UNREPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF

UNREPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF

UNREPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 1459
September Term, 2013
MEHMET YAVUZ CORAPCIOGLU
v.
SHARON ROOSEVELT
Eyler, Deborah S.,
Kehoe,
Rodowsky, Lawrence F.
(Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
Opinion by Eyler, Deborah S., J.
Filed: July 16, 2014
Mehmet Yavuz Corapcioglu (“Father”), the appellant, and Sharon Roosevelt
(“Mother”), the appellee, have one child together, Darren Yavuz Corapcioglu (“Darren”).
Darren was born in Texas on November 8, 1999, while Father and Mother were living
together there. Father and Mother were not married to each other, and Mother was married
to a man in Maryland, Eric Karl Benck (“Husband”), to whom she remains married. In
January 2000, Mother left Father in Texas and took Darren to Maryland, where she resumed
living with Husband. Nevertheless, Mother and Father continued their intimate relationship
until February 2001. During that time, Father had access to Darren. In 2001, Father got
married.
In December 2001, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Mother filed suit
seeking custody of Darren. Mother had Darren baptized in January 2002. Then, in May
2002, while the case still was pending, Father took Darren to Turkey without Mother’s
permission. Father is from Turkey and is a citizen of that country. The parties became
embroiled in an international custody dispute. Father prevailed in a Hague Convention
action, but Mother appealed and prevailed in the Supreme Court of Turkey.
The parties then reached a comprehensive agreement regarding custody, visitation,
and numerous other issues. On July 15, 2004 they filed a Consent Custody Order embodying
their agreement. Darren was returned to the United States the following day. The court
approved and entered the Consent Custody Order on July 20, 2004 (“the 2004 Consent
Order”). Among other provisions, the 2004 Consent Order required Mother to correct
misrepresentations she had made about Darren’s paternity.
On March 30, 2009 the court entered a supplemental Consent Custody Order, in which
the parties agreed to a number of modifications regarding custody and visitation (“the 2009
Consent Order”). Among them, Father and Mother agreed to jointly make decisions
concerning Darren’s mental health, and to use the services of a Parent Educator/Coordinator
(“parenting coordinator”) in the event they could not agree on such a matter.
Despite the consent orders, the parties have almost continuously battled in court, and
are not strangers to this Court.1 The present appeal stems from two orders entered by the
circuit court in August 2013 and October 2013, respectively. In the first, the court denied
a motion filed by Father seeking to have the court order the correction of Darren's baptismal
records, in which Husband is listed as Darren’s father. In the second, the court denied
Father’s motion to appoint a parenting coordinator.
Father asks five questions on appeal, which we have rephrased and combined as
follows:
I.
Did the circuit court err by denying Father’s motion to correct Darren’s
baptismal records?
II.
Did the circuit court err by denying Father leave to amend that motion?
1
See Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt, 170 Md. App. 572 (2006), aff’d, Roosevelt v.
Corapcioglu, 415 Md. 434 (2010) (addressing counsel fees and costs awarded to Mother);
Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt, (unreported) No. 2212, 2008 Term, filed June 25, 2010
(addressing a modification of the Consent Order); and Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt,
(unreported) No. 1014, 2012 Term, filed August 16, 2013 (addressing Father’s request to
modify the Consent Order).
2
III.
Did the circuit court err by denying Father’s motion to appoint a
parenting coordinator?
IV.
Did the circuit court’s denial of Father’s motion to appoint a parenting
coordinator effectively terminate Father’s joint legal custody with
respect to Darren's mental health?
For the reasons to follow, we shall affirm the orders of the circuit court.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
A. Father’s Motion to Correct Darren’s Baptismal Records
The 2004 Consent Order awarded Mother primary physical and sole legal custody of
Darren, and set forth a detailed visitation schedule for Father. That order provided:
ORDERED, that [Mother] shall inform all persons who she is aware has [sic]
been misinformed about Darren’s paternity. These people will be notified that
[Father] is the father of the child. In the future, the paternity of Darren shall
be represented correctly to the third parties . . . .
According to Father, this provision was included in the 2004 Consent Order because he was
aware that Mother had told her relatives, neighbors, and Husband’s coworkers that Husband
was Darren’s father.
