The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of

Transkript

THE ECLIPSE OF THE
STATE?
on Stateness
Reflections
in
an Era of Globalization
By PETER EVANS*
J.
classic 1968 article on the state aimed to convince his
P. NETTL'S
scientists
social
fellow
restructuring
ceptual
that "the thing exists and no amount
of con
it."1 Analysis
of the state was "not
can dissolve
much in vogue," asNettl put it, and he considered this an intellectual
aberration.
trality
He
was
that "stateness"?the
convinced
in important
of the state?varied
ways
institutional
and
nations,
among
cen
that
political behavior and institutions could be understood only if the state
were
decades
center
into the
back
brought
since have thoroughly
of political
Nettl.
three
analysis. The
re
Issues of stateness
vindicated
gained and retained the kind of centrality that he argued they should
revive continues
unabated.
that he helped
content of his vindi
form
and
the
vindicated,
are full of ironies. The
state to econom
interest
in
of
the
spread
have. The
While
cation
debate
Nettl
ics, a discipline
has been
almost
ignored
completely
in Nettl's
article,2
has been
central to the revival of debate. In part because of this disciplinary shift,
the
stakes
ness" were
are defined
systems
to "state
For Nettl,
the alternatives
differently.
in which
of public authority
other kinds
of institu
tions (parties in Britain, the law and legal institutions in the United
States) were
institutions
salient.
than
Current
about
the
debates
are less about
extent
to which
the form
private
of public
can (or
power
should) be checked by public authority. Reinvigorated political faith in
the efficacy
of markets
combined
with
a
rediscovery
of civil
society
ere
like to thank Fred Block, Ha Joon Chang, Neil Fligstein,
Stephan Haggard, Atul Kohli,
Theda Skocpol, John Stephens,
and especially the members
of my graduate seminar in
an
early draft of this paper and, of course,
comparative political economy for their useful criticisms of
to absolve them from any responsibility
for the directions
taken by my response.
1
"The State as a Conceptual
Variable," World Politics 20 (July 1968), 559.
Netd,
2
footnotes
Netd was interdisciplinary?his
refer to a wide range of sociologists, political scientists,
or economic
in 1968 he found references to economists
in deal
and historians?but
logic unnecessary
on the state.
with
debates
ing
*Iwould
John Ruggie,
WorldPolitics 50 (October 1997), 62-87
This content downloaded from 212.175.32.139 on Wed, 29 Jan 2014 03:01:03 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ECLIPSE OF THE STATE?
ates a charismatic
63
and a corre
set of substitutes
institutions
for public
for the "eclipse of the state."
set of arguments
theoretical
perspectives
Changing
sponding
cannot
be separated
from
real his
torical changes in the position of the state. In the brief decades since
on the state have
In the OECD
the demands
wrote,
burgeoned.
in transfer payments
countries
driven
increases
have
demographically
as a
of
in a doubling
resulted
of government
proportion
expenditures
more
GDP. In
countries
de
the desire for
rapid economic
developing
Nettl
a similar
expansion.
development
Lagging
produced
velopment
in an ominous
institutions
resulted
litical and administrative
of po
"capacity
most
some
of
the
In
Africa,
world,
parts
dramatically
developing
gap."
institutional
real eclipses of the state, in the sense of full-blown
collapse,
ero
there was no threat of collapse, aworrisome
took place. Even where
to be under way. It was
seemed
sion of
institutional
capacity
public
much harder to ignore the state in the 1990s than itwas in the 1960s.
most
is how
of Netd's
ironic, from the perspective
analysis,
arena have affected
"stateness." For Nettl,
international
rein
the international
role vis-?-vis
system was "invariant,"
Perhaps
changes
the state's
forcing
decades
in the
stateness
even when
later the international
domestic
arena
institutions
is viewed
denied
very differendy.
it.3 Three
The
col
lapse of the old bipolar world has diminished the power of statecentric
Si
international
relations.
rivalries to dominate
and military
economic
for
transnational
of
the
opportunities
multaneously,
growth
about why
for a new series of arguments
gains has laid the foundation
to these arguments,
the intensified
states are anachronisms.
According
transactions
that cross national boundaries
of economic
development
as an
it marginalized
the power of the state, leaving
has undermined
now
saw as
stateness
arena that Netti
is
actor. The
economic
securing
as
seen
the power of the nation-state.
transcending
political
Changes
in the global ideological climate are as crucial as new flows
a
of money
and goods, and Netd's
key aspect of
analysis does anticipate
was
"stateless
the
For
those changes.
Nettl,
society par excel
England
self-examination
lence" and "an American
simply leaves
sociopolitical
no room for any valid notion of the state."4 Thus,
the relative neglect of
3
Netd
(fh. 1) saw the international arena almost purely in realist terms, arguing that in the interna
arena the state was "the almost exclusive and acceptable locus of resource mobilization"
(p. 563).
state is the basic, irreducible unit, equivalent to
In Netd's view, "Here [in the international
system] the
function is invariant," "even where
the individual person in a society" (p. 563). Since the "international
the notion of the state is very weak, as in Britain and the United States, the effective extrasocietal or in
tional
ternational
role is not affected"
(p. 564).
4Netd(fn.l),562,561.
WORLD POLITICS
64
the concept of the state during the twenty-five
his arti
years preceding
cle was a logical consequence
of the "shift of the center of gravity of so
cial science to the United
the untrammeled
States."5 Today,
hegemony
is one of the most
of Anglo-American
salient
ideological
premises
forces
the specific
shaping
of the current
character
cluding the extent to which globalization
global
economy,
in
is viewed as entailing the
state.
eclipse of the
In this environment
a different
starting
as a feature
pursuing Nettls
agenda
requires
can no
Statelessness
longer be treated simply
point.
of Anglo-American political culture. It must be dealt with as a domi
nant global ideology and potential institutional reality.Therefore, the
the eclipse of the state is likely and, if so, what
the
an
shift would
of such
institutional
be, takes precedence.
of whether
question
consequences
The trick is to deal with the question of eclipse seriouslywithout taking
a
answer
positive
for granted.
Iwill argue that while eclipse is a possibility, it is not a likely one.
the discourse
What
uine
crisis
is to make
has done
to a gen
responses
and defensive.
The
negative
capacity unrelentingly
states will end up as
but that
institutions
marginal
s
the state
role will be ac
repressive ways of organizing
is not
danger
meaner,
of eclipse
of state
that
more
as the
institutions.
the collapse of public
only way of avoiding
consideration
of
with
positive
eclipse cripples
Preoccupation
possibili
so that
can more effec
to increase states'
ties for working
they
capacity
meet
them. The goal should be to
the new demands
that confront
tively
cepted
work
back
paring
with more
attention
explicit
I begin
to Nettls
closer
something
kinds of "stateness"
toward
different
com
agenda of
this
time
consequences,
original
their
to the effects
at the
impact
by looking
and
of globalization.
on stateness
of globalization
and ar
guing that the structural logic of globalization and the recent history of
the global economy can then be read as providing rationales for "high
as well
stateness"
a clear
logic
as "low stateness." That
connecting
economic
Iwill
globalization
argue that the absence of
to low stateness makes
the normative and ideological side of the global order a key determinant
of how globalization
tion to a discussion
guing
affects
of current
that these perspectives
stateness.
I will
theoretical
are both
then move
perspectives
sources of
insight
from globaliza
on stateness,
ar
into the nature
of the contemporary global order and influential shapers of the political
and ideological face ofthat order. Finally, I conclude with a discussion
of what
5
this analysis
implies
for future forms
of stateness.
Ibid., 561.
and the Role
Globalization
65
of the State
"Diminished," "defective," and "hollow"were typical adjectives applied
to the
state in a recent
Glob
contemporary
special issue o? Daedalus.6
reason
not
is
for the perception
alization
the only
that "state authority
and downwards"
and in some
has leaked away, upwards,
sidewards,
but it is a central one. The effects of global
"just evaporated,"7
two
in
ization flow through
interconnected
but distinct
channels. The
of transnational
economic
character
and changing
creasing weight
have created a new,
relations over the course of the last three decades
more
context for state action. The
effect of these
constraining
political
matters
structural changes has been channeled by the growing global hegemony
of Anglo-American
ideology.
The New Global
Economy
Political
one con
assertion
remains
that "[t]here
only the
concluding
actor in
invariant development
of stateness for each national
invari
has
been
Now
the
the international
field"
inverted.8
presumed
ant is the international
arena's negative
effect on stateness. As wealth
transactions
that take
and power are increasingly
by private
generated
Nettl's
stant?the
place
come
across
the borders
harder
to sustain
of states
the
image
rather
of states
than within
them,
as the
preeminent
it has be
actors
the global level.No one questions that the traditionalWaltzian
"national
interests"
competing
tem,"9 but the muted
great
relations
leave international
continues
to drive
at
logic of
the "interstate
sys
of the post-bipolar
world
struggles
contaminated
and often over
increasingly
power
shadowed by the private logic of the global economy. Nettl likened the
to a
states were the
"society" in which
"people," but
status of states must be
order
the
unique political
global
most
the
"citi
fact
that
balanced
the
against
economically
empowered
arena are transnational
zens" of the international
(TNCs).10
corporations
con
of transactions
and organizational
The growing
relative weight
cross
cornerstone
is
of
the
nections
that
national boundaries
globaliza
international
arena
in the current
tion.
and
Exports
than domestic
more
than
imports
growing
transactions
around the world
one
and a half
times
and a doubling
of the
are
to
OECD
GDP
in
countries
the
of
the
exports
just
begin
proportion
as fast as
investment
three
times
has
been
direct
growing
ning. Foreign
faster
6
Daedalus 24 (Spring 1995).
7
124 (Spring 1995), 56.
Susan Strange, "The Defective
State," Daedalus
8Netd(fn.l),591.
9
Cf. Kenneth Waltz,
Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley,
10
is quoted in fn. 3.
Netd s formulation
1979).
WORLD POLITICS
66
trade, and other
subcontracting,
sorts of transnational
connections
(alliances,
corporate
even faster.11
and so on) have probably been
growing
The impact of both trade and investment ismagnified by the chang
than being an exchange
of goods between
ing character of trade. Rather
a flow of
domestic
trade is increasingly
systems,
productive
goods
that are organized
rather than na
within
networks
production
globally
are created
tionally.12 Commodities
through
in a
tion processes
performed
multiplicity
Whether
the integration
of national
of produc
territories.
any given territory is included in global production networks
or excluded
on the decisions
actors.
from them depends
of private
can
to
cannot
make
their territories
but they
dic
States
attractive,
try
tate the structure of
networks.
global production
In the classic
realist world
traditional
forms of statecraft
military
were
intertwined
with possibilities
closely
to have
actors were
economic
presumed
military
capacities
est in the
capacities
for economic
gain. Powerful
an interest in the
and
political
of "their" states, just as state managers
had an inter
economic
of "their" entrepreneurs.
National
prowess
was the foundation of military (and therefore diplomatic) strength.Ter
was a route to control over new
assets. A
expansion
productive
of global production
networks makes
the prospective
economic
from territorial
the returns to realist
dubious,
conquest
reducing
ritorial
world
gain
statecraft.
on
al
strategic
capital and technology
depends
liances with those who control global production
rather
than
networks,
a
on the control of any
piece of territory. In
global economy
particular
a
over
amounts
where
there is surplus of labor, control
of territory
large
to
Access
can be more of a burden
and population
than an asset.
on the
actors were
As long as private economic
dependent
political
a
sense
it
environment
made
for them to
state,
provided
by
particular
successes
the political
and aspirations
of that state. Na
identify with
tional
aggrandizement
sovereignty might
Robert
Reich
calls
out the prospect
of private profit; threats to
threats to profit. The operators
of what
reason to
have
much
less
webs"13
"global
identify
held
also contain
11
Robert Wade,
and Its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy Are
"Globalization
and Global Capi
in Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity
Greatly Exaggerated,"
talism (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University
offers a compilation of other such statistics,
Press, 1996). Wade
a nicely
account of the ways in which
such statistics may
along with
skeptical and carefully balanced
exaggerate globalization.
12
See Robert B. Reich, The Work ofNations
(New York Vintage Books, 1992); Gary Gereffi and
eds., Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism
Korzeniewicz,
Miguel
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger,
see
of global networks for social organization,
vision of the consequences
1994). For a comprehensive
Castells, The* Information Age: Economy,
1996).
ciety13(Oxford: Blackwells,
Reich (fn. 12).
Manuel
Society and Culture, vol. 1, The Rise
of theNetwork
So
with
nationalist
territorial
tive of these
the
ambitions
and anxieties.
interstate
networks,
infrastructure
piece of economic
of disruption
and uncertainty.
system
and conflicts
67
From
the perspec
is an essential
as a whole
among
states are a source
Underlying the transnational mobility of capital and the construc
tion of global production networks is a radically globalized financial
a fundamental
au
to
poses
challenge
public
realm. There
has always been foodoose
capital
on the
fi
of international
depended
cooperation
whose
system,
operation
in the economic
thority
and states have
often
but the changes
that have taken place in the last two decades
nanciers,
are
When
Nettl was writing,
the fixed exchange
quite extraordinary.
rate system was still in effect and most
countries
industrialized
major
to exercise
continued
controls
1980s, by contrast,
capital
of currencies was left more
new
framework
institutional
cation
and
information
over
capital flows. By
had been dismanded
controls
to markets
was
the end
and
than to states.14 The
magnified
of the
the value
effect
of the
in communi
by advances
systems.
a succinct
of the current dispropor
summary
economic
and
the
global
leverage avail
states:
in the worlds
able to individual
"Foreign
trading
exchange
centers exceeds a trillion dollars a
financial
greater than the total
day...
