peace and reconciliation in turkey from a human security

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Authors Hale Akay and Zeynep Sarlak
Turkish Proofreader Ayse Esra Koç
English Translation Hale Akay
English Redaction Mehmet Cem Ülgen
Cover Visual Bertan Kılıçcıoğlu
Design Myra
Publication And Cover Design Tülay Demircan
Application Serhan Baykara, Harun Yılmaz
Printing İmak Ofset
This publication has been prepared
with the support of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Turkey Office.
www.festr.org
[email protected]
The views expressed in this publication are those of the participants of the round table held as a part
of the“Peace and Reconcilliation in Turkey from Human Security Perspective” meeting and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly or Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Turkey Office.
© Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği
CONTENTS
4 Human Security Focused
Conflict Resolution
7 The Implications of the Human
Security Approach for the
“Solution Process” in Turkey
9 “Peace and Reconciliation in
Turkey from the Perspective of Human
Security” - Meeting Report
10 Laws, the Judiciary, and the Police
15 Village Guard System
19 Other Mechanisms of Insecurity and
Inter-Communal Relations
3
PEACE AND RECONCILIATION
IN TURKEY FROM A HUMAN
SECURITY PERSPECTIVE
HUMAN SECURITY FOCUSED CONFLICT RESOLUTION
4
The concept of “human security” brought forward first by the
United Nations (UN) and then by the European Union (EU)
beginning from the mid 1990s, has been proposed as a human
focused security approach that functions as an alternative to
the traditional state-centred security discourse which has yet to
be successful in providing solutions for the new security threats
that emerged from the post-Cold War era and which could not
correspond to the security perceptions of different individuals and
communities. The concept of human security stresses that security
policies should not be dictated from the top, but instead should
be shaped according to the information from below and with
the participation of society. It redefines security on the basis of
human rights, human development, and human dignity. Hence,
it encompasses social, political, economic, psycho-social and
environmental dimensions of security that are disregarded by the
traditional approach.
Human security is also a concept that is widely referred to within
studies on conflict resolution and peace building. The human
security approach underlines the fact that peace processes
themselves also carry the risk of creating new types of conflicts
especially in the short and long term. Therefore, it draws attention
to the need for expanding peace-building processes that go
beyond negotiations between political elites and promotes social
engagement, as well as to the need for providing answers to
different types of insecurity that have emerged as a result of the
conflict, which are often neglected during negotiations. Contrary
to the widening scope of states’ security policies on the basis of
security considerations, the approach of human security intends
to allow people to directly express collective and individual rights
that constitute a common ground and understanding. Table 1,
provided by the UN report titled “Human Security in Theory and
Practice”, provides a summary of the human security approach
and human security principles for post-conflict situations.
TABLE 1: HUMAN SECURITY APPROACH IN POST-CONFLICT SITUATIONS1
Human Security Principle
Human Security Approach
Put populations impacted by conflicts,
including the most vulnerable, at the
centre of analysis and planning.
Emphasize reconciliation, reintegration
and rehabilitation at the level of the
individual and community and not only
through large-scale institutional reforms.
PEOPLE-CENTRED
Consider and evaluate the impact of
conflict interventions and donor policies
from both a human and state security
perspective.
Adopt participatory processes where
possible so as to consider information
from the points of view of those
affected.
Think about local capacities and
resources in order to identify gaps in
protection and empowerment strategies.
5
Shift from a military focus towards
public safety and reform of the state
security sector.
Analyse the inter-linkages and
externalities between e.g., security,
health, education, human rights, etc. No
element of post-conflict transition can
be tackled in isolation.
Adopt inclusive and multi-actor
approaches.
MULTI-SECTORAL
Minimize negative externalities that can
cause a conflict to relapse.
Ensure coherence among humanitarian,
security and developmental approaches.
Link people and institutions towards
inclusive and representative governance
processes.
1. United Nations Office
for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs
Human Security Unit,
“Human Security in
Theory and Practice,
pp. 44-45, http://hdr.
undp.org/en/media/
HS_Handbook_2009.pdf.
Human Security Principle
Human Security Approach
Take a multi-dimensional approach,
engaging a broad landscape of issues,
sectors and disciplines (see human
security clusters for post-conflict
situations).
