,
nationalism, laicism, and (neo-Iiberal) capitalism.
Nationalism-A Strategic Tool for Power?
In its official discourse AKP resembles ANAP' s approach to nationalism by
representing a twofold disposition. First, in its program the party pays its tributes
to tolerance toward differences in belief and culture as assets of society. Second,
in party discourse nation emerges as the focal point of politics. For example, t~e
party perceives politics as a means of serving the nation. However, t~e emphasıs
on tolerance and the implication for a state in the service of the natıon shall be
read in terms of the metaphorical connection between the familyand societyread as the Turkish nation-and the definition of political activity on the
grounds of the "revelation of national will" and a "consensual platform that
excludes conflict.,,83 Such a formulation is explicitly in line with an organic
approach to society and politics.84
Different from the other political parties of the center space, AKP does not
distinguish among political, economic, and security dimensions of the Kurdish
issue. In this respect, in the party program the solution to the issue, which in the
final analysis is relegated to a problem of terror, is presented in a tripad: "... the
means for ending terror requires a conceptualization of the state, whieh respects
basic rights and liberties, and considering economic development and security as
the parts of the same whole.,,85This proelamation has been in line with the
effects of Turkey's EU accessian process on the Kurdish issue.86
However, the fact that the party has been rather silent in such issues as the
Abdullah Öcalan case, and that it reacted to the recent "flag crisis" on almost
extreme nationalist grounds and provided support to the rather hysterical societal
demonstrations that followed signify the essentially Muslim-Turkish identity of
the party. Briefly, it can be argued that while AKP government has managed to
take steps toward the resolution of the Kurdish issue within the context .of EU
accessian process, it is hard to conelude that the party has broken wıth the
almost traditionalized pattern of nationalism in center politics. Besides, the issue
of religion-i.e., Sunni Islam-turns out to be the wider framewor~, w~ich both
encompasses the party's nationalism and relegates the Kurdısh ıssue to
secondary status. In fact, the issue of religion has so far functioned as the major
point ofreference in the delineation of AKP's distinct location in center politics.
This is especially manifest in the party's relatian with the Armed Forces.
Laicism-Conservative
Democracy as a Solution?
Due to its pro-Islamist origins the issue of laicism has formed one of the
benchmarks to identify the AKP. This worked both as a grounds for the party's
opponents to criticize AKP for politicizing religion, and as a negative reference
point for party itself to disCıaim its non-secular intentions. In this respect, the
term "conservative democrat" has been an attempt on the part of the party to
forge itself an identity that would neither upset its electoral base nor deepen the
suspicious approach of the Armed Forces, which relegates the party to a
pro-Islamist and fundamentalist stance.87
First, in line with the general tendency in center-right politics AKP defines
laicism in terms of freedom of conscience. The party takes laicism as "the
principle of freedom and peace." Second, the party denies any association with
"Muslim" and/or Islamic identity in political terms.88 This cautious stance can
be read as the continuity in center-right polilical parties' tendency to fine-tune
their policy preferences with respect to the priorities, set by the Armed Forces.
In the case of AKP this seems all the more diffıcult since almost all the policy
proposals and practices of the party is somewhat perceived to be associated with
Islamist leanings. Exemplary are the draft law on public administration reform,
which was prepared for institutionalizing decentralization, educational policy
proposals-in secondary and higher education system-and Abdullah GüI's
proposal, when he was prime minister of the fifty-eighth govemment, to subject
the decisions of the Higher Military Council to civilian courts.
At-this point it is apt to argue that AKP has been walking on a tightrope
between its electoral base and the "sensitivities of the regime," represented
mainly by the Armed Forces. Additionally, the EU accession process forms the
general framework in which this tripodal relation is continuously formed and
reformed. Laicism as a "sensitivity of the regime" is placed at the center of this
tripodal relation. We think that the positioning of laicism at the center
reproduces one other tendency in center politics, that of "de-economization" of
politics. In other words, both the competition and opposition in the center take
place withoutsubstantial reference to economic policies in terms of alternatives,
which in the final analysis results in the marginalization of economics.
Economic Policies-Neo-Liberalism
Mutatis Mutandis
Ahmet lnsel points at the rise of a "new middle class which is culturally
conservative, politically nationalist and moderately authoritarian, eeonomically
liberal or rather, on the side of free enterprise.,,89 The most continual factor in
center politics in post-1980 Turkey, that is neo-liberalism, which has also been
the founding feature of center space, stands stili in AKP's term in office. This is
most vividly explicated in AKP Group Vice President, Sadullah Ergin's
response to the criticisms directed against AKP' s relations with Islamic Private
Sector: "One should not consider the color, religion and nationality of money.
Economics does not have religion ... We also take credits from IMF and World
Bank. Their origins are Christian. The importantthing is the cost of money.',90
The AKP has overtly displayed its neo-liberal leaning both in its
pre-election discourse and in its practices after coming to power. In this respect,
privatization, creating incentives for foreign investment and compliance with
other IMF-imposed requisites formed the basic priorities in the AKP's
socio-economic measures. F1rst, in line with the emphasis on foreign investment
the provisions of the new Labor Law (ıo June 2003) manifest that the priorities
of the party are tlexibility in and security of the workplace. Within strictly
neo-liberal terms it can be argued that in parallel to Erdogan's depiction that
"lack of investment, namely capital is the major problem of [the] Turkish
economy,,,91 The AKP opts for providing the suitable grounds for auracting
especially foreign investment. In this respeet, the party overtly sets the security
for the entrepreneur as a precondition for employment and wage security.