As noted, Mother had had Darren baptized in January 2002, specifically, on January
13. The baptism thus took place two and a half years before the court entered the 2004
Consent Order. Darren was baptized at the Messiah Lutheran Church, in Germantown.
Father was unaware of the baptism at the time. Some time later, after the parties entered into
3
the 2004 Consent Order, Father obtained a copy of Darren’s baptismal certificate from the
church secretary.2,3 The certificate contains the following relevant information:
DATA FOR BAPTISM
NAME: Darren (Yavus Corapcioglu)
DATE OF BIRTH: Nov 8, 1999
PLACE OF BIRTH: College Station, Tex.
FATHER: Eric Karl Benck
MOTHER: Sharon Roosevelt
* * *
SPONSORS: . . . Elise and Gary Bowman [4]
DATE OF BAPTISM: Jan. 13, 2002
As noted, Eric Karl Benck is Mother's Husband. Handwritten on the bottom of the certificate
are the words: “Use only 1st Name in Bulletin [and] for Baptism but whole name on
Certificate. Not enrolled as member [at] Messiah yet.”
On June 28, 2013, Father filed a pro se “Motion to Correct the Baptismal Church
Records in which [Mother] Listed her Husband as the Father of [Father’s] Son Darren Yavuz
2
The record does not reflect when Father obtained Darren’s baptismal certificate, only
that it was “some years after [the baptism] happened.”
3
The 2004 Consent Order contains a provision requiring Mother to furnish Father a
copy of Darren’s baptismal certificate. According to Mother, she told Father about the
baptism in the spring of 2004.
4
Elise and Gary Bowman are Husband’s sister and brother-in-law.
4
Corapcioglu and Other Appropriate Relief.” In his motion, Father pointed out that Husband
is listed as Darren’s father on the baptismal certificate, and explained that he was unaware
of Mother’s “deceitful representation at the Messiah Lutheran Church” until he obtained the
baptismal certificate from the church secretary. He argued that,
by not using [Darren’s] middle and last names in the church Bulletin and at the
Baptism ceremony, the members of the church were misled to believe that
[Mother’s] husband was Darren’s father. Members of the Messiah Lutheran
Church where [Mother] and her husband attend services still believe
[Mother’s] husband is the father of [Darren].
Father asserted in his motion that, after discovering the baptismal certificate, he made
many attempts “in good faith” to have the baptismal records corrected. He attached to his
motion an email he sent to Mother on April 16, 2013, in which he asked her to
[p]lease correct the church records that you and [Husband] registered your
husband as Darren’s father without my knowledge and provide me with
verifiable proof that you did so. The false registration should also be corrected
at the church bulletin sent to the congregation as it was done at that time and
a copy of the bulletin should be provided. If you do not do so before May 1,
2013, I will take legal action without any further notice.
Father stated in his motion that Mother responded with an email on May 1, 2013, in which
she wrote: “. . . [Husband] was never listed as Darren’s father in any official church records.
He is listed as a PRESENTER, not parent, on the baptismal record. A presenter does not
have to be a parent and neither parent has to be a presenter.”
Father further explained in his motion that after unsuccessfully trying to resolve the
issue with Mother he enlisted the help of the Circuit Counselor for the Lutheran Church –
Missouri Synod (“LCMS”), a division of the Lutheran Church to which Messiah Lutheran
5
Church belongs. Attached to his motion is an email he received on November 22, 2005, from
The Reverend Lester P. Stano, Circuit Counselor for Circuit Six of the LCMS. In the email,
Rev. Stano informed Father, in relevant part, as follows:
I had a long conversation with Pastor Hill [the pastor of Messiah Lutheran
Church] today. He indicates that he baptized your son without any knowledge
of the affair [between Father and Mother] at the time. He claims that what he
recorded [on the baptismal certificate] was based only on what he was told.
He also stated that the individuals in question [Mother and Husband] attend his
church VERY infrequently, in fact, they have only been there no more than 6
times since the baptism. [Pastor Hill] is saying that he will not be forced to
print anything in the bulletin unless he has broken some state law, especially
since this family “used” him and they are very nominal attenders. . . .
I have no authority to force anything else in this issue. I also do not want to
be triangulated in a personal/family dispute. . . .
