Page 1 Page 2 *er THE A_Grncuit`iul AND rNDUsT i

 Int. J. Middle East Stud. 5 (1974), 65-76 Printedin Great Britain
65
Edward C. Clark
THE OTTOMAN
INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION*
The European industrial revolution adversely affected the Ottoman Empire in
the nineteenth century and was instrumental in its final collapse. The eastward
flow of European goods grew rapidly in the years following the end of the
Napoleonic era in 18I5, and Ottoman lands soon became important markets for
many European manufacturers. Their wares increasingly displaced traditional
Ottoman products, made Ottoman handicraftsmen jobless, reduced Ottoman
internal sources of taxes, and so contributed to eventual European control of
Ottoman finances. These phenomena are well known and have received appropriate recognition as symptoms of an economic invasion that was aided by the
diplomacy of West European consuls and ambassadors,I and sanctified by
largely unquestioned European arguments in favor of laissez-faire.2
On the other hand Ottoman responses to this European economic challenge
are relatively unknown, and even the extensive and costly Ottoman industrial
efforts of the I84os seemingly have been dismissed as the casual if not comical
games of disinterested bureaucrats.3 Such dismissal is warranted in the sense
that the attempts largely failed, but is inadequate as a portrayal of Ottoman
awareness of, and response to, a growing industrial malaise. What were the
nature and magnitude of these Ottoman responses? What were Ottoman
objectives ?What main factors contributed to their failures ?What, if any, achievements resulted? These questions are considered here.
It should be noted that the Ottoman Porte did not wait until the i84os to
introduce new European industrial techniques. To go back but to the I79os and
*
The authoris indebtedto the AmericanPhilosophicalSociety, the ForeignAffairs
FellowshipProgram,and the Universityof Texas at El Paso ResearchInstitutefor their
supportof researchupon which this articleis based.
I For an extensive treatmentof Ottoman-Europeaneconomic relations see Vernon
Puryear, International Economicsand Diplomacy in the Near East, I834-I853 (Stanford,
1935). For contemporary views see Cyrus Hamlin, Among the Turks (London, 1878),
pp. 57-60, and portionsof Dominique Chevallier,'Western Developmentand Crisis in
the Mid-NineteenthCentury...,' in WilliamR. Polk and RichardL. Chambers(eds.),
Beginningsof Modernizationin theMiddleEast: TheNineteenthCentury(Chicago,I968),
pp. 205-22.
2 Even Friedrich List in the I83os and I84os, an implacable foe of laissez-faire argu-
ments, had no sympathyfor the Ottomans.See, for example,his The National System
of Political Economy, trans. S. S. Lloyd (New York, I966), pp. 419 ff.
3 Ali Riza
Seyfi, 'Imparatorluk Devrinde Sanayile?me Komedisi,' Cumhuriyet
Gazetesi(Istanbul),31 July, 5 August 1939;OmerCelalSarc,'Tanzimatve Sanayiimiz,'
Tanzimat (Istanbul, I940), pp. 423-40. (Also translated in Charles Issawi (ed.), The
Economic History of the Middle East, I800-I914 (Chicago, 1966), pp. 48-59.)
5
MES 5 I
66
Edward C. Clark
the Nizam-i Cedid, Sultan Selim III took an intense personal interest in
improving the manufacture of military goods.' As early as I793-4 he introduced
contemporary European processes and equipment for the production of cannon,
rifles, mines and gunpowder.2 Numerous difficulties prevented Selim from
fully realizing his goals, but he persevered. As late as I804, for example, he
initiated the construction of elaborate buildings to house a woolen mill for
uniforms and a paper factory near the Bosphorus at Hiinkar Iskelesi.3 Following
the overthrow of Selim III few if any industrial improvements seem to have
been attempted in the first two decades of Sultan Mahmud II's reign, but this
hiatus was followed by a burst of activity. A spinning mill was built near Eyiip
in Istanbul in I827,4 a leather tannery and boot works at Beykoz was improved
early in the I830s, a part of the paper factory at Hiinkar Iskelesi was converted
to cloth manufacturing in the same years,5 the Feshane was established in I835
to supplant hand-manufacture of the new fez headgear,6 a wool-spinning and
weaving mill began operating south of the Balkan Mountains at Islimiye about
i836,7 a new saw mill and copper sheet-rolling mill were built also about then
near Tophane, and in the late I83os both the Tophane cannon foundry and the
Dolmabahqe musket works were converted from animal to steam power.8
With the partial exception of the Feshane, these early attempts to introduce
European industrial methods were devoted exclusively to the manufacture of
goods intended for governmental and military use. The dates of these attempts
suggest a simple pattern. During the military reforms of the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries before the downfall of Selim III in I807, and again following twenty years of reaction against such reforms9 - from the overthrow
of the Janissaries in 1826 to the political containment of Muhammad Ali by
1841, the Ottoman Porte invested imperial funds in individual factory operations
with the somewhat over-optimistic hope of transferring European industrial
I
Enver Ziya Karal, Selim III'iin hatt-i Hiimayunlarz-Nizam-i Cedit, 1789-i807,
Tarih Kurumu Yalynlarlndan,
2
Turk
cilt VII, no. 14 (Ankara, I946), pp. 6I-3.