Recognize that lasting peace requires
social, economic and security
dimensions to be addressed in a manner
that captures their inter-linkages.
COMPREHENSIVE
Engage multiple actors from various
levels including the local, district,
national, regional and international.
Provide extra attention to excluded
groups and focus on social inequalities
and reconciliation.
Employ a dual ‘protection and
empowerment’ framework to peace
building strategies.
6
Adopt context-specific strategies to each
unique post-conflict situation.
Pay attention to the root causes behind
the conflict in a given context.
Conduct an in-depth analysis of targeted
issues and populations from both local
and external perspectives.
CONTEXT-SPECIFIC
Work with the principles, norms and
institutions that are linked with the
history and culture of a war-torn society.
Extend analysis to capture the regional
dynamics of the conflict where
appropriate.
Situate insecurity within other contexts
(district, national, regional, global).
Human Security Principle
Human Security Approach
Conflict prevention must be included as
an element of peace building.
Address root causes of conflict and the
ensuing insecurities.
Develop early warning systems.
PREVENTION-ORIENTATED
Support building of local capacity and
ownership to ensure sustainability.
Conduct mapping at different time
periods to identify trends and provide
information for preventive solutions.
Identify most vulnerable and most
neglected areas or populations.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE HUMAN
SECURITY APPROACH FOR THE “SOLUTION
PROCESS”2 IN TURKEY
In the beginning of 2013, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan announced that Turkey had entered a new process of
negotiations aiming to solve the problem commonly named as
the “Kurdish Question,” which has been continuing in the form of
armed and violent conflict for almost 30 years except infrequent,
short-term cease-fires. This new process has been managed
differently than the 2009 initiative known as the “Kurdish
Opening,” which was based on secret negotiations between the
Turkish state and PKK in Oslo, Norway and which failed soon after
they became public. This time the negotiations are taking place
directly between the government and Abdullah Öcalan, the lifeimprisoned leader of the PKK, detained in Imralı Island in Turkey.
The public has not been regularly informed on the content and
progress of those negotiations in an official manner. However, as
the delegations of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party
have been allowed to visit Öcalan in İmralı island from time to
time, Öcalan’s messages and opinions on the peace process
can be followed in the media. A ceasefire has been declared by
Öcalan after the process was made public in early 2013 and since
then, Turkey has been enjoying a new environment in which both
sides do not receive news on loved ones killed during gunfights
7
2. The peace process in
Turkey concerning the
Kurdish-Turkish conflict
is officially named by
the Government as “the
solution process.”
8
anymore, allaying the public’s concerns about the recurrence of
armed clashes. One of the turning points of that process was in
March 2013, when the message of Abdullah Öcalan was read in
Kurdish and Turkish during the Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakir,
also broadcasted live by major television news channels in Turkey.
The withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey officially began that
day and has been claimed to be continuing ever since. One of
the important steps taken as a part of the solution process was
the establishment of the Wise People Commissions under the
coordination of the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security.
These commissions, allocated to seven geographical areas
in Turkey, made field visits and prepared reports on different
opinions, reactions and expectations among the public regarding
the process, which were later presented to the Prime Minister
in June 2013. On the other hand, within the Democratization
Package revealed at the end of September 2013, the government
proposed options for reducing/abolishing the 10 per cent general
election threshold, which has been regarded widely as an
important problem for sustaining peace, allowed for teaching in
different languages and dialects in private schools, annulled the
ban on the use of letters X, Q, W freeing the Kurdish language,
promised to reinstate the historical Kurdish names of towns and
villages in South-East Turkey and allowed for election campaigns
employing different languages and dialects.
The solution process launched almost a year ago has been
continuing despite the insecurities, concerns and unease on
both sides, especially among the Kurdish population who feel
disappointment as most of the demands for peace have yet to
be met. Although this meeting report does not aim to make
a general political analysis of the peace process in Turkey, it
can nevertheless provide a brief evaluation of its management
from the perspective of human security. The solution process
in Turkey has been carried out through high-level negotiations
not fully transparent to the public, while both the negotiating
parties, the public and the media, perceive the process solely as
a matter of technical and political decisions taken during these
negotiations. Though the establishment of the Wise People
Commissions can be regarded as the only and most important
step for ensuring public ownership of the process, it is unclear
how seriously the government takes -or plans to take- into
consideration the outcomes of those Commissions’ observations
and recommendations in their reports. Moreover, there is no
sign of an attempt to implement mechanisms that will allow
public dialogue and discussion between different groups during
the peace process. The steps taken for the “socialization” and
the “institutionalization” of peace are far from being sufficient.