Besides, for the party such a priority seuing is justified on the basis that it works
92
to the advantage of both the workers' and the nation's welfare.. This pri~rity
seUing is most recenııy reflected on AKP's relation to tra?e ~nıo~s on varıo~s
issues as in the case of collective bargaining, and the prıvatızatıon of certaın
SEEs: most recenııy that of Turkish Cellulose and Paper Factories Company
(Türkiye Selüloz ve Kağıt Fabrikaları Anonim Şirketi, SEKA).
.
The same paUem can also be observed in the AKP's aUe~pt.s for pubhc
administration reform. In this context privatization and decentralızatıon form the
principal pillars. The AKP's emphasis on privatization and decentralization is
grounded on a managerial perception of politics, w~ich focu~es al~ost solely on
efficiency. However, the partY softens its managerıal mentahty wı~hrecourse to
one of the "henefits" of decentralization; that is the maıntenance of
transparency. In other words, the party seemingiy espouses dialogue.among t~e
state, market forces and civil society as a means for more effıcıent publıc
administration. But in the final analysis, the AKP reduces the partners of the
dialogue to the firsttwo.93
.
In the health sector it is also possible to observe the persıstent tendency
94
toward privatization and marketization. Briefly, the program that is pursued by
the party to restructure the health sector leads to the displacement .of the
"perception of health services as the rights of .the.citizen~" by the me~talıty that
opts for their "commodification.',95 The AK~ Ju~tıfies ~hıstrans~ormatıon o~ the
grounds of efficiency, which is totally ın lıne wlth neo-h.b~ral. prac.tıce~,
introduced by the ANAP governments in post-1980 Turkey. Thıs Justıficatıon ıs
also based on a certain conception of social justice.
In the party program, the AKP presents a "moralistic" a~proach to economy
in general, and the issue of social justice in particular. In thı.srespect, .the party
adopts the view that "[t]he eco~omic ap~ro?~hes, ••wh~ch ~ontaı.n ~oral
perspective, represent an understandıng that prıor.ıtızes ~ocıal dımensı?n and
"social justice.',96To put it brietly such a perceptıon e~t~lls the eı:np~ası~o~ the
"protection of the individual vis-a-vis the state" ~y tradltı~nal s~cıal ınstltutıon~,
starting with the family. Within the frame of thıs mentalıty prıvate property. ıs
asserted as both the insurance of family ties and the maintenance of famıly
through generations, and, thus, as a strategic tool for the endurance of soci~1
stability. In the final analysis, the AKP propos~s. ~ merely regul~tory state ın
economic matters,97 and relegates the responsıbıhty for the maıntenance of
social justice to civil society. This provides the most vivid exam.ple that the
party carries the ANAP's posture to the 2000s, however wıth a more
conservative tune.
In this chapter we aimed at analyzing the evolution of center poli~ics in ~~st1980 Turkey. In doing so, we focused on two main representatıve polıt.ıcal
parties from the center left (CHP and DSP) and three from the center. r.ıght
(AKP, ANAP and DYP). The main assumption is that ~he24 January decı.sı~ns
and 1980 coup d'etat provided the framework in whıch the alrea.dy ~xıstın.g
political norms have been subjected .to a. major cha~ge. ~n cons~d~rıng thıs
assumption we selected three pohcy ıssues-natıonahsm,
laıcısm, and
neo-liberal capitalism-as
the founding elements of center politics, and thus as
the analytical tools in assessing the political parties of the center.
At the outset ANAP emerges as the pivotal representative of center politics.
This is due to the fact that ANAP was the tirst party to come to power in the
aftermath of 1980 coup d' etat. More importantly the party tit well into the
existing
"critical juncture"
framework,
which can be summarized
as
authoritarian Iiberalism. The retlection of this framework on the center right
parties in the following decades has been a new version of populist stance, Le.
neo-liberal populism. On the part of center left parties asimilar tendency in the
case of economic policies can be observed. In this respect, it can be argued that
as far as the economic sphere is concerned center right and center left political
parties are positioned not as opponents, but as competitors. On the other hand,
the main c1eavage between the two positions, which leads to a mutually
acknowledged opposing stance among the parties of the center left and the
center right beyond competition can be observed in the socio-cultural sphere, i.e.
on the issue of laicism. At this point we shall immediate1y note that nationalism,
as a major constitutive feature of center politics is a common theme of reference
for all the political parties without question. Rather the political parties in
question display differences in the tune and degree of their nationalistic stance.
This common theme of reference has been all the more important by the
escalation in Turkey's EU accession process duri.ng AKP rule. EUaccession
process presents a complex and paradoxical scheme in analyzing whether there
has been a transformation in center politics by the rise of AKP to power. First,
the process has worked as a means for maneuyering for the AKP in its c1aims
for individual rights and liberties, particularly with reference to the practice of
Islam vis-d-vis the laicist circIes. Second, and paradoxically, the process also
exposed the inherent conservative-nationalist
stance of the AKP along TurkishIslam synthesis, which in the tinal analysis connotes a shift to the right in center
politics. This shift is also substantiated by the increase in the intensity of
nationalistic discourse among center left political parties, which had aıready
adopted a statist-nationalist stance.