These are well covered by Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New (Cambridge,
Mass., I971),
pp. 138-44.
Adnan Giz, 'Ilk Sinai Tesislerimiz,' Istanbul Sanayi OdaszDergisi (Istanbul), cilt iI,
no. 23 (January 1968), pp. 25, 26. These were so ornate that later tourists mistook them
for converted palaces. See James E. DeKay, Sketches of Turkey in 1831 and I832 (New
R. Walsh, A Residence in Constantinople..., vol. ii (London,
York, 1833), pp. I22-4;
1836), p. 295; R. Walsh, Narrative of a Journalfrom Constantinopleto England (London,
3
1828), p. I5.
4
Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanli Tarihi, cilt vi (Ankara, I954),
p.
241.
5 DeKay, pp. 118-24.
6 Julia Pardoe, The City of the Sultan, vol. in (London, I838), pp. 177-84; Sumerbank
Aylzk Endiistri ve Kiiltiir Dergisi (Istanbul), cilt I, no. i (July 1961), p. 24.
7 Ami Boue, La Turquie d'Europe, vol. in (Paris, 1840), pp. Ioo-2; Odalar Birligi,
Tiirkiye'de Pamuk Ipligi ve Pamuklu Dokuma Mensucat Sanayii (Ankara, 1958), pp. 4-9.
8
John Reid, Turkey and the Turks (London,
I840),
pp. 272-6.
9 As one example, Selim III's plan for a new weaving mill at Azadli was dropped
upon Selim's deposition (see Anna Naguib Boutros - Ghali, Les Dadian, trans. Archag
Alboyadjian (Cairo, i965), p. 91).
The Ottoman industrial revolution 67
superiority to Turkey. Typically these efforts concentrated on the final stages
of manufacture and ignored or only partly solved associated problems such as
internal sources of raw materials, transportation, and other economic infrastructure. More realistic solutions to such problems were undertaken only in
the decade which followed.
In the I840s Ottoman recognition of disadvantages inherent in Ottoman
dependence on foreign manufactures, and of the necessity for a more ambitious
form of 'defensive modernization' - economic if not social - apparently reached
a peak. In those early years of the Tanzimat from 1841 or 1842 to the eve of the
Crimean War a great number of Ottoman state manufacturing facilities were
built. In variety as well as in number, in planning, in investment, and in attention
given to internal sources of raw materials these manufacturing enterprises far
surpassed the scope of all previous efforts and mark this period as unique in
Ottoman history. They constituted the main Ottoman hope for a true industrial
revolution.
The geographical heart of this endeavour lay immediately west of Istanbul
in an elongated area bounded on the north and south respectively by the Edirne
road and the Marmara Sea, and extending nine miles east-west from the
Yedi kule corner of the Istanbul land walls to Kiiuiik (ekmece. There, beginning
in I842, Ottoman officials laid out a remarkable manufacturing and agricultural
complex in what amounted to an 'industrial park.' Its manufacturing center
on the shore near Zeytinburnu contained a foundry and machine works designed
for the production of iron pipe, steel rails, plows, bits, stirrups, locks, lanceheads, cannon, swords, knives, razors and other forgings and castings of any
desired complexity or quantity. One section was built to produce cloth and
cotton stockings. Workers were housed in a two-story barracks 650 feet long,
and the entire impressive unit was enclosed by walls approximately one-half
mile in circumference. A technical school was established nearby.'