Vincent
offers
Cable
tion between
stock
financial
of foreign
exchange
markets
reserves
held
by all governments."15
The
re
sult iswhat Fred Block has called "the dictatorship of international fi
nancial
state that engages
in policies
"unwise"
deemed
Any
as the value of its currency
traders will be punished
its access to capital shrinks.16
markets."
financial
by private
declines
and
These
of globalization
processes
state
of
evaporation
authority, but
certainly contribute
is not
the connection
to the
perceived
as
straightfor
ward as itmight first appear.The state is not eclipsed by the simple fact
its becoming
tistics suggest
of
creased
on trade.
cross-national
dependent
Existing
that greater
reliance on trade is associated
with
role for
more
the
state
rather
than
a diminished
sta
an in
one. Moreover,
14
See Fred Block, The Vampire State and Other Stories (New York: New Press, 1996).
15
A Study in the Loss of Economic
Nation-State:
Cable, "The Diminished
Power," Daedalus
1995), 27.
(Spring
16
a
124
Politics of
Block (fn. 14). See also Geoffrey Garrett, "Capital Mobility,
Trade and the Domestic
the surprising ex
Economic
49, no. 4 (1995). Garrett emphasizes
Policy," International Organization
tent to which
have been able to resist "the dictatorship of international fi
social democracies
European
a
nancial markets," but he leaves no doubt that resistance
growing price. For example, he
imposes
concludes his study by saying: "[Financial markets have imposed significant
interest rate premiums
on the power of the left and
labor, and these increased with the removal of barriers to cross
organized
border capital flows_In
time, one might speculate that no government would be able to bear this
burden" (p. 683).
WORLD POLITICS
68
look at the nations
that have
over
successful
economically
stateness may even be a compet
been most
the last
that
thirty years suggests
high
itive advantage
in a globalized
economy.
Cameron
noticed
years ago David
Twenty
that
the statistical
rela
(as mea
openness
tionship
was
sured by the share of trade in GDP) and the size of government
as
a
rather
The
than
logic
plausi
positive
negative.17
finding
suggested
shares in
ble as that connecting
and
trade
globalization
eclipse. Higher
crease a
to
induced
traumas; a larger
externally
country's
vulnerability
a
sector
Peter
Katzenstein's
counterweight.
public
protective
provides
case studies of small
out the insti
social democracies
spelled
European
the
this
of
tutional
infrastructure
operation
underlying
logic.18
in advanced
industrial
economies
between
are not
is now referred
These
relationships
simply artifacts of what
to as "the
Recent
age of capitalism"
analy
golden
(roughly 1950-73).19
et al., and others shows how the
sis by Garrett,
Kitschelt
configuration
to
continues
of public
institutions
shape the impact of globalization.20
Dani Rodrik has replicated and extended Cameron's statistical findings
using
contemporary
data. Looking
at data
on OECD
countries
for the
1980s and the early 1990s, Rodrik found "aquite strong correlation
between
the OECD countries
(as a
among
government
expenditures
more
are
to
to
that
trade: countries
share of GDP) and exposure
exposed
the
when
he extends
trade have bigger governments."21
Furthermore,
one hundred
most
to more
them
of
than
countries,
developing,
analysis
size of gov
between
he not only finds "a striking positive
relationship
to trade"
case
ernment
and exposure
(in this
government
consumption)
but also finds that "the degree of openness during the early 1960's is a
17
of the Public Economy: A Comparative
"The Expansion
Cameron,
Analysis," American
Science Review 72, no. 4 (1978).
18
Small States inWorld Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe (Ithaca, N.Y:
See Katzenstein,
Political
Cornell
Press, 1985).
University
19
and Realities: Some Histor
See Paul Bairoch and Richard Kozul-Wright,
"Globalisation: Myths
on
in theWorld Economy"
ical Reflections
and Growth
Industrialisation
(Paper presented
Integration,
on "Transnational
and
at the UNU/WIDER conference
in the Developed,
Developing
Corporations
Transitional
Economies:
University,
Sep
Changing
Strategies and Policy Implications," Cambridge
tember 21-23,1995).
20
OECD countries over the period
Garrett's
Geoffrey
analysis (see fn. 16) of data from fifteen
to further elucidate institutional con
included other measures of globalization,
1967-90, which
helps
of
He found that a "coincidence
nections between globalization
and the expansion of government.
to greater gov
and
trade
leftist
unions,
strong
strong
high levels of trade led
parties, capital mobility,
are
ernment
in which
the consequences
of globalization
spending." For another analysis of the ways
see Herbert Kitschelt
et al., eds., Continuity and Change in Contem
mediated
by national institutions,
Press, forthcoming).
(New York: Cambridge University
porary Capitalism
21
Lecture, delivered during the
Rodrik, "The Paradoxes of the Successful State" (Alfred Marshall
1996a),
Istanbul, August 22-24
[final version, September],
meetings,
European Economic Association
31-32. See also idem, "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments"
(NBERWorking
no. 5537,
Paper
April 1996b).
69
of the
very good predictor
three decades."22
expansion
of government
over
the subsequent
over the
look at contrasting
past thirty
trajectories
regional growth
more
stateness
than simply insulate do
may do
years suggests that high
a source
traumas. It may
mestic
from external
actually be
populations
A
advantage in a globalizing
of competitive
growth
leading
major
Asian
of transnational^
economic
headline
competing
economies.
economy. The
may
organized
production
of the thirty years since Nettl
headline
has been
Few would
now
over
have
dizzying
been
wrote,
the
but the
of East
the
growth
spectacular
that the growth of East Asia
dispute
a historic
hier
shift in the economic
the past fifty years represents
one that could
shift
prove to be a regional
eventually
archy of nations,
to the rise of Northwestern
If
earlier.
the
250
years
Europe
comparable
state is
that
the
for
the
headline
argument
globalization
provides grist
on thewane, the East Asia headline has very different implications for
the evolution
of stateness.
since Netd
In the years
wrote,
East Asian
states?from
Korea
in the
North to Singapore in the South with the People's Republic of China in
used
the middle?have
central
role to effect
various
dramatic
in which
the state played a
strategies
in the interna
in
Asia's
changes
position
the role of the state varies across these
societies.23 They
cases,
argue that they are stateless
conti
offer a new variety of high stateness, quite different from Netd's
terms.
in economic
but perhaps more effective
model
nental European
successes
the idea that effective
force us to reexamine
East Asian
tional division
of labor. Obviously
but no one would
participation
state
in a globalized economy is best achieved by restricting
involvement
in economic
affairs. They
suggest
that successful
par
more intense
ticipation in global markets may be best achieved through
22Rodrik(fn.21,1996a),32.
23
literature on the role of the state in the East Asian eco
For a sampling of the now voluminous
in East Asian
see Yilmaz Akyuz
Nexus
and Charles Gore, "The Investment-Profits
nomic miracle,
on "East Asian
Industrialization"
paper prepared for the conference
Development:
(Background
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,
Lessons for aNew Global Environment,"
1,1996).
February 29 and March
See also the published version, World Development
24, no. 3 (1996); Alice Amsdtn, Asia's Next Giant
South Korea and Late Industrialization
Press, 1989); Jos? Edgardo Cam
(New York: Oxford University
Shared Growth Credible (Washington,
pos and Hilton L. Root, The Key to theAsian Miracle: Making
The
"The Politics of Industrial Transformation:
D.C.: Brookings
Institution,
1996); Tun-jen Cheng,
of California,
Case of the East Asia NICs" (Ph.D. diss., University
Berkeley, 1987); Peter Evans, Em
States and Industrial Transformation
Press, 1995);
(Princeton: Princeton University
Countries
The Politics of Growth inNewly Industrializing
Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery:
Press, 1990); Chalmers
(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University
Johnson, Mm and the Japanese Miracle: The
Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982); Robert Wade,
in Taiwan's Industrialization
and the Role of Government
(Prince
Governing theMarket: Economic Theory
Bank (IBRD), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth
ton: Princeton University
Press, 1990); World
and Public Policy (AWorld Bank Policy Research Report) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
bedded Autonomy:
WORLD POLITICS
70
state involvement.
is the most
Singapore
obvious
case
in
Singa
point.24
pore is not only a highly internationalized economy in terms of its ex
treme reliance on trade, but it is also exceptionally dependent for its
local economic dynamism on foreign direct investment by transnational
for the capacity
At the same time it is equally renowned
corporations.
state
and power of its
bureaucracy.
as it may be in terms of the conventional
wis
This
case, anomalous
dom,
underscores
what
should
obvious:
be logically
small countries
bar
gaining with large TNCsmay do better if a competent, unified national
are many
on the local side. There
in the bargaining
participates
some
to
consistent
of
them
with
make
ways
rising wages
quite
profits,
If a state can credibly promise an in
and high rates of local reinvestment.
a
set
consistent with
such strategies,
frastructure
along with
predictable
agenda
of rules and competent rulemakers with whom to dialogue, it is hardly
surprising that there is no dearth of TNCs disposed to join the game.25
East Asia
tween high stateness (albeit not Netd's
success
in a globalizing
and Rodrik's
regression
of a positive
the possibility
demonstrates
connection
be
classic European variety) and
and puts historical meat on Cameron
economy
connection
results. If such a positive
exists, then
the currendy pervasive belief that the institutional centrality of the state
is incompatible with globalization must be explained in terms of the
ideological
face of the current
Ideology
and Interests
global
order.
in the Global
Order
In any international
regime, norms, formal rules, and shared assump
in
the role of the state as the flows of
tions are as important
shaping
goods and capital. John Ruggie made the point impeccably fifteen years
ago in his explication of how the global political economy of the golden
liberalism."26
age came to be characterized
by "embedded
sense
unrestricted
freedom
for global
in the
of relatively
Liberalism,
was
capital,
24
and the role of the state bureaucracy in
internationalized
On Singapore's
strategy of development
and Root (fh. 23); Cheng
this strategy, see Campos
(fh. 23); Gillian Koh, "A Sociological Analysis of
in an Evolving Developmentalist
State" (Ph.D.
Elite: The Bureaucracy
the Singapore Administrative
and National
of Sheffield, England,
1995); Jonathan Quah, "The Public Bureaucracy
diss., University
Abroad (Washington, D.C.:
in K. K. Tummala,
Administrative
in
ta.,
Systems
Singapore,"
Development
and Public Administra
of the Market
Press of America,
1982); idem, "The Rediscovery
University
Administration
from the Singapore Experience," Australian JournalofPublic
tion: Some Lessons
51, no.
L. Root, Small Countries, Big Lessons: Governance and the Rise ofEast Asia (Hong
3 (1993); Hilton
Press, 1996).
Kong: Oxford University
25
to the New,"
States: From the Old Internationalization
See Peter Evans, "TTMCsand Third World
Global
and Robert Rowthorne,
in Richard Kozul-Wright
eds., Transnational
Corporations and the
(London: MacMillan,
forthcoming).
Economy
26
and Change: Embedded
Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions
36 (Spring 1982).
Economic Order," International Organization
Liberalism
in the Postwar
in a social
"embedded"
that committed
compact
71
the advanced
indus
trial states to insulating (at least partially) their citizens from the costs
of such
a
Embedded
system.
liberalism
was
also an Anglo-American
construction, but itwas the product of an Anglo-American
ideology
significantly constrained by post-World War II fears that failure to
domestic
protect
populations
the preceding
decades.
might
reinitiate
the political
traumas
of
Like embedded liberalism, the current regime is ameans of uniting
the contradictory principals of national sovereignty (the keystone of the
interstate system) and economic liberalism (which presumes that states
will
restrain
over
sovereignty
is distinctive
What
to exercise
their desire
cross
economic
transac
their borders).
about the current
can be
to which
is
first
of
all
the
economic
regime
gain
degree
pursued
of
of a version of
the
and, second,
sovereignty
independendy
hegemony
untrammeled
precepts
ideological
remarkably
Anglo-American
by
tions
that
anxieties over potential political instability. Finally, unlike embedded
as a
of primarily
liberalism, which was conceived
regime for the indus
to
to
is
trialized West,
the current normative
regime
apply
presumed
rich and poor alike.
Whether
active
state
citizens
involvement
from
can
increase
the global
economy
that proscribes
using
the benefits
becomes
that a
a moot
garner
country's
sover
in an ideological
climate
territorial
to limit the discretion
actors. In the current
of private economic
eignty
have been tran
order
global
ideological
Anglo-American
prescriptions
to which
states must
scribed into formal rules of the game,
individual
point
commit
or risk
GATT and the
economic
becoming
pariahs.
the most
obvious
formal manifestations
of the doctrine
themselves
are
only
that as far as capital
as economic
behave
WTO
negotiations,
the message
international
international
states
and goods are concerned
the less individual
off
the
will
the
better
world
be.27
Bilateral
actors,
at least those to which
the United
States is a party, convey
even more
financial
financial
of
The
private
representatives
aggressively.28
case
in
the
of
countries,
capital and,
developing
same
like
the
IMF,
organizations
impart the
tutelage.
27
of changes
in regulatory fashion since the golden
For a general discussion
age, see Ha-Joon
on Regulation
in the Postwar Era," Working
of Perspectives
Chang, "The Evolution
Paper (Washing
Institute of theWorld
ton, D.C.: Economic Development
Bank, 1995). For a discussion of the way in
as
which
the WTO constrains economically
nationalist
industrial policy, see V. R. Pan
strategies such
chamuki, "WTO and Industrial Policies," Study no. 7, UNCTAD Project on East Asian Development:
Lessons for a New Global Environment
(Geneva: United Nations,
1996).
28
and Assertive
Industrialization:
U.S.
See, for example, Peter Evans, "Declining Hegemony
in the Computer
43 (Spring 1989).
Brazilian Conflict
Industry," International Organization
WORLD POLITICS
72
The effect of global ideological consensus (sometimes apdy labeled
the "Washington consensus") on individual states goes well beyond the
econ
imposed by any structural
logic of the international
more
in trying to im
fact that becoming
omy. The
actively
engaged
not
economic
local
conditions
risks
the
prove
just of
opprobrium,
but
of
the
also
makes
any state
global hegemon
private actors,
powerfiil
a
intervention
An
that considers
such
very risky proposition.
ideology
constraints
action
neither
local
state from
possible
nor desirable
does,
for whatever
responsibility
suffer at the hands of the global
may
however,
economic
economy.
at least release
the
woes
Even
its citizenry
richer states, with
more highly developed institutional capacities for insulating their pop
ulations
from
are more
metries
economic
likely
of international
power,
are under
the same pressure. They
have done so,29 but given the asym
state to shift
it is hard for any individual
uncertainty,
to resist and indeed
the balance.