Father argued that by “not correcting the church records,” Mother had violated the
2004 Consent Order and was in contempt. He asked the court “to order [Mother] to correct
[Darren’s] baptismal records and provide [Father] with a notarized and variable [5] copy of the
corrected baptismal records.” Father also asked the court “to order [Mother] to provide him
with a notarized and variable copy of the church Bulletin distributed to the members of
Messiah Lutheran Church containing the retraction of the earlier announcement and
correcting the paternal information of Darren.”
Mother, through counsel, responded by filing a “motion to dismiss” for failure to state
a claim for which relief could be granted. She argued that the court did not have jurisdiction
5
Although the motion refers to a “variable copy” of the baptismal record,“verifiable
copy” was more than likely intended.
6
over Messiah Lutheran Church, and could not order a change to its baptismal records or the
publication of a retraction in its bulletin.
Mother also argued that Father’s request for relief was barred by the doctrine of laches
because Darren’s baptism had taken place in 2002 and Father had waited until 2013 to file
his motion. In addition, Mother asserted that Father’s claim was barred by res judicata
because the “very same issue regarding Darren’s baptismal records was raised a number of
times during a four day merits hearing in 2006.” That hearing, held in June and July of 2006,
concerned one of Father’s requests to modify the 2004 Consent Order. Mother attached a
transcript of the following colloquy that took place during that hearing, on June 27, 2006:
[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: On the baptism. The thing that [Father]
was concerned about with the baptism was the fact that [Husband] was listed
as the father of [Darren].
* * *
[MOTHER]: . . . I never told [Father] about the baptism in 2002. He
couldn’t express a concern about it.
[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: Oh, okay. So when did you tell him about
the baptism?
[MOTHER]: In Turkey, in the spring of 2004.
* * *
[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: . . . The thing that [Father] was concerned
about in the baptism was the fact that he felt the child’s parentage was
misrepresented at the baptism. Am I right? . . .
[MOTHER]: Yes, I remember because there was a provision in the
consent order about that.
7
* * *
[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: Okay. Have you made it clear to the people
who were involved in the baptism that Darren is not [Husband’s] son?
* * *
[MOTHER]: Anybody that was confused about it, the minister that was
involved in the baptism knew at the time.
[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: Okay. Were there people who were
confused about who was the father of the child? Was there anybody?
* * *
. . . [Reading from the Consent Order] “that [Mother] shall inform all persons
who she is aware has been misinformed about Darren’s paternity. These
people will be notified that [Father] is the father of the child. In the future, the
paternity of Darren shall be represented correctly to the third parties.” Have
you done that?
[MOTHER]: Everybody that I was confused about, that I know of, that
I can identify, knows.
Mother also attached a copy of another colloquy concerning Darren’s baptismal
records that took place during the hearing on July 5, 2006:
[FATHER’S ATTORNEY]: . . . What is the baptism issue?
[FATHER]: The problem, the way the child was registered in the
church. He’s registered as [Husband’s] son, in the church records, and I’m
trying to correct that since I found out. And, actually, it’s not a problem with
[Mother]. It’s a problem with the pastor, and my lawyer is trying to deal with
it right now.
On August 30, 2013, the circuit court held a hearing on Father’s motion. The court
observed that the motion was “very unusual,” and explained that “even if it were a
8
meritorious request, I’m not so sure the court has the authority to even do what you’re asking
the court to do. We have this separation of church and state thing.” Father responded that
he was not asking the court to order the church to change Darren’s baptismal record; rather,
he was asking the court to require Mother to comply with the misrepresentation provision in
the 2004 Consent Order. Specifically, he was seeking an order directing Mother “to
approach the church and ask the church to correct the church records. I’m not suing the
church. I’m asking the church to correct the records.” Father also asserted that Mother had
engaged in “parental misrepresentation” and “basic parental fraud.”
Mother responded that Father was effectively asking the court to order a change in the
church’s records and to require Mother to address the church’s congregation. She argued
that, under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the court lacked jurisdiction to
order the relief Father was seeking.