Also in this Istanbul complex was a second manufacturing unit built west of
Zeytinburnu near Bakirk6y (then Macrikeui to some foreigners). This included
a factory to spin, weave and print calicoes, another iron works with a furnace
and two forges, a steam-driven machine shop, and a boatyard equipped for the
construction of small steamships. The furnace was immediately adjacent to a
pre-existing gunpowder works, a fact which prompted more cynical observers
to predict an expansive, even explosive future.2
An ambitious model farm project was established farther west toward
Yeqilk6y (San Stefano), still within the same complex. Based on French prototypes it was supplied with new strains of livestock, various experimental crops,
I
Charles MacFarlane, Turkey and Its Destiny, vol.
ii
(London, I850), pp. 603-8.
Although generallyunsympatheticwith Ottomaneffortsto industrialize,MacFarlanein
1847-8 personallyvisited most factoriesin the Istanbul-Izmit-Bursaareas. His factual
reportsof location,size, workers,equipmentand productionhave provedaccuratewhere
comparativedata is available.See vols. I, II, passim.
2
MacFarlane, vol.
II,
pp. 219 ff.
5-2
68
Edward C. Clark
and thousands of seedling trees. Students were recruited for a new school of
advanced agricultural techniques that was located on the premises.'
Still farther west the far boundary of the Istanbul complex was marked by
a second pre-existing gunpowder works near Kiigiik Qekmece. This works, the
central array noted above, and a salt-evaporating basin on the shore near
Yedikule at the extreme eastern boundaryz were the principal components of
the Istanbul complex. To some the project appeared destined to become 'a
Turkish Manchester and Leeds, a Turkish Birmingham and Sheffield,' all
four in one.3
In the i84os all site selections, construction, purchasing, hiring and manufacturing within this area were directed by a single management. In I843 this
management set up another major state factory 60 miles east overlooking the
Marmara Sea near Izmit. The building itself incorporated significant advances
in European construction techniques, the machinery was the finest available,
and the factory soon turned out woolen cloth equal to the best in Europe.4
Nearer Istanbul on the north shore of the Marmara Sea at Hereke the same
management built a cotton mill which before the end of the i84os they converted to the production of fancy silks for palace use.5
Truly effective Ottoman industrial independence presupposed an internal
supply of raw materials for these manufactures, and a crash program was
initiated. For iron, foreign geologists and mining engineers conducted explorations and by 1845 began excavating iron ore from deposits on both the Princes'
Islands and the mainland nearby at Maltepe, limestone from outcrops west of
Istanbul, and coal from seams at Eregli.6 For wool, late in 1842 the Ottoman
government established some 15,000 merino sheep on a ranch near Bursa.7 For
calicoes in the mid I840s an American agricultural expert planted cotton on the
model farm west of Istanbul. He ordered gins and confidently predicted South
Carolina-style plantations throughout eastern Thrace. He even brought his
slaves, emancipating them first.8 For raw silk the Hereke mill depended on the
I A. Ubicini, Letters on Turkey, trans. Lady Easthope, vol. II (London, 1856), p. 324;
MacFarlane, vol. I, pp. 60 ff., vol. II, pp. 606 ff.
2 MacFarlane, vol. II, p. 220.
3 MacFarlane,
4
vol. I, p. 58.
Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office Archives (hereafter referred to as FO)
Sandison to Canning, Bursa, 9 December I843; Journal de Constantinopleet des
195/208,
interets orientales (Istanbul; hereafter JC), Nov. I843, p. 2; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp.
450 ff.
5 The cotton machinery was transferred to Istanbul. See Omer Alageyik, 'Tiirkiye'de
Mensucat Sanayiinin Tarihcesi', Istanbul Sanayi Odast Dergisi, cilt II, no. I6 (June
1967), p. 9; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 461 ff.
6 JC, 26 Oct. 1844, p. I, and II Feb. 1845, pp. I, 2; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 223 ff.,
612, 615; Ubicini, vol. II, pp. 342 f.
7 FO 78/532, Sandison to Aberdeen, Bursa, 8 Feb. I843; MacFarlane, vol. I, pp.
5II ff. The former report notes 3,600 sheep, but MacFarlane hears of more.
8 FO 195/290,
Carr to Canning, Biyiukdere, 30 Oct. I848; MacFarlane, vol. I, pp.
59 ff., vol. II, pp. 629 ff.
The Ottoman industrial revolution 69
traditional silk-cultivation region surrounding Bursa, fifty miles south across
the Marmara. By the mid i84os private entrepreneurs in Bursa were converting
from hand-reels to steam-powered silk-reeling mills of the Italian variety. These
mills produced superior raw silk, and in I850 the Ottoman Porte built one of
the largest of their type in Bursa to supply the Hereke looms.'