The
maining
current
order fits the ideological
and the private
superpower
of both
proclivities
firms that dominate
the only re
the global
to their
iswhether
it speaks effectively
economy. The question
in practice
If an economically
stateless world
could deliver
equilibrium that met the needs of TNCs, then eclipse might
interests.
a
global
indeed be
investors trying to integrate opera
in the offing.
In fact, transnational
across a
contexts need competent,
of
national
pre
shifting variety
even more
sector counterparts
than do old-fashioned
dictable
public
can concentrate
on
their time and energy
investors who
domestic
tions
a
relations with
individual government
building
particular
apparatus.30
even more
same argument
to
The
strongly
applies
global financial
of international
is really closer to a
finance"
capital. The
"dictatorship
situation. The
of the international
financial
operation
hostage
into
chaos
without
fiscal
and
would
descend
system
quickly
responsible
on
actors.
markets
the
Financial
of
international
monetary
part
policies
mutual
can
in the long run their returns de
the principal na
system in which
the control of competent
and "responsible"
states, but
easily punish deviant
on the existence
of an interstate
pend
tional
state
need
are under
economies
actors. Those
capable
great magnitude
who
sit astride
The
the
international
at which
lightning
speed
regulators.
can be
for great
makes
completed
financial
system
transactions
of
allocational
29
Cf. Garrett
(fn. 16); Kitschelt et al. (fn. 20).
30
For a general discussion of the extent to which
effi
firms rely on states to create and sustain markets,
"Markets, Politics and Globalization"
(Manuscript, Berkeley, 1996). See also idem,
Fligstein,
toMarket
Institutions" American Sociological Re
"Markets as Politics: A Political-Cultural
Approach
view 6 (August 1996).
see Neil
ciency
in theory, but
it also makes
for great volatility
73
in
practice.
"Rogue
traders" are (as the name implies) supposed to be aberrations; yet the
returns from
of enormous
the
activity makes
possibility
speculative
a
a
role
continual
certain
After
the
rogue
temptation.31
point, reducing
to
more
states
to
of
interfere
increases
collective
risk
power
exposure
than it expands the possibilities for individual profits.
The
actors need competent,
that private
transnational
capable
than their own ideology
admits does not eliminate
the pos
are
of eclipse. The
calculations
of even sophisticated
managers
fact
states more
sibility
biased by their own worldviews.
Bent on maximizing
its room for ma
an
could
in the
become
neuver, transnational
capital
easily
accomplice
on which
destruction
of the infrastructure
of public
institutions
its
to a
the ability of states to inter
profits depend. Up
point, constricting
vene in
increased profits. By the time state
global markets may produce
so reduced that the
is
of the business
environ
capacity
unpredictability
even
to
ment becomes
actors
who have wide
latitude
intolerable,
major
to do business,
in choosing where
could
reconstructing
public authority
even an
one.
be a long and painful process,
impossible
connect
interactions
The
that
the
complicated
global order and do
more
mestic
the prevail
likely. Accepting
politics make miscalculation
to protect
constrains
the
of
governments
ideology
ability
ing global
costs
of
in the
those
who
bear
the
shifts
citizens,
ordinary
especially
it
is the
of
international
networks.
Whether
configuration
production
Bolivian
in order
state
for health
and education
cutting domestic
expenditures
or
to remain
in conformity
with
the latest restructuring
plan
the Clinton administration pushing through NAFTA in order to demon
strate its full faith in the free international movement of goods and cap
vis-?-vis
of those who
lack privileged
ital, the perception
positions
state is
is likely to be the same. The
international
markets
perceived,
not as the ultimate
of national
interests, but instead as
representative
the instrument
of dimly understood
but somehow
"foreign" interests.32
were
it
in their interest to
decide
that
transnational
managers
have to overcome
of state capacity, they would
foster the reconstruction
reverse
as
as
well
institutional
accumulated
alienation,
atrophy.
political
result of any iron
If eclipse does occur, it will not be the inexorable
Should
clad structural
logic. The
economic
logic of globalization
does
not
in it
31
See Block (fn. 14).
32
there is, of course, a long-standing
tradition of seeing the state in these terms,
In the Third World
that is, as a "tool of imperialism." In the United States a lively folk tradition is rapidly developing
along
as a
as fears of "black
helicopters" and visions of the U.S. government
analogous lines. As nonsensical
sense that U.S. administrations
does reflect an underlying
pawn of the UN may be, this folk mythology
are more responsive to transnational actors than to domestic pressure from below.
WORLD POLITICS
74
self dictate eclipse.While
exercise
from
globalization does make it harder for states to
economic
it also increases
initiative,
state action and the costs of
effective
both
returns
the potential
incompetence.
when
Only
viewed through the peculiar prism of our current global ideological
movement
toward statelessness.
logically entail
out of the
in turn, as much
order grows,
preju
order does globalization
This
global
ideological
dices and ideologies of dominant global actors as out of any logic of in
terests. Given the degree towhich political effects of global economic
change
are mediated
porary
theoretical
by superimposed
interpretative
on the state become
perspectives
contem
frames,
consequential,
not
just for the insights they offer, but also because of their potential im
pact
on
policy.
on the
New Perspectives
State
a
debate on the nature
helped
continuing,
many-stranded
spark
and role of the state. Some of the strands consisted
of efforts to dem
Nettl
onstrate
ical and
in stateness
why variations
economic
analysis. They
perspectives,
like
those
of Weber,
be a central
must
revitalized
Hintze,
and
element
in
polit
refined
pre-Nettl
and Gerschenkron,
and
added new arguments to them.33Other strands jibed better with the
normative and ideological side of the emerging global order.The flour
ishing
of neoclassical
political
and
economy
the renewed
fascination
with civil society are two of the best examples. The logic of each is quite
about globalization,
of arguments
independent
on
a
with
built
order
Anglo-American
global
These
successful
formulations
must,
politically
yet both resonated well
visions
of statelessness.
however,
be considered
salient counterposing
less public
that raise
arguments
together with
new reasons for the
stateness. Once
of
this is
continuing
importance
new
on
as
on
state
the
of
the
lies
much
the
done,
weight
perspectives
as
on
stateness
the side of
side of persistent
eclipse.
New Economic
Perspectives
Of the many strands of thinking on the state that have emerged in the
thirty years since Nettl wrote,
rated into the public political
none
has been more
debate
of neoclassical political economy.While
than
thoroughly
the "neoutilitarian"34
incorpo
version
this line of reasoningwas quite
33
For a review of early efforts in this direction, see Peter Evans, Dietrich
Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University
initial essay by Skocpol.
34
in Evans (fn. 23), chap. 2.
See discussion
and Theda
Reuschemeyer,
Press, 1985), especially the
75
independent of arguments for the historical inevitability of eclipse
based on the supposed exigencies of globalization, it reinforced them,
suggesting that eclipse might be not only inevitable but also desirable.
were
to treat the
the "golden age" most
economists
willing
During
was a source of
state as a black box. Economics
for poli
prescriptions
was not
it
economic
but
cies that would
best promote
growth,
promi
nent as a tool for the institutional analysis of the state itself. As
capitalist growth began to look more problematic in the mid-1970s,
the weak performance
this changed.
Ironically,
in those countries where
the 1970s and 1980s
of market
state
in
economies
involvement
was
least extensive (that is, Britain and the United States) was advanced as
evidence
of excessive
over
power
public
the economy.35
Concern with optimizing state policies continued but itwas joined
to
by efforts
the
analyze
institutional
that underlay
mechanisms
"bad"
policies (that is, those that did not jibe with economic prescriptions).
of "rent
Analysts
in return
change:
seeking"
conceptualized
for political
and material
as an ex
policy-making
state bureaucrats
support,
actors to reap
unproduc
private economic
not because of increased demand
for col
rules that enabled
produced
tive rents.36 States expanded,
Rent
of self-seeking
bureaucrats.
but because
seeking
goods,
seen as aberrant,
and
took what had been traditionally
corrupt practices
in
of
transformed
them into the core of the political
economy
public
lective
stitutions. In this framework approaches likeNettl s, inwhich
and
the maintenance
the state s outputs,
did not make
tablishment
the
Reconceptualizing
to
easier
much
characterize
ical. Older
arguments
state
about
state
the
of norms
were
preeminent
the es
among
sense.
as a vehicle
intervention
inefficiencies
for rent
seeking
made
it
as
intrinsically
patholog
of bureaucracy
and the
impossibility of gathering sufficient information to make good policy
were
If
neoclassical
economy.
political
by this reinvigorated
were
a
state
of the
the negative
effects of
logical consequence
policies
more competent
nature of
then better information,
institutions,
public
advisers were not remedies. The only
officials, and more knowledgeable
were then either
for
the
rational strategies
alleviating
reducing
problem
an absolute
to
institutions
these
allocated
the resources
perverse
by
trumped
35
States and Economic Development: A Comparative Histori
and John M. Hobson.
Cf. Linda Weiss
cal
(Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 1995).
Analysis
36
and Gordon Tullock, eds., Toward a Theory ofRent
See James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison,
ed., Neoclassi
Press, 1980); David Collander,
Seeking Society (College Station: Texas A&M University
DUP Activities
and
Mass.:
cal Political Economy: An Analysis
Ballinger,
(Cambridge,
of Rent-Seeking
of the Rent-Seeking
1984); Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy
Society," American Economic
Review 64 (June 1974).
WORLD POLITICS
76
or somehow
minimum
"marketizing"
on norms of
public
incentive
systems.
reliance
replacing
of marketlike
structure
the administrative
service with
the hard
itself,
constraints
were
as
in favor of state intervention
arguments
Keynesian
rejected
some of
taxes to channel
outmoded.
collective
output
Using
society's
was
a
into
"the old practice of bleeding
public endeavors
equated with
patient with leeches in order tomake the patient healthy."37The grudg
of using
ing acceptance
the
state as a means
of ameliorating
the lot of
those disadvantaged by market outcomes, which had prevailed during
the golden
age, was
supplanted
by the firm conviction
as
that as surely
private greed produced public good through the market, public welfare
to stunt the economic
virtues of its recipients.
Pri
only served
as
as
economic
litde
power, constrained
by the distorting
possible
hand of public policy, was once again touted as the best protector
of the
efforts
vate
public
good,
and
edge.
aggressive
Neoutilitarian
corruption
reaucracies.
on rent
the
ideology
of statelessness
took on a harder, more
an
did provide
the
elegant way of explaining
that are undeniable
facets of most public bu
and venality
As explanations
of such pathologies,
that focus
perspectives
seeking
models
are very usefid.
If, however,
they crowd
out all other
in
terpretations of public behavior, leaving public authority a synonym for
rent
filling
views
run the
a self-ful
and venality,
they
danger of becoming
extent
that
the
To
of
the
neoutilitarian
prophecy.
prevalence
seeking
a career in
remov
and legitimates
strips
public service of prestige
resources
real services to con
need to deliver
ing the
public agencies
rent
becomes
motivation
the
indeed
reasonable
stituents,
seeking
only
norms and traditions
of public ser
the public sector. Once
for joining
vice have been destroyed,
basis is an
them on a piecemeal
reinstituting
task.
overwhelming
While
neoclassical
into pol
economy was easily assimilated
political
more
for
with
fundamental
icy analysis, other innovations,
implications
economic
theories of production
and exchange, were harder to incor
more
"new growth
porate. The
theory," which
provided
elegant ways of
formally endogenizing
technological change and brought the idea of
returns back into
increasing
as
be
read
easily
legitimating
the center
an
expanded
of economic
could
debates,38
role for the state,39 but was
37
38Speech
For a
by Senator Kyi in the Senate, January 20,1995,
quoted in Fred Block (fn. 14).
see Paul Romer "The Origins of Endogenous
but nontechnical
sophisticated
exposition,
Growth," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives 8 (Winter 1994).
39
For example, in the view of Garrett
(fn. 16), "'New Growth'
theory contends that active govern
ment involvement
in the economy (for example, public spending on education, physical infrastructure,
and hence competitiveness
and research and development)
may actually increase productivity
by
77
ECLIPSEOF THE STATE?
nonetheless
difficult
extremely
to translate
into
prescriptions.
policy
the possibility of increasing returns also required accepting
Admitting
the fact that the evolution
of markets
was
and competition
often
highly
path dependent40 and consequendy characterized by multiple equilib
in turn made
ria. This
be counted
did not
on
to
necessarily
to argue that unfettered
markets
could
maximize
but
(or welfare)
automatically
efficiency
on market
to
that could
strategies
point
improve
it harder
outcomes.
are
of this vision of economic
consequences
growth
magnified
an
to
the
fact
that
number
of
software
increasing
by
products?from
more
cost of
media
ideas
than
Since
the
images?are
things.
reproduc
The
an idea
is essentially
increase
with
zero, returns
indefinitely
an
to
In
of "ideas" subject
scope of the market.
economy
increasing
turns rather than
to
ones, the distribution
decreasing
"things" subject
ing
the
re
of
income and profits is especially dependent on appropriability. The
of returns
to an idea does
not flow
from
a
logic of marginal
a
sense of the term, but it does
in
production
meaningful
depend
on authoritative
like the determination
of the duration
of
decisions,
and
the
and
intellectual
property
patent protection
regime
copyright
more
generally.
more
As an economy
of
enforcement
ideas, authoritative
produces
more
more
to
both
and
becomes
difficult
critical
property
rights
prof
a
state
this requires an active, competent
itability. In
global economy
its rules. In
that is able to secure the compliance
of other states with
magnitude
costs
the most
short,
privileged
economic
actors
in a global
information
economy (that is, global companies likeDisney orMicrosoft whose as
sets
take
stronger
enforcers
The
from
the form of ideas) do not need weaker
states;
ones, or at least states that are more
sophisticated
than the traditional
state."
