Şerif Mardin

Avrapa Nerede
Bitfuor?
Wherc does Europc end?
$ERiFMARD|N
Ttirkiye'deAvrupa
Europe in Turkey
t.rtf l,l.rdln
SoqolQi
profesiirii,
Un;tdrit i'ud.
gi;rcali,
Inanb*l'd.a
Tiirkite
doitrrtlu.
Prcfessot
ol
Sodolo8|,
p.eserd/
teod'hgh
Prin<M1
Unfuetsitl,
,ives,n ,ttdrbu,
ond P|it'raton,
bo'7ih Tu*ey.
I was born in 1927.
I was part of a generation raised with a frame
of mind largely constructed from what was
believed to be the best Europe had to ofrer.
The bcst, in this case, meant the most
enduring of Europe's intellectual
achievements: science, positivism, obiective
knowledge - shaking the cobwebs of
superstition wes the major metaphor that
aimed to anchor this approach to life. Indolent
and self-seeking sultans, inefiicient of,icials,
venal and duplicitous clerics wcre part of the
picture of a bygone Ottoman Empire which
the brave new Turkish republic had forever
relegated to the dustbin of history. This s€t ot
ideas was the crcdo oI Kemolisn, the ideology
of Republicanism which swept th?ough Turkey
beginningwith the | 920's,following the demise
of thc Ottoman Empire. Those of our mentors
who were most comPletely won over to these
ideas were idealistic primary school teachers
who belonged to the tirst generation in their
family to have had more than one book in their
possession, Past primary school, howeYer'
approaches to the ornbicnt could begin to be
less efiective. Possibly, first chink in the
ideological arms of Kemalism was the
nationalism that came with it. }Ye had all
inherited a patriotism which (l now
understand) was part and parcel of the
previous Ottoman world, althouth it was so
deeply embedded among the valucs we took
for Sranted that we never realized its
presence. But the nationalism that the new
republican elite had constructed went betond
this patriotism. On the walls of schoolrooms,
maps of Eurasia showed a number of thick
ochre coloured regions originating in Central
Asia targeted \fvestcrn EuroPe, MesoPotamia,
lvest and East Asia. The arrows showcd the
ways in which C€ntral Asia, our original
fatherland, Turan, had been the crodle of all
known civilization. Originally, the theory had
1927'dedogdum.
Benim kuga$rmdanolanlan btiyiitiip
yetigtirenlerinzihninde, Avrupa'mn verip
verecesien iyi geyoldu$una inamlan de$eri
onlara kazandrrmaktutkusu vardr. Bu anlayrga
gdre Avrupa'nrnverece$ibu en iyi gey,
Avrupa'nrn entelektiiel baqarrlanmnen kahct
olanr anlamrnageliyordu: bilim, pozitivizm,
nesnelbilgi. Batrl inanglann drdii$ii <iriimcek
a$rnrstipiirmek, o giinlerde hayatayaklagrmrn
tarzrm belirlemekte kullanrlanbaEhca
metafordu. Tembel ve sefahatdiigkiinii
padigahlar,beceriksizidareciler,ahlaksrz
memurlar, gegmi$tekalan Osmanh
lmparatorlu$u'nu dtigiinmekigin
baEvurdu$umuzimgelerdi. Yeni cesurTiirk
Cumhuriyeti bunlan ebediyentarihin gcip
sepetineatml$tl. Osmanh lmparatorlugu'nun
gokiigiindensonra, I920'lerin baqrnda
Tiirkiye gaprndaescnCumhuriyetgilik
ideolojisi olan Kemalizm'in awentii'sini bu
fikirler oluEturuyordu. Bize bu fikirleri
aqrlayanlarrn
baqtnda,ailelerinin tarihinde
birden fazla kitap sahibi olmayr bagaranilk
rimiz
kugakolan idealist ilkokul <iSretmenle
geride
geliyordu. Ancak, ilkokul agamasr
rimizin yaklagrmlannlniizerimizdeki etkileri de azalabiliyordu.
kahnca,<igretmenle
Kemalizm'in ideolojik cephaneligininson silahrda muhtemelen milliyetgilikti. $imdi qimdi,
eski Osman-hlmparatorlu$u'ndan bize miras kaldr$rmsegmeyebagladr$rmbir yurtseverlikle
onlarla i9i9eoldu$u igin, bu
doluyduk, ama tartrEmadankabul etti$imiz de$erlerarastnda.,
yurtseverli$invarhgrmnfarkrndade$ildik. Gelgelelim,yeni Cumhuriyet segkinlerinrn
yerlegtirdigimilliyetgilik bu yurtseverlilin hayli ilerisine gidiyordu. Okullarda, dersane
duvarlannaasrlmrgharitalarda,Avrasyaharitalan iizerindeki lqzlllmtrak oklar, Orta Asya'dan,
Batr Avrupa, Mezopotamya,Do$u ve Ban Asyay<inlerineuzanryordu. Bu oklar i-lk
Apr Da Nered.eBitiyor?