Apparently part of the same governmental program of the I840s were several
more manufacturing facilities operated by other managements. Among these
were a tannery set up at Selvi Burnu (Silivri?) in i84I,2 a wool-weaving section
added to the Istanbul Feshane in 1843,3 steam-driven stamping machines
installed the same year in the Imperial Mint,4 an iron foundry established north
of Istanbul at Beqikta? in I844,5 and a porcelain factory to be constructed
alongside the Bosporus at about the same time.6 Farther from Istanbul a state
factory reportedly produced coarse wool cloth at Balikesir from i842,7 a paper
factory was established in Izmir by i844,8 and measures were taken early in the
I84os to improve cannon-ball casting foundries at Samako in Bulgaria.9 A new
powder mill was built in Baghdad in 1842-7,Io and toward the end of the decade
additional large sums were spent on blast-engines and furnaces for copper
smelting at Tokat. Similar works for concentrating copper ores near government
mines along the Tigris River were improved."I Almost certainly this list is yet
incomplete.
Nearly all the machinery for these industries had to be imported from Europe.
Some was ancient while some was so new as to be still unproved in production.
Some was bought piecemeal whereas some, like the Hereke silk works, were
bought bag and baggage, including the shop steward and all hands.12 Most if
not all foremen, master craftsmen, and skilled workers of necessity came from
abroad to assemble, operate and repair factories and equipment. At first most
of these foreigners were Englishmen, but subsequently more were hired from
Belgium, France, Italy and Austria.13 Wages were lower in the latter countries,
and perhaps (as was true of Selim III's industrial program)'4 there was an
I Fahri Dalsar, Bursa'da Ipekfilik (Istanbul, 1960), pp. 405 ff.; S. Moutal, L'Avenir
economiquede la Turquie nouvelle (Paris, 1925), pp. I60, I6I.
2
Boutros-Ghali, p. 79.
3 Alageyik, p. 9.
4 Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris, Division Commerciale, Bourgueney to
Guizot, Constantinople, 6 Jan. 1844; JC, i Dec. I843.
5 JC, 6 June 1844, p. 2; Ubicini, vol. II, p. 342.
6 JC, 6 Feb. I848, p. 2.
7 FO 78/532, Sandison to Aberdeen, Bursa, 8 Feb. 1843.
8
JC, 26 June I844, p. 2; Ubicini, vol. II, p. 343.
9 FO
195/206,
Canning to Minister for Foreign Affairs, Constantinople, 2 Cemazielahir
1258.
0I
Boutros-Ghali,
p. I05.
" Warrington W. Smyth, A Year with the Turks (London,
FO 78/6II, Cartwright to Aberdeen, Constantinople,
vol. II, pp. 464, 608 f., 623 f.
I2
13 MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 436, 455.
14 Shaw, p. 140.
1854), pp. 87, I04, 156, I57.
Feb. I845; MacFarlane,
22
70
Edward C. Clark
attempt to avoid dependence on any one European nation. Many new trades
were required. In Istanbul alone were to be found foreign draftsmen, erectors,
fitters, pattern makers, moulders, boilermakers, engine smiths, coal viewers,
steam engineers, blast-furnace keepers, puddlers, bar-iron rollers, smiths,
turners, millwrights, plate rollers and ship-builders.' Even European physicians
were hired to suppress malaria and sustain health among the several hundred
men and their wives and children.2
These foreigners were the trained elite. Under their supervision were as
many as 5,000 unskilled hands, including Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews
and Turks.3 The majority were males but many women and girls were employed
in the Bursa, Hereke and Feshane operations.4 As in Europe their hours were
from dawn to dusk six days a week, other factors permitting.5
During the formative stages of this project management of the entire Istanbul
complex together with supporting mines, farm, sheep-ranch, and the Hereke
and Izmit ventures was handled by one family- the Dadians. They were
members of the Gregorian Armenian millet and already were well acquainted
with Ottoman banking, bureaucracy and industry. Their most illustrious
immediate ancestor, Haci Arakel Dad, was recommended to Sultan Selim III
in 1795 as a self-made mechanical genius.6 Haci Dad contributed substantially
to the modernization that year of the gunpowder mill near Bakirkoy and in
return was appointed chief engineer and director of the new powder works then
under construction at Azadli, a village just north of Kiiuiik ?ekmece. He was
given special tax and customs immunities, and when, thanks to water power
and newer equipment, his gunpowder proved superior to that at Baklrk6y,
Haci Dad was made director of both mills. His heirs included a son and grandson,
Ohannes and Bogos Dadian respectively, to whom Sultan Mahmud II transferred the powder-making franchise in i832.7
Ten years later Ohannes and Bogos still ran the two gunpowder plants, each
with the title barut cubatz (chief powdermaker), when Ohannes was selected to
implement much of the new industrial program.8 On paper the choice was an
obvious one. By the early I 84os Ohannes Dadian probably was more experienced
in industrial management than was any other Ottoman subject. He had begun
2
FO 195/289, Pisani to Canning, Pera, 9 July I849.