There is no evidence that in the planning of the future of the
process, the consequences of the 30 year long armed conflict on
society and individuals have been taken into account nor have
the problems that may surface during the post-conflict period,
which have the potential of creating new social tensions been
considered thoroughly. Though one of the crucial demands of the
Kurdish society has been the investigation into and reconciliation
with the past crimes that the State’s security forces took part in
especially during the 1990s, no steps have been taken toward
that direction, save for a very limited number of on-going trials.
Therefore, it is impossible to claim that the solution process in
practice is managed in line with the requirements of a human
security based approach, such as the establishment of a bottomup peace environment for the post-conflict period according to
the information provided below nor has it taken into account the
demands of society, providing permanent solutions for the root
causes of the conflict or examining and eliminating the negative
effects of the conflict on different communities and groups.
Instead of a human-focused approach, up to now, the peace
process in Turkey has been carried out by adopting a state -and
PKK- focused approach.
“PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN TURKEY FROM
THE PERSPECTIVE OF HUMAN SECURITY”- MEETING
REPORT
The Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly (hCa) has initiated a new project
in 2013 in partnership with NGOs from five countries in the
Balkans, and which is based on national and regional level
research studies to be carried out by establishing collaboration
between civil society and the academia around the theme
of human security and evidence-based advocacy activities.
One of the main pillars of this project titled “Cross-Border
9
Citizens’ Network for Human Security” is defined as “peace and
reconciliation.” The hCa decided to focus on the peace process of
the Kurdish Question and the effects of forced internal migration
of the Kurdish population from the perspective of human
security as one of the main subjects of its’ national level research
activities, which will actually begin as of 2014. The research study
will intend to reflect to the public the opinions of both individuals/
groups that have been directly or indirectly affected from the
conflict and the experts working at the community level.
10
As part of its efforts to structure the research activities on the
above-mentioned subject and with the aim of providing an
alternative perspective on the on-going peace process, the hCa,
in cooperation with Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung-Turkey, organized a
closed working meeting titled “Peace and Reconciliation in Turkey
from a Human Security Perspective” in İstanbul on September
28th, 2013. Scholars, experts and representatives of civil society
organizations that have been working on various dimensions of
the Kurdish problem and its social implications were invited to
that meeting, which was planned to explore different human
security focused issues related to the solution process. Later,
the hCa research team summarized the opinions and problems
expressed during that meeting, which has led to this report. One
should note that the content of the meeting was naturally limited
to the number of participants, their respective areas of expertise
and perspectives. Therefore, the resulting meeting report cannot
claim to include all human security problems related to the
solution process in Turkey. Nevertheless, we believe that by
providing a list of problems that are prioritized by taking into
account community-level inputs for a human security focused
approach to the peace process will contribute to and provide
insights for public debates on the current situation of the TurkishKurdish conflict. Our report summarizing the main outcomes of
the meeting held in 28
September 2013 is presented below under crosscutting headings:
LAWS, THE JUDICIARY, AND THE POLICE
The legal framework in Turkey is incompatible with the European
Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, which stipulate that laws
concerning human rights should be clear, explicit, predictable
and accessible, and should conform to the rule of law. Contrary
to the foundational principles of international conventions, the
laws in Turkey tend to restrict basic rights and freedoms and
pose a threat against their practice. Moreover, some provisions
hidden in these laws function like land mines as regards to the
practice of basic rights and freedoms. Another common problem
of the general legal framework in Turkey is the extensiveness
and frequency of limitations based on concepts like the state’s
“security” and “secrecy.” Provisions that restrict the freedom of
expression and right to information should also be noted. Some
of the laws and their related articles that constitute threats for the
practice of rights and freedoms are listed below:
• Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution on the National Security
Council.