"night watchman
growing
the global
centrality
economic
last two decades.
of the
threatened
cancellation
over
of struggles
appropriability
of
the
United
States over
policies
From
301s"
to GATT
"super
of China's most-favored-nation
a
is evident
the course
negotiations
status because
of software
come
they need
and active
of intellectual
property
piracy, the question
rights
facet
of
economic
U.S.
international
key
policy. While
to
has be
other
are
like Paul Krugman,
by the market" (p. 658). Others,
providing collective goods that
undersupplied
would argue that government
efforts to exploit the theoretical possibilities
revealed by the new growth
theory are likely to do more harm than good; see, for example, Krugman, Peddling Prosperity: Economic
in the
Sense and Nonsense
(New York: W. W. Norton,
1995). Nonethe
Age ofDiminished Expectations
have been opened up.
less, even Krugman would not deny that new theoretical possibilities
40
in the Economy," Scientific American (Feb
See, for example, Brian W. Arthur, "Positive Feedbacks
ruary 1990).
WORLD POLITICS
78
forms of regulation are in disrepute, this particular kind of policing is
now
as one of the cornerstones
treated
of economic
civilization.
are a
a
rights
specific instance of
general point.
In the complex
of
novel
authoritative
normative
exchange
intangibles,
are
measure
in
which
the
become
the
structures,
state,
by
provided
large
new institutional
of
efficient
The
with
economics,
keystones
exchange.
on the
structures and the
its
of
governance
necessity
pervasive
emphasis
trans
to any kind of economic
frameworks
of institutional
importance
can
exist
further
the
that
efficient
markets
actions,
argument
generalizes
in the context of effective
and robust nonmarket
institutions.41
only
Intellectual
property
Neoclassical political economy offers a good rationale for eclipse, but
a broader
at the evolution
look
that flowed
conclusions
itself. Powerful
of economic
our earlier
from
transnational
economic
reinforces
the
theorizing
examination
of globalization
actors may have an interest
in
their own activities but they also
the state's ability to constrain
limiting
on a
state to protect their returns,
those from
especially
capable
depend
assets. In this
of the state's institutional
optic, the persistence
intangible
centrality looks more likely than eclipse.
Civil
and the
Society
that allocational
conviction
The
control
of public
dendy
Neither
creates
efficiency
a
only
partial
can be achieved
ideological
frame
indepen
at best.
idealized visions of individuals interrelating by means of bilat
eral voluntary
relieves basic
exchanges
anxieties
suages nostalgia
New
perspectives
civil
State
society
Anglo-American
for the
nor the actual
of capitalist markets
experience
the maintenance
of public order or as
ties.
of traditional
satisfactions
community
about
on governance
role of
the potential
that highlighted
a nice
to the economic
side of
complement
provided
were not
they
global per
though
ideology.42 Even
new global order.The political
spectives in themselves, they fit with the
of the stateless Anglo-American
triumph
of state-socialist
the implosion
societies,
the charisma
of civil
society. The
world
was
revitalization
order,
an
as reflected
impetus
important
of civil society was por
41
in
to
C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
See, for example, Douglass
The Economic Institutions of
Press, 1990); and Oliver Williamson,
Cambridge University
(New York: Free Press, 1985).
Capitalism
42
For a sampling of the variety of ways which civil society has captured the imagination of social sci
Consolidation"
Journal of
entists, see Larry Diamond,
"Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic
Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (New York:
Democracy 5 (July 1994); Ernest Gellner,
Civil Society: Theory, History and Comparisons (London: Polity
Penguin Press, 1994); John A. Hall, ed.,
Civic Poli
andWorld
Activism
"Politics beyond the State: Environment
Press, 1995); Paul Wapner,
tics," World Politics 47 (April 1995).
(Cambridge:
at least
by conservatives,
trayed,
side of public well-being,
solete,
just
as
as a solution
79
to the social
and political
one that could make the state politically ob
global markets
made
the state economically
obsolete.
To fit with the prevailing global order, a focus on civil society had to
repress the possibility that social and political malaise might flow from
the pervasive marketization
of social relations
instead of from the over
state. This, of course, was
conser
intrusion
of
the
bearing
precisely what
vative interpreters did. Rather
than seeing the unchallenged
dominion
of
as the
to a revitalization
of traditional
primary obstacle
saw
intrusive
the
efforts
of
the
state, ostensibly
ties, they
community
as
aimed at enhancing welfare,
out"
Just as neo
community.43
"crowding
market
relations
classical political economy negated the state s role in the development of
a more
and efficient
productive
society, the growing
more
and exclusionary
(and other
society
parochial
state s
to
to nonmarket
the
nity) negated
ability
speak
In many
cases, the vision of an engaged,
organized
ing oppressive
movements
charisma
forms
of civil
of commu
needs.44
unseat
citizenry
state elites fit the historical facts. The oppositional
that helped
state-socialist
appara
bring down moribund
were a
The
of
process
Europe
prime example.
replac
in Latin
electoral democracies
ing authoritarian
military
regimes with
a similar surge of civil
as a
to
America
produced
society
counterweight
in these cases, however,
the leviathan of state power. Even
the idea that
tuses
in Eastern
civil society could provide a substitute for the organized public institu
tions of the state
In both Eastern Eu
optimistic.
proved unrealistically
the reinvigoration
of civil society
rope and Latin America,
proved
to authoritarian
harder to sustain once the unifying
focus of opposition
rule was
more
Here
success. Even
by political
of
relations.
theory
state-society
dissipated
complex
again,
contemporary
as in the case of economic
thinking
on civil
society
these
theorizing,
reveals much
cases
a closer
that
for a
called
look
at
is at odds
with the global order s assumption that fostering civil society requires
the eclipse of the state. The proposition
accelerating
lation between
the robustness
of state institutions
of a zero-sum
and the vibrancy
re
of
civil society is contested even by some of those most convinced of the
indispensability of civic associations. A growing body of work suggests
43
James Coleman, Foundations
of Social Theory (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1990), 321.
44
communities.
Civil society was, of course, the most universalistic basis for organizing
Exclusion
ary ethnic and religious categories represented potent alternative bases for redefining the nation and re
the footing of public authority. While
Nettl did not anticipate the upsurge of neoclassical
constituting
see (fn. 1) the
state and nation"
as a
political economy, he did
"snapping of the link between
(p. 560)
reason for
a general decline in stateness,
in
the
world.
projecting
developing
especially
WORLD POLITICS
80
that relations
thought
are more
society
or synergy.
empowerment
the state and civil
between
of in terms
of mutual
productively
Robert Putnam's brief polemic with Joel Migdal provides a good
starting point. Based on his reading of the relationship between "social
in
takes
capital" and the efficacy of regional governments
Italy, Putnam
seems
to
issue with
which
that
societies
work,
suggest
strong
Migdal's
states and that one of the necessary
result in weak
for the
conditions
se
of strong states is a "massive societal dislocation,
which
emergence
social
associa
weakens
Not
"civic
control."45
so, argues Putnam,
verely
. . .
tions are powerfully
institutions
associated
with
effective
public
Putnam's
is
strong society, strong state."46 What
suggests
perspective
on economic
that just as modern
markets
decisions
depend
being
nested
ment
in a predictable
more
flourishes
institutional
framework,
groups when
they have
have
drawn
Others
civic
likewise
citizens
engage
and
easily among
private
organized
a
sector as an interlocutor.
competent
public
contexts.
the same lesson from very different
Looking atAfrica, the region inwhich the disintegration of both state
and civil
organizations
a
for
argues
"symbiotic
During
society
has been most
relationship
between
Chazan
dramatic, Naomi
state and civil
society."47
the crisis of the 1970s and 1980s "both state agencies and social
a process
of implosion."48
where
Conversely,
experienced
of intermedi
there has been recovery from the crisis, the "reemergence
ate social
the definition
and reasser
groups" has "come together with
tion of state capacities,
the close connection
between
civil
highlighting
networks
society
and
stateness."49
Vivienne
Shue,
looking
at what
might
be con
45
in the Third
and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities
Migdal,
Strong Societies
World (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1988), 269.
46
Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions inModern Italy (Princeton: Princeton Univer
result from their different
sity Press, 1993), 176. In part, the differences between Putnam and Migdal
of a strong society. Migdal
focuses on vertical, clientelistic ties and parochial relationships
definitions
that fos
based on primordial affinities like ethnicity and kinship. Putnam focuses on civic associations
ter ties among social
rather
they may be deeply rooted in history, are modern
equals and that, while
in form. Putnam's version of society is, however, the one that is relevant to the vision
than primordial
that the emergence of civil society will permit the withering
away of formal leviathans of repressive
proponents of civil society have in mind when they work toward fos
public authority. What
optimistic
in Latin America
is presumably neither the
tering its rebirth in Eastern Europe or its reinvigoration
of clientelistic ties nor the reawakening of primordial
loyalties and parochial prejudices
strengthening
but rather the kinds of horizontal
civic associations
that are the focus of Putnam's argument. I am in
and
for drawing this point to my attention; cf. Heller, "Social Mobilization
debted to Patrick Heller
from Kerala" (Paper presented at the annual meetings
Democratization:
Lessons
of the
Comparative
Association
for Asian Studies, April 1996).
47
in Joel Migdal,
Atul
Life in Sub-Sanaran Africa,"
the State: Associational
Chazan,
"Engaging
and Transformation
(Cam
Shue, eds., State Power and Social Forces: Domination
Kohli, and Vivienne
bridge:
48 Cambridge
Ibid., 269.
49
Ibid., 278.
University
Press,
1994),
258.
81
sidered the polar opposite case?the People's Republic of China?finds
a similar
kind of mutual
of state and society. The vicis
empowerment
of state-society
relations under communist
and postcommunist
... between
rule demonstrate,
she says, "an intriguing
the
relationship
a
on
one
of
robust
of
civil
the
associational
life,
hand,
emergence
sphere
situdes
and
the consolidation
state
organization,
in a
of social
power
on the other."50
relatively
strong
or resilient
Examining what he calls "the browning of Latin America" over the
course
sets out the converse
of the 1980s, Guillermo
O'Donnell
argu
a
ment
in way
that is consonant
with
the mutual
empowerment
hy
out that "current
of Chazan
and Shue.51 First,
he points
pothesis
at
the size and deficits of the state as bureaucracy...
attempts
reducing
are also
the state-as-law
of
and the ideological
destroying
legitimation
then argues that the crisis of the state leads to a degen
and civic en
society in which
community
organization
are
an
atomization."53
"angry
replaced by
the state."52 He
eration
of civil
gagement
These broad arguments that the fate of civil society is linked to the
sector
ability of the public
at the microlevel.
Studies
to sustain
itself have
counterparts
interesting
the developing
world
throughout
find evidence
for "state-society
development
proj
synergy."54 Effective
ects at the microlevel
in combina
often involve state agencies working
scattered
tion with local social groups. The possibility of coproduction, inwhich
a
to
and local communities
work
together
produce
or collective
state appa
is associated
in turn with
good,
ratuses that have sufficient
de
and
bureaucratic
corps
esprit
sophistica
set
tion to move beyond mechanistically
the simplest possible
imposing
case in
of centralized
is
rules. The
Taiwan's
point
archetypal
irrigation
state
agencies
service
needed
which
associations,
reaucratic decision
substantial
cluding
allocation.55
are built
making
around a subde melding
of centralized
and real involvement
of local villagers,
community
States with weaker
control
over
bureaucracies
bu
in
the process of local water
are
incapable of sustain
50
See Shue, "State Power and Social Organization
in China" inMigdal, Kohli, and Shue (fh. 47), 66.
51
"On the State, Democratization
and Some Conceptual
Problems: A Latin American
O'Donnell,
at Some Postcommunist
View with Glances
2\, no. 8 (1993). O'Don
Countries," World Development
nell uses the term "browning" to refer to "territorial evaporation of the public dimension
of the state"
areas in which both effective bureaucracies
and "properly sanctioned
(p. 1358), that is, the spread of
are
lacking.
legality"
(p. 1359)
52
O'Donnell
(fn. 51), 1358.
53
Ibid., 1365.
54
in the special section on "Govern
See articles by Burawoy, Evans, Fox, Heller, Lam, and Ostrom
ment Action,
World
24 (June 1996); and also Judith
Social Capital and Development,"
Development
in the Tropics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Tendier, Good Government
Press, 1997).
55
See the article by Lam (fn. 54). See also Michael
P. Moore,
"The Fruits and Fallacies
of
Neoliberalism:
The Case of Irrigation," World Development
17r, no. 11 (1989).
WORLD POLITICS
82
ing the kind of locally oriented bureaucratic competence thatmakes co
production
possible.56
for positive-sum
The evidence
relations
between
the effectiveness
of
civic associations and state capacity is not limited to theThird World.
ex
historical
there are interesting
States,
the founding
of the Chil
synergy. In examining
amples of state-society
one of the most
in the
dren's Bureau,
successful
early developments
in the stateless
Even
United
shows how a broad spectrum of geographi
state, Skocpol
were
to this
associations
critical
women's
voluntary
cally dispersed
women
notes the
for
and
She
also
children."57
parallels
"statebuilding
effort and the relationship
between
volun
between
this "maternalist"
U.S.
welfare
tary associations
another example
and economic
of farmers
and
of state-society
the U.S.
Department
synergy
generating
of Agriculture,
social
widespread
change.58
If thiswork is right, a sustained efflorescence of civil society may well
on the simultaneous
of robust, competent
organi
a
state.
the
syn
counterparts
state-society
Conversely,
states
toward less capable and involved
ergy view implies that a move
to achieve
their goals
will make
it more difficult
for civic associations
depend
zational
construction
within
and will thereby diminish incentives for civic engagement. In the most
extreme
case,
"browning."59
the result would
Once
be a globalized
version of O'Donnell's
examination
of recent theoretical
a closer
again,
this time
an in
rather than economic,
suggests
perspectives,
political
or
ca
state
not
in
in
maintenance
of
but
the
terest,
expansion
eclipse,
members
of
it
is
interests
of
this
the
In
case, however,
ordinary
pacity.
are
at
elites.
civil society that
play rather than those of transnational
of Stateness
The Future
contain
in economics,
as in
state
capacities
results that
produces
itself. Together,
of globalization
like those
perspectives,
political
in
of
favor
arguments
strengthening
of these perspectives
eclipse. Analysis
Newer
those drawn
guments
the analysis
lead us to expect states
from
to
play
a
persistent
as many
favor
of
parallel
these ar
role in the future of
56
See Ostroms
(fn. 54) discussion of Nigeria.