Smyth, pp. 156, 157; MacFarlane, vol. II, pp. 456, 461; FO 195/289,
Dadian to
Canning, Barouthane, io August I848.
3 MacFarlane,
vol.
II,
pp. 451, 464 ff.; Pardoe, vol. III, pp. I77-84.
4 A. D. Mordtmann (ed. Franz Babinger), Anatolien (Skizzen und Reisebriefe aus
Kleinasien, 1850-1859
vol. II, p. 466.
(Hanover,
I925),
p. 296; Pardoe, vol. III, pp. 177-84; MacFarlane,
5 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Reports... Respecting Factories for Spinning and
Weaving of Textile Fabrics Abroad (London, I873), pp. 183 f.
6 Full name: Mahdeci Dad Arakel Amira Zadaian. Boutros-Ghali, pp. 42, 89-92;
Ubicini, vol. II, p. 317 (where Dad is given erroneously as Dael); Shaw refers to him as
Erakil Efendi, p. I44.
7 Boutros-Ghali,
p. 102.
8 Ibid. pp. 100-2,
119.
The Ottoman industrial revolution 71
his apprenticeship under his elder brother in the Kii9iik (;ekmece powder mill
in 1813 at the age of fifteen. In or about I820 he became director of the imperial
paper factory at Beykoz. In I826 he was made director of the state (?) clothweaving establishment at Eyiip, and in 1832 he succeeded his elder brother as
director of the Azadll powder mill. In 1835-6 he spent a year in Europe
'studying certain specialties appropriate to the factories which he had established', and in I837 he was rewarded by Mahmud II for services rendered at
the Dolmabah9e musket works.I
Sultan Abdiilmecid apparently gave extensive authority to Ohannes Dadian
as effective head of the new industrial program. In 1842 Ohannes helped select
specific sites for the Istanbul factories, the model farm, the Izmit wool mill,
the Bursa sheep-ranch, and possibly the Hereke plant.2 This stage completed
and with his nephew Bogos supervising both powder works, Ohannes Dadian
left Istanbul late in 1842 for his second one-year trip to Europe. During what
perhaps was an Ottoman businessman's version of the European Grand Tour
he visited factories in several countries, bought much equipment, hired scores
of workers, and examined the wondrous West.3
Factory construction began in 1843 during his absence, and by mid-I844
Abdiilmecid was able to inspect the first results. These were sufficiently encouraging to merit flattering remarks, expensive awards, wider administrative
authority (by then including management of the tannery and the cloth mill near
the Bosporus at Beykoz and Hiinkar Iskelesi), and governmental financial
support for full-scale operations.4 The Dadians placed family members in key
positions. Ohannes handled imports and both domestic and foreign government
relations. Bogos acted as general supervisor of works, and a son and another
nephew of Ohannes were selected to be professors and administrators of the
new technical school at Zeytinburnu. More distant relatives became local
managers and paymasters at Izmit and possibly at Hereke as well. The Dadians
even supplied the construction engineer for the new Baghdad powder mill.
Most foreign experts reported directly to them, and foreign workers and
machinery continued to flow in during most of the decade.5
The timing of this far-flung industrial program is peculiar. Already in 1838
the Ottoman government had abandoned most state monopolies and other
import-export controls by terms of the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention
of Balta Liman.6 By I84I the European powers were able to force this conIbid. pp. 48, 79, 90 f., 99, I02.
FO 78/532, Sandison to Aberdeen, Bursa, i8 Feb. I843; MacFarlane, vol. II,
pp. 220, 45I, 6i6.
3 JC, 21 Oct. 1843, p. 2, and 21 Feb. 1848, p. 3; Boutros-Ghali, pp. 79, 8o, 102.
4 JC, I Aug. 1844, pp. I f.
5 FO 195/329, Hensman to Dadian, Istanbul, 14 Nov. 1848; MacFarlane, vol. ii,
PP. 473, 599, 607.