• Law No. 3173 on Combatting Terrorism. Especially Article
1 modified in 2003 which defines terror as “any kind of act
done by one or more individuals belonging to an organization
with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic as
specified in the Constitution, its political, legal, social, secular
and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity of the
State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence
of the Turkish State and Republic, weakening or destroying
or seizing the authority of the State, eliminating fundamental
rights and freedoms or damaging the internal and external
security of the State, public order or general health by means of
pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or
threat,” and its amendment, Article 2 (2006) regulating the use
of arms by security forces.
• Law No. 2559 on the Duties and Authorities of the Police and
particularly Article 16 which regulates the use of force by the
police.
• Law No. 2935 on State of Emergency, which provides
extraordinary powers to Governors.
• Law No. 5442 on Provincial Administrations, Article 11, which
defines the authorities of the Governors and the conditions for
calling for help from armed forces.
11
• Regulation on the Organization and Duties of the Gendarmerie,
which authorizes investigative powers.
12
On the other hand, the practice of the Judiciary itself has become
a factor of insecurity among society. Arbitrary detentions, broad
interpretations of provisions in the Laws to the disadvantage
of the accused are among problems noted in this context. The
Turkish Code of Criminal Procedure Article 182, which allows
the court to rule that a hearing can be conducted partially or
entirely closed to public when necessary with respect to public
morality or security, is one of the examples of the provisions
employed in such a way. The definition of “membership to a
terrorist organization” in the Law on Combatting Terrorism and
the court decisions based on that article are also problematic.
According to the Law “Any member of an organization, founded
to attain the aims defined in Article 1, who commits a crime to
further these aims, individually or with others, or any member of
such an organization, even if he does not commit such a crime,
shall be deemed to be a terrorist offender” and “Individuals
who are not members of a terrorist organization, but commit a
crime in the name of the organization, are also deemed to be
terrorist offenders and shall be subject to the same punishment
as members of such organizations.” The outcome of the broad
interpretation employed in such cases is displayed in the Ministry
of Justice’s response to the parliamentary question submitted by
the Peace and Democracy Party MP Pervin Buldan, which states
that between the years 2009 and 2012, 38,135 individuals had
been tried under the allegation of being a member of or leading
a terrorist organization, out of which 19,925 were convicted.
The same response also demonstrates that, during the same
period, the number of individuals tried on charges of leading
a terrorist organization decreased, while the number of those
charged with membership showed a substantial increase. These
high figures make it clearly evident that the courts’ definition
and interpretation of being a member of a terrorist organization
is rather extensive. Moreover, as those who are not a member
of a terrorist organization can be charged with an organizational
crime according to the Law, people feel that they are living in an
insecure environment in which they can easily find themselves as
suspects of some cases. In addition, the gap between accusations
and convictions has been narrowing, while some experts note
that the discretionary power provided by the Law regarding the
length of sentences also encourages judges and prosecutors to
give conviction decisions without much hesitation.
Another problem put forward in relation to the Law on
Combatting Terrorism is that in a large number of cases the
indictments include controversial or twisted/fabricated evidence.
Examples like including texts of wiretappings in indictments
without any filtering -thus disclosing irrelevant personal
information- as evidence, accusations based on depositions of
anonymous witnesses, inmates with pending trials based on
irrelevant and/or unconvincing evidence who are incarcerated
are becoming widespread practices.
Furthermore, one of the problems observed in recent court
decisions regarding charges on being a member to a terrorist
organization and taking part in terrorist propaganda is that
publicly expressing different types of injustice and social demands
have begun to be frequently treated as acts of terrorism. By
increasing the ambiguity in the definition of terrorist acts
within the Law, this tendency indirectly creates an insecure
environment for people to assert rights-based demands. As
regards to the Kurdish question, this tendency implies linking
politically active Kurds with terrorism and thus deterring not
only those individuals involved in politics but a larger population
of Kurds from defending their rights politically and taking part
in rights-based activism. Also, the common opinion that the
expressions of discontent regarding the government are gradually
being included in the definition of such crimes also aggravates
insecurity by creating an atmosphere of oppression.
The detentions and prosecutions related to the Law on
Combatting Terrorism also create a particular problem of
discrimination and distrust among Kurdish citizens. As the
legal treatment against people who have participated in the
same activities, assumed similar political responsibilities and
have expressed similar demands can vary, the public cannot
understand on what grounds the ones to be detained/prosecuted
are chosen, which naturally erodes the mutual trust within society
and raises doubts between people.