57
Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers andMothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United
States (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1992), 480-91.
58
Inter
"State Capacity and Economic
Ibid., 486. See also Theda Skocpol and Kenneth Finegold,
vention in the Early New Deal," Political Science Quarterly 97 (Summer 1982). For a recent reprise of
see Skocpol,
from Above," American Prospect 25 (March-April
"Unravelling
Skocpol's perspective,
1996).
59
O'Donnell
(fn. 51).
83
the global political economy, but such an outcome can hardly be taken
for granted. Just because an information-oriented, globalized system of
even more
seem to
would
than prior
production
depend
exercise of public authority does not mean
the competent
on
economies
that the insti
tutional bases of such authority will survive. Just because the historical
experience
of those
most
countries
successfid
at
to the modern
adapting
globalized economy has been characterized by high levels of state in
volvement
does
not mean
that
their experience
will
in the
be reflected
of all, a
institutional
that prevail globally. Most
obvious
arrangements
ca
a more vibrant civil
more
between
association
society and
positive
pable state institutions will not prevent both from disappearing.
then can be said about
What
the future prospects
of stateness
in this
era of globalization? One reasonable and optimistic hypothesis looks to
the return of the ideological pendulum. In this view, the recent push to
a natural reaction
to the
the role of the state represented
previ
state managers.
The
and
of
capac
glaring
overreaching
politicians
reduce
ous
ity gap led to a period during which, inDani Rodriks words, "excessive
optimism
about what
the
state would
be able
to
accomplish
was
re
placed by excessive pessimism." Rodrik suggests further that, having
now
surmounted
serious
we are "on the threshold
of a
pessimism,"
one that
of the role of the state in development,
"excessive
reconsideration
will lead to an improved understanding of the role that governments
can (and have to) play."60
This
makes
perspective
sense.
took on more
States
handle during the period followingWorld War
than
they could
II.Dealing with the ca
was
the state s role. Readjustment
gap clearly required rethinking
s
in
the state
and overzealousness
role, natural. The
necessary,
reducing
a return to the past, but it
return of the
not sanction
need
pendulum
new efforts to turn states into effective
instruments
would
legitimate
pacity
is whether
the
question
is likely to come
point that reflects dispassionate
pendulum
to the relative ef
with
of
accumulated
regard
analysis
global experience
forms and strategies of state action.
fectiveness
of different
for
the achievement
of collective
goals.
to rest at a
The
Netd, however, brings a historical and ideological dimension to the
story
ment
to attain. His
argu
self-examination
simply leaves
sociopolitical
a
for any valid notion of the state" suggests
unlikely
hegemon
To this
of the pendulum
the proper position
dispassionately.61
the efficient
that makes
middle
seem harder
that "an American
no room
to assess
60
Rodrik (fn. 21,1996a),
61
Nettl
(fn.l), 561.
2-3.
WORLD POLITICS
84
must
actors most
the problem
that the nonstate
are
normative
order
private corporate
global
be added
the
defining
powerful
elites whose
in
view of where the pendulum belongs is colored by their irreducible in
terest
global
mands
a set of
in protecting
private managerial
prerogatives.
Generating
norms
to
that will
the
search
for
reduce
de
encourage
ways
on
institutions
but also support the necessary
enhance
public
ment of state capacity will require substantial ideological revisionism.
for expecting
Grounds
a shift
such
are scanty,
but
there
are some.
The shifting balance of economic dynamism in the interstate system is
a
source
possible
of revisionism.
success
economic
extraordinary
So far, the implications
for the kind of stateness
of East Asia's
that ismost
ef
fective in a globalized economy have found surprisingly little place in
official discourse. Official (as opposed to academic) analysis has been
remarkably
East Asia's
tinctively
the state
tenuate
The
mon,
in its
of the revisionist
of
suppression
implications
the
eventual
assimilation
of
dis
Nonetheless,
experience.62
on
of stateness
into global discourse
East Asian
experiences
obdurate
seems
increasing
the burden
movement
Any
toward eclipse.
reluctance
of the United
in this direction
inevitable.63
the current
would
at
bias
of delivering
what
to shoulder, as
hege
to be valuable
perceive
States
others
as an
for ideological
may
impetus
current
of
for
that
argues
asymmetries
change.
Strange,
example,
a
interstate power have created
situation
in which
"the most
powerful
are able to block, even veto, any exercise of
in global
issues of
authority
global
collective
also
goods
serve
Susan
or of the universal
the environment,
of financial
of
regulation,
provision
for
shelter
and
health
care."64
then
fur
needs
She
food,
presses
the present hegemonic,
do
ther, saying that "the only way to remove
basic
nothing veto on better global governance
based
is to build, bit by bit, a
on
embracing
the same
but
opposition
European-Japanese
cooperation
some
Asians
and Africans
who
Latin Americans,
share
of
remote the
interests and concerns
for the future."65 However
prospects
for this kind
compelling
of collective
action,
Stranges
argument
does
identify another potential impetus for ideological shift.66
62
Bank and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance,"
See, for example, Robert Wade,
"Japan, theWorld
Review 217 (May-June
1996).
63Left
Some would argue that the East Asian experience already constitutes a competing model, at least
countries of the region itself. See Barbara Stallings andWolfgang
for the developing
Streeck, "Capi
in Stallings,
talisms in Conflict? The United
States, Europe and Japan in the Post-Cold War World,"
Context ofDevelopment
ed., Global Challenge, Regional Response: The New International
(New York:
Press, 1995).
Cambridge University
64
Strange (fn. 7), 71.
65
Ibid.
66
source of normative
to be found
Another
unlikely but still intriguing?is
potential
change?also
in the networks of public organizations
and officials that are part of the global order. John Meyer,
in a
New
relatively implausible fonts of ideological change are likely to
These
as
consequences
only insofar
they help
ambivalent
relation
of
transnational
ready
as TNCs value the elimination
eclipse. Much
have
restrict
85
their managerial
prerogatives,
they
to further
undercut
the al
to any
project of
of the ability of states to
also recognize
the benefits
business
of dealing with robust and capable public interlocutors. They have an
interest
in
keeping
on
state managers
the defensive?something
that
escalating rhetoric on the inevitability and desirability of eclipse ac
complishes
stitutional
an interest in
the real in
avoiding
they also have
a
state.
This
of the
above all else makes
marginalization
nicely. But
return of the pendulum likely.
main
The
that
it is easily
problem with
conflated with
a
return-of-the-pendulum
a return to "embedded
is
perspective
liberalism." Even
if a return of the pendulum ismore likely than eclipse, the threat of
envi
the current global
still shapes stateness. What
ideological
eclipse
ronment does is to ensure that responses
to a
crisis
of
capacity
genuine
state
at
in order
will be defensive.
aimed
increasing
capacity
Strategies
to meet
social
and
look
demand
for
collective
goods
protection
rising
denies the state's poten
in an ideological
climate that resolutely
foolish
state managers
to the
and
Beleaguered
general welfare.
as
an
on
to preserve
institution
the state
leaders, bent
trying
political
come
some
own
innovative
with
their
(and
may
up
organi
positions),
the scope of
and some salutary ways of reducing
zational
improvements
states attempt, but their
what
strategy is likely to be reneging
primary
tial contribution
on the old commitment
to embedded
ing the capacity gap is redefined
meaner
kind of stateness.
In the most
sinister
version
as a
of this
The problem
of constructing
liberalism.
project
of clos
a leaner,
stateness,
leaner, meaner
politi
in
for the state as an institution
state managers
gain support
essential
for sustaining
the state's role to activities
for restricting
ser
to deliver
markets. The
of transnational
the profitability
capacity
can
for themselves
vices that the affluent
(for example,
supply privately
institu
restricted
the more
is sacrificed, while
health
and education)
to deliver essential business
services and secu
tional capacity necessary
cians
and
return
classic article, presents a strong case for the collective power of public officials to shape global norms at
in Al
of the Nation-State,"
"The World
the transnational
level; seeMeyer,
Polity and the Authority
bert Bergesen,
Press, 1980). Meyer's
ed., Studies in theModern World System (New York: Academic
more recent changes in global ideology, but there
is unconvincing,
especially in view of
general model
in public institutions
are some very interesting, if modest,
examples of transnational networks rooted
order. See, for example, Peter Haas,
that have effected
"Banning
change in the global normative
International
Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone,"
Chlorofluorocarbons:
Community
Epistemic
46 (Winter 1992).
Organization
WORLD POLITICS
86
rity (domestic and global) ismaintained.
means
more
devoting
and reckless among
In turn, delivering security
resources
to the
repression
the excluded,
both domestic
of the more
desperate
and international.
Rescuing embedded liberalismwould require a very different config
of state-society
and a
relations
different
correspondingly
one founded
on relations
of mutual
stateness,
empowerment
uration
of
kind
be
tween state institutions and a broadly organized civil society of the kind
suggested by Chazan and her colleagues.67 Engaging the energy and
in the
of citizens
and communities
of ser
imagination
coproduction
vices is a way of enhancing
the state s ability to deliver services without
scarce material
resources from
to demand more
in
having
society. The
creased
social
service
then
approbation
an
becomes
that comes
with
more
effective,
responsive
reward for those who
intangible
important
such a strategy simultaneously
rewards the
of
civil
the
reservoir
of po
society, thereby augmenting
reinvigoration
to in
in
it is almost certainly
tential participants
subject
coproduction,
returns. Like the returns to the
bureaucratic
of
creasing
development
in an earlier era, the returns to more
forms of organization
innovative
on
stateness
forms of
based
synergy could be prodigious.
state-society
work
the state. Since
within
Unfortunately,
the movement
toward
eclipse
has
already made
this
kind of institutional development unlikely. The kind of capacity neces
a
sary to make the state a dependable
partner in strategy of state-society
scarce
are
less
synergy is already in
supply. Civic groups
correspondingly
to be attracted
to
of
mutual
that
involve
empowerment
strategies
likely
to
disillusionment
with
the state s capacity
agencies.
Legitimate
antistate
the
discourse
exacerbated
of
the
deliver,
pervasive
by
Anglo
state
American global order, has solidified into a domestic political climate
the state as an ally seem farfetched.
and
Finally,
are
to see a
elites
threat
likely
important,
political
perhaps
private
in any form of state-society
synergy that involves subordinate
groups.
are slim, but
of
The
synergy
prospects
state-society
political
they
that makes
engaging
most
or
state managers
For beleaguered
altogether.
meaner
at
with
the
stateness,
leaner,
political
politicians
It promises
tractions of a strategy of state-society
synergy are obvious.
away out of the
to
It
also
currendy
asphyxiating
capacity gap.
promises
should
not be discounted
disenchanted
generate
of public
a set of allies
much
less ambivalent
potentially
elites who
institutions
than are the business
about
the value
constitute
the
principal political pillar of the leaner,meaner state.The logic is equally
67
See Migdal,
Kohli, and Shue (fn. 47), especially
and Accommodation
Forces: On Political Contention
Kohli and Shue, "State Power
in the Third World."
and the Social
powerful
from
the point
of view
87
of civic organizations.
Leaner,
meaner
will do little for them. They need capable state organizations
their policy
to guarantee
preferences
the global
into practice
business
climate.
likely, but the possibility
civic
liances with
no less
implausible
labor organizations
tieth
even more
Leaner,
to put
than TNCs need
meaner
states
is still more
that state apparatuses might forge new al
in the early decades
is
of the new millennium
than the alliances that were actually forged between
and the state during
the early decades of the twen
actors
century.
Probing beneath the rhetoric of globalization
problematic
quite
consistent
with Netd's
original
and eclipse reveals a
admonitions.
Project
ing the institutional evaporation of the state provides little more illu
it altogether.
with
Preoccupation
eclipse
serious ongoing
shifts in the nature of state
ness. It also inhibits
forms of stateness.
of more promising
exploration
and ex
mesmerized
by the power of globalized
Becoming
production
in the
is equally counterproductive.
Whether
the future unfolds
change
a leaner, meaner
state or embodies more
of
direction
unlikely
probable
on the economic
elements
of state-society
synergy does not depend
mination
than
distracts
attention
ignoring
from
logic of globalization alone. It also depends on how people think about
stateness.