Finally, in assessing the nature of center politics in post-20oo era one
tempts to include a third variable, that is the EU- Turkey relations. This is
because currently the center politics is inevitably run on EU discourse. In other
words, different from the period between 1980-2000, in the 2000s the dynamics
of center politics are shaped not only by the dialectical relation between political
parties of the center and the Armed Forces, but also by the penetration of the EU
requisites into domestic politics. Given the recent, however sporadic, rise of
nationalism, at times reaching to fascistic impulses, whether the EU would
provide a critical turning point so as to tit into Scul1y's "critical juncture
framework" in the analysis of center politics is at best dubious for the present.
ı. Center lefl politics in the post-1980 period were represented subsequently by the
Populist Party (Halkçı Parti, HP) (1983-1985), the Social Democracy Party (Sosyal
Demokrasi Partisi, SODEP, 1983-1985), and the Social Democratic Populist Party
(Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti, SHP 1985-1995), which was formed by the merging of
the HP and the SODEP. Here we do not analyze the SHP as a separate political
formation. Because at the ideological level the party appeared to be the carrier of the
CHP's stance in the period when pre-1980 political parties were banned from active
politics. The SHP was merged with the CHP in 1995. For asimilar assessment on the
evolution of the center left political line see Hasan Bülent Kahraman, Sosyal Dem~krasi
Türkiye ve Partileri (Social Democracy Turkeyand Political Parties) (Ankara: Imge,
1993),233.
2. See Reuven Y. Hazan, Cemre Parties, Polarization and Competition in European
Parliaıııemary Democracies (London and Washington: Pinter, 1997), 1-13.
3. Hans Keman, "The Search for the Centre Pivot Parties in West European Party
System," West European Politics 17, no. 4 (October 1994): 124-148; Hans Daaider, "In
Search of the Center of European Party System," The American Political Science Review
78,no. 1 (March 1984): 92-109.
4. DaaIder, "In Search of the Center of European Party System," 106.
5. Timothy Scuııy, Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth Century and
Twentieth Centurt Chile (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 11-16.
6. Scully, Rethinking the Cemer, No.13.
7. Keman, "The Search for the Centre Pivot Parties in West European Party
System," 124.
8. Hazan, Centre Parties, Polarization and Competition in European Parliamemary
Democracies.
9. In fact, the AP was not brand new in this respecı. The Democratic Party
(Demokrat Parti, DP), from which the AP e1aims its legacy, had emerged as the most
effective challenge to the mono-party rule of the CHP in the Iate i 940s. lronically, the
DP had !iterally originated from the CHP of the 1940s.
10. For a detailed analysis of the AP's ideological stance see Tan~1 Demirel. Adalet
Partisi. Ideoloji ve Politika (Justice Part)'. Ideologyand Politics) (Istanbul: Iletişim,
2004).
11. This restriction, which was stated in temporary [was the whole artiele temporary
or just this restriction? if the latter, the sentence would much better read "which was
temporarily stated in"] Artiele 4 of 1982 Constitution was Iifted by the law (No. 3361) on
17 May 1987 and was approved by plebiscite on 6 September 1987. For a detailed
analysis of the post-1980 party system in Turkey see, ılter Turan, "Political Parties and
the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey," in Stale, Democrac)' and Mililary in Turkey in
the 1980s, ed., Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter,
1988), 63-80; ÜstUnErgüder, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey," in Perspectives
on Democracy in Turkey, ed., Ergun Özbudun, (Ankara: Turkish Political Science
Association, 1988), 113-45. For a concise elaboration on post-1980 political parties see
Ayşe Ayata, "Ideology, Social Bases, and Organizational Structure of the Post-1980
Political Parties," in The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, ed .•
Atilla Eraıp, Muharrem Tünay and Birol Yeşilada, (Westport, Connecticm, London:
Praeger. 1993),31-49.
12. On the juxtaposition between neo-liberal preferences for structural adjustment
and military-backed emphasis on stability see Galip L. Yalman, "The Turkish State and
Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: A Relativist Paradigm or a Panopıy of Hegemonic
Strategies?" in The Politics of Permanent Crisis, Class, Ideologyand State in Turkey, ed.,
N. Balkan & S. Savran, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2002), 21-54.
13. Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "The Motherland Party: The Challenge oflnstitutionalization
in a Charismatic Leader Party," Turkish Studies 3, no. 1 (2002): 47.
i4. On the connection between the 1980 coup d' etat and the rise of the ANAP see
Muharrem Tünay, "'The Turkish New Right's Attempt at Hegemony," in The Political
and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, 11-30.
15. Tanıl Bora, "Ordu ve Milliyetçilik" (Army and Nationalism) in Bir Zümre, Bir
Parıi, Türkiye'de Ordu (A Strata, A Party, Army in Turkey), ed., Ahmet Insel and Ali
Bayramogıu, (Istanbul: Birikim, 2004),163-78.
16. For example see, "Kenan Evren'in Malatya'da Halka Hitaben Yaptıklan
Konuşma" (Kenan Evren's Speech in Malatya) (17 May i 986), in Türkiye Cumhuriyeti
Cumhurbaşkanı Kenan Evren'in Söylev ve Demeçieri (The President of the Turkish
Republic Kenan Evren's Speeches and Declarations) (9 November 1985-1989
November 1986), (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1986), 156; "Kenan Evren'in Erzurum'da
Halka Hitaben Yaptıklan Konuşma" (Kenan Evren's Speech in Erzurum) (10 July
1986),] 233-40.