13
Impunity is one of the important elements of the public’s lack of
confidence to the judicial system. When an actor has an official
position representing the State or related to the State in some
other ways, he/she is protected by a shield of impunity even
if he/she is accused of crimes that fall into the legal definition
of crimes against humanity or taken part in serious violations,
mistreatment and/or malpractice. The commonality of such cases
itself can be deemed as an element of violence and insecurity, as
it creates a widespread perception that when the accused is a
state official, justice will never be served.
14
3. For a recent analysis on
law enforcement in Turkey
see, Biriz Berksoy, Military,
Police and. Intelligence
in Turkey: Recent
Transformations and Needs
for Reform, TESEV, 2013.
Four characteristics stand out when the general legal framework
that regulates the authorities and responsibilities of the Law
Enforcement Agency (General Directorate of Security)3 -Law
on the Duties and Authorities of the Police, Code of Criminal
Procedure, Law on Combatting Terrorism and Police Force Law- is
analysed. First of all, from the very beginning the Police Force
has been designed as a mechanism to protect the State and
consequently the clause “to ensure public security (order)” has
been used to legitimize police practices and operations that
violate citizens’ rights. Secondly, there is an attempt to construct
a conservative social structure on the concept of “public morality.”
The third characteristic, which are revealed when daily practices
are examined, is that, similar to the Judiciary, ambiguous and
unclear provisions within the laws allow the Police to use its
discretionary powers in a very broad way. Finally, when using
its discretionary powers, the Police always prioritize the State
and attaches central importance to concepts like public morality
and public order. All the characteristics above imply that any
attempt to reform the Police Forces should not be restricted
to legislative changes, but should rather target a substantial
cultural transformation in mentality. Otherwise, during the
solution process of the Kurdish Question, instead of serving as
the protector of public peace, the Police Forces can become a
problem that can risk the continuation of the process. In this
regard, it should be noted that recent attempts to produce a
bottom-up negative security conception, based on encouraging
the citizens to act as informants, appear as an ominous
development.
In the context of the Kurdish Question, the practices of security
forces also generate a spiral of violence and internalization of
that violence by those that act in defence of civil and political
rights. People who participate in demonstrations or other types
of activism in order to voice their political demands, go out to the
streets taking for granted that as a result of their actions, they are
likely to face violence, can be jailed or, in worst case scenarios,
may even get killed. This situation, on the one hand strengthens
the politicization and solidarity within the Kurdish movement,
while on the other, puts Kurdish victims of internal displacement
who have moved to the Western parts of the country at the
risk of facing systematic violence. Moreover, this causes the
normalization and unquestioned acceptance of violence in
society.4
VILLAGE GUARD SYSTEM
One of the elements that casts doubts about the continuity of the
peace process and has the potential of creating new problems as
well as threats, is the Village Guard system in Turkey, which has
been employed by the State as a para-military force for the fight
against PKK since the mid-80s.
15
According to Minister of Interior Muammer Güler’s statement on
May 2013, there are 46,495 temporary and 19,343 voluntary
village guards in Turkey.5 Although the abolition of the Village
Guard system is commonly regarded as one of the important
steps necessary for the solution process, the fact that the
government has not declared any clear plan to do so raises
concerns.
According to the estimates, 100,000 people have entered into
the Village Guard system so far, including those removed from
their posts or who have retired. However, an important point that
should be noted is that people do not enter the Village Guard
system individually; families of Village Guards also indirectly
become a part of the system. Therefore, the total number of
people that have directly or indirectly participated is estimated to
be as high as 600-700,000. Taking into account the demographic
figures of the Kurdish populated region, this is a very high
number and should be kept in mind when plans and programs
for the abolition/transformation of the Village Guard system are
being developed.