The court agreed with Mother and repeatedly explained to Father (who was
unrepresented) that it did not have the authority to do what he was asking. The judge stated:
I can’t order [Mother] to go to church and do anything. She has a first
amendment –
* * *
. . . the mechanism that you have filed and that you are attempting to use – this
is a defendant’s motion to correct the baptismal church record in which
plaintiff listed her husband as the father of defendant’s son, Darren, and other
appropriate relief. This motion must necessarily be denied.
* * *
9
. . . I’m not suggesting to you that there is no remedy, or at least no legitimate
way, to get that issue before the court. It is just that this way is not the way to
get that before the court, and I can’t give you legal advice. You need to talk
to a lawyer –
* * *
– but this motion will never be granted by any judge in this court or in this
state. Now what you are arguing is a breach of contract or a person refusing
to comply with something that they’ve consented to, but that is not what you
have filed. . . . so this motion has to be denied.
The court entered an order on September 10, 2013, denying Father’s motion “with
prejudice.” Father noted a timely appeal.
B. Father’s Motion to Appoint a Parenting Coordinator
In the 2009 Consent Order, Father and Mother agreed to equal physical custody of
Darren and that “[Mother] shall continue to have sole legal custody of Darren except in the
area of mental health. . . .” They also agreed:
The parties shall engage and have monthly meetings with a Parent
Educator/Coordinator to assist them in developing more effective means of
communicating with one another. In the event that [Mother] and [Father] are
unable to reach agreement on parenting matters pertaining to mental health
and/or fall outside the providence of [Mother’s] sole legal custodial authority
and requires the cooperation and/or participation of both parents, the parties
shall seek the assistance of the Parent Educator/Coordinator in the resolution
of the issue(s). If the issue(s) is still unresolved following three meetings with
the Parent Educator/Coordinator, then the Parent Educator/Coordinator shall
issue a temporary resolution of the issue(s) which shall remain in effect until
changed by the Court or further agreement by the parties. . . .
All decisions regarding mental health services provided to Darren (e.g.,
treatment or evaluations) shall be made jointly by the parents. In the event that
the parents are unable to reach a mutually agreeable solution, they shall utilize
the services of Parent Educator/Coordinator in a manner described earlier in
this section.
10
The parties employed the services of Kelly Zinna, Ph.D., a psychologist, as the
parenting coordinator. Dr. Zinna served in that capacity for four years, until early 2013,
when Father unilaterally terminated her services because he disagreed with her “professional
judgment.” According to Father, his disagreement concerned Dr. Zinna’s recommendation
that Darren discontinue treatment and medication prescribed by a psychiatrist Darren was
seeing. Father maintains that Mother stopped taking Darren to the psychiatrist after Dr.
Zinna made her recommendation.
On April 3, 2013, after terminating Dr. Zinna’s services, Father sent an email to
Mother proposing three candidates to replace Dr. Zinna as the parenting coordinator. The
parties thereafter exchanged emails proposing names of various other candidates, but,
according to Father, Mother refused to meet with any of his proposed candidates.
On June 25, 2013, Mother sent an email to Father stating:
Darren is doing well without parent coordination. He got straight A’s this year
and is thriving and socially well-adjusted according to [one of Darren’s
teachers]. Parent coordination was not effective for us and Darren is still
doing fine. It is time for parent coordination to be discontinued and move on.
Although I will not initiate litigation, I will argue this in court if you chose
[sic] to go that route.
On September 30, 2013, Father filed a pro se “Motion to Appoint a Parent
Educator/Coordinator and Other Appropriate Relief.” In his motion, he argued that Mother
was “in contempt of the [2009 Consent] Order by obfuscating and blocking the process to
find a new parent coordinator.” He also argued that the 2009 Consent Order was a contract,
and that by agreeing to use the services of a parenting coordinator, Mother was required to
11
cooperate in the appointment of a new one. He asserted that there still were “many
unresolved issues between the parties” involving Darren’s “physical, emotional and mental
health,” and that the parties needed “the services of a parent coordinator to resolve their
issues in the best interest of the child.” Father asked the court to appoint as a parenting
coordinator one of the three candidates he had proposed.
On October 23, 2013, Mother filed an opposition to Father’s motion.
She
acknowledged that the parties had worked with a parenting coordinator for nearly four years,
under the 2009 Consent Order. She asserted, however, that pursuant to Rule 9-205.2(f)(2),
the court could not require the parties to work with a parenting coordinator for a period
exceeding two years, unless the parties agreed to an extension. Mother did not agree to an
extension because, in her view, parenting coordination is expensive and had not been
successful for the parties, and was not necessary.