17. This flexibility can be read both as a control mechanism that was employed for
capturing populist affiliation, and thus preempting the political dominance of religion as
well as the utiliıation of religion against the "communist" and/or leftist "threa!."
18. 28 February decisions forced the dissolution of the DYP-Welfare Party (Refah
Partisi, RP) coalition govemment on the grounds that the latter partner pursued
"reactionary" activities.
19. For an historical analysis of the Armed Forees' relation with capitalism, see
ısmet Akça, "Kolektif Bir Sermayedar Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri" (Turkish Armed
Forces as a Collective Shareholder), in Bir Zümre Parti, Bir Parti, Türkiye'de Ordu, 22569. See also Semih Vaner, "Ordu" (Army), in Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye (Turkey in
Transition) (Istanbul: Belge Yayınlan, 1990), 255-284; Taha Parla, "Mercantile
Militarism in Turkey, 1960-1998," New Perspectives on Turkey (Fall 1998): 19-52.
20. Here we specifically focus on the political parties' approaches to the Kurdish
issue. However, this does not mean thatthe ethnic issue has been restricted to the Kurdish
issue in the Turkish case. The specificity of the Kurdish issue arises out of two dynamics.
First, the majority of the Kurdish population is Muslim, and second especially since the
Iate i970s the Kurdish issue has been on the agenda of both the military and the political
parties, though in differing terms-either as the "Scutheastem problem," or "Kurdish
problem" or just as "terrOL" Certainly, naming the problem has also delineated
conceptualizations of its boundaries.
21. In this respect see "Anavatan Partisi Genel Başkan Adayı Sayın Mesut
Yılmaz'ın Konferansı, Türkiye'de
Milliyetçilik, Çagdaşlaşma ve Demokrasi"
(Conference of Motherland Party Chairperson Candidate, Mesut Yılmaz, Nationalism,
Modemization and Democracy in Turkey), Başkent Toplantıları, (Ankara, 27 February
1991), <http://www.anap.org.tr> (i February 2005).
22. Levent Köker, "Anavatan Partisi," (The Motherland Party), Yüzyıl Biterken
Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Turkey in the Republican
Period, at the End of the Century), i 5 (Istanbul: Iletişim, 1996), 1255.
23. This was first materialized in i 991 by the amendment of the infamous articles of
Turkish Penal Code (Article No. 141, 142, 163), which were criticized on the grounds of
severely restricting the freedom of thought and conscience, when the party was in power.
it is certain that the mentioned amendment was a critical step for civil and political
Iiberalization. However, their replacement by the Law on Struggle against Terror
amounted more to a verbal shift, than an essential change. In this respect see Simten
Coşar and Aylin Özman, "Centre-Right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002
General Election: Neo-Liberalism with a Muslim Face," Contemporary Politics lO, no. i
(March 2004), see 59. This fact can be related to the dominating role ofthe Armed Forees
in politics in general, and in the drafting of the contours of center identhy in the i980s.
24. Anavatan Partisi Programı (Motherland Party Program); "Mesut Yılma~'ın
"Güneydogu Sorunu" ile Ilgili Basın Toplantısı'ndan," (Mesut Yılmaz's Press Meetıng
on the "Southeastem Problem"), 19 November 2003, <http://www.anap.org.lr> (1 Feb.
2005).
.
i
h th
25. In fact, this "failure" was less amatter of a consistently hbera, app~oac !o e
problem than a maneuver in trying to maintain the s~nth~sis of th~ pa~y s claı"? LO Iıberal
identity with the increase in the weight of nationalısm. ın party ıd~ntıty. The ıncumbe~t
chaiperson Mesut Yılmaz's comment on the issue of ınstructıon ın m~ther language ıs
symbolic in this respect. Yılmaz explicitly rejected the use of the Kurdısh language .as a
medium of instruction on the basis of the contention that "Kurds do not, have a wntten
language." "Anavatan Partisi Genel Başkan Aday~ ~ayın Mesut Yılmaz ın Konferansı,
Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik, Çagdaşlama ve Demokrası.'
..'
26. Ümit Cizre, "Dogru Yol Partisi," (The True Path Party), Yuzyıl Bıterken
Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi i5, i258-1 2~3.
27. Kemiili Saybaşııı, DYP-SHP Koalisyonu'nun Oç Yılı (Three Years of DYP-SHP
Coalition), (Istanbul: Baglam, 1995),83.
.
.. .
28. On the f1uctuations in the DYP's discourse and power ın the 1990s,~ee U~tl
Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party, Turkısh
Sıudies 3, no. i (Spring 2002): 82-101.
29. Cizre, "From Ruler to Pariah," 92.
.
30. This shift was manifest in the rather symbolic term that Agar coıned for
describing the DYP's identity as "national center." Radikal, 15 December 2002; See al~o
"Mehmet Agar'ın Yedinci Olagan Kongre Konuşması" (Speech by Mehmet Agar ın
Seventh Ordinary [Party] Congress), 14-15 December 2002, <http://www.dyp.org.tr/
KongreKonusmasi.asp> (22 February 2005).
.
..
.
3 I. Demokratik Sol Parti Programı (Ankara: no bıographıcal ınformalton).
32. See Ayşe Kadıogıu, "Eger varsa ne durumda?," Gazete Pazar, 17 January 1999.
33. Radikal, 13 January 2005.
34. Demokratik Sol Parti'nin Seçim Bildirgesi, 7-8..
'"
35. Iınur Çevik, Raşit Gürdilek, Semih \diz and Hayri Bırler, Intervıew wıth Büle~t
Ecevit, "Presidenl's Request for Power to Dissolve Parliament and Call Early Polis ıs
'Wishful Wish'," Turkish Daily News, 5 January 1995.