2
6 The most complete analysis of the background of this convention is to be found in
Puryear, esp. pp. 17 ff. Text in Issawi, EconomicHistory, pp. 39, 40.
72
Edward C. Clark
vention on Muhammad Ali, the Porte's nominal vassal in Egypt, and the ensuing
foreign competition quickly brought rust and ruin to his factories on the Nile.
Thus, any cause for optimism concerning additional investments in factories
seemingly already had been eliminated at the beginning of the Tanzimat.
Paradoxically this foreboding example did not deter Sultan Abdiilmecid and
his advisers. Almost simultaneously they initiated the supreme Ottoman effort
to industrialize the shores of the Bosporus and the Marmara. One may well
ask why.
The reasons for Ottoman high hopes for success despite so complete a
surrender to European laissez-faire diplomacy are not immediately obvious,
but they can be sought in the contemporary industrial experience in Egypt.
Early in the i8oos Muhammad Ali invested heavily in an extensive industrialization program which materially strengthened his independent position. His
control of internal markets ensured that despite higher prices Egyptian civilians
bought Egyptian textiles and Egyptian soldiers wore Egyptian-made uniforms.'
By the early I83os his military capacity was superior to that of the Porte. By
1841, however, European diplomatic and military pressures succeeded in
restricting Muhammad Ali to Egypt and in excising his monopolies and protective tariffs in accord with the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention.
Despite this set-back the Egyptian military might have continued to consume
Egyptian manufactures, but in June of 1841 an Ottoman imperial ferman
reduced the Egyptian army by some 80% to I8,000 men. This measure had the
support of the European Great Powers as part of their attempt to maintain a
political status quo in the Near East. Quite likely Egyptian military consumption
was reduced even more than 80%, since from I841 Muhammad Ali was forced
to abandon his aggressive foreign policy as well.2 In consequence many Egyptian
factories became superfluous and soon were shut down.3
In sharp contrast with European goals for a militarily weak Egypt a strong
Ottoman state was part of European - especially English - planning for stability
in the Near East. As a result, although like Egypt the Ottoman Porte also lost
most state monopolies and other import-export controls, the European Great
Powers did not restrict the size of the Ottoman army. Following the overthrow
of the Janissaries in I826 the army had adopted much European-style equipment, however, and in so doing had decreased its domestic self-sufficiency. By
i841 the need for a massive industrial program became obvious.
I For a brief description of Muhammad Ali's industrial-commercial system, see Ali
al-Giritli, Tarikh al-sina'afi Misr (Cairo, [1952]), pp. 40-5I, 97-I04, 14I-50, translated
and reproduced in Issawi, Economic History, pp. 390-402.
2 Text of ferman in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, vol. I
(Princeton, 1956), pp. I21-3; Henry Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt (Cambridge,
England, 1931), pp. 191, 226; M.S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, I774-I923
(London, I966), pp. I04 f.
3 Charles Issawi,
'Egypt since 8o00: A Study in Lopsided Development', Journal of
Economic History, xxI (I961), pp. 1-25 (reprinted in Issawi, Economic History, p. 363).
The Ottoman industrial revolution 73
The bulk of the new Ottoman manufactures of the 1840s was consumed by the
military and the palace, and it can be assumed that Ottoman industrial objectives
in that decade at least temporarily excluded the civilian market. Nevertheless
some excess silks from Hereke did reach the civilian market through a government store in Istanbul,I and fezes from the Feshane were retailed.2 Also,
according to an announcement made in 1845, the new foundries west of Istanbul
were so successful that the public was invited to place orders for iron castings,
forgings and other metal workings.3 These civilian sales and services were
exceptions, apparently, for foreign importers reportedly neither anticipated nor
encountered much competition.4
Not even Ottoman military self-sufficiency was remotely approached, however, and by 1848 half-completed or idle Ottoman factories and rusting equipment were ominous signs of impending disaster.5 Some foreign workers were
laid-off,6 and late in i849 the Dadians themselves reportedly were removed
from office and their properties seized.7 With the Crimean War came the first
European loans and Ottoman indebtedness, and the Porte was forced to abandon
the greater part of its industrial program.8
There were numerous other contributions to the program's collapse. In 1848,
for example, the Kii;iik (ekmece powder works blew up.9 In i855 the silk
reeling mill at Bursa was destroyed by an earthquake.Io In the late I84os cotton
crops on the model farm west of Istanbul suffered for lack of gins, and the
seedling trees died for lack of water." The merino sheep project was mismanaged,
and the flock decimated by malnutrition, over-exposure, disease and theft.12
Bottlenecks, too, produced undesirable chain reactions: without access roads
and mining equipment exploitation of coal and iron-ore deposits lagged. This
meant that iron for plows could not be delivered when scheduled, in consequence
2
MacFarlane, pp. 466 f.