4. 07.05.2013, “Bakan
Güler’den Korucular
Açıklaması”, http://
www.aktifhaber.com/
bakan-gulerden-korucularaciklamasi-781908h.htm
5. 07.05.2013, “Bakan
Güler’den Korucular
Açıklaması”, http://
www.aktifhaber.com/
bakan-gulerden-korucularaciklamasi-781908h.htm
When talking about individuals and families that are a part of
the Village Guard system, one should note that they can’t be
regarded as a homogenous group that supported the side of
the State during the conflict. While an important part of them
were forced to accept being a Village Guard as a result of State
pressure, some of them have identified themselves with the
State over time, or even have undergone a process of identity
transformation -i.e. losing their Kurdish identity. Moreover, there
are differences between Village Guards in terms of their duties
in the security system. For example, it is known that there were
Special Village Guard Teams taking part in the operations of
Mixed Special Forces Teams and the number of this type Village
Guards is estimated to be approximately 8,000. The abolition of
these Special Village Guard teams is an important issue regarding
the removal of the whole Village Guard system.
16
One important problem related to this system is the conflictrelated or non-political crimes committed by Village Guards in the
past 30 years and the fact that most of these crimes have gone
unpunished. Abducting women, blood feuds, land disputes are
among issues that some of the village guards are accused in the
context of malpractice and since most of them enjoy impunity,
this increases insecurity in society and destroys public confidence
in the judicial system.
With respect to conflict resolution, land disputes in Kurdish
villages also make Village Guards a risk for the continuity of the
solution process. After Kurdish villages were evacuated, the lands
belonging to those who were forced to leave were sometimes
directly handed over to Village Guards; in some cases these
plots were even unlawfully registered on their names. In many
cases, officials turned a blind eye to land seizures by Village
Guards. Since the evacuated population began to return to their
villages as a result of the decreasing risk of armed clashes, the
lands occupied by the Village Guards have become an important
problem creating local conflicts. One of the striking examples
of this kind of land conflict is the massacre that took place in
Mardin’s Bilge Village in 2009, in which 44 people were killed.
Though initially the media portrayed the massacre as a result of
an honour killing, during the trial, the real reason was revealed
to be a land dispute between Village Guards and other locals.
Moreover, turmoil struck the same village in 2012 during a
land registry evaluation. When the background of the media
reports on murders related to land dispute or blood feuds are
investigated, the main reason usually appears to be land seizures
by Village Guards that took place during the 30 years of conflict.
It has also been noted that public institutions and political parties
are usually unresponsive to warnings about the potential threat
land disputes pose for public peace in the region. In this respect,
problems pertinent to land registry -e.g. private lands registered
to the Treasury, - occur mostly during land registration primarily
due to the locals’ lack of technical knowledge and language
problems. The accumulated income raised by Village Guards
from seized lands, cultural resistance against women’s right of
inheritance, land disputes arising from recent land registration
processes and increases in land prices due to public infrastructure
investments are also among other important factors. Since more
and more evacuated families return to their villages or at least
desire to come and work on their land daily or periodically, the
tensions around land disputes have been escalating. In this
context, the low level of soil fertility causing a high debt burden
on the villagers, the villagers’ lack of professional knowledge
after almost 20 years of incapacitation of their farming skills and
the use of traditional, archaic means of production, along with the
fact that due to those problems, younger generations who can
not work in agriculture tend to see illegal ways such as smuggling
as a solution to unemployment, are all among issues that should
be underlined. Moreover, a crucial point is that some of the
disputed lands are in fact Armenian properties seized after the
events of 1915. Consequently these lands have been subjected
to illegal seizure during the 30 years of armed clashes between
state security forces and the PKK. Moreover, telling villagers that
the PKK will confiscate the lands their families seized after 1915
was used as a propaganda tool at the time in order to force the
residents to accept posts as Village Guards.
The fact that there are villagers who became Village Guards with
the urge of protecting their once illegally obtained property is
an important issue that is rarely voiced and should be evaluated
from a historical perspective.
17
18
There are two crucial elements to keep in mind when considering
policies to be implemented for groups like Village Guards that
pose a threat to peace processes. The first element is to refrain
from alienating these groups from the process and telling them
that the process will turn out to be to their disadvantage. Instead,
mechanisms should be developed that serve to engage these
groups in the peace process. However, in doing so, the public’s
faith in justice should not be shaken by the cultivation of a
widespread perception that those who took part in crimes are
being protected. On the other hand, the Turkish Government
seems to evaluate two options as a solution for the Village Guard
system. The first option is to employ Village Guards in different
private/public security guard jobs without disarming them. Since
this option will not be regarded by the public as the abolition
of the system but as its’ continuation in a different form, it will
raise security concerns among the locals. The second option is
disarming and retiring village guards and encouraging them to
return to agriculture and livestock production. Yet, this option
is under strong resistance on behalf of Village Guards who fear
being the target of public reaction. However we should also
note that, after the launching of the solution process, some of
the Village Guards laid down their arms on their own accord.