36. Çevik, Gürdilek, \diz and Birler, Interview with Bülent Ecevit.
37. Çevik, Gürdilek, Idiz and Birler, Intervie~ with Bülent Ecevit.
.
38. CHP, Demokratikleşme Raporu, Insan Hakları ve Hukuk Devletı
(Democratizaıion Report, Human Rights and the Rule of Law) (June 2~1, n.p.), 77. See
also, "Egitimde ve Televizyonda Dil Konusu" (The Issue of ~nguage i~ Instruclton and
Television) (9 Deeember 2000) in CHP Genel Başkanı Denız Baykal ın Konuşmaları
(Speeches of CHP Chairperson Deniz Baykal), 56.
39. Yeni Yaklaşımlar Yeni Çözümler, 28. Olağan Kurultay (New Approaches, New
Soluıions, 28th Ordinary Assembly), (23-24 May 1998).
"
40. "Egitimde ve Televizyonda Dil Konusu (9 Decemb.er 2000), 56.. ~ee also 29.
Olağan Kurultay Bildirgesi: Siyasal, Ekonomik, Sosyal Gelışmeler ve Polıtı~l~r (29th
Ordinary Assembly: Political, Economic, Social Developments and Polıcıes) (no
bibliographical information), 15,37-38.
41. "Egitimde ve Televizyonda Dil ~onusu (9 December 2000)," 56."
.
42. "Egitimde ve Televizyonda Dıl Konusu (9 December 2000), 57-58, CHP,
Demokratikleşme Raporu, Insan Hakları ve Hukuk Devleti, 76-78.
43. The CHP's disposition in respect of the Kurdish issue proves to be mo~
hawkish when party politics is considered. The strategy that the party. has adopted ~n
2004 municipal election is exemplary in this respect. The party chaırperson, Denız
Baykal, rejected to participate in electoral cooperation and/or coalition among the left on
the grounds that one of the potential participants, the Democratic People's Party
(Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP), represented ethnic politics. on the contrary he
declared his intention to form coalition with the ANAP the DYP and the Nationalist
Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP). This pr~ference not only connotes the
centripetal tendency that is inherent in center political parties, but also and more
i~portantly indi.cates th~ problem~tic posture of the CHP as a "social democratic" party,
sınce the MHP ıs a far-nght polittcal party, far from being located on the center right of
the political spectrum.
44. .Mustafa Taşar, "MiJliyetçilik-Muhafazakllrlık-Demokrasi,"
(NationalismConservatısm-De~ocracy) Parti Içi Eğitim Toplantısı (Internal Education Meeting of the
Party) Ankara-Bılkent Otel,27 March 2000, <http://www.anap.org.tr/index2.htm> (21
Aug.2002).
45. Taşar, "Laiklik Ne De~i1dir?" (What Does Not Laicism Mean?), Türkiye'nin
Düşünce Gündemi (Tuıkey's Agenda of Thought), <http://www.mustafatasar.gen.tr/
yayinlar/dusunce _gllaiklik _nedegildir.htm> (7 Aug. 2002).
46. The ANAP accepted to act as the leading party of the coalition government that
was formed in accordance with the decisions of 28 February. The fırst confrontation
between the Armed Forces and the ANAP after 28 February 1997 was displayed by the
press declaration of Turkish Armed Forces on 20 March 1998. The dec1aration contained
impIicit wamings against the comments of Yılmaz, then the prime minister, that called
for a more passiye standing on the part of the military in government's struggle against
"reactionary" activities. As an indirect response to the declaration, Yılmaz inc1ined more
towards ensuring his party's adherence to the objectives of Armed Forces. See "Başbakan
Me~ut Yılmaz'ı~ "A-ry. Siyaset Meydanı" Programında Yaptığı Konuşma" (Speech
Delıvered by Pnme Mınıster Mesut Yılmaz to ATV Siyaset Meydanı) 20 March 1998,
<http://www.anap.org.tr/anaplgenelbaskanlarIYILMAZlbasin/98-3-201ATV.html>
(6
Aug.2002).
47. In the words of A~ar, the DYP represented the politicalline, which is "in service
to the nation in politics and to the God in belief." DYP Genel Başkanı Mehmet Ağar'ın
AP'nin 44 Kuruluş Yıldönümü dolayısıyla Düzenlediği Basın Toplantısında Yaptığı
Konuşma (DYP Chairperson Mehmet Ağar's Speech in Press Meeting Organized on the
Occasion of 44th Anniversary of the Foundation of the AP) 11 February 2005,
<http://www.dyp.org.~r/genelbaskan_konusmalarOı.adp?İd=566> (25 Feb. 2005).
48. In line with Umit Cizre it can be argued that such a preference has led the Armed
Force:ı to di~pense with the t,raditional alliance with the center right political parties, and
especıally ~Ith the DYP, whıch have been perceived, and which, in facl, have functioned
a~ a balancıng m~chanism vis-u-vis radical Islam. See Cizre, "Egemen İdeoloji ve Türk
Sılahlı Kuvvetlen, Kavramsal ve ılişkisel Bir Analiz" (Sovereign Ideology and Turkish
Armed Forces, A Conceptual and Relational Analysis), in Bir Zümre. Bir Part~
Türkiye'de Ordu, 149-50.