Wherc does EuroPe end?
'ERIFl.,rARDh{
anayurdumuz,Turan olan Orta Asya'nrn nastl
bi.itiin uygarh$tnbegi$ioldu$unu
gosteriyordu.Teori ashnda19. y{izyilda
Avrupa'da icat edilmig, oportunist tarihgiler
bunu bizim kendi ihtiyaglarrmtzagore adapte
etmigler,yaprcrbir rrktan geldi$imize dair
gerekli giiven ve oviing duygusunu
vermiElerdi.Teorinin bu yeni geklindeoklar
TiirkliigU Islam'la organik iligkisinden
koparryorve tarih Islam-oncesiTiirklti$iin
baEanlannr<ilEiiolarak yeniden
degerlendiriyordu.Ilkokuldayken bu
bagarrlanngergekli$indengiiphemiz
olmaml$u;Avrupa'danaldr[rmrzEeylerinilk
tohumunun atalanmrzrnkatkrlannakadar
uzandr$rnrdiigiinmekten krvangduyuyorduk.
Ama gene de, lise ga$rnagelmiqgenglerigin
bu dtgiinceler biitiini.iyle inandrncr
olmuyordu.Oniki yrlhk egitim programrnln
son srmflannda,uygarhgrmlzlnOrta Asya'dan
do$muq olmasrmnideolojik mahiyeti,
ozellikle de yabancrdilde okuyabilen
o$renciler arasrndatartl$makonusu olmaya
baglyordu. Bu aynr agamada,Kemalist
ideolojinin bazr bagkatrrmalayrcry<inleride
dikkatimizi gekmeyebaghyordu.Yeni
milliyetgilikle yetigtirilme stirecimizin bir
pargasryeni bir Tiirk dilinin olugturulmasrna
adanmrgtr.Osmanhca,eski giinlerin o siislti.,
agdahTiirkgesi, br.irokratikbir kiEinin
konugmaaracr,daha ondokuzuncu yiizyrlda
segkincive anti-demokratik olarak mahktm
edilmigti. Yeni Trirkge, Osmanhca'dakiArapga
ve Farsgakcikleri tasfiyeetmek ve "art"
been imported from | 9th centurt EuroP€.
Opportunistic historians had tailored it to our
own needs for dignity and reassurance that we
belonged to a constructive race. In this newer
version, the arrows summarizcd a theory of
history which took the Tu?kish part out of its
organic link with lslam and reevaluated it in
relation to the achievements of pre-lslamic
Turks, In primary school we were convinced of
these achievements and felt proud that the
original seed of what we had received from
Europe went back to the contributions of our
orvn ancestors. However there was something
not entirely convincing in this argument for
adolescents of lyc6e age. Already in the
terminal classesofthis | 2-year program of
instruction, the ideological nature of the
Central Asian origin of our ciyilization began
to be a subiect of discussion among students,
particularlt those who prided themselves with
reading in a foreign language. Other dissonant
aspects of the Kemalist ideology also began to
attract our attention at the time. Part of our
training in the new nationalism had been the
construction of a new Turkish language.
"Ottoman", the flowery, adorned Turkish of
btgone times, the instruments of a bureacratic
clique had already been condemned in the
nineteenth century as elitist and
undemocratic. The newer Turkish was part of
a populist effort to excise Arabic and Percian
roots from "Ottoman" and to create a new
literature of "pure" Turkish. We approved of
the democratic goals of this movement and
tried to write in the demotrc sttle. But the
difiiculti€s of the proiect were eyident even to
studen$. The first year of high school,
geoSraphy was taught as physical geography.
The text in "purified Turkish" which reached
us had a very large number of technical terms
for which neofogismsin pure Turkish had been
provided. These neofoglsmsand the way in
which they were embedded in a new syntax
Ttirkge ile yeni bir edebiyat yagatmak iizere girigilmig popiilist gabamn bir pargasrydr.