The court denied Father’s motion in a written order entered on October 28, 2013.
Father filed a motion for reconsideration of that order on November 4, 2013, and a notice of
appeal on November 27, 2013. The court denied Father’s motion for reconsideration on
December 6, 2013.
We shall include additional facts as relevant to the issues.
DISCUSSION
I.
12
In his “Motion to Correct the Baptismal Church Records in which [Mother] Listed her
Husband as the Father of [Father’s] Son Darren Yavuz Corapcioglu and Other Appropriate
Relief,” Father asked the court to order Mother “to correct [Darren’s] baptismal records,” and
“to provide him with a notarized and variable copy of the church Bulletin distributed to the
members of the Messiah Lutheran Church containing a retraction of the earlier
announcement and correcting the paternal information of Darren.” He based his motion on
the 2004 Consent Order, in particular the provision requiring Mother to “inform all persons
who she is aware has [sic] been misinformed about Darren’s paternity. These people will be
notified that [Father] is the father of the child.”
The circuit court dismissed Father’s motion for failure to state a claim, on the ground
that granting Father’s requested relief would violate the First Amendment’s separation
between church and state.
Father argues on appeal that his motion did not implicate the First
Amendment because “[Mother’s] actions amount to paternity fraud” and “the issue is simply
a matter of intentional misrepresentation of paternity and enforcement of a consent order.”
The cases Father cites regarding “paternity fraud” -- Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325
(Tenn. 2012), and Dier v. Peter, 815 N.W.2d 1(Iowa 2012) -- are inapposite. In both cases,
a mother intentionally misrepresented to a putative father that he was the biological father
of her child. And, in both cases, when the men later discovered they were not the fathers,
they sued the mothers for damages. The courts recognized a cause of action for paternity
fraud. These cases have nothing to do with the relief Father was seeking in his motion.
13
We need not address any of the constitutional arguments advanced by the parties or
the constitutional decisions made by the circuit court. On the language of the 2004 Consent
Order, Father’s motion did not state a claim for which relief could be granted. That order
required Mother to inform people she was aware had been misinformed about Darren’s
paternity to correct the misinformation. It is clear from the allegations in Father’s motion,
especially the email correspondence from Rev. Stano, that Pastor Hill, who performed the
baptism, now knows, and has known since 2005, that Father, not Mother’s Husband, is
Darren’s father. It also is clear from the allegations in Father’s motion that the members of
the congregation present during the baptism were not misinformed about Darren’s paternity.
The church bulletin for that day did not give a last name for Darren, so the congregation
members present were not given any information about his paternity. Husband’s mere
participation in the baptism did not amount to a communication by mother that he was
Darren’s father. So, with respect to the baptism, which was the sole topic of the motion, the
congregation was not misinformed to begin with, and Pastor Hill had been disabused of his
misinformation. Therefore there was nothing that Mother could be ordered to do pursuant
to the 2004 Consent Order that had not been done already. For that reason, we shall affirm
the order denying Father’s motion.6
6
We emphasize as well that in the 2006 proceeding, as quoted above, Mother testified
that she had told everyone she thought was confused about Darren’s paternity what the actual
situation was. Father’s real dispute is not with Mother, who has complied with the 2004
Consent Order, but with the Messiah Lutheran Church, which is not a party to this case, was
(continued...)
14
II.
During the August 30, 2013 hearing on Father’s motion, the following colloquy took
place after the court ruled that Father’s motion would be denied:
[FATHER]: Your honor, I would like to have 15 [days] to amend the
petition so that if the allegations are not sufficient.
THE COURT: Well, I will tell you that if you simply file an amendment
to this – you can say that two and two is five all day but that’s not going to
make it five. If you just amend this motion, it will be denied. You need to talk
to a lawyer. That’s – what you’re saying to the court that you want – that she
did [sic] and what you’re asking this court to do in this motion are two
different things. So maybe you should talk to a lawyer and he or she will tell
you what an appropriate way to get this issue before the court is. They
probably might advise you not to, but at least if you got before the court with
the proper pleading, maybe the court might address the issue.