Ubicini, vol. II, p. 343.
3
JC, 6 March I845.
4 FO 78/611, Cartwright to Aberdeen, Constantinople, 22 Feb. I845.
5 The Paris revolution of February i848 was the cause of alarm in capitals as far east
as Istanbul. A new grand vezir, Sarim Papa, reportedly tightened control of Ottoman
finances, including those associated with the new industries. MacFarlane, vol. II, pp.
599 ff.
6 FO 195/329,
Dadian to Hensman, Istanbul, 13 Nov. 1848.
7 The Times
(London), 23 Jan. I850, p. 6. The Dadians apparently regained their
personal properties since the family remained prosperous and several individuals were
prominent in Porte affairs until the mid-i89os. They continued to hold the title and
functions of barutfu basi until sometime between I870 and I889. See Boutros-Ghali,
pp. 102-24.
8 MacFarlane,
vol. II, p. 6II. For an analysis of the effect of European loans, see
Donald C. Blaisdell, EuropeanFinancial Control in the Ottoman Empire (New York, 1929),
passim.
9 Boutros-Ghali, p. I05.
IO Auguste Viquesnel, Voyage dans la Turquie d'Europe (Paris, I868), vol. I, p. 295.
I" MacFarlane,
12 MacFarlane,
vol. II, pp. 619, 629 ff.
vol. I, pp. 5I2 ff.
Edward C. Clark
74
of which projects at the model farm were delayed, causing the high-salaried
agricultural expert to become frustrated and quit.
Factory labor, also, was a difficult problem even though thousands of trained
handicraft workers had been displaced by the rising tide of European imports.
Just as in England and France two or three generations earlier, artisans strongly
disliked the impersonal demands of factory life. Their foreign supervisors found
their efficiency low, their absenteeism high, their turnover rate appalling, and
the number of their holidays incredible.2 As a result there were reports of
worker intimidation, of factory construction by corveelabor, and of some workers
hobbled in fetters.3 The problem, however, was not just the difficult restructuring of traditional peasant and artisan work attitudes. Foreigners had
little incentive to train recruits for their own positions, and apparently few
desired or attempted to separate themselves from well-paid employment.4
Foreigners were hired at rates at least twice those current in Western Europe,
and although their combined wages were not large in proportion to capital
expenditures, they contributed to the continued high cost of factory operation.5
Sickness, boredom, disappointment, anger and frustration eventually reduced
their effectiveness and increased their rate of turnover.
Some foreigners felt that the greatest problem lay with what they termed
'jobbery' among both the Dadians and the Ottoman papas to whom the former
were responsible. These they accused, not without exaggeration, of indifference
to sound technical advice, of incompetence in administration, and of excessive
enthusiasm for the all-too-common custom of milking the Ottoman cow with
insufficient regard for the calf.6
Such foreign testimony, frequently biased, must be placed within a broader
frame. The Ottoman Porte attempted an extremely ambitious program, and
the problems of raw materials, transport, construction, equipage, operation,
maintenance and distribution required intricate coordination. Given much time
and unlimited funds a larger group of experienced and dedicated administrators
might have accomplished such a task. Pafas could run arsenals and the Dadians
could run powder works or individual weaving mills, but the two or three years
I
FO
195/290,
pp. 227, 6I
2
Carr to Canning, Biiyiukdere,
20
Oct.
1848; MacFarlane, vol. II,
f., 628 ff.
Great Britain, Foreign Office, Reports, p. I87; Hamlin, pp. 57, 58; MacFarlane,
vol. II, p. 624 and passim.
3 FO
78/598, Canning to Aberdeen, Constantinople, 21 June 1845; FO 195/208,
Sandison to Canning, Bursa, 9 Dec. 1843; MacFarlane, vol. I, pp. 222 ff.
4
DeKay, p. I20. This observation dates from the early i83os, but there is no evidence
for a basic change in either government policy or foreigners' attitudes by the late I84os.