Bu hareketin demokratik amaElannr onayladrk ve bu halkgr tarzda yazmtyt gahgtrk.Ama
<i$renciler bile projenin giiglii$iinii g<irebiliyordu. Ortaokula bagladrgrmrzyrllarda co$rafya
*oz Tiirkge" metinlerde gok sayrda terim
"fiziksel coSrafya" olarak okutulurdu. Bize verilen
igin gok sayrdayeni kelime tiiretilmigti. Gerek bu yeni kelimeler, gerekse onlan sarmalayan
yeni soz dizimi, hem bizim igin, hem de <igretmenlerimizigin, anlagrlrrgibi de$ildi. Sonunda
giriEim tamamen terkedildi ve oSrencilerin alay konusu haline geldi. Gene de, Kemalizm'in
kiiltiirel sermayesinin bu erozyonu hdli krsmi sayrlrrdr. Baghcainanglanmrz, yani bilim,
ApruPo NeredeBitiyor?
Whcre does Europe end?
tERIFirARDll{
'nesnel diiqtince" ve halkgrhkayaktaydr.
Ancak, iiniversite gaSrnageldi$imizde, bir
bagkagtigliik ortaya grktrve baqhcatartr$ma
konumuz halinegeldi: bu da, Ttrkiye
Cumhuriyeti'nde demokrasininmahiyetiydi.
Tiirk kdyltistlniin "efendimiz" oldu$u
inancrylayetiqtirilmigtik. Kemalist ideolojinin
drgkrvnmlannda ya$ayanradikal inangh
yazarlarbizi durumun boyle olmadr$rnaikna
ettiler. GergekteTiirk k<iyltisiisefil bir varolug
siirdiirmekteydi ve gehirli niifhsun iizerine
bastrfrdayana$roluEturuyordu.Ikinci Diinya
karaborsadankazandrklanyla
Savagr'nda,
qehirlerdehar lrrrup harman savuranlarbu
olguyu iyicegoztimiizesoktular.Ote yandan,
Cumhuriyetrejiminin empozeediliginin
otoriter yontemi de, Cumhuriyet'in
demokratik olma iddialanm yalanhyordu.
Tiirkge-konugmayanlann
"oziimsenmesi"bu
politikarun bir yamydr.DemokrasiTiirkler
igindi amaher nasrlsabugiinlerinindegil,
yarrnlannrnbir pargasrydr.Cumhuriyetin ilk
yrllanndanitibaren siyasihayatryonlendiren
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin tek-partili
ycinetimineozgii sorumluluk eksikli$ine
bulduSumuzgoziim.,gok-partilirejimdi.
Bciylebir degigim 1946'dan sonra gergeklegti
ve gok-partilit siyasihayati degigtirdi. Ama bu
de$igiminen ilging yanr,gok genelbir
anlamda,gok-partililikkurumlanyerlegirken
Kemalizm'intemelgatrslnrnda zihnimizde
korunmugolmasrydr.Bu durumda
Kemalizm'indahakabadenebilecek
do$malanortadankalkmrgoluyordu.
were incomprehensibleboth to us and to our
teachers. The entire enterprise was reiected
out of hand and became a subiect of students
iokes. Nevertheless, this erosion of the cultural
capital of Kemalism was still partial. The main
tenets of our beliefs, science, "objective"
thought, populism still held fast. One main
blockage however, became more €yident with
time end acquired a central place in our
discu3sions by the time we were of university
age and that was the nature of democracy in
the Turkish Republic. We had been instructed
in the belief that the Turkish peasantwas our
"master". The authors with radical
persuasions who lived in the interstices of
Kemalism had convinced us that this was not
the case. The Turkish peasant eked out a
miserable existance and in fact was the
support for the urban population. Profiteering
during the years of the Second World War, the
rise of a class of speculators flaunting their
gains in towns broutht this more clearly to our
attention. The democratic pretensions of the
Republic were also given the lie by the
authorization method by which the republican
regime was enforced. "Assimilation" of nonTurkish speakers was one aspect of this policy.
Democracy was for the Turks but was
somewhere in their future not in their pr€scnt.