* * *
[FATHER]: Can I file another motion to order her –
THE COURT: You can file anything that you want to file as long as it
is the proper pleading to grant the court jurisdiction to do what it is you’re
asking the court to do. . . .
Father did not file an additional motion in the days immediately following the hearing. On
September 10, 2013, the court entered an order denying Father’s motion with prejudice.7
6
(...continued)
not the subject of the motion, was not served with the motion, and has long ago made a
decision not to change Darren’s baptismal record.
7
Based upon the court’s colloquy with Father, it is clear the court did not expressly
deny him leave to amend his motion. However, the court’s dismissal of Father’s motion with
prejudice had the practical effect of prohibiting amendment.
15
Citing Rule 2-322(c), which concerns amendments to complaints, Father contends the
court improperly denied him leave to amend his motion to correct Darren’s baptismal
records. Father argues that, under McMahon v. Piazze, 162 Md. App. 588 (2005), leave to
amend under 2-322(c) should be granted liberally, especially in cases where the best interest
of the child is at stake. In that case, we held that the circuit court abused its discretion by not
granting a father leave to amend his petition to modify a consent custody order, in which he
had alleged material changes in circumstances. The court dismissed the petition for failure
to allege facts sufficient to show a material change in circumstances and denied the father’s
request to amend. We concluded on appeal that the court should have granted the father
leave to amend because he may have been able to include additional allegations of fact
relevant to whether there was a change in circumstances in an amended petition. 162 Md.
App. at 598-99.
Here, for the reasons we have explained, there was no amendment Father could have
made to his motion to make it legally viable. Accordingly, the court did not err in denying
leave to amend.
III.
As discussed, in the 2009 Consent Order, the parties agreed to use the services of a
parenting coordinator. The parties selected Dr. Zinna, who served in that capacity until early
2013, when Father terminated her services. Father and Mother disagreed on the need for
continued parenting coordination, and, in September 2013, Father filed a motion asking the
16
court to appoint one of his proposed candidates as the parenting coordinator for the parties.
The court denied Father’s motion in a written order stating that it was doing so upon
consideration of Father’s motion and Mother’s opposition.
In 2009, when the consent order was entered, Maryland did not have any statute or
rule granting a court the authority to appoint a “parenting coordinator” or governing
parenting coordination at all. A rule granting such authority was adopted by the Court of
Appeals effective July 1, 2011. It defines “parenting coordination” as “a process in which
the parties work with a parenting coordinator to reduce the effects or potential effects of
conflict on the parties’ child.” Md. Rule 9-205.2(b)(1).
And it defines “parenting
coordinator” as “an impartial provider of parenting coordination services.” Md. Rule 9205.2(b)(2).
Rule 9-205.2(f), entitled “Appointment of Parenting Coordinator by Court,” provides,
in relevant part,
In an action in which the custody of or visitation with a child of the parties is
in issue and the court determines that the level of conflict between the parties
with respect to that issue so warrants, the court may appoint a parenting
coordinator in accordance with this section. . . .
(2) Appointment Upon Entry of Judgment. Upon entry of a judgment
granting or modifying custody or visitation, the court, with the consent of the
parties and after a hearing, may appoint a parenting coordinator. . . . Unless
sooner terminated in accordance with this Rule, the appointment of a postjudgment parenting coordinator shall not exceed two years unless the parties
and the parenting coordinator agree in writing to an extension for a specified
longer period.
17
On appeal, Father contends that because the terms of the 2009 Consent Order required
the parties to engage a parenting coordinator, the court should have appointed a parenting
coordinator when the parties reached an impasse about Darren’s mental health treatment, and
erred by not doing so.
Father maintains that the two-year time limit for parenting
coordinators, in Rule 9-205.2(f)(2), does not apply because that rule governs parenting
coordinators appointed by the court “post-judgment,” and the relevant provisions in the 2009
Consent Order did not constitute a “post-judgment appointment” of a parenting coordinator.
Father’s motion sought the appointment post-judgment of a parenting coordinator.
“Post-judgment” means at or after a final judgment is entered, i.e., not when the case is
pendente lite. Here, a final judgment was entered in 2004 and was modified in 2009. In the
latter judgment, the parties agreed to use a parenting coordinator; the court did not appoint
one, however, and did not have the authority to do so in 2009.