5 For
example, Charles Hensman, an English engineer working under the Dadians,
was earning 3,210 piasters per month (approximately ?27 Stlg.) in I848: FO 195/329,
Cumberbatch to Canning, Constantinople, 25 Jan. 1849. The American agricultural
expert and his helpers were hired for a lump sum equivalent to $9,000 per year:
FO 195/190, Carr to Canning, Biiyiikdere, 20 Oct. 1848.
6 The Times, 29 Jan. 1845, p. 6; MacFarlane, vols. I, II, passim. For more moderate
views of 'jobbery' see Hamlin, pp. 57-60, and JC, i Feb. 1845, p. I.
The Ottoman industrial revolution 75
which Ohannes Dadian spent in Europe could not possibly have created in him
the managerial wizardry required to carry through such widespread revolutionary changes. His lower echelon supervisors were far more lacking the broad
experience and training required for competent support.
Despite these difficulties the Porte initially was enthusiastic. Sultan
Abdiilmecid, however, was not Sultan Selim III. Whereas Abdiilmecid did
make inspection trips, these were more ceremonial than investigatory. He passed
out jeweled snuff-boxes and congratulated all concerned but evidenced neither
great knowledge nor intense interest.' So far as is known he made no visits
incognito after the fashion of Selim III and perhaps was last to hear of the real
problems involved.z Reportedly some of the factory goods shown him were the
finest European imports with labels and tags carefully removed.3 Even goods
that were made in the new factories remained largely dependent on Europe.
As a Belgian worker at Izmit observed in 1848, 'It would be very odd if we
could not turn out a piece of the finest cloth occasionally, seeing that we have
the best machinery of England and France, that the finest wools for the purpose
are imported, via Trieste, from Saxony and the best wool countries, and that
we Frenchmen and Belgians work it. You could not call it Turkish cloth - it [is]
only cloth made in Turkey by European machinery, out of European material,
and by good European hands.'4
What achievements, then, can be credited to this attempted revolution of
Ottoman industrial methods? Surely not the original objectives, since as techniques of warfare grew increasingly complex during the second half of the
nineteenth century, the Empire became correspondingly more dependent upon
foreign sources for new and more costly forms of communications and armament.
This trend culminated with financial bankruptcy, the Ottoman Public Debt and
failure for the attempted industrial revolution. A modest exception to this trend,
however, was the domestic supply of cloth and leather for palace finery, military
uniforms, blankets, bridles and boots. Despite fire, earthquake, obsolescence
and decay, four factories continued to produce wool, cotton and silk goods
during the remaining years of slow Ottoman decline. The Izmit wool mill
finally was abandoned during World War I, but its looms were transferred at
least in part to the Feshane, where wool cloth still is produced today by government agencies at the Defterdar Fabrikasz.5 At Baklrkoy, cotton spindles and
looms also continued to manufacture for the military, and in so doing established
the rather unenviable record of undergoing absolutely no improvement for
more than a half-century.6 Under the name Bakzrkoy Bez Fabrikasz, or more
popularly the Basmahane, this factory, too, still operates for the Turkish
I Regularfive-daysummariesof the Sultan'sactivitiesin C indicatethat Abdiilmecid
visited even the nearestfactoriesno more than once per year duringthe period I843-8.
2 For Selim III's
surreptitiousvisits, see Karal,Selim III, pp. 61-3.
3 MacFarlane, vol. II, p. 620 f.
Siimerbank.. .Dergisi, cilt I, no.
Alageyik, p. 9.
5
6
4 Ibid. p. 453.
I,
p. 24.
76
Edward C. Clark
government. The last of the four is the Hereke mill, whose more luxurious silk
and wool products are currently sold to the public through Siimerbank.
It is this minor industrial continuity into the present which was the most
influential outcome of the original plans. The several Ottoman factories, their
machines, and their employees formed a nucleus of experience and precedence
that were inherited by the Turkish Republic. When Turkey at last regained
control of import-export tariffs in I929, private enterprises were yet too weak
to supply domestic needs, especially in the depression environment of the I930S.
When in consequence the new state looked to its ancient factories for a solution,
it was acting in a manner more traditional than innovative, and the experienced
management and workers found there formed part of the cadre for the expansion
which followed.' In a real sense, then, it can be argued that important aspects
of etatism under Ataturk originated in the otherwise largely ill-fated industrialization efforts of the I84os.
UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS
AT EL PASO
EL PASO, TEXAS
I Z. Y. Hershlag, Turkey, the Challenge of Growth (Leiden, I968), p. 9I; interview
data collected by the writer in Turkey, February 1967 to March I968.