C14. ULUSLARARASI POLİTİK EKONOMİ İçinde Şaban Kardaş ve Ali Balcı, Uluslararası İlişkiler’e Giriş: Tarih, Teori,
Kavram ve Konular, Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 2014
Ziya Öniş ve Mustafa Kutlay GİRİŞ ..................................................................................................................................................... 1 DİSİPLİNİN DOĞUŞU VE GELİŞİMİ .............................................................................................. 2 KÜRESELLEŞME, ÇOK-‐KUTUPLULUK VE YENİ BÜYÜK SORULAR ..................................... 4 TÜRKİYE’NİN EKONOMİ POLİTİĞİ .............................................................................................. 8 SORULAR ............................................................................................................................................. 9 EK OKUMA ÖNERİLERİ ................................................................................................................... 9 KAYNAKÇA ...................................................................................................................................... 10 GİRİŞ Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi (UPE), devletler ile piyasaların dinamik etkileşimi ve birbirlerini nasıl şekillendirdiklerini araştıran disiplinlerarası sosyal bilimler yaklaşımının genel adıdır. Uluslararası siyasetin temel örgütlenme biçimi olan devletlerin ‘güç’, iktisadi hareketin temel örgütlenme zemini olan piyasaların ise ‘refah’ üretiminde kurucu unsurlar olduğu varsayımından hareketle, Robert Gilpin (1975: 43), UPE’yi “uluslararası ilişkilerde güç ve refah arayışının karşılıklı ve dinamik etkileşimi” olarak tanımlamaktadır. Kutu C14 1: Politik Ekonominin Kökenleri Modern UPE disiplini 1970’lerde ortaya çıkmış olmakla birlikte, disiplinin teorik kökenleri çok daha gerilere gitmektedir. Realist politik ekonomi teorilerinin kökeni 15. yüzyıl merkantilizmine dayanmaktadır. Merkantilist perspektif, devletlerin ihracatı teşvik etmesini, korumacı duvarlarla ithalatın kısıtlanmasını önermektedir. Liberal politik ekonomi teorilerinin kökeni, 19. yüzyılda serbest ticareti ve kapitalist iş bölümünü refah artışının temel dinamiği olarak öneren Adam Smith’in Milletlerin Refahı isimli klasik çalışmasına dayanmaktadır. Marksist teorilerin menşei ise yine 19. yüzyılda Karl Marks’ın abidevi çalışmalarına dayanmaktadır. Marks ve Engels, eserlerinde kapitalizmin üretim, değişim ve bölüşüm dinamiklerini ortaya koymayı hedeflemiş, tarihin akışının sınıflar ve sınıf çatışması ekseninde şekillendiğini önermişlerdir. (Watson, 2005)
Devletler ve piyasalar arasındaki girift ilişki, aynı zamanda iki farklı mantığın karşılıklı rekabet ve iş birliğini simgelemektedir. Giovanni Arrighi’ye göre devlet-‐piyasa ilişkisi, ‘sınır mantığı’ ile ‘sermaye mantığı’ etkileşimi çerçevesinde ele alınabilir. Sınır mantığı, daimi güç arayışındaki modern devletlerin belli sınırlar ve bu sınırlar içindeki beşeri ve doğal kaynaklar üzerinde egemenlik/otorite tesis etme çabasına işaret eder. Sermaye mantığı ise daimi refah arayışındaki piyasa aktörlerinin çoğu 1
kez sınırları aşarak genişleyen bir hacimde ticaret, para akışı, teknoloji transferi vs. yoluyla sermaye birikimlerini azami kılma çabasına karşılık gelmektedir (Arrighi, 2005: 27-‐30). Devlet mantığının, güç elde etmek için piyasanın ürettiği refahtan yararlanmaya çalışması, refahını daha da artırma amacındaki sermaye mantığının ise devletin kural koyucu, düzenleyici ve rant yaratıcı otoritesini yedeğine alma gayretleri, karşılıklı etkileşimin iş birliği boyutunu oluşturmaktadır. Diğer taraftan, devlet mantığı ile sermaye mantığının hedefler ve öncelikler konusunda çatışması, karşılıklı iş birliğinin rekabete dönüşmesine de sebep olabilmektedir (Balaam ve Veseth, 1996). Örneğin, çok-‐
uluslu şirketlerin ticari liberalleşme taleplerine karşı, devletlerin gelişmekte olan sanayilerini koruma gayretleri bu tarz rekabetin sayısız örneğinden birini oluşturmaktadır. Bu çerçevede UPE, uluslararası düzlemde güç ve refahın nasıl organize edildiğini anlamaya çalışır. Mevcut siyasi ve ekonomik düzende ‘kimin ne kazandığı’ ise politik ekonomi analizlerinin temel hareket noktasını oluşturmaktadır (Strange, 1988). DİSİPLİNİN DOĞUŞU VE GELİŞİMİ Bağımsız bir sosyal bilimler disiplini olarak UPE, 1970’lerde uluslararası sistemde yaşanan derin Kutu C14 2: Amerikan Ekolü vs. İngiliz Ekolü krizlerin yeni yaklaşımları zorunlu kılması sonucu ortaya çıkmıştır. İlk olarak 1971 yılında UPE’nin önemli isimlerinden Benjamin Cohen 2008 yılında yayınlanan kitabında UPE literatürünü iki ABD Başkanı Nixon, dolara dayalı sabit kur ana ekole ayırmıştır: Amerikan Ekolü ve İngiliz sisteminin çöktüğünü ilan etmiş, ardından Ekolü. Bu tasnif, coğrafya ya da ulusal tabiiyete göre 1973-‐1974 tarihlerinde yaşanan petrol krizleri değil, teorik ve metodolojik hassasiyetlere göre yapılmıştır. Amerikan Ekolü, pozitivizm ve Batı ekonomilerini beklenmedik biçimde ampirizm esaslarına dayanarak, “bilimsel” politik etkilemiştir. 1970’lerde üçüncü dünya ekonomi anlayışına vurgu yapmaktadır. Bu ekol ülkelerinin ‘yeni uluslararası ekonomik düzen’ daha çok mevcut yapıları ve güç ilişkilerini verili alarak, siyasetin uluslararası ekonominin işleyişini sloganıyla mevcut sisteme şekillendiren güç nasıl etkilediğini rasyonel aktör modeli ilişkilerini sorgulamaya başlaması, bu tarihe çerçevesinde anlamaya çalışmaktadır. İngiliz Ekolü ise mevcut yapıları verili almak yerine, bu yapıların kadar birbirinden ayrı kabul edilen ekonomi ve nasıl ortaya çıktığını incelemekte ve içerdikleri güç siyasetin aslında aynı madalyonun iki yüzü ilişkilerini, ideolojileri ve değer yargılarını eleştirel olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Bu tarihten bir perspektifle anlamayı ve yorumlamayı hedeflemektedir. Gittikçe artan oranda nicel itibaren uluslararası ticaret, kur rejimleri, tekniklere dayanan Amerikan Ekolü tema ve doğrudan yatırımlar, çok-‐uluslu şirketler ve konulara ağırlık verirken, İngiliz Ekolü uluslararası ekonomideki üretim, değişim ve bölüşümün yapısal hegemonya gibi kavramların uluslararası dinamiklerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Cohen’in tabiriyle siyasetin ihmal edilemez öğeleri olduğu Amerikan Ekolü “ağaçlara, İngiliz Ekolü ise ormana anlaşılmıştır. Oysa 1970’lere kadar Bretton odaklanmaktadır.” (Cohen, 2008: 141)
Woods kurumsal yapısı çerçevesinde göreceli olarak istikrarlı seyreden uluslararası kur, ticaret ve finans sistemleri siyaset yapıcılar tarafından teknokratik yönetim alanı olarak değerlendirilmiş, bu açıdan ‘yüksek siyaset’ gündemine dahil edilmemiştir. 1970’lerle birlikte ise uluslararası ekonomide yaşanan oyun değiştirici kırılmalar, ‘uluslararası ekonomik ilişkilerin siyasallaşmasını’ beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu eksende öncü makalelerden birini Susan Strange yazmıştır. 1970 tarihli “Uluslararası Ekonomi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler: Bir Karşılıklı İhmal Vakası” başlıklı çalışmasında Strange, uluslararası ekonomik ve siyasi sistemin kapsamlı bir dönüşümden geçtiğini öne sürmüş, uluslararası ilişkiler uzmanlarının 2
ekonomik dinamikleri yeterince dikkate almadığını, ekonomistlerin ise uluslararası ekonominin adeta siyasetten arındırılmış bir ortamda faaliyet gösterdiğini varsayarak en baştan hatalı davrandığının altını çizmiştir. Bu karşılıklı ihmalin sosyal bilimlerin ufkunu daralttığı tespitinden hareketle Strange, ekonomi ve siyasetin zararlı ayrılığını sonlandırmak gerektiğini vurgulamıştır (Strange, 1970). 1970’ler boyunca yaşanan politik ekonomi krizleri sadece Strange’i haklı çıkarmakla kalmamış, günümüz UPE anlayışının kurucu metinlerinin hızlı bir şekilde üretilmesine olanak sağlamıştır. Bu eksende, 1972 yılında Keohane ve Nye, Ulus-‐ötesi İlişkiler ve Dünya Siyaseti isimli çalışmalarında uluslararası siyasetin realist paradigmanın dar kalıplarıyla anlaşılamayacağına vurgu yaparak ulus-‐ötesi ilişkiler Kutu C14 3: Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi Teorileri (transnational relations) kavramını yeni bir analitik REALİZM LİBERALİZM MARKSİZM çerçeve olarak önermişlerdir. Söz konusu yaklaşımı zaman Tarihsel köken 15. yüzyıl 19. yüzyıl 19. yüzyıl içinde daha da geliştiren Önde gelen Hamilton, List, Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Lenin, Keohane ve Nye, ‘karmaşık kuramcıları Krasner, G
ilpin, Kant, Hayek, Frank, C
ox karşılıklı bağımlılık’ kavramını Keohane ulus-‐ötesi ilişkilerin kurucu unsuru olarak ortaya Türleri Merkantilizm, Serbest ticaret, Eleştirel teori, atmışlardır. Buna göre, hızla realizm karşılıklı bağımlılık ekolü, bağımlılık dünya sistemleri genişleyen ticaret, finans ve iletişim ağları ile bu ağların Analiz düzeyi Devlet-‐
Birey-‐merkezli Yapı-‐merkezli hayat bulmasına imkan merkezli tanıyan uluslararası örgütler (bilardo topu ve çok-‐uluslu şirketler gibi modeli) devlet-‐dışı aktörler, dünya Analiz birimi Devlet Firmalar, Sınıf, küresel siyasetinin karmaşık karşılıklı devletler, kapitalizm bağımlılık içerisinde hareket uluslararası ettiği bir zemin doğurmuştur. örgütler Karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılık ‘Devlet’ Homojen Çoğulcu platform Hâkim sınıfların üç noktaya odaklanmaktadır. tasavvuru otonom aktör temsilcisi Bu noktalar, devletler ve devlet-‐dışı aktörler arasında Davranışsal Rasyonel bir Rasyonel bir Toplum-‐içinde ve çoklu-‐diyalog kanallarının dinamikler aktör olarak aktör olarak toplumlar-‐
devlet birey arasında sömürü oluşması, farklı temalar arasında önem açısından ‘Sistem’ Anarşik, İş birlikçi, Hiyerarşi, hiyerarşi farkının ortadan tasavvuru çatışmacı karşılıklı çatışmacı kalkması (yani ‘yüksek siyaset’ bağımlılık kavramının anlamını Küresel Sıfır toplamlı Pozitif toplamlı Sıfır toplamlı yitirmesi) ve askeri gücün ekonomi oyun oyun oyun eskiye nispetle daha az önemli hale gelmesidir. Uluslararası Çok önemli Küresel iş birliği Merkez ülkelerin örgütler değil için oldukça çıkarları için Keohane ve Nye’ın önemli 3
önemli O’Brien ve W illiams, 2004: 26’dan değiştirilerek alınmıştır. vurguladığı üzere, 1970’lerle birlikte, güvenlik-‐merkezli ve ulus-‐devlet eksenli realist uluslararası siyaset yaklaşımlarının yeni ortaya çıkmakta olan karmaşık karşılıklı bağımlılığı yeterince analiz edememesi, UPE’nin ekonomi-‐siyaset etkileşimini sistematik açıdan inceleyen bir disiplin olarak Amerikan akademyasında popülerlik kazanmasını beraberinde getirmiştir (Cohen, 2008: 28-‐31). UPE, belli bir teorik ve metodolojik yaklaşımın değil, yukarıda aktarıldığı üzere temel amacı uluslararası düzende güç ve refahın birbirini nasıl şekillendirdiğini anlamak olan bir disiplinin adıdır. Kökenleri çok eskiye dayanan UPE’nin eklektik ve kapsayıcı yapısı değişik teorik ve metodolojik yaklaşımların UPE çatısı altında toplanması sonucunu doğurmuştur (Kutu C14 1). Bu nedenle, ‘UPE’ye teorik yaklaşımlar’ şeklinde özetlenebilecek bir sınıflandırma oldukça zordur. Yine de analitik kolaylık sağlaması ve disipline yeni giriş yapanlar açısından Robert Gilpin’in 1987 tarihinde yayınlanan ve politik ekonomi alanında bir klasik haline gelen Uluslararası İlişkilerin Politik Ekonomisi isimli kitabında önerdiği sınıflandırma faydalı olabilir: liberalizm, ulusalcılık ve Marksizm. Farklı araştırmacılar tarafından değişik isimler tercih edilse de bu üç temel yaklaşım halen daha geçerliliğini korumaktadır (O’Brien ve Williams, 2004). Liberalizm genellikle aynı kalmakla birlikte, ulusalcılık yerine değişik çalışmalarda ‘merkantilizm,’ ‘realizm,’ ve ‘ekonomik milliyetçilik’ kullanılmakta, Marksist yaklaşımlar ise ‘radikal teori,’ ‘eleştirel yaklaşım,’ ‘bağımlılık okulu’ ve ‘dünya sistemleri kuramı’ gibi farklı başlıklara ayrılmaktadır. Kitabın diğer bölümlerinde detaylı ele alındığı ve her bir yaklaşımın burada kısaca incelenemeyecek kadar derin bir entelektüel geçmişi olduğu göz önünde bulundurularak (Tayfur, 2011) bu bölümde bu yaklaşımlar detaylarıyla tartışılmayacaktır (C14 3’teki kutu üç temel yaklaşımın başlıca UPE kavramları hakkındaki görüşlerini özetlemektir). Bu teorik tartışmalar çerçevesinde, Soğuk Savaş dönemi boyunca, uluslararası ticaret, uluslararası finans, çok-‐uluslu şirketler, Kuzey-‐Güney ülkeleri arasındaki gelişmişlik farkının neden ve sonuçları, Amerikan hegemonyasının önemi ve akıbeti gibi konular politik ekonomi disiplininin temel uğraş alanlarını oluşturmuştur. Bu konulara yaklaşım tarzı açısından ekoller arasında zamanla büyük farklılıklar oluşsa da (Kutu C14 2) her ekolü meşgul eden ortak ‘büyük sorular’ bağımsız bir UPE disiplininin oluşmasını mümkün kılmıştır. KÜRESELLEŞME, ÇOK-‐KUTUPLULUK VE YENİ BÜYÜK SORULAR Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesiyle birlikte UPE’nin çerçevesi ve ilgilendiği ’büyük sorular‘ da kapsamlı bir değişim geçirmiştir. 1990’lar boyunca yaşanan hızlı küreselleşme dalgası ve Sovyetler Birliği’nin bakiyesi ülkelerin sancılı bir şekilde kapitalizme eklemlenmesi yeni sorunsalları beraberinde getirmiştir. Her şeyden önce, Sovyetler Birliği’nin temsil ettiği politik ekonomi modeli ve dünya tasavvurunun iflas etmesi, ABD’nin uluslararası sistemde tek hegemonik güç olarak yükselmesine sebep olmuştur. Ancak 2000’li yıllarla birlikte tek-‐kutuplu uluslararası sistemin yerini hızlı bir şekilde çok-‐kutupluluk tartışmasına bıraktığı yeni bir dönem başlamıştır. Bu eksende UPE yazınında en başından beri önemini koruyan tartışmalara ek olarak ana hatlarıyla iki ’yeni büyük soru‘ ve onların alt-‐soruları öne çıkmaktadır. Bu sorular, küresel güç kayması ve küreselleşme ve demokratikleşme arasındaki ilişkidir. 4