49. See for example "Mehmet A~ar'ın Yedinci Olağan Kongre Konuşması'"
"Laiklik tıkesinin Anayasaya Girmesinin 68. Yıldönümü dolayısıyla DYP Genel Başkan;
Mehmet Ağar'ın Demeci" (DYP Chairperson, Mehmet A~ar's Statement on the Occasion
of 68th Anniversary of the Inclusion of the Principle of Laicism into the Constitution), 6
February 2005, <http://www.dyp.org.tr/GeneIBaskan _ konusmalarO l.asp?id=560> (I
Mar. 2005).
50. See above, Note 31.
51. Interview with Zeki Sever (Chairperson of DSP, elected during the 6th Ordinary
Assembly, 25 July 2004), Hüseyin Dayı, "Ulus anlayışımız barışçı, kucaklayıcı ve
bütünleştiricidir" (Our conception of nation is pacifıc, embracing, and integrating), Önce
Vatan, 12 August 2004.
52. See for example, Akit, 13 December 1995, cited in Bütün Yönleriyle Başörtüsü
Sorunu.
Olaylar/Belgeler/Anılar
(The
Headscarf
lssue
in All
Aspects.
lncidents/Documents/Memories) (İstanbul: MAZLUMDER, 1998), 2nd ed., 432.
53. Merve Kavakçı was elected as MF from İstanbul in 1999 elections from RP
ranks. However, she was dismissed fırst from the Parliament Hall, and then from
membership since she reCusedto lake out her headscarf in pubHc.
54. Çevik, Gürdilek, tdiz and Birler, Interview with Blllent Ecevit
SS. Tanju Tosun, Türk Parti Sisteminde Merkez Sağ ve Merkez Solda Parçalanma
(Fragmentation in Center Right and Center Left in Turkish Party System) (İstanbul:
Boyut Yayıncılık, 1999),284.
56. CHP, Demokratikleşme Raporu, Insan Hakları ve Hukuk Devleti, 73.
57. See for example, lnterview with CHP Chairperson Deniz Baykal, Zihni Erdem,
"Seçim FP ile CHP arasında," ("The electoral competition is between the FP and the
CHP"), Radikal, 13 February 1999. The CHP's incumbent chairperson Altan Öymen's
words in the iOth Extraordinary Assembly are representative for this contention in that
Öymen emphasized the incapacity and reluctance on the part of civilians to be sensitiye
enough for laicism. See Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Genel Başkanı Altan Öymen 'in LO.
Olağanüstü Kurultay Konuşması (Speech of RPP Chairman Altan Öymen in IOth
Extraordinary Assembly) (Ankara: Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 1999), 13-14.
58.
"Sosyal
Politikanın
Esaslan"
("Principles
of
Social Policy"),
<http://www.anap.org.tr/anap/dokuman/programlmadde-19.htm>
(19 Aug. 2002);
"Anavatan Partisi 6 Kasım 1983 ANAP Seçim Beyannamesi," (Motherland Party 6
November 1983 General Elections Declaration), <http://www.anap.org.tr/anapldokuman
lsecim-bil/83beyannametsos.Jl0L.htm> (6 Aug. 2002).
59. "Turgut Özal'ın Görüşleri (1983), Özal'a Soruldu, Özal Cevapladı," ("Views of
Turgut
Özal
(1983),
Turgut
Özal
Answers
the
Questions")
<http://www.anap.org.tr/a~~p/genelbaskanlar/OZALlyayin/Ozal_gorus.htm>
(8 Dec.
2006); see also "Kurucu Uye ve Genel Sekreter Gaziantep Milletvekili Mustafa Taşar
Tarafından Okunan Anavatan Partisi Birinci Kuruluş Yıldönümü Beyannamesi,"
("Motherland Party First Anniversary Declaration read by Founding Member and
General
Secretary
Mustafa
Taşar"),
20
May
1984,
<http://www.anap.org.tr/anap/dokuman/lkurulus_beyannamesi.htm>
(6 Aug. 2002).
Emphasis on social justice might flrst appear to be contradicting with neo-liberal
premises. For in the neo-liberal conceptual framework "social justice" is "nothing more
than an empty formula." Friedrich A. Hayek, New Studies in Philosophy. Politics,
Economics and the History of ldeas (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 57.
However, so long as the concept is coined first and foremost with respect to "equality of
opportunity," the ANAP avoids the risk ofbeing at odds with the conceptual basis ofits
modeL. Besides as Andrew Gamble notes Hayek "himself admits that there is a role for
the state in providing a floor level of resources below which no individual should be
aııowed to faıı." Andrew Gamble, The Iron Cage ofLiberty (UK: Polity Press, 1996),49.
60. The Conservatives' emphasis on traditional and familial values has been
assessed as apoint of contradiction inherent in the adoption of neo-Iiberal economic
measures by the British Conservative Party. See Desmond S. King, The New Right,
Politics markets and citizenship (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1987). 123ff.
6 ı. Metin Heper, "State, Party and Society in Post-1983 Turkey," Government and
Opposition 25, no. 3 (1990): 326.
62. Nilllfer Göle, "Engineers: 'Technocratic Democracy'," in Turkeyand the West,
ed., Metin Heper, Ayşe Öncü and Hanz Kreimer, (London and New York: ı. B. Tauris,
1993),213.
63. Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Erinç Yeldan, "Politics, Society and Financiat
Liberalization: Turkey in the 1990s," Development and Change 3 i (2000): 498.
. 64. See ~e~?eth M. Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in
Latın Amerıca,
World Politics 48 (October 1995): 82-116; Kurt Weyland,
"Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities," Studies in
Çomparative International Development 31, no. 3 (Fal1 1996): 3-3 ı. For an analysis of
Ozal's neo~liberal ne?-populism with a comparatiye approach see Ziya Öniş, "Turgut
Özal and hıs Economıc Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective," Middle
Eastem Studies 40, no. 4 (July 2004): especially 126.
65. Interview with Tansu Çiller,.perya Sazak, Milliyet (12 August 1994), cited in
Saybaşııı, DYP-SHP Koalisyonu'nun Uç Yılı, 101.
66. Sakallıoğlu, "Liberalism, Democracy and the Centre-Right: The ldentity Crisis
of the True Path Party," in Turkey. Identity. Democracy and Politics, ed., Sylvie
Kedourie, (London, Portıand, Oregon: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1996), 142-61.
67. eoalition Protocol between the True Path Party and Social Democrat Populist
Party (19 November 1991) (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1991). See especial1y the
part on the "social state," 12-14.
68. Saybaşııı, DYP-8HP Koalisyon'nun Üç Yılı, 99-114.
69. See for example, "DYP Genel Başkanı Mehmet Ağar'ıo Kanal D "Genç Bakış"
Programı'nda Yaptığı Konuşma" (DYP Chairperson Mehmet Ağar's Speech Delivered at
Kanal D "Genç Bakış" Program) 2 March 2005, <http://www.dyp.org.tr/
genelbaskan_konusmalarOl.asp?td=577> (10 Mar. 2005).
70. Demokratik Sol Parti Programı, 74-75.
71. The DSP has displayed aciassical populist stance and thus the leader cult is the
most decisive element of party identity. The "Ieader factor" has in fact been one of the
determin!ng ~Iements i~ center political parties in Turkey, which attests the articulation
of populısm lOto neo-Iıberal frameworks. However, as Kahraman aptly observes in the
case of the DSP there has been an exclusive identification of the party with the leader
(Bülent Ecevit). Kahraman, "DSP-SHP: Oy Transferi" (DSP-SHP Vote Transfer) in
Sosyal Demokrasi Türkiye ve Partileri, 212.
72. DemokratikSol Parti Programı, 75-76.
73. Ergun Özbudun, 'The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,' in Atatürk the
Founder of a Modern State, ed., Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Özbudun (London: C. Hurst
and Co., 1981), see 89.
74. ~~r the main f~amework of the economic programme introduced by the then
State ~ıoıster ~esponsıble for Economy, Kemal Derviş, see Türkiye 'nin Güçlü
Ekono"!ıye Ge~ı! Programı: Hedefler, Politikalar ve Uygulamalar (Program for
Turkey s Transıtıon t? Strong Economy; Objectives. Policies and Practices) (Ankara:
T.C. Başbakanlık Hazıne Müsteşarlığı Ma~baası, May 2001). For a critical reading of the
program see Bağımsız Sosyal Bilimciler Iktisad Grubu (Indep'endent Social Scientists'
Group for Economy), Güçlü Ekonomiye Geçiş Programı Uzerine Değerlendirmeler
(Assessments on the Program for Transition to Strong Economy) (Ankara: Türk
Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği, 2001), 5.
75. For a si~ilar assessment see E.. Fuat Keyman, "Türkiye ve Sosyal Demokrasi"
(Turkeyand Socıal Democracy) Radikal Iki (Turkish weekly), i June 2003.
7.6: on ~1 March 2005 Newroz celebrations in one of the southem provinces
(Mersı~) Turk!sh flag was bum~ by a group of teenagers. In the following days arather
paran01~ reactıon has been organızed throughout Turkey, with the backing of the official
declaratıons by the Head of the General Command and Prime Minister. In this instance,
the CHP outwardly displayed a rather fascistic disposition.
77. The National Outlook tradition has been represented by the National Order Party
(Milli Nizam Partisi, MNP)-National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi,
MSP)-RP-FP-Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP) line for almost three decades. For an
as.sessment on the National Outlook Tradition see Ahmet Yıldız, "Politico-religious
Dıscourse of the Parties of the National Outlook in Turkey: A Critical Perspective,"
Muslim World 93. no. 2 (April 2(03): 187-209.
78. The division between "reformists" and "traditionalists" was not in fact alien to
the National Outlook line. The first of such divisions within this line was experienced in
the last MSP Congress in 1978.
,79. See. for example, statements by Abdullah GÜı. currently the Minister of Foreign
Affaırs. Mustafa Baş and Bülent Arınç, currently the Head of the Turkish Grand National
Assembly in S. Bozkurt "Milli Görüş Yol Ayrımında" (National Outlook at the
Crossroads). Yeni Binyıl (8. 9, 10 May 2000).
80. See. for example, Bozkurt, "Milli Görüş Yol Ayrımında." 9 May 2000.
81. "Changing the identity of the FP would mean commitling suicide. We are not
obl~ged to beco~e a center-right or center-Ieft party. FP can only become a center party
by lls own specıfic outlook. lt shal1 neilher be marginal nor ideological. However, we
?Iso ~ay 'no' t~ those. who propose that the party be a mass party; it shal1 be a party of
ıdenUty and ~lıef." Cıted from Bozkurt. "Milli Görüş Yol Ayrımında," 10 May 2000.