Regardless of the language of the 2009 Consent Order, Father’s 2013 motion for
appointment of a parenting coordinator was governed by Rule 9-205, which was then in
effect and provides the only authority for the court to appoint a parenting coordinator. That
rule makes plain that a post-judgment parenting coordinator only can be appointed with the
consent of the parties. Md. Rule 9-205.2(f)(2). Although the parties had agreed, in 2009,
to use the services of a parenting coordinator, that did not amount to consent to the court
appointing a parenting coordinator. And, as stated above, the rule that now authorizes a court
to appoint a parenting coordinator post-judgment limits that authority to when the parties
18
consent. Here, the parties did not consent. Mother did not want the court to appoint a
parenting coordinator because she did not think that parenting coordination had been
effective or that it was needed, and continuing to pay a parenting coordinator would be
expensive. Without the parties’ consent, the court could not appoint a parenting coordinator,
and therefore did not err in declining to do so.
We note, moreover, that even if the 2009 Consent Order established consent by the
parties to the court appointment of a parenting coordinator – which it did not – the parties
already had engaged a parenting coordinator for 4 years and it would be inconsistent with the
2 year appointment limitation in the rule for the court to appoint a parenting coordinator for
an additional time period. Also, the role described for the parenting coordinator in the 2009
Consent Order is not permitted by the parenting coordination rule. The consent order states
that the parenting coordinator can make decisions that will stand until overruled by the court.
It does not limit those decisions to the sort of time-bound minor decisions the parenting
coordinator rule permits. Indeed, decisions about mental health treatment for Darren plainly
would not be within the authority of a parenting coordinator to make.
Finally, Father’s assertion that the court should have granted his motion in order to
enforce the 2009 Consent Order is without merit. His actual request of the court was to
appoint a parenting coordinator.
IV.
19
Father contends that by denying his motion to appoint a parenting coordinator, the
court effectively terminated his joint legal custody of Darren regarding Darren’s mental
health. This is so because, according to Father,
without the existence of a parent coordinator, no decision can be made
regarding mental health services provided to the child if the parties are unable
to reach a mutually agreeable solution as they are now. . . . It is quite apparent
that without the tie breaking authority of a parenting coordinator on mental
health issues, the child would be denied any treatment or evaluation if one
parent opposes or disagrees with the medication or treatment or evaluation. .
. . Without the availability of a parent coordinator, the other parent has no
remedy to provide to his/her child any help although he/she has joint legal
custody on mental health of Darren.
Father’s argument is without merit. As we have stated, the decision making authority
of a parenting coordinator is limited. Rule 9-205.2(g), entitled “Services Permitted,”
provides, in relevant part
As appropriate, a parenting coordinator may: . . . (2) if there is an operative
custody and visitation order, assist the parties in amicably resolving disputes
about the interpretation of and compliance with the order and in making any
joint recommendations to the court for any changes to the order; (3) educate
the parties about making and implementing decisions that are in the best
interest of the child; . . . (6) assist the parties in modifying patterns of behavior
and in developing parenting strategies to manage and reduce opportunities for
conflict in order to reduce the impact of any conflict upon their child; . . . (9)
decide post-judgment disputes by making minor, temporary modifications to
child access provisions ordered by the court if (A) the judgment or postjudgment order of the court authorizes such decision making, and (B) the
parties have agreed in writing or on the record that the post-judgment
parenting coordinator may do so.
Rule 9-205.2(h), entitled “Services Not Permitted,” prohibits a parenting coordinator from
“mak[ing] parenting decisions on behalf of the parties,” except for those decisions authorized
20
by 9-205.2(g)(9) (temporary modifications to child access provisions, not relevant here). Md.
Rule 9-205.2(h)(3).
A parenting coordinator would not have the authority to make a decision regarding
Darren’s mental health treatment in the event of Mother and Father’s continued
disagreement, so the refusal of the court to appoint a parenting coordinator had no impact on
the parties’ shared legal custody regarding Darren’s mental health treatment. Father still
shares legal custody on questions of Darren’s mental health; in the event of an impasse, the
parties can seek a decision from the court.
ORDERS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY THE APPELLANT.
21