Günümüz UPE disiplininin ilk büyük sorusu, küresel sistemde yaşanmakta olan güç Kutu C14 4: Hegemonyasız Bir Dünyada İş Birliği Mümkün mü? kaymasının mahiyeti ve boyutlarına ilişkindir. 2000’li Günümüz UPE disiplininin en önemli konularından birisi hegemonya yıllarla birlikte gelişmekte olan tartışmasıdır. Batılı güçlerin, yükselmekte olan Batı-‐dışı aktörlere karşı ülkelerin hızla küresel görece güç gerilemesine girdiği bir dönüşüm süreci yaşanmaktadır. Söz ekonomiye dahil olması, diğer konusu dönüşümün küresel yönetişimin politik ekonomisi açısından iki önemli etkisi bulunmaktadır. Birinci sorun, çok-‐kutuplu bir dünyada taraftan 2008-‐2009 küresel küresel yönetişimin ve küresel ekonominin istikrarının nasıl ekonomik kriziyle birlikte sağlanacağıdır. Hegemonik İstikrar Kuramı perspektifine göre, küresel Batı’nın derin bir bunalıma ekonomik sistemin belirli kurum, kural ve normlar çerçevesinde girmesi, hegemonik dönüşüm istikrarlı işleyebilmesi ve gerektiğinde ekonomik krizlere etkin bir tartışmalarını yeniden şekilde müdahale edilebilmesi için -‐Kindleberger’in (1973) tabiriyle-‐ sistemde “bir hegemonun ve yalnızca bir hegemonun” bulunması alevlendirmiştir (Kutu C14 4). gerekir. Bu nedenle Hegemonik İstikrar Kuramı teorisyenleri küresel Bu eksende ABD yönetişimin çok-‐kutuplu dünyada zorlu bir döneme gireceğini hegemonyasının sonbaharını öngörmektedirler. yaşadığı, orta-‐vadede Çin’in yeni hegemonik güç olarak Robert Keohane gibi yeni-‐kurumsalcı teorisyenlere göre ise anarşik bir uluslararası sistemde hegemonya-‐sonrası dönemde de iş birliği uluslararası politik ekonominin yapmak mümkündür. Keohane, Hegemonyanın Ardından isimli temel aktörü haline gelebileceği kitabında hegemonik bir aktörün yokluğunda dahi devletlerin iddiaları popülerlik kazanmıştır. uluslararası örgütler yoluyla küresel iş birliğini ve yönetişimi Çin, 1970’lerde başlayan sağlayabileceğini iddia etmiştir. Buna göre uluslararası örgütler, (a) işlem maliyetlerini azaltarak, (b) bilgi asimetrilerini gidererek, (c) liberalleştirme politikalarına devletlerin taahhütlerinin inanılırlığını arttırarak hegemonyanın paralel olarak son otuz yılda yokluğunda dahi etkin küresel yönetişimi mümkün hale getirmektedir. ortalama yüzde 10’luk bir Bu çerçeveden çok-‐kutuplu dünya düzeninde küresel yönetişim büyüme oranıyla küresel sorunsalına yaklaşan analistler, BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkelerinin de hasıladaki payını 2012’de üçe dahil olduğu bir yönetişim sisteminin kurulabileceğini iddia etmektedirler. Uluslararası ekonomi son 30 yılda gittikçe artan oranda katlayarak yüzde 15’e küreselleşmekle birlikte, uluslararası yönetişim mekanizmalarında çıkarmıştır. Mevcut trendin yükselmekte olan aktörlerin söz hakkını yeterince dikkate alan devam etmesi durumunda ise demokratik kurumsal dönüşüm henüz gerçekleşmemiştir. IMF tahminlerine göre ABD’yi 2016 yılında yakalayarak dünyanın en büyük ekonomisi olması öngörülmektedir. Bu noktada zor bir soru karşımıza çıkmaktadır: Çin’in ABD’yi ekonomik büyüklük olarak geride bırakması yeni hegemon olacağı anlamına gelir mi? Ayrıca her hegemonik düzenin belli değer yargılarını önceleyen normatif bir boyutu olduğu dikkate alınırsa, alternatif bir dünya düzeninin temel parametreleri neler olabilir? Bu önemli UPE sorusuna Strange’in Devletler ve Piyasalar isimli kitabında geliştirdiği ‘yapısal güç’ kavramsallaştırmasıyla yaklaşmak aydınlatıcı olabilir. Strange, ’güç' kavramını ikiye ayırmaktadır: ilişkisel güç ve yapısal güç. İlişkisel güç, “bir aktörün diğer bir aktörü kendi çıkarları çerçevesinde yönlendirebilme kapasitesi” olarak tanımlanabilir. Yapısal güç ise aktörlerin içerisinde hareket ettikleri uluslararası yapının kurum, kural ve mekanizmalarını tesis etme ve yönetme kapasitesidir. Strange, yapısal gücün dört temel öğesini güvenlik, üretim, finans ve bilgi yapıları olarak tanımlamıştır. Buna göre hegemonik aktör, söz konusu dört temel güç yapısını ‘zor’ ve ‘rıza’ yoluyla kontrol edebildiği ölçüde hegemonyasını sürdürebilmektedir (Kutu C14 5). ABD hegemonyasının ne 5
derecede gerilediğini, Çin’in ise ‘yeni hegemon’ olarak potansiyel ve limitlerini Strange’in çizdiği çerçevede analiz etmek bu çalışmanın sınırlarını aşmakla birlikte UPE öğrencileri açısından iyi bir başlangıç noktası oluşturabilir. Günümüz UPE disiplininin ikinci büyük sorusu, çok-‐kutupluluk tartışmasına paralel olarak, Kutu C14 5: Hegemonya Nedir? küresel yönetişim ve küreselleşme-‐
UPE disiplininin temel demokratikleşme ilişkisidir. Bu tartışma, Hegemonya, kavramlarından birisidir. Hegemonya, ‘küreselleşmenin demokratikleşmesi’ ve uluslararası politik ekonomi sistemini yapısal ‘demokrasinin küreselleşmesi’ şeklinde olarak şekillendirmeye ve idare etmeye muktedir lideri tanımlamak için kullanılır. kavramsallaştırılabilecek iki temel sütundan Eleştirel ekolün önemli temsilcilerinden İtalyan oluşmaktadır. Birinci boyut, uluslararaları siyaset bilimci Antonio Gramsci hegemonyanın sistemdeki güç kaymasının devletler-‐arası ilişkilere “’zor” ‘ (coercion) ve “’rıza” ‘ (consent) olmak üzere iki temel boyutu olduğunu doğrudan yansıması mahiyetindedir. vurgulamaktadır. Buna göre hegemonik güçler, Küreselleşmenin bir ürünü olarak Batı-‐dışı aktörler liderliğini pekiştirmek için gerektiğinde “’zor”,’ gerektiğinde ise “’rıza” ‘ üretmek durumundadır. -‐başta Brezilya, Rusya, Hindistan, Çin ve Güney “’Zor” hegemonik güç açısından caydırıcılık, Afrika (BRICS)-‐ olmak üzere küresel ekonomide “’rıza” ise meşruiyet üretir. Bu iki unsuru gittikçe artan oranda etkili haline gelmişlerdir. gerektiği şekilde üretemeyen hegemonik aktörlerin zaman içerisinde düşüşe geçmesi ve BRIC grubuna ek olarak yükselişe geçen yakın-‐
yerini yeni hegemonik güce bırakması beklenir. BRIC-‐S ülkeleri (Türkiye, Meksika, Endonezya, Bu sistemik dönüşüme, UPE literatüründe Güney Kore) de önemli bölgesel aktörlere hegemonik döngü denilmektedir. (Morton, 2007)
dönüşmüş durumdadırlar. Ancak bu ülkeler, küresel politik ekonominin yönetişiminde yeterince söz sahibi değildirler. Örneğin, 2. Dünya Savaşı’nın hemen ertesinde ABD’nin jeo-‐ekonomik ve jeopolitik tahayyülünün bir ürünü olarak kurulan IMF, Dünya Bankası, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü gibi uluslararası kuruluşlar halen daha Batılı aktörlerin karar alma süreçlerinde hakim konumlarını sürdürdükleri yapılanmalardır. Oysa bu örgütlerin etkin çalışabilmek için ihtiyaç duydukları meşruiyeti üretebilmeleri ancak gelişmekte olan ülkelerin de karar alma süreçlerine aktif olarak katılabilmeleri ile mümkün olacaktır. Dolayısıyla, söz konusu dönüşümün, yani küreselleşmenin demokratikleşmesinin, nasıl ve hangi koşullarda gerçekleşebileceği ya da bu dönüşümün gerçekleşmemesi durumunda küresel yönetişimin geleceğinin ne olacağı önemli bir tartışma sorusu haline gelmiştir. Küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme diyalektiğinin ikinci boyutunu ise ‘demokrasinin küreselleşmesi’ tartışmaları oluşturmaktadır. Demokrasinin küreselleşmesi, sosyal bilim disiplinlerini yatay kesen ve ortay hattını politik ekonominin oluşturduğu girift bir tartışmadır. Bu eksende iki zıt hareketin günümüz tartışmalarının odak noktası haline geldiği görülmektedir. Bir taraftan, Streeck’in (2013) vurguladığı gibi neoliberal küreselleşmenin son otuz yılda yarattığı gelir adaletsizliği, ekonomik krizler ve ‘daimi kemer sıkma’ odaklı hakim ekonomik paradigma, gelişmiş Batı demokrasilerinde demokratik norm ve değerlerin aşınması riskini ortaya çıkarmıştır. Gelişmiş ülke vatandaşları, gittikçe artan oranda siyaset alanının daraldığını, iktidarların değişmesinin mevcut politika tercihlerini etkilemeyeceğini düşünmeye başlamıştır. Batı demokrasilerinde halkların de-‐politizasyon sürecine girmeleri, mevcut ekonomik paradigmaların siyasi yansımaları hakkında Batı ülkeleri açısından yeni sorunları gündeme getirmiştir. Zira kitlesel işsizlik, zayıf ekonomik büyüme performansı, gerileyen sosyal devlet anlayışı, artan gelir adaletsizliği ve mevcut siyaset kurumlarının bu sorunları çözmekteki başarısızlığı Avrupa demokrasilerini oldukça zorlamaktadır (Wade, 2013). 2007-‐2008 ekonomik kriziyle ‘demokrasi açığı’ eleştirilerinin kuvvetlenmesi, buna paralel olarak ırkçılık ve yabancı 6
düşmanlığının kıta içinde ciddi bir tehdide dönüşmesi Batı tipi politik ekonomi modellerinin sürdürülebilirliğine ilişkin yeni soru işaretleri oluşturmaktadır. Bütün bunların yanında, ‘stratejik kapitalizm’ olarak adlandırılan heteredoks modelleriyle Çin ve Rusya gibi aktörlerin krizden güçlenerek çıkması, otoriter kalkınma stratejilerinin gittikçe artan oranda popülerlik kazanmasına neden olmuştur. Ancak BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkeleri arasında bu konuda bir türdeşlikten bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Zira, Çin ve Rusya gibi otoriter rejimlerin yanında, Hindistan, Brezilya, Türkiye gibi daha demokratik rejimlerin varlığı, ‘demokrasinin küreselleşmesi’ tartışmalarının açık uçlu doğasını ortaya koymaktadır. Küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme tartışması, aynı zamanda günümüz UPE disiplini ile Karşılaştırmalı Politik Ekonomi (KPE) disiplini arasındaki sınırların da giderek muğlaklaşmasına neden olmuştur. KPE, ülkelerin iç siyasi yapılarının ekonomi politikası tercihlerini ve ekonomik performanslarını nasıl etkilediğini mukayeseli açıdan anlamayı amaçlayan disiplindir. Küreselleşme süreçleri ile birlikte ülkelerin iç siyasi ve ekonomik yapılarının/rejimlerinin uluslararası etkilere daha açık hale gelmesi, UPE disiplinini, KPE’nin temel sorularından bağımsız ele almayı pratikte imkansız hale getirmiştir. Bu eksende son dönemdeki en önemli tartışmalardan birini ‘kapitalizmin türleri’ tartışması oluşturmaktadır. Hall ve Soskice 2001 yılında yayınlanan Kapitalizmin Türleri isimli kitaplarında gelişmiş Batı ekonomilerini liberal piyasa ekonomileri (liberal market economies) ve koordineli piyasa ekonomileri (coordinated market economies) olmak üzere ikiye ayırmıştır. Liberal piyasa ekonomileri, firmaların serbest piyasa koşulları içerisinde rekabet ettikleri, finansal piyasaların mümkün olduğunca az denetlendiği Anglosakson modelini simgelemektedir. Koordineli piyasa ekonomileri ise kapitalizmin yine temel çerçeveyi oluşturduğu ancak firmaların çoğu kez piyasa-‐dışı dinamikleri de dikkate aldıkları, finansal sistemin daha sıkı denetlendiği