Therefore, any policy developed for the abolition of the Village
Guard system should be responsive to the concerns of those
who were pressured into becoming Village Guards, particularly
those who are not against to the idea of peace but are worried
about being stigmatized due to their position as Village Guards.
One should also note that an important reason underlying the
uncertainty about the future of the Village Guard system is the
State’s unwillingness to come to terms with crimes that public
servants have committed during the 30 years of conflict, such
as extra-judicial killings, disappearances, along with incidents
of torture and mistreatment. This unwillingness is exploited as
leverage by Village Guards that have taken part in those crimes
or witnessed them, who threaten State institutions by implying
that they will reveal the information they have about those
malpractices.
OTHER MECHANISMS OF INSECURITY AND
INTER-COMMUNAL RELATIONS
One of the negative outcomes of the 30 year-long Kurdish conflict
is the perception of insecurity and the dilemma of security
felt by society. Due to this inter-communal security dilemma,
social problems which can be resolved by dialogue remain
unresolved or even become threats to social peace. While one
of the dynamics behind this dilemma is the ambiguity about the
intentions of certain social actors, another one is the structural
uncertainty arising due to legal loopholes and daily functioning
of the system. In such an environment, it is impossible to
establish confidence among parties; therefore all groups shape
their expectations and behaviours according to the worst-case
assumptions. The inevitable result of actions based on worst-case
assumptions is the reactionary responses observed in society. We
should also note that these reactionary behaviours are multilayered: For example, what Cenk Saracoğlu6 named as “exclusive
recognition” in his study on the Kurdish population in İzmir, is a
reaction based on economic and cultural grounds, which indicate
that social discrimination does not operate through the denial
of ethnic identities anymore. Instead, it has transformed into
more detrimental discriminatory behaviour and practices that
recognizes and includes identities. This reactionary attitude, which
manifests itself in Western parts of Turkey as an unwillingness to
live in the same neighbourhoods or to send their children to the
same schools, is not only a result of individuals’ pursuit of security
but also a factor that strengthens the perception of insecurity.
The spaces where Kurds and the State encounter each other
can be seen as sites of cultural production that cause the
internalization of structural uncertainty. As the first place where
the Kurds are confronted with the State, schools are the most
important example of such cultural production sites. The attitudes
of teachers toward students, the school curricula, the problem
of teaching in a language other than their mother-tongue all
contribute to the creation of violence towards and oppression of
Kurdish pupils, thus their first impression of the State are shaped
according to these unfortunate experiences during primary
education. The second important example can be claimed to be
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6. Cenk Saraçoğlu, Kurds
of Modern Turkey:
Migration, Neoliberalism
and Exclusion, I.B.Tauris,
London, 2010.
the army, which, as a result of compulsory military service, serves
as the first meeting place of Kurdish and Turkish young men.
However, we should also note that studies on these mechanisms
demonstrate a trend toward implicit discriminatory practices
instead of open disputes and explicit practices. Since it is the
meeting place of Shafii and Hanafi citizens, it is possible to claim
that mosques may also prove to be an example of places of
implicit discrimination in which Kurds feel themselves alienated,
segregated and excluded.
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Another mechanism of insecurity is the practice of linking
social assistance and other types of benefits to terrorist crimes.
Due to the broad definition of terrorism, such mechanisms
prevent families related to terrorist acts to be entitled to certain
social benefits, thus endangering their democratic rights. The
revoking of green cards of people that participated in public
demonstrations in some provinces and threatening students
with exclusion from aid distribution in schools if they take part in
street protests, are some examples of this attitude. Some of these
mechanisms violate the principle that individuals can only be held
responsible of their own actions. Quite to the contrary, they are
used as tools to punish and control families. One related example
is obliging Village Guards to submit their spouse’s criminal records
during retirement procedures.