82. Melln Sever, "Merkez Sağ Geleceğini Arıyor, 5" (Center.Right Searches for its
Future), Radikal, 17 October 2002.
83. AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi (AK Parti Eleclion Declaration) (2002).
84. The AKP's nationalism can also be perceived in the composition and electorate
profile of the party. According to the 2002 e1ection research results the AKP received
slightly more than 20 percent of ex-FP votes, and the ratio of the v~tes that it received
from the MHP, the ANAP, the DYP and the DSP exceeded this amount. The rest of its
SUPP?rt came from new yoters who had not participated in the April 1999 general
electıon. When Yılmaz Esmer's assessment that "the rightist position [that marked the
voting paııem] in the nineties ... oscil1ates between religion based right and nationalist
rig~t" i~ ~aken into consideration the AKP does not present an exception for the
natıonahstıc tendeneyon the center right. See Esmer, "Seçmen Davranışlarından Üç
Kasım Analizi/4" (Analysis of 3 November on the basis of Voter Behavior/4). Milliyet,
18 ~ov~mber 2002. On the other hand, the AKP's membership composition is rather
fragıle ın that the party hosts both "conservative Islamists" and "Turkish nationalists
[sorne] with racist leaning." See Naci Kutlay, "AKP-AB ve Diyarbakır" (AKP-EU and
Diyarbakır), Radikal, 10 January 2005.
85. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi Programt (Justice and Development Party Program)
(Ankara, 2002).
86. In this respect, the AKP government implemented policies such as the
broadcasting of Kurdish language program in state-run television channel, TRT.
87. This insistence has been manifested in the eventual interface on various
~asions th~l both the fifty-eig~th and fifty-ninth AKP governments have experienced
wıth the Presıdent of the Repubhc, the NSC, as well as with the parliamentary opposition
party, the CHP.
88. The AKP's concem for avoiding a politically religious identity is also evident in
the response of the party' s chairperson to the idenlification of the partyas
"Muslim-democrat": "'I1ıese aııributions are not correct, not because we are not Muslims
or democrats; but because these two [identities) should be considered on different
planes."
89. Ahmetlnsel, "'The AKP and Normalizing Democracy in Turkey," South Atlantic
Quarterly 102, no. 213(SpringlSummer 2(03): 298.
90. Radikal, 6 November 2004.
91. Milliyet. 15 March 2003.
92. For the entire text of the Labor Law see <http://www.calisrna.gov.tr/
mevzuatl4857is kanunu.htm>, (8 Oec. 2006).
93. Coşar-~ Özman,"Centre-RightPoliticsin Turkey,"65.
94. For the connection between policies proposed in the draft law on public
administrationand the transformationin the health sector as devised by the party see
BağımsızSosyal Bilimciler (IndependentSocial Scientists), 2005 Başında Türkiye 'nin
Ekonomik ve Siyasal Yaşamı Ozerine Değerlendirmeler (Assessments on the Economic
and Social Life in Turkey in the Beginning of2005) (Ankara:TMMOB,March2005),46:
95. Bagımsız Sosyal Bilimciler (Independent Social Scientists), 2005 Başında
Türkiye 'nin, 44.
96. AK Parti Seçim Beyannamesi.
Turkey, September 11, and Greater MiddIe East
97. For a concisereadingof the AKP's economicpoliciessee E. Fuat Keymanand
Ziya Öniş,"Turkeyat the poııs: A New Path Emerges,"Journal of Democracy 14,no. 2
(April2003):95-107.
The attacks of international terror on Istanbul, Madrid, London, and Sharm
al-Sheikh following the September i i attacks targeted synagogues, consulates,
and financial institutions as well as international travelers and innocent people in
the metro stations. it is evident that the process commenced by September 1 i
was a development affecting the entire international system and also that the
latest attacks of international terrorism will engender serious consequences for
both the countries under attack and the international system. The immediate
response of the U.S. was to adapt a new policy of "war against terror" which
aims to counter the new tlıreat in the aftermath of September i ı. The U.S. administration changed the course of this policy after the Iraqi invasion and placed
rnore emphasis on transforming the Greater Middle East region to put an end to
the instability disseminating from this region to the rest of the world.
In this sense, the Greater Middle East emerged as the target geography in
the project of American military unilateralism, which aims to transform the
world into a safer place for itself. The idea of extending the borders of the MiddIe East northward and eastward was not a new idea, but rather one that goes
back to a few decades earlier. The disintegration of the Soviets disclosed the
former link between Muslim Soviet south and the Middle East. This new
enlarged Middle East is now the center of the new American designs and projects in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. This geography has been under scrutiny for hosting the root causes of the September II attacks, the following terrorist attacks, and the future problems lying ahead. The odd elements in
this geography not only pose a threat to the outside but also the region itself. For
example, the recent attacks indicate that a wide geography stretching from
Europe to South Asia is vulnerable to destabilization by terrorist acts.
An analysis that includes both structural and issue-based discussions may
help to understand the complex and intriguing nature of these developments. In
this chapter, i will analyze the change in world politics, the new shape of internationalorder, the nature of a new international tlıreat, and the U.S. attempts to
transform the Greater Middle East as a cure to the problems of the new era. After disc1Il'Ssing
these structural and general issues, i will put more focus on the
agent side in international politics. I will discuss the Turkish response and posi-