hiyerarşik kıta Avrupası modeline işaret etmektedir. ‘Kapitalizmin türleri’ tartışmasına göre her model kendi kurumsal önceliklerine göre küreselleşme süreçlerine entegre olmaktadır. Hall ve Soskice’in başlattığı tartışma, özelleştirme, serbest ticaret, finansal liberalleşme ve sanayi politikaları gibi alanlarda tek bir politika reçetesinin olamayacağını teyit etmesi açısından UPE disiplinine önemli bir katkı olarak değerlendirilebilir. Ancak ‘kapitalizmin türleri' tartışması, devletlerin ekonomide oynadığı merkezi rolü bilinçli bir şekilde analitik çerçevesinin dışında bıraktığı ve ülke-‐içi kurumsal mekanizmalara odaklandığı için küresel ekonomik kalkınmanın dinamiklerini açıklayamamaktadır. Ayrıca, Batılı sanayileşmiş ülkelerin kurumsal dinamikleri üzerine yoğunlaşmış olan söz konusu tartışma, BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkelerindeki ekonomik modeller konusunda tamamen sessiz kalmaktadır (Nölke ve Claar, 2013: 33). ‘Güneydeki kapitalizm türleri’ olarak isimlendirilebilecek ve devletin kalkınmacı rolünü vurgulayan ‘stratejik kapitalizm’ tartışması günümüz politik ekonomi disiplinindeki önemini giderek arttırmaktadır. İlgili yazın, gelişmekte olan ülkelerde devletin, donanımlı ve özerk bürokrasi, devlet-‐iş dünyası iş birliği, akıllı ticaret politikaları, kademeli finansal serbestleşme ve kapsamlı sanayi stratejileriyle kalkınma süreçlerini hızlandırabileceğini ortaya koymuştur. Örneğin Ha-‐joon Chang (2003), Kalkınma Reçetelerinin Gerçek Yüzü isimli kitabında esasında bugünün gelişmiş ülkelerinin de kalkınma süreçlerinde benzer politikalar uyguladığını ikna edici bir şekilde ortaya koymuştur. Kalkınmacı devlet yazını, devletin piyasa dinamiklerinden el çekmesi gerektiğini vurgulayan neoliberal kalkınma tezlerine ciddi bir meydan okuma oluşturmaktadır. Bu nedenle, UPE disiplini ile KPE disiplini arasında inşa edilecek teorik ve metodolojik köprüler, günümüz politik ekonomisinin dinamiklerini daha iyi anlayabilmek için iyi bir fırsat oluşturabilir. 7
TÜRKİYE’NİN EKONOMİ POLİTİĞİ Türkiye’nin ekonomi politiği üzerine pek çok önemli çalışma kaleme alınmış olmakla birlikte (Öniş, 1998, 2009; Keyman ve Öniş, 2007; Öniş ve Şenses, 2009; Boratav, 2012; Ünay, 2013) Türkiye’de ‘politik ekonomi çalışmaları tarihi’ üzerine henüz kapsamlı bir çalışma yapılmış değildir. Bu başlıkta, günümüz UPE disiplininin ‘büyük soruları’ ekseninde Türkiye’nin karşılaştırmalı ekonomi politiği ana hatlarıyla incelenecektir. Bu eksende, uluslararası ilişkiler ve dış politika açısından iki güncel tartışmanın altı çizilecektir. Birinci tartışma, Türkiye’nin ekonomik büyümesinin sürdürülebilirliğine ilişkindir. Son on yıllık başarılı bir dönüşümün ardından Türkiye orta gelir tuzağına yaklaşmış bulunmaktadır (Kutu C14 6). Bu eksende büyümenin sürdürülebilir kılınması ve Türkiye’nin yüksek gelirli ülkeler grubuna dahil olabilmesi için kurumlarını kapsayıcı bir şekilde dönüştürebilmesi, ileri teknolojiyi önceleyen sanayi politikalarını hayata geçirebilmesi ve insan sermayesini yüksek katma değer üreten bir ölçeğe taşıyabilmesi gerekmektedir (Öniş ve Kutlay, 2013). Çünkü Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumunda yapısal iyileşme ve dış politika performansının sürdürülebilirliği, söz konusu ekonomik ve siyasi kurumsal dönüşümün gerçekleştirilebilmesiyle yakından ilgilidir. Aynı şekilde ‘ticaret devleti’ vasfına sahip bir bölgesel güce dönüşebilmesi de söz konusu değişkenlere bağlı olarak şekillenecektir (Kirişci, 2009; Kutlay, 2012). Kutu C14 6: Orta Gelir Tuzağı Bir ekonominin belirli bir kişi başına gelir düzeyine ulaştıktan sonra durağanlaşmasına ve daha üst aşamalara ulaşamaması durumuna orta gelir tuzağı denir. Yani orta gelir düzeyindeki bir ülkenin kişi başına düşen GSYH’si daha yüksek gelir seviyelerine doğru yükselmek yerine sürekli iniş-‐çıkış halinde olduğunda, söz konusu ülkenin orta gelir tuzağına düşmüş olduğu kabul edilir. Farklı tanımları ve alt kategorileri olmakla birlikte, Dünya Bankası tanımına göre orta gelir tuzağı kabaca 12.000 dolar seviyesine tekabül etmektedir. Bu eşiğe yaklaşan ülkelerin üst gelir düzeyine ulaşabilmeleri için yüksek teknoloji üretimine önem vermesi, yetişmiş insan kapasitesini arttırması ve kurumlarını kapsayıcı bir yapıya kavuşturabilmesi gerekmektedir. İkinci tartışma ise Türkiye’nin küresel ölçekte yaşanan küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme tartışmalarında hangi eksende yer alacağı ile ilgilidir (Öniş, 2013). İlgili bölümde değinildiği gibi BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkeleri arasında yaşanan yol ayrımı Türkiye’yi yakından ilgilendirmektedir. Halihazırda ‘seçimsel demokrasi’ ya da ‘liberal olmayan demokrasi’ olarak adlandırılan bir rejime sahip olan Türkiye’nin sürdürülebilir politik ekonomi performansı açısından ‘derinlikli demokrasi’ seviyesine ulaşabilmesi gerekli bir şarta dönüşmüş durumdadır (Öniş, 2012; Öniş, 2013). Kapsayıcı ekonomik ve siyasi kurumların inşa edilebilmesi, derinlikli demokrasinin sebebi ve sonucudur. Kurumsal inşa süreçlerinin mahiyeti ve sonuçları açısından ise sadece iç dinamikler değil, uluslararası ittifaklar da belirleyici olacaktır. Bu nedenle, Türkiye’nin dış politikasındaki ittifak sistemlerini nasıl organize edeceği, hem kalkınma performansını hem de uluslararası konumunu etkileyecektir. Ayrıca, Türkiye’nin küresel yönetişim platformlarında ve dış politika stratejilerinde akıllı koalisyonlar yoluyla demokrasinin küreselleşmesine sağlayacağı katkı ihmal edilemeyecek boyuttadır. Ana akım UPE disiplininin bugüne kadar gelişmiş ülkeleri merkeze alan bir teorik ve metodolojik hassasiyetle geliştirildiği dikkate alındığında, küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme-‐ekonomik kalkınma eksenli tartışmalar yeni yükselen güçlerin öncelikleri, değer yargıları ve dünyayı nasıl algıladıklarına yeterince odaklanmamaktadır (Blyth, 2009). Bu duruma Türkiye de bir istisna teşkil etmemektedir. 8
Dolayısıyla sadece pratikte değil, BRICS ve yakın-‐BRICS ülkelerinde UPE disiplininin teorik açıdan da yeni inşacılara ihtiyacı bulunmaktadır. Bu noktada, Türkiye’de politik ekonomi disiplininin diğer sosyal bilimler disiplinleriyle etkileşimini arttırması gerektiğini vurgulamak yerinde olacaktır. Zira politik ekonomi, bir kısmı kaynakçada belirtilen kimi önemli çalışmalar yapılmış olmakla birlikte, Türk uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin halen daha kayıp halkası konumundadır. Oysa, Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu ve Türk dış politikasının imkan ve kısıtları, küresel ekonomiye nasıl eklemlendiği ile doğrudan ilişkilidir. Türkiye’yi eşi benzeri olmayan bir ülke olarak inceleyen tekil incelemeler yerine küresel ve bölgesel dönüşümlerin bir parçası olarak ele alan karşılaştırmalı politik ekonomi analizlerinin çoğalması hem Türkiye’deki uluslararası ilişkiler disiplini hem de Türk dış politikası çalışmaları açısından özgün çalışmaların ortaya çıkmasına fırsat tanıyabilir. SORULAR 1.
UPE hangi özellikleri nedeniyle disiplinler-‐arasıdır? 2.
UPE’nin temel sorusu nedir? Bu soru neden önemlidir? 3.
‘Sınır mantığı’ ile ‘sermaye mantığı’ arasındaki ilişkinin temel dinamikleri nelerdir? 4.
“UPE bir disiplin olarak fikirlerden değil, olaylardan doğmuştur” önermesinde kastedilen ‘olaylar’ nelere işaret etmektedir? 5.
UPE literatüründe hegemonyanın tanımı ve kavramsallaştırılması üzerine temel tartışmalar hangileridir? 6.
Hegemonik bir aktörün yokluğunda küresel iş birliği/yönetişim mümkün müdür? Tartışınız. 7.
Günümüz UPE literatüründeki büyük sorular nelerdir? 8.
Çok-‐kutupluluk hangi açılardan UPE için önemli bir tartışma maddesidir? 9.
Küreselleşme-‐demokratikleşme ilişkisini tartışınız? 10.
Türkiye’nin temel politik ekonomi sorunları nelerdir? 11.
Türkiye’deki uluslararası ilişkiler ve dış politika analizleri UPE’nin kavramsal çerçevesinden daha fazla yararlanmalı mıdır? Niçin? EK OKUMA ÖNERİLERİ Giovanni Arrighi, Uzun Yirminci Yüzyıl: Para, Güç ve Çağımızın Kökenleri, Çeviren: Recep Boztemur, İmge Yayınları, 2000 Robert Gilpin, Uluslararası İlişkilerin Ekonomi Politiği, Kripto Basın Yayın, 2012 Ha-‐Joon Chang, Kalkınma Reçetelerinin Gerçek Yüzü, İletişim Yayınları, 2003 Ziya Öniş ve Fikret Şenses, “Küresel Dinamikler, Ülkeiçi Koalisyonlar ve Reaktif Devlet: Türkiye’nin Savaş Sonrası Kalkınmasında Önemli Politika Dönüşümleri,” içinde Fikret Şenses (der.), Neoliberal Küreselleşme ve Kalkınma, İletişim Yayınları, 2009, s. 705-‐743. Fatih Tayfur, “Devletler ve Piyasalar,” İçinde Atila Eralp (der.), Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar, İletişim Yayınları, 6. Baskı, 2011, s. 183-‐216. Sadık Ünay, Kalkınmacı Modernlik: Küresel Ekonomi Politik ve Türkiye, Küre Yayınları, 2013. 9
KAYNAKÇA Arrighi, Giovanni (2005), “Hegemony Unravelling-‐I”, New Left Review, 32, pp. 23-‐80. Balaam, David ve Veseth, Michael (1996), Introduction to International Political Economy, New Jersey: Prentice-‐Hall. Blyth, Mark (ed.) (2009), Routledge Handbook on International Political Economy: IPE as a Global Conversation, Routledge. Boratav, Korkut (2012), Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, İmge Yayınları. Cohen, Benjamin (2008), International Political Economy: An Intellectual History, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Gilpin, Robert (1975), U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation, New York: Basic Books. Gilpin, Robert (1987), The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Hall, Peter and Soskice, David (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford University Press. Keohane, Robert (1984), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert and Nye, Joseph (eds.) (1972), Transnational Relations and World Politics, Harvard University Press. Keyman, Fuat ve Öniş, Ziya (2007), Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations, İstanbul Bilgi University Press. Kirişci, Kemal (2009), “Transformation of Turkish Foreign Policy: The Rise of the Trading State”, New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 40, 2009, pp. 29–57. Kutlay, Mustafa (2012), “Yeni Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politiği: Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt. 9, No. 35, s. 101-‐127. Morton, David Adam (2007), Unraveling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy, Pluto Press. Nölke, Andreas ve Claar, Simone (2013), “Varieties of Capitalism in Emerging Economies”, Transformation, No. 81/82, pp. 33-‐54. O’Brien, Robert ve Williams, M. (2004), Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics, Palgrave Macmillan. Öniş, Ziya (1998), State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective, Boğaziçi University Press. Öniş, Ziya (2012), “The Triumph of Conservative Globalism: The Political Economy of the AKP Era”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 135-‐152. Öniş, Ziya ve Kutlay, Mustafa (2013), “Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The Political Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICs”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 8, pp. 1409-‐
1426. Öniş, Ziya ve Şenses, Fikret (2009) “Küresel Dinamikler, Ülkeiçi Koalisyonlar ve Reaktif Devlet: Türkiye’nin Savaş Sonrası Kalkınmasında Önemli Politika Dönüşümleri,” içinde Fikret Şenses, ed., Neoliberal Küreselleşme ve Kalkınma, İletişim Yayınları. 10
Strange, Susan (1970), “International Economics and International Relations: A Case of Mutual Neglect”, International Affairs, 46, 2, pp. 304-‐315. Strange, Susan (1988), States and Markets, Pinter Publishers. Ünay, Sadık (2013), Kalkınmacı Modernlik: Küresel Ekonomi Politik ve Türkiye, Küre Yayınları. Wade, Robert (2013), “How High Inequality Plus Neoliberal Governance Weakens Democracy”, Challenge, Vol. 56, No. 6, pp. 5-‐37. Watson, Mathew (2005), Foundations of International Political Economy, Palgrave Macmillan. 11

The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of

Transkript

Benzer belgeler

GRAMMAR SUBJECTS VOCABULARY Body Parts