The language used when addressing Kurds, especially by the
representatives of the governing party, the vagueness about the
citizenship rights to be established during the peace process, the
arbitrariness concerning the recognition of those rights and the
impression that “Kurds will have to make do with what the Turks
are willing to offer” are all among the factors that contribute
and strengthen the perception of insecurity among the Kurdish
population. For example, in June, during the final meeting
between the Prime Minister and the Wise People Commissions,
it was announced that there were no plans for education in
mother tongue, that the electoral threshold in general elections
would not be lowered, and that the construction of new border
posts in South East Turkey would continue as planned. However,
as mentioned before, the Democratization Package announced in
September included some improvements regarding those issues.
This type of contradictory behaviour that deepens insecurities
indicates to the public that the solution process progresses
in momentary, whimsical steps instead of following a predetermined plan -and therefore its fate is uncertain. This type of
practices and uncertainties prove that, contrary to the principles
of the human security approach, decision-makers in charge of
the solution process lack a political understanding that prioritizes
human dignity.
In addition to the problems mentioned above, the obstacles in
Turkey preventing the public to enjoy their collective economic
and social rights weaken the sense of solidarity within society
and cause identity-based rights struggles to take the central stage.
Subcontracting, widely used by local governments and state
institutions, is a crucial obstacle in the way of economic rightsbased movements and is a system that causes identity-based
segregation in the labour market. Other important issues that
should be noted in this context are the provisions of the European
Social Charter that prohibit discriminatory behaviour and allows
for social dialogue in workplaces, all which have not been put
into practice in Turkey.
During our meeting on September 28, 2013, the participants
pointed out two specific examples of vulnerable groups that
deserve particular attention during the solution process. The first
one concerns veteran soldiers who have served in the military
in conflict zones and who have suffered a loss of limb as a result.
The second group underlined by the participants are women who,
along with children, are widely recognized as groups that are
faced with the most severe negative effects of these conflicts.
As is well known, many have lost their lives or were injured/
disabled as a result of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict. When we
analyse the group that name themselves South East Veterans,
we observe that the official practices make a distinction
between those accepted as disabled on active duty and those
who are linked to “terror” related operations. The soldiers who
had performed their military service in South East Turkey are
recognized as veterans officially only if they suffered a loss of
limb and can prove it by medical reports that the degree of this
loss fulfils the requirement for entitlement. Mental problems
like post-traumatic stress disorder following armed clashes are
not recognized among losses necessary to obtain official veteran
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entitlement. Observations on the AKP’s attitude toward the
solution process indicate that decision makers mostly approach
the problems of those who had served in South East Turkey
and their families from an economic point of view. However,
conflict resolution requires a broader approach that also takes
into account the psycho-social results of the conflict among that
group and the wider population. In this context, the insecurity
among Kurdish victims of forced internal dislocation and exsoldiers who were physically or mentally affected from the war
living side by side in poor neighbourhoods of big cities should
also be taken into consideration. The veterans also point out
the disappointment they feel due to negative behaviour of
other public servants toward them on many occasions. The
unresponsiveness of political decision makers to the problems of
this group and the lack of mechanisms that aim to constructively
engage these groups into the peace process make them feel
further isolated, along with triggering reactions against the
solution process, as well as leading them to question concepts
like military service and martyrdom.
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It is widely argued that the Kurdish conflict has caused the
politicization of Kurdish women and thus liberated them during
the 30 year long struggle. One of the important, though often
disregarded outcomes of the conflict on women is the protection
that the PKK provided against domestic violence. Therefore the
withdrawal of PKK forces from Turkey in fact have made local
women nervous, as they fear that they will lose this protection
they have so far enjoyed. Moreover, while the PKK forces
continue their withdrawal, the presence of Turkish military
forces in the region continues along with a new influx of a
male population into the region in search of the job openings
in the construction of new border posts. Since this implies an
unbalanced increase in the male population, women have
now become even more insecure and are forced to stay home.
Taking into account the sexual offenses occurred during the
conflict, which have been and continue to be rarely revealed or
investigated, it is easy to understand how this situation creates
a sense of insecurity among local women. Moreover, women
are also confronted with the following dilemma: Being at the
forefront of political protests or returning to their traditional
domestic duties of controlling the rage and anxiety of their
spouses and caring for their children.
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