Multi-partyism was the answer to the lack of
responsibility,characteristic of one-party rule
and of the single political partl that directed
political life in the first years of Republic,
namely, the Republican People's Party. Such a
change did come about after 1946.Multipartyism changed political life. The most
interesting aspect of this change, however was
that, in the most general sense,once multiparty democracy had been installed, the
general frame of Kemalism was kept intact in
our minds. Th€ cruder touch of Kemalism had
been eliminated. Now, finally we had come
around to being "real" Europeans.We could
Nihayet, "gergek" Avrupahlar olabilecek a$amayagelmigtik. $imdi, tarihte Anadolu'da
yegermig kiiltiirleri - Yunan ve Roma ktiltiirleri - bizi Turan'rn varisi yapan teorilerden gok
daha fazla incelmiE bir anlayrglakucaklayabilirdik. Bu anlamda kendimizi h0manist olarak,
Ronesans'rnmirasgrlan- benim durumumda, Montaigne ve Voltaire gelene$indeki
htimanizmin mirasErsr- olarak gordiik. Cumhuriyeti kuran atalanmrzdan daha ileri bir
incelmeye Cumhuriyet'in hedeflerineerigti$imize inanmanrn kolaycr rahath$r bazr onemli
igsel bogluklan gizliyordu. Bir kere, Avrupa medeniyetini olugturanlann - ki Marx onlann
arasrnda,on saftayer alrr - pozitivizmleri ve bilimcilikleri ne olursa olsun, varoluqsal
Aprttb a N ered e Bitil or ?
Where does Europe endl
$ERIF]'|ARDlil
sorunlarlabo$uqtuklannr,felsefesorunlartna
getirdiklerinihai goziimlerin,ontolojik
sorunlarlab<iylebir miicadelesonucunda
Islamve
bigimlendi$inibizler kavrayamadrk.
onun de$erlerve etik diinyaslbizim
ve onun igin
ufkumuzdanqrkarrlmrgtr
varoluEsal$iipheve ikilemleri kavrayacak
Bu gibi sorunlarrn
durumumuz kalmamrgtr.
gtndelik hayatrndokusununbir pargasr
yeniden
olabilece$i,ancakTiirk Islamcrh$rmn
canlanmasrndan
sonrailgi alanrmrzagirdi.
tarihi ilerlememodelini
Ayrrca,s<izgeliqi
dahil, Fransa
Fransa'danalanlarrmrz
koyliilerinin Frrnsrzyap d$trzr, yoksaFransa
krrlanndakiniifusun Montaigne'lerden
Katolikli$in
olugmadr$rnr
da anlayamadrk.
ortayasorularattr$rnrnve ona karqrya da
ondanyanatavlr alanFranstzaydtnlartntn
silkelenipbunlaracevapbulmayagahqtr$rnrn
bilincinde degildik. Kendindcn-hognut,
kendinden-eminKemalizm'imiz, Avrupa, Batr
dtigiincesinininceliklerineniifirs etmemize
engeldi vc bu bzelliSiylebir boyunduruk
oldu. BaErndanbugiine kadar,toplumun her
kanndaki *modern" egitim gdrmii$ Ttirkler'in
ama
Eo$uniuSunun,dqandan grnngalanmrg,
dipte yatan ideolojisi olarak iElevgtirmiiStiir.
Bugiin hilA, tek rakibi Islam. Bu da en hafif
soyleyigle,yapilabilir sefir er alarunrncpey
dar olduSunu gdsteriyor.
now embrace the previous cultures heYint
flourished on Anatolian soil -Greek and Roman
culture - with a much more sophisticated
understandin8 than the theories which made
them heirs of Turan, In that sensew€ thought
of ourselvesas humanists,inheritors of the
tredition, the Renaissancein my case the
humanism of l.lontaigne and Voltaire' This
smuS contentment with having achievedthe
goals of the Republic only with more
refinement than its founding fathers concealed
a number of internal lacunae.For one we did.
not r€alize that the fathers of European
civilization-whatevertheir Positivism and
scientism - and Marr on the forefront of their
ranks - had grappled with existential problems,
that their ultimate solutions to philosophical
questionswere the outcome of such a combat
with ontological problems. lslam and its wodd
ofvalues and ethics having been taken out of
our frame of reference, we had no aPPreciation
of existential quandaries.That such Probl€ms
were part ofthe fabric of everyday life only
camc to our attention after the rise of the
Turkish-lslamic revival. Secondly'we never
realized (or those whose model of historical
protress was France) that Catholicism had
raised problems which French intellectuals,for
or against, had risen to answer. Our latent,
self-satisfiedKemalism, this inability to
penetrate the intricacies of the thinkint of
Europe, of the West, had been an
extraordinarily and pervasive yoke. At the
time it functioned and continues to function to
date as the latent, received ideology of the
maiority of "modern" educated Turks on all
leyels of society. Today its only rival is still
lslam, which is, to say the least, a restriction of
options.